

*Disputatio de lamiis seu
strigibus, in qua de earum
viribus perspicue disputatur*

*[A Disputation on Lamiae, or Witches, in Which Their Powers Are
Clearly Debated]*

(1578)

by Thomas Erastus (Thomas Lieber, 1524–1583), professor of
medicine at Heidelberg

Translation by Scott Weisman



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Translator Version 2

Upright reason dictates that the recipients of the good, of whatever type and level of beneficence it may be, must show gratitude and blessing to the beneficent person in every way possible, commensurate with the value of the beneficence. And one who has benefited all the people of the world — for example, one who invented a new instrument for the good of the world, or a good book — it is fitting for every discerning person, out of the obligation of love of fellow beings, to at least purchase it, so that the man will profit and his heart will be encouraged thereby to invent yet more good instruments in the world. And similarly, all other wise-hearted people will likewise strive and exert themselves to invent good things and instruments needed for the repair of the world and its perfection.

And therefore, whoever says: "What do I need this new instrument for?" — he does not act well towards the world. For if not for the man who invented it, where would you be? And what would your city do? And more than this, if the man did not exert himself, what would the world do?

— R. Pinchas Eliyahu Hurwitz, *Sefer HaBris HaShalem* (1797)

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A NOTE ON THE WORK

A Heidelberg physician's dialogue on what witches can and cannot actually do. Erastus grants the premise that witches exist, have made a pact with the devil, and deserve death — and then spends the book dismantling, on medical and physical grounds, nearly every marvel attributed to them. Transformation into wolves, bodily flight to the sabbath, the raising of storms, intercourse with demons in assumed bodies: these he explains as demonic illusion, melancholic delusion, or the ordinary action of poisons on the imagination. His speaker Furnius presses the popular and legal case; Erastus answers as a doctor. The result is one of the sharpest sixteenth-century analyses of the difference between what a demon can do and what nature permits — and it sits, pointedly, in the same volume as the inquisitors it contradicts.

This translation is made from the 1581 composite volume printed at Frankfurt by Nikolaus Basse: the volume title page, the disputation as printed at pp. 500–604, and the colophon leaf. The anonymous *De veneficio et veneficis*, a gathering of scriptural and patristic testimonia that immediately precedes the disputation in the volume (pp. 495–499), is not Erastus's work and is not included. Two other treatises from the same volume, Nicolas Jacquier's *Flagellum haereticorum fascinatorum* and Martín de Arles's *Tractatus de superstitionibus*, are translated separately. Page references follow the volume's printed pagination, pp. 500–604.

A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION PROCESS

This translation was produced with the translation-pipeline. See the linked repository for details on the process.

This edition has been checked at citation grade. A stratified sample of it was independently re-transcribed from the original page by readers given no sight of the translation, and the two readings were then reconciled letter by letter. Every disagreement in the layer a citing reader depends on — figures, names, headings, and whether a passage is present at all — was settled against the page before publication, and none was left open.

What that does and does not mean. It is a claim about a sample, not about every line. A passage the sample did not reach is neither confirmed nor denied, and silence in an independent reading is not agreement. Where the page itself will not settle a reading, this edition withdraws rather than guesses: a bracketed pair marks a genuine ambiguity the original cannot decide, and a question mark a character that could not be read. Those marks are deliberate refusals, and they are worth more than the confident readings they replace.

A note on the references. A scriptural or bibliographic reference given in brackets or parentheses is, in most cases, an **editorial identification of an allusion rather than a citation printed in the source**. Books of this kind quote and weave scripture constantly without naming it, and the identification is supplied here as a convenience to the reader. Where the source does print a reference of its own, it is given as printed. **An identified allusion is not**

evidence that the author cited that passage — look at the original before resting an argument on one.

This text is the product of a highly refined automated translation process. It has undergone only cursory human review and should not be treated as an authoritative or scholarly rendering. It is offered solely as a reference and reading aid — a way to make an otherwise inaccessible work approachable — and any passage of real consequence should be checked against the original source.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Translated with the assistance of Claude. The translator thanks the Anthropic team for making this work possible.

[Volume title page of the 1581 composite volume]

[Manuscript inscription, head of page: *Benedictinorum Anglorum Parisiis 1620* — "(Property) of the English Benedictines at Paris, 1620."]

THE SCOURGE OF HERETICAL ENCHANTERS [*Flagellum haereticorum fascinatorum*], by Brother Nicolaus Iaquierius [Nicolas Jacquier], of the Order of Friars Preachers, and formerly Inquisitor of heretical depravity.

[Manuscript inscription, split either side of the line "uitatis Inquisitore": *sancti* ... *Edmundi* — "of Saint Edmund".]

TO THESE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN ADDED:

- the DIALOGUES of Dr Lambertus Danaeus [Lambert Daneau] on poisoners [*de veneficis*], whom people commonly call *sortiarii* [sorcerers];
- the LETTER of Dr Ioachim Camerarius [Joachim Camerarius] of Bamberg [*Pabebergensis*], on Plutarch's *On the Failure of Oracles* [*de Oraculorum defectu*];
- the TREATISE on Superstitions of Dr Martinus de Arles [Martín de Arlés], Professor of Sacred Theology, Canon, etc.;
- THREE QUESTIONS of Ioannes Trithemius [Johannes Trithemius] on the Reprobate and on Evildoers [*de Reprobis atque Maleficis*], addressed to Maximilian I, Emperor of the Romans.
- Also
- the BOOK of Dr Thomas Erastus on *striges* [*de Strigibus*].

Edited with the greatest care and diligence by Brother Ioannes Myntzenbergius [?]
[*F. Ioan. Myntzenbergij*], of the Carmelite Order.

What else this book contains, a full INDEX will show.

With the Grace and Privilege of His Imperial Majesty, for ten years.

FRANKFURT AM MAIN, M. D. LXXXI. [1581]

A DISPUTATION ON LAMIAE, OR STRIGES, *in which their powers are clearly debated by Thomas Erastus*

FUR. The questions about *lamiae* [*Lamiae*], or *striges* [*Striges*], that we argued over between ourselves in past years I thought had been so firmly settled by argument that no room was left for contradiction. For I know that you do not pronounce hastily on matters of such weight, but give your judgement only after the whole subject has been carefully turned over and sifted. Now the facts themselves teach me that things stand otherwise. For yesterday, as chance would have it, I caught sight of a book on *lamiae* at a bookseller's; I bought it and devoured it most greedily, like a glutton, and in it I noticed, not without astonishment, that your arguments had been refuted. So I ran straight to you, to be the first to inform you of it.

ER. But I have not only seen it already; I have also read it through carefully and examined it. You remember, I think, that the author of the book, immediately after the publication of our disputation, informed us of this very thing that you now see he has done, and that we in turn asked him, if he had anything better and more certain than ours, to bring it forward freely, with our full goodwill, for the sake of the public good and of truth.

FUR. You have also brought back to my mind the letter I read, written to a man most distinguished for piety and learning. In it he writes that, far from your disagreeing with him on the chief point of his books, hardly anyone yet seems to have fortified and confirmed that view of his more soundly and more learnedly. For since you conclude (page 214, line twenty-three) that those *striges* are to be punished who knowingly and willingly — seized by no delirium, madness, or disease of an impaired *phantasia* [*laesae phantasiae morbo*], and not possessed by demons [*a Daemonibus obsessae*] — deny God and His worship and give themselves up to the devil [*diabolo*], you agree with him, he says, since he has included such people under the name of *magi* [*Magorum nomine*], both in his preface and in Book 2, chapter 2. When I read this, I thought there would no longer be any question whether *striges* could justly be put to death; the only question would be whether our *striges* are contained under the *magi*, and whether, having deserted God, they enter into a pact [*foedus*] with the demon.

ER. You judge rightly. For that most learned and most highly praised man is now doing nothing else than trying to show that everything happens only in image [*in imagine*].

FUR. He certainly brings forward a great deal that is both plausible and seems to carry great weight as proof, to show that your arguments did not adequately demonstrate what they set out to prove.

ER. What are you saying? Do you think that even a single one of our arguments has been weakened or refuted? If you believe anything of the kind, you are mistaken by the whole width of the heavens [*toto caelo*]. If you care to reread our work and compare it with his, you will declare without any hesitation that I am telling the truth. Indeed, a friend told us recently that some students of law had compared the two and reached the same judgement. The theologians will have much less doubt. For we made our case from the Holy Scriptures, not from the opinions of jurists [*Iureconsult. placitis*], which we never studied; nor ought anyone to attack our position with arguments of any other kind.

FUR. That is what the author does, and vigorously: he proves your arguments feeble and mutilated, and shows that you do not rightly understand the mind of God.

ER. He has tried to. What he has actually achieved you will understand only when you have compared the reasoning of both sides with each other.

FUR. If it is no trouble, please explain this contest to me more fully.

ER. There is no need, for everything has been said — or at any rate enough that you will find nothing lacking, if only you are willing to reread it attentively.

FUR. All the same, I want certain points set out more plainly that you either did not touch on or put forward too briefly.

ER. Since that is what you want, go ahead and ask.

FUR. First, I should like you to take in the *sagae* [sagas] in a definition, or else in a short description. Next, I should like you to show how, and by what marks, they are distinguished from the wicked *magi* [Magis]. After that, I am eager to hear once more why they may rightly be punished with death [mortis supplicio]. Finally, I want the arguments I am going to put to you resolved. [Margin: Capita præsentis disputationis — The heads of the present disputation.] And so that I do not deceive myself on any point, I want above all the names we are going to use to be distinguished. For the *sagae* we are dealing with seem to be named in various ways by the Greeks and the Latins. The Greeks call them φαρμακίδες [Greek: φαρμακίδες (pharmakides, "women who deal in drugs," i.e. poisoners or drug-sorceresses)] and φαρμα-κεύτριάι [Greek: φαρμακεύτριάι (pharmakeutriai, "female drug-mixers")], from the word φαρμακείας [Greek: φαρμακεία (pharmakeia, "the use of drugs," hence sorcery by drugs)] — the name by which their art is expressed. The Latins call them, indiscriminately and confusedly, *magae*, *lamiae*, *sagae*, *striges*, *veneficae*, *incantatrices* [Incātrīces] and *maleficae*. [Margin: Nomina Sagarū multa & varia sunt. — The names of the *sagae* are many and various.] Moreover, I know only too well how uncertain the use of these names is among the authors, and how often they are confused. For writers express different things by the same name,

and the same thing by several names or by all of them, so that it is hardly ever clear what one ought to settle on.

ER. You are right to point this out. Hardly any one thing has been called by so many and such discordant names, and distinguishing them will show us the reason for it. So we must know at the outset that among the Greeks *μαγείαν* [Greek: *μαγεία* (*mageia*, "magic")], *μαγγανείαν* [Greek: *μαγγανεία* (*manganeia*, "trickery, sorcery by charms and philtres") — the page prints γ as the sixth sort], *γοητεία* [Greek: *γοητεία* (*goēteia*, "enchantment, sorcery")] and *φαρμακείαν* often signify particular arts, or particular modes of operating; more often they are all so mixed up with one another that each of them signifies all the others, or several of them; and very often they are all used for illusions [*præstigiis*], imposture, guile, fraud, cunning and deception. For the ancients — I mean the learned ones — were not so crude and senseless as not to see that the promises of the *magi* and people of that sort were for the most part false, and nothing but pretences, illusions [*præstigia*] and old wives' tales. The position of the Latins is much the same, whether they borrowed these words from the Greeks or coined them themselves. For *magus*, *vates* [seer], *incantator* [enchanter], *præstigiator* [illusionist], *veneficus* and *maleficus* do not always signify one and the same thing distinctly; on the contrary, one is often put for another, and very often all of them are taken to mean impostors.

FUR. Why do you think they are called *φαρμακεύτριας*? [Margin: *Cur striges vocatæ sint pharma-ceutria.* — Why *striges* were called *pharmaceutriae*.]

ER. The Greeks take the word *φάρμακον* [Greek: *φάρμακον* (*pharmakon*, "drug" — remedy or poison)] — from which *φαρμακεία*, *φαρμακεύτρια* and *φαρ-μακίς* [Greek: *φαρμακίς* (*pharmakis*, "sorceress, poisoner")] are derived — in both a good and a bad sense, just as the Latins have also used the words *medicamentum* [medicament] and *venenum* [poison]. But since we are not discussing here the good and wholesome drugs [*pharmacis*] with which physicians arm themselves to fight diseases, we shall leave that sense aside and consider the other. We find, then, in reliable authors, that the names mentioned above, whenever they are taken in a bad sense, carry a threefold meaning [*notionem tripertitam*]. For sometimes they signify a lethal poison [*lethale venenum*], and not rarely a philtre [*philtrum*] — that is, a love medicament [*amatorium medicamentum*]. This too is of two kinds. [Margin: *Philtri duo sunt genera.* — There are two kinds of philtre.] Some of them are taken into the body, and these are generally poisons, or at any rate poisonous and malignant; others consist rather in words, characters, images, ceremonies, actions, the burying of certain things [*certarum rerum infossionibus*], and the like. Women who busied themselves with the one kind or the other were called *φαρμακεύτριαι* and *φαρμακίδες*, as anyone can see from Theocritus's second *Idyll* alone, which is entitled *φαρμακεύτρια* [Greek: *Φαρμακεύτρια* (*Pharmakeutria*, "The Sorceress")], and from its scholia.

The third meaning of *τῆς φαρμακείας* [Greek: *τῆς φαρμακείας* (*tēs pharmakeias*, "of *pharmakeia*")], is somewhat more general: it is used for every kind of enchantment [*incantatione*], in whatever manner or with whatever instruments

it is performed, and for whatever end it is practised — unless perhaps it does not include necromancy [*Necromantium*] and the other kinds of divination. Between this meaning and the second the difference is almost solely this: in the *veneficium* of love [*amoris veneficio*] everything is done only to win love, whether it is accomplished by a spell [*carmine*] or by any other means; in the third, everything — and sometimes the very same things — is employed, but the ends differ from case to case. And yet even love incantations [*amorum incantamenta*] — I mean those that are not drunk and are not applied to the body — were sometimes used for the purpose of killing a lover [*amasius*] who refused to come back. So the difference between the two meanings is very slight, and what is said of the second kind can rightly be said of the third as well.

FUR. Can you prove this with reliable witnesses?

ER. I can. Plato, in book ii [?] of the *Laws* [in libr. ii. de Legibus], says this: [Margin: Plato duo facit genera malorū pharmacorum. — Plato makes two kinds of harmful drugs.]

διτταὶ γὰρ δὴ φαρμακείαι κατὰ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὔσαι γένος,
ἐπισχοῦσι τὴν δι-ἀρρήσιν. ἦν μὲν γὰρ τὰ νῦν[?] διαρρήδην
εἵπομεν, σώματι σώματα κακουργοῦσά ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν: ἄλλη
ἢ μαγγανείαισθαι τισὶ καὶ ἐπωδαῖς καὶ καταδέσεσι λεγομέναις,
πείθει. τοὺς μὲν τολμῶντας βλάπτειν αὐτοὺς ὥς δύναται τὸ
τοιούτον· τοὺς δ' ὥς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ὑπὸ τούτων δυναμένων
γοητεύειν, βλάπτονται.

[Greek, translated: "For there are two kinds of *pharmakeia* [φαρμακείαι] among the human race, which [?] the [?]. The one we have just now expressly described does harm to bodies by means of bodies, according to nature. The other, by certain sorceries [μαγγανείαισθαι], incantations [ἐπωδαῖς] and so-called bindings [καταδέσεσι (katadeseis, 'binding spells')], persuades those who dare to do harm that they are able to do such a thing, and persuades the others that they are harmed, more surely than by anything, by these people who are able to bewitch [γοητεύειν]." — The word divided "δι-/ἀρρήσιν" across the first two lines of the quotation is printed with a doubled ρ, each with a breathing, followed by η. It and the verb ἐπισχοῦσι are left untranslated. The page prints μαγγανείαισθαι, with σθ set as a single ligature sort; the form is kept as printed.]

A little later, advising that a twofold law be enacted on this account, he says:

διαλαβόντας δὲ διχῇ τὸν τῆς φαρμακείαι περὶ νόμον, ὁποτέρως
αὐ[?] τις ἐπιχειρῇ[?] φαρμάττειν.

[Greek, translated: "dividing the law concerning *pharmakeia* in two, according to whichever of the two ways someone attempts to use drugs [φαρμάττειν]." — The page prints φαρμακείαι, ending in αι; the word before τις reads αὐ, with the mark over the second sort, and is flagged.]

Then, having laid down a law concerning those who do harm by administering a drug [pharmaco exhibito], he lays down a second concerning incantations, in these words:

Ἐὰν δὲ καταδέσσειν, ἢ ἐπαγωγαῖς, ἢ ἐπωδαῖς, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων
φαρμακειῶν ὄντινωνοῦν δόξῃ ὅμοιος εἶναι βλάπτοντι, ἐὰν μὲν
μάντις ὢν, ἢ τερατοσκόπος, τεθνάτο: ἐὰν δ' ἄνευ μαντικῆς ὢν
τῆς φαρμακείας ὄφλη, ταῦτόν καὶ τούτῳ γιγνέσθω.

[Greek, translated: "But if someone appears to be like a person who does harm by bindings, or by spells of attraction [ἐπαγωγαῖς], or by incantations, or by any drug-sorceries [φαρμακειῶν] of that kind whatever: if he is a seer [μάντις] or a diviner of portents [τερατοσκόπος], let him die; but if he is convicted of *pharmakeia* without being versed in divination, let the same befall him too."]

Here Plato demonstrates most plainly that in that early age the ancients called by the name φαρμακείαν not only poisonings [veneficia] but any kind of enchantment [incantationis speciem] by which someone might try to harm a human being, a beast of burden, or the crops. (Plato himself, in fact, was also in doubt whether harm could be done in that way.) For, so that he should not seem to be speaking only of bindings [ligaturis], allurement [illicio] and spells [carminibus] — a little earlier he had also mentioned wax images buried at a crossroads or beneath a threshold — he adds that general clause, "or by any other incantation whatever" [vel quocunq; alio incantamento].

A second point should also be noted here in passing: he uses the verbs μαγεύω [Greek: μαγεύω (mageuō, "to practise magic")], γ[ο?][η?]-τεύω [Greek: γοητεύω (goēteuō, "to bewitch, practise enchantment")], φαρμάττω [Greek: φαρμάττω (pharmattō, "to drug, to bewitch with drugs")] and φαρμακεύω [Greek: φαρμακεύω (pharmakeuō, "to use drugs or sorcery") — a short mark hangs under the final ω, iota subscript or speck [?]] to signify the same thing.¹ So too φαρμακεία, μαγγα-νεία, μαγγάνευμα [Greek: μαγγάνευμα (manganeuma, "a charm, a piece of sorcery")], ἐπαγωγή [Greek: ἐπαγωγή (epagōgē, "a spell of attraction")], καταδεσμός [Greek: καταδεσμός (katadesmos, "a binding spell")] and ἐπωδή [Greek: ἐπωδή (epōidē, "incantation") — a short mark stands under the ω, iota subscript or speck [?]] all signify the same thing in this passage.

FUR. Do you have other witnesses besides?

ER. Aristotle too used the word φαρμακείας in this sense, in the sixth book of the *History of Animals* [de histor. animal.], chapter 18, and in the ninth book, chapter 17. [Margin: Aristot. nomine φαρμακείας vitur pro incantamento. — Aristotle uses the word *pharmakeia* for incantation.] In the former, speaking of hippomanes [Hippomane], he says: καὶ Ζητοῦσι τοῦτο μάλιστα πάντων, οἱ περὶ τῆς φαρμακείας [Greek: "and those concerned with *pharmakeia* seek this

¹in μαγεύω, γοητεύω and φαρμακεύω here, and in φαρμακεύειν on p. 508 (text and margin), the page sets the acute over the ε of ευ.

most of all" — the page prints the article τῆς before φαρμακείας, and sets the breathing of οἱ over the ο]. "And the *magi* or enchanters [Magi vel Incantatores] seek this most of all." In the latter, speaking of a bird, he writes: καὶ λέγεται φαρμακεία εἶναι, [δ?]ιὰ τὸ πολυῖδρις εἶναι [Greek: "and it is said to be a thing of *pharmakeia*, because it is very knowing" — πολυῖδρις (*polyidris*, "much-knowing, cunning")]. "And a magical power [*vis magica*] is said to reside in that bird." Hence the *sagae* [Sagæ], in Aristotle's *History of Animals*, book 6, chapter 22, are called φαρμακίδες [Greek: φαρμακίδες (*pharmakides*, "drug-sorceresses") — a second accent-like stroke stands between ρ and μ, accent sort or stray [?]], when he writes: διὸ καὶ αἱ φαρμακίδες ζητοῦσι καὶ συλλέγουσιν [Greek: "which is why the *pharmakides* seek it out and gather it" — the mark over the ι of αἱ is compound, breathing alone or breathing with acute (αῖ) [?]]. In Aristophanes, who is much older than Aristotle, we read φαρμακί-δες Θετταλαὶ [Greek: "Thessalian *pharmakides*"]. [Margin: Aristophanes.] That the women of Thessaly were enchantresses, or *magae* [Incantatrices seu Magas], is certain. The commentator on Pindar [Pindari interpres] also writes that women, whom he calls φαρμακίδας, tie the bird ὕγγα [Greek: ὕγξ (*iyx*, the wryneck) — two dots stand over the υ, diaeresis (ῥῥγγα) or specks [?]] to a wheel and chant certain spells over it, to call absent lovers back. [Margin: Pindari interpres. — The commentator on Pindar.]

Further, there is no need even to point out that the verb φαρμακεύειν [Greek: φαρμακεύειν (*pharmakeuein*, "to practise *pharmakeia*") is used very frequently by authors for "to enchant" [*incantare*] and for practising illusions and impostures [*præstigias* & *imposturas*]. [Margin: φαρμακεύειν significat *incantare*. — *Pharmakeuein* means "to enchant."] I shall add only this: in the eighteenth chapter of the Apocalypse, φαρμακείαν is used for superstition or imposture, where it is written: ὅτι ἐν φαρμακείᾳ σου ἐπλανήθησαν πάν-τα τὰ ἔθνη [Greek: "for by your *pharmakeia* all the nations were led astray" — no article is printed before φαρμακεία, and a short mark hangs under its last letter, iota subscript or speck [?]; transcribed as seen]. And who does not know that the Romanists [Romanenses] drove the nations out of their minds not with real poisons but with superstitions and impostures? I also pointed out at the beginning that all the Greek names by which they express any kind whatever of incantation or magic [*Incantationis* aut *Magiæ*] are often used by authors for illusions, idols, impostures and the like, because they judged almost everything attempted or done by such people to be empty, futile, false, foolish and deceitful.

FUR. I understand why they called them φαρμακίδες. Now show me why they called them *magae* [Magas].

ER.

The reason for this name is not in the least obscure. [Margin: Cur striges vocentur Magæ. — Why *striges* are called *magae*.] For it is clear from what has already been said that this name extends so widely that even diviners [*Diuinatores*] are commonly called *magi*. To put it briefly, the name *magus* is

almost always taken to mean a disreputable and infamous man [homine infami & intestabili]. Indeed, only about the *magi* who came to worship Christ have I nothing to say as to whether they were good or bad; for there are some who affirm the former, and there are not a few who maintain that they had practised detestable magic but had not persisted in it. I have shown clearly enough, I believe, in my Antiparacelsian disputations [in Antiparacels. disputat.], that no lawful magic is to be found. For what is called *θεουργία* [Greek: *θεουργία* (theourgia, "theurgy")], which summons angels, whether good or evil, even for the sake of benefit rather than of harm or evil, is not practised without dealings with the evil demon [Cacodæmonis]. Nor were the Persian *magi*, whom some call philosophers or wise men, anything other than worshippers of demons [Dæmonum cultores] and workers of marvels that exceed the powers of nature. [Margin: Magi Persarum fuerant Dæmonum cultores. — The Persian *magi* were worshippers of demons.] For by what other means would they have been more commendable than other men, had they not been seen both to know more than others and to be able to perform miracles? Other nations too had priests, who, had they been nothing more than that, would never have come to be held in such admiration. Holy Scripture also shows clearly enough that the Egyptian, Persian, Median and Chaldean *magi* were not only priests but also diviners and showmen of miracles [miraculorum ostentatores]. Those, therefore, who seemed either to know or to be able to do things that cannot be brought about by natural causes have always and everywhere been held to be *magi*: namely, because such things are greater and more wonderful than could come about in a natural way. [Margin: Pro Magis qui habeantur & habiti sint olim. — Who are held, and were formerly held, to be *magi*.] But things that can be referred neither to the known nor to the occult powers of nature [occultas naturæ vires] have not been produced by natural causes. They are therefore accomplished by the agency of a more powerful cause. Now, only God, and the angels good and evil, surpass the powers of nature. Such things must therefore be attributed to the power [virtuti] of these, joined together with them.

Further, that the *magi* rely on the help neither of God nor of the good angels in their actions may be clear even from this: what they attempt is utterly contrary to the order prescribed by God. [Margin: Magi Dæmonis opera vtuntur. — The *magi* make use of the demon's agency.] It follows, then, that they use the ministry of evil demons [Cacodæmonum]. Yet the demons do not attend on just anyone; they serve those who have bound themselves to them by the force of a pact, either explicit or hidden [pactionis manifestæ aut occultæ]. For they are not equally present to anyone at all who pronounces those words or employs those same things. A particular person, place, time and manner of acting are required, and particular characters, figures and so on. From this it can be seen that this power belongs neither to the actions nor to the words. For if it were in the words or actions, whoever pronounced them, in whatever manner, place and time, would obtain his wish. And what

need is there of words here, when it is established that the demons [*Dæmones*] attend only on those who are bound to them in any way whatever by a pact [*per pactum obstricti*]? [Margin: *Vtrùm veri aliquid faciant Magi.* — Whether the *magi* do anything real.] It follows further from this that the things they seem, to the inexperienced, to do beyond the powers of nature are for the most part illusions and fictions [*præstigias & figmenta*]. For whatever exceeds the faculties of nature [*naturæ facultates*] and does not have God as its author only seems to be; it is not truly what it is thought to be.

FUR. Then are the apparitions [*spectra*] that these people sometimes call up not truly apparitions? The woman at Endor certainly brought before Saul's eyes a shade or apparition [*ymbram seu spectrum*] that falsely passed itself off as Samuel. And even if it was not Samuel himself, it was still not nothing at all. For how could something that is nothing at all speak?

ER. I do not say that they do nothing at all, but that the things are not what they seem. That apparition was not wholly nothing, but it was not Samuel: rather, the Devil [*Diabolus*] lay hidden beneath that shade. Meanwhile I do not deny that the demon [*Dæmonem*] sometimes displays something real, whenever it acts either at God's command or through natural causes.

It is enough for the present to have shown that anyone is called a *magus* who, with the help of the demons, openly or secretly professes to know or to be able to do things that cannot be accomplished by natural powers. [Margin: *Sagæ inter Magos cõputari debent.* — The *sagæ* must be counted among the *magi*.] Moreover, it is quite certain that the *sagæ* [*Sagæ*] believe they perform wonders by the Devil's favour, and that by virtue of the pact [*ex pactione*] they demand such things from him. It is therefore certain as well that they are rightly named *magæ* [*Magas*].

FUR. Do you posit several species of wicked magic [*scelestæ Magiæ species*]?

ER. An inquiry into that does not belong here, so I shall get myself out of it in two words. [Margin: *Magiæ intestabilis species.* — The species of infamous magic.] Some divide it into more parts, others into fewer. Elsewhere, as you know, we have divided it into divinatory and operative magic [*in Diuinatricem & Operatricem*]. For although virtually all *magi* claim knowledge of both parts, some nevertheless devote themselves more to the one, others to the other. And since the *sagæ* are occupied not so much with divining as with acting, we place them rather among the operative *magi* [*inter operadores Magos*]; yet we do not entirely exclude them from the company of the others. The differences or species of operative magic are, moreover, generally taken from the instruments and the manners of acting. But here too the confusion is so great that nothing certain and fixed can be laid down. Nor does any necessity compel us at this time to inquire into the matter over-scrupulously [*superstitiosè*].

FUR. I ask nothing further on this point; I would rather hear why you call them *lamiae* [*Lamias*].

ER. They are called *lamiae* [*Lamiæ*] on account of a resemblance they bear to the *lamiae* of the ancients. [Margin: *Cur Sagæ vocentur Lamiæ.* —

Why the *sagae* are called *lamiae*.] For the ancients' *lamiae* were apparitions and phantasms [spectra & phantasmata] appearing with remarkable splendour in the form of beautiful women. They pretended to be captivated by love for young men, and kept company with them until they could destroy and devour them. Cælius Rhodiginus [Lodovico Ricchieri, called Caelius Rhodiginus]² writes, together with Philostratus, that the ancients called them Empusae and Marmolyciae [Empusas & Marmolycias].

Such an apparition appeared under the Emperor Maximilian I [Maximil. 1. Imp.], near Augsburg [Augustam], around the year of the Lord 1503, in the form of Margaretha à Roth, abbess of Etesstetten [Abbatissæ Etesstettensis]. [Margin: Spectrum Augustanum. — The Augsburg apparition.] It could not only be seen and touched, but could also speak most expressively. Since, then, our *sagae* are not themselves apparitions, but feast, sport, do business and indulge their lust with apparitions, and sometimes crave the juices of infants [infantum ... succos], they have been called *lamiae*.

FUR. Where does the name *striges* [strigum] come from?

ER. [Margin: Cur striges vocentur. — Why they are called *striges*.] They are called *striges* for a similar reason, after the bird of that name, which the ancients believed milked its teats into the lips of infants at night. Ovid [Ouid.] holds that infants left alone without a guard are snatched from their cradles by *striges*, which suck out their blood. Since, therefore, the *sagae* too are believed to crave the blood, fat and gore [sanguinem, pinguedinem, & saniem] of infants, so as to use them for accomplishing their purposes, they have been called *striges*.

FUR. [Margin: Cur Venefic[?]. — Why they are called *veneficae*.] Why are they called *veneficae* [Veneficæ], "poisoners," when they rarely (not to say never) do harm with poisons or poisoned substances [venenis aut venenatis rebus]?

ER. They are called *venefica* [Venefica]³ by the Latins in the same way as they are called φαρμακείτριαι [Greek: pharmakeutriai, "women who deal in drugs; sorceresses"] or φαρμακίδες by the Greeks. For just as a drug [pharmacum], so also a poison [venenum] can be good and bad alike. In addition, what they administer, even though it is not in itself a harmful poison, they nevertheless believe to be poison, and they give it to drink as though it were poison. They are rightly considered and named *maleficae* [Maleficæ], "evildoers," for this reason: they rarely do anything for the sake of helping or benefiting. Indeed, all their pursuits, efforts and thoughts are directed almost wholly to this, that they may do harm and not good. For he at whose prompting they do everything was a liar and a murderer from the beginning. It is therefore no wonder if he trains his disciples according to his own nature.

FUR. [Margin: Cur Incantatrices. — Why they are called *incantatrices*.] It remains for you to tell me why almost everyone calls them *incantatrices* [Incantatrices], "enchantresses."

²the page prints "Rhodiginus".

³the page prints "Venefica", with final -a.

ER. For the Latins *incantare* means the same as ἐπάδειν [Greek: ἐπάδειν (epaidein, "to sing over, to charm by incantation") — the π is set in its ϖ form; a small mark stands under the α, and whether it is an iota subscript or a speck does not resolve on the scan; the form of the breathing over the ε (smooth or rough), and whether a short stroke above the ϖ is a separate mark, also do not resolve] for the Greeks, namely to sing to [accinere] or to murmur over [admurmurare]. For those who use this kind of sorcery [maleficij genere] are accustomed to mutter certain set words [verba quædam concepta], which writers call *carmina*, "spells"; by the power of these they believe they can bring about great and wonderful things, and they say so. This form of *veneficium* [Veneficij], called ἐπωδή [Greek: epōidē, "incantation, spell sung over"] by the Greeks and *incantatio* [Incantatio] by the Latins, is extremely old, since the most ancient of the Greeks mention it. The author of the book *On the Sacred Disease* [de Morbo sacro], which is read under Hippocrates' name, shows plainly that it existed in his day, and he calls its practitioners μάγοι, ἀγύρται, ἀλαζόνες [Greek: magoi, agyrtai, alazones — "magi, begging priests, charlatans"]. Plato honours them with the same titles: in the second book of the *Republic* [de Republica] he likewise names them ἀγύρτας καὶ μάντις [Greek: agyrtas kai manteis, "begging priests and seers"]. Very few of them, however, seem to have been so foolish as to think that what they boasted they could do was brought about by a power residing in names or spells [carminibus]. Rather, they affirmed that the ability had been granted them by the gods, as Plato's words clearly prove:

[Greek: πείθουσι[ν?] ὥς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶ[ν?] ποριζομένη, θυσίαισθαι καὶ ἐπωδαῖς, εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν: καὶ ἐάν τι[?] ἐχθρὸν πημῦναι ἐθέλη μετὰ σμικρ[ῶ?]ν δαπανῶν, ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ. βλάψει, ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶ καὶ καταδέσμοις τοὺς θεοὺς, ὥς φασι, πειθόντες σφίσιν ὑπηρετ[εῖ?]ν. — "they persuade [people] that there is with them a power furnished from the gods, by sacrifices [?] and incantations, to heal, with pleasures and festivals, any wrong done by a man himself or by his ancestors; and if he wishes to injure an enemy, for a small outlay he will harm just and unjust alike, by certain invocations and binding-spells, persuading the gods, as they say, to serve them."]

"They persuade the citizens [ciuitibus]⁴," he says, "that they hold a power that comes from the gods, by which, with sacrifices and certain spells [carminibus], amid pleasure and festivals, they can expiate wrongs unjustly committed by the clients themselves or by their ancestors; and, if the clients wish to take revenge on an enemy, a power of harming him, just and unjust alike, at very small expense.

For they claim they can persuade the gods by certain allurements and bindings [illecebris & ligaturis] to be obedient to them." The author of the book *On*

⁴*ciuitibus* is the form the page prints.

the Sacred Disease [de morbo sacro] wrote in agreement with this. Xenophon too, in book 2 of the *Sayings and Deeds of Socrates* [libr. 2. de dict. & fact. Socratis], when he is discussing how friends are to be won, says this:

[Greek: [?]ναι μ[?]ν τινὰς φασὶν ἐπιδοῦν, ἃς οἱ ἐπιστάμ[ε?]ν[ο?]ι ἐπάδοντες, οὓς ἄ[ν?] βούλονται φίλους ἑαυτοῖς ποιοῦνται. — "[?] they say there are certain incantations, by chanting which over whomever they wish, those who know them make those people their friends."]

[Margin: Sirenum cantus. — The song of the Sirens.] This, on the same witness, is that song of the Sirens by which, as the poets have told in their fables, they held back and overpowered those sailing past. Hence in Suidas [the *Suda*] a woman is called ἐπωδὸς [Greek: epōidos, "enchantress, one who sings charms"]: ἡ ἐπάρδουσα τοῖς νοσοῦσι παισὶ [Greek: "she who sings charms over sick children"], that is, a woman who healed children who had been bewitched [fascinatis] or enchanted by singing a charm [carmen] over them.

[Margin: Incantationes vsitatae quæ sint. — What the customary incantations are.] To this class belong all those who busy themselves with stanching blood, curing wounds and driving off any disease whatever by words or spells [carminib.], either alone or with other things applied besides. Those too must be counted among them who murmur words over herbs as they gather them, or over drugs [pharmacis] as they prepare them, to make them more wholesome. For ἐπωδαὶ [Greek: epōidai, "incantations"], or spells [carmina], are of two kinds: some were used to harm, others to help. This is also mentioned in the *Code*, under *On Sorcerers and Astrologers* [in Cod. quoque de Malefic. & Mathem.]. The former kind, the harmful, was nevertheless the more frequent. The poets mention Circe, Medea, the Thessalian *veneficae* [Veneficarum], the Sirens and others of that sort everywhere. Who does not know Horace's Canidia? To this same class must be relegated the exorcists [Exorcistæ], who suppose that with set words or adjurations [adiurationibus] and with characters [characteribus] they can shut devils up in a circle, in rings, in other objects, and who believe, finally, that by such means they compel them and call them out to wherever they wish.

[Margin: Incantatorū genera. — The kinds of enchanters.] From what has been said it is plain that there are two kinds of enchanters or enchantresses [Incantatorum seu Incantatricum], ἐπωδῶν [Greek: epōidōn, "of singers of incantations"]. Some set up their incantations on the basis of an open pact entered into with the demons. Others, not knowing that those words or spells [carmina] have their force from a pact made with the Devil, recite them as if so great a power resided in the words or characters themselves. These people, although their ignorance and stupidity are great, might nevertheless seem in some way excusable, provided malice is absent. Both kinds are eager to do harm, but this is more the aim of those who openly contract a covenant and fellowship [foedus & societatem] with those damned spirits. Even if they are sometimes eager to do good, for the most part they desire to inflict damage on people, on beasts [brutis], on fields, and so on. The others, although they

too often try to do evil, more often wish either to help, or to give pleasure to onlookers, or to be highly esteemed by them.

That the *sagae* [Sagæ] are rightly called *incantatrices* [Incantatrices], "enchantresses," is clear from what has been said. For by ceremonies, imprecations and other things (which, by a power from the demons, they dream have been imbued in them) they aim to stir up storms, turn friends into enemies, bring about shameful loves, infect people, beasts and crops with *maleficia* [maleficijs], send diseases, and inflict damage on everyone they hate. Nor do they busy themselves only with accomplishing this by spell [carmine] and dire imprecations: they also openly make pacts with the demons, feast with them, and behave with them more familiarly than is fitting. So it is with the fullest right that they are placed among the evil-working [maleficos] enchanters.

FUR. Not even here does anything occur to me that I would ask further. So tell me: from what are the *sagae* [Sagæ] named?

ER. [Margin: Vndè Sagæ dictæ. — From what the *sagae* take their name.] *Sagae* are so called not only because they are busy enough [satis agant] and all too diligent in their wicked office, as Acron judged, but much more, it seems, from *sagire* [à sagiendo], as Cicero held — namely, because they want to know many things. For they have persuaded themselves that they can both know and do what no one could know or do naturally.

FUR. The name is apt and very fitting. For they claim more for themselves than they know and have learned, or can even bring about.

ER. Now that the names have been explained, the rest of our task will be easier, especially if you will consider that there is the greatest confusion in the terms. The cause of this lies both in many other things and above all in this, that almost no species of operative magic [Magiae Operatricis] keeps within its own bounds and does not borrow some part from the others. Nor can it be otherwise where no real thing underlies it, but where either all or at least most of its precepts and its works alike are imaginary, feigned and counterfeit.

FUR. Tell me at last, then, what a *saga* [Saga] properly is, and in what respect she differs from the other masters of impiety.

ER. [Margin: Saga quid fit. — What a *saga* is.] A *saga* is a woman who is a *maga* [Maga], or an enchantress [Incantatrix], or a conjureess of illusions [Pręstigiatrix] (or whatever anyone likes to call her), who, having first abjured God and the true religion, has bound herself over [mancipauit] to the evil demon [Cacodæmoni] by an open compact [manifesta stipulatione], so that (besides other promises and hopes) she may be taught by him to disturb the elements, raise storms, and harm people, beasts of burden [iumentis], fields and crops by means of spells [carminibus], herbs, and other things harmless in themselves [per se innoxijs], and to do other marvels, things impossible to nature.

FUR. Unless you prove each part of your description, not everyone will agree with you, I know.

ER. That *sagae* are also *magae*, enchantresses [Incantatrices], and φαρμακεύτριαι [Greek: pharmakeutriai, "women who prepare drugs / poisons"] and φαρμακίδες [Greek: pharmakides, "sorceresses, poisoners"], we made plain in what came earlier. For we showed that a *magus* [Magum] is one who is persuaded that he knows and does things that cannot be brought about by natural powers. It is therefore necessary that he accomplish them by the power of a demon. And indeed all *magi* [Magi] mostly attempt things that are either unworthy of God or displeasing to him, and are done against his command. Who would think that such things proceed from God or from the good angels? I pass over the fact that they are not unaware that they do such things by the power of the Devil, whom they summon for the purpose with characters [characteribus], circles [circis], herbs, spells or conjurations [carminibus feu coniurationibus], and many other things — and whom, as they falsely believe, they compel to come by the power [virtute] of such things. Since, therefore, our *striges* [Striges] profess similar things, and are fully convinced that the things they use for their *maleficia* have been endowed with that power by the Devil, they cannot by any means be excluded from the fellowship of the *magi*. For even supposing it were sometimes suspected that those powers were implanted [infitas] in the very things they employ, and not recently infused [infufas] by a demon, all of them nevertheless confess that they were taught about the force [vi] of those things by the Devil. That they also use incantations or imprecations — ἐπωδαῖς [?] [Greek: epōdais, "incantations"] — by which to lure some people into love, sow hatred among others, and inflict harm on people and on beasts [brutis], is not in the least either obscure or doubtful.

FUR. [Margin: An carminibus vtantur Sagæ. — Whether the *sagae* use spells.] But they do not seem to use any spells [carminibus], or formulas of conjuration, or set words [conceptis verbis].

ER. Although they are thought to do their business solely by using certain things, without any murmuring of words, they nevertheless do nothing of the kind without a dire imprecation and an invocation of the Devil.

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[Margin: Carmen quid fit. — What a *carmen* is.] Moreover, the ancients gave the name "evil-working spell" [carmen maleficum] — and we too ought to give it — not only to a long chant [cantationem], but also to an imprecation consisting of only one or two words. They also called wax images, characters, and things made with a like superstitious curiosity [curiositate] *carmina*, because these are usually prepared either with a muttering of words or with some superstitious observance from which they are believed to acquire those new powers. Indeed, in every age the women who, even without a spell, did something superstitious to call back their lovers [amafios], or to accomplish similar follies [deliramenta], have been called φαρμακίδες and ἐπωδαὶ [Greek:

⁵the page is numbered 421 as printed.

ἐπῳδαί, "enchantresses"] alike. It cannot therefore be denied, with any right or any reason, that they are deservedly named *magae*, and enchantresses, and φαρμακεύτριαι or φαρμακίδες (for these two names both mean the same thing).

[Margin: Præstigiatrices etiā dicuntur Sagæ. — The *sagae* are also called conjurers of illusions.] That they are also not inaptly called conjurers of illusions [Præstigiatrices] is amply proved by the fact that they do not truly do what they think they do. For these are phantasms [phantasmata] and mere illusions [præstigiæ] of the Devil. When we say this, we do not mean that they always do absolutely nothing; for they often do something, but they do not do what they intended to do. Someone who paints a man does not do nothing at all (for he makes a painted man), but he makes nothing of a real man.

FUR. You are hardly [?] consistent with yourself [Haud fatis tibi cunctas]⁶, since you want the *sagae* reckoned under the different names and species of magic alike.

ER. I answered this already earlier: the species of this vanity lack true differentiae [differentijs], since they are nothing other than illusions and delusions — nothing real or solid. For whatever they seem to do, Satan does all of it, compelled, as he wishes it to appear, by the force of the pact. So here too no fixed differentiae can be assigned. They differ in some measure, as I pointed out above, both in the instruments they use and in their ways of acting. For none of them keeps within its own bounds (such is human curiosity, once it has overstepped its prescribed limits); rather they leap recklessly from one kind to another. So it happens, since each of them professes and does several things, that no fixed definitions [præscriptiones] and boundaries could be laid down. It is therefore no wonder that the same person is called by several names, since one person tries to do what are, so to speak, the native and proper business of several. If the principles and the subjects differed, the confusion would be less. Here, where the first author and agent is one and the same, the passage from one thing to another is easy. For this reason it has also come about that all the names of incantations, Greek and Latin alike, have not only been confused, but also all signify deceit, fraud, imposture and illusions [præstigias] — as if there were nothing true in any of them.

FUR. I am satisfied on this point at least, so you may go on to other matters.

ER. [Margin: Saga[?] abiurant Deū. — The *sagae* abjure God.] Next, that the *sagae* [Sagæ] or *striges* abjure God and divine worship along with all piety, and pledge themselves by stipulation [stipulentur] to become the Devil's chattel slaves [mancipia diaboli], needs proof far less than I could wish it did. For it is, alas, more manifest and clear than it ought to be. I have never known a prudent man who would dare to deny it.

FUR. It is a dream, and this happens in the imagination [in imagine] alone. So it ought not to be set down in the description.

⁶the verb is printed "cunctas", which does not construe here; the sense "you are not consistent with yourself" is taken from the context and is not a reading of the word

ER. I am aware that some people nowadays make light of this matter, as if it were only some dream and did not really happen. I am compelled to think and to speak otherwise. For knowingly and prudently [*sciētes, prudētes*], having first deliberated the matter with themselves, they make a pact with the evil demon — whom they know full well to be that very one [*illum ipsum*] — that if he is willing to do, teach, or give this or that, they will be adversaries and enemies of God and of piety, and will moreover serve him alone. And so that you may know all the better that this is so, after the stipulation by clasped hands [*post manuum stipulationem*], the kisses and the embraces, he imprints a mark [*signum*] on their bodies, now in one part, now in another (into which, without their feeling it [*sine sensu earum*], either a whole needle or some other sharp iron could be hidden), so that by this very thing, as by a sacramental oath [*sacramento*], he may bind them to himself. I do not deny, however, that the mark of the pact or covenant [*pacti seu foederis*] is not one and the same everywhere and in all of them. For he likes to vary it, the more easily to deceive. Nevertheless, all of them, with one consent, in whatever place and at whatever time they are questioned, confess this very thing, even though they foresee that it will cost them their lives [*capitale sibi fore*].

FUR. But they are old women [*anus*], melancholic [*Melancholicæ*] and deranged [*deliræ*]; besides, they see such things through dreams and imagination [*per fomina & imaginationem*], but in truth do nothing.

ER. [Margin: *Non fola[?] foeminae, nec fola[?] anus artem hanc exercent.* — Not women alone, nor old women alone, practise this art.] It is not only old women or foolish women who are ensnared in these evils: young girls too, and a great many women in the full vigour of life [*integra etate*], and even men, are infected with this plague — which no one can deny. And while I do not deny that those who let themselves be driven out of their minds [*dementari*] by the demon, the father of lies, are foolish and silly, I boldly affirm that for the most part it is the more cunning ones (but the more wanton, those wasting away with lust, anger, envy and hatred, and despising piety) who are tempted and overcome by him. [Margin: *Non sunt melancholicæ[?]*. — They are not melancholic.] That they are not melancholic is shown by the following: that in all other matters they are of sound mind [*sapiunt*]; that they know perfectly well that they are sinning and doing wrong (and for that reason conceal their wickedness with the greatest care); that almost all of them commit similar crimes, and use similar methods and arts in carrying them out; and finally that they teach the same things to others, and use various arts for persuading [*suadendum*] others. [Margin: *Nō in fom-no sua agunt via.* — It is not in sleep that they go about their business.] And why are dreams thrown in our faces? As if they were either always asleep, or did nothing while awake.

FUR. Will you deny that in sleep they imagine a great many things that do not really exist?

ER. By no means [*Minimè gentium*]. But I am not speaking of such things. We are now discussing the things they do while both sane and awake. How

could it happen that the same thing, with the same circumstances, should come to so many people in sleep? Not the same things⁷, but things differing very widely, usually appear to dreamers. Yet it is established that many of these women, arrested — not rarely — even in different places, have in their accounts reported precisely the same and mutually consistent things about their presence, their number, the day, place and hour, the deed, the drug [pharmaco], the going out and the return, the people they met on the way, and other such matters. Indeed, those whom they say they encountered testify, if questioned, that the matter is so. Will you maintain that the women met these people, too, in a dream [per somnium]? Surely anyone who believes that such things can be done by people dreaming and raving is not quite sound in the head. Do they not all, living in one place, recite the same things about their powers [viribus], ceremonies, feasts, customs and initiations? That in other places they have other customs and rites, no one denies; nor does this contradict what we affirm.

FUR. If it is certain that by people awake pacts [pacta] are made, I resist no further. I know that at other times they dream many things that nevertheless never happened in reality.

ER. [Margin: *Vigilantes ineunt foedus cū diabol.* — They enter into the covenant with the Devil while awake.] It is certain that at the outset they contract the covenant [foedus] while awake, and are received into the society.

FUR. Go on, then.

ER. What follows in the description needs neither proof nor explanation. For who does not know that the *sagae* [Sagas], deceived by the promises of demons, hope to obtain from that same one silver, gold, and the other things each of them most desires? It is equally well known that all of them claim for themselves the knowledge and the power [facultatem] to lure whomever they wish into love, to sow hatred between spouses, to raise storms, to inflict diseases, and in short to bring about many marvellous things. [Margin: *Caufa[?] defertionis Sagarum.* — The grounds of the *sagae*'s desertion.] Nor, whenever they are questioned on this matter, do they give any causes for their desertion other than those just mentioned and others like them. Nor is it likely that all of them would have kept silent about it until now, had they known of any other causes that served to excuse their case and their deed. So on this part, too, no scruple of doubt remains. We shall therefore rightly hold the description given above as true, until either it is shown to be false or a better one is brought forward.

FUR. Why did you not rather express it in some brief definition, instead of that long description?

ER. For this reason I propose no definition because a definition deals with things that are true, constant and immutable, and here you will find almost nothing of that kind. For apart from the desertion of God and of divine worship,

⁷the page prints *cadem*.

and the going over to the Devil's camp [*transfugium in castra diaboli*], nearly everything is either lying and feigned, or at any rate uncertain, inconstant, slippery and changeable. The wicked spirit [*spiritus nequam*] promises to give and to teach many things that he never truly delivers; and what he sometimes seems to deliver is sheer illusion [*præstigium*] and phantasm [*phantasma*].

FUR. [Margin: *Qua differant re Sa-ga[?] à Magis alijs.* — In what respect the *sagae* differ from the other *magi*.] Now, then, teach me by what distinction they are marked off from the other *magi* who work their effects [*Magis operatoribus*]. For how they differ from the divining *magi* [*Magis diuinatoribus*] I have heard on another occasion.

FUR.⁸ If the *sagae* [*Sagæ*] alone fell away from God to the Devil, there would be something for us to say. But other *magi* [*Magi*] do the same. For no one can accomplish marvels that surpass the powers of Nature [*Naturæ vires*] — especially if he attempts to perform them for an evil end, or for pleasure, or for display — without the help of demons [*Dæmonum*]. Since most *magi* have seen this clearly, they compel the demons — as they impiously believe — by conjurations or exorcisms [*coniurationibus feu exorcismis*] and other rites to bring about what they want accomplished. Yet that deserter spirit does not readily serve anyone (nor indeed can he serve just anyone in that way) except deserters, or those bound to him by some covenant [*foedere*] or fellowship. A pact, therefore, either open [*apertum*] or hidden must intervene — although the pact [*pactio*] is not always equally manifest or equally obscure, and degrees are indeed found on both sides.

FUR. The infamous *magi* [*Magos*] must have something that cannot be affirmed of the *sagae* [*Sagis*]. For otherwise some people would not deny with such confidence that these women undergo capital punishment unjustly.

ER. [Margin: 1.] In this matter, first, there is some difference: the *striges* [*Striges*] contract their fellowship with Satan by a stipulation [*stipulatione*] that is open and manifest in every way, and hand themselves over wholly into his protection and patronage, having first abjured GOD [*DEO*]; whereas the *magi* of the Christians (the heathen [*Ethnici*], who never knew GOD, are not said to have defected from him) for the most part are either drawn into his fellowship obscurely and without knowing it, or do not give themselves over to him wholly with the same openness. I say that this happens "for the most part," because we read that there have been some who did not hesitate to make a pact with him on these terms: that if he did what they commanded for a fixed period, they would afterwards be in his power. But just as this is infrequent among the other *magi*, so among the *sagae* [*Sagis*] it is most frequent and nearly constant. [Margin: 2.] They are distinguished, next, also in this: that most *magi* believe that demons, by the power of certain words, characters [*characterum*] and rites, of the name of God pronounced in set formulas [*conceptis verbis*], and of ceremonies [*cæremonijs*], are compelled against their will to do what

⁸the page prints "FVR." here a second time in succession, with no "ER." between the two prefixes; the attribution follows the printed prefix.

they are ordered to do. If such men were instructed and taught by what fraud he pretends to be compelled, and at what peril to themselves they attempt such things, they would easily return to the right way, since they are not yet as captive as those others are. Men of this kind think themselves superior to others chiefly in this very respect, that they have acquired so wonderful an art; nor do they believe that it conflicts with piety, especially since they are persuaded that Solomon [Salomonem] and other pious men were taught such things by God. The *sagae* [Sagæ], by contrast, know to whom they have sworn their faith and whom they serve; and they all confess frankly and openly that they do everything they do not by divine power [diuina virtute] but by the power of the one whose lead they follow. They are sometimes deceived in this: they judge that such great powers [vires] lie hidden in the things they apply, and are not infused into them by the demon [à Dæmone]; they credit the Devil only with this, that it was at his prompting and teaching that they came to know such things and learned how to use them. [Margin: 3.] To these a further difference can be added: the *magi* [Magi] mostly draw their follies from books and masters [Magiftris], and seek out books with diligent study and hire teachers from whom to learn the mysteries they long to know. The *striges* [Striges], on the contrary, use neither book nor teacher, but are instructed by the Devil himself in a short time about everything, if not truly, then at least falsely [verè, falsò tamen]. [Margin: 4.] In their end, too, we see some difference: in the *sagae* [Sagis] it is mostly evil, whereas the *magi* [Magis] often seek nothing else than either to entertain or to be seen as workers of miracles, and they aim to harm no one except in jest. The account of the instruments by which both the women and the men think they can accomplish their ends is almost the same. Both carry out the demon's [Dæmonis] commands with charms [carminibus], characters and figures, and with other things of every kind, often ridiculous. Nor does either group stay within fixed bounds; each repeatedly leaps over into the other's territory — which is above all common to, and at the same time characteristic of, nearly all the *magi* who work their effects [Magis operatoribus].

FUR. [Margin: Cõfufionis artiũ Magicarum caufa. — The cause of the confusion of the magic arts.] What do you think chiefly produces this confusion?

ER. The cause seems to be that the old trickster spirit [Veterator ille spiritus] sees that he will be neglected if he is not at least thought to deliver what he promises. Since, then, he knows that he cannot always give what is asked, he tries to make up in another way for what he could not do in one; and in this way, even against his will, he foully confounds the boundaries — so to speak — of his arts. For what else is he to do, when he promises real things that he is unable to deliver? Clearly he works at this by whatever means he can: that he should not appear to his disciples wholly a liar and powerless.

FUR. Which things, then, and of what kind, do you think the *magi* [Magos] can bring about — or rather, the demons themselves through them? If I

understand this, it will also be clear what the *striges* [Striges] can do, and likewise on whose help they rely when they promise themselves such things.

ER. Since I think it is clear enough from what has gone before that they know and confess that whatever they do, they do by the help and power of the devil, anyone who has shown what demons can do in this area will have explained the matter clearly enough. Indeed, the women do not deny that of themselves they knew nothing great or recondite; nor do they deny that they were trained and taught by the demon. So even if they are thoroughly convinced that the things they customarily employ contain wonderful powers [vires], unknown to everyone else, they nevertheless all testify, with great unanimity, that those powers were revealed to them by Satan. And yet the experience of so many centuries has taught most firmly and most surely that a great many of them believed that those same things were imbued with new powers [facultatibus] whenever they had made up their minds to use them and had become suppliants to the devil for that gift. This fact alone could have warned them: that they did not exercise such powers as often and whenever they wished, but only when they were ordered by the Demon [à Dæmone] to use them. [Margin: *Infitæ rerū vires semper infunt.* — "The innate powers of things are always present in them."] For whatever powers any things have obtained in themselves and from their own nature, they exercise everywhere and always according to their nature and strength — even though the same effect, either because of the unsuitability of the patient or because of other impediments, does not follow invariably.

FUR. Why, then, do you not finally set out how great the devil's power is?

ER. I have explained this sufficiently, in my own judgement at least, in the *Antiparacelsica* [In *Antiparacelficis*]; here it will be enough to repeat the gist of it briefly. [Margin: *Quæ fit Dæm. potestas in efficientia miraculorum.* — "What the power of demons is in the working of miracles."] Of the marvellous things that appear to be done beside or against the accustomed course and order of Nature, some truly are what they appear to be; others merely appear to be something, although in reality they are something other than they are thought to be. The first class contains true miracles, artificial things, and certain natural ones. That God alone is the author of miracles is self-evident, for they belong to creation — indeed, there is in them a kind of creation. So nothing here can be attributed to the Demon. Things that are purely artificial do not concern our present purpose, since we do not doubt that devils can do such things, or assist those who do them. The theologians hold that demons, if they are not restrained by God, can do everything that can be brought about by local motion [per localem motum]; for they maintain that the demons did not lose their nature when they fell from the grace of God their creator. So the devil can carry food, drink and other such things from the most remote places in the briefest space of time. In these, as in artificial things, the essence is not changed, nor is any new substance made that did not exist before; rather, a different composition is made of things that already existed, while the things are joined

together differently, and only their quantity, outward shape, position, place and the like are changed. [Margin: Dæm. non possunt naturales res producere. — "Demons cannot produce natural things."] Of natural things — those that are truly and simply such — the author is none other than Nature, which is God's ordinary power, placed in things at their very creation. If demons could produce these by their own powers, without the intervention of natural seeds [fine interuentu naturalium feminum], we should be forced to confess that they are creators. Some things, however, are made from natural things beyond Nature's ordinary way; but what is made in this way is not simply natural — it comes into being partly by the work of Nature and partly by the work of art. Who does not know that fruits can be changed marvellously — in flavour, colour, shape and size — by grafting, cultivation and other means? It is certain that a purgative quality can be imparted to astringent things, a wholesome quality to unwholesome ones, and conversely a harmless quality to harmful ones. We know, too, that art has brought it about that fruits which could not come into being in a certain place because of the intemperate air [propter aëris intemperiem] have come into being there. Finally, it has also been plainly seen that some fruits have both come into being and been brought to full ripeness much earlier or later than their nature allows. If it is maintained that the Demon too can do such things, and teach others to do them, I will not object;

but in this he will be no better than a good and diligent farmer (or some other craftsman, if similar things are done in other matters). What is proper to the Demon, therefore, is this: to cast illusions [præstigias] before the senses, to mock with feigned things, and to present fictions and empty images [inania simulachra] in place of things. [Margin: Quomodo morbos inferat Dæmon. — "How the Demon inflicts diseases."] If he inflicts diseases by using the natural motions of the humours, the spirits and the members — which, however, he cannot do without God's special permission — and if, by withdrawing and ceasing to move them, he appears to heal those same diseases, he does nothing that could not also have been brought about by Nature. It is evident from what has been said that devils neither perform true miracles nor produce natural things without natural causes, but only feign shadows, which appear to be the things whose likeness they cast before the senses, and yet are not. [Margin: Sagæ nihil supra naturā possunt. — "The *sagæ* can do nothing beyond nature."] It therefore follows necessarily that the *sagæ* [Sagas] do not accomplish anything beyond the powers of nature either. Indeed, in this respect they are inferior to Satan to the same degree that corporeal things are more hampered than incorporeal substances [incorporeis substantijs]. So they cannot insinuate themselves into our bodies in order to disturb the humours and spirits there — something that is sometimes granted to Satan by God. This too is evident: the things by which they stupidly suppose they perform marvels receive no greater powers than they have of themselves. If at any time any of those things comes about which they wished to do at the prompting of the evil demon, it must be believed to have been done not by those things but by the devil himself. He easily

persuades those he has first deranged that it was done by them — a thing which he perceived God had granted him the power to accomplish.

FUR. I have understood whom you call *sagae* [Sagas], and how much, in your judgement, they can do. Since that subject must also be discussed later, I am content for now. What I want to hear now is whether they can rightly be punished with death [capitis supplicio affici]. [Margin: *Saga iniuste videtur capitali poena puniri.* — It seems that a *saga* is unjustly punished with capital punishment.]

ER. I am well aware [Nō ignoro] that there are many who firmly deny that very thing, and who pile up many arguments in support of their opinion — solid ones, as they themselves at least think. [Margin: 1.] And indeed, since it is admitted that these women harm no one by the things they mostly use, and can do none of the things whose effecting they ignorantly claim for themselves, it seems unjust that they should be hurried off to punishment. What adds to the injustice is that none, or very few, have been found who have administered lethal and truly harmful poisons [lethalia & verè perniciofa venena].

FUR. I will add others to this reason of yours. [Margin: 2.] First, they have no fixed formulas of conjuration [coniurationum formulas], as other enchanters [Incantatorum] have. Rather, because their *phantasia* [phantasiam] is corrupted by melancholic humours [humoribus melancholicis], which abound at an old woman's time of life, they dream that they harm people whom in actual fact they have neither harmed nor been able to harm. [Margin: 3.] For the same reason they imagine that they possess skill in some harmful art [artis maleficæ] — whose, I do not know — though there is nothing they have learned or know less. [Margin: 4.] If you think they should be punished for apostasy [propter apostasiam], I will contend that this is done by no right at all. First, because a desertion of that kind is imaginary. Second, the penalty of death [poena capitis] is not to be imposed for every defection whatever — unless you wish to subject St Peter [D. Petrum], and many others who denied Christ, to the same penalty. [Margin: 5.] It will further have to be seen whether they come back to their senses [refipiscant] or persevere obstinately in error. If they return to the way, why should you reject the body when God receives the soul? If they remain stubborn, you must beware of destroying the soul along with the body. [Margin: 6.] Or will you strive to call us back under the Mosaic yoke? Will you not reflect that we have come into the time of grace? Under Moses a false witness is put to death, Deut. 19; a corrupted bride [Spōfa corrupta] is overwhelmed with stones, Deut. 22; a thief by day [Fur diurnus] is killed, Exodi 22. Now is a time of some grace. That is why Christ does not order the adulteress to be put to death, Iohā. 6⁹, nor wish an eye to be paid back for an eye, Luc. 6. These things are not observed so strictly now; they are greatly mitigated.

⁹the page prints "Iohā. 6."; the episode stands at John 8 in the received text.

ER. I hold the opposite view: that they can lawfully, and in accordance with the will of God, be punished with death. [Margin: *Sagæ ex Dei voluntate occidi possunt. — By the will of God the *sagæ* may be put to death.*] I think I have proved this with truer reasons in the disputations of my *Antiparacelsica* [Antiparacelsi. di-/sputationibus].

[Margin: Argumentum I. — First argument.] This, first of all, is agreed among all who have tasted Holy Scripture even with the tip of their lips: God openly commanded that the *magi* [Magos] be visited with the ultimate punishment [extremo supplicio]. It follows that our *sagæ* [Sagas] too, whom we have shown to be included among the *magi*, must be judged liable to the same penalty. [Margin: *Striges cōtinentur sub Magis. — The *striges* are included among the *magi*.*] If anyone is in doubt here whether we are right to count the *sagæ* among the *magi*, let him reread what we said on this matter above, and examine attentively what we shall have to say later. I do not doubt that he will agree with us.

FUR. About that later, when I have heard your other reasons.

ER. [Margin: 2.] The second reason is this: through Moses, Exod. 22 [22. Exod.], God ordered in plain and express words that *maleficae* or *magæ* [maleficas feu Magas] — from whose company our *sagæ* can never be exempted — be punished with death [pœna capitali]. [Margin: *Deus præcepit Sagas interfici. — God commanded that the *sagæ* be killed.*] For whether we look at the Hebrew name, the Greek or the Latin, this will always remain true: in the passage just cited God commanded that all those be removed from our midst who desire to accomplish anything, whether good or bad, by the works of the devil — that is, by illicit arts and methods devised by the Devil. And it is certain that whatever marvellous and unusual things the *sagæ* either do, or believe themselves to do, they do by the power [virtute] of the evil demon. Whatever of these things they profess to know, they have all confessed, at all times and in all places, that they received from the devil. [Margin: *Mosis præceptum nō agit de Veneficis propriè vocatis. — Moses' command does not concern *veneficae* properly so called.*] That Moses is not speaking here of the *veneficae* [Veneficis], who kill people by giving them a harmful poison to drink [veneno malo propinato], is clear first from this: he uses the same name here as he uses in Exod. 7 [7. Exod.] to signify Pharaoh's *magi* [Magos Pharaonis], who contended with Moses not by poisons but by illusions [præstigijs]. We find the same word (or forms inflected from it) used elsewhere too; but in no place does it signify one who administers a real poison [venenum verum exhibentem]. Everywhere it signifies either an enchanter [Incantatorem] or an impious diviner [impium Diuinatorem] — that is, one who has dealings and fellowship with devils — unless it is agreeable to except that single passage, 4 Reg. 9 [4. Reg. 9. cap.]. There Jehu [Iehu] answers Jehoram [Iehoram], who asks whether he comes in peace: "What peace, while the fornications of Jezebel [Iezebel] your mother, and her very many sorceries [veneficia], continue?" We read that this woman was utterly devoted to the worship of demons and sought with the greatest zeal

to overthrow and trample underfoot the true worship of God; but we do not read that she was a harlot or that she killed people with poisoned cups. Jehu is therefore speaking of spiritual fornication and spiritual *veneficium* [veneficio spiritali] — that is, of the veneration and worship of devils.

FUR. But the Seventy Translators [Septuaginta interpretes] seem to have understood and rendered this word differently.

ER. [Margin: Septuaginta interpretū cōuerfio. — The version of the Seventy Translators.] If it is agreeable to look at the Seventy Translators' version [septuaginta interpretum conuerfionem], our position will be confirmed all the more. Almost everywhere, in fact, they rendered the word Moses used by the names φαρμακοῦ [Greek: φαρμακοῦ (pharmakou, genitive of φαρμακός, "sorcerer, drug-mixer")] and those derived from it — just as the Latins generally rendered it *malefici* [maleficos] and *maleficia*. Since Moses had used the same word both here and in Exod. 7 [7. Exod.] (except that here he used the masculine gender, and in Exod. 22 [22. Exo.] the feminine), they nonetheless translated it by the same word, φαρμακοῦ, because they judged that the same thing was meant by Moses in both places. It is true that in Exod. 7 [ca. 7. Exo.] they call them not only φαρμακοὺς [Greek: φαρμακοὺς (pharmakous, "sorcerers," accusative plural)] but also ἐπα[ο?]ιδοὺς [Greek: ἐπαοιδούς (epaoidous, "enchanters," accusative plural)], just as they likewise name the methods of working that those Egyptian *magi* used both φαρμακείας [Greek: φαρμακείας (pharmakeias, "sorceries, drug-craft")] and ἐπαοιδίας [Greek: ἐπαοιδίας (epaoidias, "enchantments")]. From this it is plainly proved that these men thought the Hebrew word, which they translated in both places, meant the very thing that φαρμακός [Greek: φαρμακός (pharmakos, "sorcerer")] and ἐπαοιδός [Greek: ἐπαοιδός (epaoidos, "enchanter")] both signified to the Greeks at that time. But anyone would be utterly ignorant of almost everything who supposed that by the names φαρμακῶν [Greek: φαρμακῶν (pharmakōn, genitive plural)] and φαρμακείας they meant to signify *venefici* [veneficos] properly so called, and poisons [venena].

For who does not know that the Egyptian *magi* fought with Moses not with poisons or poisoned cups, but tried to evade his commands by enchantments [incantationibus] and illusions [præstigijs]? And with great judgment indeed the most eminent men seem to have expressed the Hebrew word by the name φαρμακῶν, so that no one could explain or understand it otherwise than as the Hebrew word itself signified. It is certain that for the Greeks the verb ἐπάδειν [?] [Greek: ἐπάδειν (epadein, "to sing over, to enchant")] denotes nothing other than to practise illusions [præstigias exercere] or to enchant, whereas the word φαρμακεύειν [Greek: φαρμακεύειν (pharmakeuein, "to use drugs; to practise sorcery")] can be taken in both a good and a bad sense. And when it signifies something bad, it denotes both of these things: harming with poisons [venenis nocere] and casting illusions [præstigias offundere]. So they very wisely joined the former word to the latter right at the beginning of their translation, so that it would be plain to everyone how they were going to use

the word φαρμακείας [Greek: φαρμακείας (pharmakeias, "of sorcery"; genitive of φαρμακεία)] from then on.

FUR. Do you want to bring forward other arguments on this matter as well?

ER. Whoever is pious, and believes God to be so truthful that he is willing to hold what God said only once to be no less binding than if He had repeated the same thing ten or twenty times, will ask for nothing more. It has been proved clearly enough that God wills all to be killed who strive by forbidden and demonic arts [vetitis & dæmoniacis artibus] either to harm or to help, whether they actually accomplish it or think they accomplish it. [Margin: Deus, cum Diabolo cōmercium habentes per artes vetitas, interfici vult omnes. — "God wills that all who have dealings with the Devil through forbidden arts be put to death."] Since no one at all can deny that the *striges* [ftrigas] are counted among these, what I had undertaken to prove has been proved plainly enough. Nonetheless I shall add other reasons too, so as to satisfy the less educated as well. That an idolater [Idololatram] may be put to death according to God's command is certain from chapter 17 [ex 17. capit.]

of Deuteronomy [Deuter.], where it is written thus: "If anyone is found among you, whether man or woman, who has undertaken so great a crime against God that he has gone so far against His covenant as to worship and adore foreign gods, and you have established after diligent inquiry that this is true, you shall lead that man or woman who committed that outrage [flagitium] out to the gate, and you shall kill him, overwhelmed with stones." [Margin: 3.] [Margin: Striges sunt Idololatrarum omnium pefsima. — "The *striges* are the worst of all idolaters."]

Is anyone really so shameless as to deny that the *sagae* [Sagas] are idolaters [Idololatrās]? For which of the two sins more gravely, or is more of an idolater: the one who adores an idol of the devil and serves it, or the one who is a suppliant to the devil himself? The *striges* do not adore images of demons; rather, they give themselves over wholly to the demons themselves, deliver themselves into their clientship [in eorum clientelā], promise that they will be their slaves [mancipia], and bind themselves by a pledge given [data fide stipulātur] to obey their commands. Has there been devised in any age, or could there ever be devised hereafter, an idolatry more wicked and sacrilegious? I do not think so. Why, then, do they judge that these women, rather than others, should be spared?

FUR. That they are idolaters, if they do what you assert they do, no one will be able to deny. Nor do we doubt that idolaters who are deserters [Idololatrās defertores] are to be punished capitally. The dispute turns on this: whether they do these things truly, or only in imagination [in fola imagine]? But go on now:

perhaps we shall deal with this later.

ER. [Margin: 4.] [Margin: Striges alios feducunt. — "The *striges* lead others astray."] To what has been said, this must be added: they often also induce and

urge others to commit the same crime, by whatever means they can and know (from the start they covenant that they will apply every diligence to this). Of these seducers [*feductoribus*] the Law of God speaks thus, in Deut. 13 [*capit. 13. Deuter.*]: "If your brother, born of the same mother as you, or your son, or your daughter, or the wife who is in your bosom, or a friend as dear to you as your own soul, secretly urges you to the worship of foreign gods, do not comply with him, do not listen to him, do not obey him, do not pity him; but kill him, overwhelm him with stones, since [q] he tried to lead you away from your God." What of the fact that it goes on to order the houses, cattle and household goods, together with whole towns in which any such abandoned men are found who incite their fellow citizens to worship other gods, to be burned? God therefore wills, and seriously commands, that not only those who openly and with impunity counsel desertion and apostasy [*apostafiam*], but also those who secretly try to persuade anyone of the same, be punished with death. And if any town does not punish such criminals, He orders the whole of it to be destroyed and forbids it ever to be rebuilt. What excuse shall we make here? That our *striges* are worshippers of demons and deserters of the true God [*Dæmonum cultores & Dei veri defertores esse nostras*]

[*Striges*] is certain [*certum est*]. That they also try to drag others into the same crime is equally plain. Therefore they must be punished capitally for their wicked desertion; and on account of the seduction, if it has been established and they are not put to death, destruction hangs over others as well.

FUR. This is a weighty speech, and one that cannot rightly be dismissed. But what answer I think can be given to it, I shall show later; you go on to what follows.

ER. [Margin: 5.] [Margin: *Sagæ sunt homicidæ.* — The *sagæ* are murderers.] They deserve punishment on another ground as well: namely, that they are murderers (since they try to destroy both men and beasts with diseases); that they strive to inflict every kind of harm on those they hate; that they labour to sow hatred between husband and wife, and not merely to drive but actually to force both maidens and married women into unchaste loves. Although each of these is a capital crime in itself, they are all the more so because they are accomplished through the ministry and servile labour of demons. Nor will it excuse them that the things by which they try to satisfy their hatreds are not endowed with such power [*virtute*] as could bring about what they wish. It is certain nonetheless that these attempts of theirs often achieve their effect, and that they rejoice greatly in their hearts [*in finu fuo*] at what they have perpetrated, and think no otherwise than that it was accomplished by themselves. For they obstinately believe, that the herbs, images, characters and words they work with as their instruments can bring about effects of this kind, by a power either inherent in them or acquired from the demon. Add that they repeatedly incite the evil demon himself [*Cacodæmona*] with prayers, and by whatever means they can, to help them accomplish such things. No good and intelligent man, I think, will dare deny that this is a capital crime. For although the wicked spirits

are watchful of their own accord to do harm, and, like a roaring lion (as Peter says), go about seeking whom they may devour, it is nonetheless probable that they would often never have thought of what they attempt, and with God's permission accomplish, at the instigation of the *sagae* [Sagis]. The *maleficia* are indeed performed secretly by the demons themselves; but those who drove them to it are nonetheless rightly called, and truly are, *malefici*. No one denies that notorious *magi* [Magos] and necromancers [Necromantes], who merely call up shades or demons with certain spells [carminibus], sin capitally, even if they have resolved to harm no one. How, then, does the one not sin more gravely who invites them, not with a spell containing a tacit pact, but by open fellowship summons them with suppliant words and inflames them to do harm?

[Margin: Cur lex peculiaris de Strigibus data fit. — Why a special law was given concerning the *striges*.]¹⁰ Why should Moses be thought to have passed a special law on the punishment of *striges* [ftrigum], if they are to be counted as murderers? For chapter 35 of Numbers [35. cap. Num.] clearly shows that whoever, with the deliberation of his mind, knowingly and willingly destroys someone is a murderer: whether he has killed him with a sword, an iron blade, an axe, a stone, a club or a fist; or suffocated him with a noose, a pillow, a cloth, his hands or water; or thrown him down from a height; or put him to death by hunger or poison; or forced him to lay hands on himself; or killed him in any other way whatever. So if the matter stands thus — that whoever has done away with a man, knowingly and deliberately, by whatever means he procured his death, is truly called a murderer — what need was there to speak specifically of *striges* [ftrigib.]?

ER. There is a strong reason why a special law had to be passed concerning *malefici* [Maleficus] and enchanters [Incantatoribus]. For the case of those who do away with a man by a definite poison [veneno certo], one they have come to know to be such, is very far different from that of the others, who in earnest and in actual deed contrive destruction for others with dire spells [carminibus], the invocation of demons, exorcisms, images and characters consecrated to the Devil, or by administering or using other things that have been enchanted or medicated by demons. If they really always brought about what they attempt, it could have seemed superfluous, I admit. But since experience has taught that they very often use for harming things that are wholly harmless and equipped with nothing to harm anyone [cuiq; nocendi nulla præditis]; and moreover it is known that they do not always, indeed not even often, obtain what they wish — it was not without cause that the ancients passed a special law concerning them, by which they decreed that such practitioners [artifices] are guilty of homicide. For Plato, in book II of the *Laus* [li. II. de Legibus], ruled thus:

[Greek: ὅσα τις ἄλλος ἄλλον πημάνει φαρμακοῖς, τὰ μὲν θανάσμα αὐτῶν διείρηται: τῶν δ' ἄλλων περὶ βλάβειν, εἴτε [?] τις ἄρα πόμασιν, ἢ καὶ βρώμασιν, ἢ ἀλείμμασιν, ἐκῶν ἐκ προνοίας πημαίνει, τούτων οὐδὲν πω

¹⁰the page prints no speaker prefix here and no paragraph break; this question runs on mid-line after the preceding one. The next prefix printed is ER., on the following page.

διερρήθη. διτταὶ γὰρ δὴ φαρμακεῖαι κατὰ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὔσαι γενός, ἐπίχουσι τὴν διάρρησιν. ἦν [?] μὲν γὰρ τανῦν διαρρήδην εἵπομεν, σώματι σώματα ἐστὶ κακουργοῦσα [?] κατὰ φύσιν: ἄλλη ἢ μαγγανείαις καὶ ἐπωδαῖς, καὶ καταδέσεσι, &c.]

"Of all the harms that one person does another by drugs [φαρμακοῖς], the lethal ones have been dealt with; but concerning the other injuries — whether someone harms another willingly and with forethought by drinks, or by foods, or by ointments — nothing has yet been laid down. For there are two kinds of *pharmakeia* [φαρμακεῖαι] among the race of men that [?] the determination [τὴν διάρρησιν]. The one we have just now expressly described is the kind that injures bodies by a body [σώματι σώματα], according to nature; the other, which works by sorceries [μαγγανείαις] and incantations [ἐπωδαῖς] and bindings [καταδέσεσι], etc."

Here Plato plainly affirms that the nature of lethal poisons [lethaliū venenorum] and of enchanted drugs [incantatorum pharmacorum] is not the same, and that separate laws must therefore be passed concerning them, since the manner of harming is not the same. For the first is natural; the second seemed, even to the ancients, to rise above the measure of nature.

FUR. I accept this reasoning, since I have nothing I could rightly set against it. So you may add more, if you have anything further.

ER. [Margin: 6.] [Margin: Striges exercent artem capitalem. — The *striges* practise an art that is a capital crime.] What of the fact that the practice of this art — or rather this vanity — is a capital offence, even if it is practised or sought solely for pleasure or for sport? What I say is plainly evident from the fact that God earnestly commands that anyone who merely consults a soothsayer [Ariolum], a *magus* [Magum], a seer [vatem] aliud [?] [confulit] [Margin: Vatem aut magū con- (the note runs on past the foot of the page)]

[Margin: (completing the note begun on the previous page) One who consults a seer or a *magus* commits a capital sin.]

[folūm] be put to death. Now if God wills that a man who uses the counsel of someone practising a forbidden art should be punished with death, even though he has done no harm and has not even thought of doing any, how, I ask you, could anyone believe that God meant to spare the one who gives the counsel [consultori]? The same reasoning applies to the *magi* [Magorum] who work no harm but only perform amusements [ludicra], or inquire into certain hidden matters. For God commands that all such people be removed from our midst. And no other reason can be given for this than that they have learned illicit arts. The reason is that these arts can be neither learned nor practised without commerce with the Devil. For anyone who tries to bring about, by natural instruments [infrumenis, recte: infrumentis], things that exceed the powers of Nature, and who does not use the ministry of God or of the good Angels to effect them, necessarily relies on the Devil's work [opera], with a pact [pactione] intervening, either tacit or express [manifesta]. For what else could be devised or imagined? Now no one denies that the *striges* attempt

greater things than can be effected by the powers [viribus] of the things they use. It is no less certain that they believe the very things they apply acquire new powers from a blasphemous and foolish muttering of words and from the invocation of demons. That they also *Pcifci* [?] with the devil — and indeed far more wickedly than other enchanter[s] [Incātorib.] — the facts themselves show; nor do they themselves deny it.¹¹ Therefore nothing can be affirmed with more certainty than that they are both instructed in nefarious arts and use them. Who, then, [Margin: Knowledge of a single thing is commonly called an art [Ars].]

will deny that they should be killed [occidendas], even on this ground alone?

FUR. And yet they possess no art, nor have they gone anywhere from home for the sake of learning one. They have no books, and most of these women [pleræque] have not even learned to read.

ER. I answer that the Law of God punishes not only those who have thoroughly learned a long art, consisting of many precepts and rules and acquired with much labour and time, but also all the others who, on account of the partnership [focietatē] they have entered into with the evil demon [Cacodæmone], have drawn something from him. By "art" we here mean even the knowledge of a single thing, or some single experiment [experimentum], or several, of the kind commonly called "receipts" [Receptæ] and "arts" — as when someone says he knows an art of doing this or that: [German: ein Künſt, "a knack, a trick"]. And why not? Has a man who asks a seer [vatem] about the outcome of some business he has undertaken learned some long art? Yet by the Law of God the man who had done this was to be put to death, because God wills that no one should learn blasphemous arts, which have the devil as their author and inventor, nor practise them, nor that others should use them — whether a person does so for a good or for an evil purpose. Nor do we find it written anywhere that only those who use set formulae [conceptis verbis] or a longer spell [carmine] ought to be punished. Rather, the law commands that *malefici* ("workers of harm") [maleficos] in general be put to death, whether they use many words or few. For under the same law are included all *malefici* [malefici] who practise illicit arts in any way whatever, even if in place of words they substitute ceremonies or other trifles [reculas] that are harmless in themselves — provided only that they acknowledge the devil as their master. God therefore willed such arts to be capital crimes, not because they are long or short, difficult or easy to learn, but because they are not learned without a capital pact [capitali pacto]: that is, because those who learn them, those who practise them, and those who expect some profit from them all contract a partnership and covenant [focietatē & fœdus] with the devil, either openly or tacitly. [Margin: Why diabolical arts are capital crimes.]

¹¹The page prints "*Pcifci*" (six sorts: P-c-i-f-c-i), with a short oblique stroke standing over the first c; as it stands it does not assemble into a Latin word. *Pacifci*, "to make a pact", fits the sense; whether the stroke is an abbreviation mark or a flaw in the sort cannot be told from this scan.

FUR. Would you like to add anything more to what you have said?

ER. [Margin: 7.] [Margin: *Sagae* [Saga] join their bodies with devils.] Let this stand as the seventh reason: that they practise a foul and execrable lust with the evil demon. Certainly each of them has her own lovers, distinguished by dress, appearance and name. And they usually come together with them immediately after the partnership or pact has been contracted — as all of them, wherever they have been caught, have always affirmed with great agreement.

FUR. How can you say this, when the devil is without true flesh and for that reason is gripped by no desire for Venus, as human beings are?

ER. [Margin: Why the Devil couples with the *striges* [Strigibus].] This is no obstacle to my view and to what I have said. For he does not mingle with them in order to take pleasure himself from that act, but in order to produce delight in the *sagae* [Sagis]. Nor is there any doubt that he is able to produce a titillation by stirring up the humours, the spirits [spirituum] and the seed, no less than by the disturbance of the same, with diseases he can torture [excarnificare]. The former is all the easier than the latter, because in the former case he has the natural appetite and motion of the *strix* [Strigis] serving him, whereas in the latter they resist him. Moreover, he assumes various bodies, as they say. There is no need at all to say more about these, since it is certain that he surrounds himself with a body that can be seen and touched, even though it is not true flesh. The *lamiae* [Lamię], or *empusae* [Empufæ], of the ancients prove this. The German or Augsburg apparition [spectrum Germanicum feu Auguſtanum], which I mentioned above, proves it; countless other cases prove it. For he often meets travellers in the form of a real man, has walked along with them, has conversed with them, and has behaved in every other respect in such a way that he was believed to be a real man. I have heard from trustworthy people that in certain places they [eos] sought lodging in the guise of noble knights, reclined at table together [vnà accubuiſſe], ate, and shortly afterwards vanished from sight. Furthermore, that women who dare so dreadful and nefarious a crime deserve to be punished even with the cruellest penalty is too plain to need proof. God commands that those who couple with a beast be burned together, both of them. Does not the one who admits the foulest spirits to his embraces — indeed entices and solicits them — sin more gravely? As a crowning conclusion [coronidis vice] I add this last argument. It is most certain that blasphemers are to be subjected to capital punishment, according to the Law: "Whoever curses [malè] [dixerit] his God shall bear his iniquity. And whoever pronounces [exprefferit] the name of Jehovah [Iehouë] shall surely die; the whole congregation shall certainly stone him" [moriendo morietur, lapidando lapidabunt eum] (Lev. 24 [Leuit. 24.]). Now it is established that the *lamiae* [Lamias], by deliberate choice [Greek: ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως (ek tēs proaireseōs, "from deliberate choice")], in order to gratify Satan, revile the eternal God with horrible abuse and give open proof of their hatred toward him by dreadful blasphemies. So it is not obscure what penalties they should suffer. Strictly speaking, a blasphemer is one who hurls abuse at God, led by

the wicked lust and wantonness of his own mind. Yet I see that among the Jews, and in the New Testament too, those also are called blasphemers who abjure God and tear apart all piety and divine worship with curses (Acts 18:6; James 2:7; 1 Peter 4:14 [Act. 18. 6. Iac. 2. 7. 1. Petr. 4. 14.]).

FUR. These are trifles, as will be seen later. Now finish your story.

ER. You call them trifles, and laugh; but you prove by no arguments that they are false. [Margin: Conclusion.] For my part I know that with these reasons I have clearly demonstrated that the *sagae* [Sagas], according to the prescript of God [iuxta p̄ scriptum Dei], are liable to capital punishment; and that the magistrate who punishes such people [tales] with death does not sin, but carries out the divine will and does a thing pleasing to God — provided only that he punishes the guilty [nocētes]. [Margin: Why punishment is inflicted on the wicked [Cur poena scelerofis infligatur].] Moreover, punishment is inflicted, whether on these or on others, for no other end than that the rest may be deterred and dare nothing of the kind. That is why we read it repeated so often in Moses, as often as he commands that some be put to death for crimes committed: it is done so that others may see, and fear to commit the same. Plato too gave this reason, in the passage cited a little earlier, writing as follows: [Greek: οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ κακουργῆσαι διδοὺς τὴν δίκην (οὐ γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀγέννητον ἔσται[?] ποτέ[?]) τοῦ δ' εἰς αὐθις ἕνεκα χρόνον ἢ τὸ παράπαν μισῆται τὴν ἀδικίαν. αὐτόν[?] τε καὶ τοὺς ἰδόντας αὐτὸν δικαιούμενον, ἢ λοφῆσαι μέρη πολλὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ξυμφορᾶς.] — "he pays the penalty not for the sake of the wrongdoing (for what has happened will never be made not to have happened), but for the sake of the time to come: that he himself, and those who see him punished, may either hate injustice altogether, or be relieved of a great part of such a calamity." He says that penalties are not to be inflicted on account of the crime [maleficium], since what has been done cannot be undone, but so that from then on crimes may be avoided both by those who commit them and by those who look on, or at least be committed less often. Now I shall answer the arguments you sang out at us above — unless you see it otherwise.

FUR. I will listen, and afterwards I will try to refute your points with weightier ones.

ER. [Margin: *Sagae* [Saga] are put to death not because they accomplished marvels, but etc.] I say again: the *striges* [Striges] are not to be punished because they did any of those marvellous things which they supposed they had done, but because they attempted to do such things through the works of the devil. I have already pointed out that God punishes with death seers [vates] and *magi* [Magos] who never set their minds on doing harm to anyone, but either strive only to foresee the future or by their illusions [prestigijs] give pleasure to others. What then? Does he not command that anyone who consults a diviner [Diuinatore] be put to death, even if he has nothing else evil in mind? But why to proceed [animaduertere] with such severity against these men does he order? [præcipit?] No other reason can be given than that those who dare such things

strike a partnership [*focietatem*] with the Devil, either openly or tacitly. It is therefore in vain to object that they have done no harm, since God wills them to be put to death not on account of harm done but on account of the covenant [*fœdus*] struck with the devil. Nor are they excused by the fact that, unlike other enchanterers [*Incātatorum*], they use no fixed formula. [Margin: There is more than one way of making a pact with devils.] For this pact [*pactio*] can be contracted in various ways. It is enough that what they do, they do with the devil's help. I deny, moreover, that this pact is imaginary, since it is sought and performed [*petatur & præstetur*] by people who are awake, and not without deliberation going before.

FUR. Not every desertion is capital.

ER. [Margin: What desertion is capital.] I grant it; but I flatly deny that a desertion such as that of the *sagae* [*Sagarū*] ought not to be suppressed and restrained by the ultimate punishment. Peter's denial was something else, as we shall hear presently in its proper place. But if she comes to her senses [*refipit*], she is to be pitied; if she does not come to her senses, the soul is not to be killed together with the body. [Margin: The wicked do not escape punishment whenever there is repentance for the deed [*facti res pœnitet*].] To both points one answer serves: God does not will that perpetrators of capital crimes should be spared slaughter [*non trucidentur*] on the ground that they have either begun to repent of their crime or in no way repent of it. Will the magistrate, then, release a robber who repents? Or will he refrain from putting to death one who does not know how to repent? Penalties, as I said before, are not inflicted because the criminal either repents or does not repent, but so that by the example of the punishment the rest may be deterred. It is not necessary that the soul too be killed when the body is killed. For are none of those who are put to death, whether justly or unjustly, saved? Far from it. Indeed, of both kinds many are saved and many are damned; for this temporal death neither saves nor damns. They [*Instituendæ*] must therefore be instructed before they are put to death. Nor, for that reason, do I wish to bring you back under the yoke of Moses (although I do not see where the moral Law of God has been abolished; certainly Christ, in Matt. 15 [*Matt. 15.*], seems rather to establish it than to abolish it). I affirm only this: whatever crimes God made capital may even now be restrained by the magistrate with capital punishment without offence to God. [Margin: Crimes that God made capital are to be held as such now too.] I do not insist that this be done in every case, but I maintain that the one who does it does not sin. If some crimes can be repressed just as successfully by a milder penalty, I do not demand a harsher one, since I have shown that penalties were instituted for this end: that people may be drawn away from crimes by fear of them. Nor does he judge rightly who thinks that the time of grace in which we live extends so far that greater licence has been granted to crimes. [Margin: The liberty of the Gospel does not command that the wicked be spared.] We live under the liberty of the Gospel; but this liberty does not command the magistrate to neglect crimes, nor in any other way does it grant

power to sin more freely. For not less now than under Moses does God wish the wicked to be punished, for the reason stated above [propter ante dictam causam]; and the passage of Matthew cited a little while ago shows this most clearly. The liberty of the Gospel concerns the conscience; it does not grant impunity for crimes. It frees us from the yoke of ceremonies; it does not abolish the moral law and its penalties. Therefore the magistrate could not be blamed if he were now to punish a false witness, a betrothed woman who has been defiled [sponsam corruptam], and a thief by day [furemque diurnum] in the same way that God commanded them to be punished through Moses. Nor is what you were saying about the adulteress an obstacle. For Christ did not forbid her to be punished according to the Law; he rebuked them because they had brought her to him in order to test him [tentandi causa]. I pass over the fact that Christ had not come to occupy the benches of judges. As for the passage in Luke, chapter 6 [6. capit. Luc.], which denies that an eye is to be paid for an eye: it does not concern the magistrate and the civil order [politicumque ordinem], but private persons. For there he means to teach how great the perfection of Christians ought to be, and their patience toward their neighbour.

FUR. I have listened to you long enough. The time now demands that you in turn hear me attacking your reasons, and setting out and confirming at greater length what I said more briefly above.

ER. Put forward whatever [quicqd] you have been able to think up, or to learn from others: I shall bear with you gladly. Indeed, your utmost effort [summum conatū tuum] in finding fault with our positions [nostris] and

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defending yours I shall count as the greatest of kindnesses [summi beneficij loco].

FUR. First, I boldly deny to you that the *sagae* [Sagas] are included under the *magi* [Magis]. [Margin: Objection to the first argument [Aduersus 1. argumētum obiection].] For they stand at a great distance from the wicked *magi*. The *magi* apply their minds to these arts of their own accord, driven by a kind of mad elation of spirit or moved by an unlawful curiosity; whereas the *sagae* do whatever they do here because the devil has persuaded them. Now it is far more grievous to commit a crime of one's own will and deliberation than to be led into it by certain enticements; and the two ought not to pay the same penalty. Take as an example two homicides. One of them, having debated the matter with himself [re apud se disputata], is driven by the lust to do evil and kills a man; the other, induced by persuasions, commits the same act. It is certain that the first has deserved the penalty of death; the second we say is either excusable or to be punished with a far milder penalty, because the deed of the former has an internal cause, that of the latter an external one. Moreover, the *striges* [ftriges] of our time were not known to Moses. So he could not have included them within the scope [complexu] of the *magi*.

¹²the page is numbered 356 as printed.

ER. If only those *magi* who are alike in every respect are contained under the name of *magi*, I shall gladly grant that the *sagae* cannot be counted among the *magi*. [Margin: The kinds or modes of *magi* are several [Magorum species seu modi plures].] For we have already shown that they do many dissimilar things. But that the *sagae* also surpass in wickedness most other *magi*, we have likewise shown. On that view, however, there will be only a single species [species] of *magi*. We, by contrast, have shown that magic [Magiam] is divinatory [Diuinatricem] and operative [Operatricem]; and we have pointed out that several species, or modes, or grades, or differences [differentias] of it too are found. Because of the confusion in the manner of learning and practising them, because of the instruments, the same ones of which several often use, and because of their end as well — which is not one and the same for all, if we speak of the proximate end [de proximo] — they cannot be separated into true species. Yet it will never follow from this that they are not all contained within the scope of what is, so to speak, a single genus [generis]. For is man not an animal because he has many things that certain other animals lack? The *striges* [Striges] have certain properties of their own when they are compared with certain other *magi*; but because of this disparity they cannot be removed from the genus of *magi*. Indeed, common to all *magi* (I am speaking of the operative ones [de operatoribus]) are a pact [pactio] with the devil, either open or tacit, and the working of wonders that transcend the powers of nature, and that by the work and help of demons [Dæmonum]. Whoever has these things in him is a *magus*. And in the *striges* [Strigibus] all of them are found. For they both enter into a covenant [foedus] with the devil truly and openly, and attempt to do things that naturally no human beings can and finally they strive to accomplish such things, not by the help and power of God, but by the work of evil demons [Cacodæmonum]. Why then do you deny that they ought to be counted among the *magi*?

FUR. Because the definition or description of the two is not the same. [Margin: What a *magus* is [Quid Magus].] For a *magus* is one who, having been taught either from books or by a demon or some other master, summons demons by spells [carminibus], solemn rites, characters [characteribus], images, figures and other things, to this end: that they answer his demands by voice, or by sign [nota], or in any other way whatever, or accomplish some work beyond and above the order of nature. [Margin: What a *saga* is [Quid Saga[?]].] But a *lamia* [Lamia] is one who, because of a delusive covenant [ob præstigiosum ... foedus] contracted with a demon, either of her own accord or at the devil's urging or with his help, tries to bring some harm on someone, either by a spell [carmine] or by some other thing that is not in itself harmful [per se nō malefica].

ER. What difference is there here so great as to forbid us to count the *striges* [Striges] among the *magi*? Both make a covenant with devils, although the *magi* do it more secretly and obscurely. Both use spells, figures, and things medicated [medicatis] by the devil, as they suppose, to accomplish what they

desire. For my part I certainly see no great difference between them, except that our *sagae* [Sagæ] are worse than the *magi*. [Margin: The *sagae* surpass the *magi* in wickedness [Saga[?] vincunt improbitate Magos].] The former [Illi], for the most part, do whatever they do for foreknowledge of things to come, or [au] for delight, or for jest or play, or [au]

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for display [ostentationem] [agunt, quæcunque agunt]; the latter direct everything of theirs [sua omnia] to the ruin and harm of others. The former think that they compel demons [Dæmones], and that in this they are superior to others; the latter acknowledge him as their patron, guardian and God, promise all obedience, and ask of him what they wish to accomplish. The former draw their learning from books; the latter are for the most part instructed by the devils themselves. The former do not expressly abjure piety; the latter surrender themselves wholly to him with a pledged hand [ftipulata manu]. These and similar points do not prove that they [eas] are not included under the *magi*; they prove only that they are not *magi* of that kind [tales Magos]. In the same way, whoever shows that a man is not a quadruped does not prove that he is not contained under "animal", but indicates that he is not that kind of animal.

FUR. The very greatest difference lies in this: that the pact [pactum] of the *sagae* is wholly illusory [præstigiofum] and invalid.

ER. How so? Because the devil is a covenant-breaker [fœdifragus] and acts by guile and lying? [Margin: The pact of the *sagae* and of the devil is not an illusion [Pactum Sagarum & Diaboli nō est præstigium].] Who ever said that no pact had been concluded between the parties to a covenant [fœderatos] on the ground that one party never intended to keep the pact, but acted in pretence so as to crush the other by fraud? To make a pact is one thing; to abide by pacts is another.

FUR. But the devil feigns himself a man, and dazzles the eyes and the *phantasia* [phantasiam] of the wretched old women.

ER. Is [An] the devil an illusion [præstigium], something imaginary, no real thing at all? I do not think so. What then? He has, you say, an illusory body about him. But the *sagae* know this perfectly well, and know with the greatest certainty that the devil lies hidden under this shadow. Next, it is not true that the body in which he presents himself is no body at all, or merely imaginary. For if it can be seen and touched, it is certainly a real body, not an illusion.

FUR. Do you not notice how you contradict yourself? If we listen to you, they are illusions and not illusions at the same time.

ER. [Margin: In what respect the assumed body is illusory [Quatenus corpus assumptū fit præstigiofum].] It is illusory if you suppose it to be a human body, which it only feigns to be. It is not illusory if you take it for the kind of body it is, namely condensed air [aëre ... condensato]. But I am labouring at this in vain, since you yourself supply me with the weapons to win. For you admitted

¹³the page is numbered 359 as printed.

to me elsewhere that demons appear sometimes clothed [circumfulis] in whole, solid and exact corpses of the dead, sometimes in cloudy and vanishing shadows. By the former form he deceives the necromancers [Greek: νεκρομάντις (nekromanteis, "diviners by the dead")], by the latter the sciomancers [Greek: σκιομάντις (skiomanteas, "diviners by shades")]. Therefore it is not all illusory. But be it so: let it be granted you that that body is nothing but illusions. Can the pact [pactio] not be real on that account? [Margin: A man can make a pact with a spiritual substance [Pacisci potest homo cum spiritali substantia].] Indeed, he both speaks and does many things without assuming [assumptione] a visible and palpable body. Next, not with that body, or insofar as [qua-] he then appears corporeal [tūc corporeus videtur], that they contract with him, but insofar as he is the devil, and an invisible and incorporeal spirit.

FUR. And yet the disparity of natures [naturarū disparitas] does not permit this.

ER. I deny that there is any impediment here. For was the pact between God and Abraham, Moses and others void and illusory on that account, because he spoke with them and made a pact with them although he was not seen? Moreover, if this dissimilarity of natures does not allow a pact to be valid, then not even the other *magi* will be able to strike a covenant [fœdus] with the devil: here too, whatever has been attempted will be imaginary and false. Certainly no *striges* [Striges] are so foolish as to think that the bodies in which the devils appear to them are truly human bodies. They know that such bodies are put on by them for a time and laid aside again when they please. Nonetheless they make a pact with him, whom they clearly and certainly know to be the devil, in whatever appearance [specie] or form he displays himself. What, then, shall we be able to devise, or by what argument shall we prove that no pact intervenes? For my part, I see that nothing can be thought up. For it is not true that the demon strikes this covenant with people asleep [cum dormientibus], or that he feigns these things in the spirit [spiritu] of the eyes and brain alone, and that they are not then outside them [nec extra eas tunc esse]. [Margin: The devil does not make a pact with sleepers [Diab. non paciscitur cum dormientibus].] For he does not do everything in that way with the *striges*, but truly appears in a counterfeit or feigned form [in mentita seu ficta forma], and truly speaks with them, existing outside them. And that he can do this, and has often done it, one may demonstrate [demonstret] most firmly both by innumerable other examples and by the single story of Saul alone, 1 Sam. chap. 28 [1. Sam. 28. cap.].

FUR. I cannot yet believe that an express pact [Pactum expreſſum] intervenes.

ER. Come, let this too be granted you, that no express pact intervenes: will they be excluded from the number of the *magi* on that account? By no means. Indeed, very many *magi* not only do not contract an open covenant [fœdus ... apertum] with the devil, but even think that they draw in and compel one who is unwilling and resisting [inuitam & repugnantem]; yet all of us judge them

worthy of punishment on account of the hidden pact [occultum pactum]. And since he often comes to the *sagae* [Sagas] of his own accord, uncalled, a closer union must exist between the *striges* [Striges] and the demon than between him and the *magi*. It is established, moreover, from Holy Scripture that God wills the *magi* to be put to death on account of this communion with devils, of whatever kind it may be [qualemcunque], even if they have harmed no one by their magic, or wished to harm anyone. (Whoever remembers that God wills those who merely consult *magi* about a doubtful matter to be put to death will not expect proof.) How then shall we suppose that he wished the *striges* [ftrigibus] to be spared, who live with demons far more intimately [familiariùs viuunt]? So whichever way we turn, and whatever we may finally attempt, this will always remain true: that the *striges* [Striges] are reckoned among the *magi*, and that their wicked audacity [sceleratam eorum audaciam] ought to be restrained [coherceri] with the same punishment as theirs.

FUR. Although it does not occur to me now what I should say, I shall nevertheless think about it.

ER. What you were saying — that the *magi* ponder and do [meditari agere] such things of their own accord, the *sagae* [Sagas] at the devil's persuasion [fuafore Diabolo] — does not prove that they [eas] are not counted among the *magi*. For in many *magi* too the devil is the originator [autor] of their learning the magical vanities [Magicas vanitates]; and the *sagae* [Sagæ] too, with no devil urging them [nullo impulfore diabolo], nevertheless hand themselves over to him. [Margin: They are no less *magae* [Magæ] for sinning at the devil's instigation [Non propterea non sunt Magæ, quia instigatore Diabolo peccāt].] Very often daughters are led astray [feducuntur] by their mothers, just as *magi*, at someone else's urging [impulfore alio quopiā], apply their minds to both vanity and impiety.

FUR. But the devil instigates through others.

ER. If that were an excuse, scarcely any criminal would have to be punished. For all are incited by the devil, either openly or secretly, whether he whispers it himself or persuades through others. Either, then, the *sagae* are contained in the number of the *magi*, or the *magi* must be defined [describendi] otherwise — which will never rightly be done. For whether they renounce God [Deum abiurent] by their own counsel and give themselves into the devil's protection, or do so moved [permotæ] by him as their adviser, they will always be bound by the devil's covenant [fcedere Diabolico]. Indeed, no one, I think, doubts that both have the endeavour [conatus] to accomplish marvels.

FUR. Even if [Vt ma-] [Vt ma-]ximè: I grant this completely, those [ill...] who do it from their own deliberation still sin more gravely than the women who have been enticed [illectæ] by the demon.

ER. For my part, I am not disputing here whether the former or the latter [illænè an hæ] act more wickedly; I maintain that both must be placed among the *magi*, since both commit the same crime [flagitium]. Nor does the example of the two murderers [homicidarum] that you put forward tell against us; on

the contrary, it confirms our position most strongly. For he who kills a man when persuaded by another is no less a murderer than he who, urged by no one, committed the same deed. [Margin: He too is held liable to the penalty of a murderer [Homicid[æ?] pœna tenetur] who kills a man at someone's persuasion [aliquo suafore].] (What we are saying must be understood of one who is not compelled but only persuaded, and who, though he was able not to do it [cùm facere non poffet]¹⁴, nevertheless allowed himself to be persuaded to will it.) If, then, each is guilty of homicide, how will both not deserve the penalty for homicide?

FUR. Because the deed of the one has an external principle [principium], that of the other an internal one.

ER. But I deny to you that the proximate principle or near cause [principium proximum seu causam propinquam] of the homicide was not the internal deliberation of the mind. For either the man who deprives another of life at someone else's urging does it unwillingly and under compulsion (a case we are not dealing with here), or willingly. But if he kills the other willingly, how did such a homicide not have an internal cause? Next, it is false that murderers do not have [au-] [au-]torem: the devil as their author [autorem] and instigator. [Margin: Every murderer has the devil as his persuader [Homicida omnis suaforē habet diabolum].] For it is not only those who collude with him after the manner of the *sagae* [Sagarum] — so closely, I say, that they see, hear and touch him — who do evil at the devil's persuasion, but also others who act wickedly at his suggestion [fuggeftione]. The sum of it is this: you will never prove that whoever has killed a man neither unwillingly nor under another's compulsion (I speak of private persons, not of magistrates) is not liable to the penalty for homicide. So the distinction between an external and an internal cause has no place here.

FUR. It can be shown from the example of Adam and Eve that those who do wrong of their own accord offend more gravely and must be punished more severely than those who sin moved by the persuasion of others.

ER. Your example of our first parents and the serpent proves nothing. First, it has no bearing on the matter in hand [ad institutum]. For not every capital crime is homicide: adultery is capital, and it is something very far removed from homicide. Next, those first parents of ours did not commit a homicide of the kind we are now discussing. Where you ought to have put forward an example of two murderers, one of whom had killed a man of his own accord and the other at another's prompting [instinctu], you put forward examples of a perpetrator and a persuader [patratoris & suaforis]. Eve persuaded Adam to eat the forbidden apple [pomum vetitum], which she herself had tasted first at the serpent's urging; but she did not persuade him in such a way that she herself [vt ipfa non idem] had not done the same first [prius fecisset]. Next, both — Adam, that is, and Eve — became transgressors of the Law through the

¹⁴the page prints "cùm facere non poffet", literally "although he could not do it"; the English gives "though he was able not to do it".

exhortation of others: Eve had the serpent as her instigator [impulforem], and Adam then had Eve. So there is no murderer here who killed a man without being invited by anyone. Finally, the example proves nothing. For was Adam not visited with the penalty that had been laid down for those who ate of the forbidden fruit? I think we all perceive whether he went unpunished. He certainly died no less than Eve, even though she suffered certain other hardships besides. But I am not disputing here whether the *sagae* [Sagæ] are to be put to death [excarnificandæ] more leniently or more harshly than the other *magi* (for one capital penalty is milder and more tolerable than another); I assert only that it cannot be denied that they constitute a species [speciem] of magic, and are for that reason liable to the penalty of the *magi*.

FUR. I see clearly enough that the example does not fit at all, and proves even less.

ER. [Margin: Whether there were *sagae* in the times of Moses and Christ [Vtrūm Sagæ Mofis et Chrifiti tēporibus fuerint].] Your contention that our *striges* [ftriges] did not exist in Moses' age does not weaken our position [fententiam]. It can certainly happen that some *magi* too arose after that time, of a kind that did not exist then; yet these are not on that account excluded from the *magi* [non ... funt ... fub Magis comprehenfi]. For what makes a *magus* is the effecting of marvels [mirabilium effectiones] by the demon's power [virtute] or assistance [auxilio], and a pact with him, either open or tacit [vel aperta vel tacita cum eo pactio]. The modes of acting [Modi agendi], the instruments with which they act, and likewise their ends [fines] do not make them *magi*; they make them *magi* of such-and-such a kind [tales quosdam Magos]. I know that before Christ was born there were no *magi* who used the names of Christ and Jesus to cast out, or otherwise to compel, demons — of the kind that very many afterwards sprang up [enati funt plurimi], as everyone knows and as Luke testifies in Acts 19 [Luc. 19. Acto.]. Will you deny that these were *magi*, or that they practised magic [Magica exercuiffe]? Hardly, I think. If they were and are *magi*, then they too have been condemned by Moses, even though they did not yet exist in that age. Why, then, should the same not hold [locum habeat] for the *sagae* [Sagis]? Granted that they did not at that time do precisely such things as they do now. (They certainly could not specifically abjure Christ [Chrifitū ... abiurare fpeciatim].) Does it follow on that account that those who exist now [quæ nunc funt] have nothing to do with those [ad illas nihil attinent]? The demon adds something to these arts he has himself devised, takes something away, or changes something, as he judges expedient; but meanwhile he does not entirely do away with the thing itself.

Moses commanded that statues standing out for worship [fstatuas ad cultum profantes] not be erected, and perhaps he did not know at the time that it would come about that later generations [pofteri] would erect such statues to Peter, Paul, and so on [&c.]; and yet did he not by that law forbid ours as well [nec tamen nō prohibuit lege illa ét noftras]? [Margin: God's laws suit present and future times [Leges Dei præfentib. & futuris cōgruunt].] Finally,

it is certain that God made [tuliffe] his laws in such a way that they would suit not only the present times but the future ones too; and that they would embrace not only those vices which flourished among the people of God, but also the crimes of other nations and ages [ætatum scelera], which either existed elsewhere or were yet to arise [nascitura deindè effent]. So you achieve nothing by this objection, even if you could prove to the utmost [fi maximè ... probare posses] that no such women existed at that time.

FUR. Yet it is probable [Probabile tñ est] that such old women [anus] did not yet exist.

ER. On the contrary, it is far more probable that this plague [pestem] flourished then too, or else its sister or its mother. [Margin: The art of the *sagae* is very ancient [Antiquissima est ars Sagarum].] For Orpheus describes illusions [præstigias] of this kind, and he flourished roughly 1270 years [annis plus minus 1270.] before Christ, at about the time when Abimelech judged the Israelites. Aristophanes mentions the Thessalian φαρμακίδων [Greek: φαρμακίδων (pharmakidōn, "of the drug-women")] more than once, and to them all writers have attributed what our *sagae* [Sagæ] now claim for themselves. Does not Homer write that in the times of the Trojan War there were Circe [Circen] and the Sirens, who drove fools out of their minds [demētarent stultos] with spells or incantations [carminibus seu incantationibus]? Does he not affirm that Ulysses' [Vlyfsi] blood was stanchèd by a spell [carmine] by the sons of Autolycus? The Trojan War, moreover, began about 1200 years before the birth of Christ. Hippocrates in the book *On the Sacred Disease* [Hippoc. in lib. de Morbo sacro], Plato in many places, and Aristotle [Arift.] too write the same things, as is clear from what was said above. Around the three-hundredth year [Circa 300. annum] of the city of Rome — namely in the third year of the 81st Olympiad [anno videlicet tertio, Olympiad. 81.], 452 years before Christ was born of the Virgin — envoys [Legati] set out for Greece to seek the laws of the Twelve Tables [ieges 12. Tabul.]¹⁵, in which this plague is openly condemned [hæc pestis apertè damnatur]. But it matters little whether we suppose that they existed in the time of Moses or arose [exortas] afterwards, so long as we show that the thing itself is forbidden. Let it be enough to have shown that some practised this art of the Demon [hanc Dæmonis artem] shortly after Moses' government [gubernationem], since you can show by no argument whatever that none [nullas] existed at that time. Why, then, should our view not seem preferable to your opinion?

FUR. [Margin: Whether Christ, the Apostles, healed a sick person on account of the *sagae* [An Christus Apostoli & Sagarum causa ægrotatē sanarint].] Christ and the Apostles cured no such person [nullum talem]. So it is likely that nobody was harmed [læfos] by them at that time.

ER. But neither do we read of a melancholic [Melancholicum], a maniac [Maniacum], a phrenetic [Phreniticum] or an epileptic [Epilepticum] (unless

¹⁵the page prints "ieges".

you suppose that τοὺς σελ[?]ιζομένους [Greek: "those who are [?]", as printed; no accent stands over the ε, and a stroke of unresolved form stands over the ν; see QA] of Matt. 4 [Mat. 4.] were epileptics), nor of others who were foolish [fatuos] or delirious [deliros], nor of anyone with gout [Podagricum] or colic [Colicum], being specifically and explicitly healed. Were there therefore no such diseases then? We believe both that there were people afflicted with these diseases at that time, and that they were restored to health by Christ or the Apostles, since they [Christ and the Apostles] are recorded as having healed the sick of every kind, even though the sick are not named one by one [nominatim exprefsi non fint]. Add that the women themselves [ipſæ] do no harm; the devil is the author of the harm [læfionis autor], when, complying with them, he brings about what they ask. What, then, prevents these too [hos ét] from having been healed among those who were vexed by demons, even though it is not added on what occasion the devil began to afflict them? I shall say it all at once [Semel dicam omnia]:

whatever you have objected to us here is of no force at all [nihil omninò valent].

FUR. [Margin: Against the second argument [Contra argumētum fe·undum].] I come to your second argument [alteram tuam rationem], which is plainly refuted, first, by the etymology of the Hebrew word [Etymologia Hebraicæ dictionis] that Moses uses in Exodus chapter 22 [Exod. 22. cap.]; next, by the vote of the Seventy Interpreters [Septuaginta interpretū fuffragium] and the consensus of the Rabbis [Rabinorum]; and finally, by the explanation of Josephus [Iofephi]. All of these prove that that word means a *venefica* in the proper sense [veneficam propriè dictā], namely a woman who kills with poisoned cups [venenatis poculis] or with true poisons [venenis veris] administered in any manner whatever.

ER. I hold the contrary: that it is put for a woman (under which men too are included [fub quibus etiam viri comprehenduntur]) who, by the devil's work and art [diaboli opera & arte], tries either to do harm or to do good, or to do something else. I prove this as follows. [Margin: The noun used by Moses in Exod. 22 does not mean a woman who administers poisons [Nomen à Mofe 22. Exod. pofitum, non fignificat Venena exhibentem].] This word (and the others derived from it) nowhere in all the books of the Old Testament means *veneficium*, poisoning, in the proper sense. (It recurs at Exodus 7, verse 11; likewise 4 Kings 9, verse 22; likewise 2 Paralipomenon 33, verse 6; likewise Isaiah 47, verses 9 and 12; likewise Jeremiah 27, verse 8; likewise Daniel 2, verse 2; likewise Micah 5, verse 12; likewise Nahum 3, verse 4; likewise Malachi 3, verse 5 [Repetita eft Exodi 7. verf. 11. Item 4. Reg. 9. verf. 22. Item 2. Paral. 33. verf. 6. Item Efa. 47. verf. 9. & 12. Item Ierem. 27. verf. 8. Item Dan. 2. ver. 2. Itē Mich. 5. v. 12. Item Nah. 3. v. 4. Item Malach. 3. v. 5].) Therefore it is not used in that sense in the 22nd chapter of Exodus either. For in all the other places it means either a soothsayer [vaticinatorem], or an enchanter [Incantatorem], or one who in some other way uses the help or agency of

a demon [dæmonis auxilio seu opera] in doing things. And that in the 7th chapter of Exodus it is used [pofitum] thus by Moses [fit à Mofe], everyone admits, compelled by the truth itself.

FUR. But there it was used in a looser sense [liberiores significato].

ER. But how can you say that it was used loosely, and not rather taken in its proper sense, when you cannot prove that it is used otherwise in any place at all? Bring forward a passage where it indisputably [citra controuersiam] means poisoning properly so called [proprie nominatum veneficium], just as I bring forward a passage from chapter 7 of Exodus where, by your own admission, it denotes something else. If you cannot, admit that you are wrong in this matter, or else confirm your opinion with a firmer argument. The same occurs [Legitur eadem] in Deuteronomy 18 [18. Deu.], a passage where no one in his right mind would think it denotes anything other than what we have said. For Moses is speaking there not of poisoners [veneficis] or other murderers, but of those who have dealings and fellowship [commercium ac societatem] with devils [Diabolis] and with the arts devised by him [ab eo]. Whoever cares to examine all the other passages will at once affirm that we speak the truth.

FUR. Come now [Heus tu], you do not argue soundly: "The word is used in this sense in several places; therefore in Exodus 22 [vigefimofecundo Exod.] as well it means the same."

ER. I reply that in our case it follows firmly. [Margin: The Hebrew word signifies one having communion with the devil [Nomen Hebraicū significat cū Diabolo cōmunionem habentem].] For we can judge the meanings of Hebrew words from no other source than Holy Scripture. Therefore, if some word is repeated in several places in the Old Testament, always meaning the same thing or something similar [idē aut simile fēp significet], we shall necessarily conclude that this is what it properly signifies [id ab eo proprie significari]. So wherever that same word occurs, we shall pronounce that it means the same thing or something similar, unless the circumstances compel us to take it in another sense. And that this meaning is not its proper one [Et hanc significationem propriā eius non effe]¹⁶ is self-evident [per se est notum], unless we are willing to think that the Holy Spirit chose to use words improperly rather often, but properly more rarely — indeed hardly ever. That word therefore signifies, not in a looser sense but in its proper sense, an impious diviner [Diuinatorem impium], a notorious *magus* [Magum famofum], an enchanter [Incantatorem], and a man who uses diabolical arts. We have said what the etymon [Etymon] of the word is; now let us see what it means in Exodus 22 [22. Exodi]. If it is used there in its proper sense, we have won. For one who kills with venom or poison [veneno seu toxico] attempts nothing beyond the laws, course, and powers of nature [Naturæ leges, morem, vires], nor does he need the devil's help [opera Diaboli] to accomplish it any more than other murderers do. If it is contended that it is used improperly, that will have to be proved. But

¹⁶the page prints *non* here.

how will it be proved, when nothing whatever, and no kind of circumstance, compels us to depart from the proper meaning [à propria notatione]? And all the theologians, the old and the more recent alike, have judged that it is taken in its proper sense. We have shown by the best arguments that it ought to be taken in its proper sense; and among other things we also said this: that poisoning properly so called [veneficium propriè sic vocatum] is contained under homicide. [Margin: Poisoning properly so called is [?].] [Veneficiū propriè dictum, est [?]].] For whoever knowingly and deliberately [sciens ac prudens] kills a man [hominem interimit], by whatever means or instrument he does it, is guilty of homicide. [Margin: Kinds of homicide [Species homicidij].] You, on the contrary, hold that poisoning needed an article of its own [proprio egiſſe articulo], because it differs in many circumstances [cōditionibus] from the other kinds of homicide: that it is committed in secret, so that not even the strongest man can guard against the plots of a feeble little woman or of a servant; and, under the pretext of a health-giving draught [ſalutaris poculi], against those whom you were bound to love on account of duties or of close ties [propter officia, aut neceſſitudinem]; and by inferiors against superiors. As if all these things could not equally fall under other varieties of homicide [alias homicidij differētias]! Is no one killed in secret? Is no one secretly strangled or smothered by little women, servants, brothers, children, spouses, subjects? How, then, was a new law needed on account of these things? Secret homicide is spoken of in Deuteronomy 27 [Deut. 27.]; its penalty and its various kinds in Numbers 35 [35. Num.]. So this law could have seemed superfluous.

FUR. But the Seventy Translators rendered it φαρμακὸν [Greek: φαρμακὸν (pharmakon — the word the Latin goes on to treat as meaning "poison, drug")], a word which, when it is taken in a bad sense, always stands in Dioscorides, Galen, and all Greek antiquity for a poison or a poisonous medicament [medicamento venenoso].

ER. Did you think anyone would grant you this? Unless perhaps you deny that Plato, Aristotle, Aristophanes and others were approved Greek authors — and ancient ones at that [Margin: All the Greeks use the word φαρμακ[?] for an enchantment [Græci oēs nomine φαρμακ[?] pro incan-]] [fuisse neges]. [Margin: ... [tamento vtuntur].] Dioscorides says in the chapter on *Rhanno* [cap. de Rhanno]: "Its branches, it is said, if placed before doors or windows (ἀποκρούειν τὰς τῶν φαρμάκων κακουργείας [Greek: ἀποκρούειν τὰς τῶν φαρμάκων κακουργείας (apokrouein tas tōn pharmakōn kakourgeias, "to repel the evil workings of *pharmaka*")]), drive away the *maleficia* of *pharmaca* or of enchantments [maleficia pharmacorum seu incantamentorum]." Here he does not call *pharmaca* things harmful in themselves — for how could branches placed before doors or windows prevent poison from being brought in? — but magical ones [Magicas]. Galen, I admit, rarely used it in this way. The reason is plain to see [in medio posita]: he wanted to teach the art of medicine [artem Medicam], not *maleficia* and incantations, as he testifies at the beginning of book 6 of *On the Faculties of Simple Medicines* [lib. 6. de Simpli. pharm. facult.],

writing thus about Pamphilus: καὶ δὴ κέχρηται πρὸς περίαπτα καὶ ἄλλας μαγγανείας, οὐ περιέρχους μόνον, οὐδὲ¹⁷ ἔξω τῆς ἱατρικῆς τέχνης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀπάσας. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὔτε τούτων οὐδ[?], οὔτε τὰς τούτων ἔτι ληρώδεις μεταμορφώσεις ἐροῦμεν. [Greek: "And indeed he has used them for περίαπτα ('amulets') and other trickeries (μαγγανείας, manganeias), which are not only superfluous and outside the medical art (ἱατρικῆς τέχνης, iatrikēs technēs), but all of them false. We, however, shall speak neither of any of these, nor of their further silly transformations (ληρώδεις μεταμορφώσεις, lērōdeis metamorphoseis)."] That is why he says that he will say nothing about such *pharmaca* [pharmacis] (for he shows clearly that they were then called by this name): because they lie outside the bounds of the art of medicine, and are all of them false or ineffectual [falsa seu inualida] — old wives' tales, illusory [præstigiofa] and incantatory or magical things. So too, when in the second book of *On the Composition of Medicines* κατὰ τόπους [Greek: κατὰ τόπους (kata toπους, "according to places")] he speaks of the περίαπτοις [Greek: περίαπτοις (periaptois, "amulets")] of Archigenes, he says that he will say nothing about them, because they have no medical rationale [nullam rationem Medicam] (οὐδένα λόγον ἱατρικὸν [Greek: οὐδένα λόγον ἱατρικὸν (oudena logon iatrikon, "no medical reasoning")]) and are judged by experience alone. Nevertheless, it is clear from what has been said that he called [Vocaffe] such things, together with others [alijs], φάρμακα [Greek: φάρμακα (pharmaka, "drugs")], even though he judged them empty and ineffective [inania & inefficacia] [ex dictis constat]. Moreover, in the tenth book of the work cited earlier [decimo libro citati prius operis] he writes as follows: [Greek: ἐγὼ τοίνυν οὔτε βασιλίσκων, οὔτε ἐλεφάντων, οὔτε ἵππων νεύων[?], οὐτ' ἄλλου τινός, οὐ μὴ πείραν αὐτὸς ἔχω, μνηνομε[?]ύσω [recte: μνημονεύσω]. τῶν δὲ καλουμένων φίλτρων ἀγῶ[γ?]ίμων ὀνειροπομ[π?]ῶν τε, καὶ μισήθρων, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἂν, οὐδ' εἰ πείραν ἱκανὴν εἶχον, ἐμνημόνευσα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν θανάσιμων φαρμάκων, ἢ τῶν, ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσιν, καθοποιῶν. ἐκεῖνα μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, καὶ γέλοια, καταδεῖσαι τοὺς ἀν[τι?]δίκους, ὡς μηδ' ἐν[?] ἐπὶ τοῦ δικανικοῦ δ[?]ῆναι φθέγξασθαι ("I, then, will make mention neither of basilisks, nor of elephants, nor of Nile horses, nor of anything else of which I myself have no experience. And of the so-called attracting love-philtres, of the dream-senders, and of the hate-potions, I would not have made mention at all, not even if I had had sufficient experience of them — just as I make none of the deadly *pharmaca*, or of those which, as they themselves call them, [?]. For those claims of theirs are also ridiculous: to bind their opponents at law so that they [?] not utter a single word before the court")], etc.

Will you say after this that Galen did not call the harmful instruments [malefica ... instrumenta] of the *sagae* [Sagarum] *pharmaca*? I think not. He condemned the thing; he was not unaware that everyone named it with the

¹⁷the page prints οὐδὲ, with δ followed by a separate ι-shaped sort on the baseline and no apostrophe; the form intended is not settled here.

name φαρμακοῦ [Greek: φαρμακοῦ (*pharmakou*, "of a *pharmakon*")]; and he himself was not reluctant to name it so. What then? Do not all people constantly call φάρμακα the amulets [Greek: περίαπτα (*periapta*, "things hung about the body," amulets)] and the "natural" [Greek: φυσικὰ (*physika*, "natural")] remedies — so named and approved by some physicians — even if they are employed to do harm [*mali causa*], and lack all poisonous force [*vi ... venenata omni careant*]? Hippocrates [Hippocr.] too, in the book *On the Sacred Disease* [*lib. de Morbo sacro*], seems to call those who are enchanted, or harmed by incantation, πεφαρμαγμένους ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων [Greek: πεφαρμαγμένους ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων (*pepharmagmenous hyp' anthrōpōn*, "drugged by men")], since he is dealing there with magical cures [*curationibus Magicis*]. It is false, therefore, that Greek antiquity, Galen, Dioscorides and all the others did not include the instruments of *magi* and enchanters [*Magorum & Incantatorū instrumēta*] under the name *pharmacum* [*Pharmacī*]. From these things it is plainly seen [*Præclare ex his perspicitur*], that the Seventy Translators [*Septuaginta interpretes*], when they everywhere rendered the Hebrew word [*nomen Hebraicum*] by the words φαρμακοῦ and φαρμακείας [Greek: φαρμακοῦ & φαρμακείας (*pharmakou*, "of a *pharmakon*"; *pharmakeias*, "of sorcery / drug-craft"), etc., were right, and followed usage [*rectè vsitatēque*], in naming by these terms both *maleficia* and *malefici* [*maleficos*] — those, that is, who strive both to know and to do marvellous things by the agency of the devil [*Diaboli opera*]. [Margin: The Seventy Translators rightly and in accordance with usage called the *magi* [*Magos*] in Greek φ[?]ρμακοὺς [Greek: "sorcerers"].] For I have proved by the most certain testimonies that all the Greeks were accustomed to name such people in this way long before the age of the Seventy Translators. For they lived not many fewer than 130 years after Plato — to pass over older writers. Therefore they cannot have been ignorant of the true usage of this language. So neither here, then, do you have anything with which to attack us [*Ne hīc igitur habes, quo nos oppugnes*]. It would be pointless for me to deal with the rabbis [*De Rabinis*] here. For who would doubt, when Scripture says that Manasseh [*Manaffen*] restored the *malefici* [*Maleficos*] together with the pythonesses [*Pythonissis*], that this is not to be understood of true poisoners [*veneficis veris*]? Who would think that King Nebuchadnezzar [*Nebuchadneferem*] summoned poisoners [*veneficos*] to judge and interpret his dream? Since the meaning of the word is evident from the text itself, there is no reason for us to be concerned any further. And yet I do not doubt that the rabbis stand with us, not with the adversary.

FUR. What will you answer to Josephus [*Iosepho*]?

ER. Almost the same thing. For he would not deserve greater credence than Scripture itself — that is, than the Holy Spirit. And yet, when he says μήτε τῶν εἰς ἄλλας βλάβας πεποιημένον [Greek: μήτε τῶν εἰς ἄλλας βλάβας πεποιημένον (*mēte tōn eis allas blabas pepoiēmenon*, "nor of those made for other harms")], it could be believed that he is speaking of the *pharmaca* of enchantresses [*Incantatricum pharmacis*].

But there is no need to examine these matters too scrupulously [superfictioſius], ſince we have clear arguments from the Scriptures. If you judge that one could not have cited Joſephus [Si Iofephum citare non potuiſſe exiſtimites], you will alſo have to praiſe what he wrote: that Solomon [Solomonem] deviſed an art for uſe and protection againſt demons, and alſo eſtabliſhed a manner of conjurations [cōiurationum] and incantations againſt diſeaſes. [Margin: Joſephus is not ἀναμάρτητος [Greek: ἀναμάρτητος (anamartētos, "free from error").] He writes that he himſelf ſaw Eleazar the Hebrew [Eleazarum Hebræum], in the preſence of Veſpaſian Caſar [Veſpaſiano Cæfare], draw a demon out of a poſſeſſed man through the noſtrils, and that he did this by the power [virtute] of a root ſhown by Solomon, which he kept encloded in a ring. Who would be ſurpriſed that Joſephus, approving ſuch deluſions [deliria], interprets this law otherwiſe? For if he did not do ſo, he would condemn himſelf. Io. Franciſcus Picus [Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola] alſo writes that in the Hebrew hiſtory of Joſephus [Hebraica Iofephi hiſtoria] it is written that Abſalom [Abſoloni] had ſo great a quantity of hair that a ſingle barber could ſcarcely cut it in the ſpace of eight days. Whether this was written by him (which would be a manifeſt lie, for in ſo many days a meadow of moderate ſize could be mown with ſhears) or not, it is eſtabliſhed that he wrote the things above; and therefore his teſtimony is of no weight, at leaſt in this matter. Accordingly, our ſecond argument [ratio noſtra ſecunda] has not been weakened by the adverſary's objections, but much more confirmed. To the third argument, by which it was proved that they [eas] can be put to death as idolaters [Idololatræ], what do you bring forward? [Margin: Againſt the third argument [Contra argumentū tertium].]

FUR. Nothing other than this: I deny that they are idolaters and that they deny God.

ER. Rightly [Rectè]. For it cannot be denied that, according to God's precept, idolaters are to be puniſhed with the penalty of death [capitis pœna].

FUR. At leaſt they ſeem to be excuſed by the example of St Peter [D. Petri] the Apoſtle, who denied Chriſt — whoſe deed was graver and more deteſtable than the crime of the *ſtriges* [Strigum].

ER. I ſhuddered when I read what you have briefly touched on. I ſhall answer it in one word: there is no likeneſs between the abjuration [abiurationem] of Peter and that of the *sagæ* [Sagarum]. [Margin: The denial of St Peter differs from the denial of the *sagæ* [Differt negatio D. Petri à negatione Sagarum].] For Peter abjured Chriſt out of fear of death in ſuch a way that he never thought of deſerting to the devil; nor did he make a pact with him, whether openly or tacitly [vel apertè vel tacitè], any more than all other ſinners make one. But the *sagæ*, compelled by fear of no evil or danger, of their own accord and without any juſt cauſe (moſtly either ſpurred on by luſt [libidine], or inflamed by hatred or anger, or carried away by other ſimilar paſſions [affectibus]), abjure God, their creator and deliverer, in ſuch a way that they go over into the adverſary's camp, promiſe obedience, ſurrender themſelves wholly to him, pledge that

they will be enemies of God and of piety, prepare themselves to do harm, and enter into foul embraces with the evil demon [*Cacodæmone*]. The unworthy comparison of Peter with the *striges* forces me [*Exprimit inuito mihi*], against my will, [*indigna Petri & ftrigum comparatio*] to say [*vt dicere cogar*] that whoever would seek an equality between the sin of Peter and that of the *sagae* [*Sagarum*] is not sane. But by your amplifications you seem to rate St Peter's [*D. Petri*] as graver and greater — which is not rightly done.

FUR. I do not deny that idolaters [*Idololatræ*] may be put to death. But that the *sagae* are idolaters I do not yet grant you.

ER. And I, for my part, declare that I do not yet see on what pretext it could be denied that they are idolaters — and indeed the worst of all who have ever existed in the world. Many have worshipped idols, thinking them to be God [*Deus*], or statues of God; these women venerate the evil demon [*Cacodæmonia*] himself, whom they know to be the enemy of God and of Nature. Of those, many thought they were acting rightly — that is, they served their godlings [*Deastris*] through error and ignorance; these know with complete certainty that they are acting shamefully and impiously. For this reason they deny the deed with such constancy, so that they may not be compelled to pay the penalties which they are well aware they have deserved. To those nothing was established concerning the true God; these desert the one whom they have known. Those did not always contract a special pact [*peculiare pactum*], against conscience, against the true God; these abjure God and all piety in such a way that they stipulate that they will be enemies.

FUR. These things are imaginary, and do not truly happen so.

ER. I do not deny that many are imaginary and illusory [*præstigiosa*], which happen after the covenant [*foedus*] has been contracted. For then, when the devil in a certain way has those unhappy women in his power, he more easily wins belief for whatever he wishes. [Margin: Deeds done before the covenant is contracted are not imaginary [*Ante contractū foedus facta non sunt imaginaria*].] But before they have made the pact [*pactæ sint*], things of that kind do not happen through imagination alone; rather, they really contract fellowship and friendship.

FUR. How is it established for you that a pact has been forged with the demon [*Dæmone*]? Since you were not present, and do not have it from other witnesses worthy of belief, you must have it from their confession [*ex ea[?]um cōfessione*]. If they confess such things voluntarily, these are either impossible to do, or possible — and these, however, either were not done, or truly happened. If under compulsion [*coactæ*], they carry little weight, since they were wrung out by unbearable torture [*quæstionibus intolerabilibus*]. A voluntary confession of the first kind does not deserve punishment. Nor the second, because the deed was not done. Nor the third, because the devil drives into the *phantasia* [*phantasiæ*] of the wretched women that they themselves did what either happened naturally or was accomplished by him. Who would put

faith in a coerced confession, so as to judge on account of it that they are to be put to death [occidendas]?

ER. But if a confession extorted by torture has no force, then no robbers, traitors [pditores], or other criminals (or at any rate very few) are justly punished. For few confess the crimes they have committed of their own accord.

FUR. Certainly some confess under the force of torments what they never perpetrated.

ER. But no wise man would think that the truth is therefore not to be extracted [extorquendam veritatem] by torture [quæstionibus].

Defendants [rei] are not subjected to torments on account of just any suspicion or a slight conjecture, but when the deed can be fully proved by arguments, or they are not much inferior to perfect proofs. Nor is it an obstacle that the judge [Iudex] did not see such things, since it is enough that others saw. Moreover, all hidden crimes are revealed in the end, so that here not even the devil is able to foresee and guard against everything. [Margin: Hidden shameful deeds are uncovered at last [Occulta flagitiosa tandem deteguntur].] It is therefore idle for you to despise a confession extracted by torments. Why a voluntary one should not have force, I for my part should very much like to understand.

FUR. Because what is confessed [confitetur] is either impossible to do, or things which could indeed have been done but were not done, or were done, but not by them [ab ipsis].

ER. I believe you have forgotten what you had undertaken to prove — namely, that they have not forged a pact with the demon [Dæmone]. The question now is not whether they can draw the stars down from the sky, stir up storms, fly through the air, or pass through closed doors, but whether they have contracted fellowship, or a pact, or friendship with the evil demon [Cacodæmone]. Is this impossible to do? I do not believe that you believe this. Why then do you repeat [repetis] these things, and strive by them [ijs] to show that no covenant [fœdus] is struck with the demon? [Margin: To contract fellowship with the devil is not impossible [Societatem contrahere cum diabolo non est impossibile].] It is both possible to do, and has been done more often than I would wish.

Therefore they do not confess something impossible to do when they confess that they have made a pact [se pepigisse] with the devil. This pact does not come together naturally; rather, there must be an agreement of wills on both sides. For the demon [dæmon] cannot set up such a covenant [fœdus] by himself alone.

FUR. But it is imagination and delusion [imaginatio & delusio], nothing of truth.

ER. It is a remarkable thing: when someone has begun to defend a thesis, he denies all the most certain and most true things, so that he may seem to judge rightly. Holy Scripture testifies clearly enough that what men do with demons [Dæmonibus] is not nothing; the experience of all ages proves the same; the *striges*, all of them, confess; the matter itself demonstrates. [Margin: Not

everything done by the *magi* is wholly empty [Non omnia sunt vana prorsus, q̃ à Magis aguntur].] Did the woman at Endor not call up a demon in the likeness of Samuel? Did the Egyptian *magi* [Magi Aegyptij] not raise up serpents? Does Psalm 58 [Pfalm. 58.] put forward a phantasm [phantasma] when it writes that asps shut their ears, so as not to hear the voice of the enchanter [incantatoris]? Has no one gathered serpents, and likewise mice, into one place by *carmina* [carminibus]? Scripture teaches that the devil, through his own [per suos], will produce such prodigies that even the elect would have been in danger, if it had been possible for them to be seduced. Therefore not everything is imaginary, as you say. It is certain, moreover, that no one could, and not even now can, do the things mentioned without a diabolical pact [pactum diabolicum]. For why are not all able, if no pact [pactio] is required?

FUR. Not all know the art.¹⁸

ER. As if it were established that that woman had been versed in a long art [longam artem calluisse]! Can a demon [dæmon] be compelled by any art? Not at all. It is therefore by the pact [ex pactione] that he is present.

FUR. If what they confess with such constancy is the emptiest of lies — that they fly through the air, that they carry off crops [segetes transferant], and do many things of this kind — why, in the remaining matters, is the certainty of the confession so insistently set against us [opponitur]? Why, when in one and the same hour they both say those, and confess that they have struck a covenant [fœdus] with the Devil, do we believe this to be true rather than those? Or why do we not think this imaginary, just as those are?

ER. The reasons are these: that those cannot be done, whereas this can; that images of those [illorum imagines] appear, as a rule, to people dreaming, whereas this is done by people awake; that those are instilled into them by the Devil [à Diabolo eis persuadentur] after he already commands them, and drives, rides, possesses and handles them more freely and familiarly. That men can contract a covenant with devils is certain. That they themselves [ipfas] contract it awake and knowingly is equally well known. That before the pact they are not yet so held and governed by the demon as, after the pact, he deranges them [eas dementat], is likewise admitted. Why then do you wonder that we believe this to be true rather than those? But if you contend that this too is made up [factitium], I ask you why God commanded putting to death [occidi mādauerit]? Because they do harm with poisonous draughts [venenofis poculis], you say. For you bring forward nothing, nor can you bring forward anything else.

But it has been shown that nowhere in the Bible [Biblijs] does that Hebrew noun which is read in Exodus 22 [Exod. 22.] signify true poisonings [vera veneficia]. Next, it is established that it was a capital offence [capitale] to use the services of demons, even if they did harm by no poisons. The woman at Endor plainly indicates to Saul that she is not permitted to use incantations

¹⁸the page is numbered 383 as printed.

[incantationibus], because the King had forbidden it under pain of death [sub poena capitis]. Of poisonings [veneficiorum] no mention is made here.

But since mention has already often been made of this woman, it may perhaps be worthwhile to examine the whole story [historiam] carefully, so far as it bears on this. [Margin: The story of the woman, a *maga*, at Endor [Historia mulieris Magæ in Endor].] First, then, it must be observed that she was not unaware that the practice of her art would be a capital matter for her. For on this account she denies that she has knowledge of it, or at least declines to practise it. Second, that she called up a shade [vmbra], and in the shade a demon [demonem], not Samuel — although she supposed that she had called up Samuel. Third, that although she did not accomplish what had been asked of her, Scripture nevertheless says that she accomplished this very thing, that is, that she raised Samuel — although Samuel was an illusion [præstigiōsus]. Fourth, that it is not written that this woman did harm to anyone by her art. Fifth, that no mention is made of any long art that she had learned. Sixth, that she is not read to have raved [delirauisse], nor to have been possessed by a demon: much less that she did such things through imagination alone. Finally, that without a special agreement [peculiari cum Dæmone conuentione] with the Demon she could not have done what she did. For others, and above all Saul [Saulus] himself, who would most have wished this, could not accomplish it. There must therefore have been something more in this woman. Accordingly, since the devil cannot be compelled by any art, it is necessary that he was present to the woman who called him by virtue of the pact and agreement [vi pacti & conuentionis]. For nothing else can be devised in this case.

FUR. What do you wish to make out of these?

ER. This is what I mean: that the *sagae* [Sagas] are no better. [Margin: Comparison of the *sagae* and that woman, the *maga* [Comparatio Sagarū (?) & mulieris illius Magæ].] First, they know that the practice of their art will be a capital matter for them, and for that reason they conceal it with the greatest care. Second, that although they do not always accomplish what they want, but only spread illusions [præstigias tātūm offundant], yet before God it is just as if they had accomplished it. For no less than she, they are accustomed to summon demons in some human form [in specie aliqua hominis]. And just as she thought that she had called up Samuel, who nevertheless did not appear to her, so the *sagae* too deceive themselves and others. Fourth, they, who are always eager to do harm, are more harmful than she. Fifth, just as it is not written of her that she possessed a long art, so we ought not to excuse ours [nostras] on this ground either, since they have no less familiarity with the Demon than she. Sixth, it is evident that these are not ravings and dreams [deliria & fomnias], but that impious little women [impias mulierculas] can strike a pact [pactionem ferire] with demons with their senses and mind intact [integris sensibus ac mente].¹⁹ For if she did not rave, must ours do everything

¹⁹the page prints "Cum enim si illa non delirauit, ...?"; the opening *Cum* does not construe with the question that follows, and it is rendered here without it.

through delirium? And if she was able to make a pact, what prevents ours from making a pact? Finally, just as she had deserved the death penalty [capitis pœnam] not because she had given poison to anyone to drink, but because she was an enchantress [Incantatrix], so our *striges* too can be punished, even if they have harmed no one. For it is most certain that they usually lay the covenant [fœdus iacere] not in sleep but while awake [per vigiliis]. So you feel that not I, but you, have been slain with my sword.

FUR. They would never, I think, have confessed the deed, if they had their wits about them [fi faperēt] and if the crimes charged against them were true.

ER. Do not other criminals [facinorosi] also do this, whenever they understand that they cannot deny? Or do they repent of the crime? And this is surely evidence of a less wicked mind. For the more obstinately anyone denies, the less he repents of the outrage [flagitij] — as the matter itself teaches. Nor did I deny that some are found who confess their crime without torture [fine tormentis]; but I pointed out that they are rare. [Margin: *Striges* sometimes confess their crime without torture [Striges aliquādo fine tormentis fatentur crimen].] For some answer the questions freely out of fear of judicial torture [quæstionum] alone. Nor are those who do so foolish; rather, they are wiser than the others. For they prefer to say without torment what they understand can be extorted by torture. But they are neither melancholic [Melancholicæ], nor more devoid of mind and reason than other criminals [alijs scelerosis] (as the adversary [adversarius] repeats again and again) — as has already often been shown. It is no less certain that none of them boasts of her skill [peritiam] openly, but only among those [women] whom they hope can be drawn into their fellowship [focietatem]. If they suffered from melancholic delirium [melancholico delirio], they would joyfully proclaim to everyone their arts and their knowledge of working marvels. Therefore whatever has been brought forward to excuse the covenant [fœderis] contracted with the devil, and the horrifying apostasy, lacks all credibility and likelihood.

FUR. [Margin: Against the fourth argument [Contrà argumētum quartum].] I pity the unfortunate women, and for that reason I would wish, if I could, to free them from the executioner [à carnificina]. You, on the contrary, sweep together with great zeal whatever can be devised to inflame the judges. When you can do nothing else, you keep crying out that they seduce others. Whom would foolish old women [infulfæ anus] seduce, when they are themselves deluded — unless you wish to defend false imaginations [falsas imaginationes] as real actions? For all of them confess the demon as their master [magistrū suum dæmonem]. Their feeble sex [Sexus ēt iners] also, and their dull age, prove that nothing of this kind takes place. Finally, what both the teacher [Magistra] and the women trained by her relate hangs together so poorly that you can easily see them to be out of their minds and possessed by the Demon.

ER. What piety is this? To defend an opinion preconceived in your mind, you seem ready to deny even that the sun shines at noon.

I am pleased here to use Aristotle's saying from Book 10 of the *Ethics* [Aristot. dictum 10. Ethic.]: [Greek: ὁ γὰρ πασεῖ δοκεῖ, τοῦτο εἶναι φάμεν. ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν, οὐ πανυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ (ho gar ... dokei, touto einai phamen; ho d' anairōn tautēn tēn pistin, ou panu pistotera erei — "For what seems so to [?] ..., that we say is so; and he who destroys this belief will not say things much more credible")]. With what mind do you dare, without adequate and plausible proof, to deny everything that is not only known but also certain and true? What *saga* [Saga] ever said that she had drawn some [woman] into the fellowship, without the other, who allowed herself to be seduced, affirming the same? When both of them likewise relate the day, the hour, the place, the manner, the occasion and the outcome, they have nevertheless lied, as far as you are concerned [tibi]. Many underage daughters [filiae impuberes], compelled by their mothers, at length made a pact [pepigerunt]; and these, coming to their senses, told [of it], induced by no punishments. If no human being is to be believed, we shall not believe even you. If someone is to be believed, why do you want yourself to be believed, when you speak without reasons, rather than others who bring forward things consistent with the truth?

FUR. Because they dream, and have a corrupted imagination [corruptam imaginationem].

ER. How do you prove this? They know what they did, with whom they did it, how they did it — things present, past and future. In no other matters do they rave [delirāt] more than others; they answer everything aptly; in short, there is nothing you could find fault with. I am speaking of what they do while awake, not of what befalls them in sleep.

FUR. [Margin: How *sagae* seduce others [Quomodo Saga[?] alios feducant].] But they acknowledge no master except the demon.

ER. I know. For they do not seduce in such a way as to teach the art without bringing [anyone] to the Devil; rather, with promises and persuasions they drive [them] out of their minds [dementant], so that, from the lust of obtaining what they desire and of learning marvellous things, they allow themselves to be brought to the demon and received into the covenant [fœdus]. This is what we call seducing — not, as you seem to think, teaching the same arts. For they understand well enough that without the work of the demon [dæmonis opera], which is acquired by force of the concluded covenant [pacti fœderis], no one becomes a sharer in such great marvels [miraculorum]. Nor are they as stupid as you constantly insist; nor are they all women; nor are they all little old women [vetulæ]; nor, as I said, are they found in any other matters to be either more stupid or more foolish than others. Their accounts too, when they speak of things they did while awake, hang together in such a way, and there is such agreement of deeds and words, as you would scarcely ever find anywhere else. Therefore here too you are pouring out words — unless you think us deprived of common sense, or can persuade [us] that only what seems so to you is true. You reproach [me] with cruelty, from which I am as far removed as fire from water and black from white. I know full well that mildness

[Lenitatem] befits Christians [Margin: Mildness prescribed by the Word of God befits Christians [Christianos decet lenitas verbo Dei præfinita].] — but [a mildness] that is circumscribed by the Word of God and has not degenerated into vicious indulgence. This [indulgence] is not praiseworthy but damnable. For [it] conflicts with the divine will, and hurls very many into destruction. For what [follows]? If it were permitted to commit such things with impunity, is it not inevitable that many others would be defiled by these abominable crimes, from which they are now held back by fear of punishment [supplicij]? What sort of mercy, then, would that be, which neither heals the putrid limb nor preserves the healthy [parts] from its infection? Let us rather remember the golden saying of Athalaric, King of the Goths [Athalarici Gotthorum Regis] [Margin: A saying of Athalaric, King of the Goths [Athalarici Regis Gotthorum dictum].]: "It is impious," he says, "to be lenient toward those whom heavenly piety [cœlestis pietas] does not allow [to go] unpunished."

FUR. What I said you should take as referring not to you, but to savage and barbarous judges.

ER. Cruelty and tyranny ought to be far removed from all Christians. Those who are such show well enough whose father's sons they are. But come, if you have constructed anything against the fifth argument, bring it forward. [Margin: Against the fifth argument [Contra argumētum quintum].]

FUR. Nothing much — except that it seems unjust for the magistrate [magistratus] to punish so harshly a will that has not come to action [in actum]. A distinction must also be drawn between the will of the sane and of the insane, or of the delirious [deliri] and of the fatuous [fatui].

ER. I know that the will to sin ought not to be punished by the magistrate if it has not arrived at action. I also know [Scio ēt] that the *striges* do everything they can and know how to do in order to harm others. When the thing does not succeed, they grieve no less vehemently than they rejoice unrestrainedly over a success. That the demon sometimes carries out the business at their own instigation [ipfis instigantibus], whenever this is granted to him by the just judgment of God, you would not, I think, dare even to deny [dæ-] [monem negotiū peragere, quoties iusto Dei iudicio ei conceditur, ne quidem negare aulis, puto]. Certainly demons [dæm.], when asked, and when called out by spells [carminib.] or by other means, do a great many things which they would not have done had they not been summoned and driven to it. [Margin: Agunt dæmones rogati, quæ aliàs acturi non fuerunt. — "Demons, when asked, do things they otherwise would not have done."] Indeed, they do not lightly [non temerè] gather serpents or mice unless some Exorcist reminds them of the pact [fi Exorcista eos pacti nullus admoneat]. [He] would not have appeared in the form of Samuel had he not been called up by the enchantress [fœmina Incātrice]. Nor would [they] have produced those serpents before Pharaoh had the *magi* [à Magis] not demanded it of them. So too, they would not inflict diseases on either men or brute beasts if the *sagae* kept quiet. Therefore all *striges* are not outside guilt [Non sunt ergò extra culpam oēs striges]; and they sin

the more gravely as their manner of harming is the fouler, and as he through whom they seek to injure is the more wicked.

FUR. On the sexual embraces [De Venereis amplexib.], at least, you will retract your opinion [fniam], since it is utterly ridiculous, false, childish and silly, as I also warned you above. [Margin: Contra argumētum septimum. — "Against the seventh argument."] ²⁰

ER. Refute, if you can, any of what we argued above [fup.] on this very matter. This intercourse generally takes place immediately after the pact [à pactione], so that [he] may have them more compliant from then on, and may more easily lead them away from the worship and observance of God to the veneration of himself.

FUR. But dried-up, worn-out and bloodless old women [vetulæ exfuccæ, effœtæ & exangues] do not seek lust, especially since they take no pleasure from the unusual intercourse, because of the coldness of the member.

For everyone says that the devil's male member is felt to be cold. But not even the demon is roused to sexual desire [ad Venerem] by titillation; and indeed he can neither copulate nor generate. The intercourse [concubitus] is therefore imaginary — namely when old women, deluded by the oppression of a deeper sleep [altioris fomni oppreffionem delufæ anus], think they have satisfied their lust.

ER. I certainly never said that the devil is tempted by lust in the way men are. Rather, he falsely claims to be captivated by love, so as to keep his worshippers to their duty. Meanwhile, I am not unaware of what some of the ancients wrote about incubi, and of what both Palladius, the disciple of Evagrius [Euagrij], and Alessandro Alessandri [Alexand. ab Alexandro], in his book *On Genial Days* [lib. de diebus Genialibus], have handed down on this same matter. [Margin: De Incubis & Succubis. — "On incubi and succubi."] For me the common confession of everyone is enough, since what they say was done could have been done, and is altogether probable. As regards the devil, he can assume a dense and tangible body [corpus affumere crassum & tactile]. He can likewise move the spirits [fspiritus] and the semen so that titillation arises. He can therefore produce pleasure for those paramours of his [amafijs illis fuis]. As regards [the women] themselves, the *striges* are exceedingly lustful, so that for this reason too they give themselves over to the devil the more easily. [Margin: Striges funt libidinofæ. — "The *striges* are lustful."] Those who are not such do not enter into these pacts so readily. Indeed, [women] who dare so great and so horrible a crime must be altogether impious, bold, shameless and lecherous.

Nor do you deny that it is mostly impious women who are dragged into these nets of the devil. And nobody is unaware how given over such women are to the pleasures of the flesh. The devil adds the spur, so that they rush into it with greater impetus and frenzy. Nor does it excuse them that you call them stupid and worn-out old women. For it is false that only old women [vetulas]

²⁰the side-notes on the previous page and this one name the fifth argument and then this seventh; no note naming a sixth is visible in the scan reproduced here.

are ensnared. I have seen very many, but I have seen none so aged [at *tàm anum nullam vidi*]. Whoever denies that [women] of every age are received into this covenant [*foedus*] will dare to deny even that twice two makes four [*bis duo quatuor*]. Then again, who does not know that very many old women [*anus*] itch more violently for certain younger men? [Margin: *Anus aliquando in Ve[rlt]ulis [?] plùs pruriunt. — "Old women sometimes itch more in [?]."*] How many old widows [*anus viduas*], otherwise respectable, do we see marrying adolescents and robust young men for this very reason, and even buying these marriages at great cost [*multo ære*]? This is how the proverb arose among our people, that old she-goats lick salt more eagerly than young ones [*vetulas capras libentiùs lingere fales iuuëculis*]. If we see such things done every day by these women, who are far removed from the audacity, crime and frenzy of those others, and who are openly neither impious nor wicked, who would doubt that those others are carried to impurity, like brute beasts, more immodestly and with greater ardour, without the rein of reason or fear of disgrace? Therefore, since the devil both can do such a thing, and the old women [*vetulæ*] (for so you usually call them) not only give their assent but also seek it out and carry it through into act [*in actum deducant*] — which, from everyone's [*quod ex omnium*] confession is clear [*confessione liquet*] — then what reason, after all, is there why they should not be burned on this ground alone? You grant that one who copulates with a brute beast must pay the capital penalty. You also grant this second point, that intercourse with a demon is to be punished even more severely. But the deed is established. Why, then, should they be spared? If you are willing to give conjecture some room, you would not be thinking foolishly if you supposed that Moses [*Mofen*], or God, in Exodus 22 [*Exod. 22.*], added that other law, on one who lies with a beast, immediately after the Law on *sagae* [*de Sagis*], so as tacitly to indicate something of this matter to us. [Margin: *Lex de Sagis & cum bruto rem habentibus contigua sunt. — "The law on *sagae* and [that] on those who have dealings with a brute beast stand side by side."*] For it runs thus: "You shall not suffer a *malefica* (or *saga*) to live [*Maleficā (fiue Sagam) ne patiaris viuere*]. Whoever has dealings with a beast, let him be punished with death."

FUR.²¹ But it is a mere dream, and consists in imagination alone [*in fola imagine*], as can be shown by the following reasoning. It seems less possible that a very strong man, reasoning excellently, with all his senses sound and in use without injury, so that not even the slightest suspicion of Melancholy [*Melancholiæ*] seems to lie beneath it, should slip into that false and empty persuasion, so as to affirm most insistently that his male member has been taken from him, than that an old woman should dream that she has dealings with a Demon. But since the former happens, the latter must be thought to occur much more often.

²¹the prefix is printed "FV." here.

ER. Many kinds of answer could be brought against this. First, the example in which the comparison is made does not fit. For the argument [Sic enim contexti argumentum] ought to have been framed thus [debuisset]: if a strong man, with his senses sound [integris sensibus], neither suffering from Melancholy [Melancholia] nor otherwise out of his mind [deficiens], can imagine that he is having sexual intercourse with the Devil [se cum Diabolo rem venereum exercere] although he has never done anything of the kind, then this same thing could more easily befall a woman. You construct [it] out of disparate terms [ex disparatis terminis]. For in the man you put forward the belief [opinionem] that a member has been lost, and in the woman the imagination of intercourse [imaginationem concubitus] — which are disparate things. Next, you bid us believe something that has been neither believed, done nor written, either in our own age or in that of our fathers. For who has ever heard of a man in whom no signs of delirium or madness were observed complaining of the loss of his member [virga] together with the testicles, when he had not in fact lost them? Many have been deprived of both, but not by the force of a magical incantation [Magici incantamenti], nor in imagination alone, without any appearance of folly [deficientiae specie]. For what do melancholics [Melancholici] not usually imagine? Or will [a man] who has the use of sound senses and a sound mind, and who examines his private parts [pudenda], detect none of these? That they are drawn back somewhat and contracted, I do not deny; but that they are contracted so far that neither part protrudes, and that [this] appears so both to sight and to touch, I flatly deny [pernego]. The passages you cite to confirm this from Hippocrates, book 2 of the *Prognostic*, 10 [ex Hippocr. libr. 2. Prognost. 10.], no more show this than Hippocrates meant by those words to show that Ethiopians are white [Aethiopes albos]. [Margin: Hipp. 2. Progn. 10.]

What that man of yours brings forward from book 5 of Clement's *Recognitions* [ex lib. 5. Recognit. Clemen.] is found written nowhere in those books. From this you can gather how much credit you ought to give to the other witnesses he cites. When St Peter [D. Petrus] (as that author writes) wished to answer the heathen [Ethnicis], who said that their festivals and sacrifices had been instituted for this purpose, that the mind might be released a little from cares and labours, he speaks thus: "If they were devised for this reason, why do they invoke demons in groves and woods? Where do the mad whirlings [rotatus], the cuttings of limbs come from? the cutting-off of the private parts [verendorum abscissiones]? Where does the raging frenzy come from? Why are women driven by furies, with their hair dishevelled? Where do the groaning and the gnashing of teeth come from? Where does the bellowing of the heart and the entrails come from? And all those things which, either feigned or contrived through the ministry of Demons, are put forward to terrify the foolish and the uneducated?" [Margin: Refutatio eorū, quæ ex Clemente falsò citantur. — "Refutation of what is falsely cited from Clement."] Is it said in these words of Clement that some people imagined their private parts [pudenda] had been taken from them, which nevertheless had not truly been taken? I, for my part,

find nothing of the kind. He mentions the cutting of limbs and the amputation of the private parts; about this imagination he asserts nothing.

FUR. He says they were feigned.

ER. First, it could never be shown that he meant to say that those whirlings [gyros], the cuttings of limbs and of the private parts [verendorum], and the other things listed after them, were feigned. Besides these, he says that certain other things were feigned (or even done) in order to frighten simple people [ad terrendos simplices]. But if everything had been feigned, Peter would have proved nothing, since what he meant to show was that the mind is not relaxed and freed from its cares by such things [curis, & rebus talibus], but is rather the more occupied. Moreover, who that is versed in reading the ancients does not know that such things were regularly done in the solemn rites of Cybele [Cybeles] and Bacchus? Add to this that Clement did not so much as dream that those people believed their private parts [verenda] had been taken from them — parts which they had not cut off themselves or felt and known to have been amputated by others. Nor is it written, either, that they were afterwards restored. If anything of that kind had happened, how would you defend [the claim] that such people suffered from no kind of madness? But what need is there of words? The antecedent of your reasoning, if you want it proved from Hippocrates and Clement, is nothing but a dream. Therefore neither the antecedent, nor the consequent, nor the consequence of the argument, as they say in the schools, holds [valet]. [Margin: Quantum fidei fit tribuendum Itinerario D. Petri. — "How much credit is to be given to the *Itinerary* of St Peter."] But grant that the author of those books wrote what you said (books which no wise man would call the genuine and by no means spurious work of that Clement who was known to the Apostles): do you think it must be believed on that account? Epiphanius certainly, and Rufinus in his *Apology* for Origen [Ruf. in Apol. origenis], report that these very books (which were also entitled the *Itinerary* [Itinerarij nomine], because they contain the journeys of the Apostle Peter) are stuffed with errors [erroribus] [refertos tradunt]. I ask you: do not the things he recounts in them about parents and brothers bear the likeness of a fable rather than of the truth? That is certainly how it has seemed to all learned men. I say nothing of the fact that, among the letters, those which contain certain passages copied from the *Itinerary* were suspect to the ancients for this very reason [cām]. He also wrote *Dialogues* held between St Peter [D. Petrum] and Apion [Appionē], which Eusebius [Euseb.] rejects outright. What is to be thought of the *Apostolic Constitutions* [Constitutionib. Apostol.] — there is no theologian today who does not know. Who, then, would trust this author when he tells of impossible things, when nobody would lightly think he should be believed even when he writes plausible ones [cui probabilia scribenti nemo temerè putet credendum]?

[Margin: Quomodo pudenda dicantur ablata. — "In what sense the private parts are said to be taken away."] We commonly say that someone's private parts [pudēda] have been taken away whenever he has lost the use of them,

whether this has come about through slackening [refolutionem] or through retraction [retractionem]. Nor is it wrong to speak so. For an eye is rightly called [an eye] only so long as it is the instrument of sight; once it has been deprived of this use, it is no more called an eye than a painted eye or one of stone. For the instruments of the body are defined by the work and the power [opere & potētia] for the sake of which each one was made, as both Galen [Gal.] and Aristotle [Arift.] taught. Grant, then, that someone not deranged [non delirās] may have thought himself truly deprived of these members, although it was not true, and that some *saga* may have had dealings with a demon only in a dream: is the sin, on that account, either equal in both cases? or has no *strix* undergone intercourse with a demon [dæmonis congressum passa est]? Neither follows from the premises [ex antegressis]. For a man who is robbed by a magical enchantment [Magico incantamento] either of those members or of their powers grieves that this has happened to him, and he did not ask it of the demon. But the *sagae* delight in that intercourse [coitione], seek it out, and think that Satan owes them this by virtue of the pact [pactionis]. This, therefore, is a capital crime, and that is not, since no diabolical pact intervenes. Next, by what middle term [quo medio] will it be concluded that, because some one woman has mingled her body with a demon only in imagination, no woman has truly attempted to perform this act? You yourself affirm that all confess the crime, and that each one names and describes her own lover [amafium]. Shall we say that all were deceived by this false image in sleep? But the *sagae* themselves will refute this opinion of ours, when they assert that they committed the deed awake and in the fields; and others too confirm the same fact. For they often rise from feasts, withdraw a little from the dances, and, the thing done, return to their companions. Your argument, then, even if we grant you the antecedent in full, shows only that it can happen that those unhappy women are rather often driven out of their minds by men [viris]²², so that they believe that to be which is not — something we have certainly never denied. What we deny is that all are so deceived in this respect that they have never, in actual fact [ipso facto], set about performing this filthiness with the Devil while awake [aggressæ sint]. Now, since not even the antecedent is true, what will be said of your whole argument?

FUR. I shall affirm that it is melancholic delirium [Melancholicum delirium].

ER. I too shall repeat what I said before: that no sign [indiciū] of it appears. If, although no mark betrays itself [nulla fese nota prodat], you nevertheless contend that it is present or has been present, and on that ground hold them excused, by what right [Iure], I ask you, or by what law will you punish other criminals?

FUR. Because they committed the things of which they were accused while in their right minds [prudentes].

ER. What if they affirm that they did it out of melancholy [ex Melancholia]?

²²the printed word is clearly *viris*, "by men"; the sense of the phrase is doubtful

FUR. It could not be shown by any sign that they had been insane.

ER. Why should this same reasoning not hold for the *sagae*? For my part, neither before the deed nor after it, nor in the deed itself, will you generally find even the slightest suspicion [*fuspiciunculam*] of an unsound mind, such that they could be excused on that account and ought to have done their shameful acts with impunity. Next, if they suffer from melancholy, how does it come about that all of them, taken [*captæ*] over so many centuries now and in the most diverse places, have constantly agreed among themselves? Nor can you even devise anything here (if in the matter itself there is nothing but an image or a phantasm [*phantaſma*] or a dream) to give as your answer: melancholics plainly persuade themselves of incredible things. But in all the centuries scarcely two have been found who imagined the same thing. [Margin: *Nunquam duo Melancholici idē.* — Two melancholics are never seen to have imagined the same thing (the note ends with "imaginati videntur." in the margin at the head of the next page).] [Illegible: faint specks under the third line of the side-note; real ink traces, not read. They are not a lost line of the note: the note continues in the margin at the head of the next page] From this it is plainly seen to be utterly false that *striges*, overwhelmed by melancholic juice [*Melancholico ſucco*], recount only imaginings and tales, as is said. [Margin: *imaginati videntur.* — "are seen to have imagined."] For there could not be so great an agreement among them: they would no more think, say and do the same things, I say, than dreamers do. Indeed, the Devil could scarcely — nay, not even scarcely — imprint the same visions [*viſa*] on the *phantasiae* [*phantaſijs*] of all, or fashion and feign the same images in all. For the spirits [*ſpiritus*] of all are not equally apt for receiving any phantasms whatever [*quælibet phantaſmata*]. Therefore, since intercourse of that kind is capital even on your own testimony, and you judge with us that a more severe penalty must be inflicted on such persons [in tales] than on the others who have intercourse with brute beasts, you are compelled to admit altogether that no injury is done to them when they are lawfully put to death; nor do the magistrates sin who in this matter carry out the divine sentence.

FUR. One thing still remains. For you have made no answer to that objection which asserts that they are possessed [*obſeſſas*] by the Devil, and for that reason denies that they are justly put to death.

ER. I answered this and all the others long ago in the *Antiparacelsica* [*Antiparacelficis*]. But what need is there to answer assumptions [*ſumptiones*] that are plainly false, which no sensible person would approve, and which the very inspection and evidence of the facts refute? The possessed, indeed, are cruelly tormented [*agitantur*], afflicted, [Margin: *Sagæ non ſunt obſeſſæ.* — The *sagæ* are not possessed.]

miserably, torn apart [*diſcerpuntur*], thrown to the ground, hurled headlong, tortured — and of all these things most *striges* suffer nothing. The examples cited from the sacred books, which you have read, prove this well enough that to pour out words here would be to do what has already been done [*actum fit*

agere]. Next, the possessed are not of sound mind, or at least cannot use it at the time of their paroxysms [paroxyfismorum]. For they are tormented by diseases so severe and bitter that during the exacerbations [exacerbationibus] they do not seem to be in their right mind. The contrary happens with the *striges*, who both enjoy good health and show no sign of an injured mind. Nor again do they ever speak in a foreign tongue [peregrino idiomate], as the possessed do. What of the fact [Quid q] that the possessed, when they have lucid intervals [interualla dilucida], beg pardon with groaning and the greatest sorrow if they have said or done anything wrongly, and [say] that they did not give their consent to the demon who was using their tongue and limbs against their will? The *sagae* are so far from showing that they repent of their crimes that they grieve most bitterly if they could not accomplish something they wished to do. Fifth [Quintò], the *striges* are accustomed to boast of their skill in marvellous things and of some knowledge or other of working miracles; the possessed claim none of these things for themselves. Nor again do the possessed ever remember any pact contracted with the Devil; nor have they ever taken delight in the presence of the Demon; but they ask with mouth and heart that [he] be as far away from them as possible for ever [petunt]. The *sagae*, by contrast, rejoice that their lovers [amafios] are present; they summon them when absent, urge them on when they delay, and welcome them with applause when they arrive. And when questioned, all of them confess with one voice that they have been bound by pact [pactas se fuisse]. Finally, scarcely any *sagae* admit that they are possessed [obfessas], whereas all who are truly possessed, in their time of quiet [tempore quietis], grieve, mourn and lament this one thing above all.

FUR. How could so great a crime and so great an impiety befall them, if the Devil did not possess their mind?

ER. I was speaking of the possessed in the way everyone usually speaks together with the Holy Scriptures: namely, when Satan has occupied the body and governs, drives and rides [equitat] it almost at his own will. When so far he only besieges [obfidet] the mind, to drive [it] to shameful deeds [flagitia], the one who is possessed in this way is not excused — unless you decide that all criminals are to be acquitted.

FUR. I will say candidly what I think. When I first read the book, I thought there was something solid in it. Two things moved me to think so. The first is that the man is both exceptionally learned and prudent and pious. The second, that I knew he had been asked by you that, if he had decided to write anything against [it], he should make it good with firmer arguments. I believed, therefore, that after weighing the matter most carefully he had ventured to attack our view [sententiam, printed contracted fñiam] relying on better reasons. But the thing itself shows clearly that he has brought nothing new, but has repeated earlier things.

ER. So the matter stands [Sic h̄bt res].²³ if it were true, what everywhere and almost solely in this cause [hac cā] he drives home — that the *lamiae*, because their *phantasia* is occupied by false images, do not admit true ones (so indeed a mirror tinted with a particular colour does not receive all colours; but there is nonetheless an enormous difference between a mirror and the *phantasia*) — we might plausibly suppose [probabiliter cogitaremus]: that something similar has happened to this most accomplished and illustrious man. For because, moved by pity for the unhappy women, he impressed this deeply on his *phantasia* — that a wrong is being done to them (nor is he entirely mistaken: for many innocent women too are put to death because they have been denounced [indicatæ] by guilty ones; and the guilty are torn apart by torture more cruelly than is just [æquo atrociùs excarnificantur]) — he could not easily thereafter give place to true reasons. But just as this can be affirmed to some extent of the sick and the melancholic [melancholicis], so in the healthy it is true absolutely. Whatever the case, you have said rightly that he has not now brought firmer and better [arguments] — which would grieve me greatly, if something more certain could be found. For I would rather die than err knowingly and wittingly [sciens & prudē] in so great a matter, since such an error is not free of the highest impiety. May the only-begotten and eternal Son of the eternal God the Father, our Lord Jesus Christ, grant that we may all be of one mind in him, and that, laying aside our passions [affectibusque pofitis], we may keep the eyes of the mind fixed on the one truth. Amen.

The Kalends of July, in the year 77 [Cal. Iulij, anno 77.[?]]²⁴.

FINIS [The End].

[Volume colophon]

Printed at Frankfurt am Main [IMPRESSVM FRANcofurti ad Moenum], by Nikolaus Basse [apud Nicolaum Bas-f[alæ]um [?]].

Diagram. Printer's device, woodcut. An oval medallion set in a rectangular scrollwork cartouche, with a winged putto at each upper corner and clusters of fruit at each lower corner. Inside the medallion a nude female figure with long hair blown forward stands on a disc or wheel resting on the water; she holds a blade raised in one hand, and a length of drapery or sail billows around her. Behind her are sun-rays; a walled town with towers stands on the shore to the left, and a ship under sail on the water to the right. A capital-letter legend runs round the oval band.

- Legend (round the band, clockwise from lower left): "HAC OC- | CASIO CALVA | FRONTE CA- | PILLATA EST | POST" — the words HAC, OCCASIO, CALVA, FRONTE, CAPILLATA, EST, POST. The legend is circular and the band shows no mark of where it begins, so the reading order is not fixed by the page; one order gives "FRONTE CAPILLATA

²³the page prints a point after *res* followed by a lower-case *fi*.

²⁴i.e. 1 July; the century is not printed — 1577 is a supplied identification; the volume's imprint, at the end, is dated M. D. LXXXI (1581)

A DISPUTATION ON *LAMIAE*, OR ...

EST, POST HAC OCCASIO CALVA” (“Opportunity has hair in front,
behind she is bald”).
M. D. LXXXI. [1581]