Milchamot HaShem

מלחמות השם, "The Wars of the Lord"; on the title page "Milchamot ha-schem: Die Kämpfe Gottes"

(c. 1329)

by R. Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag, Gersonides), 1288–1344, Provence

Translation by Scott Weisman

Ars Astronomica

2026

"Milchamot HaShem (מלחמות השם, "The Wars of the Lord"; on the title page "Milchamot ha-schem: Die Kämpfe Gottes")," published in c. 1329, is in the public domain. All translations, original additions, including illustrations, commentaries, and summaries, are copyright.

The source text was obtained from Internet Archive and is available at https://archive.org/details/sefermilamothash00leviuoft.

Translation © 2026 Scott Weisman. All rights reserved.

Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Share with attribution; non-commercial; no derivatives.

Published by Ars Astronomica

Translator Version 2

Upright reason dictates that the recipients of the good, of whatever type and level of beneficence it may be, must show gratitude and blessing to the beneficent person in every way possible, commensurate with the value of the beneficence. And one who has benefited all the people of the world — for example, one who invented a new instrument for the good of the world, or a good book — it is fitting for every discerning person, out of the obligation of love of fellow beings, to at least purchase it, so that the man will profit and his heart will be encouraged thereby to invent yet more good instruments in the world. And similarly, all other wise-hearted people will likewise strive and exert themselves to invent good things and instruments needed for the repair of the world and its perfection.

And therefore, whoever says: "What do I need this new instrument for?" — he does not act well towards the world. For if not for the man who invented it, where would you be? And what would your city do? And more than this, if the man did not exert himself, what would the world do?

— R. Pinchas Eliyahu Hurwitz, *Sefer HaBris HaShalem* (1797)

If you find this translation useful, consider supporting Ars Astronomica.

ArsAstronomica@protonmail.com

A note on the work

The Wars of the Lord is the philosophical and theological masterwork of Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides, 1288–1344), one of the boldest minds of medieval Provence. Written over many years and completed in 1329, it confronts the hardest questions where Aristotelian philosophy and the Torah collide, and refuses easy answers. Across six books, Gersonides examines the immortality of the soul, the nature of prophecy and dreams, whether God knows individual future events, divine providence, the heavens and their movers, and the creation of the world. Rigorous, original, and unafraid to dissent from Maimonides where reason demands it, this is a defining monument of Jewish rationalist thought.

A note on the translation process

This translation was produced with the translation-pipeline. See the linked repository for details on the process.

This text is the product of a highly refined automated translation process. It has undergone only cursory human review and should not be treated as an authoritative or scholarly rendering. It is offered solely as a reference and reading aid — a way to make an otherwise inaccessible work approachable — and any passage of real consequence should be checked against the original source.

Acknowledgements

Translated with the assistance of Claude. The translator thanks the Anthropic team for making this work possible.

Milchamot HaShem — Front Matter

Source PDF p. 1 — Front cover (photograph of binding)

[Illegible: no readable text on the cover photograph.]

Source PDF p. 2 — Library book-pocket (rear paste-down)

[The page is an affixed cream-colored library lending pocket. The printed text reads, upside-down relative to the leaf:]

> PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
>
> UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

Source PDF p. 3 — Endpaper (blank leaf)

Blank cream endpaper. A pencil notation appears in the upper-left corner.

[Margin: pencil marking in upper-left corner, "$50" (a price/acquisition note) [?].]

Source PDF p. 4 — Endpaper (blank leaf)

Blank cream endpaper. No text.

Front Matter

[Half-title]

מלחמות השם

The Wars of the Lord [מלחמות השם]

Milchamot Ha-schem.

[Title]

Milchamot Ha-schem.

Die Kämpfe Gottes.

[German: **The Wars of God.**]

[German: Religious-philosophical and cosmological questions, treated in six books]

[German: by]

Levi ben Gerson

[Levi ben Gershom / Gersonides, 1288–1344, the author known in Hebrew as Ralbag]

[German: New, thoroughly corrected edition.]

Leipzig,

[German: Printed and published by Carl B. Lorck.]

Milchamot HaShem (The Wars of the Lord) — Levi ben Gershom

[Title]

This recto repeats the Hebrew title page already given on the half-title opening:

> The Book of *Milchamot HaShem* [The Wars of the Lord] Composed by the philosopher, the great rabbi, Rabbi **Levi ben Gershon** [Gersonides / Ralbag]. First printed in Riva di Trento [ריווא דטרינטא] in the year ש"כ [= 320 of the lesser reckoning, i.e. 5320 AM = 1559/60 CE]. And now brought to light a second time. Leipzig. Published by Herr Carl B. Lorck [קארל ב' לארק]. In the year תרכ"ו [= 626 of the lesser reckoning, 5626 AM = 1865/66 CE].

Blank leaf. A triangular library accession stamp is visible (reading "AU[G] / 23 / 1983" with "UNIVERSITY OF [TORONTO]" around the border). [Library accession stamp, English] No printed text.

דברי [Words of] — Jacob Marcaria

יעקב מרקריאה [Jacob Marcaria]

Who first brought this book to light [מוציא הספר הזה לאור ראשונה]

[This is the editor's preface from the original first edition (Riva di Trento, 1560), reprinted here. It is written in ornate, allusion-laden rhyming prose; the rendering below conveys its sense in readable English.]

To the reader. This time my husband will be joined to me, for I have borne you a son [cf. Bereishis 29:34, a play on the name Levi] — and you shall call it the Book of *Milchamot HaShem*, by the divine philosopher, the master Rabbi Levi ben Gershon, may his memory be for the life of the World to Come, who in philosophy ascended on high and spoke concerning God. And although his words appear to contradict our Torah and the sages of our nation — for the LORD's is the war, front and back, [as] a help opposite him — and although many call it "wars *against* the Lord," and these are the "waters of contention [Mei Merivah]" over which men have quarreled, with many warring against him from on high: nonetheless he himself made his defense on this matter in the introduction to the book and in the final chapter of the First Treatise [מאמר ראשון]. From there we have seen that words of Torah are one thing and words of philosophy another — [Aramaic: אינהו בדידהו ואנן בדידן, "they are about their own matters and we about ours"]. And I, for my part, have not come to be for him an advocate or upright interpreter, nor to fight the LORD's war — for help has already come [to him] among the mighty: the master, author of the *Sefer Neveh HaShalom* [ספר נוה השלום, "The Abode of Peace," by R. Avraham Shalom], and the rest of those skilled in this warfare. Rather, let this be written as a memorial in a book: that any man who wishes to come and ascend the heights, and reach the utmost limit of philosophy, should look to his [the author's] ways and grow wise, and should not forsake or abandon this book, for all [others] are as nothing beside it. And as for the man — "Known" [מודע] is his name in Israel [cf. Rus 2:1], who has joined companions in their wisdom, with composition and with commentaries — therefore I have withheld [my pen] [text continues].

[The remainder of this opening paragraph praises the book's production: that the reader will see for himself how fine this paper is, "how lovely this paper" — and that the editor has emended it (גם הגהתיו והסירותי מקרבו כל רע, "I have also corrected it and removed from its midst every fault"). He notes that the difficult passages written in this book left him in doubt; whatever he found doubtful he checked against the books of Aristotle [ספרי ארסטוטלוס] and other men of

renown, drawing upon them. He recalls the saying "Take fine flour" [קח קמח, cf. the *solet*/fine-flour image] — "and when this book comes, your lips shall murmur [over it]." **Blessed is He who teaches my hands to do battle, and my fingers to war** [Tehillim 144:1] — with which the paragraph closes.]

[A second, shorter note follows, set off by rules:]

And I, the corrector [מגיה] of this book that lies before you — alas, O reader, there is no need for many words, for you are wise: discern and know. But this one thing I ask of you: when you study this book and examine my work in it, do not look upon it with a grudging eye or a bitter spirit, for you are wise — examine, and you will know. [The corrector explains] that his labor in it was great, the time was short, and afterward [recovered the text]; he who was at my aid [?] — and it [the prior edition] was full of errors and deficiencies, as one finds [when reading] this [present] book if one reads [it] against the book that Jacob, mentioned above [Marcaria], first brought out. —

Blank leaf; faint show-through and scattered foxing only, no printed text.

The Author's Introduction [הקדמת המחבר]

(Praise to God) [תהלה לאל]

By the word of the Lord the heavens were made — the work of a Master, whole and perfect, their light a light to themselves. He wrapped Himself in it, and brought forth from His spirit the hidden depths; the heavens grew radiant. His hand brought forth the noble heavenly body, raising it to heights far above all the other heavenly bodies. Upon its base He set it firm, like a cast mirror; He made it strong, He spread out the firmament and stretched it like a tent to dwell in — a strong expanse that does not change, a body to which no other body can be compared in its essence or its eternity, and to whose beauty none can be likened.

The Lord by wisdom founded the earth upon its foundations; He stretched over it the line of formlessness and the stones of emptiness [Cf. *tohu va-vohu*]. He set the deep darkness as a finished stone; His hands fashioned it, so that He might do, as on this day, His work over the whole face of the earth, and satisfy the desire of all that the soil brings forth. All the luminaries of light in the heavens — He set them in their courses to do all that He commands them. He placed their dominion in the earth and made their signs into signs. And though there is none among us who knows for how long, through them every living being below upon the earth is enabled to acquire its soul [נפש] — the fish of the sea, the creeping thing, the

winged bird, man and beast — from His source of life for all the living. And though He has set the destroyer [המשחית, the agent of corruption] within their individuals, by His bounty their species endure.

God chose for Himself one who speaks from among the composite beings [המורכבות, the compounded creatures]: he alone is illumined by the light of the King of life. With an added measure He gave him understanding and discernment in fellowship, and it was set upon his heart. From him He chose to make for Himself a kingdom of priests and a holy nation, that they might return and walk in exaltation. The power of His deeds He declared to His people in His perfect Torah, to refresh their souls as they walk among those who stand here [the angelic ranks] — the wise host. To Him praises are fitting, for all the great good He has dealt with us in giving us knowledge to make our souls pleasant, eternally pleasant in His pleasantness. Every existing thing — His existence is exceedingly awesome, and who can contain it? No intellect that thinks can comprehend Him; the fullness of praises cannot reckon Him. He is exalted above all blessing and praise. How could He be sought out in a tumult of sound? When a man draws near to bow to Him, it befits him better to raise a sound of stillness. And in this let every soul give praise.

[The Body of the Introduction]

Said Levi ben Gershom [לוי בן גרשום, Gersonides / Ralbag]:

After praise, thanksgiving to God, and the request from Him to set our path straight before us, we have determined in this book to investigate certain questions — exceedingly precious and obscure — in which great principles are at stake, principles that lead a person to his intellectual felicity [הצלחתו המדעית]. They are as follows.

The first is whether the rational soul [הנפש המדברת, the speaking/rational soul] survives after it has been perfected with some measure of perfection; and, if it does survive, whether the human rank is changed [transformed] in this survival. For this question is most important and most doubtful, and an error in it removes a person from his true felicity by an enormous distance.

The second: when future events become known to a person — in a dream, by divination [קסם], or by prophecy — are they made known to him essentially [בעצם], or accidentally [במקרה], that is, without an efficient cause? And if there is an efficient cause there, what is it, and how is this sent forth from it? For here there are formidable doubts, however the matter be supposed.

The third: does God, may He be blessed, know the existing things [the particulars of existence]? And if He does know them, in what manner does He know them? For however the matter be supposed, doubts, perplexities, and confusions follow from it.

The fourth: whether God, may He be blessed, exercises providence [משגיח] over existing things, and in what manner — and in particular over the human species and its individuals.

The fifth: how do the movers of the heavenly bodies [מניעי הגרמים השמימיים] move them? How many is the number of these movers, so far as is possible for us to determine? And in what manner is this motion completed by them? For this question is most doubtful.

The sixth: whether the world is eternal [קדום] or created [מחודש]; and if it is created, what is the manner of its creation. For this question too is most doubtful, and bound up with it are the principles that direct a person toward his intellectual and political felicity in some measure.

It is clear that one who pursues this inquiry [the sixth question] is pursuing no small matter. For the eminence of an investigation derives from the eminence of the subject investigated, and there is here no subject more worthy than the one investigated here. For the world in its totality is far more worthy than its parts. Moreover, the divergence that arises among those who reflect on this question leads to a divergence in their views on many precious matters. For this reason, this question is among those questions that serve as the starting points [התחלות] for many things; and it is clear that arriving at the truth in the starting points is exceedingly precious, since it brings the inquirer to grasp the truth in what follows from those starting points — just as an error in them is grave, since it leads to error in those very matters for which they serve as a starting point. This is especially so when the matters that depend on the starting point are things that direct a person toward his intellectual and political felicity, as is the case with this question.

For this reason, this question, on account of its eminence, is by nature desired by every inquirer. And it should not be hidden from him that he must not rely, in this matter, on a demonstration drawn from things eternal to the world — such as one would say of the First Cause. For our knowledge of the essence of the First Cause is exceedingly weak, and therefore it is impossible to make of it a starting point for a demonstration in this inquiry. Rather, the demonstrations that can be constructed concerning this question are of the kind of evidentiary

demonstrations [מופתי הראיה] of necessity — that is, they are drawn from matters that are posterior with respect to this evidence, supposing that the world be generated [הווה].

To these questions we have further joined two religious questions [שאלות דתיות] that are most doubtful. The first concerns the matter of the signs and wonders [האותות והמופתים]: in what way is their occurrence possible, by whose hand, and who is the agent — according to what follows from our faith, when there is joined to it what appears from the side of speculation. The second: whether there is here a means by which the prophet may be tested, as appears from the statement of Jeremiah, peace be upon him, to Hananiah son of Azzur [ירמיה... לחנניה בן עזור; Cf. Yirmiyahu 28].

There is no doubt that one who studies this book ought first to have studied the mathematical [הלמודיות], the natural [הטבעיות], and the divine sciences [האלהיות]. For of the questions we have mentioned, some belong to natural science, some to divine science [metaphysics], and some are established by means of the mathematical sciences — as, for example, the matter of the number of the movers of the heavenly bodies. For our determination of the number of the heavenly bodies that are in motion has already been settled upon, and the determination of this number belongs to the mathematical science of the stars [astronomy], as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] explained — all of this in the treatise marked with the letter *lamed* [Book XII, Λ] of the *Metaphysics* [*Metaphysica*]. Furthermore, the inquiry into the world — whether it is eternal or created — will of necessity be settled either from the side of the essence of the world, or from the side of its attributes, whether these be natural or mathematical; or from the side of the agent, if that be possible.

Now it is not our intention in this book to set down how the truth concerning these matters has been demonstrated in their proper places. For if we adopted that practice, this book of ours would encompass all the sciences, or most of them. Rather, we shall lay out, at the level of roots [השרשים, i.e. as principles], what has been demonstrated elsewhere by demonstration. And likewise those roots from which is verified what we maintain are not [each] demonstrated for the reader in this book, since our intention in it is that our words be of the utmost brevity. For the length of discourse on these deep matters is a concealment from the eye of the reader. Yet in certain places we have expanded in clarifying what the reader might suppose was [already] clarified in the words of others — and what brought us to this is some matter we have innovated in it, or have set forth by way of guiding toward the discovery of the truth in the matter.

As for the kinds of demonstration employed in this book: it is clear from what has preceded that some of them must be mathematical, some natural, and some philosophical, according to the matters under inquiry. We are aware that refraining from striving with these questions would have been fitting for us, for several reasons.

— Among them: that inquiry into them is exceedingly difficult, all the more so given what has happened with most of these subjects — namely, that the ancients said nothing about them by way of speculation; and what some of them did say about them by way of speculation happened to be the contrary of the truth, as has been made clear from our words in this book. This is among the things that add to our enormous difficulty in these inquiries, joined to the fact that we are beset by the troubles of the times, which impede all speculation.

— And among them: that without doubt many people reject [recoil from] things they find

strange to them — and this from defective views that have come to them, not from speculation and not from the [received] religious principles, but only what they have inherited from others. Our words, however, are not for that group, for it suffices them to believe and not to trouble themselves to know. Our words are rather for those who have been perplexed by these formidable questions, and whose minds will not rest short of grasping the secrets [סודות] of these matters. What I suppose stems from the envy of men — which has not ceased and will not cease — namely, that many [reject what is real] when it is spoken of alone, but [accept it] when it is pictured to the soul.

— And among them: that they may ascribe to us insolence and recklessness for having inquired into the eternity and creation of the world. For perhaps they will suppose that there is no path for the intellect of the sage to arrive at the truth of this question — except that he be a prophet — all the more so when they see that the perfect ones who preceded us in our nation, and among them the crown of the sages, the diadem of glory of the masters of the Torah, our Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon [רבינו משה בר מיימון, Maimonides / Rambam], may his soul rest in Eden [נ"ע], did not inquire into this object of investigation as into the present inquiry, and indeed concluded from this the impossibility of attaining this object of inquiry by way of speculation — for, had it been possible, it would not have been hidden from those who came before.

But this is a very weak argument. For it is not necessary that what was hidden from the ancients be hidden from those who come after them, since time suffices

for the bringing forth of truth, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] said in the second book of the *Physics* [מספר השמע, *De Auditu / Physica*, Bk. II]. Were this not so, no one would be found inquiring into any of the sciences except in what he learned from another; and if the matter were so, there would be no science at all — which is manifestly false. Moreover, if our words in this inquiry are correct, then what they reckon a disgrace would be praise — I mean, if we have grasped what was hidden from the ancients. And if they are not correct, it is clear that from that side alone the disgrace will attach to us.

Now it would have been possible for them to say that the truth in this inquiry can be reached only by a prophet — for they perhaps will say that what is known not by the way of prophecy cannot be known by the sage through the way of speculation; and still further, that this object of inquiry has been clarified for the prophet by the way of prophecy, and from this it follows necessarily that its knowledge by the sage through the way of speculation is impossible. But the resolution of this doubt is not difficult. The point is this: the prophet must necessarily be a sage, and therefore the matters that the prophet grasps are known to him — some of them from the side of his being a prophet alone (and this is mostly in the foretelling of particular contingent matters that fall out at some time), and some of them he can also grasp from the side of his being a sage (and this is what is grasped from the secrets of the order of existence). The difference in this between the sage and the prophet lies only in the ease of attainment, since the wisdom of the prophet is generally greater than the wisdom of the sage who is not a prophet, and therefore prophecy is consequent upon it. It is not that what is a second intelligible [מושכל שני] for the sage is a first intelligible [מושכל ראשון] for the prophet, as some men suppose — for if the matter were so, the sage's knowledge of this would be more perfect, since he knows the thing through its causes while the prophet does not know it through its causes; and this is false. It is rather possible that there are here intelligibles that the sage who is not a prophet does not attain, while the sage who is a prophet attains them from the side of his being a sage.

Author's Introduction [הקדמת המחבר] (continued)

Since the matter stands as we have laid it out — namely, that there are intelligibles here which both the sage and the prophet may attain — you will find in the words of the prophets things whose truth is beyond doubt for those engaged in speculative inquiry. Such, for example, is the unity of God, may He be blessed, which the Torah mentions, and the Account of the Chariot [מעשה מרכבה] recorded in Ezekiel and in Isaiah, peace be upon them; and many other matters

below these in speculative rank are mentioned in the words of the prophets. Indeed, one finds there matters that are, for those engaged in inquiry, like first intelligibles [מושכלות ראשונות], as in His saying, "And God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very good" (Bereishis 1:31); "The Rock, His work is perfect" (Devarim 32:4); and what the Torah makes clear about the dependence of plant life on rain and on the working of the soil, as in His saying, "for the Lord God had not caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was no man to till the ground" (Bereishis 2:5); and what is made clear about the vapor rising from the earth, as in His saying, "and a mist went up from the earth" (Bereishis 2:6) — and many things like these. Now, these particular apprehensions are distinguished by the fact that they carry no "and the Lord said," "and the Lord spoke," "and the word of the Lord came to me," or the like. And if some matter of this speculative class is found accompanied by an indication that it is prophetic, that would be in order to lend authority to these apprehensions.

This being so, as we have posited, it is clear that the creation of the world recorded in the Torah belongs among those things that a sage may possibly clarify by speculative means. And if someone should say, "Perhaps it belongs instead to that class which a sage cannot possibly clarify," we reply that this is no objection against us unless he can demonstrate to us that it must belong to that class. As for what the Rav, our Master Moses [רבינו משה — Maimonides], may he rest in peace, decreed regarding the impossibility of attaining this object of inquiry, it is no objection against us unless one first refutes the falsity of one of the two horns of the dilemma that follows from it in this investigation, as set forth earlier. And it is possible that we shall clarify in due course why it must be possible to verify this object of inquiry by speculative means.

The point is this: we find in all those engaged in inquiry — as the Philosopher [the Philosopher = Aristotle] mentions, and the Rav, our Master Moses, may he rest in peace, mentions as well, and as has become clear to us by direct experience — a natural longing to ascertain the truth of this question, going back two thousand years. And the natural longing cannot be directed toward what is impossible to attain — still less in an entire community of inquirers. In sum, of all the inquirers whose words have reached us, none refrained, on account of these causes mentioned earlier, from completing the investigation of these questions to the best of his ability. This is because human felicity is perfected when a person comes to know something of the existing things insofar as that is possible, and such felicity is greater in the apprehension of the more honored things than in the apprehension of things lower than them in rank and worth. For this reason it is that we long more for the partial apprehension available to us of the honored

things than for the complete apprehension we have of things lower than them. This will be made fully clear in the First Book of this work, God willing.

Moreover, it is not fitting that one who has apprehended something of the speculative matters should withhold from imparting to others what he has apprehended of it, for this would be the height of baseness. In general, just as the emanation from God, may He be blessed, of this whole existence — though it brings Him no benefit — reaches it [creation], so it is fitting for everyone who has attained any measure of perfection to strive to perfect another in it, so far as is possible, thereby resembling God, may He be blessed, to the extent of his ability.

It is clear, then, that none of the perfected should rebuke us for entering upon such difficult investigations; rather, we ought to be praised for our exertion in investigating such profound matters, even if all we attain is the exertion alone. All the more should we be praised for completing the treatise on these investigations as fully as possible, as will be seen from our words. Likewise it is clear that one who studies our words ought not, under the influence of his affection for us and our intention to benefit him, abandon the very things [?] that we meant by them. He should, without doubt, grant us those premises that a man would grant in the cause of fair argument, and not contend over our words for the sake of contention [לבעל ריבנו]. For this might be a cause of his failing to understand our words. And if he is not a contentious adversary [בעל דין], this is all the more fitting for him, since all these inquiries are among those upon which the principles of the Torah depend, as will become clear from our words, God willing.

By the life of truth, we did not cease to fear composing a book on such matters, knowing the custom of the foolish who are wise in their own eyes regarding such profound topics. But what brought us to this was the intensity of our longing to remove a stumbling block from the path of those engaged in speculation about these great questions — questions error in which removes a man very far from his felicity.

We have resolved to set down, in each one of these inquiries, all the opinions that may fall under it, and what establishes each opinion and what refutes it; for by this means many premises will be prepared for us in each of these inquiries, and it will become easy for us to distinguish the correct ones from the incorrect, in a way that brings about for us the attainment of the truth in each of these inquiries so that no doubt remains in it. This is because doubt arises about a matter on account of the conflicting considerations we have regarding it; and when the investigation of them is completed, the correct is distinguished from the

incorrect, and doubt is removed from that inquiry. And since it has already happened, in all these inquiries, that the ancients held incorrect opinions about them, we have pressed the investigation hard, to show that the opinions of the ancients are incorrect in every way in which this can be shown. It came about, together with this, that everything that became clear to us by speculative means is the view of our Torah. For this reason we have called this book *The Wars of the Lord* [מלחמות ה'], for in it we have warred against the incorrect opinions found among the ancients regarding these matters.

Let the reader not suppose that it is the Torah that compels us to verify whatever is verified in this book, apart from its being true in itself. For it is clear — as the Rav, the Guide [הרב המורה — Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed*], of blessed memory, has explained — that it is fitting for us to believe what is shown to be true from the side of speculation. And if the Torah should conflict with it according to the literal sense of its words, then it is fitting that those words be interpreted in a way that accords with speculation. For this reason the Guide, of blessed memory, interpreted what appears

from the words of the Torah to the effect that God, may He be blessed, is corporeal, in a manner that does not conflict with speculation. For the same reason the Rav, the Guide, of blessed memory, judged that if the eternity of the world were demonstrated by proof, it would be fitting for us to believe it, and that the words of the Torah which appear to conflict with this view should be interpreted in a way that accords with speculation. Hence it is clear that, if the path of speculation led us in these matters to something other than what appears from the literal sense of the Torah, we would not be prevented by the Torah from declaring the truth in them; for this is no conflict with the Torah in truth. The Torah is not a law that compels us to believe falsehoods; rather, it guides us, as far as possible, toward the attainment of the truth, as we explained where we began our interpretation of the words of the Torah.

For this reason our practice in these inquiries has been to investigate them with a complete investigation, first from the side of speculation, and afterward we have shown that what speculation has brought us to in each of these inquiries is the view of our Torah. And it was fitting that it should be so, since in some of these inquiries the Torah has directed us to find the right truth — wonderfully so — beyond what comes of it through speculation alone; for the Torah aims to bring those who conduct themselves by it to human perfection as fully as possible, as we explained in our commentary on the words of the Torah. This being so, and

there being here inquiries so very profound that it is hard for a man to attain them, it was fitting that the Torah should direct us to attain their truth.

And it is clear, from what has preceded, that our investigation in this book will necessarily concern distinct matters, and it is incumbent upon us to explain the reason on account of which we have placed some of them before others. Now, were we to give the reason for each and every matter, repetition would occur in those matters that have been placed one before another for one and the same reason. We have therefore seen fit to set forth a preliminary discussion that will explain the reasons for the arrangement of this book, so that we need not mention the reason for each individual matter. And it is this.

Know that order in things is very useful for bringing the inquirer to the intended goal in those things. In our view this rests on seven causes: some on the side of necessity — and this is either from the side of the matter and the side of the inquirer together, or from the side of the inquirer alone — and some on the side of what is better, this being either from the side of the matter, or from the side of the inquirer, or from the side of both together.

The first. There are matters some of which naturally precede others in being known, such as the precedence of knowing the premises over knowing the conclusion necessitated by them — and this holds whether within a single science or across two sciences. For instance, the mathematical objects [העניינים הלמודיים] naturally precede the natural objects [העניינים הטבעיים] in being known; and where one subject is more universal than another — for the mathematician [הלמודיי] investigates body absolutely, and the natural scientist [הטבעי] likewise investigates body absolutely, except that he investigates it insofar as it is in motion. Thus within a single science some matters precede others in arrangement and in nature, and some sciences precede others in arrangement and in nature. This kind of precedence is necessitated from the side of the matter and the inquirer.

The second. The placing of universal matters before particular matters, since by this means the premises adopted to verify those matters are primary, and what they are predicated of, they are predicated of in a certain respect, and no repetition occurs by this means. This kind of precedence is, as it were, intermediate between what is necessary from both sides and what is on the side of what is better from both sides; and the more necessary of the two from both sides is the more fitting.

The third. It is clear that an author does not compose for himself but to impart to others. It is therefore fitting that he direct his effort to arranging his words in a way by which the inquirer will reach the full aim of that book; and for this reason he must begin instruction with the easy. For if the earlier did not make known the later in essence, he would be obliged to begin with the easy — and this kind of precedence is, from the side of the matter itself, on the side of what is better, while from the side of the inquirer, for whom the very intention of composing that book was undertaken, it is, as it were, necessary; for by this means the inquirer habituates and trains himself in that science, until, by this means, what is hard becomes easy for him on this difficult path. But the authors who do not follow such a practice — those who instead add obscurity and concealment to their words, whether by their arrangement or by the depth of their language, so that they make easy things hard — ruin the very purpose for which any author composes. For not only do they fail to benefit the inquirer; they add to his confusion, so that his words are understood only by exceptional individuals, his words being harmful to the multitude when they are understood by them — God forbid — unless the author's intention is to conceal them from the multitude of inquirers.

And sometimes this serves as a stratagem on the author's part. For when he is aware of a defect in his statements or of their weakness, he contrives for them deep, polished phrasings, and composes for them, in addition, matters that throw the inquirer into great alarm, so that he conceals from him the defect or weakness in those statements — inasmuch as his speculation has been forced to occupy itself with grasping those phrasings; and the matters, together with what the author has put into them of concealment and of drawing hearts toward what he desires, alarm them. But our intention in this book is the opposite of that intention. We wish to make our language ample and clear and our arrangement good, so that our intention is plain to the inquirer despite the depth of the matter — not that the depth of the language and the poorness of arrangement should hide from him the defect and weakness of the matters. For this reason we have not employed in it elegant figures of speech and deep phrasings; the depth of the matter in it suffices, together with sound arrangement and clear language, without there being added to it the depth of language and poorness of arrangement as well.

The fourth. When an author is obliged to discuss distinct matters that do not make one another known, and those matters have some order in existence or in nature — like the precedence of one to two, and of the triangle to the quadrilateral — it is fitting that he govern the arrangement of those matters by

the order they have in their existence. This will also be a cause that nothing of them be omitted by the author, and that the locations of the items of inquiry [דרושי המספר] be better known. This kind of precedence is from the side of the matter and the inquirer

[The Introduction continues; the discussion of the seven causes of arrangement is not yet complete.]

The fifth. Sometimes an author needs to add a preliminary discussion in order to clarify matters of some kind. In such a case you should not ask me for the reason why the investigation is set within the preliminary discussion we set down, whether to one of the prior matters or to something other than it; nor should you ask why we placed it before one matter rather than the matter itself, or why we nullified one matter or established it for the sake of another. For you yourself are able to examine the reason on account of which we arranged it in this order. This is clear in light of the prior causes: that where there are two matters fit to be placed one before the other — the one in one respect, the other in another respect — and the matters in question fall to the author by this kind of precedence rather than to other matters, then, the case being so, it is fitting that he not be asked the reason why these matters were placed before others as we did; for he has already arranged it according to one of the prior causes. This is clear also from the fact that, were we to make the order of the matter the reverse, the [same kind of] question would fall upon it just as well.

As for what is not in doubt — that according to the prior causes the [reader's] reflection ought to favor investigating in the book what was investigated earlier — this concerns whether the author was right to order his words in good order according to the prior causes. And the obligation that the reflection upon the book investigated earlier should rest upon what is investigated later is itself an eighth cause, which the author at times can [appeal to], leaning, in what comes later among his words, upon what has been clarified earlier. And this is so that he need not lengthen the clarification in that place. For where he extended the clarification of a matter, there is in this a redundancy and a superfluity that he does not need. And if the earlier among the things to be investigated is investigated later, it will happen to him that he does not understand it, or that he will understand it otherwise than the author intended.

This being the case, you ought, O reflector, if you wish to grasp the truth of this book, to make your reflection upon it follow the order in which we have arranged it. For if you do not conduct yourself by this practice, the confusion that would befall you from this is what would prevent your standing fast upon the depth of

this book and its secrets. And it is fitting that the truth not be hidden from one who reflects upon our words in this book, where the matters in it have not fallen by any defect in speculation, but rather what has fallen in it has fallen after complete investigation — in such a way that no book has yet been left as comprehensive in what this book comprehends; and there has been omitted from it, moreover, much of the doubts that fall within the sciences in general, as will be clarified to one who reflects upon the sciences and senses in them those doubts and their resolution, together with which the principles of the Torah in general are established. And by this it is clear that it is not fitting for any of the reflectors upon our words to change anything of what this book comprehends, neither in its order nor in its matter nor in what is clarified within it; for that would perhaps spoil our intention.

And so, the parts of this, the first book, are six.

The first is the treatise on the immortality of the soul.

The second is on foreknowledge of future things.

The third is on the knowledge of God, may He be blessed, concerning particular things.

The fourth is on the providence of God, may He be blessed, over existing things.

The fifth is on the heavenly bodies — their movers and their gradation, some in relation to others, and the gradation of God, may He be blessed, in relation to them — so far as is possible for us.

The sixth is the treatise on the origination of the world; and we have included within it the treatise on signs and miracles, and the manner by which the prophet tests [them].

With this, the purpose of this book is clarified, and its benefit, and what its name indicates concerning it, and its order, and the necessary parts and their gradation. And this is what was intended. Here it is.

> Make known to me Your way, that I may walk; for I have lifted up my soul to You. ✻ [cf. Tehillim 143:8]
>
> O Lord, lead me in Your righteousness, because of those who lie in wait for me; make Your way straight before my face. [cf. Tehillim 5:9]
>
> From my enemies You have made me wiser through Your commandment, for it is mine forever. [cf. Tehillim 119:98]

Treatise One [מאמר ראשון]

On the Immortality of the Soul, and it is divided into fourteen chapters.

Chapter One — in which the prior opinions concerning the quiddity of the human intellect are recalled. — **Chapter Two** — in which is recalled what manner of proofs there are by which to verify each of these opinions. — **Chapter Three** — in which is recalled the nullification of each of these opinions on account of the proofs by reason of which there are present in them refutations of these opinions. — **Chapter Four** — in which is clarified the nullification of some of these opinions in a complete manner. — **Chapter Five** — in which is clarified, so far as is possible for us in this place, the quiddity of the hylic intellect. — **Chapter Six** — in which is clarified the quiddity of the Active Intellect, so far as is possible for us. — **Chapter Seven** — in which the prior opinions concerning the matter of the immortality of the hylic intellect are recalled. — **Chapter Eight** — in which is recalled what manner of proofs there are by which to know the opinions about it. — **Chapter Nine** — in which it is clarified that there is no proof in these proofs to establish a true endurance, nor to nullify it, by these opinions, whether of true endurance or of true nullification. — **Chapter Ten** — in which it is clarified that the acquired intellect is eternal. — **Chapter Eleven** — in which it is clarified that it is not possible that the Active Intellect should apprehend the [thing] until they become one and the same in every respect. — **Chapter Twelve** — in which there is investigated the resolution of the doubts touching on what is precious in what we explained concerning the matter of human felicity. — **Chapter Thirteen** — in which there is investigated the resolution of the doubts touching on what is precious in the matter of the emanation of the Active Intellect upon the hylic intellect — these being the intelligibles which it brings about. — **Chapter Fourteen** — in which there remains to be made straight what in our words ought not to be abandoned on account of what the [received] faith requires that one bring to the reflection upon it.

Chapter One [פרק ראשון]

In which the prior opinions concerning the quiddity of the human intellect are recalled.

Since the intellect is the most honored of the parts of the soul, it is fitting to begin with reflection upon the immortality and the eternity that lie in it. For the rest of the parts of the soul are, as is clear, matters that perish with the corruption of the

matter, since their actions are performed by means of bodily organs. Now it is fitting, before we investigate the matter of the immortality of the soul — whether it is something existent or not, and, if it should be existent, how it is existent — that there be investigated the quiddity of the human intellect. For human immortality and human felicity belong to its apprehensions, and it is not fitting to investigate the matter that is investigated before [investigating] its quiddity; for one who does not know the quiddity of a thing does not know its apprehensions.

And because the philosophers have differed about this with great difference, it is fitting first to investigate their opinions about it, and what straight path may be taken from them, and what is found in them that is not straight — which will be clarified [only] after the right path has been clarified — to the end that the matter come to nullification through truth. In this manner we shall remove from the reflectors what may have taken hold in them whereby the prior opinions which are not straight are corroborated, and so that what they were raised upon and grew accustomed to believing should not prevent them from reaching the truth in this investigation.

We may say, then, that the earlier philosophers were divided on this question into four opinions.

The **first opinion** is that of Alexander [of Aphrodisias]. He holds that this disposition [ההכנה] — that is, the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] — resides in a substrate, as if one were to say the soul as a whole, or some part of its parts, such as the imaginative soul [הנפש המדמה] or the imaginative forms [הצורות הדמיוניות] found within it; and that in itself it is nothing other than the disposition.

The **second opinion** is that of Themistius [תמסטיוס] and those who follow him. He holds that this disposition is a separate intellect [שכל נבדל], neither generated nor corruptible [בלתי הווה ולא נפסד].

The **third opinion** is that of Ibn Rushd [בן רשד / Averroes] in his commentary on De Anima [בביאורו לספר הנפש]. He holds that this disposition is the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] itself, except that, by virtue of its conjunction [דבקות] with us, a disposition arises in it and it acquires the power to intellect what is here below — that is, these intelligibles [המושכלות] that depend on the sensible matters found outside the soul. It is as if we were to say, "every living thing perceives" and "every man speaks," and the like. But in its own essence it is an intellect that intellects its own essence and does not intellect what is here below.

And there is here a **fourth opinion**, held by some of the more recent thinkers of our own time. They hold that this disposition is a separate intellect that has come to be [שכל נבדל הווה] in its own essence, not from any matter.

פרק שני [Chapter Two]

Recalling what kinds of demonstration exist for knowing which of these opinions is correct.

Now that we have recalled the opinions of the predecessors concerning the essence of the intellect, it is fitting that we recall what kinds of demonstration may be found for the correctness of each of these opinions, according to what we have found in the words of the predecessors or by the force of their words. For when the arguments that establish each of these opinions are ready at hand for us, it will be easier for us to ascertain the truth among them. This too is a marvelous aid for arriving at the truth in this inquiry,✻ since, when we have many premises that establish each one of the divisions that arise in this inquiry, it becomes easier for us to clarify from them whatever bears upon attaining the truth in this investigation — as stated above.

We say, then, that on reflection the opinion of Alexander agrees both with what Aristotle [ארסטוטלוס] intends and with what follows from his principles. As to what Aristotle intends: Aristotle called it the "material intellect," and this is among the indications that Aristotle regards this disposition as not being a separate intellect, but rather that it has something belonging to it of the rank of the material [מדרגת ההיולי]. As to what follows from his principles: Aristotle makes it a principle concerning this disposition — that is, the material intellect — that it is not any of the existing things, and on this account he likened it to the disposition in a tablet to receive writing. And what Aristotle laid down as principle concerning this disposition is necessary. For whatever is in potentiality with respect to a thing must not be that thing in actuality, since potentiality and actuality are mutually exclusive [פותרים]. And since this material intellect is in potentiality with respect to all the forms in some manner, it follows that it is not

any of the forms in actuality. Moreover, if it were one of the forms, that form would prevent it from receiving another form, as has been explained in De Anima [ספר הנפש]. It therefore follows concerning this disposition that it is not any of the existing things.

This, however, can only be conceived if this disposition is posited as a material intellect in the manner that Alexander states. For if it were posited as a separate intellect, it would be absurd that there should be here a separate form, subsisting in its own right, which is not any of the existing things. But once we have posited this disposition as residing in a substrate, in the manner that Alexander states, then it is correct to say of the disposition that it is not any of the existing forms, yet that it is in potentiality with respect to them and is not a simple privation [העדר פשוט] — for potentiality is not a simple privation. Furthermore, on this view that Alexander holds, no absurdity arises from what is said regarding the generation and corruption of man. For the form by which a man is what he is comes to be in this manner: it is newly generated at his generation and corrupted in some manner at his corruption — and this is fitting for what is generated and corruptible, since everything generated is corrupted with respect to its form, which is newly produced in it after the matter has been disposed to receive it.

But once this form is posited as separate, neither generated nor corruptible — as Themistius would hold — then a powerful absurdity follows, given that the generation and corruption of man cannot be escaped by any means. For when this form is posited in this manner, the matter cannot avoid one of two alternatives: either we posit that the form of Reuben, say, was hidden [נחבאת] in the matter from which Reuben came to be, prior to his coming-to-be, and that when the matter is disposed and receives the power of nutrition [כח ההזנה] and sensation, its activity becomes manifest; or we posit that it migrated [שתעתק] to him at his coming-to-be. Now our saying that a form migrates in its own essence is false, since it has already been explained in the natural science, in the Physics [ספר השמע], that whatever is in motion must be a body. And when we posit concerning this form that it was hidden in the matter from which man comes to be, it then necessarily follows either that it migrated and came to him at the generation of that matter, or that it was hidden in the matter from which that matter comes to be. And since it is false that it migrated, it follows that it was hidden in the matter from which that matter comes to be; and from this it follows that it was hidden in a third matter; and this proceeds without end — until it follows from this that all generated and corruptible matters would possess a human intellect, which is the utmost in absurdity and disgrace. This very same falsehood follows when we inquire concerning this form at the corruption of man, whether it migrates or whether it remains hidden in him — and this is self-evident. And since all of this is false, it is thereby evident that this disposition is not separate, but is generated and corruptible.

Now if someone should object that this absurdity does not follow from positing this form as separate — reasoning that, since it is separate, its existence is not posited together with matter, and therefore it has no need either to migrate or to be hidden in order to manifest its activity in each individual, but rather this form is

מאמר א' פרק ב' [Book One, Chapter Two]

one in number, and its activity reaches every matter disposed to receive it, as is the case

with the Active Intellect — we reply to him that the conjunction of a separate form with matter is understood in two ways. Either it is a conjunction that is not essential, like the conjunction of the Active Intellect with the seminal fluid [שכבת הזרע] and with seeds, where it is not such that it is their proximate form [צורה קרובה]; or it is an essential conjunction, like the conjunction of the separate intellects [השכלים הנפרדים] with the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים], of which they are in essence the proximate form — and like the conjunction of this material intellect with us, according to the opinion of Themistius, that it is a proximate form to us.

Now it can be conceived that matter be devoid [רק] of the form when the form is conjoined to it by a non-essential conjunction. But when it is conjoined to it by an essential conjunction — as is the case with the form of the heavenly bodies — this cannot be conceived in any way, since this form imparts life to them throughout the entirety of their body, and were they devoid of it they would be dead bodies. Rather, what we mean when we call this form "separate" is that its activity is not exercised through a bodily instrument [כלי גופיי], as is the case with the material forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] — and this is clear to anyone who has examined the words of the philosophers on this matter.

Moreover: even if we were to grant that the heavenly bodies could be devoid of the separate form, it would not on this account follow as a demonstration that the matter belonging to man is devoid of the material intellect. On the contrary, it will be shown that this is impossible, since this form is acted upon in its own essence in each individual by differing affections [פעליות מתחלפות] — to such a degree that in one individual it knows, and in another it is ignorant, or errs in what it knew in the other individual. Hence it is impossible that the form belonging to the knower be the very same form belonging to the one who errs or is ignorant, for it is impossible that a single form, one in number, be at once both

knowing and erring with respect to the same thing. And since this is so, it follows that this form is conjoined with each individual man as forms many in number; and from this the previously stated doubt follows. It has likewise been shown from this that it cannot be separate in any manner — as will be explained hereafter — that is, that on account of its necessary multiplication with the multiplication of its subjects, it will be shown that it cannot be separate; for a separate form cannot be subject to multiplication, as has been explained in its proper place.

Furthermore: it is already evident that among the properties most distinctive of the material forms, insofar as they are material, are found in this form — that is, the material intellect. For it is already evident concerning the material forms, insofar as they are material, that their impression in that wherein they are found follows upon a change in their essence, and that they are multiplied according to the multiplication of their subjects. And behold, so it is seen to be with this form: that its impression follows upon the change of the matter wherein it is found — for that matter is first disposed to receive the power of nutrition and sensation before this form appears in it — and it too is multiplied according to the multiplication of its subjects, so that the form of Reuben, say, is other in number than the form of Simeon. For if this were not posited, it would necessarily follow that a single form, one in number, would contain ignorance and knowledge together with respect to one and the same thing — that is, if the intellect of the wise man and the intellect of the ignorant man were posited to be one and the same — and this is the utmost in disgrace and absurdity. So then it was possible for this form to be multiplied according to the multiplication of its subjects when it was posited in the manner that Alexander stated;

מלחמות ה' [Milchamot HaShem]

whereas when it is posited in the manner that Themistius stated, it cannot be multiplied, since the separate substances [העצמים הנבדלים] are not multiplied unless they differ in species, as has been explained in its proper places. These, then, are the proofs establishing the opinion of Alexander, and they themselves refute the opinion of Themistius.

Now the opinion of Themistius also has its kinds of demonstration.

One of them: It is already apparent concerning this disposition that it is separate, since apprehension [השגה] grows stronger at the time of the weakness of the bodily instruments — that is, in old age. Had it been material, its substrate would

necessarily be weaker at that time, and it would follow from this that its activity would weaken. For example, just as the faculty of sight weakens in the aged because of the weakness of its substrate, so it would necessarily be with this disposition, were it material. But we find the matter to be the opposite — that is, the intellect of the aged is stronger. It is therefore apparent that this disposition is separate.

Another of them: It is already apparent in the material apprehending faculties [הכחות המשיגות ההיולאניות] that they do not apprehend the infinite multitude, because they receive whatever they receive by a particular reception, by reason of their receiving it by a material reception. For example, the faculty of sight apprehends this color in this visible object that is upon this surface and in this shape belonging to this visible object, because it receives it by a material reception in some manner — that is, that in its seeing, a certain impression of this apprehension is impressed upon it; and it necessarily follows from this that what is seen by it must be received within a bounded surface and a determinate shape, and that it does not apprehend color absolutely, but rather apprehends this particular color. But this disposition is found to render a judgment that is unbounded, for it apprehends universal verdicts and definitions [הגזרות הכוללות והגדרים], each of which is a judgment upon an infinite multitude. If so, it is already apparent from this that the material intellect is separate.

Another of them: It is already apparent concerning this disposition that it is a form and not a pure disposition [הכנה גמורה], as Alexander would say. For we find the material intellect — though its way is to apprehend the forms — to apprehend this disposition itself as devoid of the forms; and on this account it was possible for it to intellect privation [ההעדר], that is, by reason of its apprehending its own essence as devoid of the forms. And since this is so, it is apparent that what is called the disposition to receive the intelligibles is necessarily a form.

Another of them: It is already apparent in the material apprehending faculties that the apprehension is other in number than the object apprehended. For example, the appearance [המראה] that is in the faculty of sight at the time of its seeing the visible object is not the appearance that is in the visible thing itself — just as the heat that is in the thing being heated is not the very same heat that is in that which heats it. And this necessarily belongs to them by reason of their receiving the thing by a material reception, since a single accident, one in number, cannot possibly be in two subjects in any way — still less can it be in them together. But this disposition that is in us is such that the apprehension and

the object apprehended are found in it to be one and the same. For the intelligible that it intellects is itself the very thing that reaches us from it, since the intelligible is the universal nature [הטבע הכולל] found for each thing, and the universal nature is in no way multiplied. For example, man

of which—being a species—no two specimens are found numerically distinct; rather, it is the particular nature [הטבע הפרטי] that is multiplied. Since this is so, this disposition is seen to be such as ought to be separate [נבדל].

A further point: the material apprehending faculties [הכחות המשיגות ההיולאניות] are clearly affected in some way by their act of apprehension. Hence when we turn from a strong sensible object to another weaker than it, we cannot immediately apprehend the latter as it truly is. For example, when we have gazed at the sun and then turn from it to some other sensible object, we cannot apprehend that object as it truly is. The same holds for the other senses, and this necessarily follows from the very fact that they receive in a material manner, in a certain way. ✻ But the disposition within us behaves in the opposite way: when we turn from a deep intelligible [מושכל] to one easier than it, we apprehend the latter with ease. This is what one might suppose to show that this disposition is non-material [בלתי היולאנית].

A further point: since we have made this disposition essential to ourselves [שנתעצמנו בה] and it is what is distinctively ours, it must be a substance [עצם]. Yet if its character were posited as Alexander [Alexander of Aphrodisias] maintains, it would in itself be neither a substance nor a part of a substance, but rather one of the apprehending powers of the imaginative soul [הנפש המדמה], that is, the imaginative forms [הצורות הדמיוניות]. But once we posited it as a separate intellect, it became a substance in itself, and it was confirmed that it is what is distinctively ours.

Nor can it be objected that, even granting the disposition is not itself a substance, its substratum [נושאה] is a substance—say, the imaginative soul—and that this substratum is what is distinctively ours, just as the case stands with the other dispositions, which we treat as distinctively belonging to us on account of their substrata, from which these dispositions are derived. This objection plainly has no standing, for the imaginative soul is not what is distinctively ours, since it is already found in the other animals as well.

A further point: just as the substratum of a disposition to receive other things receives a form that prevents it from receiving some [other] form when the disposition passes into actuality—as has been explained—so the case ought to be

with this disposition within us to receive the intelligibles [המושכלות]. And since whatever receives the intelligibles is an intellect, the substratum of this disposition ought to be an intellect; the disposition should not fall under one genus while its substratum falls under another. That is, the disposition that receives the intelligibles should be abstracted from its substratum—as must be held on Alexander's view, and as Alexander himself stated explicitly: namely, that this disposition receives the intelligibles by a reception in which its substratum—the imaginative soul, or the soul as a whole, or whatever is posited as its substratum—is not mixed in. For Alexander's view is that, were its substratum mixed in with it, then the form belonging to its substratum would prevent it from receiving some [other] form, as has been explained, since the way of the power belonging to its substratum is to receive only particular things [הדברים הפרטיים]; so that it would be impossible for it to apprehend the universal matters [העניינים הכללים]. These very [considerations] refute Alexander's view, according to what is supposed to follow from them.

But as for what supports the view of Ibn Rushd [בן רשד / Averroes], it is what he says about this disposition—that it is generated and perishes [מחודשת ונפסדת]. That is, this befalls the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] by reason of its conjunction [דבקות] with us, such that there comes to be a disposition alone; and this conjunction is renewed in each individual person and perishes with their perishing.

the proofs we have mentioned that support Alexander's view do indeed support it. And as for what he said concerning the essence of this disposition—that it is the Active Intellect—the proofs we have mentioned that support the view of Themistius [תמסטיוס] support that, for in this discussion he combined these two views together. ✻ Now Ibn Rushd's view is seen to be preferable to that of Themistius for other reasons besides those we have mentioned in refutation of Alexander's view. And indeed, on Themistius's account, there must here be a disposition residing in a separate substance—that is, the disposition to receive the intelligibles—and the falsity of this is evident, since a power follows necessarily upon matter [היולי] and is found in it alone; and when it is found [present] in [separate] forms, this is incidental [במקרה], by reason of the substratum. In this way it may be said of forms that some of them receive others, as has been explained in the book *On the Soul* [ספר הנפש].

There are those [who hold] that Themistius is necessarily committed to the position that the first perfection [השלמות הראשון] within us is eternal—namely, the material intellect—while the final perfection [השלמות האחרון], which ought to

be more noble than it, comes to be and perishes; for he holds that the intelligibles are generated [מתחדשות] in the material intellect, and being generated, they must on his view be perishable, since it has already been explained in the book *On the Heavens and the World* [ספר השמים והעולם] that everything generated perishes. But for Ibn Rushd this falsity does not follow, for the final perfection that belongs to us—which this disposition has attained—is the Active Intellect itself; and according to what Ibn Rushd holds, this is eternal and ungenerated, except incidentally—that is, by reason of this intellect's conjunction with us. This does not prevent this intellect from apprehending itself at any time, for it apprehends itself perpetually by reason of what is not conjoined with us, according to what Ibn Rushd says. [recte: ר"ל מצד מה שאינו דבק בנו — "by reason of that aspect of it which is not conjoined with us"]

But as for what supports the view of the later thinkers [האחרונים], who posit this disposition as generated and separate: what they said of it—that it is generated—is supported by the third of the proofs we mentioned that support the words of Alexander, since by that [proof] this disposition is generated [מחודשת], not eternal as Themistius maintained. And what they said of it—that it is separate—is supported by the proofs we mentioned that support the words of Themistius, while the other proofs we mentioned that support the words of Alexander refute it. The remaining proofs, which we found in the words of the earlier thinkers [הקודמים], both support these views and refute them, even though they are not found in this manner [to yield] perfection. We have thus completed the discussion of these matters as far as was possible for us; for in this way our inquiry into it will be more complete. And this is necessary for whoever wishes to render a sound judgment in any investigation:

[that one] establish, as far as possible, the very view that one is refuting. For this reason his words are not complete by which he refutes it. For if one refutes some one of those views without having first argued for the refutation of that view in a complete manner—this is exceedingly clear.

פרק שלישי [Chapter Three]

[Rashi script, sub-caption:] In it we shall recall what serves to refute, by it, each one of these views, on account of the proofs by which we recalled that each one of these views is established.

Now that we have recalled the arguments that the earlier thinkers stated, or that lay within the force of their words, in a manner such that they could possibly support each one of these views—while these very arguments refute [another]

view, as we mentioned—the order of investigation dictated that we examine these arguments and select from them which truly establishes or refutes, [versus] which does not truly establish or truly refute. Except that there is no way for us to verify, by any one of these arguments, that some one of these views is established by it with a true establishment. For if this were possible, it would be so either because that argument establishes that view, or because it refutes the opposing view. Now to demonstrate this by [the argument's] refuting, with a true refutation, the view that opposes it—this is impossible. For it is evident that, in whatever something refutes a given view, the [resulting] refutation does not establish with a true establishment the view that opposes it, unless the two views were [together] all the parts of the contradiction [חלקי הסותר] that could possibly arise in this inquiry. But absent this, it is evident that when one of them is refuted, none of the remaining views is thereby established—still less is any particular one of them established by it. And to demonstrate this by [the argument's] establishing some one of these [views] with a true establishment—this is remote. For it is among the things that become clear with but a little reflection, together with what we are recalling in this inquiry, that no argument among these has the power to establish some one of these views, unless more than this measure is said in them; and that the existence of [such] an argument in this profound investigation, of this wondrous depth, is exceedingly remote. We therefore set aside this inquiry—namely, the inquiry into which of these arguments establishes the view that one supposes them to establish with a true establishment—and we shall investigate which of these arguments we mentioned serves to refute the view that it refutes with a true refutation. For in this there is profit and guidance toward arriving at the truth in the matter we are pursuing. For when it has been verified for us in this manner which of these views are false, it will be easier for us to find the correct view—whether one of the views we mentioned, or another, if it turns out that they are all false.

We say, then, that whatever serves Alexander to establish his view, drawn from the principles Aristotle [ארסטוטלוס] laid down concerning the nature of this material intellect, undoubtedly serves to refute the view of Themistius

and the fourth view, which we attributed to some of the more recent thinkers [המתאחרים]. For they hold of this disposition that it is a separate substance [עצם נבדל]—either it is an intellect, or it is a substratum for [an intellect]. Since this is so, it is either mixed with a form or is itself a form. Either way, it follows that it cannot intellectually apprehend all the forms. For a thing is able to receive all things only by reason of its being divested of them all; and in this way the eye, for example, receives all colors, and the sense of taste all flavors—that is, by reason

of their being divested of all those things they apprehend. For this reason, when it happens to the sense of taste that it has a flavor [of its own], it is unable to apprehend all the things tasted. Hence Aristotle says that, were this power mixed with some form, that form would prevent it from receiving the other forms, or it would receive them otherwise than as they are—as is the case with the sense of taste when it has a flavor [of its own]: for if it were to apprehend the things tasted, it would apprehend them otherwise than as they are in respect of flavor.

Now it might be that someone applies to this disposition [the term] "the soul," or one of its parts, as Alexander says. ✻ But this argument too refutes the words of Alexander. For if the substratum of this disposition were the soul, or some one part of it, as Alexander says, then this disposition would be mixed with a form among the forms—namely, the form belonging to its substratum. Except that Alexander removes this difficulty by saying of this disposition that it receives the intelligibles by a reception not mixed with its substratum, and that the substratum is a condition [תנאי] for its existence, not for its reception of the intelligibles—as Ibn Rushd reported this from Alexander in his epitome of the book *On the Soul* [בקצורו לספר הנפש].

Here, in this nature, gradations are imprinted. For some of the things that the substratum has a disposition to receive, it receives by a true reception belonging to itself—that is, it is affected in a certain way by the kind of thing it apprehends—as is the case with the sense of touch. For it receives the matters it senses in a certain way; I mean that it itself becomes warm or cold, by way of a true [reception], with some [degree of] warming and cooling, even if [these] are not at the degree of the heat and cold that it senses. For were the matter so [i.e., at the same degree], its sensing of the heat and cold would necessarily occur in [a span of] time, since it grows warm in time or grows cold in time; and the falsity of this is evident, for we see that the moment we touch some object we sense it [the quality]. Furthermore, were it necessary for this sensing that this sense first be affected by the quality it apprehends, it would then be impossible for it to sense that [quality], for [in that case] it apprehends it only by reason of the equilibrium [השווי] within it, as has been explained in the book *On the Soul*. ✻ And some [of the things the substratum is disposed to receive] it receives in a manner intermediate between the mixed reception and the unmixed reception—like the reception of the sense of sight; for the instrument of this sense is not itself dyed [מצטבע] thereby, and for this reason it was able to receive opposites together, as has been explained in its place. Yet it too is in some respect mixed with matter, and for this reason it came about that, after it has sensed [one] sensible object, it does not sense… far from the mode of reception found in the senses, which is

mixed with matter, since its apprehension is more firmly grounded. To the degree that a sense is more spiritual, its apprehension is more complete. Thus the common sense [החוש המשותף] is more spiritual still. After it comes imagination [הדמיון], which is more spiritual yet — that is, its reception is less mixed with its substratum, and for this reason imagination follows the will. So nature ascends, step by step, until it reaches a disposition [הכנה] able to receive things in a manner not mixed with matter at all. And the substratum of this disposition — indeed, this disposition itself — is the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני], as has been demonstrated regarding its nature in the place where no doubt remains about it.

Themistius [תמסטיוס] and the recent thinkers, however, have no device by which to escape this difficulty in this way, since they posit that this intellect, which is the substratum of this disposition, is itself the recipient of the intelligibles [המושכלות]. And it will be shown further on that it is impossible to posit that the substratum of this disposition is an intellect while also positing that it receives these intelligibles in a manner not mixed with its substratum.

The argument by which Alexander's [אלכסנדר] view might be upheld — drawn from the generation and corruption [ההויה וההפסד] that pertain to a human being — genuinely refutes the view of Themistius, as we explained in the place where no doubt remains, when we set out this argument. Ibn Rushd [בן רשד / Averroes] mentioned this argument in brief in his epitome of *De Anima* [ספר הנפש], arguing against Themistius and those who follow him: a thing whose mode is to be of this kind among the forms cannot reach its completion within a corruptible body. This is quite clear in the manner we have set out.

Likewise the argument by which Alexander might uphold his view — namely, that such a form must necessarily be multiplied by the multiplicity of its substrata — genuinely refutes both the view of Themistius and the fourth view that we attributed to some of the recent thinkers, as we explained in setting out this argument in the place where no doubt remains. For Ibn Rushd, however, this would not constitute an objection, on his reckoning, since he already concedes regarding this disposition that it is multiplied accidentally, by reason of the conjunction [דבקות] of this intellect with each individual human being, even though the intellect itself remains numerically one. As for what we noted in this argument — that this disposition is seen to be material [היולאנית], since its renewal is seen to follow upon a change in the substance, as is the case with the material forms — this does not refute the view of Themistius in any event. For he does not concede that this disposition comes into being at all; therefore he does

not say that its renewal follows upon a change. Rather, he says that this change occurs on account of the renewal of the material forms present in the human being — such as nutrition [ההזנה], sensation [החוש], and the like. In this way it becomes clear that, from this angle, the view we attributed to some of the recent thinkers is not refuted.

Now the argument by which Themistius might uphold his view — that this disposition's apprehension grows stronger when the corporeal instruments grow weak — is easily shown not to entail that this disposition is separate [נבדלת]. For the material forms suffer a weakening in their activity when the instruments that bear them grow weak, not on account of any weakness in the form

itself — as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, i.e. Aristotle] noted — since the nature of the form is necessarily one in all the individuals of a species, for the form is the essence [עצמות] of the thing, and the essence admits of no more and less. This weakening befalls a form only because of the weakness of the instrument through which it performs its activity. For example, if an old man had an eye like that of a youth, his sight would be like the sight of the youth. Since this is so, and since this disposition does not perform its activity through any instrument — for it has already been explained regarding its nature that it receives the intelligibles in a manner not mixed with any form — it follows that no weakness of apprehension is entailed when its substratum grows weak. On the contrary, its activity will grow stronger, since at that time the corporeal psychic faculties [הכחות הנפשיות החמריות] are weakened and their activity diminishes on this account, and so its own activity becomes greater than it was when those faculties were vigorous in their activity. For their engagement in their own activity is among the things that prevent this faculty from performing its activity, since the soul is one and therefore cannot make complete use of differing apprehensions at the same time.

As for the argument by which Themistius might uphold the claim that this disposition is separate — namely, on account of its apprehending an unlimited multitude [הרבוי הבלתי בעל תכלית] — it is likewise clear that it does not genuinely refute the view of Alexander. For [a particular apprehension] is necessarily entailed in the apprehending faculties that are material, which apprehend the particular by reason of the nature of the substratum that bears them and receives that apprehension. This disposition, by contrast, does not receive what it apprehends in a manner mixed with the substratum, as has been said before. Therefore it is not entailed in it that what it apprehends be particular, as is the case with the other material forms — for it is the way of a body that it receive a

form bare of certain accidents, accidents which would render the form particular to it.

As for the argument by which Themistius might uphold his view — namely, what we find regarding the material intellect, that it apprehends this disposition, bare of the other forms, just as it apprehends the other forms, from which it follows that this disposition must itself be some form [צורה מה] — this argument, when we examine it closely, is in fact an argument against Themistius, refuting his view rather than refuting Alexander's view. For if this disposition were a form, then when it apprehended this form it would be apprehending itself, and this is the height of absurdity — that is, that the substratum of this form, when it apprehends it, should receive its own self. This faculty, in its receiving, would suffer just what Themistius says, and so this absurdity would befall it: namely, that the thing itself [should receive itself]. No such absurdity befalls us when we posit that the separate intellects [השכלים הנכדלים] apprehend themselves, for we do not posit of them that they receive themselves, since there is in their apprehension no reception of some other thing they did not already possess. The material intellect, however, receives the forms themselves and is perfected by them, and therefore this is necessarily entailed in it if the matter stands as Themistius says. Nor does it follow from this that this faculty apprehends privation [הערר] — as though one were to say that it apprehends that a thing is non-existent for some thing, or that the thing is non-existent absolutely — so that we might say the cause of this is its apprehending this

form, bare of the [other] forms; and that, were it not posited thus, it would not be possible for it to apprehend privation, since it is not a form, while it is the way of this faculty to apprehend the forms, as was mentioned in this argument. For every faculty that apprehends a thing has it within its power to apprehend the privation of that thing, since the apprehension of privation belongs necessarily to the faculty that apprehends the possession [הקניין], and to no other. This is clear with little reflection. For example, the sense of sight apprehends color, yet it apprehends the privation of color only accidentally, and on this account it apprehends the image [התמונה] in which the particular color it apprehended was found — apprehending it from one angle, namely, the angle by which the color ceases and is absent. Likewise this material intellect, because it apprehends the forms, apprehends their privation; and in this manner it apprehends this disposition — I mean, from the angle in which the disposition is a privation. In this respect the material intellect is the opposite of the separate intellects: for they apprehend themselves and do not apprehend what is other than them, whereas the material intellect apprehends what is other than it essentially and

apprehends itself only accidentally. And since the apprehension of privation is not a reception for this intellect, it is clear that our positing this of it does not entail that it apprehends itself in such a way as to receive the thing itself. This is the absurdity entailed for Themistius from this supposition.

As for the argument by which Themistius might uphold his view — namely, what we find regarding this disposition, that the apprehension and the apprehended object are numerically one and the same, which is not so in the material apprehending faculties — it will easily be explained, from what was said before, that this does not refute the view of Alexander. For this state of affairs obtained in the other material apprehending faculties — I mean, that the apprehension is other than the apprehender — only because they have a bodily instrument by means of which they receive the apprehension. Therefore it is entailed in them that their apprehension of the thing be of the thing as particular, as was said before. But this disposition receives this apprehension in a manner not mixed with its substratum, and therefore it is not entailed in it that it apprehend the thing as particular. Rather, it apprehends the universal nature [הטבע הכולל], which is not multiplied; and on this account the apprehension in it, and the apprehended object, are numerically one and the same.

As for the argument by which Themistius might uphold his view — namely, what we find in the material apprehending faculties, which undergo some affection [מתפעלות הפעלות מה] together with the apprehension, whereas in this apprehension this is not found to be the case — it will easily be explained that this does not refute the view of Alexander. For this obtained in the other material apprehending faculties because they apprehend what they apprehend by means of the bodily instrument that bears them, and this substratum undergoes some affection through the imprinting upon it of the image of the apprehended thing. This disposition, however, does not receive what it receives by means of a substratum, as was said before, and therefore it is not entailed that the same be found in it. And here nature proceeds by gradations [מדרגות]: that is, among the material affectible faculties [הכחות המתפעלות ההיולאניות] there is the kind whose substratum undergoes, on their account, a true affection — as is the case with the affectible faculties present in the elements [ביסודות] and in the proximate components of the compounds formed from them. And among them is the kind whose substratum undergoes no true affection,

as is the case with the sensing faculties [הכחות המרגישות]. These too admit of gradations in this respect, as has been explained in *De Anima* [ספר הנפש], until the matter terminates in a faculty whose substratum undergoes no affection at all

on its account — as is the case with this disposition, according to what Alexander holds.

As for the argument by which Themistius might uphold his view — namely, that this disposition is something separate for us [הבדל לנו] — it is evident with little reflection that this does not refute the view of Alexander. For Alexander does not say that this disposition is a form for us; rather, the substratum of this disposition is a form for us inasmuch as this disposition is found in it. Now the substratum of this disposition is something actual [דבר בפועל] — as though one were to say, the soul or some faculty among its faculties. And the soul, or the faculty among its faculties that is posited as the substratum of this disposition, even though it is found in some living beings, is not found in them joined with this disposition. Since this is so, it is clear that one may indeed posit that the substratum of this disposition is a form for us inasmuch as this disposition cleaves to it [דבקה לו], and no such absurdity as was mentioned follows from this argument.

As for the argument by which Themistius might uphold his view — namely, what we find, that the substratum of the other dispositions receives the form arriving from the disposition — I say that the view of Alexander is not genuinely refuted on this account. For to one who would say that in this respect this disposition is distinguished from the other dispositions, [I reply] that things falling under a single genus need not all share the same predicate — this is self-evident. Moreover, since it is clear regarding a disposition, qua disposition, that it necessarily has a substratum (for potency [הכח] is among the things that are not separable), there is nothing to prevent this disposition from receiving what it receives in a manner not mixed with the substratum. For the substratum is necessarily, by exhaustive division, either a body or a soul. However it be, it necessarily receives what it receives in a manner not mixed with any form. And whichever of these alternatives the substratum is posited to be, it would necessarily receive it in a manner mixed with the forms — for a body is never devoid of a form, and the soul and the intellect are themselves forms. Since this is so, it is clear that it is necessarily entailed in this disposition that its substratum not receive the form arriving from the disposition — which is the opposite of what Themistius would have it be by this argument.

As for the argument by which the view of Ibn Rushd might be upheld in some manner — namely, what follows by way of absurdity if a disposition bare of matter [הנחה רקה מן החמר] be posited here — this genuinely refutes the view of Themistius, as we explained in setting out this argument. And if someone should say that there is no impediment to the existence of a separate disposition, just as

there is no impediment to positing separate forms in the heavenly bodies [צורות נבדלות בגרמים השמימיים] — for the form belongs to the category of the relative [ממאמר המצטרף], that is, it is relative to matter, and if there were here forms not belonging to the category of the relative, then there would be no impediment to the existence of a disposition not relative to matter, as Ibn Rushd said in some

in his letters, in order to remove this difficulty raised against Themistius. We replied to him that, in speaking of these forms, we did not mean that they would be absolutely free of the relational nature [טבע ההצטרפות] that obtains between form and matter — not forms of this kind. Rather, they exist in a certain mode of perfection relative to those things; that is, the separate forms [הצורות הנבדלות] are a kind of perfection for the heavenly bodies. We called them "relational" only with respect to the relation between the disposition and the thing whose nature it is to receive it.

Moreover, positing that these forms are separate from matter does not in fact remove their corporeal character [הנחת גופיי], for they do not perform their proper activity — namely, apprehension [ההשגה] — through a bodily instrument. But if we posited a disposition separate from matter [הכנה נבדלת מחמר], we would already have absolutely removed the necessity of supposing this disposition to be separate. And the view that may be sustained — that there are separate forms — is something whose necessity has already been demonstrated, and there is nothing here that would compel us to posit this disposition as separate.

Now, as for what may follow for Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] by way of refutation, if the matter is posited as Themistius [תמסטיוס] would have it — namely, that the first perfection within us [השלמות הראשון אשר בנו] is eternal [נצחי] while the final perfection [השלמות האחרון] is generated and corruptible [הווה נפסד] — then Themistius's view is not thereby refuted at all, and this is so. As for Themistius, this refutation [bears upon him] only incidentally, on account of his teaching concerning the intellect. For it does not follow from our positing the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] that it is corruptible — as we shall explain afterward — whereas he himself holds the acquired intellect to be corruptible, since he reckons it to be generated, and the Philosopher [the Philosopher = Aristotle] has already shown in the *Book of the Heavens and the World* [*De Caelo*] that whatever is generated is corruptible.

פרק רביעי [Chapter Four]

In which the refutation of some of these views will be set out completely.

Having recounted the views of our predecessors concerning the essence of the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני], and having shown that Themistius's view is void, it is fitting that we now investigate the views that remain, until we find the correct view among them — whether it be one of theirs or another. We shall begin the investigation with Ibn Rushd's view, since his is the one reckoned to be the most fitting of all these views with respect to what is found of the nature of this material intellect.

We say that when the matter of the material intellect is posited as Ibn Rushd states it, many falsehoods follow which there is no escaping by any means. Among them: it would follow that learning is in vain in those theoretical matters [הענינים העיוניים] whose end does not reach as far as action. For if no trace of human felicity [ההצלחה האנושית] is found in them — that is, in the survival of the intellect [השארות השכל] — it is clear that there is no benefit in them at all. For were there any benefit in them, it would necessarily be either for human felicity or for bodily life, since there is no third alternative here. And this being so, it is clear that if there is no benefit in them for bodily life, there is no benefit in them at all, since it has already been posited that they have no trace [bearing] upon spiritual and bodily felicity.

That they have no benefit for bodily life is clear: not only do they bring no benefit to bodily life, but one finds in their acquisition something that impairs the good of life — to the point that we already find, among those inquirers who labor to acquire these intelligibles [המושכלות], that they pay no heed to the pleasures of bodily life,

and they do not take from their bodily concerns even what is necessary for them to be whole. Now if someone should say that the capacity [הכח] for apprehending the intelligibles was placed within us so as to be the source of those practical arts [המלאכות המעשיות] which we need for ordering the affairs of our lives, and that there is therefore benefit in them from this angle — we replied to him that this is incorrect, for one will find theoretical arts that are not at all suited to the practical side. Furthermore, if the matter were posited thus, the practical arts would be more honored than the theoretical arts, since the practical would be the end of the theoretical. But this is the opposite of what we have been formed to recognize. For we find, in the case of every person, that there is a great superiority of the theoretical sciences over the practical, and we find ourselves

more gladdened by the little we attain of these theoretical arts than we are gladdened by the much we attain of the practical arts — to the point that it already appears that the joy and pleasure we have in what we attain of the practical portion bears no proportion to the joy and pleasure we have in what we attain of the theoretical portion. We also find that nature has set within us a longing — at least in certain people — toward theoretical inquiry greater than our longing toward practice. All of this indicates that the theoretical portion within us is not for the sake of the practical portion.

And once this conditional syllogism [ההקש התנאי] has been established for us — namely, that if no trace bearing upon the soul's felicity is found in these theoretical intelligibles, then there is no benefit in them at all — we go on to say that it follows necessarily, on Ibn Rushd's view, that no trace bearing upon human felicity is found in the theoretical matters. For the union [ההתאחדות] with the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], which is human felicity according to Ibn Rushd's view — and which is in truth so in a certain respect, as we shall explain — would, on this supposition, be achieved by every person at the moment of death, whether he be foolish or wise. For at that moment the conjunction [הדבקות] which the intellect within us possesses dissolves, and the material intellect reverts to being the Active Intellect itself, in every respect. And this being so — that is, the antecedent of this conditional syllogism being necessary on this supposition — it follows from this the consequent: that our labor to acquire these intelligibles is toil and a vain thing. And this is the height of absurdity, for if the matter were so, nature would have set within us this capacity for apprehending these theoretical things in vain, and likewise the longing within us to apprehend them would be in vain. And all of this is false, for nature does nothing in vain.

Furthermore, if the matter were so, nature would have set within us a thing that has no benefit at all — which is contrary to its existence, as was previously stated. Rather, we indeed see that nature strives in every way to set within an existent things conserving forces [כחות שומרות] that preserve its existence for the longest time possible for it, in the most perfect manner.

And among them: if this material intellect were itself the very Active Intellect, and the Active Intellect were what brings it forth into actuality [מן הכח אל הפועל] as the Philosopher explained — then it would follow from this the absurdity that a thing brings its own essence forth from potency to actuality, which is the height of absurdity and baseness.

And among them: it would necessarily follow, on Ibn Rushd's view, that in one and the same intellect [the same in number] there would be found the theoretical

intelligibles that are here both in potency and in actuality at once. For according to what

has been demonstrated concerning the Active Intellect — that it is what brings forth the material intellect within us from potency to actuality in the apprehension of these intelligibles — and according to what has been demonstrated in natural science, that everything which brings another forth from potency to actuality possesses in actuality something resembling what is found in potency in the thing acted upon, and in this way it is possible for it to bring it forth into actuality (the illustration being that fire makes what is hot in potency hot in actuality because the fire itself is hot in actuality) — and since this premise has already been verified and the difficulties bearing upon it resolved, in natural science and in metaphysics — then it is clear that the Active Intellect brings the material intellect forth from potency to actuality in the apprehension of these intelligibles because they exist in it in actuality, while the material intellect receives them inasmuch as they exist in it in potency. And if the material intellect were the very Active Intellect, as Ibn Rushd states, then it would follow that the very same intelligibles would be found in potency and in actuality at once in one and the same intellect — and this is the height of absurdity.

And if someone should say that this difficulty does not at all follow from this supposition — reasoning that it is the imaginative forms [הצורות הדמיוניות] in which these intelligibles are found in actuality in a certain manner, not the Active Intellect; and that the rank of these imaginative forms relative to the intelligibles we apprehend is like the relation of the sensible object to sense, while the relation of the Active Intellect to these intelligibles is like the relation of light to the apprehension of the visible things, and that therefore this absurdity does not follow — we replied to him that it is not enough that the imaginative forms bring this disposition within us forth from potency to actuality, since the intelligibles are not in them in actuality but in potency. That is to say, when the material accidents [המשונים ההיולאניים] in which the imaginative form had its particularity are stripped away from it, there comes to be in it an intelligible in actuality; for the universal nature is found in the particular thing in potency, as the Philosopher explained in the *Metaphysics*. It is for this reason that the Philosopher had to introduce here an Active Intellect, which restores to the imaginative forms intelligibles in actuality after they had been intelligibles in potency.

And it will further be shown, in what follows, that it is necessary that these intelligibles be found in the Active Intellect in actuality, as we have posited; for it

will be shown afterward that the Active Intellect is [an intellect] in a certain manner. Furthermore, the Active Intellect already possesses foreknowledge [הודעה] of things in a way that the ordering of the intelligible cannot account for, regarding these things that are here. It is therefore necessary that there be found in it intelligibles such as one would say exist in the imaginative forms we possess — and these are the [forms of] foreknowledge that reach a person from it in a dream or by divination [בקסם].

And among them: if the material intellect were the Active Intellect, then it would follow that things differing in definition would be one and the same in number — and this is the height of absurdity. For since apprehension is taken to be within the definition of "intellect," and since the material intellect is that whose nature it is to apprehend the intelligibles that are here and not to apprehend the Active Intellect, while the Active Intellect is that whose nature it is to apprehend itself and not to apprehend the intelligibles that are here — as Ibn Rushd mentioned when he made this statement about the material intellect — then it is clear that the definition and essence of the Active Intellect is

other than [זולת] the essence of the material intellect. And if we posited that the material intellect is the Active Intellect itself, then it would follow that two things differing in essence would be one and the same in number — and this is the height of absurdity and baseness, for it is impossible for them to be one in species, all the more so that they be one in number.

And among them: as for what Ibn Rushd said about the Active Intellect — that it does not apprehend itself, incidentally [במקרה], by reason of its being conjoined to us — this may be understood in two ways. Either [he means] that it does not apprehend itself at all, so long as its conjunction with us persists, and the cause of the absence of apprehension is nothing but a thing external [to it]; or [he means] that it does apprehend itself always, except that it does not apprehend itself inasmuch as it is conjoined to us, but rather inasmuch as it is itself. The rank of this statement would be like the rank of one who says of a builder, at the time he is building, that he is not building inasmuch as he is a human being — and this is because he builds by reason of the order of building present in his soul, not inasmuch as he is a human being, for not every human being is a builder.

And if Ibn Rushd understood by this that it does not apprehend itself so long as its conjunction with us persists, then we ask him: what is the cause that prevents this apprehension from it, if its essence is not changed by reason of the conjunction? Is it that human nature [הטבע האנושי] veils this apprehension from it — on the model of what Plato [אפלטון] used to say, that the intelligibles are

impressed [טבועות] within [us] in our childhood [בעת הנערות]? But how would this intellect have any trace [bearing] from the side of human nature, when it exists separate in itself? And if it were that human nature veils this apprehension from it, [we ask:] what is it that would give it a capacity, by reason of this conjunction, for an apprehension that is not in its nature — that is, in the nature of the Active Intellect, namely the apprehension of [the things] that are here, which this conjunction prevented from it, namely the apprehension of itself, given that its essence is not changed? For it would not be fitting that it have a capacity by reason of this conjunction except for the apprehension [arising] from the side of this conjunction.

And in general, it is impossible that any cause be assigned here except by supposing that the Active Intellect is changed in its essence by this conjunction — and this is impossible for it, since it does not receive change at all, on account of its being pure of matter in every respect. And if we conceded that change is possible in it, then yet another difficulty would follow, no small one: namely, that there would be no Active Intellect here to bring its potency forth into actuality, since the Active Intellect would already have been changed by this conjunction and would have reverted to being a disposition [הכנה]. And it is impossible for it to be at once both as in its first existence and in this [new] existence into which it has changed.

And it would also follow from this that there would be no Active Intellect at all save one alone at a single time, since the intellect of Reuben [ראובן] is other than [the intellect of] another. Now it would be false that from it [Reuben's intellect] there should come to be the intellect of Simeon [שמעון] unless after Reuben dies — for once this intellect has changed into the material intellect that belongs to Reuben, and this intellect reverts to what it was before Reuben existed, then the intellect of Simeon can come to be from it. And all of this is manifestly absurd.

And if Ibn Rushd understood by this statement — that it apprehends itself always, except that it does not apprehend itself inasmuch as it is conjoined to us — then many falsehoods follow from this. First, it would follow that there would not be…

[The discussion continues.]

Book One (מאמר א'), Chapter Four (פרק ד') — continued

there would be no use for the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] in apprehending the intelligibles that are here, and its self-actualization in apprehending them would be mere labor wasted on nothing. The explanation is this: since it apprehends the essence of the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] continually, and the essence of the Active Intellect is the intelligible ordering of these things — the very form that they take on as a consequence of these intelligibles, and the most perfect mode of their existence, as will be explained below ✻ — it follows that it apprehends the intelligibles that are here continually, in the most perfect mode, and that there would be no effort required of it to apprehend these intelligibles.

And, third [reading], it would already follow from this that the material intellect would have no need of sense-perception in apprehending definitions — that is, in apprehending the conceptual content [הציורית, the "what-it-is"], which is the apprehension most proper to it, as the Philosopher [ארסטוטלוס, Aristotle] explained ✻. For true apprehension is, as it were, compounded of intellection and sense-apprehension, and this is why error occurs in it just as error occurs in sense-perception — namely, when sense passes judgment on something perceptible that is not proper to it, as when, on seeing something yellow, we judge it to be sweet, because we have sensed honey to be both yellow and sweet.

But how does it follow from this supposition that the material intellect would have no need of sense-perception in apprehending definitions? Here is what I say. Since it apprehends the essence of the Active Intellect continually, and the apprehension of the definitions of these things is present in the Active Intellect, it is clear that it would have no need of sense-perception to apprehend these definitions. For it has already been explained that present in the Active Intellect is knowledge of the intelligible ordering belonging to all these things — those beneath the sphere of the moon — and of the form in which this ordering inheres ✻; and whoever knows this ordering in its totality must of necessity know each of its parts, since knowledge of a composite thing is not possible without knowledge of the simple things out of which it is composed. This being so, present in it is the concept of the intelligible ordering belonging to whatever exists — except that its knowledge of that ordering does not rest upon the individual existents, as when we say "every man is rational" and "every living thing is sentient." The reason is that the Active Intellect did not acquire its knowledge of this ordering from the individuals; rather, the individual existents acquired the existence they possess

from the knowledge that the Active Intellect has of this ordering. This is why we did not say that the Active Intellect has intellection of the true intelligibles in the mode in which the material intellect acquires them; what it necessarily possesses, rather, is apprehension of the definitions, as we explained — for these are the apprehensions whose knowledge does not rest upon the individual existents.

And, third: even if Ibn Rushd [בן רשד / Averroes] should tell us that what he means is that this Active Intellect [does apprehend] continually, only that it does not apprehend itself insofar as it is conjoined to us — he still cannot escape having to ascribe change to the Active Intellect. For if the Active Intellect undergoes no change on account of this conjunction, then we ask Ibn Rushd: what is the nature that the Active Intellect has acquired by reason of the conjunction, such that it apprehends the intelligibles that are here? It is not in its nature to apprehend them, since by this supposition it would do so only of necessity, on account of its admixture with the soul that is ours; and so there would be found in it

properties shared in common between the properties of the sentient soul [הנפש המרגשת] and the properties of the Active Intellect — I mean, it would apprehend the intelligibles that are here, which are as it were compounded of sense and intellect, as is explained in Ibn Rushd's commentary on *De Anima* [ספר הנפש]. This being so, let us ask Ibn Rushd to inform us what this compounding is from which there must follow the generation of this nature in the Active Intellect. Does it follow the manner of things compounded by way of juxtaposition [הרכבת שכנות] — I mean, such that after the compounding each of those things is found preserved in itself, in actuality? Or does it follow the manner of things compounded by way of blending [הרכבת המזגות] — I mean, such that not one of those things is found, after the compounding, preserved in itself, in actuality?

If he tells us that its manner is that of things compounded by way of juxtaposition, we reply to him that, this being its manner, the compounding generates in not one of those things any nature other than the nature they already had — that is, [the Active Intellect would have] this power that is outside its own nature, the power to acquire the intelligibles, [only] prior to the compounding ✻. This being so, from where, then, did the Active Intellect acquire this nature that is here? "Would that I knew!" ✻ — for the nature that comes to be in it cannot possibly come to be on account of this compounding, if the compounding is posited in this manner, as set out above.

And if he tells us that this compounding follows the manner of things compounded by way of blending, then the material intellect will of necessity be

other than the Active Intellect — for things that are blended are not found, in the blend, in actuality after the compounding — and this is the opposite of what Ibn Rushd posited concerning this intellect; together with which it follows from this that the Active Intellect would be changeable in its very essence, and this is in no way possible. And since all of this is false, it is clear that what Ibn Rushd posited concerning the material intellect is false.

And among them [the absurdities]: if the material intellect were the Active Intellect itself, only that, insofar as it is conjoined to us, it would have the power to apprehend the intelligibles that are here, as Ibn Rushd said — then the matter cannot escape a disjunction. Either [a] insofar as it is conjoined to us it has a single numerical existence only — and this is what appears from Ibn Rushd's words, since for him there are, with respect to this single numerical intellect (I mean the Active Intellect), only two aspects: the one aspect being its being not conjoined to us, and the second aspect being its being conjoined to us — or [b] insofar as it is conjoined to us it has many numerically distinct existences.

If it be posited that, insofar as it is conjoined to us, it has a single numerical existence, then all the material intellects of all human beings would already be one in number; and this single numerical thing would be receiving opposites together from a single aspect — and that is the height of absurdity. This being so, the following would result. Because Reuben's [ראובן] intellect knows a given intelligible while Simeon's [שמעון] intellect is ignorant of it or errs concerning it, it would result that the one selfsame intellect is at once wise and ignorant with respect to the same object of inquiry. Furthermore, if the matter were posited thus, I ask: how is it that Reuben's intellect does not make use of the sense-perceptions that Simeon apprehended? For once this intellect is posited as

needing sense-perception for what it would intelligize, it is clear that it would suffice for it that some other single person had perceived [a thing] for that perceptible's intelligible to belong to all human beings — and that is the height of absurdity.

And if it be posited that, insofar as it is conjoined to us, it has many existences by reason of the particular relation it has with each and every individual among human beings, then falsehoods would follow from this too. For [b] in the first place, that which was posited as separate [נבדל] would be without [numerical] plurality except by reason of quality; whereas material forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] admit plurality both by reason of quality and by reason of quantity. (For separate forms are distinguished from the rest of the forms in that they do not admit plurality.) An example of plurality by reason of quality is our saying that the form

of the horse is other than the form of the donkey; and an example of plurality by reason of quantity is our saying that this horse's form is other than the form of the second horse, numerically. This being so, and the material intellect receiving plurality by reason of quantity — since it was already posited as multiplied by the multiplicity of the substrates [הנושאים] to which it is a form — it follows that it is not separate, since a separate form is not multiplied by the multiplicity of the substrates to which it is a form; yet this intellect had been posited to be the Active Intellect itself, which is separate. This is false and impossible.

And [b] in the second place, it would already follow from this that the Active Intellect, which is one in number, would be many — and not merely many, but infinitely many. For if we suppose the material intellect to be the Active Intellect itself, then, on this supposition, the material intellects would be many in number, infinitely many; and it is clear that the Active Intellect, which is one in number, would then be many without limit. And that is the height of absurdity and disgrace.

This, then, is what we saw fit to record of the absurdities that follow upon Ibn Rushd's view. There are indeed many further absurdities besides those we have mentioned, but what we have mentioned suffices to refute this view.

As for the view we mentioned belonging to some of the later thinkers [המתאחרים], it too is plainly false on many counts. Among them: their supposition leads them into self-contradiction. For they posit this form as separate, and yet, since it is separate, it could not possibly admit numerical plurality. This being so — take, for example, Reuben's form, which comes to be now — it would be the very same as Simeon's form, which exists now and which belonged to Reuben, and would have existed before it came to be; that is, it would have existed before Reuben came to be. If so, then this very same form, which belongs to the existing Simeon now, would have existed before Reuben came to be ✻. And by this it is explained, with respect to each of the human intellects, that it exists before its coming-to-be; and that whose way this is — is not subject to coming-to-be. Yet this had been posited as subject to coming-to-be; which is false — I mean that the not-subject-to-coming-to-be would be subject to coming-to-be.

And among them: because they posit, for one and the same numerical man, two comings-to-be — that is, they posit one coming-to-be for the material intellect and another coming-to-be for the human matter [החמר האנושי] — there results from this the absurdity that the one numerical man would be many in actuality, since each of his parts exists in itself and separately. For [if] a thing be one in number

[only] because of the unity that obtains among the parts of its definition — I mean, that the one part among the parts of the definition is a perfection of the second part and is found within it; and therefore, even if it is many in [terms of] definition, it is [yet] many [only] in potency, [being] one in actuality, as is explained in the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבעי] — then [it follows that] only where there is no unity among the parts of the definition is the thing defined many in actuality.

This absurdity necessarily attaches to Themistius [תמסטיוס] as well, for he too posits the material intellect as separate and existing in itself. And it attaches to Ibn Rushd too, in a certain manner. For because he posits the material intellect to be the Active Intellect itself, which is separate and exists in itself, it must follow for him that the material intellect is separate and exists in itself — and so this absurdity must follow for him on this account.

It will be explained in yet another manner that there already follows, from what the later thinkers posited, that the one numerical man would be many. For it is clear that several existents that come to be cannot be one in number unless their totality has a single coming-to-be. It is as though one said that fire and the other elements, each of which comes to be in itself, could not be one of them in number unless they had, in their totality, a single coming-to-be by which they become one — as though you were to say that they multiply and blend and there comes to be from them one numerical generated thing. For the one numerical generated thing has a single numerical coming-to-be, and that which has a single numerical coming-to-be is one in number — this is self-evident. Therefore, of that which is found to have more than one numerical coming-to-be, it must follow that it is more than one in number.

And among them: it would already follow for them, because they posit this material intellect as a generated thing existing in itself, that it would be a form of some sort ✻. And since, on this supposition, it is mixed with one of the forms, it would follow that it does not intelligize those forms at all, or that it intelligizes them otherwise than as they are, as we explained earlier — and this is plainly absurd, since it has already been explained from the nature of this intellect that it has the power to apprehend all the intelligibles just as they are. This very same difficulty followed for Themistius, as we mentioned earlier.

And among them: it would already follow from this supposition that there would be no impress of the apprehensions of the senses upon the apprehension of the intellect — such that our intelligizing things we have not sensed would be just as possible as our intelligizing things we have sensed. For how would the

apprehension of the senses reach the intellect, if there were no unity between it and them? [That is:] do I apprehend what you apprehended when you apprehended it? This absurdity necessarily attaches to Themistius too, for he likewise posits this form as separate and existing in itself. And it attaches to Ibn Rushd too, in a certain manner, for it would already follow, from what he posited, that this form would be separate and existing in itself, as we mentioned earlier.

And among them: if the material intellect were separate and [self-]existent, why is it that it cannot perform its operation at the time when the senses or the other apprehending powers of the soul are engaged in their operation? Must its operation be prevented when you are engaged in your operation? In general, it is clear that the reason for this is

that the soul is one — as the Philosopher mentioned. And since there is no unity here between the hylic intellect and the powers of the soul, there is no cause here for nullifying the intellect's operation while the other apprehending powers are engaged in their operations. ✻ And if it be said that this would be costly to the hylic intellect, inasmuch as it takes its principles from those very powers whose operations these are — to that we have replied that this is plainly absurd; for we see that the principles which reach it from the senses occur in the course of a single inquiry, whereas it could not investigate them while the senses are occupied with their own operations. ✻

This same absurdity necessarily attaches to Themistius too, for he, like Ibn Rushd, posits that this intellect is likewise separate and existing in itself. And it attaches in a certain manner to Ibn Rushd as well, since on his supposition he posited that this form is a separate substance in itself, as we said. — And among them: since they posited that the single intellect receives by number a plurality of contraries at once. ✻ And this too was already shown to be costly to them, because they posited that this intellect is separate and existing in itself, so that all the human intellects existing in number would be one — for the form, being separate, is not multiplied by the multiplicity of the things in which it exists. ✻ And given this, Reuben's intellect would be one and the same as Simeon's: if one of them knew while the other was ignorant of it, or erred in it, then here is the costly consequence — that the one intellect would, at one and the same time and in one and the same respect, be receiving wisdom and ignorance together, and knowing and not-knowing one and the same thing at once. — And among them: that which they posited is the very opposite of what Aristotle posited; for he had already explained that this form has no coming-to-be at all, except per accidens, by reason of the substrate, whereas they posited that this form has a coming-to-be

and an origination in itself. — And among them: that the very being of this form does not preclude its having a substrate or its being a full-fledged thing; and if it had a being, then it would necessarily be costly that it change until from it there comes to be this form. And since it has already been explained that everything that changes is a body, it would be costly in this case that the substrate be a body. And given this, it would follow that this form is either a body or a power in a body. But it was already posited that it is a separate intellect — and this is plainly impossible.

And if they posited that this newly-arising form is a full-fledged thing in itself — and this is what they are seen to say, and is the reason they called this being a "creation" [בריאה] — here this supposition is, if we may put it so, costly. For it has already been explained at the outset that everything newly-arising requires a substrate, [so that] the newly-arising thing would be a substance or an accident. And further, because this very form arose after it had not been: it must therefore be that there was a potency in which the existent existed prior to its being in actuality, and that, in respect of which it could not be separate, it would be costly that there be in this case a substrate in which this potency exists. And given this, it is explained that it is impossible for this form to be a full-fledged thing without a substrate. And it has already been explained at the outset that it is impossible for this form to exist in itself, neither in a substrate nor as a full-fledged thing without a substrate. And it is explained that it is false that this form be a full-fledged thing in itself. And it is explained

that this view already has many other refutations besides those we have mentioned; but what we have mentioned of it is enough.

And since the view of Ibn Rushd, of Themistius, and of the later thinkers has been found, with respect to all the divisions it was possible for them to make in positing the substrate for this disposition — namely, that the intellect is separate in itself — and since it has been explained from our discussion that each one of their views is false, it is explained that the supposition of a substrate for this disposition is in every case false. — Nonetheless, their views have already been found, with respect to all the divisions that it was possible for there to be of this supposition in some manner, [and] this is clear from what is being said. For it is not precluded that the substrate posited for this disposition of the intellect be one it has in its substance, as Themistius and the later thinkers maintained, or per accidens, as Ibn Rushd maintained; and likewise it is not precluded in this case that the substrate of the intellect be either something that does not come to be, as Themistius and Ibn Rushd maintained, or something that comes to be, as the later

thinkers maintained. ✻ But rather: since it is possible that these views differ in other respects — as though one said that, just as it was possible for the intellect that this its substrate be per accidens, so it was possible for this same intellect to differ in some respect other than the Active Intellect, and so too it was possible that the substrate of the intellect differ per accidens in respect of its coming-to-be (a matter that none of the earlier thinkers posited) — I mean, of these men, it is fitting that we explain comprehensively that it is impossible for the substrate of this disposition of the intellect to exist in itself. ✻

And we say that it is impossible for the substrate of this disposition of the intellect to exist in itself; for if we posit the matter so, the question is not avoided whether this disposition of the intelligibles received is mixed with the substrate, or whether it is received unmixed with the substrate. But if we posit that they are received mixed with the substrate, it has already been explained that this is false, since it is necessarily costly in it that the intelligibles received not be mixed with a form of the forms, as Aristotle explained. ✻ And if we posit that they are received unmixed with the substrate, then the substrate would have no relation to these intelligibles, and it would not be precluded that the positing of it be intelligizing or not-intelligizing. ✻ But our positing it as not-intelligizing contradicts itself — I mean, the positing that the intellect has no power to intelligize. And if we posit it as intelligizing, then what is the thing it will intelligize? Would that I knew! Will it intelligize from the intelligibles whose reception is the disposition found in it — namely, is it some thing proceeding from it in the grade of form? And if we posit it as intelligizing a thing from these intelligibles whose disposition to receive them is in it, [then] these intelligibles would be found in it potentially and in actuality together — and this is the costly consequence already explained. And if we posit it as an intelligible intellect proceeding from these intelligibles in the manner of the form, as though one said that what they have in them is one of these intelligibles, then this intellect would be the Active Intellect itself, or this intellect would be

higher than the intellect in actuality. ✻ And how could that be, such that there would be in it, in a perfect manner, these intelligibles whose disposition to receive them is in it, and these conceptions would be as every intellect intelligized from them? ✻ And since there has already been found in it a disposition to receive all these conceptual intelligibles, here this is the costly consequence: that there be found in it these conceptual intelligibles potentially and in actuality together. ✻ And this is explained also of all the false views, which are not free of being shared among these three positions, that they are made costly when one posits the substrate for this disposition of the intellect to be

separate in itself. And given this, it is explained absolutely that it is costly that the substrate of this disposition of the intellect be separate.

פרק חמישי [Chapter Five]

In which there will be explained, so far as is possible for us in this place, the quiddity of the hylic intellect.

And since it has already been explained that it is costly that the substrate of this disposition of the intellect be separate, it is fitting that we investigate what its substrate may be; for the potency is something that requires a substrate to which it attaches. ✻ And it is explained that it is impossible that its substrate be anything but either a body or a soul, since there is no fourth existent here. And if we posit that the soul is the substrate of the hylic intellect, here it is explained that the soul is something not existing in itself, since there is no way for the form to be one whose substrates are themselves at one end; rather it would be a thing whose substrates are received in part at one end — that is, that they receive their forms in part by means of one another, as is explained in the Book of the Soul. ✻ And given this, what would be costly is that the body be the substrate. ✻

For if the prime matter receives at its first end the form by way of receiving in it the elemental forms, they would be received by means of one another in the manner of the matter of the compounds compounded from the elements, and in the manner of those things that come after them among the compounds — that is, the later ones would already receive their forms by means of others. And it is explained that this disposition, among the forms which the prime matter receives at its first end, is not free except to be a form by means of the last forms. ✻

But since this disposition is not among the forms which the prime matter receives at its first end — here it will be explained in what follows. For this — namely, that this is the path by which the forms are not extracted from them as a body of the compounded bodies, as is explained in the Book of the Soul — and the example of this is that it is impossible that a compounded body be extracted from the compounded bodies by way of the forms of the elements in which there is heat, dryness, lightness, and heaviness, since they receive the form they receive by means of these forms. ✻ And if this disposition were among the forms which the prime matter receives at its first end, here all the bodies compounded from the elements would be possessors of human intellect — and this is utterly absurd. ✻ And since it has been explained that this disposition is the conception which the prime matter receives by means of a form other than the first, here it is explained

that it is impossible that the prime matter receive it at its first end, among the forms which

the prime matter receives, prior to its reception of the whole of the imaginative soul, or [something it receives] by another reception of the imaginative soul. And if we posit that it is from the forms which it receives prior to the reception of the imaginative soul, here this form would be at the grade of the hylic from the imaginative soul of imagination, since what precedes a thing in respect of the form is prior, in the grade of the hylic, to that which comes after it. ✻ For since it is in the grade of the form, the form does not separate from what it is in the grade of the hylic — as is explained in the Book of the Soul. Here it is necessarily costly in every case that there be a soul possessing imagination that possesses human intellect; ✻ and this, because many living things possess an imaginative soul, and the discourse — namely, that they are possessors of human intellect — is clearly false, to the point that the length of its clarification is superfluous. For this is among the false [conclusions]: that there would here be a form belonging to a species among the species [of animals], when their elements and their compoundings, from which their operations are ordered, do not differ from the path by which those operations are ordered. ✻

And given this, it is explained that what is corporeal is the substrate of this disposition, by means of the imaginative soul. And if the substrate of this disposition were a part of the parts of the imaginative soul, [then] the corporeal thing which is the substrate of this disposition would be such by means of the imaginative soul, and it would not be that the imaginative soul itself is the substrate of this disposition in any manner. ✻ And this is explained also from what Aristotle explained concerning this disposition: that it is costly that the reception of the intelligibles be received unmixed with its substrate, and that there would then be a substrate necessary to its existence, not mixed in with the reception of the intelligibles — as Alexander said. ✻ And since this form is among the forms by which the prime matter lives at its first end, by way of receiving them, here, just as all the forms by which the prime matter lives at its first end were coming-to-be and newly-arising, so too this form is coming-to-be and newly-arising. But whether it is possible for it to have perpetuity and permanence after the perfection in the intelligibles, or whether it is necessarily costly that it be corrupted, as is the case in the rest of the hylic forms — this is among the things to be investigated in what comes after this.

פרק ששי [Chapter Six]

In which there will be explained the quiddity of the Active Intellect, so far as is possible for us in this place.

And since it has already been explained to us, in what has been said, the quiddity of the hylic intellect, it is fitting that we investigate whether it is possible in it that there remain, after the perfection in the intelligibles, [something that is] victorious [i.e. that survives], or not. ✻ For according to what Ibn Rushd explained in his Epitome of the Book of the Soul, and in some of his treatises — that if there remained of this intellect anything victorious [surviving], then it would indeed be in actuality — here the investigation into this is among the latter matters, [namely] whether it is possible for us or not; that is, what would be costly if we did not know the quiddity of the Active Intellect. ✻ Here it is fitting that we investigate first the matter of the quiddity of the Active Intellect, and we shall not mention in this the view of the earlier thinkers, since we have not seen them make any statement in this inquiry.

And we say that it is explained that every intellect which proceeds from potency to actuality is indeed brought forth to actuality by one who has it in actuality, in the manner of that in which there is something acted upon potentially. And here already

this premise is verified, and the doubts that arise concerning it in natural science and in metaphysics are resolved.

Since this is so, and since the nature of the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] has been clarified — namely, that it is the power that potentially apprehends the order [נמוס] of the existents here below and sets them straight and orders them — it follows that the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] must possess a knowledge of these ordered arrangements [הסדורים] in actuality, in some manner. For this content need not be present in the Active Intellect in the same mode in which it is present in the patient when the patient passes into actuality. By way of illustration: the form of the chair does not exist in the soul of the craftsman in the same mode in which it exists in the chair produced by his craft. We must therefore investigate in what manner the Active Intellect knows them.

We say: since we find that the Active Intellect informs the material intellect of these arrangements one arrangement after another, it follows from what has preceded either that it has knowledge of these arrangements one after another, or that the material intellect derives from more than one Active Intellect — which

is plainly absurd. For the one agent, insofar as it is one, cannot exist essentially except as derived from the agency of God [פועל האלהים] — unless some of these agents are subordinate to others, as in the case of the master craft together with the crafts subordinate to it. And were the matter framed in this way, then likewise the entire agency would derive from a single agent in number, namely the master craft, since it is the master craft that directs the remaining crafts subordinate to it. By way of illustration: the carpenter's craft cuts the beams from which the ship is made, and the craftsman who builds the ship makes the ship from them. Yet in truth the master craft is the one that acts in this, since it directs the craft beneath it in such a way that what proceeds from that lower craft is fitted to the master craft. By way of illustration: the shipwright directs the cutter of the beams as to the manner in which they are to be cut, so that they will be fit to be made into a ship.

Since this is so, and since it has been clarified that the perfection of the material intellect with respect to the intelligibles [מושכלות] of which it is potentially the apprehender is a single agent in number — for this perfection is the end of the material intellect, and the true end of that which is one in number is necessarily one in number — it follows that the attainment of this agency in the material intellect must come from a single agent in number. It therefore follows that the Active Intellect must possess the knowledge of these arrangements one after another.

And since we find that the Active Intellect also informs the material intellect of the rank [מדרגה] of these intelligibles, some in relation to others — that is, it informs it that some forms are perfections of others, in such a way that all of them culminate in a single form which is their perfection (as one might say, the human form [הצורה האנושית], for that is the form which the first matter [החומר הראשון] receives through the mediation of the other forms which it is potentially capable of receiving, and which stand to those forms as the rank of perfection and form) — it follows that the Active Intellect must possess knowledge of these arrangements with respect to the aspect in which they are, as a whole, a single ordered arrangement, namely the aspect in which they are one.

This is also shown to be necessary in another way. For if these many intelligibles were not unified in the essence of the Active Intellect, then the Active Intellect would be

many — since its intelligibles are many and they are its very essence, for the intelligible and the intellect are one and the same in number, as has been clarified. Yet it has been clarified in what preceded that the Active Intellect is one

in number. This is a contradiction that cannot stand. It is therefore clear that the Active Intellect knows all these arrangements with respect to the aspect in which they are one, and in this manner the Active Intellect is one.

As for the material intellect, owing to the difficulty of its reception of the intelligibles — because of its need for sense [החוש] — it happens that it does not apprehend, from the aspect in which these arrangements were a single arrangement in number, except by remote degrees [במדרגות רחוקות].

Now one may raise a doubt against what we have explained concerning the essence of the Active Intellect, saying that it does not follow, from the Active Intellect's bringing the material intellect from potentiality to actuality in the acquisition of the intelligibles, that the knowledge of these arrangements should reside in the Active Intellect. For one might say that the relation of the Active Intellect to these intelligibles is not the relation of the form in the soul of the teacher to the form acquired from it by the learner, nor the relation of the sensed object to the form attained from it in sensation; rather, its relation to them is the relation of light [האור] to visible things — light renders them actually visible, things that had been visible only potentially, without there being in the light the visible images in actuality. So too, the objector says, is the case with the Active Intellect: it renders the imaginative forms [הצורות הדמיוניות], which are potentially intelligible, actually intelligible; and therefore it does not follow that it should have knowledge of these intelligibles.

We reply: when the Active Intellect renders actually intelligible that which had been potentially intelligible in the imaginative form — namely, the universal nature [הטבע הכולל] mixed within it together with the material concomitants [המשיגים ההיולאניים] in which it had been particularized — without there being in it any apprehension of that intelligible, then this must necessarily occur either (a) by its imparting to the material intellect a nature whereby it apprehends, out of the imaginative form, the universal nature within it; [or (b) by its imparting to the imaginative form a nature whereby the intelligible of the universal natural nature within it comes to be]. But if we suppose that it imparts to the imaginative form a nature whereby the intelligible of the universal natural nature within it comes to be — just as light renders visible things visible when the light reaches them — I wish I knew what this change is that would thereby arise in the universal nature within the imaginative form, such that an intelligible comes to be in it. It is impossible to say anything cogent about this, even if one wished to invent it from his own heart, as a fancy [בדיאה]. Moreover, the material concomitants, all of them, may possibly become intelligible in some manner. —

[Margin / inserted clause: that is, when they are taken on the one side, that is, when they are not taken together with the subject in which they were accidental to it; for there is in all of them a speculative aspect in which they are essential. For all the accidents may possibly become intelligible in some manner.] Since this is so, it cannot be said that some nature is imparted to a part of what is in the imaginative form, namely the universal nature which is the intelligible within it, and that by this nature the material intellect is perfected, abstracting from it the universal nature — for there is nothing else there in it, and it cannot be that there is an intelligible in it. And since this is false, it is clear that it is impossible

that this matter be settled by the Active Intellect's imparting a nature to the imaginative form whereby the universal nature mixed within it together with the [material] concomitants is altered in such a way that the material intellect is able to apprehend it.

It is also clear that it is impossible to suppose that the Active Intellect imparts to the material intellect a nature whereby it apprehends that [universal nature] which is in this imaginative form. For if the matter were so, then either this nature which it imparts to it in apprehending an intelligible would be one and the same nature [for all], or it would impart to it a nature peculiar to each one of the intelligibles. And if we say that it imparts to it one and the same nature for apprehending all the intelligibles, it follows from this that the material intellect would be unable, by reason of this universal nature within the imaginative form, to abstract from among the material concomitants — since each one of them may possibly be intelligible to it — and the result would be that it apprehends the imaginative form as it actually is. But if we say that it imparts to it a nature peculiar to each and every intelligible, it follows from this that the one and the same agent imparts to the one and the same recipient differing natures, which is plainly absurd. — Furthermore, it is among the false suppositions that a nature be imparted to the material intellect whereby it receives the intelligibles. For if the matter were so, then the material intellect, by virtue of this nature, would be possessed of some form, and that form would prevent it from receiving the intelligibles, as will be explained — and this contradicts what was posited. It is therefore clear that it is impossible for this to come from the Active Intellect by way of a nature it imparts to the imaginative form, nor by way of a nature it imparts to the material intellect.

Since this is so, it is clear that if the Active Intellect renders actually intelligible that which had been potentially intelligible in the imaginative form, this can come about only by its abstracting from the imaginative form the universal

nature from among the material concomitants. And since it abstracts it, it follows that it must apprehend it — or else its abstracting of it would be merely accidental; and if its abstracting of it were accidental, then the correct outcome would arrive only on rare occasions, which is plainly absurd.

It is also clear that it does not follow from what we have said that the Active Intellect apprehends the material concomitants in which the universal nature is mixed. For it is possible that the taking of one thing from another be accomplished when [only] the [one] thing is apprehended alone — this is self-evident — and in this manner the sense of sight apprehends the visible appearance which is in that body. Moreover, we find that the Active Intellect informs us of things that have no imaginative forms potentially present in them, in this same manner, as Ibn Rushd [בן רשד / Averroes] mentioned in the *Book of Sense and the Sensed* [ספר החוש והמוחש, Aristotle's *De Sensu*] — and this is the truth in itself, as we shall explain in the Second Book of this treatise, God willing [בג"ה]. This indeed occurs in what the Active Intellect makes known to a person in a dream, or by divination, or by prophecy. It is therefore clear that this information does not come by way of the imaginative form alone; rather, the Active Intellect must possess knowledge of these things which it makes known to the material intellect.

Furthermore, light renders visible things actually visible after they had been visible only potentially, accidentally; and this occurs by its preparing the transparent medium [האמצעי הספיריי] so that the visible appearances come to be in it actually in some manner, and then it is able to move the sense of sight to

receiving the visible appearances. For the sense of sight cannot apprehend its object without a medium, as has been clarified in the *Book of the Soul* [ספר הנפש, *De Anima*]. And since the medium does not receive the impression of the visible appearances except when it is luminous, and the light gives it that luminosity, it is clear that light is not the agent in this [act of seeing] itself; rather, it prepares the medium so that it may become an agent.

The Active Intellect, by contrast, must necessarily be an agent in its own essence. For the agent of the intellect ought to be intellectual. This is among the things that require the Active Intellect to be an agent by virtue of what it possesses of these arrangements, in the manner that has been clarified.

Furthermore, since the agent of these existents here below must possess a knowledge of these arrangements — as is the case with the craftsman and what he produces by his craft, that is, he must possess in his soul an apprehension of

the order belonging to each particular thing he will produce in his craft — and since it was necessary, as we shall explain, that this agent be the Active Intellect whose existence has been clarified in the *Book of the Soul* — it is therefore clear that the Active Intellect possesses knowledge of all these arrangements belonging to the lowly existents. And it does not follow from this alone that it knows all these arrangements [merely as such]; rather, I say that it also follows from this that it has knowledge of all these arrangements belonging to the lowly existents under the most noble aspect, which is the aspect in which they are one. This is just as the craftsman knows the beams, the bricks, and the stones from which the house will be made — not insofar as they are beams, bricks, and stones, but with respect to the unity [האחדות] they acquire by composition, which is the form of the house [צורת הבית]; that is, he already knows them insofar as they are a part of the house, which is the most noble aspect in their existence.

As for how this is to be explained, it is according to what I shall say. For inasmuch as the first matter [החומר הראשון] advances, by this agency through which the Active Intellect acts upon it, from perfection to perfection — that is, it receives the perfections, some by the mediation of others and some for the sake of others, until the matter culminates in the final perfection, which it is potentially capable of receiving, and for the sake of which all the other perfections existed — it is clear that the coming-to-be of all these perfections in it is a single coming-to-be [התהוות אחד], since a single end is intended in it; and the agent of them must, accordingly, know them under the aspect in which they are one. By this aspect it was possible for every coming-to-be to be directed toward the end. Just as, when the one who builds the house makes the bricks, it is clear that he must have knowledge of the order from which the bricks come to be under the aspect in which the bricks were at the rank [serving] the house — since he makes them for the sake of the attainment of the form of the house. Since this is so, it follows according to this thesis that the Active Intellect possesses knowledge of these arrangements under the most noble aspect, which is the aspect in which they are one.

As for the necessity that the agent of these things here below be the Active Intellect whose existence has been clarified in the *Book of the Soul* — this is clear from what I shall say. For it has already been clarified, from what was clarified in the sixteenth book of [Aristotle's] *On Animals* [בעלי חיים, Aristotle, *On Animals*]...

that which acts here within plants and animals is an intellect. This is what the Philosopher [Aristotle] calls the soul that emanates from the heavenly bodies, of which he said that it is a divine faculty — namely, an intellect. Many of the later

philosophers call it the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל]. For there is no doubt that the seed contains nothing of a soul, since the seed merely resembles the parts and is not a part of an ensouled being such that we might say a faculty of soul resides in it. Rather, it is the final residue of the nourishment, as was explained in the book *On Animals* [ספר בעלי חיים]. What may indeed be present in the seed is a certain heat bearing some relation to the natural heat of the ensouled being that engenders it — and this proportioned heat may well have flowing into it an influence from the heavenly bodies through the spark of the sun and the other stars, as the Philosopher mentioned. But it is not possible that this heat should contain a faculty that forms the bodily organs and creates them with that wondrous wisdom which human understanding has labored in vain to grasp in its truth. This cannot arise from such heat unless a divine faculty — an intellect — is joined to it, as the Philosopher mentioned, according to what we have found in the texts translated for us from the languages of the Christians [הנצרים].

For this faculty performs its work without an instrument, since the seed is nothing of the kind: it merely resembles the parts. And we find it likewise performing without any instrument the work it does upon the organs — work that is ascribed to it. For the organs come to be, in their several parts, within the ensouled being, from the primary organ of that being and from the rest of the organs in their respective ranks. For example, the portion of the liver that is renewed from the nourishment is renewed by means of the heart, the liver, and the rest of the organs of digestion belonging to them. This is clear. Such being the case — I mean that this faculty creates the organs as a whole without an instrument, whereas the faculty in the ensouled being creates only some portion of the organs, and does even that by means of an instrument — it is plain that this faculty is other than the faculty acting within the ensouled being, which is more closely bound to instrumental action through the natural instruments. This faculty is more exalted than the latter beyond all measure.

Nor can we say that this exalted faculty in the seed comes from the male progenitor, for no such wondrous faculty exists in the progenitor; and it is impossible for the progenitor to engender anything but what resembles what is in himself. Moreover, it is false that the ensouled being should impart to the nourishment a faculty of soul of this description. For were that the case, the nourishment would itself possess a nutritive soul and a formative faculty, and then the nourishment would itself be nourished — and it would not be the ensouled being that is nourished by the nourishment. For things that share a single nutritive soul within the same species cannot have one nourished by the other; were that possible, then — say — one part of the flesh of the hand would

be nourished by another part of it, which is the height of absurdity. In general, then, the nourishment is acted upon by the faculty of soul present in the one nourished, and in this way a part of it becomes part of the one nourished. There is no faculty of soul in the nourishment such that it could act of itself in another; it has only a disposition to be acted upon by another. And if this is so in the case of the nourishment, all the more so is it so in what is the residue of the nourishment, for that bears

even less relation to the one nourished. Therefore it is impossible that there be in the seed a faculty of soul of this description deriving from the male progenitor, since the seed is the residue of the nourishment, as we said. What does come into it from the progenitor is a certain heat bearing some relation to the natural heat of the progenitor. And it is plain that heat is not a soul, but is in some manner an instrument for the soul, as was explained in the natural sciences [the *Physics*]. Therefore it is plain that in generation a divine faculty — an intellect — is required, since the intellect does not perform its action through a material [היולאני] instrument, as is the case with the material faculties of the soul.

And should someone object that this faculty is not an intellect — on the grounds that the intellect acts in itself, and its action is apprehension, whereas this faculty acts in another, as Ibn Rushd [בן רשד] said in his *Epitome of De Anima* [קצורו לספר הנפש], as if to say that it acts by means of the elemental heat present in the seed, so that this faculty would necessarily be corporeal [גשמי] — we reply to him that the intellect has two kinds of action. The first is its apprehension of itself; the second is that an action upon a corporeal being is ordered from it. This is evident in the case of the heavenly bodies. For their movers have an action in themselves, namely their apprehension of their own essences; and they have an action through motion, by means of the nature of the heavenly bodies that are moved by them — a nature suited to receive from them precisely such a motion as the separate higher beings impart. They also have, along with this, an action upon these things here below by means of the stars, as was explained in the natural sciences. Now the action they have within their own essences is altogether without an instrument, whereas the action they have upon a corporeal being must necessarily be through an instrument, and in it the corporeal being is fit to receive their volitions. So too is the matter with the practical intellect [השכל המעשיי]: its apprehension of its own essence does not require an instrument, whereas the actions ordered from it are by means of an instrument — and this is evident regarding the soul. So here it has been explained that this faculty is an intellect, as the Philosopher mentioned.

Moreover, even granting that this coming-to-be should originate from a faculty of soul present in the seed, it is plain that this becoming cannot be ascribed to the seed apart from another principle that comprehends all these arrangements [הסדורים] under the aspect in which they are one. For the forms that first matter [החומר הראשון] is in potential to receive are, some of them, for the sake of others, as the Philosopher explained. Hence its reception of them must continue until it reaches the goal of the single coming-to-be [תכלית ההתהוות האחד]. And since the single coming-to-be, insofar as it is a single coming-to-be, must necessarily be ascribed to a single cause in number, it follows that the agent producing all of them is a single agent — and it must be the case that this agent apprehends the goal toward which these things came to be for its sake; otherwise its attaining the intended perfection in this becoming would be by chance, and this is impossible in this material becoming, all the more so given that

[this becoming] always proceeds from one determinate formation to another determinate formation in number, and the formation that is one in number and embraces the whole span of time is necessarily an intellectual formation. Therefore it follows necessarily that this agent is an intellect; and it will be explained that it is the Active Intellect, since whatever of apprehension belongs to the Active Intellect must necessarily belong to this agent. For each of them must necessarily apprehend all the intelligibles under the aspect in which they are one. And since the intellect and the intelligible are one thing in number, it follows that these intellects are one thing in number, since the intelligible belonging to them is one and the same. For this reason the later thinkers did well in agreeing that the Active Intellect is the agent of these lower existents, and they called it "the Giver of Forms" [נותן הצורות]. This will be explained with the fullest explanation in the fifth treatise [המאמר החמישי] of this book — I mean, that here is an intellect that is the agent of these comings-to-be, and that it is the Active Intellect whose existence was demonstrated in *De Anima* [ספר הנפש].

As for their statement that the Philosopher ascribed this becoming to the soul that emanates from the heavenly bodies, it is plain as well that it follows from this that the soul emanating from the heavenly bodies is the very same as the Active Intellect. For since the very apprehension belonging to the Active Intellect belongs to the soul that emanates from the spheres, as was set down before, it follows that the one is the other — because separate beings that agree in their quiddity can have no number among them at all. For number apprehends quiddities only by reason of their being in matter; but when they are taken abstracted from matter, no number whatsoever can be conceived in them. The example is that the material [היולאנית] form, when taken as in matter, gives rise to

multiplicity; but when taken abstracted from the material substratum [ההיולי], multiplicity cannot be predicated of it in any way. This is self-evident to one who reflects upon this book, [namely the existence of] the divine beings — unless we say that there is a difference between them with respect to this apprehension. And this would be the case when the apprehension belonging to the Active Intellect of these things proceeds along the path of perfection and form relative to the knowledge present in the soul emanating from the spheres regarding them; for the Active Intellect makes known to man certain things to which the soul emanating from the spheres does not impart being — as if to say, the knowledge of the heavenly bodies and their movers — these proceeding along the path of perfection and form to those generated and corruptible things whose coming-to-be is ascribed to the soul emanating from the spheres.

Moreover, the Active Intellect engenders man according to what he understood thus from the words of the Philosopher, and the soul emanating from the spheres engenders the rest of things. And the knowledge of the rest of the arrangements is included in the engendering of man, since man is the last of composite beings and their perfection; and the perfection is not separated from that of which it is the perfection. Therefore it must be the case that, with the human form, there are found in some manner the rest of the forms that matter is in potential to receive — for they belong to it [the human form] at the rank of substratum. Moreover, when we have posited that it [the Active Intellect] knows the arrangement belonging to man under the aspect in which he is of existence, and

this arrangement is at the rank of perfection relative to the rest of the arrangements, it is plain that its knowledge will not be complete under the aspect in which he [man] is found, except by its knowing the arrangements that have for him perfection and form. And such being the case, it is plain that there already follows from this that the Active Intellect is the agent of these things here below. For there is no obstacle whatever to prevent the Active Intellect from engendering the rest of the lower existents besides man; indeed it has knowledge of the arrangements, and that which produces them produces them from this aspect.

Moreover, the potential belonging to first matter [החומר הראשון] for the reception of the human form — its passage into act is another coming-to-be, for it is a stepping toward another goal, as set down before. And the single coming-to-be, insofar as it is one, necessarily has a single agent — unless this be by chance, as is the case in the auxiliary crafts in relation to the master craft. In truth, the whole operation belongs to the master craft, for it directs the auxiliary crafts in what

they do. And it is plain that we cannot posit the soul emanating from the spheres as auxiliary to the Active Intellect in this operation, since the Active Intellect, being an intellect, requires no intermediary in performing this operation; for in whatever manner this operation could be completed by that intermediary, it could equally be completed by the Active Intellect itself. Now this [use of an intermediary] would be possible in crafts that a man performs in order to lighten his labor and toil. But the separate being whose action reaches some place fit to receive it without toil or trouble — it is inconceivable that it should perform its action through an intermediary, unless it needed in this operation some instrument that is an intermediary and is not itself primary.

In this manner the Name, blessed be He, performs many of His operations by means of the movers of the heavenly bodies, because these have an instrument — namely the star — through which these operations can be completed by them. But as for these intellects of which we are speaking, it is plain that they have no instrument through which they perform their action, apart from the mixtural disposition [ההכנה המזגית] in the thing that receives the comings-to-be through the stars. This instrument is conjoined to one [intellect] just as it is conjoined to the other, for we may say that one of these is a mover of the heavenly bodies and that [the Giver of Forms] is not the latter [mover]; and on this supposition the Giver of Forms would necessarily be one in number. So too is the matter with the Active Intellect insofar as it perfects the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני], as was explained earlier. But the movers of the stars are necessarily many, as was explained in the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע] and will be explained in the fifth treatise of this book. Therefore each of these acting intellects must necessarily be an intellect other than the intellects that move the heavenly bodies. And such being the case, it is plain that the conjunction of this instrument to one of these other intellects is just like its conjunction to the other intellect; hence it is plain that neither of them stands at the rank of intermediary to the other. Moreover, even if we grant that one of these has an instrument, it does not follow that these intellects are two in number. For the [Active] Intellect already suffices…

the agent of bringing all the comings-to-be into being, and of leading the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] from potentiality into act. For according to the conceptions that the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] emanates upon the hylic intellect, there is nothing here that requires us to posit any other agent besides it. And in general, that which knows the final end that precedes the end-product — and through which the whole coming-to-be is rightly ordered toward the end — must necessarily be the giver-of-being to man, just as it is the giver-of-being to the rest of the lower existents.

Now I hold that what the Philosopher [= Aristotle] meant by "the soul emanated from the spheres" is the Active Intellect. For it has already been shown that the Active Intellect must necessarily be the agent of the lower existents, and that it is the thing emanated from the spheres which gives them the disposition by which they come to be. This is so because the Giver of the Form [נותן הצורה], which is the final end in the coming-to-be, must fittingly bestow the temperament [המזג] upon the matter that receives it, in the very respect in which it is prepared to receive it — since the whole here is a single agent in number, and a single operation in number must necessarily proceed from a single agent. And given that this is the case, it has been shown that the spheres watch over what is here below through the emanation of the temperament by the powers in them taken together. Here, then, it would be fitting that the Giver of the Form be one [proceeding from them], until they all share — in respect of the form — just as they share in respect of the body of the temperament. For it is false that there be here two distinct agents producing a single operation in number, unless this be in the respect in which the two agents are in some respect a single agent. And given that this is the case, it is shown that the Active Intellect is the soul emanated from the spheres — that is to say, from their movers [ממניעיהם] — and this is so because it is impossible that an intellect be emanated from a body. And here it has been shown that the Active Intellect knows these orderings, all of them, inasmuch as they have in it a single circuit [periodic order]; and this is so either because of what it acts upon in these things that are here, or because of the knowledge derived from these orderings for the hylic intellect.

And it has already been argued, with respect to the difference in the mode of being of the Active Intellect — on account of what is emanated to the hylic intellect by the bringing-forth from potentiality to act in the acquisition of the intelligibles [קנין המושכלות] — that it does not follow from this difference that there is here some [agent] that brings it [the hylic intellect] forth from potentiality to act, and that this be the Active Intellect. For this is so [only] because of the difference in the imaginative forms in their being brought from potentiality to act; for there are already found in these intelligibles, which it apprehends, some mode [of generality]. And even though there are already found in them, together with the hylic apprehensions [המשיגים ההיולאניים] that were in them, these imaginative forms which are particular — yet this intellect does not require the apprehension of these particular intelligibles which involve hylic matters mixed in with them. This is so because it is possible that some other intellect, simpler [than this], should apprehend the hylic intellect [grasping] those imaginative intelligibles in which there is no admixture with the hylic apprehensions; for one might say that the apprehension proper to it [to that

simpler intellect] is the universal nature [הטבע הכולל], and this is what would be granted — that it apprehends some [feature] simpler than the hylic apprehensions, just as the sense of sight [חוש הראות]…

apprehends the visible appearance [המראה] abstracted [stripped] from the warmth and from the source [of the impression] and from the rest of the accidents [המקרים] that were found together with the visible appearance — [accidents] to which it [sight] paid no heed; for when the sensed object reaches it, it apprehends it without [attending to] anything beyond that which distinguished the appearance from these accidents. — And we may say that in this very respect there is nothing in what is apprehended that does not appear to it from within. This [holds] for the sense of sight, by way of example. Indeed, the sense apprehends the visible appearances in respect of the accidents found together with them, even though it has no access [entry-point] to apprehending them [the accidents] in any way. But the hylic intellect has already been shown to have its concern with matters that are not here a thing to which it pays no heed in some manner. And given that this is the case, there is in truth found alongside it [the hylic intellect] most of the things known [ideas], which are [grasped] in respect of the natures common to them. It has been shown that it is possible there be in the form sufficient — that is, in the imaginative forms in their changing [variation] — toward the apprehension of the natural universals found in them, apart from what is comprised here by [the fact that] these universal natures are abstracted from the universal apprehensions that are mixed in with them.

And were the matter so — I mean, that the hylic intellect grasped these universal natures from the imaginative form without their being mixed in with the hylic apprehensions, because the universal apprehensions have no path except by way of the universal natures alone — then it would not be possible for the hylic intellect to grasp the accidental thing in respect of what it itself is, just as the sense of sight does not grasp the accidental thing in respect of what it is by way of the appearance. And this has been shown to be false, for one has greatly mistaken the way in which most of these things have gone astray; and this is very well set out for the one who studies it in this book.

And again, were the matter so, the hylic intellect would not have needed, in the acquisition of any intelligible whatever, [the help of] some intelligible by sense [sensible mediation]; rather, whenever the palate [some sense] senses by some sensed object whatever it be, the intelligible would come to be from it of itself. And this too has been shown to be false, for there cannot be here things such that

the apprehended intelligible would be sensed by them, except [as something arrived at] through repetition and through great pains.

And given that this is the case, it has been shown that it is impossible there be here some other agent, besides what is found in the hylic intellect, [proceeding] from the bringing-forth from potentiality to act in the apprehension of the intelligibles. — And here it has been shown that there must necessarily be here some agent, by reason of what is found of the bringing-forth from potentiality to act in the acquisition of the human intelligibles, and by reason of what is found of the coming-to-be of these things here. And it has been shown, together with this, what its quiddity [מהות] is, so far as is possible for us in this place — I mean to say, [showing] that these orderings are here [the work of] a single agent in number. But the complete account of this will be in the fifth treatise of this book, and there it will be shown, by the comprehensive inference [בגזרות], that the Name is its perfection — in refutation of what Ibn Rushd [בן רשד] said, namely that the agent of these things is not here an intellect, just as the philosophers who expound the words of the Philosopher held.

And it is fitting that there not be hidden from us what has already been made clear by what has been shown here, [in answer to] all the doubts…

by which the predecessors were moved [to raise], in order to nullify [divine] knowledge, or to posit universal forms [as] existents outside the soul — each one of which is false [empty], as has been shown in the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע]. This is so because they held that these intelligibles, which are here something subsisting outside the soul, were so by reason of what is found existing — for the soul [exists by reason of] the individuals which are subject to perpetual change, and which are moreover perishable [נפסדים]. Now it has been shown, concerning the matter of [divine] knowledge — [the knowledge] that it was fitting [to have], if there were here a [genuine] knowledge — that the thing known be enduring and for the thing [known] to be subsisting, as has been shown concerning the matter of the true knowledge in the Book of Demonstration [ספר המופת]; [the conclusion being] that this is not here a [genuine] knowledge.

But those who came after them showed regarding [these intelligibles] that it is not possible that knowledge be nullified, since we find it subsisting and abiding at all times, [persisting] from their changes in a single way — that is to say, the comprehensive ordering [הסדור הכולל] that comprehends these things. And they were compelled, on account of this, not to posit these universals, in which the knowledge resides, as existing in their own selves outside the soul; for already it

had been forced upon them that there are here many falsehoods from which there is no escape, as has been shown in the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע].

But when the matter is posited as has been shown here regarding the Active Intellect — that the knowledge was [grounded] in the agent, here in respect of [the fact that] it abides as a thing subsisting in itself outside the lower [world], and this is the comprehensive ordering [הכללות] which is in the soul of the Active Intellect — yet the universality is a thing that befalls it in respect of what is found among the individuals of the sentient souls outside the soul. And just as the ordering which is in the soul of the craftsman [נפש האומן] is found in every one of the instruments newly produced by it in some manner, so will this ordering be found in every individual among the individuals of men newly produced from that circuit. And this is what makes clear that there does not befall this disposition the thing [posited] by those who nullify [knowledge], who were compelled, on account of the disposition, to posit the universals as found outside the soul.

And here this doubt is dispelled — [the doubt] that arises in respect of the definitions [הגדרים] — because of [the fact that] they [the definitions] are themselves what is known: the substance of each one [of the individuals being] in the genus that is defined, by the name [signifying] the quiddity [מהות] of each one of them. For that which is defined is the ordering itself — that is, [the ordering] in the soul of the Active Intellect from which that genus comes to be — and this ordering will already be found in some manner in every one of the individuals of that genus, as set down before. And it does not follow from this that all these individuals be one in number, as those say who are accustomed to speak of the universal forms.

And again, in this very manner — the manner that rightly orders knowledge in the case of the accidents — so too [it is the case] not in [the individuals] themselves alone, just as it was fitting to say concerning the universal forms that they are existents found outside the soul. And this is so because they saw that the accidents could not be such that they should stand in their own selves separate; [and yet] they did not say of the universals that they were found outside the soul. And on account of this it was forced upon them that there was here knowledge in the accidents. — But when the matter is posited as has been shown here regarding the Active Intellect, then the orderings which belong to the accidents are also found here outside the soul — I mean that they are found in the soul of the Active Intellect. And in general, when the inquiry [is made], it is found that in the very respect [in which] all the objections to them are dispelled, [it holds] until

that which is itself [the thing in itself] is also [secured], as we have set out. And behold, this is Plato's [אפלטון] [view], which is what he intended — and this is what he meant…

by the forms: that they are likenesses to these sensed things, and he called them universals inasmuch as they are common, by a shared nature [טבע משותף], to many things in number. Rather, [the truth is] that already he [Aristotle] has apprehended, in [arguing] that he did not posit these forms as [existing] for the [individual] things themselves, what compels [the answer]: that it must be granted to them [the universals] that they have a place to subsist by reason of what is shown concerning the matter of knowledge in the things of mathematics [הדברים הלמודיים] — that is to say, that they are themselves something, namely the number and the one and the surface and the [geometrical] body, which are false [empty], according to what has been shown in the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע].

And as for what compelled Aristotle [ארסטוטלוס] to posit the subsistence of knowledge and the removal of the doubt that arises by reason of the definitions [הגדרים] — he does not escape from the doubt and the perplexity, as will be shown for the one who studies it in the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע]. And we have already set this down in our exposition there, if it be the will of the Name, blessed be He, and He give us leisure [respite]; and there it will be set out, with the help of the Name, blessed be He, how it is that already it is shown here regarding the matter of the Active Intellect [that it serves to] remove all the doubts that arise in respect of knowledge and in respect of the definitions — and that there not be forced upon us, on account of this positing, the falsehoods which compelled Plato [אפלטון] and the rest of the men who posit forms.

And behold, [more] is left over to be said in this place; but the place [here] requires a long inquiry, and that is something not [proper] to our way. And given that this is the case, my intention is [only] that it be shown here regarding the matter of the Active Intellect [that it serves to] remove all the doubts that arise in respect of knowledge and in respect of the definitions for [those] besides us. This, then, is what has been made clear; and the [further] perfection — the full and complete revelation — is what is to be added to it [elsewhere] regarding what has been shown here concerning the matter of the Active Intellect.

פרק שביעי

[Chapter Seven]

[Subtitle:] In it [there is] a recollection of the views of the predecessors concerning the matter of the immortality of the hylic intellect [השארות השכל ההיולאני].

After the matter of the Active Intellect has been shown, it is fitting that we exert ourselves in the removal of the doubts that arise from this emanation, which would [otherwise] be from the Active Intellect to the hylic intellect. — From them [the doubts]: it is a marvel from where there should come to us these intelligibles which are acquired in the mathematical arts [המלאכות הלמודיות] and in the mathematical sciences [החכמות הלמודיות], and in [the matter of] the heavenly bodies and their movers and the First Cause [הסבה הראשונה].

This is so because it is already plain, from what has been shown concerning the matter of the Active Intellect, that it is what makes [us] intellectually grasp the orderings that are here, according to that which it acts upon. But as for that which it does not act upon, as is the case in [the matter of] these things — how does the knowledge of them reach us? All the more so [is it a marvel] in [the case of] that which is at a rank above it [the Active Intellect], such as the matter of the movers of the heavenly bodies and the First Cause; for it has already been held that it is impossible that there be for the hylic intellect an apprehension of the apprehended [feature] in them — granting that, if this were possible, the Active Intellect would [have to] be the agent together with them, one in number; for the intellect, the intelligible, and the intellectually-grasping [subject] are, in the case of separate things, one in number, and this [reduction] is the utmost in nullity and disgrace. — And from them [the doubts]: it is a marvel how there should reach us the more complete knowledge in some of the intelligibles [grasped] by an agent, beyond our attaining them at a single rank, whereas the patient [recipient] is, in all of them, at a single rank. But [the case is] that the agent…

But as for the agent, since its arriving at us is at a single rank—because, as has been clarified, its action is in actuality—and since the intelligibles that come to us from it are at a single rank insofar as they are at a single rank in actuality with it, it follows necessarily that there be a potency that arrives at the apprehension of each one of the intelligibles that come to us from a given intelligible; for the apprehension of one intelligible is not equal in its potency to the apprehension of another. And this too is clear concerning what is acted upon by the agent for the reception of these intelligibles, which is likewise [received] in a uniform manner. This is because it is already evident that among the intelligibles there are those whose apprehension, in respect of their truth, is more readily attained, and others whose apprehension, in respect of their truth, is attained with less ease and with more difficulty. For were the matter not so, it would follow necessarily that the material intellect have apprehension only of that which is intelligible; and this is because what the intellect apprehends, it is impossible for it not to apprehend in respect of its truth—for, according to my view, anything that the

intellect apprehends apart from it [the object's truth] is a defect, and not perfect apprehension nor free of error. And the material intellect has already been shown to acquire this intelligible by way of the [acquisition of] the intelligible; this is a change that cannot but be. And since the matter is so, it is evident that what is acted upon by it for the reception of these intelligibles is itself in respect of their truth, and on this account it must be that its potency for the acquisition of these intelligibles differs by less and by more.

And let us say that the first doubt has no resolution other than what has preceded. This too will be made clear on the basis of what we have come to know: that since the Active Intellect is the agent of these things, it does not necessarily have knowledge of the practical crafts, of the mathematical sciences, and of the rest of the things that it does not produce. Rather, from the side that it is the one that gives us these pieces of knowledge, it must necessarily have some knowledge of them in some manner, as preceded. And, further, it already appears that the Active Intellect does have knowledge of these things in which this doubt arose. For it already appears that, with the Active Intellect, there is knowledge of these practical crafts—and here too: he provides man with implements to make them and, what is more, with the fully perfected man within, who serves him so that he may make whatever he wills on the side of those crafts that serve the master crafts. For it appears that the master craft is the one that directs and that sets up that which is beneath it concerning what it accomplishes by means of the craft. And it already appears, from what we have seen, that some of the ensouled beings have prepared in them, by nature, that they perform some of what man performs by these crafts—as in the spider's weaving and the bees' fashioning of the [honeycomb] cells and the like. And, further, the practical crafts—they are all for the sake of the perfecting of the master craft, which we see is the one toward which the agent inclines in the majority of the things it does. For the Active Intellect watches over the preservation of the living being, in providing it with the implements by which it attains its sustenance; and in some of them these implements are the senses, the imagination, and the rousing faculty; and in others of them it further sets up bodily organs as implements for them, as in the matter of the predatory living beings, which it has provided with implements by which their prey is made complete for them; and in others again it has provided implements that are psychic faculties, as the [in-built] craft of the bees…

that provides the honey, which is their sustenance. And it watches over, further, the preservation of the living being in providing it with something that will be a shield against the things that surround it, as it provides the woolly creatures with their wool, the feathers in the feathered creatures, the scales [קשקשים] in the

scaled creatures, and the venom in the venomous creatures; and in providing it with implements by which it may fight off those that war against it, as the horns and the hooves in the [non-]predatory living beings. And when one investigates the practical crafts, one finds them all directed toward this end in the most perfect manner possible for them. To take man as an example: because it was not possible for him, on account of the thinness of his matter, to have from his earthly material that which would be for him a shield at the rank of the wool and the feathers, there was set in him a potency to make clothing and a house. And, according to the cause that it was not possible, in his case, for implements to be found in him by which he might fight off the living beings that wished to feed upon him, there was set in him a potency for making the instruments of war and the chase. And according to the cause that it was not possible for him to find food ready-made apart from a craft, there was set in him a potency for the working of the soil and the preparing of the foodstuffs.

And in general: when we investigate all the practical crafts, we find them suited to the intended end, on account of which these things are done—so that the craft was a servant to nature, as the Philosopher recalled in the second [book] of the *Physics* [בשני מספר השמע]. So too it appears that the Active Intellect has knowledge in mathematical matters. For it already appears that the Active Intellect has knowledge in the [geometrical] figures, since nature attends greatly to what it makes, fashioning the figures suited to the operations of the things measured by the figure. So too it appears that the Active Intellect has knowledge in quantities, for it attends to the [proper] number of bodily organs in the figures, and assigns to each of them some measure of what it ought to be, in accord with what is fitting. For it appears that these proportions are measured with respect to nature; and it is possible that there is in them a relation of the speaking [being] and what is related to the non-speaking. So too it appears that the Active Intellect has knowledge in number. For we find, among the natural composite things, that they have limited numbers—as the matter is, by way of example, with the number of organs and veins and arteries and the rest, and what differs of them in its custom; this comes about by the limited numbers belonging to a given species among the living beings; and the matters that are circumscribed for one who knows perfectly in the genus are what the objects of apprehension of the subject know.

So too it appears that the Active Intellect has knowledge regarding what is among the heavenly bodies, in the manner in which there is, with it, knowledge of that which is ordered from them in this lower world—and this is what it is possible for knowledge of them to reach us. But that it must have knowledge in respect of

what is ordered from them in this lower world has been clarified. For according to this, the order is itself [that] of the Active Intellect at the rank of the implement, made to do whatever inclines toward it. This is because they newly produce the temperament and give it, and this is to be found existing from these things, as has been explained concerning the natural things; and it is the implement for the attaining of the form, which is from the Active Intellect. And, further, [it appears] that because the Active Intellect emanates from the movers of the spheres, as preceded, this order, which is from the spheres, emanates from the spheres. It must necessarily be that the relation of the Active Intellect to this order…

ordered here from the heavenly bodies is like the relation of the movers of the heavenly bodies to the heavenly bodies. And according as the relation of the movers of the heavenly bodies to the heavenly bodies is the relation of form to matter, so the relation of the Active Intellect to the order that is ordered from the heavenly bodies is the relation of form to matter. And since the matter is so, it is clear that the order which is in the soul of the Active Intellect proceeds in the way of form and perfection from the order that is ordered from the heavenly bodies. And it has been clarified that he who knows the perfection in a perfect manner must necessarily know that of which it is the perfection. The example: he who knows what the quiddity of a house is must necessarily know the beams and the bricks and the stones, of which is the quiddity to which the perfection of the house belongs. But as for the movers of the heavenly bodies, and the First Cause: it appears, in the first place, that the Active Intellect has some knowledge of this; and this is the knowledge that belongs to the effect concerning its cause. For when the effect apprehends its own essence in a perfect manner—and its own essence is an effect, in respect of what it is, found [to be]—it must necessarily be that the effect apprehend the existence of…

its cause. And inasmuch as the effect and the correlatives are matters of a single knowledge, it must necessarily be that there be, for the effect, knowledge of its cause. Except that this is a deficient apprehension; and on this account the pieces of knowledge that are acquired in such things are deficient in respect of the Active Intellect's [own apprehension], in a deficient manner. And here this doubt is resolved; all of it will be clarified more perfectly in the fifth treatise of this book, [if it be] by the decree of the Name.

But as for the second doubt, its resolution too is clear with a little reflection. This is because it happened to us that we have a more perfect knowledge of one of two things from a certain side, or of both of them, [than of others]. And here, the one cause among them is this: because there is not, with the Active Intellect, a

knowledge perfect [equally] for them, as is the matter concerning the movers of the heavenly bodies and the First Cause. And the second cause is that, on account of the need of the material intellect, in receiving the emanation of the Active Intellect, for the sensory apprehension—and on account of this our apprehension is not perfect to us in things in which there cannot be found among them what is sensed of what is needed for apprehension in them, as is the matter in the order ordered from the heavenly bodies in this lower world. And here a deficient knowledge is also found in things, from the side of the nature…

of the subject in which the knowledge resides. This is because, when the existence was for it a deficient existence, it happened that the knowledge concerning it was likewise [deficient]—as is the matter in [the science of] political philosophy and in what differs of its custom.

פרק שמיני [Chapter Eight]

In which we recall what aspects of indication there are for knowing an opinion concerning them.

Now that it has been clarified what the Active Intellect is, it is fitting that we investigate what our inquiry here required of us toward this end—namely, whether the material intellect can have within it a survival or not; and if it was possible, how it is possible. And we shall recall what preceded of the opinions concerning this matter, in the way in which we recalled their opinions when we investigated the quiddity of the material intellect.

And let us say that the philosophers were divided concerning this matter of survival into three opinions. The one opinion is the opinion of Alexander [of Aphrodisias] and Themistius and Ibn Rushd, according to what Ibn Rushd recalled in his Epitome of the *Book of the Soul* and in some of his letters. They were of the view that the material intellect can have survival and permanence within it when it arrives at a rank of perfection such that it has intellection of the intelligibles which are in their own essences intellect—and in particular the Active Intellect, for it is the one that one might think it possible for it to have apprehension of, from among the rest of the separate intellects. And they agreed that the survival is not made complete for it in [the intellection of] the intelligibles which are here, because they are subject to generation and corruption and are newly produced in us after they had been in potency; and everything that comes to be must necessarily corrupt, according to what they held.

But when it has intellection of the things that are in their own essences intellect, there was not here anything newly produced—for that which is intelligible from them is the intellect itself—and on this account it must necessarily be that there be no corruption when it [the material intellect] becomes one with the Active Intellect. And here is their opinion, as it appears, built upon four premises. The first is that these intelligibles which are here are subject to generation and corruption in the material intellect; the second is that everything subject to generation is subject to corruption; the third is that that which gives us intellection is the Active Intellect, which is possible; and the fourth is that, when the material intellect has intellection of it, it must necessarily be that it have survival.

And the second opinion is the opinion of Ibn Sina and of those who followed after him, according to what Ibn Rushd recalled in his Epitome of the *Book of the Soul*. It [holds] that it appears that the acquired intellect is eternal. And its [adherents'] view is built upon two premises. The one is that these intelligibles are subject neither to generation nor to corruption; and the second is that that which is subject neither to generation nor to corruption is eternal. And on this account they did not deem it far-fetched that the acquired intellect be eternal; for there is not here a thing subject to generation that should survive as eternal, since the material intellect is eternal. And on this account it is not prevented in its [coming-to-be], for it is eternal when it is perfected by these intelligibles; and these intelligibles too are eternal in their own essences, even if there was [something] in them that is newly produced [as found] in the material intellect.

And the third opinion is the opinion of Abu Nasr [al-Farabi]; it appears [to hold] that it is impossible for survival and permanence to reach the material intellect in any way. And his view is built upon two premises. The one is that the material intellect is subject to generation, and the second is that it is impossible for that which is subject to generation to survive as eternal. And on this account he decided the matter and said that, when the material intellect becomes one with the Active Intellect, the statement is like the statement that is similar to the absurdities of nullities. But in a letter that he composed, he made [his view] clear, in the exposition where our intellect found him agreeing that survival is made complete for the material intellect in a manner that those who followed Alexander agreed to. And here he called the apprehension of the intellect concerning the things that are in their own essences the acquired intellect; and Ibn Rushd said that it is the perpetual life.

Book I (מאמר א'), Chapter 9 (פרק תשיעי)

Chapter Nine (פרק תשיעי)

[Chapter summary line, set in smaller type beneath the heading:] In it we shall explain that none of these indications yields anything by which the opinion of any of these [thinkers] can be confirmed or refuted, so as to establish a true confirmation or a true refutation.

Now that we have already set out the opinions of our predecessors concerning the survival of the intellect, it is fitting that we recall the arguments by which each of those who hold these opinions might possibly establish his view — whether on the basis of what we have found in the words of the predecessors, or on the strength of their reasoning. For this is among the things that will guide us toward attaining the truth in this inquiry, as was noted earlier.

We say, then, that for the doctrine of Alexander and those who follow him concerning survival, there are indeed several ways in which it may be demonstrated. They have, as we mentioned, built their view upon four premises.

The first of the premises we mentioned, upon which they built their view, is the premise stating that these intelligibles [המושכלות], which the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] acquires, are generated and come to be within it. This premise can be shown to be true from several angles.

[The first consideration.] One angle: it can be shown that these intelligibles are generated in the material intellect and come to exist in it actually after having been in it potentially — and not that they are found in it actually at all times, as Plato [אפלטון] held. For if the matter were as Plato held, then why does a person not apprehend them the moment he is born? Is there here something that prevents their appearing? Or [does it appear] in the period of youth, while they are already present in him actually — as Plato held, that they travel through the moist [substance] in the period of youth? For if the matter were posited thus, it would necessarily follow that learning would be of no use to a person in attaining the intelligibles. For if that moist [substance] which (let us say) prevents the intelligibles from appearing in him were to be exhausted, then these intelligibles would appear in him without learning, and his learning of them would be in vain. And if that moist [substance] were not exhausted, then it would be impossible for them to appear in him, and his learning of them would again be in vain. But if there were no learning here at all, and learning were [merely] recollection, as Plato held — then by this very demonstration it becomes clear

that it would already follow from this supposition that a person would have no need of sense-perception for what he comes to understand of the intelligibles. And all of this is the height of disgrace and refutation.

[The second consideration.] Another angle: it can be shown that it is necessary that these intelligibles be generated in themselves, and be found sometimes potentially and sometimes actually, because the intelligible among them is not itself the very thing that is found of them outside the soul; for what is found outside the soul is not these intelligibles actually or potentially. This is because the intelligibles, since they are universals according to what is held, it is clear that they are not found in these sensible things except potentially — for the universal is unlimited, and that which has no limit is not found outside the soul except potentially. For what is found of the individuals of the universal is necessarily limited; and moreover, the encompassing nature [הטבע הכולל] is not found in the particular actually but potentially. For the particular [?] — and moreover, what is found of them outside the soul is not intellect, whereas the intelligible among them is intellect. The [intellect] found from it actually exists together with the material apprehenders [המשיגים ההיולאניים]; it comes to be in them when a person intellects it.

It would have been possible, however, for them to be posited as not generated in their essence — even while being in the material intellect sometimes potentially and sometimes actually — if the intelligible among them were itself the very thing that exists of them outside the soul; and this would further require that there be posited of them something outside the soul that is not generated. The illustration: if the appearance [color/form, מראה] that reaches the seer's [visual] faculty potentially were the very same appearance that is in the seen object outside the soul, then the appearance reaching the seer's faculty would undergo no coming-to-be in its essence when it reached it — and this is evident in itself. Rather, it would already have a coming-to-be in its essence, because that appearance had already come to be in the seen object. But were that appearance not generated in the seen object, it would follow from this that the appearance would have no coming-to-be in its essence — even though it is generated in the seer's faculty. And since the matter is so, and since it has already been shown that these intelligibles have a coming-to-be in the material intellect, and that the intelligible among them is other than what is found outside the soul, it necessarily follows that they have a coming-to-be in their essence at the time of their being generated in the material intellect.

[The third consideration.] Another angle: it is evident in the case of these intelligibles that they are already affected by the things that affect the material forms [הצורות ההיולאניות]; and for this reason it necessarily follows of them that they are material, and that they are not always found actually — for if the matter were so, they would be separate, not material. As to how it can be shown that these intelligibles are affected by the things that affect the material forms insofar as they are material — this is according to what I shall say. Now, that they are affected by the things that affect the material forms insofar as they are material — as Ibn Rushd [בן רשד] mentioned in his Epitome of *De Anima* [בקצורו לספר הנפש] — [appears from this:] that their existence, in the thing in which they are found, is consequent upon a change in its essence. The illustration: the material form that reaches the seer's faculty when it apprehended the seen [object] is consequent upon a change in the seer's faculty, on account of the impression of that form in it; for had that sense not been affected in this mode of being-affected, that form would not have been generated in it. And the matter is found to be so in the case of these intelligibles. For their coming-to-be in a person is itself consequent upon the being-affected in sense-perception. For the intelligibles cannot but be either primary — these being the first premises that are not demonstrated from anything other than themselves — or secondary — these being the premises that are the products of demonstration. Now the secondary intelligibles require, for their existence, the primary intelligibles. And as for the primary intelligibles, it has already been shown of their nature that it is impossible for a person to acquire them without the mediation of sense. This is because the premises that we acquire by means of sense, together with repetition [ההכפל], it is evident that they require sense — as has been shown in the *Book of Demonstration* [בספר המופת]. But as for the primary premises, concerning which we do not know when the knowledge of them reaches us [אשר לא נדע בהם מתי תגיע לנו הידיעה] — and not to sense alone, but to imagination [הדמיון] and the faculty of memory [הכח הזוכר] as well —

such as the premise stating that the whole is greater than the part, and what conducts itself after its manner — it can be shown of these too that they reach us by means of sense, from what I shall say. This is because it has already been shown of the nature of this material intellect that it is stripped of all forms; hence it necessarily follows that there is at first no intelligible whatsoever with it, but rather that all of them are acquired by it. And since every acquired intelligible requires of the person a prior knowledge — as was shown in the *Book of Demonstration* — it necessarily follows that this intelligible reaches us by means of another apprehension. And this apprehension cannot but be either one of the intelligible apprehensions, or one of the other apprehensions we possess — say,

sense, imagination, the cogitative faculty [המחשב], and the faculty of memory. Now it is false that it should be one of the intelligible apprehensions; for if the matter were so, the first intelligible would require another intelligible, and what was posited as first would not be first. Hence it remains only that this apprehension, by means of which this first intelligible is acquired, is one of the other apprehensions we possess. And since the other apprehensions we possess are either sensory, or require sense for their existence — for the apprehension of the common sense [החוש המשותף], of imagination, of the cogitative faculty, and of memory, are all of them generated from the sensory apprehensions, as was shown in the *Book of the Soul* [בספר הנפש] and the *Book of Sense and the Sensible* [בספר החוש והמוחש] — it is therefore evident that these intelligibles reach us by means of sense. Except that we do not know when they reached us, because we do not require, in the attaining of such intelligibles, the [particular] apprehensions in sense; rather, the very [moment] we sensed, let us say, in the matter of quantity, it becomes clear to us that the whole is greater than the part, and likewise with the rest of the premises that conduct themselves after its manner. And since the matter is so, it is evident that every intelligible reaches a person by means of being-affected in sense — and this is what we proposed at the outset.

[The fourth consideration.] They are also affected, moreover, by the subjects [הנושאים] — and this is evident in itself. And likewise it is found in the case of these intelligibles, in a certain manner, [as with] the material forms insofar as they are material, that they multiply with the multiplication [of their subjects]. This appears from several angles. And it is already evident in these intelligibles that they lean upon [are referred to, נסמכות] the images [דמיונות] of the sensible individuals found outside the soul. By this the intelligible [I have] comes to be other than the intelligible [held] by him who preceded me — for the intelligible I have leans upon the images of the individuals existing now, whereas their intelligible leaned upon the individuals existing in their time.

As to how it can be shown that these intelligibles lean upon the images of the sensible individuals found outside the soul — this is according to what I shall say. This is because the intelligible is true [valid] when it has a subject outside the soul to whose imagined form the intelligible is referred; whereas that which has no subject outside the soul, upon which the universal is referred, would be false — as is the case with [the proposition concerning] the "goat-stag" [עז איל] and the marvelous "fish-eagle" [עזניה]. And since the matter is so, it appears in the case of these intelligibles that the existence belonging to them is on the side of their leaning upon the images of their individuals.

It also appears, from another angle, that between these universal intelligibles and the particular images of their individuals there is a leaning-relation by which the universals exist. For the universal had its existence, insofar as it is universal, only on the side of the particular — since they are correlatives [מצטרפים], and have the property [that is theirs] on the side of that to which each is correlated. It is evident that the universal is correlated to the particular; for it is necessary in the case of correlatives that each of them acquire the existence that belongs to it — by which it is correlated [to the other]. As for the universal, it is correlated to the particular insofar as it is universal, for it encompasses it and surrounds it; and hence it necessarily follows that the universal not be found except [where] the particular is found — for it is necessary in the case of correlatives that they be found together. (And were it possible for the universal to exist in itself, as Plato held, then the universal would have explained [באר] what the particular does not explain — but this Aristotle [ארסטוטלוס] has already shown in the *Metaphysics* [במה שאחר הטבע] not to be the case.)

[The fifth consideration.] Another angle: if these intelligibles were not posited as multiplying with the multiplication of their subjects, then there would necessarily follow from this absurdities from which there is no escape by any means whatever. — One: it would necessarily follow, according to this supposition, that when one man apprehends a certain intelligible, the rest of mankind would [also] apprehend it; and so the sciences of Aristotle, let us say, would be known to one who never learned them — and this is a manifest absurdity. That this absurdity necessarily follows from this supposition is evident according to what I shall say. This is because, since the intelligible is one in number in all men according to this supposition — for it would be unmultiplied by [their] multiplication — and since it has been shown of that which is one in number that it necessarily exists either potentially or actually, and that it is impossible for it to exist potentially and actually at once — it is therefore evident that it is impossible, according to this supposition, that the intelligible be, with respect to one man, [a thing] not-yet-understood by another. [And this is] false.

And should someone object that this absurdity does not necessarily follow — on the ground that there is nothing to prevent [the same thing] being one in number while existing potentially in one respect and actually in another respect — and that hence there is nothing to prevent its being potential for one man and actual for another, since the man who knows actually is other [in state] than the man ignorant potentially: for if this were possible, then the one-in-number would exist potentially and actually at once, and this in a one-in-number that is found potentially in one respect and actually in another respect; and hence nothing

would prevent, by comparison to the potency it has, that the [thing] be potential for one man and actual for another, since the man knowing-actually is other than the ignorant-potentially with respect to the potency he has for attaining the intelligibles, [a potency] other than the potency belonging to the knower —

To this we said: This belongs among the things refused in themselves. For potencies that are potencies toward an agent [effect] one in number are [themselves] one in number, since the potencies are correlative to [opposite, נגדיים] the actions to which they belong. Hence, if the actions were many in species, then the potencies toward them would be many in species; and if the actions were many in number, then the potencies toward them would be many in number; and if the agent [effect] were one in number, then the potency toward it would be one in number. And since the matter is so, it is evident that if the effect which is in the material intellect — namely, the intelligible — were one in number, it would necessarily follow that the potency toward it be one in number. And since the potency is one in number, it is evident that if the intelligible were not-yet-understood by one of mankind, [a thing] that has already happened in the case of a thing one in number, [namely] that it be found potentially and actually at once on one and the same side — this is a manifest absurdity. —

Book I (מאמר א'), Chapter 9 (פרק ט') — continued

Further, this assumption entails — and the absurdity is demonstrated in just the same way as before — that when one person forgets some intelligible, it would be forgotten by everyone else as well, both by those who know it and by those who do not. This is the height of absurdity and disgrace.

Further, this assumption entails that there would be no such thing as learning or forgetting. For if these intelligibles do not multiply with the multiplication of their subjects, then they are separate [נבדלות], since whatever is material [היולאני] is found to multiply with the multiplication of its subjects insofar as it is material. But if they were separate, then they would have neither generation nor corruption, because generation and corruption, when they belong to a form, belong to it insofar as it is material, as was demonstrated in the *Physics* [the natural science]. ✻ And if they had neither generation nor corruption, then they exist always in actuality, and there would be no learning or forgetting — which is the height of absurdity and disgrace.

As for the second of the premises we mentioned, on which this view is built — namely, the one stating that everything generated is corrupted — its truth has

already been clarified according to what is held in the *De Caelo* [ספר השמים והעולם, *On the Heavens and the World*].

As for the third premise, which states that it is possible for the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] to apprehend the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], there are several considerations that support it.

Among them: since the relation of the intellect to the intelligible, according to the view of the Philosopher [Aristotle], is the relation of the sense to the sensed object, and since it is evident from the nature of sensation that it involves three things — a recipient, which is the sensing organ; a received form, which is the form reaching the sensing faculty by way of sensation; and a mover, which is the sensed object existing in actuality outside the soul — it therefore follows that these same three are found in the intellect: a recipient, which is the material intellect; a received, which is the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה]; and an agent, which is the Active Intellect. And since it has been established that the object existing outside the soul in actuality [is what moves], it is fitting that the material intellect be able to receive this relation; for it is evident from the nature of the sensing faculty that it is able to receive the sensed object — [so too] the Active Intellect.

Among them: since the intellect within us apprehends something that is not in itself intellect, it is all the more fitting that it should apprehend what is in its very essence intellect.

Among them: since the Active Intellect renders the imaginative forms [הצורות הדמיוניות] intelligible in actuality after they had been intelligible in potency, and since it is evident that anything which confers a given attribute upon another is itself more fittingly described by that attribute than the thing which possesses the attribute on its account — as fire renders another thing warm, and is itself more fittingly described as warm than the thing warmed because of the fire — it follows from this that the Active Intellect is more fittingly an object of our intellection than these imaginative forms which the Active Intellect rendered such that they became intelligible to us.

Among them: the intelligibles here are cognitions in potency, since they are cognitions of things that exist in potency without limit — that is, they are cognitions of individuals that are unlimited and exist only in potency. For what has a limit

exists only in potency, as was demonstrated in the *Physics* [ספר השמע, *On Hearing/the Lecture*]. And since what exists outside the soul exists outside the soul

in the likeness of what it is in the soul, it is evident that what exists outside the soul, drawn from these intelligibles, exists in potency; and so the definition of the true intelligible follows — namely, that the intelligibles are cognitions in potency. This being so, and since it is evident that any genus in which something existing-in-potency is found in that genus must necessarily revert to what is in actuality in that genus, and since it has been found that the material intellect moves from potency to actuality toward the acquisition of the intelligibles — it therefore necessarily moves toward an intelligible that is in actuality. And since the intelligible in actuality is the separate intellect [השכל הנפרד], for these intelligibles here are intelligibles of cognitions in potency, the material intellect will be in potency for the apprehension of the separate intellect. Now what happens to it is that it first moves toward acquiring an intelligible that is intelligible in potency — as happens to many of the natural things, which receive the perfections for which they are in potency by means of other perfections. For example: bread is a part of what is nourishing in potency; it moves to becoming a part of what is nourishing in actuality by first being transformed into what is a part of the nourishing in potency, namely blood.

As for the fourth of the premises we mentioned, on which they built their view — namely, the premise stating that when the material intellect has cognized the Active Intellect, it becomes eternal — it too has one mode of support. It is this: since the intelligible derived from it, when it cognized the Active Intellect, is the very thing it received, there is nothing newly arising on account of this apprehension that would require it to be corruptible by reason of having newly arisen; rather, it is the Active Intellect itself, which is eternal.

[The view of Avicenna]

As for what Avicenna [בן סינא] said in this inquiry, his position too has supporting considerations. The first of the premises we mentioned on which he built his view — namely, the premise stating that the intelligibles here are neither generated nor corrupted — already appears to be correct on several grounds.

Among them: it already appears, from the nature of the forms of the intelligibles, that they exist in man in a manner separate from the existence of the material forms in that in which the latter are found. By "material forms" I mean either the forms themselves — such as heat and cold in the elements, the temperament [המזג] in things of homogeneous parts, the nutritive soul in plants and the sensitive soul in animals — or the apprehensions that are perfections of certain material forms, such as the form reaching the faculty of sense from sensation, and from imagination in the imaginative soul [נפש המדמה]. For when we

examine these material forms, we find that their existence in their subject is other than the existence pointed to [the referent], in that their material existence is other than their intelligible existence. This is self-evident; for they are more numerous in number than they are as intelligibles, and they do not multiply with the multiplication of the subjects in which they are found, but they are

more numerous as particulars and in matter — and this is something subject to generation in the material forms insofar as they are material. As for the intelligible forms, it appears that their intelligible existence is the very substance of their existence pointed to in the material intellect. This being so — I mean, that the intelligible drawn from these forms is what exists of them, and the intelligible is other than what exists outside the soul, as stated above — it is evident that whatever is of this character is a separate form, since if it were material its existence would be from these intelligibles, [which] are separate. Therefore it follows that they are neither generated nor corrupted, for generation and corruption belong to a thing composed of matter and form insofar as it is composed of matter and form, as was demonstrated in the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע] and in the first book of the *Physics* [ראשון משמע הטבעי].

Among them: these intelligibles are distinguished from the other psychic apprehensions in that the other psychic apprehensions are found to have a limit to their apprehension, and this is necessitated of them by reason of their being material — that is, they judge only the particular individual pointed to, as stated above. But the apprehension of these intelligibles is without limit — that is, they judge every individual of that universal class found at any time whatever. This is among the things from which it appears that these intelligibles do not exist in us in a material mode of existence, and on this account it necessarily follows of them, as stated above, that they are neither generated nor corrupted.

Among them: this intellectual apprehension is further singled out from among the other psychic apprehensions in that in it the apprehension, the apprehended, and the apprehender are one and the same thing. That the apprehension and the apprehended are one and the same is evident: for the apprehension is the universal nature [הטבע הכולל] found in each thing, and so too is the matter with what is apprehended in it. And since the universal nature neither multiplies nor is numbered, it is evident that the apprehension is the very apprehended. That the apprehension is the very apprehender is evident from what I shall say: the acquired intellect is nothing other than what it apprehends of these intelligibles, for the material intellect has already been shown by its nature to be nothing but a preparation [הכנה] alone. Now this is not the case with the other apprehensions;

for the form which the faculty of vision acquires from its apprehension of the color, for example, is not the faculty of vision itself, nor is that form the color belonging to the sensed object outside the soul. This is among the things from which it appears that these intelligibles are not material; for if they were material, it would not be possible in this apprehension for the apprehension, the apprehended, and the apprehender in it to be one in number, since this is among the properties peculiar to separate apprehenders insofar as they are separate. And once it has been shown that they are not material, it is evident that they must necessarily be neither generated nor corrupted, as stated above.

Among them: these intelligibles are further singled out from among the other psychic apprehensions in that their apprehension does not occur through being acted upon, whereas the other psychic apprehensions do occur through some being-acted-upon. For example: it happens to the sense that it undergoes some change in receiving

the sensed object. Therefore, when we have perceived a strong sensed object and then turned away from it, we cannot immediately perceive one that is weaker; and this is necessitated of them by reason of their apprehension occurring by means of [a bodily organ]. And since the form reaching the apprehension impresses upon the bodily instrument a bodily impression which they receive materially — for on this account it follows that their apprehension must have some instrument — this happens to them. The intelligibles, by contrast, are the opposite of this: I mean that when we have intellected a strong intelligible and then turned from it to a weaker intelligible, we apprehend it more easily. This is among the things from which it appears that this apprehension is not material, and it follows from this — concerning the intelligibles which it apprehends — that they are neither generated nor corrupted, as stated above.

Among them: these intelligibles are further singled out from among the other psychic apprehensions in that their apprehension increases in old age, whereas the other psychic apprehensions are the opposite of this. This happens to the latter only by reason of their being material; for on this account it follows that the faculties which receive these apprehensions must have bodily instruments by means of which they receive these apprehensions. And since the bodily instruments grow weak in old age, it would follow that their apprehension is weak at that time — not on account of the form belonging to the bodily instruments, as we said above, for the form does not weaken in its own essence. This is among the things from which it appears that these intelligibles are not material; for if they were material, it would follow that their apprehension must

weaken in old age, as is the case with the other psychic apprehensions. And once it has been shown that they are not material, it is evident that it necessarily follows of them that they are neither generated nor corrupted, as stated above.

As for the second of the premises we mentioned on which Avicenna built his view — namely, the premise stating that the material intellect is neither generated nor corrupted — we have already mentioned the arguments that uphold it in what preceded; these are the arguments we mentioned by which the view of Themistius [תמסטיוס] concerning the material intellect may be upheld. And we have already explained above that it does not follow from these arguments that the material intellect is ungenerated.

[The view of al-Farabi]

As for what al-Farabi [אבונצר] said in this inquiry, his position too has supporting considerations. The first of the premises we mentioned on which he built his view — namely, the one stating concerning the material intellect that it is generated — its truth has already been clarified beyond doubt by what we said in the second of the arguments we mentioned by which the view of Alexander may be upheld. As for the second of the premises we mentioned on which al-Farabi built his view — namely, what he stated in it, that it is impossible for the material intellect to unite with the Active Intellect — this too has supporting considerations.

Among them: that if this were possible, the effect would revert to its cause, and this is impossible, since these existents are recipients, for they are correlative.

Among them: that if this were possible, then what cannot be eternal would be eternal. For the material intellect,

— since the material intellect is generated, it follows necessarily that it is corruptible. And if it were to apprehend the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], it would become identical with it, and then corruption would be impossible for it — which is impossible.

פרק עשירי (Chapter Ten)

In which we shall explain that the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] is eternal.

Now that we have already set out the opinions of our predecessors on this question, together with the arguments that uphold each of these opinions, it is fitting that we examine these arguments to determine whether what they aim to establish is in fact truly established by them or not. And since it has turned out that the arguments upholding any one of these opinions serve to refute the

opinion opposed to it, we must likewise examine whether the opinion they aim to refute is in fact truly refuted by them or not.

We say, then, that it is clear that the first of the arguments we cited — those upholding the view that the intelligibles [המושכלות] acquired by the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] are generated and come to be in it — does indeed establish truly that these intelligibles come to be in it; but it does not follow from that argument that they are generated in their own essence. This is self-evident from what we said in presenting that argument. And it is also clear that it does not follow that they are generated in their own essence merely from what was shown in that argument: namely, that these intelligibles come to be in the material intellect and come to exist in it actually after having existed in it only potentially. For not everything to which some relation to some thing newly arises is thereby altered in its own essence. Take the example of the sun: in summer a nearer approach to us arises for it, yet it does not follow from this that the sun is altered in its own essence. This being so, it is clear that one could argue that these intelligibles exist in actuality permanently, and that what merely happens is that the material intellect receives them at certain times — not in the sense that they have any existence in it apart from the existence they have in their own selves. This is on the model by which material apprehension occurs — namely, sense-perception and what is analogous to it — which is distinct from the material object of apprehension that exists outside the soul. This being the case, it is clear that this argument refutes none of the three opinions we cited from our predecessors on this question. It does, however, truly refute the opinion of Plato [אפלטון], who held that these intelligibles are permanently in the material intellect in actuality.

As for what the second of these arguments inferred — that these intelligibles are generated in their own essence, on the grounds that the intelligible among them is not the very thing that exists outside the soul — we shall now explain that this conclusion is by no means necessary. What they argued, to prove that the intelligible among them is not what exists outside the soul, rests on three arguments. The first: that the intelligibles are universal, and the universal is found outside the soul only potentially [the universal nature is not found in the particular things that exist outside the soul]. The second: that the intelligibles belong to the quiddity [למהות]

only potentially. The third: that what of them exists outside the soul is not an intellect, whereas these intelligibles are intellect.

Now the first of these arguments turns out to be invalid on several counts. — One of them: it has already been shown that these intelligibles exist outside the soul in actuality, in the soul of the Active Intellect; hence they exist outside the soul with the existence of the intelligible. And if they exist outside the soul with the existence of the intelligible, then it does not follow that they are generated in their own essence on account of their coming to be in the material intellect [even though they do not exist outside the soul with the existence of the sensed object]. For their being generated in their own essence on account of their arising in the material intellect would follow only if it were first shown that they have an existence in the material intellect distinct from the existence they have in the soul of the Active Intellect — and this is something that is shown neither by this argument nor by the rest of these arguments. On this count, all three of these arguments are refuted in this manner — except that this refutation applies more specifically to the third of these arguments. For in this manner it is shown that these intelligibles are themselves an intellect outside the soul, in the soul of the Active Intellect, which is the contrary of what was posited here.

— Another count: it is not necessary that the intelligibles be universal and embrace infinitely many individuals, as was posited in this argument. This is evident in the case of things of which only a single individual exists, such as the heavenly bodies and what is analogous to them. And if these intelligibles were generated in their own essence — and they are the universal intelligibles — and some of them held that the intelligible in these things is the [single] existent thing, then it would follow that some of them would be ungenerated, namely the intelligibles of things of which only a single individual exists. This contradicts what they posited concerning these intelligibles, for they said that all of them are generated in their own essence, and on that basis inferred that they are corruptible.

— Another count: it has already been shown that these intelligibles are not universal. For if they were universal, then the apprehension belonging to the material intellect with respect to them would necessarily be either in the respect in which the universal is one — that is, the respect in which it embraces and comprehends all the individuals falling under it — or in the respect in which the universal is many, that is, in that it apprehends the individuals, which are infinite. But that the material intellect should have an apprehension of it in the respect in which it is many is impossible. For the intellect has no representation of an individual qua individual, and therefore it is impossible for it to apprehend the multiplicity, all the more so to apprehend an infinite multiplicity of them; for

what is infinite cannot be brought through to its apprehension in the respect in which it is, in it, without limit — this is self-evident.

Nor could one argue that the intellect already apprehends the division of magnitudes into infinity, so that there is no bar to its apprehending an infinite multiplicity. For the intellect does not apprehend the magnitudes as divided without limit; rather, it apprehends in [the magnitude] that it divides into what is divisible, and so the dividing has no end. Likewise it would be possible

for it to apprehend that the coming-to-be of sensible individuals preserves the potency, and so coming-to-be does not cease; but that it should apprehend the individuals, which are infinite — that is manifestly impossible.

Likewise we say that it is clearly impossible for the material intellect to have an apprehension of the universal in the respect in which it is one — the respect in which it is a genus or a species. For since the universal, in that it is related to the individuals it embraces and comprehends, [is universal precisely in that respect], and since it has been shown from what preceded that it is impossible for the material intellect to apprehend the individuals qua individuals — which is the respect in which they are correlative — then it is likewise impossible for the material intellect to apprehend the universal qua universal. For one for whom it is impossible to apprehend one of the correlatives can in no way apprehend the other, since each of the correlatives is found in the definition of its fellow, and therefore the one cannot be conceived by anyone who does not conceive the other. The example: one who does not know what "double" is cannot apprehend that the other thing is its half.

This being so — I mean, that if these intelligibles were universal, then the apprehension of them by the material intellect would be either in the respect in which the universal is one or in the respect in which it is many, for there is no third respect here — and since it has been shown that it is impossible for the material intellect to apprehend the universal in either of these ways, it necessarily follows that the intelligibles it apprehends are not universal, which is the contrary of what was posited in this argument. Rather, the apprehension of the material intellect is of the individual — not qua some individual, but qua being whatever individual happens to be — and this is a thing existing outside the soul in actuality, I mean the individual. This will be explained fully in what follows: I mean that the intelligibles belong to the individual qua being whatever individual happens to be.

— Another count: it can be seen that these intelligibles are not universal, by inquiry and investigation. For the intelligible is either a concept [ציור] or an assertion [אמות]. As for the concept — and these are the definitions — it is clear that it does not belong to the universal. For if it belonged to the universal, it would belong to it either qua one or qua many; and however it be, it follows, if the matter were so posited, that the definition would not make known the quiddity of the single individual. For the single individual is other than the universal that comprehends it, and is also other than the many individuals, and therefore the definition of the universal could not attach to it, since things that differ have differing definitions. In general, then, just as the definition of "house" does not attach to a brick, and the definition of "ten" does not attach to "two," so it would be impossible for the definition to attach to the individual on this supposition — this is self-evident. But it is clear from the very nature of the definition that it makes known the quiddity of each of the persons to whom that definition attaches; hence it is clear that the definition does not belong to the universal. Furthermore, if the definition belonged to the universal, then it would necessarily belong to it in the respect in which it is one, for no multiplicity is seen in a definition: one does not say of the definition of "man" that it is "living beings that speak," but rather

one says that it is "a living being that speaks"; and from this it can be seen that the definition belongs to a single thing defined. This being so, then once it has been shown that it is impossible for the definition to belong to the universal in the respect in which it is one, it will be shown that it is impossible for the definition to belong to the universal absolutely.

We say, then, that it is impossible for the definition to belong to the universal in the respect in which it is universal and comprehensive — namely, the respect in which it is a genus or a species. For if the definition belonged to the universal — that is, to the genus or the species — then, since in this respect it is correlative, it would necessarily follow that this correlation be incorporated into the definition, I mean its comprehending of what it comprehends, as we posited as necessary. And if the definition belonged to the universal, it would follow from this that the species would be its own genus — and this [happens] in definitions. Furthermore, it is clear that each of the parts of the definition is predicated of the thing defined as a definition, [bearing] the correlation that obtains between it and the master [i.e., the subject], and this is an utterly impossible thing, the height of absurdity. For since man is a living being that speaks, "living" is therefore predicated truly of man, and the species would be its own genus. And it would also follow from this that the lowest species would be the genus of genera. For since man is a

living being, and the definition of "living being" is "that which is nourished and senses," man would therefore be nourished; and since the definition of "that which is nourished" is "a growing body," it would follow that man is a body, and from this the matter would track to absurdity and disgrace.

As for the assertion [אמות], it too is necessarily not of the universal — so that man, who is a lowest species, would be the genus of genera, which is the height [of absurdity]. For the assertion is nothing but a judgment about what is conceived, and therefore the concept precedes the assertion. This being so, and since it has already been shown that the concept does not belong to the universal, it is therefore clear that the assertion does not belong to the universal. Furthermore, the universal proposition is clear from its very nature that it does not judge of the universal in the respect in which it is comprehensive and embracing, since the subject of which it judges does not signify the universal in the respect in which it is subject and comprehensive. For if the subject in it signified the universal in the respect in which it is universal, then there would already be posited in it as multiple something that is not multiple. Take the example of our saying "every man speaks": it signifies a multiplicity in "man," and therefore this proposition is rendered as one of the [quantified] propositions [lit. "a proposition of a vessel," i.e., quantified] [?]. And if what is intended by "man" were the species, then this species would be posited in it as multiple, whereas it is clear that the species is not multiple and that two of it are not found in number. Therefore it is clear, in the universal proposition, that the subject in it is not comprehensive and embracing; and from this it follows that the matter stands likewise in the indefinite proposition, for the quantifying particle does not alter the signification of the subject — this is self-evident.

So too, if we suppose the universal proposition to judge of the universal in the respect in which it is universal and comprehensive, several absurd consequences will already follow from this. — One of them: it would necessarily follow from this supposition that the universal proposition would not be falsified on account of its being false of each of the individuals, since the universal is other than the individual, and it does not follow, when it is false of an individual, that it is false of the universal. For it can already happen that what is false of one of its parts is true of the universal. The example: it can already be true of Reuben that he is a man, even though none of his parts

[continues ch. 10 (פרק עשירי), Book I (מאמר ראשון)]

of man. This is plainly absurd and disgraceful — all the more so, since it is falsified of [another] individual; and even more so [if] it is falsified of every one

of them. So this assumption [ההנחה] is already made obligatory, [the assumption] that it does not [hold] in any of the given times. For if [the universal judgment] were [made to hold] of the intellect [שכל], this would be the definition [גדר] of the true [הצודק].

It is impossible that this comprehensive universal proposition [הגזרה הכוללת] be found — the one that is all-encompassing [הכוללת] of all the individuals [האישים]. For it is plain that the comprehensive proposition, were it not all-encompassing of all the individuals, would [still] be obliged to be found [true] outside the soul [חוץ לנפש], according to the true. And this is plainly the case: that according to this assumption, the proposition is true outside the soul, in that it is something universal and all-encompassing [כולל ומקיף]. But [the things found outside the soul] are the individuals, and this proposition does not judge of the universal [הכללי]; and the universal is not found outside. Yet [as for] what is found outside the soul — they are the individuals; [so] according to this assumption, [the proposition holds] of them, as [for instance] the judgment about the [number] ten will not be a judgment about [a thing] of which [it is] one part, and the judgment about the moon, which is one part of it. And this is plainly false [מבואר הבטול]: for the comprehensive universal proposition is already found to be true at every one of the times — [an inference] always true of whatever living, perceiving thing there is [כל חי מרגיש].

— And from this it likewise follows: for it has already been clarified, by this assumption, that the [things] clarified about a thing as being equal to [another] thing — or [equal] in more [respects], as we said regarding [a figure] whose three angles are equal to two right angles — the all-encompassing universal [holding] of all the individuals [would be] without limit [בלי תכלית]; whereas they are without limit, and it is impossible for them ever to be [traversed].

[Suppose] one were to say that the intended sense is "the angles of the [given] figure" [בזווית הנצבות הזויות / the angles in question]. The individual angle [הנצבה האישיוה] — indeed, these too [would be] without limit, since that which has no limit is not equal to [that] for which there is no limit, as regards the dimension of the limit [מצד התכלית]. And furthermore, because their equalities [are equal], the double of the all-encompassing universal angle for which there is no limit [is] double of [that] for which there is no limit. And by this it will be clarified that the depicted figures [התמונות] — [those drawn] by the speaker, or [in some] greater [number] — for it is impossible to say

that he is a speaking [being], and in that he is a perceiving [being]; and [as for] the all-encompassing universal, in that it is universal and all-encompassing, it

would be [potent] at one time of the times. For the universal living [being] is a way [of being potent] [potent] at one time of the times. And this is plainly false [מבואר הבטול].

And the world, which is obliged in its every potency to bring forth to act what it brings forth — [these] would be the subjects and the predicates which [hold] of them — that it is obliged by this assumption [ההנחה] : [that] the genus would be a [false] subject, and this [would be], for example. And [it would be] of this — that it is plainly false [מבואר הבטול].

And in the matter's being so, the [proposition] judges of the universal in respect of its being universal [and] one. And we likewise say that it does not [judge] of [the universal], on [the supposition] that there is a single judgment [holding] of [the universal], [holding] of these many — for [it would judge] of them — since the comprehensive universal proposition does not judge [of the universal as such]. For all the falsehoods that were entailed from this [assumption] — other than the first falsehood we mentioned [זולת השקר הראשון שזכרנו] — and it is [the one] in the comprehensive universal proposition. Indeed, [the matter] has already settled this : for it has been clarified that, by this assumption, this man would not be obliged by this assumption. And the conclusion is fully [established].

But [as for] the remaining falsehoods which we enumerated, [those] which they are entailed — likewise, according to this assumption — it will be clarified, so that there be clarified the falsehoods [entailed] of this assumption. For it has already been obliged [that] the comprehensive universal [proposition] be falsified of each one of the individuals together; and that it not be true in [each] one of them. And by this manner it will be clarified that already [there is] the comprehensive universal proposition.

And in the matter's being so, it is plainly the case that the comprehensive universal proposition does not judge of the universal [שאין הגזרה הכוללת שופטת על הכלל] — not in the respect in which it is one in which a single judgment holds of them, and not in [the respect] in which it judges of the universal, [namely] that it judges of [the universal] in respect of being one of them. And this is so that there not be prevented [the proposition] judging of the universal — a disjunction [מחלוקה]: [either] that it be universal and all-encompassing [אחד ומקיף], or in respect of its being many.

[As for] the many, indeed it is obliged: if it judges of them — it judges of a part among them. And already the universal in respect of its being one and all-encompassing, and not

it judges of these many together [as] a single judgment : indeed, it has not been left [open] but that it judge of a part among them. And because there is no [open option] here for these many but [that they be] a part bounded by [some] man, then it is obliged that it judge of every [individual] — of [them], [each] individual and [each] individual among them — as we said.

And [there is the case] where there is no [such part] here for these many : a bounded part, that it judge of them that they — together, inasmuch as it is clarified in itself that we said that each one of the human individuals is a speaking [being]. For there is nothing here for the individuals.

And from a final part it is possible that there be said of them that they — together, inasmuch as it is plain in itself that we said that one of the human individuals is a speaking [being]. And when [the judgment] was [made] in propositions whose subject would be a final genus — it has been clarified that, where the subject is of [a thing] in propositions, its subjects would be a final genus. If we grant that [the proposition] would be judging of that part, each one of the bounded universals which it [the genus] encompasses, as it were — [as if] the final genus encompasses that genus.

Here it has been entailed by this assumption — [the assumption] of the comprehensive universal proposition that it judges of a single judgment, and this is plainly [established] in itself. And when the comprehensive universal was [the one] judging of every man and [every] man, it has been clarified that the comprehensive true universals are [found] outside [the soul] in respect of what they are in the soul; and this is the opposite of what we are investigating concerning it : namely, that the comprehensive proposition does not judge except [of] the existence of the subject in respect of the subject — and this is plainly [established] in itself.

And in the matter's being so, it [judges] of the [universal] always as [it judges of] what is in the soul. And this [shows] that the subjects which are universal in this proposition are found — that it judges of that [comprehensive universal] proposition, and by this manner is found [the judgment] of the soul.

And here its matter will be found in truth as — what is outside the soul. And this [is] when [the proposition] was true of [the individuals]: indeed there is left for it a potency that it be true of [the] individuals. And likewise the matter [is] with

[existence], which is what is outside the soul : [of] some individual [among] them, indeed there is left a potency that is found — [of the] limit.

[New segment] [Were one to say that] the intelligible passes over by way of the comprehensive universal to be found outside [the soul] — [judging] together of each and every one of the individuals that are found outside the soul, it is [endowed] of a limit. We said to it that the intelligible [holds] of an [unlimited] multiplicity of individuals — not at all, for there is not, with it, [the supposition] that the multiplicity be possible. And this [is so] because it indeed [אמנם — line ends, continuing p. 68]

some error of his has reached [him] from the side [from which] it is some individual at some time — not from the side [from which] it is this man. But it has happened [that] this [arose], by way of the comprehensive universal that indicated [something] about the multiplicity — namely, that it would be composite of the intellect and of perception, as the Philosopher explained in the *Book of the Soul*. It has been clarified that, with the intelligible, there is no — in that it is [the same] of the individuals as [being] without limit; but it is some individual at some time — not from the side [from which] it is this man.

And furthermore, this — were the [comprehensive] proposition judging of these individuals together; but it does not judge of the totality of [those] found — [nor of those] judged to be found together — but rather it judges that the subject is conjoined with it in [the predicate by] affirmation, if the proposition was [affirmative]; [or] the proposition was negative, [in which case] this will be found always true. If [it is] so, it is plainly the case that the judgment being in this [way] is bound to existence — that which is outside the soul, [the one] which is.

[Were] one to say that the intelligible has already passed over by way of the comprehensive universal to be found outside [the soul] — according to [the supposition] that with the intelligible [there is] a depiction [concept] of all the individuals which are not found [as] one together outside the soul — we said to it that it is impossible that there be, with the intelligible, in respect of its being [the individuals] at all, as [we said] before.

[New paragraph] My intent [is] that every intelligible is either a concept [ציורי] or an assertion [אמותי]. And if [it is an assertion], [each] one of them is universal; but it is [an assertion] of an individual in respect of its being — as we explained, [in] what we said regarding the intelligibles, that they are universal. Likewise it is not obliged, on account of the universality found, [that they be] in a manner — [namely] the intelligible apart from the existent, and this is the contrary of what

they obliged. [This follows] because the intelligible is [an assertion] of an individual in respect of its being — [the intelligible] which is acquired from perception [the senses] together with change, and this —

[is] the perceiving of the material things apprehended by their abstraction.

[New paragraph] But the second argument, [one] of these arguments, is what they said in it : that the universal of the intelligibles is not found in [the] individuals outside the soul, but only [in its being] apart from the existent. This too is not true.

[Reply] [The universal] is found in actuality in each one of the individuals which [bear] this [nature] : the all-encompassing nature is a definition [גדר] or a part of a definition [חלק גדר], and the definition [indicates] its essence; and the essence is found in [each of] all the essences. [Were] the matter so, the thing [the universal] would be itself in potency alone — for were the matter not so, it would follow from this that the thing would be receiving itself; for the potency and the act are contraries,

—and this is at the level of utter nullity and defectiveness. Hence it is clear that the all-encompassing nature [הטבע הכולל] is found in actuality in each one of the individuals to which this nature belongs. This too is clear in actuality in the case of the visible appearance [המראה]: even though it [the visible appearance] is composite, joined together with other things, still—as we said—it has already happened to each individual that accidents inhere in it. Furthermore, the nature that is all-encompassing is the quiddity [המהות], which belongs to it [the individual]. That is to say, the quiddity already exists in actuality in the thing that possesses quiddity in actuality; for it has already been said that it is found in actuality in virtue of its quiddity, which belongs to it.

This too is clear from another consideration. The thing that is more entitled to be illuminated [i.e., to be made an object of intellect] is the more intelligible one, which is more disposed to be illuminated on its own account. The illustration is that, if the eye were to set Socrates [סקראט] as the object made illumined to it by that illumination on its own account, then the eye would be more entitled, inasmuch as it sees, [to be a seer] than Socrates [מסקראט]. And since this is so, the quiddity is more entitled, by the name of "the things that exist" [המציאות], to be illuminated [made intelligible] in actuality—the quiddity being conjoined with the accidents and the apprehensible features [המשיגים] in which it [resides], even though it [the quiddity itself] was an individual particular [האיש פרטי]. This is the reverse of what was said about the nature of these intelligibles.

Furthermore, all the things that are found in the individuals, [whose status is to be] apprehended along with the accidents that inhere in them as particulars, are found in them in actuality in virtue of [their] quiddity. And it is necessary that the quiddity be more entitled, by the name of "the things that exist," than these apprehensible features [המשיגים] and accidents. This is a matter the Philosopher [הפלוסוף — Aristotle] already explained, and accordingly he said that what exists is said to belong first to the substance [העצם], and when [the term "exists"] is said of the accidents [המקרים], it is said of them in a posterior sense, because of their existence in the substance [בעצם]. And since this is so, it is clear that it is necessary that the quiddity be found in the thing that possesses quiddity in actuality.

But the third argument [ואולם הטענה השלישית]—which is what they said in it, that these intelligibles are not found outside the soul at all; rather they are the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] itself, and accordingly it is necessary that the thing that is found apart from them be the soul itself rather than the intelligible—this has already been clarified [to be false] by what was explained earlier, that it [the universal] is not true [as so stated]. And this [is so] because it has already been explained that these hylic intelligibles arise in their own essences [בעצמותם] by reason of the things that newly come to be [התחדשם] in the hylic intellect.

But what they relied upon, in this third argument, [to conclude] that these hylic intelligibles would be without [there being] separate [forms] —this too is, in the same way, what is not necessitated from the side from which they necessitated it, and it derives from them [their premises]. For they advanced in this two claims [שתי טענות]. The first is that they [the intelligibles] are dependent upon the individuals found outside the soul. And the second is that, if the matter were not so, it would be necessary that change [שנוי] be in the intelligibles themselves [בעצמות], just as the matter stands with the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות].

This is what they said with regard to the first [claim]: but the [matter] is clarified [otherwise] with a little examination [במעט עיון], in that it is not true. And this [is so] because the hylic forms that newly come to be arise [נמשך] from change in their own essences, and they are found by reason of this very reversal of that change. The illustration is that the form that reaches [arrives at] the visible appearance in the power of sight comes about only after the eye has been acted upon by the visible appearance—that is, after the visible appearance has been imprinted upon the eye, and likewise the matter is found in the case of the rest of the hylic forms. But these intelligibles do not arise from change.

[...do not arise from change] per accidens [במקרה]—that is, in respect that they [the intelligibles] require, for their existence, something from which the change arises, namely the sensible apprehension [ההשגה החושיית]. And from this it appears that the intelligible already comes to be many times after some long interval of time during which the sensible thing perceived [החוש מהמוחש] has changed. Furthermore, [were it as they say,] then they would be teaching about themselves [admitting] that in their existence they arise from change per accidens, in that it is hylic [הוא היולי]; for the hylic intelligible that reaches the hylic intellect [comes to be] through the apprehension of the actualized intellect [השכל הפועל].

And this [is so] because they say that this sensation [ההרגשה] requires, for its existence, something proper to it : namely, these intelligibles, which require for their existence a thing from which change arises, and accordingly this intelligible would require, for its existence, a thing from which change arises in their own essences. And if the matter is so, then it is necessitated, according to their statement [על פי מאמרם], that this intelligible be subject to corruption [שיהיה זה המושכל נפסד]—and this is the reverse of what they posited [וזה הפך מה שהניחוהו אותו].

But the second argument [ואולם הטענה השנית], which is what they said in it—that these intelligibles are composed of a multiplicity of [their] subjects, as is the case with the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות], and accordingly it is necessary that they [the intelligibles] be hylic—this has been clarified [to be false], [it being] likewise not necessitated from the side from which they would necessitate it. For they advanced in it three claims [שלש טענות]. The first is that they [the intelligibles] are dependent upon the individuals found outside the soul. The second is that, if the matter is not so, it would be necessitated [that one] taught some intelligible by a teacher, either forgot it, or that the rest of men taught it to him, or [that they] forgot it. The third is that, if the matter is not so, there will here be no learning and no forgetting.

And let us say that the first of these arguments is not true [היא בלתי צודקת]. And this [is so] because they already established it from two sides [משני צדדים]. The first side, that holds true, [is] that it [the intelligible] relies [יסמך] upon what is found of the individuals outside the soul. And the second is that these intelligibles are universals [כלליות], and the existence that would belong to the universal is from the side of the particular found outside the soul.

And here let us clarify that this first side is not true. And this is what is said: were it so, that the existence of these intelligibles would be from the side of the

individuals upon which they rely—and were the individuals upon which the intelligible relies with respect to Reuben [לראובן] other than the individuals upon which the intelligible relies with respect to Shimon [לשמעון]—then the intelligible would be multiple [מתרבה], and it would be necessitated, on account of this, that it be hylic [שיהיה היולני]. But this [is so] only because the matter does not preclude that there be a division [מחלוקה] over this —

—[the division being:] whether the existence of the intelligible relies upon the likenesses [הדמיונות] of the individuals found at that time [בעת ההיא]; or whether it relies upon the likenesses of the individuals that newly come to be [התחדש] from the sensation [מההרגש] that was inhering in them; or whether it relies upon this or that chance individual.

Now if we suppose that it relies upon the likenesses of the individuals that newly arise—which the intellect newly produces in the hylic intellect from the sensation that inhered in them —then it [the intelligible] would be multiple from this side, and accordingly they would be necessitated to many falsehoods [שקרים רבים] arising from this. Among them: that this very supposition would entail the corruption of the intelligible upon the corruption of the individuals from which the intellect newly produced [the intelligible]. For if it were the case that the existence of the intelligible were from the side of the intellect [arising] from the sensation that was inhering in them, then it would be necessitated—

—that when those individuals were corrupted, that intelligible would be corrupted; and the possessor of that intelligible would have to be such that he no longer senses [those] individuals, and from them he would learn [understand] through the sensation of that intelligible. This [would obtain] in respect that it was [dependent] upon it, and this is at the level of utter nullity [תכלית הבטול]. And among them [the falsehoods]: that the intelligible would be at one time true and at another time false [פעם צודק ופעם כוזב]. This [is so] because, when we suppose that the truth of the intelligible relies upon the existence of these individuals outside the soul—just as they said in this argument—then it is necessitated by this that, when these individuals are corrupted, the intelligible would be false; in that there is no subject [נושא] for it outside the soul on which its existence relies. And this is the reverse of what was said about the nature of these intelligibles—I mean, that it has already been said of them that they are true at [all] times. And among them: that this supposition would already necessitate that these hylic intelligibles be finite, and this is impossible.

And this [is so] because, if the multiplicity [ההתרבות] is in the intelligible by reason of the difference of the individuals from which it newly comes to be, then

it follows that the intelligible would be more numerous where it newly arises from the sensation [מהרגש] in many men [אנשים רבים] than [where it arises] from individuals among others. There would [then] be one [intelligible] numbered as many; and what would have its way be hylic [is impossible], for it is impossible for the hylic thing that it be one numbered as many —and it would already be hylic, and this is false.

And among them: that this supposition would already necessitate that some of these hylic intelligibles be hylic and that their endpoint be not hylic; and this is the reverse of what we supposed of it. And this [is so] because the intelligibles that newly come to be from the sensation [מההרגש] of individuals that perish are already multiplied and made hylic. And as for the intelligibles that newly come to be from the sensation of individuals that are eternal —as is the case in the science of the stars [בחכמת הככבים]—these would be without multiplicity and not hylic, since there belongs to them only one individual outside the soul.

But if we suppose that the existence of the intelligible relies upon the likenesses of the individuals found outside the soul at that time, then they would likewise be necessitated by this supposition to many falsehoods. Among them: that, because the intelligible is at one individual according to this supposition, other than the intelligible at another individual according to this supposition—because this [one] relies upon the likenesses of [some] individuals found at that time, and this [other one] relies upon the likenesses of other individuals—

—found at another time. Hence it is necessitated by this supposition that the matter be such that the intelligible would belong to one man, [namely] the intelligible such that, when there are found for it [individuals] outside the soul, [it is] what [it is], other than the intelligible such that, when there are found for it [individuals] outside the soul, [there are found] other individuals.

And since the matter is so, it is clear that this supposition already necessitates that there be required of a man, [in] learning, with respect to the intelligible that is with him, that the individuals upon whose existence it relied be corrupted. For when they are corrupted, the intelligible upon whose existence it relied is corrupted. And if there had been found for it other things [individuals] among the newly arising ones, it would be an intelligible other than the first one. And among them: that this supposition would already necessitate, with respect to the intelligible "Mercury" [כוכב], that there be a subject [נושא] found for it outside the soul.

And this [is so] because the intelligible that a man possessed at the time when there were found for him individuals [matching it] outside the soul would already be [the intelligible of] Mercury [כוכב]; by necessity, when they [the individuals] are corrupted and other individuals come to be, then the intelligible that holds true of these newly arising individuals would be an intelligible other than the intelligible that held true of the individuals that were found earlier. And accordingly it would be necessitated that the first intelligible be corrupted; for if it held true, the [single] intelligible would be one numbered as many —and this is impossible.

And among them: that this supposition already necessitates that the intelligible "Mercury" [כוכב] be like most of the things [studied] in the mathematical sciences, inasmuch as truth-as-certainty [האמות] would reach them. And this [is so] because it has already been seen, by necessity, from the matters [studied] in the mathematical sciences, that there cannot be found among them individuals outside the soul. The illustration is that the truly straight line is not found outside the soul as the geometers posit it. And this [is so] because that line is what is straight, which is the endpoint of a body in it, and which is not always divided into—

—what would be divided; and there would not be added to it what would be added perpetually [תמיד], as the geometer posits; and the cause that prevents this [from existing] is wholly the matter. But it is clear that it is impossible that there be found a circle [עגולה] outside the soul that truly touches a straight line at a point, nor a true sphere [כדור] truly touching a flat plane at a point. And accordingly, some of the early ones [הקודמים] among the geometers would [hold] that their demonstrations would already be false, as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף — Aristotle] mentioned.

And in sum: this supposition already necessitates that there be here no intelligible of a thing that is barred [from existence], in the respect that it is possible; and they [the geometers] have already made these intelligibles much [used] in the sciences. And this is clarified to one who looks into natural science [בחכמת הטבע] and into the mathematical science [וחכמת הלמודית].

And among them: it has already been necessitated, according to this supposition, [that] these intelligibles would be hylic and not-hylic together. This is because the intelligible, with all the men found together, is one numbered, inasmuch as this intelligible relies upon them, among other individuals. And what would have its way be hylic [is impossible], for it is impossible for the hylic thing that it be one

numbered as many. And [yet] it would already be [hylic], according to this supposition.

[The intelligibles would be] hylic and not-hylic together, and this is false. And among them: that it has already been necessitated, according to this supposition, [that] these intelligibles be some hylic [things] and not hylic; and they are the intelligibles [המושכלות] which are of the things that are eternal, as is the case with the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים]. For there is found for them only one individual outside the soul, eternally one. And accordingly it is necessitated that the intelligible belonging to them not be multiplied by the multiplicity of [their] subjects, and what would have its way be not hylic. And it has already been posited that all of them are hylic—and this is a contradiction [חלוף], which is impossible.

But if we suppose that the intelligibles rely upon this or that chance individual of the individuals found—not from the side that it is this [particular] man —then the intelligibles would not be multiplied by the multiplicity of [their] subjects, because of this reliance that is found for them—

with respect to the individuals — for here there is no distinction among individuals in this regard, and this is plain — so that the contrary would not be demonstrated, namely the premise that these intelligibles are material [היולאניות]. Rather, the very reverse of this is demonstrated: I mean, [the conclusion] that they are immaterial [בלתי היולאניות], inasmuch as they are bound up with the bringing-together of the subjects [הנושאים], and that what is their way is to be immaterial [בלתי היולני]. It has likewise already been demonstrated that it is impossible — I mean, the premise that this intelligible's existence should be referred to the individual that exists outside the soul, on account of the closeness it has, from the side of whatever individual happens [to fall under it]. For if the matter were so, it would be possible for us to have an intelligible of many of the mathematical entities [הדברים הלמודיים], as we said earlier — for there exists no man corresponding to them outside the soul. And, in general, it would then be impossible for us to have any intelligible at all, inasmuch as it is something prevented [from existing] from the side of what is possible — and this is wholly false.

Moreover, if the intelligible existence stood on account of the sensible individuals that exist outside the soul, then it would here be necessary for the sensible existence to be prior to the intelligible existence — and this is false. For it has already been demonstrated in what preceded that the intelligible existence is the cause of the sensible existence. For the sensible existence is indeed renewed from

the intelligible existence belonging to the soul that is the intellect in actuality [השכל הפועל]. But if the sensible existence were the cause for renewing the intelligible within us, [the intelligible] would not exist of itself — and this is plainly impossible, after it has been demonstrated that the intelligible has no need [of it]; once it has reached us, let it not be supposed [to depend] upon some sensible thing outside the soul.

However, the second of the [arguments] from which they concluded that the intelligibles are bound up with the individuals — namely, that which they said in it, that these intelligibles are universals [כלליות], and the universal [הכללי] would indeed have existence on account of the particular to which it is related [המצטרף לו] — it has already been demonstrated, by what preceded, that it is false to say that these intelligibles are universals. And further: even if we grant, concerning the intelligibles, that they are universals, it would still not be necessary that they be universals on account of the closeness they have to the individuals from which they were abstracted [מהתרבות]. For this is plainly [refuted by] what was demonstrated in itself, that they indeed lean upon the individual only inasmuch as it is that very individual; and from this side there would be no plurality among individuals, and therefore it would not be necessary that these intelligibles be universals on account of being abstracted from this side. For it is not necessary, on account of the relative's [המצטרף] being that very relative, that there be in it the relation to many things.

And the analogy [המשל]: that the one [in number] differs from number [מהמספר] — and that is three [השלשה], by way of example. For, as was described, when [the one] is described as being slight [in itself], behold it is joined by chance [במקרה] to each of the many numbers that are numbered from it; and it would not be necessary that there be in it the number of the things [הדברים] of which it would be the number to which it is joined — for the joining belongs to it only on the side that, in itself, this description [התואר] is [applied] to it [as a number]. This is on the side that it is more than that which is less than it, and less than that which is more than it — not on the side of its being four or five. And further, as was already demonstrated in what preceded, it is false that the existence intelligized for these intelligibles should be on account of the sensible individuals that exist outside the soul, in the way it is supposed in this premise.

However, the second of these arguments [הטענה השנית] — namely, that which they said in it, that if the intelligibles were not bound up [with the individuals] on account of being abstracted from their subjects, then it would be necessary that, even were a man to intelligize something, or forget what he had learned, the rest

of men would learn it or forget it [together with him] — behold, [the man] says that this too is not correct. For [the simultaneity] would not be prevented [merely] by there being in number a relation to differing individuals. And this is, by way of example, [like] the sun: it is one and the same in our view, and it is closer to this man than to that man, and it sets on one horizon [באופק] and rises on another horizon — and so [too] it is plainly demonstrated that we are not prevented [from saying] that the intelligible is renewed for this man and not renewed for that man, [the intelligible] being one in number among them. And it would not be necessary, on account of the one actuality belonging to it — the actuality which was the potency [הכח] toward that one actuality, as was recalled in this argument — [for the simultaneity to follow]. For, even if this were correct, were it the case that this were [the actuality] of a material thing [דבר היולאני], [it would follow]; but it differs essentially [בשיונה נבדל], and so it is not necessary [to conclude] this, as is explained in this work [Aristotle, De Anima]. — And as for Ibn Sina [אבן סינא / Avicenna], this [argument] obligated him toward annulment [of his position] by necessity, since he posits one actuality [shared] in number; for he already said, concerning the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני], that it is separate [נבדל] and uncompounded, and does not come to be and does not perish.

However, the third of these arguments — namely, that which they said in it, that if the intelligibles were not bound up [with the individuals] on account of being abstracted from their subjects, then there would be here neither learning nor forgetting — this too is not correct. For if this were so — that there are [intelligibles] of which we are informed [from] some separate thing that does not come to be and does not perish — then it would not be prevented, on account of this, that these intelligibles be renewed in the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] and perish from it. And whatever it is that is prevented [from this] would be the things that come to be of themselves or perish [of themselves].

However, the second premise of the premises upon which the holders of this opinion rest [their case] — namely, the one that says that everything that comes to be perishes — behold, it will be demonstrated, in what comes, that it is false; and what is clarified concerning it by the Philosopher [הפלוסוף / Aristotle], this premise is not [meant] to be passed as decided upon in every respect. — However, the first argument that we recalled, in which they maintained that it is possible for the hylic intellect to attain the actual intellect [השכל הפועל / the Active Intellect], — namely, that which they said in it, [is] that because Aristotle [ארסטוטלוס] already said that the intellect is related to the intelligible as the sense [is related] to the sensed [object], and the sense was able to receive the sensed in actuality — behold, the intellect is able to acquire the intelligibles in potentiality

[בכח], and it is the actual intellect, according to what they said in this argument. Behold, [the man] says that it is not necessary therefrom that the hylic intellect should attain the Active Intellect. And this [follows] in that the analogy is [of the form called] "the analogy of the example" [הקש המשלי], and the analogy of the example does not yield the truth in every respect. And further, [it follows from] this: that this very analogy will demonstrate the contrary of what they concluded from it. And this [is so] in that we say that, just as the sense has no power to receive the sensed itself, but rather receives some thing resembling it,

[the resembling thing] which is [present] in the visible appearance [הראות] — [just so the sense] does not receive what is seen [as it is in itself], but rather receives what resembles it in some manner — so [too] the hylic intellect has no power to receive the intellect itself, but rather receives what resembles it in some manner. — However, the second of these arguments — namely, that which they said in it, that if the hylic intellect were to intelligize that which is not in its own essence an intellect, then all the more so would it be fitting that what is in its own essence an intellect should be intelligized [by it]: behold, it is not [the case that] it is more fitting [in this respect merely] because [the latter] is more fitting [in dignity]. And this [is so] in that these [arguments] are [as] they say: that if the hylic intellect [could intelligize] what is not in its very self an intellect — [a thing] that on its account is an intellect — behold, it is more fitting that it should intelligize the things that are in their very selves an intellect. This, in itself, is correct, except that there will not be demonstrated from it what they obligate from it by this argument — I mean, that it should be possible for the hylic intellect to attain the Active Intellect. However, it is not necessary [to conclude] that, just as it has power over the apprehension [השגת] of the lower forms [הצורות הפחותות], it should [also] have power over the apprehension of the more honorable forms [הצורות היותר נכבדות] among them — inasmuch as the apprehension in [the case of] them is more difficult. And behold, what has already been seen [is] that every intellect for which the forms were more honorable, the apprehension in [the case of] them would be the more difficult.

And this is [also] clarified concerning the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] themselves: for it is plainly demonstrated, concerning that which has a power over a thing, that it is not necessary that it have power over what is heavier than it and more difficult. And the example [of this]: that which has power to lift three pounds [שלשה כרים], it is not necessary that it have power to lift what is much greater than it — and this is plainly demonstrated of itself. And, the matter being so, it is plainly demonstrated that it is not necessary, on account of the power that the hylic intellect finds for apprehending the hylic forms, that it should have a

power for apprehending the more honorable forms — they being in their very selves an intellect. For their apprehension is more difficult, and what is in [the case] of a thing harder [to apprehend] is not necessary [to follow] from what is in [the case] of what is more perfect than them. And behold, they too [say], likewise, that the apprehension of the actual intellect is more difficult than the apprehension of the rest of the forms which are in [the case] of them; and this, they said, [makes] the apprehension equal — and this, were it [the case] for a man, it would already have been [the case] that the hylic intellect was perfected by the apprehension of all these intelligibles. And, the matter being so, behold this argument is plainly annulled, according to their statement and according to the matter itself.

— However, the third of these arguments — namely, that which they said in it, that because the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] is what places the imaginative forms [הצורות הדמיוניות] intelligized in actuality for the hylic intellect, after they were intelligible in potentiality [בכח] — behold, it is more fitting that the actual intellect should be intelligible for the hylic intellect, inasmuch as everything that posits a description [תאר] for something other than itself, behold it is the more fitting to be [thus] described from [the standpoint of] the describing thing to which that description belongs through it — behold, [the man] says that it is not correct. For it has already been laid down that something posits a description for something other than itself, and that description is [present] in that thing [described], not on the side of its nature, [but] together with what it acquired [from the descriptor]; and one who named [it] by some description — and were it not necessary, [for one] who named [it] by this description, that there should be in him that description [as] described —

— [just so] we place "sharp" [חותך] upon iron [as] a description [for it] that it has sharpness, and it is plainly demonstrated that the craft [of the smith] is not described as being sharp; for this description belongs to the iron on account of its nature, together with the form that the craft acquired for it [as a tool]. And so it is found in the craft of medicine [מלאכת הרפואה], that it [restores] the sick to the description of being healthy [בריא], and it is not described by the description that it is healthy — inasmuch as it restores [the patient] to health, which is the very cause within him. And, the matter being so, behold one [might] say that perhaps this is [the case]: this description, [namely] that the imaginative form be intelligized in actuality for the hylic intellect, [is] on account of what the Active Intellect acquired for it; and from this it would not be necessary that the Active Intellect be intelligible inasmuch as it intelligizes for the hylic intellect.

However, since it is already possible to say that this description belongs to the imaginative form on account of what acquired it [for it] — namely, that very Active Intellect — [behold] it is plainly demonstrated that it should not be acted upon by anything from any side that happens [in] some happening of the time [דבר הזמן]. And perhaps there is no [power] in the hylic intellect to apprehend other than these intelligibles that are here, and [yet] it apprehends them; and after this, that which restores them [is] the Active Intellect, in the description in which it is possible that it be intelligized in [the case of] it. And further, since it is plainly demonstrated that the Active Intellect, [as the one] that posits this description for the imaginative form, does not act in the imaginative form in any [manner of] acting; I mean, that it [the form] is not acted upon by it in a manner of change, [such] that an imaginative intelligible would return [to being] an imaginative intelligible after it was an imaginative intelligible — for it [remains] the same in itself. But rather it acts in the hylic intellect, and seats them [the forms as] intelligized in actuality, after they were intelligible in potentiality [בכח]; rather, it acts in it by chance [במקרה] — I mean, on account of the restoring [of] the hylic intellect [as] intelligizing [these forms], after it [the form] was, in actuality, intelligized [by it as] intelligizing [it] in potentiality [בכח]. And it is plainly demonstrated that, in [the case of] that which posits a description for something other than itself, it is not necessary, [merely] on account of [its bringing about] a happening that comes to be in that description, [that it bear it itself].

And the example [is] that the fire [האש] makes some of the things black [שחורים] and some of them bitter [מרים], and yet it is not fitting that the fire be described by being black or by being bitter; and the matter being so — [I mean] that it [the fire] indeed seats them in this description by chance [במקרה] — [behold] the description that is acquired from it in [their] very selves is the heat or the dryness, and in the description that subsists in [their] very selves it is the more correct that the fire be described as hot. And so the fire is found to set, by chance, some of the things [as] cold [קרים] — I mean, [the things] from which the hot portion [החלק החם] separated — and it is not fitting that the fire be described as being cold. And, the matter being so, it is plainly demonstrated that it is not necessary that the Active Intellect be described, inasmuch as it places the imaginative form, by chance, [as] intelligible for the hylic intellect — on account of [its] being intelligized in actuality after it was intelligible in potentiality [בכח]. But [as for] what would be necessary [to follow] from this inference [הגזורה], [namely] if we were informed that it were correct, it is [this]: that, because the Active Intellect places the hylic intellect [as] intelligizing the imaginative form in actuality, after it was intelligizing it in potentiality [בכח], behold the Active

Intellect [as] actual is the more fitting to be intelligizing it. And this is plainly demonstrated to be correct from what preceded — for it has already been demonstrated that the Active Intellect is the apprehension of these intelligibles. And it would already have been necessary, from this argument which they laid down [in] this argument — and it is [the principle] that, for everything that posits a description for something other than itself, behold it is the more fitting [to bear it]…

[continuation] —by that very attribute, namely, that the intelligible which is in the soul of the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] derived from the imagined form [הצורה הדמיונית] is the more fitting to be intelligible to us than the imagined form itself. For this reason, it is made clear, on the contrary, that the imagined form is made intelligible to the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] only by reason of the intelligible which is in the soul of the Active Intellect. Now this intelligible is the one more fitting to be made intelligible by this attribute, since it is what the hylic intellect's intelligible derived from. So it was my intention that the intelligible which is in the soul of the Active Intellect should be made intelligible to the hylic intellect.

And this is the truth, beyond doubt: that the imagined form is in no way made intelligible; for the particular is not intellectually apprehended in respect of its being particular. Rather, what is intellectually apprehended is the order [הסדור] derived from it in the soul of the Active Intellect. But [the claim] that the imagined form should be made intelligible—if it should be made intelligible at all, it would indeed be so only by reason of what is derived from it in the soul of the Active Intellect. This is made clear; for were it not that the existence of the sensed object [המוחש] has an intelligible order [סדור מושכל], it would be impossible for it to be made intelligible—just as the things of which there is no order are not made intelligible—but only by reason of the order, newly arising from the master craft [המלאכותיי], which is in the soul of the craftsman [נפש האומן]. We have already recalled this with [its full] clarification in the discourse marked with the letter Lamed [Metaphysics Book Λ], so as to learn [the matter] from another natural [consideration].

And it does not follow, from the fact that this intelligible is made intelligible to us by the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], that the Active Intellect itself should be made intelligible—for what we have asserted holds of all these intelligibles, and the consideration regarding them is one and the same on every side. From the fact that this [conclusion] has not yet been made clear, it would still be possible [to suppose otherwise]. So it is made clear that this premise does not entail that the

Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] be made intelligible to the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני].

And if someone should say that it has already been explained that it is possible for the Active Intellect to be made intelligible to us—namely, that the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] sets the imagined form [הצורה הדמיונית] as a mover of the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני], and for this reason it is the more fitting that the Active Intellect, which is a mover of it [the hylic intellect] in its own essence, should be made intelligible to it—we have [already] said that it is possible that this attribute belongs to the imagined form by reason of what the Active Intellect acquired for it [imparted to it], together with what that [form] itself acquires; and from this it does not follow that the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] should be made intelligible to it in this respect, just as we established earlier. And if there was a change such that the imagined form [הצורה הדמיונית] is a mover of the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] only by chance [במקרה]—for the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] is not an agent in the imagined form

[continuation] by chance, but rather it [the Active Intellect] is what sets it [the hylic intellect] in motion by means of the imagined form. And it is not necessary, by reason of the change in something through an intermediary, that there be change in the intermediary itself: for elemental heat [החום הטבעי] sets in motion the stone [האבן] that is thrown by the hand, by means of the hand, yet it is not necessary that there be change in the intermediary, the hand, in itself, in respect of [its being] an intermediary—but this is not impossible. But what this premise [in fact] entails is that the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] is the more fitting to be made intelligible, inasmuch as the imagined form, by which it sets [the hylic intellect] in motion as an intermediary, is described [as a mover]—not that the Active Intellect should set the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] in motion otherwise than by means of the imagined forms [הצורות הדמיוניות]. And the matter being so, it has not been made clear that it is possible for the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] to apprehend [anything] other than these intelligibles.

As for the fourth of these arguments—namely, what they said in it: that since the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] is moved from potentiality to actuality toward the acquisition of the intelligible [קניית המושכל], and since it is made clear that what is moved from potentiality to actuality toward something is itself, in actuality, of the genus of that thing—it would therefore follow that what is moved toward the acquisition of an intelligible is itself an intelligible in actuality; and what then is its way [of being so]? Now [in fact] the intelligible apprehends [only] that which is itself an intellect in its own essence. And were these intelligibles, whose

acquisition is brought about by means of the imagined form [הצורה הדמיונית], intelligible in potentiality [בכח] insofar as they are universals—and the universal is not found apart from the intellect except potentially—then it would happen [for the intellect] that it be moved from potentiality toward what is intelligible in potentiality, as it [in fact] is. But it has [seemingly] occurred [to the imagination] in many of the natural things that are moved toward perfections by means of other perfections—[yet] this too is likewise impossible.

For it has already been made clear that these intelligibles are not universals, and that they are not connected to the existence of the individuals found outside the soul, as we established in this discourse. And it does not follow [from the foregoing], by reason of these individuals' being such that the universal is taken up in them—that what is made intelligible from them is intelligible in potentiality [בכח], whereas the intelligible derived from them is intelligible in actuality, inasmuch as it is found in the soul of the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], which is intellect in its own essence—just as we established earlier. And there are also those who would say that what is moved from potentiality to actuality toward something is itself, in actuality, of the genus of that thing. But what is correct is that whatever is moved from potentiality to actuality is moved toward that very potentiality which belongs to it, the matter being such that its whole motion was for its sake [for the sake of that potentiality]. This being so, its motion will have no end-point [תכלית] at all.

For if it [the thing] is moved toward one perfection for the sake of another perfection—and there were here no perfection that is not [moved toward] for the sake of another perfection—then this motion would have no end-point at all; rather, the last perfection toward which the motion would [finally] be must be such that it is not [sought] for the sake of any one of [further] things. This is very plain. But it is necessary that there be a final perfection for the sake of which this motion exists, [final] in respect of [its being some] other perfection.

[continuation] —which is complete [in act], inasmuch as they are all [moved] for the sake of the human form [הצורה האנושית]. And the matter being so, it is not necessary in the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] that, by reason of its being moved toward the intelligibles which are themselves potentiality on a certain side, it be moved toward an intelligible which is a complete act. So it is made clear that these intelligibles are, according to their assumption, an act on a certain side, since the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] is moved by them from potentiality to actuality, and for this reason it would necessarily be an act of some sort. And the matter being so, it is made clear that one is not compelled, by one of these

arguments, [to hold] that it is possible for the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] to attain the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל]; nor is anything nullified by a single one of these arguments [in] the view of Abu Nasr [Abu Nasr al-Farabi].

As for the argument which they advanced—that when the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] becomes the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], it returns eternal; and this is what they said in it: that, since this intelligible newly arises in its own essence, it does not follow concerning the hylic intellect that, when it apprehends it, it should be corrupted; rather it returns eternal, because the Active Intellect's intelligible is in itself eternal—now this is contradicted by the [following] consideration, that what they laid down is that it newly arises. For [if so] then there would be no intelligible newly arising in its own essence when the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] apprehends it; rather it is what newly arises in the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני], and it does not follow from their assumption that it should newly arise on the side of [its being] something newly-arising [in itself]. My intention is that this form [צורה] should be lacking from the hylic intellect, and if it is not corrupted in its own essence, then this [its eternity] is made clear concerning the soul. And so this too [tells] against [the view of] Abu Nasr [Abu Nasr al-Farabi], [as it] preserves their assumption more than [it does theirs].

[Reply concerning the divine intellect.] As for [their saying] that, if they did not [hold] that the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] is the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], but rather that it does not [yet] intellectually apprehend its own essence at the time [it apprehends], except by reason of its conjunction with us—as Ibn Rushd [Ibn Rushd / Averroes] held, who says [so] at the end of his letters and explains in his commentary to the Book of the Soul [De Anima] and in his commentary to the Metaphysics [מה שאחר הטבע]—now behold, we have already explained earlier what is entailed [as a result] of [conceding] what we conceded, [namely] this assumption of nullity [ההבטול].

As for the first of the arguments which Ibn Sina [Ibn Sina / Avicenna] sets up among them—that these intelligibles are not subject to coming-to-be and are not subject to corruption; and this is what he said in it: that, since these intelligibles which are found [in the soul] are the intelligible itself which is found in the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני], it would then follow concerning them that they should be separate [נבדלות]; for, were they corporeal [היולאניות], the intelligible derived from them would be other than the thing found [outside], and on account of their being separate, they are by nature subject neither to coming-to-be nor to corruption—

[continuation] [these are] separate [intelligibles]; and that they should be subject to coming-to-be in a certain manner is made clear [to be otherwise], since we [hold] that there is no [thing] separate that is subject to coming-to-be in any manner; this [point] is from what will be explained hereafter. And likewise, here too the matter does not entail [the conclusion of] what Ibn Sina [Ibn Sina / Avicenna] said—in his saying that they are subject neither to coming-to-be nor to corruption. For whether he means by this that they are not subject to coming-to-be in the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] continually and in [full] actuality, or whether he means by this that they are not subject to coming-to-be in their own essences—but rather that they are something newly arising in the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני]: if he means by this that they should be subject to corruption, then this [conclusion] is made clear [to be false] from what was established earlier. And if he means by this that they are not subject to coming-to-be in their own essences, but [grants] that there is coming-to-be in the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני], then it would follow that the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] be corrupted—and this is the reverse of what he laid down.

And by this we say what is made clear—that the arguments which Ibn Sina [Ibn Sina / Avicenna] set up among them, [maintaining] that these intelligibles are subject neither to coming-to-be nor to corruption, are already seen [to require] that they be separate [נבדלות]; and that they should be subject to coming-to-be in a certain manner is made clear, since we [hold] that it is impossible for a separate [thing] to be subject to coming-to-be in this manner. This [is so] in respect of the manner in which these intelligibles would newly arise in the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני]. For this coming-to-be is [only] said by equivocation of the name [בשתוף השם] with [genuine] coming-to-be, as has been explained by the Philosopher [Aristotle]—since it is impossible for it [a separate thing] to be a form in its own essence, but [it is so] perhaps in the way that has been explained elsewhere. And in general, it is fitting that the true views follow upon the existents, [and] not that the existents be set up [to fit] the view that is prior to us in matters [of opinion]. And the matter being so, it would necessarily follow concerning these intelligibles that they newly arise separate [from matter]; and this [point] is from what will be explained hereafter.

And [as for the argument] that, when the possible [העלול] returns a perfect act in something that is itself possible [in respect of being acted upon]—the illustration: that fire, when it sets [something] ablaze, when [the heat] does not move it [the matter], this is [because of] the nature of the receiving matter, and [fire] acts upon it [otherwise]. But if it were possible for the corporeal form [הצורה ההיולאנית] to be made into a graded form [צורה במדרגתה], then it would be fitting

that it be possible [for it to be made] into a separate form [צורה הנבדלת]—[but] this matter is necessarily impossible, for were its action stronger, its working would be more wondrous.

And inasmuch as the separate form [הצורה הנבדלת] is such that, when an agent makes a graded form [צורה במדרגתה], it [the result] returns; and it [the separate form] is itself the form which is one thing in number, since the separate things [הדברים הנבדלים] which agree in [their] quiddity [מהותם] are in no way numbered [as plural]: it is made clear that it is already possible for one possible [עלול] to return, and that one possible should be other [than another] in number among separate things [הדברים הנבדלים]—if this be not precluded [as impossible] in respect of the nature of the possible itself, that is to say, that it is impossible for it to receive a perfect act for [the sake of] its own perfection. This matter has not been made clear by the words of Abu Nasr [Abu Nasr al-Farabi].

And furthermore: were it conceded that it is impossible for one possible [עלול] to return, and that its possible be other in number—by reason of these existents' being correlatives [מקבילים] in a certain manner—then, if we grant that the possible [העלול] should not be [present] in respect of these two [correlative] existents together; but [if] we grant that the possible should be [present] in these two existents together, it does not [follow]—for the being of the possible together [with the other] is not precluded as impossible in existence [?].

which derives from a cause [that is later] in being [העלה] than the effect [העלול] derived from it — just as cold is not impeded in a body that was hot only after [first] becoming cold. This has [already] been explained in itself.

As for the second objection — namely, the claim that it is impossible for the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] to apprehend the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], because if this were so, then what comes to be would be eternal [נצחי] — this too is so, yet [the conclusion drawn from it is] incorrect, for it does not necessarily follow from this premise that what comes to be would be eternal. This is because the intelligible [המושכל] which the material intellect acquires when it apprehends the Active Intellect is something newly generated in the material intellect, even if it is not newly generated in itself. From this it does follow, if we grant that everything that comes to be is corruptible, that this intelligible would be corruptible insofar as it belongs to the material intellect — and yet, even though it is, in a respect, capable of corruption in itself, this does not nullify [the thesis], for it has [already] been explained that we are not prevented from [holding] the corruption of the material intellect by reason of its own corruptibility. By this it is

made clear that none of these objections nullifies the view of those who say that it is possible for the material intellect to apprehend the Active Intellect.

פרק אחד עשר [Chapter Eleven]

[Chapter heading, gloss line:] We shall explain that it is impossible for the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] to apprehend the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] such that the two of them become one thing in every respect.

After recounting the views of our predecessors on the matter of [the soul's] immortality [ההשארות], and after explaining that none of these views can stand up to the objection raised against it by the holder of the opposing view — [an objection] which is in a certain respect just — and that the views in conflict are likewise not [wholly] nullified, it is fitting that we now investigate this matter according to its own merits, until it becomes evident to us which of these views is the correct one. And it is fitting that what has already been explained in the foregoing not escape us: namely, that the intelligibles [המושכלות] are coming-to-be in the material intellect, and that the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] is separate [נבדל]; and that if it [the acquired intellect] were something newly generated, it would necessarily be corruptible like everything else that comes to be and perishes — as was reckoned in the *Book of the Heavens and the World* [ספר השמים והעולם, De Caelo] — yet here this is the case [i.e., here the matter stands otherwise], so it would necessarily follow that there would be no immortality whatsoever [no survival of the soul] here, as Avempace [אבונצר — Abū Naṣr; identification uncertain] saw.

And it is fitting that we investigate whether it [the acquired intellect] is necessarily corruptible like everything that comes to be, or not. If it were not necessarily so, [we must ask] whether this thing that comes to be is necessarily corruptible — meaning the intelligible which the material intellect acquires — or whether it is incorruptible; or whether part of it would be corrupted and part of it not corrupted.

And we say that it has already been explained in this book, in our investigation of the origination of the world and its eternity [קדמותו], that it does not necessarily follow from what the Philosopher [Aristotle] established in the *Book of the Heavens and the World* [De Caelo] that everything which comes to be is corruptible. This has [there] been clarified, for the reason that it does not follow from this [premise] that there would be no immortality here. Since the matter stands thus, it is fitting that we investigate, concerning this coming-to-be — I mean the acquired intellect [literally: the intellect-disposition that belongs to the

material intellect, השכל הנקנה לשכל ההיולאני] — whether it is corruptible or incorruptible; or whether part of it is corruptible and part of it incorruptible — as though the intelligibles that are in these matters,

and part of them is what is incorruptible, as if the intelligible were saying of itself that it belongs to the separate things [הדברים הנפרדים] which are intellect in their very selves, as the predecessors said.

And we say that it has [already] been explained that the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] is the perfection [השלמות] that arrives at the Active Intellect from the material intellect. Now this perfection is of two kinds: one is called conception [ציור], and one is called confirmation [verification, האמתה]. As for conception, it has no [relation of] dependence upon anything existing outside the soul — this is clear from its very nature — but rather it is the knowledge of the order [ידיעת הסדור] that is in the Active Intellect itself. As for confirmation, it does have a [relation of] dependence upon the things existing outside the soul, as we said of every living sentient being; and this would belong to it accidentally [במקרה], since it is, from one aspect, compounded of intellect and sense [מורכבת מהשכל והחוש].

Since the matter stands thus, the perfection that arrives from it in the intellect is conception alone, and it is incorruptible. [This is] like a man among the things existing outside the soul: just as the form attained by the sense of sight, when we judge of a thing that it is remote because we perceive it through the sense of sight to be small, is the thing's brightness — not its true [magnitude] — so when this is [properly] reckoned, it is clear that the acquired intellect is, in its essence, the order [הסדור] which these things have in the material intellect. This same matter we have already shown in what preceded — I mean that the intelligible

which these things have in the material intellect is the intelligible-in-act [המושכל בפועל] for us. The intelligibles of these things in the material intellect are not the imaginative forms [הצורות הדמיוניות], for it does not lie in the nature of the imaginative forms that they should be intelligibles, and even if they were of help toward the acquisition of the intelligibles [it would still not be so]. And when this is [properly] reckoned, it is evident that it necessarily follows, concerning the acquired intellect, that it is eternal [נצחי] — for that which is intellected in act would be eternal, since the intelligibles caused these things [to be] intellected in the soul of the material intellect itself.

And it has [already] been explained, in a more complete way, that it necessarily follows concerning the acquired intellect that it is eternal — and this, [namely]

that the acquired intellect is incorruptible, has nothing among its causes that produces corruption; and that which has no causes of corruption cannot possibly be corrupted; and it necessarily follows from this that the syllogism [ההקש] is so compounded that the acquired intellect is incapable of corruption.

Now the first premise [ההקדמה הראשונה] — [namely] that the acquired intellect is incorruptible — is clarified by what preceded. And the third premise [ההקדמה השלישית] is clarified by it [as well], for the relation of the thing to its causes is a necessary relation, and by this it is made clear that it is impossible for a thing to exist apart from its causes.

As for the second premise [ההקדמה השנית] — namely, the one stating that the immaterial thing [הדבר הבלתי היולאני] has no causes of corruption — it is in need of clarification. And we say that it has already been explained in the *Physics* [בטבעיות, ספר השמע], and in [the discussion of] what the nature is by which corruption [comes about] in things, that corruption comes about by reason of matter [החמר], not by reason of form [הצורה]; for it is the form that gives a thing its existence and its good, and it is the form that gives the thing existence in every respect insofar as it is possible. The matter, however, would be the cause of corruption and of evil, by reason of the [matter's] not being obedient to the form — as has been explained in the fourth [book] of the *Meteorologica* [מאותות השמים], I mean, that corruption would come to a thing when the passive [affected] powers [הכחות המהפעלות] overcome the active powers [הכחות הפועלות]. And since the matter stands thus, [it follows] that the matter is

the cause of corruption; and since the immaterial thing [הדבר הבלתי היולאני] has no matter, it is clear, as has been explained, that the immaterial thing has no causes of corruption.

Now it might be reckoned that the acquired intellect must be corruptible, on account of several objections already mentioned by the predecessors. The one [objection]: because this acquired intellect was [first] brought into existence [שהיה מציאות] by the material intellect, [its existence being] drawn from corporeal apprehension [להשגה גופיות], as was explained earlier; and since all the corporeal apprehensions are corruptible, it necessarily follows that the acquired intellect would be corruptible. This is so because, when that from which the existence of the acquired intellect proceeds is corrupted, it [the acquired intellect] would be corrupted by the corruption [of its source, in respect of its having been brought about].

And the second [objection]: that this intellect is the perfection [שלמות] belonging to the human soul [לנפש האנושית], and with the corruption of the soul its acquisition and its perfection would be corrupted.

And we say that the first objection has no advantage in it beyond what is false. For granted, it would be necessary that what was set in motion by a cause should cease to be when that cause from which the motion comes is removed, just as the standing of what is set in motion ceases when its cause ceases — yet this would indeed be so when the cause is [a cause] in respect of [the thing's] very essence. But the corporeal apprehensions are the cause of the existence of the acquired intellect [only] accidentally [במקרה], not essentially. This is because that which is a cause in respect of essence for its [the acquired intellect's] existence is the order [הסדור] of the intelligible that is in the soul of the Active Intellect, as was explained earlier. Moreover, were the corporeal apprehensions a cause for the existence of these intelligibles in the material intellect, they would be a cause [only] for the attainment of knowledge [הגעת הידיעה], but they are not a cause of the existence of the intelligible [as such] in them.

As for the investigation in this matter, the contrary is my intent — I mean that the existence of the intelligible-that-is-intellected which is in the soul of the Active Intellect is a cause for the existence of all these things that are here; and from this it does not follow that the order of the intelligible would be corrupted when corruption comes to them [the things here], since their existence does not stand by them [the things here]. Indeed, that which it is necessary to say would be corrupted by their corruption is the *attaining* of knowledge [קנות הידיעה] — I mean that it is impossible for the material intellect to attain knowledge after the corporeal apprehensions are corrupted; but this is a thing [already] explained in itself.

And what has [now] been said is already evident from the following: suppose that one man newly produced [חדש] a tool [כלי] by himself, and another man saw this tool and learned from it the order [הסדור] by which it came into existence in this man's soul; then, after that tool was absent [destroyed] — behold, it is clear that it would not necessarily follow, on account of the absence of that tool, that this [piece of] knowledge would be corrupted in the second man; for what that tool was a cause of was [only] the acquisition of this knowledge, and not [a cause of] the existence of the intellected order [derived] from it.

Now a doubter [מסתפק — an objector] may raise a doubt and say that it has already been seen that with the corruption of the imaginative forms [הצורות הדמיוניות], the intelligibles are impressed [leave their trace, רושם] in the standing

[in the establishment] of the intelligibles — since we see in men whose imaginative faculty has been corrupted that their intelligibles are also corrupted; and further, since you already mentioned that the intelligible is intellected when the imaginative forms incline [are stirred] toward the establishing of the intelligibles. It is [thus] clear that with the corruption of the imaginative forms the intelligibles are corrupted. And we say that we [too], by the knowledge that the imaginative faculties of men are corrupted, do not find them apprehending the intelligibles which

they [formerly] apprehended at first; and indeed the intelligible is [first] apprehended when the imaginative forms are stirred toward this intelligible. Behold, it does not necessarily follow from this that the intelligible would be corrupted by the corruption of the imaginative form.

This is because the intelligible [exists] in three ways. [First,] there is the intelligible-in-pure-potentiality [בכח גמור] — and this is the intelligible which a man is fit to learn about, but has not yet learned. [Second,] there is the intelligible-in-complete-actuality [בפעל גמור] — and this is the intelligible which the wise man uses at the time he is making use of it. [Third,] there is the intelligible that is intermediate [ממוצע] between them — and this is the intelligible which the wise man [possesses] at a time he is not making use of it; and herein lies its resemblance to forgetting [לשכחה], by accident [במקרה].

This is because, the soul being one, the wise man does not perceive, by his knowledge of it [the intelligible], what he continually uses to make use of something other than it [i.e., he does not notice the dormant intelligible itself while attending to other objects]; but when something brings it about [presents some thing] that is to be made use of, then it will be estimated that this knowledge had already been [present] in it. And, just as this happens with respect to this matter, so it is that, when the imaginative form is corrupted, it happens to him that there is no longer here some thing to bring about the use of this intelligible; but when something brings him

to make use of it, [then it is recalled]; and when it is recalled [יזכר], then it would be estimated that this knowledge had already been [present] in him, and for this he would not need to return to learning [התלמדות] and investigation [חקירה]. And so too one finds, among men whose imaginative faculty has been corrupted — those who, when they are cured, find themselves knowing intelligibles which they knew before this [corruption], without [need of] learning and investigation. Yet if these intelligibles had been corrupted in them, they would have needed [to

recover] them by [fresh] apprehension after their corruption, through learning and investigation — but this is [already] explained in itself.

And further, since we see some men whose imaginative faculty has been corrupted, who [nonetheless] still apprehend properly the intelligibles about which they are questioned — and this [comes] from the fact that these intelligibles were not corrupted by the corruption of [their] imaginative faculty. And in general, corruption and forgetting [הפסד ושכחה] cannot occur in the intelligible, as was explained in what preceded — I mean that the intelligibles are not among the things susceptible to corruption [בלתי אפשריות ההפסד]. For this reason it is impossible that forgetting should occur in them in any respect, as if the nature of the truth itself necessitated this concerning them — God forbid! — unless the intelligible were [merely] an intelligible by the equivocation of the name [בשתוף השם]: I mean, [unless] there were in it no true knowledge, in its [proper] sense; just as it happens to some of the learners [students], in particular with respect to the figures of geometry [התמונות בהנדסה], and especially with respect to figures explained by means of many [different] figures [diagrams]. For these [students] do not exert themselves to understand by way of the intellect the thing sought in its [proper] sense, but [instead] they look

in the book at the figure [diagram, התמונה] [taken] from the wording found there — [to see] whether what is explained there agrees with what is set down for them concerning that figure; and for this reason forgetting befalls them with respect to these intelligibles, since these are not [really] intelligibles for them — but those who [genuinely] attain [them], the author [of the book] has already explained [their case].

As for the second objection — the one which the holder of [the view] reckoned, [namely] that the acquired intellect is corruptible — it is the [following] objection: that perfection [השלמות] is of two kinds: a kind mixed with [a substrate] possessing perfection [מעורב בבעל השלמות], as is the case with the other perfections that belong to the rest of the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות], and a kind not mixed with [a substrate] possessing perfection — as is the matter of this material intellect explained [to be]. And granted, it would necessarily follow that perfection would be corrupted by the corruption of [the substrate] possessing perfection if the perfection were mixed with it; but when the perfection was not mixed with it,

but rather it exists in its own essence — it is not [something] necessitated *in* it [i.e., in something else] — and this has been explained in [the soul] itself. And since the matter is so, it has been explained that what is necessitated in the

acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] is that it would be corruptible; rather, what is necessitated is that it be eternal [נצחי], as has been explained in what preceded.

פרק שנים עשר (Chapter Twelve)

[Rashi-script chapter summary:] An inquiry into whether there occurs degree-difference [greater and lesser] in what we explained concerning the matter of human felicity [ההצלחה האנושית].

Now that the matter of the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] has been explained, it is fitting to inquire whether it is possible for a man to attain a felicity [הצלחה] greater in its magnitude [עוצמה] than this felicity — as we see that some of the predecessors [הקודמים] attained more than others can attain. The man [in question] is the actualized intellect [השכל הפועל — here: the man whose intellect is in act].

Let us say: were this possible, then it would necessarily follow, after our having apprehended all these intelligibles [המושכלות] — for all of them were [present] in the soul of the actualized intellect [השכל הפועל] on the side on which they are one — as has been explained in what preceded; and it would necessarily follow that we would have apprehended them prior to the apprehension [in question] on that side on which they are one, just as it is necessary that we should first know the quiddity [מהות] of the beams and the stones from which the house is to be built before we know the quiddity of the house. This is what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד / Averroes] said — that this apprehension comes about after the apprehension of all these intelligibles, as if the nature of the truth [טבע האמת] necessitated this for them. And he said, "Even if it is exceedingly difficult, perhaps these wise men will achieve completion [ישלים] by means of [intermediate] groupings [קבוצים] that are reckoned helps toward attaining a portion of them."

And since the matter is so, behold, were it impossible for a man to apprehend all these intelligibles, it would be explained that it is impossible to apprehend by it [or: in it] the actualized intellect [השכל הפועל]; and likewise, were it possible for him to apprehend all these intelligibles, it would [still] be impossible to apprehend by it that single side which is one [in it].

And when this is considered, behold it will be made clear that it is impossible for a man to apprehend the actualized intellect, inasmuch as it is impossible for him to apprehend all these intelligibles. For there are here species [מינים] of living things [בעלי חיים] and of plants [צמחים] and of inanimate things [מחצבים] in which there is for us no intelligible [object — מושכל], and it is impossible for us to

apprehend, in some of the species, the known order [סדור] of their members [איבריהם] and the manner of the wisdom [אופן החכמה] in their coming-to-be in this way — [even] in the smallest creature [לקטנם] that this sense [המחוש] creates; and likewise in the species whose individuals are numerous [גרולים → reading: numerous], it cannot stand firm upon the truth of the order of their members in their entirety.

And the analogy is that of man: even with the greatest [degree of] inquiry that has been into the matter of his members [אבריו] and his veins [עורקיו] and his sinews [וגידיו] and his bones [ועצמיו] — behold it cannot be that this knowledge [הידיעה] be completed in a complete manner, by way of which there would be known to us [the truth] of these things and the changes [וההתחלפות] among them in quantity [בכמות] and in quality [ובאיכות] and in [their] form [ובהבנות → ובתבנית — reading: shape] — and this is very plainly explained for the one who looks into [למעיין] this matter.

For there is, with regard to the actualized intellect [השכל הפועל], a complete knowledge [ידיעה שלימה] of what these stars [הכוכבים] necessitate [שיתחייב] in this lower world [העולם השפל], as will be explained after this — and this [a man] cannot complete from the outset [בהתחלות], since for us there is in this nothing of [that] sense[-knowledge]; and in sum, behold a man cannot know the truth [האמת] in this order [הסדור], and this is plainly explained from the science of the laws of the stars [חכמת משפטי הכוכבים — astrology], for [a man] may apprehend some of the laws of the stars, [and] he may observe a planet many times [כוכב … הרבה פעמים], yet he certainly cannot know the truth in this order in its causes [בסבותיו], such that he would have complete knowledge [ידיעה שלמה] of it.

And further, even if our reasoning told us that it were possible for a man to apprehend all these intelligibles which are in the soul of the actualized intellect, behold this would [still] involve [the consequence] that it is impossible for a man to apprehend them, inasmuch as it is impossible for a man to apprehend [the way] they have been ordered [הדרגתם → reading: ordered/graded] onto a single side. And this — as has already been shown — is plainly seen here [in that] the matter is ordered [כרור → reading: ordered] toward the first matter [החומר הראשון] in receiving the forms [הצורות], up to its completion [שיכלה] of the matter into the human form [הצורה האנושית] — [a thing] that cannot be known of a single species.

The analogy is that the elements [היסודות] are, absolutely, in the lowest hyle-degree [מדרגת ההיולי] of the things made [from them — המחצבים], and they are, in respect of some of them, in [a higher] degree of the hyle of water; and this is

because earth [הארץ] is in the hyle-degree of water, and water [המים] is in the hyle-degree of the element of air [ליסוד האויר], and the element of air [ויסוד האויר] is in the hyle-degree of the element of fire [ליסוד האש]. And behold, the things made [from the elements — המחצבים] are in the hyle-degree of plants [לצמחים], and the plants are in the hyle-degree of living things [לבעלי חיים]. And it will be seen that the forms of the things made [צורות המחצבים] are likewise, in part, in the hyle-degree, up to where the matter reaches a [thing] that is, as it were, intermediate between the inanimate and the [mineral] growing thing [בין הצמח והדומם] — and that is the *almog* [האלמוג → coral].

And likewise the matter with the plants: I mean that some of them are, in part, in the hyle-degree [of the next rank], up to where the matter reaches a [thing] that is, as it were, intermediate between the [mineral] growing thing and the living thing [בין הצמח והחי] — and that is the sponge [האספוג] and the kinds of standing-[pool growths] [החלוון הקיימים — reading uncertain]. And likewise the matter with living things [בבעלי חיים], up to where the matter reaches the human species [המין האנושי].

And it has already become apparent how what we have laid down here is necessitated, by what is said [in what follows]. This is because the first matter, in these forms, [is moved] from privation [מההעדר] to existence [אל המציאות]; and these are all of the intermediate forms [הצורות האמצעיות] — privation [העדר] [pertaining] from one side, and existence [מציאות] from [another] side. I mean by this: that they are [in privation] in respect of what preceded them of the forms [מהצורות], and in privation in respect of what comes after them of the forms — just as the parts of motion [חלקי התנועה] are in act [פעל] in respect of what passed of the motion, and in potency [or: in privation] in respect of what is yet to come [שעתיד]. And it would necessarily follow that each of these forms would be [in] the hyle-degree relative to what comes after it, up to where the matter reaches the human form [הצורה האנושית].

And this [view] is such that it cannot be that these two forms be in a single degree, for were that possible, behold it would not be prevented that there be [either] one final-end [תכלית] [for them], such that there would be forms which the first matter would receive, or that there would be from each of them an intermediate [אמצע], or that there would be one [arising] from them as a final-end and the other intermediate. But [the supposition] that each of them would be a final-end is false [הוא שקר]; for were that the case, behold it would necessarily follow that these final-ends [התכליות] were [each] for one motion in itself [לתנועה אחת בעינה], or that they were for changing motions [לתנועות מתחלפות].

But [the supposition] that they were [each] final-ends for changing motions — I mean that the forms would be received [up] to where each [motion] would reach its [own] final-end [תכלית] — behold it would necessarily follow that there would not be found for it one [form]…

[Source p. 87 continues:]

of the forms which are in the one motion such that it could receive one of the forms which are in the other motion; and there would then be here, according to this supposition, two first principles [שני המרים ראשונים → reading: two first matters/principles]: the one which receives the forms that are in the one motion, and the other [which] receives the forms that are in the other motion. And if this were so, behold it would necessarily follow that each of these first matters [החמרים הראשונים] possessing some form [would be such that] in it there is one nature by which it receives some forms, and another nature [by which it receives] the receiving of other forms — and this is impossible, as has been explained in the first [book] of the *Physics* [מהשמע → ספר השמע / Aristotle, *Physics*].

And further, were this so, there would not be found here a form [common] to all those things that came to be and perished [הנפסדים], having life [חיים] upon it [or: in respect of it] — I mean, one of the forms which are in the one motion — and it would not be possible that there be things possessing the forms which are in the other motion [also] having life upon them. And this is false [וזה שקר]; for behold there have already been found all these things having life [חיים] upon the forms of the elements [צורות היסודות], as has been explained concerning the elements [ביסודות]; and this is because the elements are found, [each] one of them, having life upon it, and the composite bodies [והגשמים המורכבים] are drawn [→ נחכים נמשכים — reading: drawn] to them.

And in sum, behold it has already been explained in the first [book] of the *Physics* [מהשמע] that there must necessarily be the first matter [החומר הראשון] one.

— And if we suppose that these two forms were [each] an intermediate [אמצע], it is explained from what preceded that it is impossible that we posit the two of them as belonging to two changing motions [לשתי תנועות מתחלפות]. And since the matter is so, behold the two of them would be intermediate to a single motion [לתנועה אחת], were this possible; and it would necessarily follow that the first matter would receive one of the forms prior to the [other] forms. And let us say that, when the matter is so, it is necessitated that the later form [הצורה המאוחרת] would be more honored [נכבדת] than the earlier one [מן הראשונה], and this is

because the one motion would be such that each part of it [comes] for the sake of the part that comes after it, until the matter reaches its final-end [תכליתו].

The analogy is that the [agent of] cooking [הסם המבשל — reading: the digesting/cooking agent] is for the sake of the [thing] cooked [המבושל]; and the [thing] cooked [המבושל] is for the sake of the bringing-out of its moisture [הליחה — reading uncertain; the source repeats "הליחה הליחה"]; and behold the supplying [המחליאה → reading: the supplying/filling-out] is for the sake of the [living] creatures [הבריאות]. And since the matter is so, behold every part, and [every] part [arising] from the intermediates [מהאמצעיים], is a final-end [תכלית] in the manner [described] before it.

And inasmuch as the final-end is more honored than what is for the sake of the final-end, behold it is necessitated that the later form [הצורה המאוחרת] would, in coming-to-be from these forms, be more honored than the earlier one [מהאחרת]. And this is plainly explained, [namely] that it is impossible that we posit one of these two as a final-end and the other as an intermediate — for were that possible, there would [then] necessarily be [a reduction] to a single motion in itself [לתנועה אחת בעינה], and it would be necessitated that the form which is a final-end would be more honored than the form which is an intermediate [אמצע].

And it will [further] be explained in another way that it is necessitated that these forms go in [graded] degree [בהדרגה] and in order [וסדור], proceeding from existence-with-deficiency [מהמציאות החסר] toward the complete existence [המציאות השלם]. This is because Nature [הטבע] does not skip — it does not give a form to each of the possible mixtures [המזגים האפשריים] of the elements [ליסודות]; and this is because, were the forms [given] to those things that came to be and perished according to the number of the mixtures [מספר המזגים], then, inasmuch as the mixtures go in [graded] degree and order from the coarse [מהעובי] toward the fine [אל הדקות]…

[Source p. 88 continues:]

[i.e.,] from the coarse, [the one] that is nearer to the coarse than to the fine [following] the path that the form follows in what is nearer to the coarse — behold the matter would be so in their forms [as well]; for the relation of the matter [החומר] to the form is [as] the relation of the form to [the further] form. And this is what was needful: that, just as the mixtures [המזגים] are all of them drawn out in order and degree from existence-with-deficiency toward the complete existence, so these forms are all of them drawn out in order and degree from existence-with-deficiency toward the complete existence.

This explains that there is no power in a man to apprehend the perfection of the order [שלמות הסדור] belonging to the mixtures [למזגים] — all the more so [that] there is no power in him to apprehend the order [הסדור] that belongs to the generations [לדורות — i.e. across all generations of forms]; but he can apprehend [only] something of this, from among the far[-removed] degrees [מדרגות רחוקות]. It is as if one were to say that what is closest to the inanimate [שהדרומם → reading: the inanimate] is in the hyle-degree of the deficient growing thing [לצומח החסר], and the deficient growing thing is in the hyle-degree of the complete growing thing [לצומח השלם]; and the complete growing thing is in the hyle-degree of the deficient living thing [לחי החסר]; and the deficient living thing is in the hyle-degree of the [creature] of the "swimming" likeness [לדמי השח — reading uncertain: the lowest/aquatic animal], and the [creature of the] "swimming" likeness [רמי השח] is in the hyle-degree of the "flying" likeness [לדמי המעופף], and the "flying" likeness [רמי המעופף] is in the hyle-degree of the "walking" likeness [לדמי ההולך — the terrestrial/walking animal]. [Reading note: the three "likenesses" appear to designate the aquatic, the flying, and the walking ranks of animal; reading of דמי uncertain.]

And since the matter is so, it has been explained that it is impossible that we know, in [its] perfection [בשלמות], the side on which these intelligibles [המושכלות] are one — for [just] as we cannot know their [graded] degrees [הדרגתם], so we cannot know the side on which they are one. And by this it is explained that it is impossible for the actualized intellect [השכל הפועל] to be apprehended.

[As for] God [האלהים] — if it be said that one has already apprehended these intelligibles in [some] manner, inasmuch as they are all of them in the soul of the actualized intellect [השכל הפועל], and this [would be] the very union [ההתאחדות] which we would have with the actualized intellect — and as though this were the view of the predecessors [הקודמים] and what they necessitated [for it]; against [the supposition] that one might say that it is possible for a man to apprehend the actualized intellect, [we reply that] the dispute [המחלוקת] over this fell not [only] among the philosophers [הפלוסופים], but it is [also] found likewise among the sages of our Torah, our predecessors, of blessed memory [חכמי תורתינו הקודמים ז"ל].

They said in the Midrash [במדרש]: "*And God saw the light, that it was good*" [Bereishis 1:4] — Rabbi Yehuda bar Simon [רבי יודא בר סימון] said: "The Holy One, blessed be He [הקב"ה], set apart [הבדיל] the light for Himself. Said the Holy One, blessed be He: No creature [בריה] is able to make use of it [להשתמש בו] but I alone — this is as it is written [הדא הוא דכתיב], '*and the light dwells with Him* [ונהורא

עמיה שריה]' [Daniel 2:22]. A parable of a king who saw a fine portion [מנה יפה], [and] said, 'This [is] for myself.'" And the Rabbis say [ורבנן אמרי]: "The Light He set apart to give to the righteous [לצדיקים] in the time to come [לעתיד לבא] — this is as it is written, '*Light is sown for the righteous* [אור זרוע לצדיק]' [Tehillim 97:11]."

And it is plainly explained that they aimed by this at the light of the Separate Intellects [השכלים הנפרדים], for the perceptible light [האור המוחש] has already been made use of by the sentient creatures [המרגישים — those endowed with sense]. And Rabbi Yehuda bar Simon wished [to say] that the apprehension [השגת] of the Separate Intellects [השכלים הנפרדים] is not possible for a man; while those who dispute with him held that these are apprehensible [מושגים] by a man — [as] an apprehension [that is] feeble [חלושה] and intermittent [ונפסקת], in proportion to what they have emanated upon him [שישפיעו עליו — reading: emanated], as if the apprehended light [האור המושג] were for him [a flash of] lightning [ברק]; and of this they said, "He set [it] apart for him," and they said that this emanation [ההשפעה] is what is to be given to the righteous in the time to come.

Their meaning by this is that the apprehension [ההשגה] — the feeble one [החלושה], the one which is for us at the outset [בה תחלה] — it is [the means] by which we reach our apprehending [שנשיגם] them with a complete apprehension [השגה שלמה] and cleave to them [ונדבק בהם].

מלחמות ה' — Treatise One

פרק שלשה עשר (Chapter Thirteen)

[Sub-rubric, in smaller type:] An investigation into the resolution of the doubts that may arise concerning the emanation of the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] upon the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] — these intelligibles [המושכלות] that it acquires.

Now that it has been made clear that the ultimate felicity [ההצלחה התכליתית] consists in the acquisition of these intelligibles which are at issue here, we ought to take some pains to resolve the doubts that may arise concerning this premise. One such doubt is that one might suppose this felicity to be empty and void. And here is why: since these intelligibles which the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני] acquires are in themselves identical with the intelligibles that exist in the soul of the Active Intellect [נפש השכל הפועל], it would follow that nothing new is

generated when we acquire the intelligibles — and an act that generates nothing for the sake of which it is done is an act performed in vain.

A further doubt one might raise is this: it has been found that the ends [התכליות] available for any single thing are many in number. And the reason is that the end [התכלית] intended for man is the acquisition of these intelligibles; and since these intelligibles are many in number, it would follow that the ends [התכליות] available to man would likewise be many. But this is impossible — for it is necessary that there be a single end for any single thing, since the end [התכלית] is the form and the perfection [צורה ושלמות], and it is impossible that there be for a single thing more than one perfection. This is self-evident.

And there is a further doubt: one might suppose that the effort expended in the multiplicity of [acquiring] knowledge is in vain. For if the intended end for us is the survival and permanence of the intellect [ההשארות והקיום לשכל], and the intellect achieves its eternity through the acquisition of even a single intelligible alone, then the effort spent in multiplying the acquisition of intelligibles would be in vain. And there would be a gradation: one who acquires but a single intelligible drawn from among the more excellent intelligibles would, by this felicity, stand at the very same grade as one who has labored long and added to his wisdom — up to the point that he came to know all the secrets of existing things, were that possible. This too seems plainly to be in vain, for the speculative thinkers [המעיינים] forever find within their souls a longing to add to their knowledge; and a natural longing [התשוקה הטבעית] cannot exist in vain.

Now I say that the first doubt — that nothing new is added — has no force. For if these acquired intelligibles, which exist in the soul of the Active Intellect [נפש השכל הפועל], were identical in our acquired knowledge of them with what exists [there], then it would indeed follow that they are void [for us]. But the truth is that even though the intelligibles are not generated newly in themselves [as objects], they are nevertheless newly generated in us with respect to the hylic intellect [לשכל ההיולאני]. Moreover, the acquired intelligibles for us are not identical with the intelligibles as they exist in the soul of the Active Intellect [נפש השכל הפועל], for there they all exist in actuality [בפועל] and as one all together, whereas it is impossible that they should exist in the hylic intellect [בשכל ההיולאני] in this manner, in the way already described.

But the second doubt requires more careful examination, namely that the intellect which has been acquired is one in number. This will be explained with a little reflection. For these human items of knowledge that are found here proceed along a track whose terminus is the [final] perfection and form [השלמות והצורה]

— what it is and how it is — since the single science is itself an explanation of matters that are but a portion of [the contents of] its own grades [מדרגותיו]: the perfection and the form. And the many sciences are likewise each of them a portion of perfection [שלמות]. And being that the matter is so, it is clear that the intellect that is acquired is one in number; and from this respect there are these intelligibles, which are many, by reason of the conjunction of subjects [התחברות הנושאים]. For a single intelligible may already exist in Reuben [בראובן] and in Shimon [שמעון], yet differ in them by reason of a difference in the forms of their unity [צורות האחדות] — that is to say, by what the acquired intellect in the one of them [Reuben] has that the acquired intellect in the other [Shimon] does not have, and conversely what is in Shimon's.

The cause of this difference [in the acquired intellect] lies in their difference in the acquisition of the intelligibles, in quality and in quantity. And this is because the more one has acquired in a single science, the more he will have of objects of thought [in it] that are not had by the one who has acquired but little of these intelligibles. And likewise, one who has acquired the intelligibles of one science from the rest of the sciences which the other has not acquired will have his acquired intellect differing from the acquired intellect of the other; and by this the grades of the felicitous [מדרגות המצליחים] come to differ from one another.

And all the more, the more closely the intelligibles approach unity [אחדות] — that is, the unity of the intelligibles which is in the soul of the Active Intellect [נפש השכל הפועל] — the greater is the felicity [הצלחתו], and the stronger his joy and his delight [שמחתו ותענוגיו] in what he apprehends. And there is already found in this a difference, such that they are not equal in the joy and delight [שמחה ותענוג] that the one will attain through what he has acquired of the intelligibles as against what the other attains through what he apprehends.

And the third doubt remains: what we apprehend of these intelligibles is, in our [present] life — that is, the meager measure that the bestial soul [נפש הבהמיה] and the [bodily] preoccupation [התבודדות] of the intellect leave behind in its [the intellect's] activity — found to be of the kind of conjunction [הערבות] that bears no relation at all to the rest of the [possible] conjunctions. All the more so, since this conjunction [הערבות] will be greater after death than the apprehension of the intelligibles we acquired in our life through diligent study, and [since] we shall apprehend together all the things that lie within our [grasp]. For inasmuch as, after death, the impediment that existed for us in our life on the side of matter [מצד החומר] has been removed —

— and this is on account of the bestial soul being one [single soul], which impedes the intellect's apprehension by its making use of the other faculties of the soul [מכחות הנפש] that remain in their activities; so too, even when the intellect is engaged in its activity [during life], it does not befall it that it apprehend together [all the intelligibles] but only those intelligibles to which its thought is inclined, as has been explained earlier. But after death, the intellect apprehends together all the intelligibles that it apprehends [now] in life.

But it ought to be known that it is not possible, after one has acquired [it], that any intelligible whatsoever be apprehended which he did not apprehend in his life — for he no longer has the instruments by which the intelligible is grasped, namely the senses and the rest of the faculties consequent upon them, such as the imagination and the faculty of memory [הדמיון והכח הזוכר]. And here it will be explained, also on this account, that there is no relation [between them]: that the apprehension of the deficient intelligibles [המושכלות החסרות] bears no relation to the conjunction [הערבות] which will obtain for the apprehension of the more honored intelligibles [המושכלות הנכבדות] — for the conjunction found in this [present] life [proceeds] from one degree of difference [מהחלף] to a wondrous degree of difference. And similarly, their [the souls'] providential apprehension [השגתם] too [tends] toward greater multiplicity, up to the point that the meager apprehension of the more honored matters comes already to be more desired than the much [apprehension] of the rest of the matters. And to this the early Sages, of blessed memory [ז"ל], gave their assent — that here [too] there are grades of difference [מדרגות מהתחלפות]

— [grades] for the righteous in the Garden of Eden. They said in the Midrash: "[There are] seven categories of the righteous [שבע כתות של צדיקים]." And they took the number seven as an indication of multiplicity, not for precision in the count [לא לדקדק במספר]. And likewise you will find many [such expressions] in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them. And the Sages, of blessed memory [ז"ל], said: "Seven times the righteous one falls and rises [שבע יפול צדיק וקם]" (Mishlei 24:16), and the like of this. And they too assented in this way that the perfect felicity lies in the acquisition of these intelligibles, whether little or much. And concerning this they said that all Israel have a portion in the world to come [כל ישראל יש להם חלק לעולם הבא] (Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:1) — that is to say, since the Torah directs them toward the acquisition of the intelligibles, this is the wondrous direction found in it. Hence it is impossible that they not acquire much from these intelligibles, whether little or much. And their saying "all Israel" [is] in the [sense of the] grade of the great majority of Israel, for the universal premises [ההקדמות הכוללות] which are in the Talmudic wisdom [החכמה התלמודית] are

conducted in this manner. They have already explained this and said: "One does not learn from general statements [אין למדין מן הכללות], even in a place where 'except' is stated with them [אף על פי במקום שנאמר בהם חוץ]" (Eruvin 27a).

פרק ארבעה עשר (Chapter Fourteen)

[Sub-rubric, in smaller type:] An investigation into the matters [required] by our discourse concerning that which speculation does not deem worthy [to be the case], but which faith [האמונה] obligates — by reason of what speculation deems worthy in regard to it.

And if it should appear to someone that faith [האמונה] obligates [us to hold] that human felicity [ההצלחה האנושית] [comes about] otherwise than in the manner we have described — by reason of what brought him [to this]: to believe in the literal sense of some of the matters stated [by the Sages] concerning the Garden of Eden [גן עדן] and Gehinnom [גהנם] in the words of the Midrashim, the aggadot, and the words of the prophets — let him know in what way it is that we have not inclined this view toward [agreement with] this position. Is it because we have seen that it accords with the view of our Torah? No — for that has not drawn us [to it]; rather it is because speculation, where it is found [sound], holds [the position] that it is at variance with [a mistaken reading of] faith [שהוא מסכים ... שיהיה ... חולק על האמונה]. But when there is [such a conflict] of this kind, it is fitting that the deficiency of wisdom be ascribed to our [own] shortcoming.

And in accordance with this [principle] it is, as has already been explained, that one is already obligated [to hold] that whoever believes a thing should make his belief serviceable [to the truth] — for we too conduct ourselves in this way. If [then] it should appear to us that faith [האמונה] [requires] some matter which we have understood [otherwise], this is among what we are obligated to accept as received [קבול] by everyone of the believers [המאמינים]. For were the door open to dispute over faith in whatever it appears to a man that speculation contends against, faith would perish, and there would be wanting [what sustains] the men of faith [אנשי האמונה], and dispute and confusion [המחלוקת והבלבול] would arise among the believers [המאמינים] over what would not have fallen [into dispute] had faith not been there; and there would be generated from this corruption [מההפסד] what ought not to come about.

And what we have said in this place — [namely] this [much] — it is fitting that we reckon by it [the like] for the rest [of such cases], in accordance with what will be explained in the homilies [בדרושי] concerning this atonement [הכפר]. That is to say, if it should appear to one of the men of faith that there is in them [in our

words] something whereby it is obligatory that their [literal] sense be changed [שיאמן חלופי] from the side of faith [מצד האמונה], then it is fitting that he ascribe the deficiency to speculation [שיעזוב העיון] and draw [his understanding] back toward faith [וימשך לאמונה], and ascribe the change [החלוף] that falls in it to our [own] shortcoming.

[Colophon, centered, in smaller type:] Here is completed Treatise One [נשלם המאמר הראשון]. Praise be to the Lord, blessed be He, who has helped us in its composition; and may He help us in its comprehension, and in His service, out of His love. Amen.

מאמר שני (Treatise Two)

[Display sub-rubric:] On the matter of the dream, divination, and prophecy [בענין החלום והקסם והנבואה].

[Chapter-list preamble:]

Chapter One [פרק ראשון] — In it will be explained that this [foreknowledge by] informing [ההודעה] [proceeds] from a cause that is an active knower [מסבה פועלת יודעת] of these things which were [the content] of the informing, and [that] these matters concerning which the informing [occurs] are limited and ordered [מוגבלים ומסודרים].

Chapter Two [פרק שני] — In it will be explained what these things were that were [the content] of the informing [ההודעה], and in what way they are limited and ordered.

Chapter Three [פרק שלישי] — In it will be explained what it is that produces this knowledge.

Chapter Four [פרק רביעי] — In it will be explained whether it is possible that this informing [ההודעה] reach to speculative matters [בדברים העיוניים].

Chapter Five [פרק חמישי] — Knowing in it for what end this knowledge was found.

Chapter Six [פרק ששי] — A solving in it of some of the doubts that may arise concerning this informing [ההודעה].

Chapter Seven [פרק שביעי] — An investigation in it into two hard questions that arise concerning the matter of the dream and divination [החלום והקסם].

Chapter Eight [פרק שמיני] — A giving in it of the causes of the differences in the grades [התחלפות המדרגות] among people, in each one of these [kinds of] informing — in dream, in divination, and in prophecy [בחלום ובקסם ובנבואה].

פרק ראשון (Chapter One)

[Sub-rubric, in smaller type:] In it will be explained that this informing [ההודעה] [proceeds] from a cause that is an active knower [מסבה פועלת יודעת] of these things which were [the content] of the informing; and [that] these matters concerning which the informing [occurs] are limited and ordered [מוגבלים ומסודרים].

Because the inquiry into this topic is among the very precious inquiries — whether on its own account, or because many of the precious inquiries which it was our intent to clarify in this book depend upon what will be explained in it — and because along with this there is much doubt [רב הספקות] regarding it; and given that we did not rely upon what was mentioned of it in *On Sense and the Sensed* [ספר החוש והמוחש] (Aristotle, *De Sensu et Sensibilibus*), inasmuch as the inquiry there was not completed as it ought to be (for there were already stated there matters that are not true, as will be explained in this treatise) —

[for these reasons] we shall begin and say what we have found whereby knowledge reaches a man concerning future things in the dream, or in divination, or in prophecy [בחלום או בקסם או בנבואה] — [and we shall show] that it cannot be by chance [במקרה]. And this [is so] because that which is rarely found in its existence — [found only] in little of [the relevant] time and in few of the [relevant] things taken together — as is stated in the second [book] of the *Physics* [בשני מהשמע] (Aristotle, *Physics* II) — [cannot be ascribed to chance]. And this [reaching of foreknowledge] has already become widespread and manifest in our time: those few persons who foretell many of the future things, often — they are the ones called diviners [קוסמים]; and all the more is this more manifest in prophecy [בנבואה], which is a matter [common] to every nation. For the degree of truth [הצדק] [in such foreknowledge] [?] would be found in it according to how widespread the matter is. And there has already appeared in this [matter] too, in the case of the true dreams [החלומות הצודקים], that many people have all agreed in their [shared] mental images [דמיונים] regarding one and the same thing that is to come about in the future — as when a man sees in a dream that So-and-so and So-and-so [שפלוני ופלוני] will go to such-and-such a place, and they [in fact] found there So-and-so and So-and-so, and a quarrel arose between them [מריבה ביניהם],

and one person relates part of it to a certain matter, while another fits part of it to a certain blow [i.e., a foretold word is matched to one particular event, another to another]—yet all of this is impossible to ascribe to chance, as was said. And indeed we find people who dream true dreams many times over, and especially the melancholic [השחורים, those of the black-bile temperament]; and all of this is part of what has been seen to issue from this informing [ההודעה], so that this informing is not a matter of chance.

Now when one reflects that this informing is not a matter of chance—as has already been explained—two things follow.

The first is that the future events of which this informing notifies us are received and ordered in advance; what is more, they are determined and ordered. For if there had been no contact with these determined and ordered things, the knowledge concerning them could not have existed before they came to be, but only by chance—as has already been explained on its own terms.

The second is that there is here something that knows these ordered things in which the informing falls, and it is that something which acts to produce this informing within us. For this knowledge that comes to be within us exists, before it comes to be, in potentiality; and it has already been explained in the comprehensive treatise that everything which passes from potentiality into actuality of a given genus is brought forth from potentiality into actuality by something already in actuality of that genus—that is, what is in potentiality is brought into actuality by what is in actuality in some respect. It necessarily follows, then, that there is here an agent that knows in actuality all those things in which this informing falls. And it is clear that the agent which produces in us the knowledge of these things is an intellect, since it performs its activity without any bodily instrument.

פרק שני (Chapter Two)

[Argument:] We shall explain in it what these things are in which this informing falls, and in what manner they are determined and ordered.

Since it has been explained that the things in which this informing falls are determined and ordered, it is fitting that we investigate what these things are, and in what manner they are determined and ordered.

We say that it has already been shown by investigation that this informing did not pertain to the necessary matters, for these are few—if it pertained to them at all. Rather, what it pertained to are the contingent matters that befall the

individuals of the human species; for it has been shown by investigation that the knowledge which reached a person through a dream, or through divination, or through prophecy, came to him only concerning matters belonging to the individuals of the human species, and to that respect in which they are subject to chance. And when knowledge reaches us concerning something other than the individuals of the human species, this is by reason of that thing's relation to some particular human being—as Samuel, peace be upon him, informed Saul, peace be upon him, by way of the lost she-asses, that they had been found, because they belonged to the property of Kish, Saul's father.

And when we investigated these contingent matters in which the informing falls —through dream, divination, or prophecy—we found that there are two classes of matters to which this informing that reaches us through sense applies, [classed] by the individual substances to which their hints are referred. The first is that a person is already informed of what so-and-so will beget, in the manner explained above, and what deed he will do; and this is what is made clear in the matter of the diviners. The example of this in prophecy is what the prophet announced—

—namely, that a son would be born to the house of David, [and] that at this appointed time he is now seizing [the throne]. And among them are [individuals concerning whom] this informing reaches us—[individuals] subject to chance in their coming-to-be. These are the individuals among them whose accidents were brought about by determined causes—that is, by what comes to be in them from things chosen [by will] or by nature; and among them, [individuals] whose accidents were not brought about by determined causes, as in the case of chance and coincidence.

And here it appears, upon investigation, that this informing falls within both these kinds; for one is already informed by the diviner or the prophet which of two warring parties will be victorious, or [that] rain will fall on a certain day—and these events are accidents brought about by determined causes. And one is likewise already informed of what comes to be by chance and coincidence, as is clear from sense [in informing through] divination and through dreams; and it is also well known that this informing has already fallen upon such matters as these in prophecy—as in what Samuel, peace be upon him, informed Saul, peace be upon him: that three men would meet him by the way and would give him two loaves of bread, and that he should take [them] from their hand; and as the prophet who was in Samaria informed the prophet who was in [his own] house, that a lion would already have found him on his way and would slay him.

And here it appears, upon investigation, that the majority of the items of knowledge which come to be through dream, divination, or prophecy belong to that which is subject to chance and coincidence. And since the matter is so, and since it has already been explained that the things in which this informing falls are necessarily determined and ordered, it is clear that great doubts already arise from this.

One of them is that it necessarily follows from this that the contingent nature of the accidents that befall the individuals of the human species is annulled. For since one of the parts of the contingent [must have been] determined and ordered so as to issue into actuality—such that the informing about it was completed [and] reached [us] before it came—then if so, there is here no contingent, but all those matters would be necessary, and choice would be void, and this is the height of absurdity.

And further, it necessarily follows from this that there would be no contingent thing here at all, but all those matters would be necessary. For if there were any contingent here, it would be in what falls of the accidents among the individuals of the human species; for in the rest of things no contingency is found in them except on the part of man—since the motion of the living being is delimited by nature, and likewise the motion of the plant and of the inanimate, and they have of themselves nothing but one of the parts of the contingent. The example is that the living being moves toward the food when it sees it, and it has of itself no impulse [(?התחלה=) ההלה, the initiative] as to whether it moves toward it; whereas man renders this motion contingent, in that he can prevent himself from moving toward it, or move the food from that place, and thereby prevent this motion from issuing into actuality. And the matter being so, it is clear that if there were among the individuals of the human species no contingent thing—[which would mean] that there is no contingent at all here—then all the matters would be necessary, and this is the demonstrated absurdity and folly.

And of these [doubts], it now follows that what is subject to chance and coincidence—in which this informing falls—must be delimited and ordered. Yet this assumption refutes itself, for what is subject to chance and coincidence is precisely that which has no causes by which it would be ordered. And behold, if we grant—even in [the case of] what is subject to chance and coincidence falling among the individuals of the human species, being undelimited and unordered—

then we cannot give the cause for the informing that newly arises in them concerning a person, for this informing necessarily requires that [the things informed of] be ordered and delimited.

Now when Ibn Rushd [Averroes] estimated the measure of this difficulty, he concluded in his treatise that this informing cannot occur concerning what is subject to chance and coincidence; but sense itself testifies to the contrary, as we have noted, and this informing through a dream has already reached us many times over concerning what is subject to chance, and it has reached others too, according to what we have heard from them. It is not fitting for us to deny the sensed [evidence] on account of these arguments; rather it is fitting that we investigate how it is possible for this informing to reach [us] concerning what is subject to chance.

We say that it has already been shown that within what is subject to chance and coincidence there is a certain order, since people are already found who possess great success—every single one of them—in [matters] that come to be for them by chance; and these are the people called "the fortunate" [טובי המזל, those of good fortune]. And other people are found who possess great misfortune, every single one of them, in [matters] that come to be for them by chance; and these are the people called "the ill-fortuned" [רעי המזל]. And this is what necessitates that there be in what is subject to chance a delimitation and an order in a certain manner. And what this manner is, and who it is that gives it—this we shall [now] declare.

We say that it has already been shown by investigation that, of all these lower existents, the [supernal] nature watches more carefully over the preservation of the more honorable ones, as has already been explained in the *Book of Animals* [Aristotle, *De Animalibus*]. And since the matter is so, and since man is the most honorable of all the lower existents found in this lower world—being one who conjoins with the honorable divine existents through the intellect within him—behold, He who watches over [all] with great providence, [He] whose activities and thoughts are all ordered, watches over him.

And it has already been demonstrated, concerning that which the astrologers [חכמי משפט הכוכבים, the masters of the judgment of the stars] hit upon in these matters, that they know the thoughts of man and his deeds, and they have predicted them many times over. Yet they have also erred concerning them many times over in this craft, because of the distance of these divine bodies—the heavens being very far in their very substance and place—and because of the difficulty for sense in apprehending what these

heavenly bodies necessitate by [way of] the configuration [derived] from their positions; for the apprehension of these heavenly bodies cannot reach us by way of their position, since it cannot reach us by [way of] sense as would be fitting—as in these prepared experiments [recte: empirical observations]. For the

configuration upon which one must reflect cannot be reckoned, except over many thousands of years, which is a wondrous reckoning—as is clear to anyone who reflects upon the craft of astronomy [מלאכת התמונה]: that the motions belonging to the heavenly bodies are not yet [perfectly] known; indeed we know but little of the order of this [system] over the length of time, and through this little that has become known to us, the perfect revealed apprehension of the human accidents that are all ordered by the heavenly bodies [escapes us].

And since the matter is so, it is clear that the matters in which this informing falls have a delimitation and an order on the part of the heavenly bodies; and so there will be a delimitation and an order—they being the accidents of man—on the part of the heavenly bodies.

And by this it is truly fitting that what reaches a man by chance and coincidence be delimited and ordered, in the manner [deriving] from the [astral] delimitation and order. And that which is delimited and ordered is necessarily so, since one of the parts of the contingent is delimited and ordered for an individual—as one might say that "digging brought it about" that a man dug a pit and found buried treasure: this is per accidens, [whereas] the digger's finding of the buried treasure was [merely] the intent of the digging, [namely] to make a pit. But when one posits the matter as it [really] is, behold, it annuls the contingent nature possible to those things in which this informing falls; and choice within us would be void; and the contingent nature possible to all things would likewise be annulled—and this, as we said before, is the height of absurdity. And if we grant that these things are not delimited and ordered, we cannot give a cause for this informing, given that it has [already] been explained that these things are delimited and ordered.

We say that—because it has been explained that there is no doubt that these matters are among the things delimited and ordered, on the part of the foreknowledge that falls upon them prior to their coming-to-be, and on the part of what is revealed to us through sense, namely that they are delimited as deriving from the heavenly bodies—it has also been explained that they are not delimited and ordered, and yet are delimited and ordered, [each] from a [different] side: for it necessarily follows that these accidents are delimited and ordered from one side, and not delimited and ordered from another side. Now the side from which they are delimited and ordered has already been explained earlier; that is, it has already been explained that they are delimited and ordered as deriving from the heavenly bodies. But the side from which they are possible and not delimited and not ordered is the intellect and the choice present within

us; for the intellect and the choice we possess have it in their power to change them away from that toward which they are determined by the heavenly bodies.

And indeed it has been so, because the accidents of man are ordered as deriving from the heavenly bodies, and the heavenly bodies preserve the very [order] that exists [beneath them] when they bring about its contrary, one time and another—and this is because of the variations of the positions belonging to a given star. One might say that when the sun is in the northern quarter, the nature of air and fire is strengthened in the simple and composite bodies there; whereas when it is in the southern quarter, the nature of water and earth is strengthened in the simple and composite bodies there. And if, on account of the varying planets, [the astrologers] should say that they strengthen the nature of fire, and the moon strengthens the nature of water—these being the contraries that come to be from them in the temperament of the individuals of mankind—[then] an impression is made upon [their] attributes, deeds, and understandings.

It necessarily follows, then, that the heavenly bodies—[however] their positions may be—direct a man, by what derives from their positions, toward a certain intent; and when [their position] is the contrary, [the position] would direct him toward its opposite. So too is the matter regarding the accidents that result from the contingent matters which are ordered by them. And it likewise necessarily follows that what is necessitated by the varying stars would in turn be altered—[such that] some of them would set [the persons] upright.

some of [the stars] make a man, in part, upright in his conduct, while in their contrary [configuration] they incline him toward the opposite. And since it has already happened, many a time, that some people, though wicked, attain their wicked ends, it is clear that HaKadosh Baruch Hu has exercised His providence in this matter — namely, that He set in us an intellect endowed with [the capacity for] an end, so that we may attain to that which is otherwise restricted [in us] by virtue of the heavenly bodies, and thereby correct the deviation that falls out by chance, so far as is possible.

Now in this [we see] the manner in which the providence whereby the heavenly bodies are made to watch over man is exercised. For, were people [merely] preserved from many [forms of] harm [that are] suited to befall them — to the point that wicked men have already been found who direct all their effort to slay others and to injure them, yet little of this is brought to completion for them, even though they are, by their natures, fitted for such deeds — then [it would follow] that these effects [come about] through the [natural] causes [present]. But were it not for this providence, their deeds would, for the most part, have come to pass in

accordance with the [natural] custom that holds for the rest of the [productive] crafts in what they accomplish through their accustomed causes.

The illustration is this: that which is naturally produced by the craft of carpentry is, for the most part, brought to completion in accordance with that upon which the craft acts; and the [outcome] desired [by the craftsman] is not [thereby thwarted], save in a few cases. Yet in this [matter of man] the providence has been [otherwise]: [it gathers and orders the civic community]. And this is because the order which derives from the heavenly bodies makes some men inclined toward one [productive] craft and others toward [another] craft, and they fulfill in this [way] the manner of the crafts so as to perfect [the order], in the way Plato laid down with regard to the matter of the civic community.

But that the crafts not be wholly hindered — [each] from [reaching] its end — is something already explained, [namely] that not all the crafts can be hindered from [reaching] their ends. For, in accordance with the [stellar] configurations from which the crafts arise, they are scarce; and [that is] why we know little of the art of [astrological] judgment. And [it is] because this [outcome] is rare, [arising] only where the configuration of many individuals inclines [them] toward a [single] craft.

And although choice has [the power] to disturb this order, the intellect will find scarcely any means by which to throw it into confusion — only a little. For this is on account of the desire [already] acquired [in a man] by this order, in accordance with what that order has fixed for him: he will not abandon that [particular] craft for the sake of another craft. And [as for] what we see — that the masters of the lowly and despised crafts do not abandon their crafts for another, even though they would seem [better off] to transfer to a different craft — and that we see that some have already entered upon the study of the lowly and despised crafts and have chosen them: this is because of [the inclination toward] the attainment of human felicity, [a thing] which [for] these men is the way by which they are [counted only] among the few.

Yet were it laid down that choice could convey a man toward the other craft, this would be of little [avail]; nor would [the heavens] hinder it from finding these [crafts], inasmuch as the order deriving from the heavenly bodies is scarce, as we said before. And the cause for what we mentioned — that this informing falls among the chance occurrences of man alone, to the exclusion of the other living beings — [is] in accordance with the fact that they [these occurrences]

are ordered by the heavenly bodies, [and] not the chance occurrences of the other living beings, except insofar as they stand in some relation to man. And this is the reason on account of which, I think, the early Sages of blessed memory agreed that the chance occurrences of man are ordered by the configuration of the stars, [but] not the chance occurrences of the beast. They said in the first chapter of [Bava] Kama: "A man — there is a constellation [mazal] for him, [as] it is written, 'for he shall gore with it' [Devarim 33:17]; a beast — there is no constellation for it, [for] it is written 'with it,' as one would say 'with the body.'" [Aramaic: אדם דאית ליה מזלא כתיב ביה כי יגח, בהמה דלית ליה מזלא כתיב ביה כי יגוף — cf. the discussion at Bava Kama 2b on the goring ox.]

פרק שלישי [Chapter Three]

[Summary line, small type:] In it we shall explain what the agent is that brings about this knowledge. [נבאר בו מה הוא הפועל לזאת הידיעה.]

Now that it has been explained what these things are in which this informing falls — [whether] in a dream, or in divination, or in prophecy — and in what manner they are limited and ordered, it is fitting that we inquire what the agent is that produces this knowledge.

We say that it has already been shown [that] the agent which produces this knowledge is, in our view, the Active Intellect, whose existence was explained earlier. For this [Active Intellect] is what is already obliged [to be the agent] of this informing, [it] being that which [first] produced the order present in these things in which [the informing] falls. This will be explained in the manner we set forth in the First Treatise of this book, [namely] that the intellect which produces these things is the very [intellect] that here acquires for us their intelligibles. And since it has already been explained that the agent producing this order [present] in these things in which the informing falls — in a dream, or in divination, or in prophecy — is the very [intellect] which it was earlier explained [to be], that is, that the heavenly bodies are, in the degree [of their rank], instruments to the Active Intellect for what these things receive in their being acted upon by [their] temperament: it is fitting, then, that the matter be so in [the case of] what acts upon these chance occurrences. And since the matter is so, it is plain that the agent of this order is the Active Intellect; and therefore it is necessary that the Active Intellect be the agent of this knowledge — whether directly [as intermediary], or through something other than [itself as] intermediary.

It has [thus] already been shown, from several aspects, that the intellect which is the agent of this order [present] in these things [is the Active Intellect]. The first of

them: because this order present in these things in which this knowledge falls is providence over the individuals of the human species, as before; and the intellect [which is] the agent is that which exercises providence over man and watches over him, so far as is possible, by virtue of [that] which is in him from [among] the organs and the psychic faculties — these things preserving for them their possible time [of existence], as is explained in natural science. So it is fitting that this order be ordered by the Active Intellect, inasmuch as it is found in man for an end, in the way that the Active Intellect is the agent [of it]; and this is the ultimate providence, [namely] the ultimate end for which it is fitting that there be one agent — and this is explained in [the treatise] On the Soul. And [further] of them: because, inasmuch as these things were [each] of a genus in whose manner the Active Intellect acts upon them, and there is found in [the matter] that which is [in part] ordered and limited, whether from the standpoint of the universal nature, or from the standpoint of the particular nature — for it is the quiddity that acts, from which their elements are bounded, [and] the things

in which [the particular nature is found], by virtue of the universal nature — and the particular temperament acts through the mediation of the heavenly bodies and of the seed, from which most of the chance occurrences found in [a man] are ordered. Hence it is fitting that there be in [a man] something else found that is ordered among the chance occurrences, ordered by the Active Intellect. For if one does not concede this matter, it becomes difficult to attain the cause of this — [namely,] what this [intellect] is by which the Active Intellect, which brings man into being, [is] that which produces these chance occurrences in which this informing falls — and it is [the Active Intellect] which gives [man] his existence; and it is that in which [a man] is found, and [there are] in him many chance occurrences of his.

Moreover, were one not to concede this matter, then there would here be two agents acting upon a single thing: the one acting through some apprehension and a [particular] aspect of its apprehension, and the other acting upon it through other apprehensions. And so it would be, [if so,] for that which is acted upon by the single [thing] — being, in our view, two natures: the nature which receives in it the act of the one agent, and the nature which receives in it the act of the second agent — and this is something disgraceful [i.e., absurd].

Moreover, this informing is already found, [several] times over, in the chance occurrences that are referred to the particular temperament and to the rest of the chance occurrences together. And since this informing is necessarily one in which there is a single agent — because it is one [act] — the agent of this

knowledge is the agent that orders these things. And [this] is explained in the book; and therefore it is necessary that, when the agent produces these chance occurrences which are [referred] to [the side of] temperament, it produce these chance occurrences [as well]. And since the intellect [which is] the agent is the agent which orders [those] chance occurrences whose [being] is from the side of temperament, as before, it is plain that the intellect [which is] the agent is the agent of these other chance occurrences in which this informing falls.

Moreover, [it must be] that this informing should at times be [present] in the things newly arising for human individuals, and in [things] common to these chance occurrences together — as if the diviner or the prophet were to say that such-and-such an individual has already newly come to be, [foretelling] in [such] a manner that thus-and-so will happen — that such-and-such a chance occurrence will be done [to him], or that such-and-such a chance occurrence will newly come about for that [individual]. And this [is] in accordance with that wherein the act, which acts upon the [particular] substance, is the very [act]; and inasmuch as the agent of the [particular] substance is the Active Intellect, it is plain that the agent of [that] order [which] is the agent of all the chance occurrences ordered [in it is the Active Intellect].

And [further:] because the agent which produces this order [present] in these chance occurrences ought, [as] is fitting, to know these things — to the point that this order may [issue] from it in a complete manner, so that the things inwardly [contained] in [the order] may be directed toward the intended end in [it] — and that [agent] is the [agent] of the preservation and the providence over the human individuals, in accordance with what is possible: it is impossible that it should not know the quiddities of the things found in [the world]. For [the agent], being [that which it is] from what is explained in [the treatise] On the Soul, [is such] that it does not [have] the apprehended objects of a thing [merely] in the manner [in which] one does not know the quiddity of the thing [that is], in regard to that which falls to it. It [thus] has been explained in full how the agent which produces this order [present] in these chance occurrences has knowledge of the quiddity of man; and since the matter is so, then it is necessary [that] the agent be [the agent]

[when] the [Active] Intellect [which is] the agent proceeds [in] the perfection and the form deriving from this intellect, [it] is necessary that there be for the Active Intellect a knowledge in soul [proper] to this order. For inasmuch as the knowledge [whereby the agent] proceeds [in] the perfection of the thing [as] speaker [i.e., of the rational nature] is [present] by necessity, [then] the

knowledge of that thing which is to it its perfection and its form [is present too] — just as one who knows the form of the composition of a house [thereby] has knowledge of the quiddity of the beams and the boards and the stones of which it is composed.

And, in general, in proportion as [the intellect] proceeds in its degree of perfection, [it] does not separate from what is [proper] to it in [its] degree as the hylic [intellect]; and therefore it is necessary that there be, with the Active Intellect, knowledge of all those cognitions which [belong] to the intellect that is [more] from it in the degree of perfection and the form. And were there [no] knowledge for the Active Intellect [present] in this order [present] in these chance occurrences, then there would be no need to bring in here another agent for this order besides [the Active Intellect]; nor is it possible, either, that the agent of this order be [left] in this manner [to] another intellect besides the Active Intellect. For if one were to concede the matter [thus], then what is this — that the Active Intellect, which produces [the order], is [the very intellect] that produces these chance occurrences? And [it] knows [them], and [it] is [itself] the agent of [them].

And were the other intellect to proceed [further] than the Active Intellect — proceeding [in] the perfection and the form — then it will be explained, [just] as was explained in what preceded in our [account], that this other intellect is the agent which newly produces the things [it] refers to the Active Intellect. I mean, [the intellect] which is the agent for all the things here, and acquires here the intelligibles for us — together with [the fact] that this supposition [too] is explained as null. For, were the intellect to proceed in the degree of perfection and the form, [proceeding further] than the Active Intellect, then the Active Intellect would still know what the order [present] in these chance occurrences [is]. Hence the order [present] in these chance occurrences, [which] proceeds [in] the perfection and the form, [is one] whose order [belongs] to substances [whose chance occurrences befall them]; and it is necessary that these chance occurrences proceed [in] the perfection and the form [proper] to substances — and this is [demonstrably] absurd and disgraceful [i.e., impossible].

And since the matter is so, it is plain that the agent which produces this order [present] in these chance occurrences is the Active Intellect; and therefore it is necessary that the intellect which is the agent of these chance occurrences in a dream, or in divination, or in prophecy, be the Active Intellect — except that it has not yet been explained whether it is [the Active Intellect] acting [directly] in its own [right] as the intermediary, or [whether it acts] through something other

than [itself as] intermediary, or [whether] it is an agent [acting from] one extreme through an intermediary and [from another] extreme through something other than the intermediary. And this we have already inquired into in [the discussion] of what follows from this.

And it has already become evident, from another aspect as well, that the intellect which is the Active Intellect is [the agent] of this informing [that] reaches us in these chance occurrences — [and] this is that the perfect agent [must be] one in number. And since the matter is so, the informing [that] reaches the hylic [intellects] is [their] perfection, and there are here two species of informing: [namely], the informing which [is present] in [respect of] the intelligibles, and the informing which [is present] in [respect of] the chance occurrences. So it is necessary that there be two [acts of] informing of a single intelligible: [if] one does not concede this matter, [then] the hylic intellect is two — the one being acted upon by the one intelligible, and the other being acted upon by the second [intelligible]. And were the hylic intellect two, it would be necessary that man not be…

[The argument continues into the following pages.]

one in number. For unity, [though] it is indeed found to belong to a thing by virtue of its form, [the thing] could not be the bearer of that form which is one in number unless the form itself were one in number. And were the form not one in number, it would be impossible for the thing to be the bearer of that very form which is one in number; and this would issue in nullity and disgrace [i.e., absurdity]. Since the matter is so, it has been explained that the Active Intellect is that from which there reaches us the two [acts of] informing.

פרק רביעי (Chapter Four)

[Small-type abstract:] In it we shall explain whether it is possible for this informing to reach [us] in the speculative matters [i.e., the objects of theoretical reason].

It is fitting that we inquire whether it is possible for this informing to reach [us] in the speculative matters. The inquiry into this divides into two parts. The first: whether it is possible to attain [these matters] together with their causes, in this same manner [we have described], by way of the informing — as is the case with the other things in which all the informing falls, [reaching us] in a dream, or in divination, or in prophecy. For it has already been seen that they [i.e., the recipients] attain through these [means] together with their causes [things] other

than the informing. The second: whether it is possible to attain [these matters] together with their causes by this same manner, [namely] by way of the informing.

We say that it has already been held that this is possible, because we find that many speculative matters have reached [men] together with their causes in a dream — as is set forth in the books of the physicians; and many such [cases] have indeed come about in this matter, [reported] of Galen and of Ibn Zuhr [Avenzoar]. And it has [also] happened that, one day, a man was instructed in his dream that a certain sick person should be given to eat a certain herb for the illness that he had — though he had not [previously] been acquainted with that herb, nor did he know it by nature [i.e., by his own knowledge]. He inquired about it from the physicians, and they told him that this herb was not harmful to him, [reporting] in accordance with what [investigation] found of the nature of that herb in their villages; and he ate of it, and was healed. It has thus been seen that it is possible for this [to occur] — I mean, the attainment of the speculative matters together with their causes in this same manner, by way of the informing.

For if the matter were so, this knowledge would be a knowledge by the equivocation of the name [i.e., "knowledge" in a merely homonymous sense] — for it would be thought, [yet] would not be knowledge; rather, [in truth] it is knowledge. For the [true] definition of [genuine] knowledge is that one know the thing through the cause that it [has] within it.

And here, by this manner, the view of whoever holds, [following] some of the Sages of our Torah, that knowledge of the speculative matters reached the prophets in prophecy — [a knowledge] derived from the first intelligibles [acquired] by them — is nullified. But, [in truth,] all of them [the prophets] are upon the [common] level of the first intelligibles [in this regard]. For were the matter so, the knowledge of the prophets in these matters would be below the knowledge of the Sages; and they [the prophets] did not [merely] have, in the speculative matters, knowledge [arrived at] by way of thought [i.e., discursive reasoning].

Moreover, were it by way of the Active Intellect that the hylic intellect should attain these matters together with their causes, [the hylic intellect] would not need the [external] sense for the acquisition of the intelligibles; and this, too, is patently null and void. And Ibn Rushd [Averroes] has already argued that the attainment of the speculative matters in this same manner, by way of the informing, is nullified [on two counts]. The first is that, were the matter so, this

informing would be void. For, by the very nature of man, he attains the speculative sciences in a more

complete manner, [proceeding] from what is created in him out of the first premises [self-evident propositions]. And the second: were it possible to attain the intelligibles without the first premises, the thing [so attained] would be found turning about among contraries — and its standing [as established] for those [who hold it] would be a thing of necessity [i.e., would falsely claim the firmness of the necessary]; and this is false.

And if we say that this [supposed] knowledge is called [knowledge] only by the equivocation of the name [shared] with the [genuine] knowledge that attains the matters together with their causes, then [what we are dealing with] would be thought, not knowledge — and there would be no benefit in its attainment.

And if [someone objects that] we [seem to be claiming] that this informing does not reach [us] in the speculative matters in the manner of the [ordinary] informing — let him be hard pressed by what we have set forth: that this attainment reaches [men] from the science of medicine in a dream, and by what is found in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, [those prophets] to whom one [single] way of this knowledge has reached, in the speculative matters which they [attained]. For this is the way by which this knowledge reaches them — as appears in the matter that was shown to Isaiah, peace be upon him, concerning the Work of the Chariot [the *Ma'aseh Merkavah*], in which many other matters [too] were included in the prophecy, [matters] which fall under the way of prophecy. And so, too, [is] the matter that Ezekiel saw, peace be upon him, concerning the Work of the Chariot. This is found at length in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them.

And since the matter is so, here there is great doubt in this matter — for the sensed [evidence] confirms that it is possible for [this] knowledge of the speculative matters to reach [men] in this same manner, by way of the informing, while [theoretical] speculation nullifies this. And here our Master Moshe [Maimonides], may his memory be a blessing, set this cause far off [i.e., dismissed the explanation], that what Galen related of himself should be true — that there had reached him, in the art of medicine, many [items of] knowledge in a dream. And [Maimonides] said that the [items of] knowledge were [already] in [Galen's] waking state, but appeared to him as newly arising in sleep — as in the matter of the man who lived in a house with ten thousand men, and all of them went out except for one; for it had already preceded [in] his knowledge that that man came [in] by such-and-such a name, and that he was already there beforehand. [So too

with the supposedly new knowledge,] except that this [explanation] runs counter to the sensed [evidence], as we have set forth.

And we say that it has already been seen that the attainment of the first intelligibles is not impossible in a dream by reason of their causes — I mean, when the imagined forms required for the acquisition of that intelligible stand established [in the soul]; rather, [the dream] would be of slight [effect]. For [if] one asks for the imagined forms required for the acquisition of that intelligible, their standing established [for him] would be, for the most part, [a matter] of effort

[—such effort] as makes great use, in sleep, of [the work of] producing the second intelligibles; rather, [in a dream] no intelligible would stand established for one by [his] choice. But the second intelligibles alone — those to which the first intelligibles [already] within him lead — [these] would stand established [for him]. This thing has happened to us many times: especially when we applied ourselves to the deep speculative matters, [things] were intimated to us in our dream concerning the intelligibles about which we had inquired, and we were answered concerning them with a true answer — [these being] matters of which no [prior] speculation had preceded for us.

And since the matter is so, here it appears that, just as there reaches the prophets, peace be upon them, [an] intelligible [of] what [they receive] in prophecy, so does there reach them [knowledge] together with its causes. And of this there is found a slight [number] of places in what the prophets, peace be upon them, have related, [places] in which they tell the cause from which some of it is obligated [to follow] — as appears in what Isaiah, peace be upon him, said: "to establish that the Lord, may He be blessed, is the Agent of [all] existing things" — not the idols whom some of the people of his generation were serving: "Who has wrought and done it, calling the generations from the beginning" [Isaiah 41:4]. For [Isaiah] has already brought a proof that it is HaShem, may He be blessed, who is the Agent of these things, by reason that He knows their falling out before they come [to pass] [Isaiah 41:21–23].

And here the places that are mentioned [in which] the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, [include] their causes — they belong to one of two [reasons]: either by reason that the knowledge of these speculative matters had [already] reached them in their waking state — because the recollection of the premises had been forgotten, [the premises] being [otherwise] well-known [to them], or by reason that the matter required a deep [exposition], or that the matter needed [an account] reaching to the premises, [an account] much extended in the telling.

But what they related of the [items of] knowledge reaching [men] in the art of medicine in a dream is exceedingly strange. For these matters are matters [of] experience, and there is for their attainment no [other] path than that they reach [us] from sensation — for [otherwise they could come] only with great difficulty. And by this it [would be] hard [to explain how] the matter is completed: how the conditions of [the] experience were [ever] fulfilled, for they are many, as the Sages of medicine have explained. And since the matter is so, how is it possible for [this knowledge] to reach [men] without sensation — "Who has given [a mouth to man]..." [Exodus 4:11]?

And we say that it has already been seen that there are diseases whose remedies man has already learned through [their] being arranged [for him] by the heavenly bodies, as in the matter that has happened in the case of other things; and [yet] it would have been possible for there to newly arise in [men] knowledge of this kind — I mean, from the side that such-and-such a person was healed [by such-and-such a remedy], as the informing reaches

in [the case of] its other chance occurrences. And here this [was] the acquisition of the intelligible — [namely] this informing in a chance occurrence; and this informing reaches the sick person, or the physician [who is] applying himself to his cure.

And here, when one inquires into all these accounts that are found of this [matter] among the physicians, one finds that the [items of] knowledge had already reached them from this side: for they related that they were commanded, in a dream, to do thus; or that the sick person himself, [and others] applying themselves to his cure, were commanded in a dream to do thus. And here, from this side, one finds that there were already sick people longing to do something beneficial for their healing, while they did not know [what it was], because the longing for it was [implanted] in them [as] arranged by the heavenly bodies. And by this manner there newly arose [in them] many [items of] knowledge in the art of medicine, which the physicians have already related of themselves.

And it has already happened, in the case of a [certain] woman, that there was for her a stricture [of the throat] [recte: "in some other place"? — see flag (a)], and she saw there an herb [such] as had not [previously been known to her]; she gathered it and ate of it, and was healed. And not [many] days were long [in passing] before she was healed. And there was there a wise woman, who came to understand the matter; and she learned from this that this herb was beneficial for [such] a stricture, and many were healed by it — as we have seen [in] our

[own time] — and there was no wish to disclose this to any man, since [that] woman had already let this knowledge be lost.

And so it happened to one of our brethren: there was prepared for them [recte: "created for them"] a single dish [of food], and he was small [i.e., young] at that time, and did not apply himself to recognize that [particular] dish. And [the following] is also related: that there was a certain sick man, and his illness was protracted, and his sickness grew very grave; and he saw that a snake had entered into the pot, and [his appetite] longed wonderfully to eat of that cooked [food]. He asked some of it from his household; and when [the food] drew near to the pot, and he saw the snake, he said, "Is there death in the pot?" [2 Kings 4:40] — and [yet] he was not given any of it [at first]. But he went on his hands and feet up to the pot, took of the cooked food, and ate of it — and that poisonous bile, which was [the cause of] his sickness, was thrust out from his body, and he was wholly healed.

פרק חמישי (Chapter Five)

[Small-type abstract:] In it [we shall] make known for what final end this informing is found.

After it has been explained from which of the things this informing falls, and what it is, and what is the Agent of it, it is fitting that we inquire toward what final end it is found.

We say that the final end for which it is found is providence and preservation. For [it is] that man — into whose soul this informing falls — [is meant] to direct [himself] toward the good and to keep far from the evil [that is] fated to reach him, from the side of that which is [in him] arranged by the heavenly bodies. And the knowledge would be deficient in [the case of] one in whom there is falsehood — [knowledge] of [both] the good and the evil — [were it not for] this informing; so that he might be saved from the evil which he knew was prepared [as fated] for him, and direct [himself] toward the good prepared [for him], coming to him by [way of] the causes [that are] his helpers toward his existence. And by this there is added to him that good. And this has already been mentioned in the Book *On Sense and the Sensed* [*De Sensu et Sensato*].

פרק ששי (Chapter Six)

[Small-type abstract:] In it [we shall] resolve some doubts that arise in the matter of this informing.

Concerning what is found here in the matter of this informing — [there are] many doubts; [and] it is fitting that we inquire into them according to what is possible for us.

Among them: how is it possible that the intellect should make known the particular thing, in [respect of] that which is particular [about it], as is the matter in this informing? — and [yet] it is indeed similar to what [the intellect] is in itself, [namely] the universal order [— so how can it inform of particulars]?

And among them: how is it possible that it should make known *when* the thing will fall out? — and why is the knowledge that belongs to it [confined to] a time bounded altogether [i.e., why is it tied to a determinate moment]? For that one knew when this thing would fall out — this is the matter set forth concerning what the diviners intimated in our own time, and from what Joseph, peace be upon him, interpreted from the dreams of the [men imprisoned] in Egypt [recte: the cupbearers — see flag (c)], and from what came to Daniel, peace be upon him, [concerning] the end of the Exile, and to Jonah, peace be upon him, [concerning] the end of Nineveh.

And among them: how

how the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] can make known the comprehensive ordering [הסדור הכולל] that obtains for a given person, as a means of providence [השגחה] and protection [שמירה]. For it is hard to see why this informing should reach one particular person rather than another. If the Active Intellect knew of this man that *this* ordering obtained for him — that is, if the Active Intellect possessed concerning the man in question the items of knowledge that befall him — then there would result from this [the conclusion that the Active Intellect joins together for him all these items of individual knowledge — which is itself the difficulty]. And if we say that this is not for the sake of providence and protection, then no purpose [תכלית] is to be seen here other than [the one] explained — and this would be wholly false; my intention is that there should be a purpose.

Furthermore, granting that there is no doubt that the Active Intellect makes this known to him, [there remains the question of] what concerning these matters it makes known to him — for if this informing reached him not for any purpose, this too would be entirely false; as is explained regarding natural things, that there is no thing without a purpose.

And in sum, the doubt here is this: it is possible that this informing should be singled out [to reach] one man more than [it reaches] another to whom it is informed; and that with men whose preparation for it is great, [the informing]

should be purer than [it is] with [other] men — [the question being] whether the Active Intellect knows of them that this ordering [obtains] for them, and that they are men close to the man [in question] by kinship [מעמו], or that they stand before him. — And [a further doubt]: this knowledge of matters apart from him [the recipient] — was it such that it was already fitting [for it to come], and whether it would have been fitting that the knowledge reach the one for whose sake it is found? — And [a further doubt]: why was this [informing] given in explanation, and why, in the end, does it come through riddles [חידות] and parables [משלים] — and here lies the wonder. — And [a further doubt]: why does this knowledge that is among the intelligibles come mostly in waking [בהקיץ] — and here it [the doubt] is, in its own right. — And [a further doubt]: how does it come about that this [informing reaches] the man who is not perfect at all — more than [it reaches] what is fit; and it would already have been fitting that the more prepared and the more discerning [המשכילים] be readier to receive this emanation [שפע] of the Active Intellect, by reason of their being more closely conjoined [התאחדות] with the Active Intellect.

Let us say, regarding the **first** doubt, that what is permitted [as its resolution] is this: there is no contradiction [in supposing] that the Active Intellect should arrive at the knowledge, by the ordering [בסדור], that obtains for the man, as a means of providence and protection — not in respect of its being *this* individual [matter], but in respect of [the fact] that there were born, from the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמיימים], items of this individual character in the horizon [באופק] under which [the man] was born. And accordingly [it follows] that the heavenly bodies were [so arranged] that all those men present in that [horizon] received from the material intellect [השכל ההיולני] this individual matter, in respect of the fact that this individual [character] is alive and operative at the time when those men [were born under that horizon]. And according to the situation [המצב] arising from the side of the heavenly bodies — [the situation] obtaining at the hour the [man] was born — and according to the comprehensive ordering, which is from the side of the heavenly bodies, [it follows that] they were [characterized] by one description [תאר] and by several [other] accidents [מקרים]; [and] with all the accidents that there were here, there was an individual [feature] from [the side of] the men of this description, and they received it.

[105 / 106]

[The Active Intellect] resembles it [the recipient] in this manner; and there results for him from this [situation] that, at that time, there is found no one else to whom this [informing] reached — for the emanation [ההשפעה] was in the

comprehensive ordering, and [it befell] those who shared in this [character], that there were of this [emanation] items in the imaginative soul [נפש המדמה] in this description. — And in this is loosed [resolved] this doubt. And we have said another [thing], namely, what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] said: that just as the intellect is receptive of an individual [matter], so the matter [העניין] is in this case; my intention is that it [the matter] is receptive of an individual [matter]. But this [Ibn Rushd's] resolution, on close examination, we find insufficient [בלתי מספיק]. For [rather] the individual existents emanate from the comprehensive ordering, [there befalling] to them accidents whereby one man is singled out from another. Thus, [granting this,] there would be a reality to these accidents [המקרים] which the imaginative power [כח הדמיוני] receives from the side of the nature [טבע] of the matter [החומר] that men find — [a man being singled out] from the side of the alteration [חלוף] of the individual temperament [המזג הפרטי]. And since the matter is so [constituted], these accidents in which there is the individual temperament have been renewed [generated] by the power of the imaginative [faculty]; and these objects of apprehension [המשיגים] and the accidents whereby this informing is individuated, if it was [there] something from the [side of] sense [מהחוש] and not from the [side of] intellect [מהשכל].

— And further: are these things, as they [really] are, of [the class of] the accidents whereby this man is singled out, such that there should be present in them the [individual] depiction by means of the imaginative power? This [depiction], if it were to come about without an efficient cause [מזולת סבה פועלת] — and that is false. And here is loosed [resolved] what was hard [in the matter]. And we now proceed to loose [resolve], with respect to it, most of the doubts that we have mentioned in this chapter [בזה הפרק].

[Resolving the **second** doubt]: as to the manner in which the thought [המחשבה] turns toward the matter [in question] — that is, what the diviner [הקוסם] makes known, or what the prophet [הנביא makes known of] what they ask of him — and if they do not ask it of him, or do not strive in their knowing of it, [it makes known] little, if [anything] reaches [him]. This would be from the side of the matter [in question] wherein the informing itself [lies]. Likewise [the resolution holds] with respect to what a man reckons in waking [בהקיץ], and wherein the informing — which is in the [comprehensive] ordering [במושכלות?] — is participated [in].

[106 / 107]

And this [resolves the matter], just as what befalls [שקרה] the thought concerning that matter [is resolved] — [whether the man] sees [it] in the dream, namely,

what he sees in respect of what [befalls him]. This informing [is] in the manner in which the informing... the Active Intellect places [it] for the material intellect [?]... in him [?], because he must, in his receiving it, [receive] what [comes] to the sense [החוש] and to the striving [ההשתדלות] in acquiring this... [for it is] the orderings [הסדורים] that [obtain] for individual men, [which come] to the intellect [?], all of them, in him [אצלו] — because he must, in his receiving [them]... — that the thought wanders [שטתה — strays?] in the manner in which [it strays] in the matter [?] that the diviner makes known, and that the prophet brings — the accidents whereby [there is] thought in them in some manner [?]. — And the example [המשל] that the prophet [made known]: Josiah [יאשיה] is his name, and he [Josiah] would burn upon the altar [המזבח] that Jeroboam [ירבעם] built men's very bones [עצמות אדם], because there had already preceded for him [the prophet] a thought concerning the house of David [בבית דוד]. *(1 Kings 13:2 — the man of God foretelling that "a son shall be born to the house of David, Josiah by name," who would burn upon Jeroboam's altar the bones of its priests.)*

[Resolving the **third** doubt]: let us say that it [the matter] already befell [the man], the Active Intellect making known [to him by] the comprehensive ordering that obtains for him. And this [resolves it]: it is [a matter of] the sun [השמש] or the daily sphere [גלגל היומי] or others [of their kind]: [a matter that stands] at some degree [במדרגה] of prosperity [מההצלחה], or its reverse [הפכה], according as he [the recipient] knows all that befell him in the perfection [בשלמות] of this people [העם]; but [it is so] in respect of his being [an individual,] this man or [that man] — they being ordered [in] this [comprehensive] ordering. — And he knows in a general way [בכללות] this [matter] which the recipient receives in this matter in some manner; my intention is that he knows in what manner the degree [המדרגה] of that [matter] obtains at this time, and the thought [המחשבה] inclines toward them — the Active Intellect of the emanation in a general way [בכללות], not in respect of its being an individual [matter] from the side of [actual] existence [מצד המציאות], as we have explained. The recipient is informed [משידע] [as to] the time of [the matter's] befalling [זמן הנפילה] among events [למקרים] for a far-off time or a near one, as they said: "From afar the Lord appeared to me [מרחוק ה' נראה לי]" *(Jeremiah 31:3, Masoretic)* — that is, we saw him, but not now. Yet this will [sometimes] occur owing to a deficiency [לחסרון] of the power of the imaginative [faculty] in fixing [מנתינת תקוי] the number [המספר] [—] this side [yielding only] a great number [מספר רב]. And here is loosed [resolved] this doubt.

[Resolving what was raised as the doubt]: the Active Intellect has already emanated to the material intellect [the comprehensive] ordering, owing to the inclination [נטות] of the thought of the recipient [—] this emanation [being] of the

Active Intellect itself; and his being informed [הודעתו] of this — [namely,] of what individual time [הזמן] of his this ordering would be [—] would be [provided] by what is effected [שיפעלהו] from the limbs [מהאברים] and the intentions of the soul [הכוונות הנפשיות], for the sake of providence and protection, [in a way] other than there being [proper] knowledge [ידיעה] for [one] man over [another] man. And it would not be necessary to suppose that the Active Intellect possesses [an] individual [knowledge of] this man; for this [knowledge] would [otherwise be] the more wondrous [marvelous] informing in this man, [the more so] in respect of [his being] other than himself — as is explained of itself, together with what we have set straight [שהישרנו] concerning it.

[Resolving the **fourth** doubt]: that this is explained from what preceded. And this [is so]: granted that these men, for the most part, [receive this] only because they sought after the informing [—] and this [is so] because we find that the prophets, when their thought inclined [toward Israel], spoke concerning [Israel]; yet most of their words were [such] that their thought inclined toward them [Israel] more [than otherwise]. [The fourth doubt being]: why this informing should be peculiar to these men of Israel, [and not] in their thought [המחשבה המקבל] that receives this informing [—] [why] their thoughts [should differ] from [those of] the rest of the nations [בשאר אומות] apart from Israel [—] [and] in respect of what befalls [שקרה] Israel, their thought being [inclined toward them]… [the resolution as above].

[Resolving the **fifth** doubt]: there is no contradiction [hard thing] in what was hard. For this [is so]: since this informing is exceedingly hard to find in existence, it would have been better that it reach a man

[107 / 108]

[—] one [endowed] with [a particular] knowledge in the [course of] events [בקורות] of others, until there be ordered for him… that most men preserve [the disposition], as was the case [with] him who attained to this degree — he will find that there already reached him, of the [comprehensive] knowledge in their matters, [the relevant items]. Do you not see that Jeremiah [ירמיה], peace be upon him — though the word of the Lord, blessed be He [דבר השם יתברך], became a reproach [לחרפה] to him, so that he was perpetually stricken and crushed [נגוע ומדוכא] — still did not flee [בורח] so as to suppress his prophecy. *(Jeremiah 20:8–9 — "the word of the LORD was made a reproach unto me … but it was in my heart as a burning fire … and I could not stay.")* — He who attains to the [proper] perfection [is] so [endowed]; my intention is that, according as it is possible for [the perfection] to emanate from Him, blessed be He, to others, [the recipient] will

find that there reached him… The sages [החכמים] composed in [their] book [ספר] what they apprehended [שישיגוהו], [and] the [authors of these] books [הספרים] composed them for themselves [לעצמם]; yet this reality is perfected [נשלם זה המציאות], r"l [רצונו לומר, "that is to say"], by reason of the benefit that those who are perfect emanate of [their] perfection to him who is less than they; and [by reason of] the benevolence [והחנינה]. — And the example [המשל] is that, were it not [for] the will of the Name, blessed be He, [to bestow] of perfection in the way of grace [החסד] and benevolence [החנינה], the separate intellects [השכלים הנבדלים] would [not] emanate any portion to the limit of what is possible; and were it not for the will of the heavenly bodies, the lower world [העולם השפל] would [not stand] in the way of grace and benevolence. And one need not say that it [the world] would not be perfected.

[The resolution, continued, on the] side of grace and benevolence: because it is explained… that benefit [לתועלת] reaches them [the recipients], for [otherwise] there would be no [such] existence [מציאות] at all. But were the matter the reverse, my intention is that the thing… they would not have been found. And since the matter is so, in matters apart from him [the recipient], [it is so] for the sake that the knowledge [הידיעה] should reach… [he] strives in his knowing it [whenever] it is possible for him, [so that] there reach a man, of [the] perfection, what he is able [to receive] of it [—] of what suffices for him alone [שיספיק לו לבדו].

[Resolving the **sixth** doubt]: it is more [readily resolved] according to what [is the case] [—] [namely,] in respect of what these informings [are] in themselves: it should be understood that it would be [a matter] either [stemming] from one of two causes [משתי סבות], or from the two of them together [—] [for] he is prepared to receive the apprehension [ההשגה] in perfection, and this is what… he will have no power [כח] to receive this apprehension — what reaches [him reaches] only by [way of] choice [בחירה] and parable [ומשל]. And this [is so]: because [there are] many intentions [כוונות רבות], and because of this, this [informing] was by necessity [בהכרח] deficient [חסרה]. And the matter here is like the matter in [the case of] two men, one of weak sight [חלוש הראות], the other of good sight [טוב הראות], apprehending one [and the same] visible [object] [מראה אחד]:

[108 continued]…it is possible for him; and it [the deficiency] is the better, also, in this [respect] — that he is able to emanate from himself to another more than [the recipient] would be. According to what he says: this [is so] also, granting that what is operative [שהפועל] is [drawn from] another; [it being] that this difference [החלוף] is from the side of the degree [מדרגה] of the recipient [המקבל], and this

[arises] from the two of them together [—] if [it be] because the material intellect is the one… that arrives at his knowing the thing in [its] explanation; and the other [—] the [one possessing] the apprehension in perfection [—] and this [the deficient apprehension] would not reach him [as perfect]. For this [matter of] the riddle [החידה] and the parable [והמשל] [is such that] there have already been found for them, by necessity, the informing knowledge [—] the [knowledge] reaching in this [way] [—] the manner of knowing of the matter, in respect of his being one whose power of sight is good [טוב הראות], together with one who is [deficient], the other [—] [for] the other apprehends them according to what he [is able].

*

Sefer Milchamot HaShem — Book II (מאמר ב'), Chapter 6 (פרק ו')

[Continues the resolution of the enumerated doubts concerning the informing (ההודעה) — divination, dreams, and prophecy.]

[Book-page 109 / PDF p. 121]

[Resolving the sixth doubt, continued]: Even one who apprehends only the genus of a thing — I mean, one who apprehends that it is red or green, but does not apprehend at which grade within the red or the green it stands — the matter of the informing [ההודעה] is likewise. For he who receives this emanation [השפע] in its full perfection apprehends the [comprehensive] ordering [הסדור] insofar as it pertains to this man, or to this people, in respect of what it is, and in respect of which time it would be that this ordering of his would be [realized]. But he who receives that ordering in a deficient manner apprehends only the genus of this ordering. He brings the visible appearance [המראה] and assimilates that genus to whatever fits each one of the kinds belonging to that genus — and this imitation [החקוי] is the riddle [החידה] and the parable [המשל].

By this, too, there came to be grades [of prophecy]. I mean that, in proportion as the riddle and the parable were the deeper, the apprehension was the more deficient — for [such an apprehension] is assimilated to more things. The difference among the prophets, peace be upon them, in this matter resembles this: that what they received was this emanation, which is the intellect [השכל], as has been explained elsewhere. He whose intellect was more perfect in its perfection — his way [enabled] him to receive this apprehension in a more

perfect manner. And this is what was said of Moses our master, peace be upon him: that his apprehension was not [given] in riddle, whereas with the rest of the prophets, peace be upon them, most of what reached them came in riddles and parables. This, too, occurred in grades, according to their respective grades in prophecy and according to the prophet's grade [in apprehension] when the informing of prophecy reached them — namely, that the one prophet [received it] in a more perfect manner than the other.

Now the prophecy of Moses our master, peace be upon him, was, at its outset, [given] without riddle, in that the perfection-bearing way [of apprehension] reaching a man might reach him at first in a deficient manner, and later reach him in a more perfect manner. — Or this might come about by reason of the perfections of grade and disposition [הכרה], not by reason of the [defect in] retention of the apprehension and its completeness. This [is so] when the imaginative faculty [המדמה] is disposed in full perfection to imitate what it apprehends from the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני]: then that ordering would be assimilated [accurately] to it, [the imaginative faculty] taking it in as it is. But when it is not disposed for this in full perfection, it would not take in that ordering as it is; rather, it assimilates [only] what resembles it — and this is the matter of the parable.

Indeed, this would obtain when the recipient apprehends this material intellect, as has been explained in the matter of prophecy. And it would obtain when the recipient apprehends this [emanation] by way of divination and dream, in accordance with what will be explained hereafter. So, then, the deficiency that occurs in the prophets [reflects] their grades, and their perfections [reflect] the deficiency of the apprehension reaching them and its completeness.

Now the diviner [הקוסם] who has some grade [drawn] from the grades of divination [הקסם] or prophecy is so [endowed] by reason of the inclination [נטות] of his thought toward this matter, [so] that knowledge of some matter should reach him by way of a parable. By contrast, one who did not [stand] at this grade — knowledge of some matter could not reach him by way of a parable, but only by accident [במקרה].

This is what Joseph [יוסף] said to Pharaoh [פרעה], peace be upon him, when [Pharaoh] asked him concerning what was hidden from [Pharaoh] in his dream: "It is not in me; God will answer the peace of Pharaoh" [Genesis 41:16] — wishing to say thereby that what would be said to him in interpreting [בפתרון] this dream is what would be emanated upon him in this knowledge from the Name, blessed be He; for [Joseph] was being saved by this discourse [המאמר] concerning the

interpretation [פתרון] of the dream, were there in it some matter against Pharaoh — that is, [a matter] not according to [Pharaoh's] will — but [it was] according to what [Joseph] was shown from heaven.

[Book-page 110 / PDF p. 122]

[Resolving the seventh doubt]: Now the seventh doubt [is resolved] the more readily, according to what was said. This [is so] because the informing [ההודעה] that has already reached the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] for the most part awakens, in order that this emanation [השפע] from the [actualized] intellect be received, by means of an aid [שיעור] from the [common] sense [מהחוש] and from the imagination [הרמיון]. This [is so] in that the imagination [הדמיון] sets up the imagined forms [הצורות הדמיוניות] needed for it to set up an intelligible [מושכל]; and according to [the imagination's] setting up of these imagined forms, it would not be [realized] except by [deliberate] application [בהשתדלות], if it did not occur by accident [במקרה]; and [that] application would not [come about] in setting them up except in waking [בהקיץ]. Hence it was of necessity that knowledge [הידיעה] not reach [a man] through the first premises [בהקדמות הראשונות] for the most part, except by [deliberate] application.

As for [knowledge through] the second intelligibles [המושכלות השניות], this is explained: the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] needs [first principles] in order to set up, by means of them, the first premises [ההקדמות הראשונות] from which knowledge in their intelligibles reaches it — and this setting-up [העמדה] would not be, for the most part, except by application. Hence such application could not be [carried out] at the time of sleep [בעת השינה], for then there would not be found in the soul-faculties [the power for] choice [בחירה] in whatever they do.

As for this second informing [הודעה], it is [given] for the most part in sleep, because it requires the withdrawal/concentration of the intellect [ההתבודדות אל השכל] — that of the imagination, or of [something] other [than it] — from the rest of the soul-faculties [שאר הכחות הנפשיות] that apprehend [things]. And this [happens] for the most part at the time of sleep, since at the time of sleep these soul-faculties are removed [from being] troubled [טרודים] in their activities [בפעולותיהם].

This informing is found, at times, [to come] in waking [בהקיץ] for one of three causes [משלש סבות]: either by reason of the perfection of the recipient's faculty [שלמות כח המקבל]; or by reason of the slightness [קלות] of the [contrary] subjugation of the rest of the soul-faculties to the apprehending faculty [aiming] at the apprehension; or by reason of the smallness of the apprehension [itself].

This [is so] because, when the recipient's faculty was perfect, this emanation [השפע] suffices for the one who receives it [even with] this weak withdrawal [ההתבודדות החלוש] that he would have in waking. And when the rest of the faculties are easily subjugated to the apprehending faculty — when [the soul] wishes to withdraw [להתבודד] from the rest of the soul-faculties — then the withdrawal [ההתבודדות] in waking would be completed, and they would not prevent it on account of the troubling [טרדת] of the [common] sense [החוש].

This [could come about] in that it might be that the senses are not engaged in their activities, [even] while a man is awake — when one faculty among the apprehending faculties is occupied with its activity, the rest of the apprehending faculties being subjugated to that faculty. And so you will find with some men: when thought is employed in its activity, they were occupied in that activity, [so that] one would call out before them and they would not hear. And this has already happened to us many times in our investigation into deep matters.

When the apprehension was small, the weak withdrawal [ההתבודדות החלוש] that one would have in waking would suffice for it. It seems that the first two of the three causes were [present] in the prophecy reaching Moses our master, peace be upon him, in waking — for the recipient faculty in him was perfect in the ultimate perfection, and so he reached a grade of prophecy above [all] the grades belonging to the rest of the prophets, all of them, as it is attested concerning him: "And there arose not a prophet since in Israel like Moses" [Deuteronomy 34:10]. And the rest of his apprehending faculties were easily subjugated to the recipient's faculty at any time he wished, as it says: "Stand, and I will hear what the Lord will command concerning you" [Numbers 9:8].

[Book-page 111 / PDF p. 123]

[Seventh doubt, concluded]: And [because of] the ease of subjugating the rest of the apprehending faculties to the recipient soul-faculty, there would not reach him [any] tremor or dread [רתת וחרדה] when prophecy came upon him — by reason of the withdrawal [ההתבודדות] that the faculty then [enjoyed]. The matter with the rest of the prophets, peace be upon them — who [found it] hard to subjugate the rest of the apprehending faculties to the soul-faculty that receives [prophecy] in them — was that the withdrawal weighed heavily upon the rest of the apprehending faculties, and there occurred to them, from this, tremor and dread [רתת וחרדה]. It resembles [the case] in which some men see true dreams [חלומות צודקים] in waking [בהקיץ], by reason of the weakness of the apprehension; and we have already explained this in the chapter that comes hereafter.

[Resolving the eighth doubt]: Now the eighth doubt — it seems that it [arises] from what one falsely supposed [שיקשה]. All the more so, given what we have made public — that the matter of prophecy requires perfection of the intellect [שלמות השכל], and for this reason the prophets were learners before the sages, until their intellect was disposed to receive the emanation of prophecy [שפע הנבואה]. And we may say that, because the knowledge [הידיעה] that reached the youths and the simple [לנערים ולפתאים] in these matters is either of the genus of divination [הקסם], or of the genus of the dream [החלום], and [because] the knowledge that follows upon perfection of the material intellect [שלמות השכל ההיולאני] is, without doubt, prophecy [הנבואה] — it is fitting that we inquire whether prophecy, divination, and the dream are of one genus or not.

For if they were of one genus, then this doubt is resolved; but if they were not of one genus, there would be no doubt at all on this side — that is, that the differing things [הדברים המתחלפים] should not arise from contraries [מההפכים].

We may say that we have already explained that prophecy differs from divination and the dream in [these] matters. For prophecy is the reaching of perfection in instruction [שלמות מגעת בהתלמדה], and for this reason the prophets were learners [תלמידים], and were drawn from [the class of] those who direct themselves [המתנהגים] — I mean, those who strove to attain prophecy; and the matter is not so in the dream and in divination. — And among them [the differences]: that the [genuine] recipient [הנביא] was a sage [חכם], and this is famed in the matter of prophecy, whereas the matter is not so in the dream and in divination; rather, they are found at times among the simple and the youths [לפתאים ולנערים] more than [what] is found among most of the discerning [המשכילים].

And among them: that everything Isaiah the prophet [ישעיהו הנביא] foreknew is just [צודק] — I mean, that the ordering [הסדור] of these matters [coming] from the side of the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמיימים] is according to what they foreknow, [together] with their being possible [in respect of being] from the side of choice [הבחירה]. This is what one would say concerning [a prophecy of] the evil that Jeroboam son of Nebat [ירבעם בן נבט] would do: it is not necessarily binding that it come about, since it might be that that man or that place or that people would escape from that evil [coming] from the side of choice — [the side] over which retribution [הושמה] is set down [—] in respect of what [men] falsely supposed [שקשרם].

But the good that the prophet [הנביא] foretells will come about without doubt — I mean, the good ordered from the quarter of the heavenly bodies — because the

human intellect [השכל האנושי] from which the principle of choice [הבחירה] is found is disposed to bringing a man to the good. And this was the [divine] intention in the existence of this choice; and for this reason it could not be that the apprehension [ההשגה] [?] reaching from it be [directed] toward evil [הרע] — [evil] in respect of which it is fitting that good should reach [a man] from the quarter of the orbit of the heavenly bodies [כדור הגרמים השמיימים]. Rather, [the intellect] strives, by the [contributing] causes [בסבות], for the aid [העזרה] toward the reaching of the good that the prophet foreknows. And this has already been explained in a fitting manner in this Book's sixth chapter [במאמר הששי], by the decree of the Name, blessed be He.

[Book-page 112 / PDF p. 124]

[The eighth doubt, continued]: In divination and the dream there is much falsity [הכזב הרבה], and this is manifest from sense-experience [מן החוש]. — And among them: that the prophet [הנביא] makes known these matters directly to a man — or [to] the people whom God informs of this — toward human felicity [ההצלחה האנושית]: when one is told to keep his way [from evil] and to return from the evil [מדרכו הרעה] and turn back to the Lord, blessed be He, that He might turn back [וישוב] from that evil [against] him — [this being] because most of the informings [ההודעות] that He makes known to men are [given] in order to bring them to human felicity. And the matter is not so in divination and the dream.

After we have made plain this [matter, in which] prophecy on the one hand and divination and the dream on the other differ, we may say that it is explained that the informing [ההודעה] in them is not of one genus. For if the matter were so, the difference between them would be one of less and more, according to the difference in the recipient's disposition [הכנת המקבל], so [that] the agent [הפועל] in them would be one according to this supposition [ההנחה], and likewise the recipient [המקבל]. But this informing is not of one genus, as has been falsely supposed; and this is explained of itself. For, according as the recipient in prophecy is the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] in [its] being perfected in the intelligibles [במושכלות] — as we set down earlier — it was of necessity that this informing, [being] of a grade drawn from perfection of the intellect [שלמות השכל], should be such that whoever has not in his intellect any perfecting thing [from] perfection [מהשלמות] is not disposed to receive this emanation [זה השפע].

And the reverse of this is what is found by sense-experience [בחוש] concerning this [matter]: for the reaching of this informing has already been found among some of the youths and the simple [הנערים והפתאים] more than what is found among many of the discerning [מהמשכילים].

Furthermore: this wondrous difference [ההבדל הנפלא] between prophecy on the one hand and divination and the dream on the other, [taken] according to what we have mentioned, instructs that the informing in them is not of one genus. For if they were of one genus, the difference between them would [merely] be this wondrous difference; rather, it is fitting that their matters [be] differing [מתחלפים] in [degrees of] less and more [only], as we have said. And given that the matter is so, then there would be no doubt at all on this side.

But there yet remains [a matter] upon which we must inquire — what these two genera of the informing [שני אלו הסוגים מההודעה] are, according to what has been given us from [first] principles [מהקדמות], and who the agent in each one of them is, and [who] the recipient — in a fitting manner [befitting] what appears to sense from their matters [מענינים]. For this — if it was very hard [קשה מאד] — [is so] by reason of the paucity of the principles found by us in this [matter]; for the very essence of the felicity [עצם ההצלחה] is that we apprehend a thing [drawn] from the things found according to what they are by nature, [a felicity] of which we [now] know [only little].

We may say that it is explained: if the recipient faculty [הכח המקבל] was not one, and the parable [המשל] which the recipient received was at the end of the imagination [באחרית הדמיון] — behold, the agent [הפועל] is not one. For there is no way that the imagination [הדמיון] should receive an agent [acting upon] the intellect [פועל השכל], if this was not [done] by means of the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני] — [namely,] by reason of the unity [האחדות] that obtains between [the imagination's product] and the material intellect, in that it [the intellect] becomes one soul [נפש אחת].

When this truth [is grasped], the conditional syllogism [ההקש התנאי] [follows]: we may say that, as already shown, the recipient [המקבל] is not one in these genera of the informing [מההודעה]. The recipient in prophecy is, as explained, the material intellect [השכל ההיולאני], and were it not so, the reaching of prophecy [הגעת הנבואה] would not be drawn after perfection of the intellect [שלמות השכל]. But the recipient in divination [בקסם] and in dream [ובחלום] — it is impossible that it be the material intellect. For if the matter were so, their grades would be according to the grade of the intellect that receives them [—] until [we should say] that whoever has the more perfect intellect would be the more disposed [to receive them]…

[Continues hereafter.]

*

to receive this informing [השפע]. And if the matter were so, it would necessarily follow that this informing would belong to everyone who is more intellectually capable, drawn from among youths and the simple [הנערים והפתאים], and to those who are the reverse — whereas in fact what is found in the case of sensation is the contrary. My intent here is to recall what has already been established: that this informing is found among youths and the simple far more than it is found among the intelligent [המשכילים].

This perhaps comes to youths and to the simple on account of the slight use they make of the heavenly informing [השתמש המהמש?]; for being less occupied with the diversion that turns their thought toward something else, [their] concentration is not disturbed by what belongs to others, and so it is brought to completion in them [?]. For [an intellect] in which the soul's other faculties remain weak is more perfect than in others. And were it so, [we would say] that this is the informing.

We have said to him that it is impossible, in the deficiency of the soul's other faculties — for there is in them no agent that produces [the concentration]; rather, only the complete intellects [שלמי השכל] achieve concentration when they make use of [the faculties] in their objects of thought, [so that the concentration] belongs to the soul's parts of this kind. And this is so because that concentration is itself explained, in the soul, for whoever examines this in this book.

[The informing through] thought in its operation — the concentration that derives from the rest of the cognitive faculties [שאר כחות], and the instrument by which concentration is brought to maturity — through their operations there comes to be, at the time, an ample yield in these matters, and a binding-together of the limbs that have sensation [האברים המרגישים], so as for the soul to be one. And accordingly, when each of them has its proper potency from its own faculties, the faculties will be such that it is possible for the soul to use both operations together.

For the [faculty] that receives this informing in divination, and [in] the dream, is the material intellect [השכל ההיולני]. But the [faculty] that receives it operates with little examination, as is stated in "the denial of the sense" [בכפר החוש]; for these are referred to imagination [הדמיון], as has been explained. Our point is that there is an interchange [התחלוף] between them — between understanding [the matter] and the dream — and that the informing in them is of one kind. And since the recipient and the agent are one and the same in them, this is so [?].

The informing that derives from the agent [מהשכל] — the [material] intellect [the producer] — it is fitting that there be… Rather, it is that he has already explained, in what has preceded [במה שקדם], that the informing [is from] the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל]. Moreover, it would be likened that the agent here is another agent. Now this is hard for us [יקשה לנו]…

it is necessary that the agent not be [other] in producing this informing [from] the agent, while the preceding discourse [המאמר הקודם] requires that there be [an agent] over it. Behold it is necessarily so that the Active Intellect be the agent, an agent producing it in another respect. And since the matter is so, the informing that reaches in divination…

and the dream by means [of the Active Intellect], not by itself. And this is so, for the discourse that requires the [Active] Intellect to give this informing does not require that the agent be a producer by itself; rather, [it requires] that the agent that produces it be it [the Active Intellect], whether it produce it by itself or through a mediating cause — if through a mediating cause [אם בזולה אמצעי], [then through that]. And this is the discourse that has required that the informing not be [given except by] an agent producing it, but only that the agent not be one producing it by itself; rather, it would be an agent producing it through mediation [באמצעות]. And since the matter is so, this is the intermediary [האמצעי].

We say that, because the Active Intellect is the agent in these matters in many of its operations, it appears that the intermediaries [האמצעיים] in attaining this [informing] are the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים]. For it has been explained that what appears to be done in it by the Active Intellect is [in fact done by] the heavenly bodies, as the informing makes plain. Moreover, it has already been explained that the informing that comes from the heavenly bodies to those who possess intellect [בעלי שכל] — behold, they are apprehending in them [the order]…

it will be explained in full clarity in Book V [מאמר חמישי] of this book, in the manner explained there. The heavenly bodies are nothing other than what is ordered from one of the [heavenly] bodies; and each one of the movers [ממניעי הגרמים] of the heavenly bodies is ordered from another, and each of them is ordered from the operations [that proceed] from it — not [merely] that which is ordered [from the rest]. When this is settled for us, behold we say that, just as they are ordered, so a man among men of the rank of the growing [הצומח] or the ruling [השליט], [a man] whose imagination [הדמיון] concentrates apart from the rest of the soul's faculties — [the order] that is poured forth upon their souls is poured forth from them. And accordingly…

there will be in it all the heavenly bodies in their perfection, as the law of [the matter] requires; and all the heavenly bodies will be these orders. Behold, this would be the knowledge that reaches [הידיעה המגעת]. This was a falsehood [שיקרה הכוב] in great measure, like these informings [ההודעות]. The contact of the Active Intellect [מגעת מהשכל הפועל] — which is what bestows [the influence] — behold, this would be the knowledge that reaches from it in full. And the intent of the Active Intellect was that the agent [produce] in every man [the influence] that is in them [whose end] is the attainment of success [הגעת ההצלחה]; for it [the Active Intellect] produces it and operates upon it by what acts upon it. [Thus] prophecy [הנבואה] would be [directed] toward success.

But divination and the dream [הקסם והחלום] — why [do] the heavenly bodies [act] in the manner we have mentioned? And it was so that in it the imagination is not set straight toward success [להישיר אל ההצלחה], but [its setting-straight is] thus [partial]. It was so because the informing was not [an informing] that sets men aright toward the ends. And it was so that the recipient receiving in prophecy [המקבל בנבואה] is the material intellect [השכל ההיולני]; this was so because the reaching [of it] was on account of this study [ההלמדרה?]. And because the recipient…

in divination and the dream is the imagination [הדמיון], their reaching [of the informing] was not drawn toward the perfection of the intellect [שלמות השכל]. And because the imagination concentrates more readily in proportion as the distraction [מטרדת] is greater, [divination is found] among youths more than among [other] men; for it was found far more often among them than among the intelligent [מהמשכילים]. And this is so, for [the recipient] needs the cogitative faculty [הכח המדמה] to concentrate apart from the rest [of the faculties], so that they do not confuse its operation. And because of what has been explained — that in the sense, the matter of these informings is itself explained — it is therefore established, in the manner that we have grasped. — And here these doubts have all been made clear.

פרק שביעי

Chapter Seven

[Sub-heading, smaller type, p. 115:] [נחקר בו בשתי שאלות קשות יקרו בענין החלום והקסם.] — "An investigation, in it, of two difficult questions [שאלות קשות] that arise concerning the matter of the dream and divination."

There still remain to us two difficult questions [שתי שאלות קשות] to investigate in this matter.

The first: What is the cause of the fact that this informing comes to a youth found in our own time [בנער הנמצא בזמננו], who makes known something whose [measure] exceeds this measure [מזה השיעור]?

And the second: Why is it that what is false [predominates], so that most of the knowledge that reaches in them by [this contact] has become widely known to us to be false — whereas [in some cases] it would be [true], as we mentioned in our exposition of the book "On the Sense and the Cogitated" [לספר החוש והמוחש]; [the case of] true dreams [החלומות הצודקים], such that already the things that befall come true forthwith [הנופלים תכף]? And it would be likened that this informing is [of the things] befalling forthwith, or that for the most part it falls [otherwise]. These [questions] are difficult, reaching very deep, and on account of the scarcity of [the relevant] premises [ולמיעוט ההקדמות] — which the [exposition] falls short of giving within them according to their measure — let us reach toward the end what is possible, when we know a thing for us.

And we, beginning the investigation from the question [מהשאלה] that precedes [in the order], in giving consideration to the cause why [this informing reaches what we have] set down alone, it is fitting to investigate of what [kind] this informing is — that is, whether it is of the species of prophecy [מין הנבואה], or of the species of divination [מין הקסם], or of the species of the dream [מין החלום]. For it is not impossible that there be some cause for this [in some respect], [in such a way] that one does not know of what [kind] this informing is in itself. And it is explained that it is not of the species of prophecy, according to what we have explained of its matter. And this is so because it [prophecy] would need [to be drawn] toward the perfection of the intellect [שלמות השכל]; and this [youth] has no portion in wisdom [חכמה] at all. According to what [it has been explained that] this informing comes to him at a time when he was [a child], at the very least, with [hardly] a [right hand and a left] — for it accords with what…

is genuinely related: that at the time they began to make known [the future], it would make known as far as seven years [ahead] [כמו שבע שנים]. Likewise we say that he is among [those who have] the true dreams [החלומות הצודקות], for they are few, since the dreams are not of a kind by which informing reaches; and if this was so, it was a small matter and by way of chance [מעט ובדרך מקרה].

Rather, this informing was of the species of divination [ממין הקסם]: the informing concerned what he was asked [מה שידעהו שואלו], and concerned that of which

he… [made] known — that is, [only] what he was asked. This is a deficient divination [קסם חסר], inasmuch as it makes known no more than this measure. It is like a person who is able to read coarse script [הכתיבה הגסה] but is not able to read [the fine] — not [merely] a person who reads coarse script, so too here; but also a person who is not able to read [the fine]…

to make known these matters, [knowing them] only if he be six years old or… And it is explained that this informing is not of the species of the few [the complete kind], and this informing is an illuminating one [מאירית]. Moreover, the informing in these matters [comes] by way of the question in waking [על דרך השאלה בהקיץ] and by way of chance. And since the matter is so, behold there does not remain [doubt that it is] of the species of divination. And according as complete divination [הקסם השלם] reaches both to what he was [asked] and to what he did not know — this [youth] being incapable [of being] thus asked — behold it is explained that this divination is greater than this measure, as has been said concerning one who is able to read the fine script [הכתיבה הדקה] which he had seen [only] deficiently, [or only] the coarse — for one who is whole in vision will read [even] the reading of the fine script. And this deficiency is…

of the cogitative faculty [המדמה] that belongs to this youth, in that he is not [capable of] the [full] measure — [and so it is], from the side of completeness [מצד זה השלמות], to be [an apprehension that is] weak; and after this [comes] strengthening, as the matter is in the rest [of cases]. If this was so, behold it is possible that there be for this youth [something] that does not prevent him. And behold the sense [החוש] is able to give a measure [שיעור]; and this is so because, if there reaches him from the divination more than this [measure], it is explained that the second cause is the true one [שהסבה השנית היא הצודקת].

But [as for] how divination would be disposed to receive the informing [השפע] by this informing — [the matter] that it would need to receive the informing in the rest [of the faculties] — the reception of the informing by this informing [is likened] to the [reading of] coarse script [הכתיבה הגסה] as against the reading of the fine script [הכתיבה הדקה], [which] he knows in it. And this is so, for the transcribing of the matter [שהעתק הדבר] toward [the recipient] that receives it is an easier transcribing than the reception of [another] matter. The illustration is from a person who would be taught one portion [מתלמד חלק אחד]…

[behold,] its transcribing toward learning another portion of them [חלק אחר מהם]; [for] toward the learning, the craft [מלאכה] is not of [the same] kind as that [outside] the kind that he receives — that is, the science of nature [חכמת הטבע] or the science of philosophy [חכמת הפלוסופיא]. The illustration is from the parts of

the geometrical crafts [המלאכות ההנדסיות]: behold the [transcribing] is easier in transcribing toward the learner [מהעתקו אל התלמד] than the [original] learning [מהתלמד], as though one were to say that the science of nature is settled by this. And this is explained in the craft [במלאכת]…

the rule that the thought transmitted from the heavenly bodies that rule [המסורת מהגרמים השמימיים השליטים] at that time, according to [their order]… It has been explained that the man transcribes [שהעתק האדם] toward receiving what was thought [מה שחשב], [and] the orders from the heavenly bodies [הסדורות מהגרמים השמימיים] are an easier [transcribing]; inasmuch as in the soul of the heavenly bodies, in the measure that it transcribes toward receiving a thought other than its own [מחשבת זולתו], it is [more readily] transcribed [הוא נעתק]. And this is so, for in transcribing toward…

[Gathering signature, foot of p. 116: "8*"]

toward a matter of the same kind as that which it had been receiving — but not toward what is informed apart from divination [בזולת קסם]. And when [the soul of the heavenly bodies] transcribes toward receiving what is emanated from them, it transmits toward receiving a matter outside the kind it had been receiving. Once this is so, it is explained that the cogitative faculty [הדמיוני] can be such that it is possible for its deficiency [to be the case], so far as it [can] receive human thought [מחשבה האנושית] — no more than this. And this [is so] whether [the deficiency] be on the side of the [celestial] cause at the root of [the soul's] formation [שרש היצירה], or [whether it be] that the application of the soul-faculties [ההתבודדות] proper to the reception of this emanation [השפע] is not complete; for, as we have already noted, it is by reason of the lesser [engagement] that the perfect cogitative faculty more readily attains, in divination, the apprehension of human thought, which it requires in order to receive what is emanated from the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים].

Moreover, it is already evident that Solomon's informing [those] that accompany a man and stand by him [imprinted] their impress [רושם] of what was found present to him in that matter — to the point that the man could thereafter speak of a thing as it ought to be spoken, as was the case in the presence of the sages. For [Solomon] was not the one who is with them; yet in man this came about, in their being masters of this faculty : that whatever was emanated from one man emanated to another man, and the informing [reached] in what its questioner [השואל] knew, [drawn] from the informing about what he did not know. — And this is the measure that appears to us concerning this question.

But [as for] the true dreams [החלומות הצודקות] that come about in waking [בהקיץ] — behold it is likely that the informing that falls in them concerns matters that come to pass close [at hand], because the application of the soul-faculties that reaches the cogitative faculty in waking is deficient; and for this reason the informing that falls in them is deficient. Now indeed, the deficiency of the informing will be clarified by what we shall say: for the complete informing [ההודעה השלימה] is that which reaches a man both in what the scale tips toward [שיפול תכף — what occurs at once / imminently] and in what it does not so tip toward. And since the matter is so, behold this knowledge that falls in waking is [only] in respect of what the scale tips toward, not in respect of what it does not — for this informing reaches even one who attains the informing [only] in respect of what the scale tips toward. And it appears that the attaining of the knowledge in respect of what the scale tips toward is far easier than its apprehension in respect of what it does not, as we shall say.

This is so because, as has been explained concerning the recipient in his soul, when the recipient is more disposed it suffices the more, by [its] greater power, to bring forth into act what it had in potency from the [celestial] agent [מהפועל] that is required to dispose the matter so that it become fit [for the recipient] in this manner. And since the matter is so, behold, when the cogitative faculty is perfect at the root of [its] formation, and the application of the soul-faculties that reaches it is complete, [the recipient] will receive the emanation of the heavenly bodies that have dominion [המשליטים] at that time — not [those] that have dominion [merely] at that very moment alone, but their disposition too [is at work]; and if the power of the [scale-tipping / imminent] act be at that time disposed to emanate in this place. But we have said that, [in their] disposing the imminent act at that time to emanate in this place, [it is] because it is likely that the power that was [present] from the heavenly bodies, to reach this place, attains the events designated to it [המקרים המיוחסים אליו]: there will be [in it] the power of the imminent [act] to reach the knowledge. And for this reason the [act of] thought was rescued [נאצלת] by [its] dominion [coming] from a particular one of the faces [aspects, מהפנים] that [the matter] would have arranged for it — not from all that serve it [המשרתים].

And if there were [also] a portion belonging to them in it [בה], that is little, in proportion to the power [present] at that time in this place; and this is explained for whoever has examined the art of [astrological] judgment [מלאכת המשפט]. And when the cogitative faculty was not complete at the root of [its] formation, or its application of the soul-faculties was not complete, or if these two causes did not combine together — there will not be for [the recipient] the power to receive

what the three heavenly bodies that have dominion at that time arrange; and [the recipient] will know, apart from that power, [only] what those serving ones [המשרתים] arrange that are completed at that time, which are particularized [יתיחדו] in it by [their] power — and this is what the scale tips toward, for it is what the scale tips toward [שיפול תכף] that the serving ones completed at that time are referred to. And it is particularized to [the recipient] in the informing [in] respect of what the scale tips toward, [as understood] from the rest of what they arrange, in their being completed in what it left over in this manner — [namely] in their thought being spread out over things. And this has already been explained, as has been said.

And behold, the serving ones [המשרתים] again, by the manner [in which they are] from the [scale-tipping] power [מהכח], are such that the time will not be for them [anything] but a long time; and there is no apprehension for a man concerning a subject that will be in that time, and for this reason the thought is not spread out over [those distant] things.

And it has already become evident that this informing, which falls upon things that come to pass close [at hand], reaches the more readily, because the things [that come] near touch the more quickly [תכף מגעת בקלות יותר], since we find that there reaches many men a strong fear in their being around at the disposed time before some evil event [פגע רע] comes upon them — as though the knowledge of what [will be] in that event were present to them, even though they did not know that very event; yet there reaches them from it [only] fear alone, just as in falsehood the deficient-of-sight will not see the flame of the lamp, but will see [its] light [יראו אורה].

And it has already been doubted, and one might say: if this informing [reaching] in what the rest of men arrange more readily reaches, [drawn] from the informing about what the heavenly bodies arrange, as has been said — why is it that the dreams that occur in waking were not [present] in the thought of the rest of men more than [in] the rest of things? And we say that the informing [reaching] in respect of the rest of men is impossible except by way of the question [השאלה] in waking; and this is indeed possible in divination, because the attaining of the informing in divination is active [מאדיית] and referred to the [diviner's] will; whereas in dreams this is not possible, because the informing in them is passive [מעטיית] and is not referred to the will of the dreamer. — And this is explained in [the soul] itself, concerning the matter of the dream. — And here these doubts have been resolved, in accordance with what we possess of the premises in this inquiry.

פרק שמיני (Chapter Eight)

[Sub-heading, small type:] In it are given the causes of the differing degrees [התחלפות המדרגות] among men in each one of these informings — in dream, in divination, and in prophecy [בחלום ובקסם ובנבואה].

Now that all this has been explained — the whole matter of prophecy, divination, and the dream — it is easy for us to give the causes of the differing degrees among men in each one of these informings.

This is so because one whose intellect was more complete and whose application of the soul-faculties [ההתבודדות] was more facile was the more complete in prophecy; and according as these two things differed, more or less, [the degrees] will differ.

And the differentiation of the informing in [its] subjects belongs to a portion of the men who receive this emanation in subjects other than [those] subjects, according to the nature of the man who is recipient of the informing: that when his thought is more inclined [toward a thing], the informing reaches him the more. And this [holds in common] for the diviner and for the prophet alike; and for this reason you find that a portion of the diviners knows some kind of the events by a particularity [distinguishing them] from the rest. The illustration is that one whose thought is inclined toward the matter of mating [הזווג] — for man and for woman, whether by nature or by custom — his informing is particularized to these things, as has been published concerning the matter of the sorceresses [הקוסמות]. And one whose thought is inclined toward the felicity of the intellect [הצלחת השכל] alone is particularized in those things in which lies the felicity of the intellect, and in the subjects bearing [directly] upon it, in respect of what is [most] directed toward it.

And [the prophet] Moses our master, peace be upon him, resembled [this]: for in him there combined these three causes that we have mentioned — I mean, that his intellect was exceedingly complete, and the application of his soul-faculties was facile, and his thought was inclined toward the felicity of the intellect alone — and for this reason his prophecy was singular from among [that of] the rest of the prophets, peace be upon them. And behold the author [of the Torah] combined these three causes in [him], to a perfection that it is impossible for any single man [to attain], such as Moses; and the Torah testified that "there arose no prophet [in Israel] like him" (Devarim 34:10).

Likewise we say that the most complete diviner [הקוסם היותר שלם] is he whose cogitative faculty is more disposed for application of the soul-faculties [להתבודד], [drawn off] from the rest of the powers of the soul; and even so, with this disposition at the very root of [its] formation [shaped] to receive this emanation in completeness — for it is already evident that it is possible that there reach, at the root of formation, a deficiency in this power, such that it cannot receive this emanation, even though its application of the soul-faculties be complete in it. And according as these two causes differ, more or less, the degrees of the diviners differ.

And this is so because the application of the soul-faculties [was] complete, and the power [was] complete; [then] the power will receive [from] the serving ones [המשרתים] that have no dominion [הבלתי שליטים] as well, and the just [reckoning] [הצדק] will reach by his words [as drawn] from this cause: in [the diviner's] knowing what the serving heavenly bodies [המשרתים מהגרמים השמימיים] arrange — for all the serving ones combine in this emanation, in the manner of what is arranged from them [as derived] from the activities in this lower world [העולם השפל]. And by every means, there is hidden from [the diviner] something of what is drawn from the divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית], which will not be on the side of the order that [comes] from the heavenly bodies; and this indeed the prophet [נביא] alone knows. And behold this will be explained more fully [באור יותר שלם] at the end of the sixth treatise [המאמר הששי] of this book.

And whoever [is such that] there be in them, at the root of formation, an utter deficiency, will not receive the emanation except from [those bodies] that have dominion [מהשליטים]; and whoever is intermediate among them will receive [from] a portion of [those] that have no dominion, [but] not from [the rest] — that is to say, [the intermediate] will receive the emanation [drawn] from those which have in them a power more potent than [the others]. And by this [reckoning] the recipient[s] will be of many degrees, according to the difference of these [their] degrees [as set] at [their formation]. And so too there will be a difference among the subjects: such that some diviners [קצת הקוסמים] foretell them, and others among the subjects [are such] that the other [class of] diviners [הקוסמים האחרים] foretell them, [each] on the side of the subjects toward which their thought [is most] inclined, as has been said.

[Colophon, centered, small type:] The second treatise of this book is completed. Praise be to God, may He be exalted [התהלה לאל יתעלה].

מאמר שלישי (Treatise Three)

On God's Knowledge of Things [בידיעת השם יתברך הדברים]

[Chapter-list, small type, preceding the treatise:]

Chapter One [פרק ראשון] — in it are recalled the opinions of [our] predecessors concerning this question.

Chapter Two [פרק שני] — in it are recalled the arguments that establish [each] opinion, according to what we have found of them in the words of the masters of these opinions, or [arrived at] by inference from their words.

Chapter Three [פרק שלישי] — an inquiry into the arguments that the Master, the Guide [המורה — Maimonides], of blessed memory, recalled, [to determine] whether they are sufficient or not.

Chapter Four [פרק רביעי] — in it is completed [the showing], in the treatise on God's, may He be blessed, knowledge of things, how it is by way of speculation [בדרך עיוני]; and it is explained that none of the arguments of [our] predecessors refutes what we shall explain to ourselves concerning the matter of this knowledge.

Chapter Five [פרק חמישי] — in it is explained, with full perfection [there] where this matter of [God's] knowledge is to be explained to us, that it is exceedingly fitting [נאות מאד] from every aspect.

Chapter Six [פרק ששי] — in it is explained [the matter] there where the inquiry into this matter of [God's] knowledge brought us, [namely] that it is the opinion of our Torah [דעת תורתנו].

פרק ראשון (Chapter One)

[Sub-heading, small type:] In it are recalled the opinions of [our] predecessors concerning this question.

It is proper that we inquire whether God, may He be blessed, knows these particular contingent things [הדברים הפרטיים האפשריים] that are here [in the lower world], or whether He does not know them; and if He knows them, in what manner He knows them. And since the men of speculation in this inquiry — the philosophers and the sages of the masters of the Torah — are already divided in their opinions, it is proper that we inquire, first of all, into their opinions: what of

them is found to be true [is] taken from them, and what is not found to be true is explained on the side on which falsehood is incurred, [so as to] nullify it.

And we say that the opinions we have found among [our] predecessors concerning this, [those] whose words are worth attending to, are two. The one [is] the opinion of the Philosopher [הפלוסוף = Aristotle] and those who follow after him; and the second [is] the opinion of the great sages of our Torah [גדולי חכמי תורתנו]. Now the Philosopher held the view that God, may He be blessed, does not know these particular things; whereas those who follow after him are divided into two opinions [as to] this view.

The one [is] the supposition that the opinion of the Philosopher is that God, may He be blessed, did not know these things that are here — [meaning] not [even] the universals [הכללים], let alone the particulars [הפרטים]: for if He did know the universals or the particulars, He would be multiple in His items of knowledge [רבוי בידיעותיו] and would be multiple in His own essence [רבוי בעצמותו]; and in general, His own essence would be divided into the more complete and the more deficient — as is the case with things that have a definition [גדר] belonging to them, since some part of what is [included] within that definition [is the part] by which [the thing] proceeds, in degree of perfection, to its [own] extremity.

And the second [is] the supposition that the opinion of the Philosopher is that God, may He be blessed, did know these things that are here, in respect of what is complete [perfect] in them, on the side of the universal nature [הטבע הכולל]...

—namely the things that exist by nature, not in respect of their being particulars. And in this there is no multiplicity in His own essence [רבוי בעצמותו], for He does not know anything except His own self [עצמו]; and in knowing His own self He knows the universal nature of all existents in respect of what belongs to them on the side of their existence, their ordering, and their right disposition [סדרם ויושרם]. But He does not know these particular things [הדברים הפרטיים] as particulars; for were He to do so, there would be in them a privation of order on this side—whereas in fact there is in them order and rightness on the side on which He knows them.

The **fifth** [point] follows from this book by the necessity that the [divine] knowledge is the same [as ours]—a position the great scholars of our Torah [גדולי חכמי תורתנו] hold, as does the exalted Philosopher [הפלוסוף = Aristotle]; and the scholars of our Torah agree to it as well: that God [השם יתברך], blessed be He, knows all of these things that exist by possibility [האפשריים], both the universals [הכללים] and the particulars [הפרטים]. They said that God, blessed be He, knows

by a single act of knowing every one of all [of them]. And it has already been explained that this is the view of the great Rav, the Guide [הרב המורה = Maimonides]: **in the twentieth chapter of the third part of his book** [Guide of the Perplexed III:20], he spoke thus, saying that He knows all these newly-coming things before they come to be, and there did not depart from Him their being known. There was no defect [העדר] in His being one who knows the universal—for His knowing that such-and-such a particular man exists, and that he continually is found to exist, and afterward, when that man passes away, just as it is when that man is found existing—added to Him no knowledge, neither here nor there; nor did any [new] knowledge come about for Him. Rather, what came about anew is what was [newly] found; whereas what He found existing—what came about anew is the thing itself, [not any change in Him]. For knowledge depends upon privation [תפול ידיעה בהעדר], and it encompasses that in which privation precedes its existence; that is, [the case] where privation precedes His knowledge of it. And His knowledge is not prevented by [those] privations [of] knowledge.

[As Maimonides] has already explained in his honored book, the *Guide of the Perplexed* [מורה הנבוכים], a thing [is thus]: these newly-coming things He knew, and He continually knows them, and through this nothing comes about anew. A given particular man is now absent, and is found at a [later] time, and afterward is absent again—so that, when that man is found, nothing is added there [to God] of knowledge, and no [new] knowledge [comes about] for Him. Rather, what came about anew is what came to be; the newness is in the thing that is found, not in Him. It is therefore necessitated that knowledge depend upon privation and encompass it, in that privation precedes His knowledge [of the thing], and that the privation not prevent the dependence of [His] knowledge upon it.

Behold, it has already been explained that He sees and knows the particular things that exist by possibility, on the side on which they are [particular]…

פרק שני [Chapter Two]

[Rubric, in small type beneath the heading:] In it we recall the arguments that sustain the [respective] view—the view [of each side]—according to what we have found of them in the words of the masters of these opinions, whether [in] the opinions [themselves] or [in] the force of their words.

After we have already recalled the opinions of the predecessors concerning this question, it is fitting that we investigate which of their opinions is the correct one;

and it is fitting—because the matter is in dispute in [the question of] these particular things—that we examine the arguments that sustain them.

Now we say that [the reason] which led the Philosopher [Aristotle] to hold that God, blessed be He, does not know these [particulars]—he had reasons that he thought to be among the [valid] demonstrations.

—The **first** mode is that the particular thing is grasped only by the material faculty [כח היולאני], as by the [external] senses. But of God, blessed be He, it is explained from what we [know] of Him that He has no material faculty; therefore God, blessed be He, does not know these particular things. For if God, blessed be He, has no material faculty, and everything that grasps a [particular] thing [has one], then God, blessed be He, [is] one who does not grasp the [particular] thing; and so the syllogism is set in order: God, blessed be He, has no material faculty; and everything that grasps a [particular] thing has a material faculty; therefore God, blessed be He, does not grasp [it].

—And the **second** mode is that the particular matters are temporal [things in time], and that one who is not described [as being] in motion cannot grasp the [particular] thing. For one who is not described neither in motion nor at rest does not grasp the temporal things; but God, blessed be He, is not described neither in motion nor at rest, and so it is necessitated by this that God, blessed be He, [does not grasp] the particulars. And the syllogism is set in order thus: God, blessed be He, [is] not [described as] at rest; and everyone who is not described [as such] is one who cannot grasp the temporal matters—if it be impossible that he grasp the temporal matters. There is further joined to him this [premise]: …in it, [namely] that the particular matters are temporal, [from which] it follows that God, blessed be He, does not grasp the temporal [things], one [act of] knowing them. And it is necessitated by this that God, blessed be He…

—And the **third** mode is that, if it be supposed that He grasps the particular matters, then it may already be reckoned that this would entail [His] being the honored, perfect one [who comes] to know; and this is in the [category of] ultimate privation [תכלית הבטול]. And what [follows]—it is explained that God, blessed be He, [would] not [be one who] grasps, [the supposition] being subject to what is reckoned [against it]: lest it be that He would not know neither the universals nor the particulars. For if God, blessed be He, were one who grasps these [matters] in the respect in which He knows them, behold, it would be reckoned that He is obligated [to such grasping] greatly, on account of the multiplicity of His objects of grasping which… and what follows of it [from] privation is null. And [thus] God, blessed be He, [is] not one who grasps these

matters. And it is reckoned that God, blessed be He, does not know [anything] except His own self—

—if God, blessed be He, were one who grasps these matters, behold, [He would be] the perfect one, honored at the very least; for knowledge is a perfection, and what follows of it from privation is null. And on this account [the conclusion is] that God, blessed be He, would [otherwise] not be one who grasps these matters. Behold, this is the argument that necessitates that God, blessed be He, would not know [anything] except His own self—that is, not the particulars.

—And the **fourth** mode is that one who grasps these matters [grasps them] by means of the intellect, by which He is constituted. For [if so], it would be necessitated by this that God, blessed be He, would not be one [thing], inasmuch as He is constituted by them—and this is in the [category of] ultimate privation. Behold, then, if this be explained, [it follows that] God [is composed] of these matters. And this argument too is necessitated, according to what [is supposed]—and the **fifth** mode is [next].

—…that the particulars in their universal aspect, in respect of what is particular about them, do not [admit of] an end [or limit]; and knowledge is an encompassing and universal matter [ענין מקיף וכולל], which conceives the known thing and does not exhaust it. And this argument too is necessitated, in respect of the particulars in their universality, in the respect in which they are particulars—it does not [admit of an end].

—And the **sixth** mode is that, if the matter be supposed thus [concerning] the newly-coming things, behold, the matter is not prevented; [yet] the [supposed] knowledge belonging to God, blessed be He, of these newly-coming things [would be] prior to their coming to be [only] together with them—their coming to be alone, not before this. And if [we suppose] that He has knowledge of them before they come to be, then His knowledge of them would be dependent upon privation —

—and this is null; for the knowledge would have been in [terms of] the necessity of recognizing a thing that is already known. And, further, [it would follow] that this knowledge which belongs to Him concerning the things that exist by possibility [obtains] only in respect of what is by their nature, in the measure to which these matters attain that they are possible; or [that] He knew them in the perfection [in which] He knew them, and there does not remain [anything] more than is possible. And if we suppose that He knew them according to what they are, then [there is] necessitated to [Him] this [knowledge] in respect of the

particular matters which are these possibles, [namely] that He would [then have to undergo] continual change [שינוי תמיד]—and this is in the [category of] ultimate privation. And if [we suppose] that God, blessed be He, knew these [matters], He would not escape from this dispute: either His ways change… or that He be victorious yet unable to set them in order; either an order is set [for] them—a good order—or He neglects them [as] base and inferior in their being, or [acts] on the side of jealousy. [Yet] from these, the latter [members of the] division are false; and this [shows that] He is not too small to do a thing of what He wills [to do]. And by the necessity that [the things] be found in the measure that is possible, this [too is shown]—

—…that what is found of the wisdom in the created order, in living beings [בעלי חיים], [is] in the measure that is possible of the good and the perfection, to the point where [it is] impossible [that anything] more perfect than what is in them [be found]. And by the necessity of the matter—that there be set in order for God, blessed be He, these matters in an arranged order [סדור]—and [by the necessity that] He knew them, [it is shown]. And this is the opposite of what is found in [the realm of] sense: that there is already found in [these things] iniquity [העול] and privation of order—many [evils] for the good, and much good [turned] to evils. [This argues] that God, blessed be He, does not know these particular matters.

—And the **seventh** mode is that, [as concerns] the particular matters, behold, [the world] would not escape that there would be a good, complete, and perfect order [סדור טוב ושלם ותמים] arranged in them, or that [He] would be able [to order] them; or [that] he who is able [to do so] would order them and remember them on the side on which they are base, lowly, and inferior. And this is what is explained by the two [members] of the division of these parts; for it is explained that God, blessed be He, is not powerless [לא ילאה], nor is He too small to give—as concerns the good and the perfection—what is possible to be found in [them], for [what is] of the wisdom [found] in the creation of living beings is in the measure that is possible of the good and the perfection, to the point where it is impossible [that anything] more perfect than what is in them [be found]. If so, there does not remain from the division [any option] except that God, blessed be He, set these matters in an order [that is] good, complete, and perfect—if it be that He knew them. And [as for] these particular matters: my wish is that [we recall] what has already been [explained] at length—that there have already been found many evils. And this is the strong difficulty: that, in the things sensed, there are [things which show] that He does not know the particulars. And it seems that this argument is the position the Philosopher [Aristotle] holds—that God, blessed be He, does not know these particular matters; and what is explained of what he

said is in his book, in [the chapter] beyond [the discussion of] nature [i.e. the Metaphysics].

—These are the arguments brought from the words of the philosophers, [drawn] from the force of their words, to establish [the conclusion] that God, blessed be He, does not know the particular things.

And by this [there is] an **eighth** argument that sustains [the view] that God, blessed be He, does not know these particular things. It is necessitated of it that the wisdom that adheres [to the maker] would be apportioned [to particulars]—for the sake of which it is possible to think that He grasps these particular matters. And it would be necessitated, on this account, that the wisdom which adheres [to the maker] be divided up [מתחלק] toward what does not divide; and behold, [this] would bring [the conclusion] that God, blessed be He, knows [yet] does not comprehend a thing. And on account of this… an argument [whereby] they hold that God, blessed be He, [is] one who does not know, [and whereby] their very selves nullify [the affirmation of His knowledge of] the particulars. [As to] one who sees that God, blessed be He…

Behold, these are the arguments that the holders [of the opposing view] establish —that God, blessed be He, does not know these particular things; and they, in themselves, nullify [the claim] that He knows these particular things.

But [as for] that which led the scholars of our Torah [חכמי תורתנו], may their memory be blessed, [to hold] that God, blessed be He, knows these particular things, there is for [their position] too an aspect [worth seeing]. The **first** [aspect] is this: that, because God, blessed be He, would [be], in the eyes of every speculative thinker [בעל עיון], [the maker]—behold, it is unfitting that He be ignorant of [the things made by] the makers; for ignorance [of these things] is [grave]. For the [things] of ignorance, in [the case of] these things, [are] more [reprehensible] the more they pertain to ignorance—the good [fled from ignorance], and the more [a thing] falls [into] worse [ignorance] from… the recipient cannot receive from the perfection that pertains to God, blessed be He.

—The **second** aspect is this: that it is not fitting [to say] that He made it [in ignorance], but rather [that] His knowledge [is] according to what He made; for He knows by a single act of knowing every one [of all] that the understanding [conceived], in [accord with] which He named it. And when a thing is seen coming about anew to Him on the side of [its] nature, [there is] knowledge in that newly-coming thing. And so they hold…

—after [it had been] known. And it should be understood that no knowledge belongs to Him that would ever fall short [of completeness] in respect of what derives from this thing made [by Him]—were the matters from which the newly-coming thing flows very many in number. And the matter being so, and God, blessed be He, being the Agent of [every] existent in general, then He knows, accordingly, whatever comes into being newly within [the realm of] knowledge, by a true and complete knowing that does not fall short of our knowing. For He knows, by a single knowing, all that comes about anew within [the realm of] that whose nature He has fixed; whereas we, indeed, come to know what newly comes to be [only] as it newly comes to be. And on this account it is not fitting that we draw an analogy between our knowing and the knowing of God, blessed be He, by saying that, were these [several] kinds of knowledge to belong to God, blessed be He, He would have manifold knowings and His essence would be compounded. For this [is the point]: that what is known by us through many distinct knowings is known to God, blessed be He, by a single knowing, as said before. Indeed, He already knows, by a single knowing, [all] these things—what cannot be understood to be attained by us [save] through many distinct knowings; for our knowing does not encompass the multitude of things that come into being newly in the world from the side of the nature that God, blessed be He, has impressed upon it.

Behold, these are the two arguments which the great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], of blessed memory, mentioned in the third part of his honored book, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, to establish that God, blessed be He, knows all these particular things. And he explains the **second** argument [thus]: that, granted that God, blessed be He, knows all the things that come into being newly —this, indeed, is the nullifying of the privation which the philosophers held in [their] arguments by which they nullified [the claim] that God, blessed be He, knows the particular things.

And behold, [as for] the side of the philosophers, who raised up against them [these objections]: the **first** of the arguments by which they established that God, blessed be He, does not know these particular things [runs thus]—that, [as for] all the particular things, none of them is set apart [from His knowing] in respect of which a privation [of knowledge] would attach to God, blessed be He; for there is no privation [in Him]. But privation pertains [only] to one whose way [it is] to remain in that acquired state, not to one whose way it is not to remain in that acquired state. And the analogy is that motion is the very perfection that belongs to ensouled beings [בעלי הנפש]. And we have not said of God, blessed be He, that, being unmoved, He suffers privation—rather, this is His perfection. And just so

they say: that, since God, blessed be He, does not know these particular things, He does not, by being unknowing, suffer privation—rather, this is His perfection. [Yet] according to his honored opinion, the things known [to Him], being honored, do not fall under the [class of] base objects of knowledge. And on this account the Philosopher [Aristotle] said, in [his] book inscribed with the letter *lamed* of [the part] beyond nature [i.e. *Metaphysics* Λ], that one who does not see many of the things is in a better [state] than one who sees [them].

And the great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], of blessed memory, has already given a comprehensive answer to all the foregoing arguments. And there issues, in the [matters drawn] from them, a [further] aspect by which it is supposed that it would be fitting that God, blessed be He, not know these particular things—[the supposition] that one should not say, in [respect of] God, blessed be He, that He is unmoved [by] privation—rather, this is His perfection. And likewise [they say]: since God, blessed be He, does not know these particular things, He suffers no privation; rather, this is His perfection.

[The philosophers thought] to demonstrate [their thesis] by drawing an analogy between our knowing and the knowing of Him, blessed be He; and they were obliged, by reason of this analogy, [to hold] that God, blessed be He, does not know these things that are here. Yet they themselves have explained to us, in a certain way, that the term "knowledge" is said of God, blessed be He, and of us [only] by the equivocation of the name [בשתוף השם] alone; and it is plain that, [as concerns] the things [grasped] by the equivocation of the names [משותפי השמות], it is not fitting that a demonstration be taken from some of them [and applied] to [the rest of] them. And by this argument it was established, in his [Maimonides'] view, that it is not prevented—by reason of these arguments which the philosophers mentioned—that God, blessed be He, should be one who knows all these particular things. And when it has been explained that He is not prevented [from this], behold, it is fitting that one posit His being a knower of them, so as to set far from Him the privation of folly [חסרון הסכלות].

And behold, the great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], of blessed memory, received [it as a tradition] that His knowing, blessed be He, differs from our knowing in five things—I mean that, in each one of these five things, [what holds] if they be found in the knowing of God, blessed be He, according to his view, is impossible in our knowing. And here I shall set forth for you, in recounting these five things [each in turn]. **The first** of them is that the knowledge [which is] one in number befits and applies equally to many things differing in species. And you should know that it is impossible that this be conceived in our knowing—[that is,]

[impossible] unless these many things were known [to be unified] out of the [several] units; I mean, in [a] unification in which the one [unit] proceeds from the other [along] the rank of perfection and completeness. For [only] in this way do the many things become one in number—as, [too,] were the parts of the definition many, [they become one] inasmuch as the one part of the definition proceeds along the path of perfection and completeness from the second. But the many matters [as concerns] which it is impossible that one of them proceed from the other [along] the rank of perfection and completeness—as is the case with the particular things, which are without [final] end inasmuch as they are particulars—it is explained that it is impossible that they be unified in our knowing, [even] were it possible that we have knowledge of them; for they have no side from which they may be unified. All the more, then, [is it impossible] that they become one in the ultimate simplicity, as is the case in the knowing of God, blessed be He, which is one in the ultimate simplicity, He being one in the ultimate simplicity.

But [as for the claim] that it is impossible, with respect to these particular things, that the one proceed from the other [along] the path of the form and the completeness—it is explained [to be so], since they proceed toward what is without [final] end; and [as for] things some of which are form to others, this is impossible for them, as is explained in [the *Metaphysics*, i.e. the book] "beyond nature." And further, [it is so because] they revolve in a cycle—I mean, in species, even if they do not revolve in [the individual]. For it is impossible, [as concerns] things that revolve in a cycle, that one of them be at the rank of form and completeness to all the rest of the things; since, were the matter posited thus, the one thing would be at the rank of form to itself, and this is the ultimate privation [תכלית הבטול]. And the analogy is that the accidents that come into being newly be the accidents of [the items] *alef, bet, gimel*, and that they go round in a cycle toward what is without [final] end: so that *bet* would be the completeness of *alef*, and *gimel* the completeness of *bet*, and again *alef* would return and be the completeness of *gimel*. Behold, then: in that case *alef* [would be] the completeness of *alef*; and by this it would be explained that *bet* is the completeness of *bet* and *gimel* the completeness of *gimel*. And since a matter such as this is impossible to be conceived in our knowing—I mean, that the many become one out of the one in the ultimate simplicity—

—[so too] the unity [is impossible for us]. The great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], of blessed memory, said that in this respect the knowing of God, blessed be He, differs from our knowing; and this [is so] because, in his view, it is possible that the term "knowledge" be said of God, blessed be He, and of us [only] by the equivocation of the name [בשתוף השם] alone.

And **the second** of the things in which the knowing of God, blessed be He, differs from our knowing, according to the view of the Rabbi, of blessed memory, is that His knowing, blessed be He, depends upon privation. And you should know that there is already obligatory for Him a change [in respect of] this difference between His knowing, blessed be He, and our knowing; for he posits that God, blessed be He, knows all the particular matters, and on this account is obliged to know which of them are absent [now] and which will be found at such-and-such a time. Behold, then: if so, the knowing [He has] of this happening—[which is] now absent—is found in actuality, and the known [thing] in which the knowing inheres is absent. And this is impossible to be conceived in our knowing. For [it is so] because the known and the knowing are one matter in number: when the known was [in fact] not present, it was obligatory that the knowing [too] not be present; and on this account it is obligatory in our knowing that, were the knowing of a thing found in actuality, the known in which the knowing inheres would be found [too]. And one is not to allow anyone to say that our knowing might already be in actuality while the known is absent, as in the matter of many of the mathematical figures [התמונות הלמודיות], of which we have knowledge though they are not at all found outside the soul. For we have already explained, in the First Treatise of this book, that the knowing which belongs to us is bound up with the intelligible order [הסדור המושכל] found, [as concerns] these things, in the soul of the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל]; and this order is found in it always. And it is impossible, [contrary] to the great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], to say that His knowing, blessed be He, of these things that come into being newly is bound up with the intelligible order found for them in His [own] soul; for it [is in Him] found always. For, were the matter posited thus, He would have no knowing of the particular things inasmuch as they are particulars, but rather would know them from the side of the intelligible order which they have in His [own] soul—and this is the side from which they are not particulars. And on this account [the Master] decreed [the conclusion]. And he said that this respect, too, [is one in which] the knowing of God, blessed be He, differs from our knowing; and this is possible, according to his opinion of blessed memory, in that the term "knowledge" is said of Him, blessed be He, and of us [only] by complete equivocation [בשתוף גמור].

And you should know that there already appears, from the second argument which [the Master] mentioned [as one] by which the great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], of blessed memory, establishes that God, blessed be He, knows the particular things inasmuch as they are particulars, that he wishes [to say] that the knowing of God, blessed be He, of these particular things is bound up with the intelligible order which is in His [own] soul, [drawn] from the world according to

the nature He has impressed upon it. And on this account he said that the knowing [belonging to] Him who is the Agent in respect of what He has made is more perfect than the knowing of another concerning it; for the things that come into being newly in that thing made are [the things] drawn [from, as an analogue] to our knowing—since He is the One who set the thing made in the manner in which these newly-coming things came into being in it; whereas human beings, those who reflect upon it, [have] their knowing drawn [only] from the things that come into being newly. And the matter being so, it might be reckoned that his [Maimonides'] words fall short, some [in comparison with] others; for, according to what he mentions in this argument, it would seem that he sees that God, blessed be He, does not know these particular things

inasmuch as they are particulars, but rather knows the intelligible order which they have for them [in His soul]. And it is fitting that we say, in resolving this doubt, that the great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], of blessed memory, did not wish to clarify for us, by this argument, how God, blessed be He, knows the things; for that is impossible for a man to attain, as the great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], of blessed memory, mentioned many times. He did, however, wish to clarify, by this argument, that He, blessed be He, knows the things, and that there is a great difference between His knowing, blessed be He, and our knowing; and on this account it is not fitting that we draw an analogy of His knowing to our knowing, as the philosophers did. This is explained for one who would do well in speculation in [the matter of] what the great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], of blessed memory, said—look into it there.

And **the third** of these five things is that His knowing, blessed be He, encompasses that for which there is no [final] end [or limit]—and this is impossible for one possessed of a [final] end. For [the Master] posits that God, blessed be He, knows the particular matters inasmuch as they are particulars; and this is the side on which they have no [final] end. And this [is so] because that is a matter [of knowing] which, inasmuch as it is knowing, the known is obliged to be a thing [that is] limited, bounded, and encompassed; and what has no [final] end—knowing does not encompass it and does not exhaust it.

And by this the great Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], of blessed memory, also [held that], the matter [of] the knowing of God, blessed be He, [differing thus] from our knowing, it is possible, according to his opinion of blessed memory, that the term "knowledge" be said of God, blessed be He, and of us [only] by the equivocation of the name [בשתוף], as said before.

And one is not to say that our knowing [too] already encompasses that for which there is no [final] end, as [in the case of] the definitions and the universal inferences [הגזרות הכוללות], [which are] comprehensive, [embracing] individuals to whose number there is no [final] end. For [the universal] proposition, when it is applicable equally within it, is without limit—this being [a case] in which the individuals are not known inasmuch as they are individuals; and this is the side on which they have no [final] end. But [they are] known from the side of the definitions and the universal inferences; and this is explained, and it is the common nature [הטבע המשותף]. And if one were to say that our knowing already encompasses that for which there is no [final] end—as [in the case of] the continuum [המתדבק], in respect of what may be divided of it, [namely] toward what has no [final] end; for so too we know it, [namely] toward what has no [final] end; and so too the matter [stands] in numbers [המספרים]—[I reply]: for we do not know this knowledge in numbers from the side of [one number] as it differs from a second number, the one and the other—one [number being] twenty, and another twenty-one, and another twenty-two—this being the side on which they are many. Rather, [we know it] from the side that each one of them [is] a number; and we know, of every number, that it is possible that [something] be added [to it].

And **the fourth** of these five things is that the knowing of God, blessed be He, of the things that are to come into being newly [העתידים להתחדש] does not oblige that the known thing be obligatory [in its being]; but [the matter is] otherwise [as concerns]

Milchamot HaShem — Treatise III (God's knowledge of particulars)

[Treatise III (מאמר ג'), Chapter 2 (פרק ב') — continued]

[Book p. 129]

would contradict it. Indeed, it is necessary for one who affirms this [the position now under discussion] that it not be possible to nullify the nature of the possible [i.e., contingency]. And since speculation and the Torah alike oblige us to hold that there are contingent things here, it follows from this that, just as God (blessed be He) knows the things that are to come to be, the contrary of that thing [which He foreknows] still reaches the level of possibility [i.e., remains genuinely contingent], in keeping with the foreknowledge that God (blessed be He) attains it

as possible. He did not attain what God (blessed be He) knew as something necessary [to occur]; for if He had attained as necessary what He knew, then without doubt its contrary would no longer be possible at all, and the nature of the possible would be nullified — and this is what the Rav (may his memory be a blessing) was wary of in this matter. This is something whose conception is impossible for our knowledge [to grasp].

This is what the Rav, the Master [המורה — Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing), intended: that God (blessed be He) knows which of the parts of the possible will come to be, even though it [remains] possible that it not come to be; and this is what is meant when one says that He thinks fit that it be so. Now this, with respect to us, is not called "knowledge" but rather "thought" [or "opinion"], and this is explained in its own terms. This is what we mean when we say that God's knowledge concerning a single one of the parts of the possible already reaches it [i.e., is determinate about it], even though it is not possible for us [to know which]. And if we mean by "the measures" —

[Book p. 129, continued]

— that which it is impossible for us to attain, then indeed this matter is not called "knowledge" but rather "thought," and this too is explained in its own terms. For I mean that we [merely] suppose that one part of the possible is already to be reckoned of equal [likelihood] to come to be [as another], and yet we do not say that we already know that this part of equal [standing] will come to be. And if we do not attain that which we [merely] suppose will come to be, then this would be an error on our part, not knowledge — and this too is explained in its own terms. And if the Rav, the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing), means that God (blessed be He) knows which of the parts of the possible will come to be, and does not [merely] know that it is possible that it not come to be — but rather that the matter [actually] is so in itself, my intention being that this thing is possibly not to come to be, and yet it is already to be reckoned that it will reach [actuality], and that its contrary may yet reach [possibility] — then indeed, just as this matter is not called "knowledge" with respect to us, but is rather called "error," when one [supposes] that what we [merely] suppose will come to be — this too is explained in its own terms.

And since the matter is so, it has now been clarified that the root of this is that there be knowledge on God's part [of a kind] which, with respect to us, is something corresponding to knowledge, since [our] error is what corresponds to knowledge, and "thought" is what is received [as a category answering] to "knowledge" in some respect. And this is what the Rav (may his memory be a

blessing) judged: that the matter is, in this respect, equivocal [התחלף — "differing/divergent"], and so too God's knowledge (blessed be He) [is equivocal] in relation to our knowledge.

This is the distinction [ההבדל] that there can be between the two [kinds of] knowledge, according to the view of the Rav (may his memory be a blessing), by reason of the fact that "knowledge" is predicated of God (blessed be He) and of us by complete equivocation.

[Book p. 129, continued]

And there is no room for one to say that what the Rav (may his memory be a blessing) meant by this is that God (blessed be He) does not pass judgment in His knowledge as to which of the parts of the possible will come to be — for he himself saw that God (blessed be He) knows the part that [actually] reaches [actuality], determinately and with certainty [על ייחוד ובירור]. This is made clear in his own language, as we have already recalled. This [too] is the distinction. And if it were as this [interpretation supposed], it would [likewise] be something whose conception is impossible for our knowledge — for we [too] would not call this "knowledge," just as [we do not call] that [other thing] "knowledge"; rather, [in that case] they would call it "confusion and bewilderment" [מבוכה ובלבול].

This is what we mean when we say that we are bewildered, and that we cannot measure [i.e., determine] whether this [particular] part of the possible will come to be, or that [other one], or [yet] another — and that, however many the bewildering parts were, the bewilderment was the stronger. And indeed, the bewilderment and the confusion —

[Book p. 130]

— [the bewilderment] is something that corresponds to knowledge. And all the more so when it is granted to be so in this manner [i.e., regarding the contingent], for the parts of the [thing] newly arising — its coming-into-being is preceded by [the possibility of] its contrary by a thousand years — parts almost without number. This, then, is when it is granted [to be so]: each one of the intermediate possibilities [whether it] could be so or could not be so, and whether it could be so or not be so. So, indeed, when one conducts the matter in this manner, the perfection of the last contingent thing to arise comes about by means of the rest of these contingencies; if it reaches [actuality], it will be [a thing] whose parts are without end.

And just as this matter is called, with respect to us, the limit [תכלית] of bewilderment and confusion — I mean, that one would be perplexed [as to] whether it will be so or will be so [in this way], or [composed] of parts without limit [בלתי בעלי תכלית] — for the bewilderment and the doubt are the greater when the contrary parts of the possible were more numerous than the [parts that are] number[able] — therefore the answer [or "the return," התשובה] is the more fitting [for] the thing [taken] singly, more than [for] something else, in respect of the perfection of the informing [foreknowledge]. And even though it is not made perfect in its perfection[s], it is as if one were to say of a ship that it is —

[Book p. 130, continued]

— a body made of wood by a craft [hidden] within a hidden interior. Behold, each one of these unifications adds [something] to knowledge, in that the bewilderment removes from all that the prior singular unification includes — that which is not included in it. And even though there is no one of them [taken] singly, the ship [is reckoned] in its perfection from something other than itself.

And the fifth of these things [the fifth of the "five matters"] is that God's knowledge (blessed be He) does not change with the coming-into-being of these things, of which there was knowledge on His part before they came to be — even though the thing in which the knowledge inheres has already changed, [the thing] which was [first] possible and afterward came to be in actuality. And it is now necessary, for one who affirms this, that — according to [the view that] God's knowledge is His very self, as has been explained in its [proper] places — there is no doubt that, with respect to [His] very self, He does not change; and according to [the view that] His very self does not change, it is necessary that His knowledge [too] not change.

And when one reflects upon this matter, one finds [something] which it is possible to explain that its conception is impossible for that which is in our intellect and our knowledge. This [too] is something that has already preceded for the Rav, the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing): that God (blessed be He) knows that the thing will newly arise [and] will be lacking at such-and-such a time, and afterward will come to be at such-and-such a time, and likewise [knows] the matter regarding [the thing] newly arising from things newly arising in the world. And when the [thing] newly arising comes to be, there is not added —

[Book p. 130, continued]

— to God (blessed be He) any knowledge of what He did not [already] know with respect to it; but rather, what comes newly into being [is something] of which it was already known on His part that it would be so, and [thus] the [thing] newly arising is found to be in accord with what He already knew of it. And since the matter is so, it is made clear that God (blessed be He) knows, in accordance with this premise, everything that newly arises and all that comes newly into being.

This, too, is something one is likewise obliged to believe regarding everyone who attributes to God (blessed be He) folly [סכלות] in these things — and this is because the [imputing of] folly [is] the greater deficiency, the folly [consisting] in [imputing folly to Him] regarding what newly arises; and this is explained in its own terms.

And since the matter is so, behold, there is no escaping [this] division: whether He knew that the contingent part which was possible [for Him to know] would newly arise; or whether He already knew —

[Book p. 131]

— that the [thing] newly arising [is] the contingent part that reaches [the level of] the possible, even though it is some part other than the one which was known to Him would newly arise — [then] this contingent part [is the one] that reaches [actuality]. And if we say that He already knew that the [thing] newly arising [is] the contingent part of the parts of the possible which it was known to Him would newly arise, then it would be necessary, on this account, that His knowledge of many of these things be of the kind we [would] call error with respect to us. And this is because the part He knew would reach [actuality] is possibly [a part] that does not reach [actuality]; behold, it has already been seen in many of these things that the part which God (blessed be He) knew would reach [actuality] does not [in fact] reach it, and one who has already attained what does not [in fact] reach [actuality] is, behold, in error beyond doubt.

And if we say that He knows that the [thing] newly arising — the contingent part of the parts of the possible which [actually] went forth into actuality — [is so], and even though it is some part other than the one which was known to Him would newly arise before this part went forth into actuality, behold, this would be [the case] beyond doubt [in that] His [act of] newly-knowing [is itself] a knowledge and a change in the knowledge of God (blessed be He) — and this is what the Rav, the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing), was wary of in this respect: [the doctrine] which they rooted regarding the knowledge of God (blessed be He).

And there is no room for one to say that the part which God (blessed be He) knew would reach [actuality], before the [thing] newly arose —

[Book p. 131, continued]

— newly arose — [for] it [would then] be without doubt of the contingent part which reaches [actuality]. [For] if it were so, then all things would be necessitated, and there would be here no possible thing at all; and this is the falsehood that the Rav, the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing), was wary of, and it is for this that he decreed that what God (blessed be He) knows is [merely] the possible that reaches [actuality]. And since the matter is so, it is made clear that it is impossible for this matter to be conceived by us in any way. For this knowledge — even if it be called "error" with respect to us, or [if] there be in it the newly-arising and change — [is] not [such] that there is in it the newly-arising and change as there is with respect to us in our knowledge. This is a thing [the conception of which] is utterly impossible [for us], in respect that this matter, which is called by the name of God (blessed be He), is "non-changing," whereas [the thing] which is called with respect to us "error" or "newly-arising knowledge" and "changing" [is so]; for [our] "error" corresponds, with respect to us, to "the non-changing," while "the newly-arising" and "the changing" is what is received by us as corresponding to "the non-newly-arising" and "the non-changing."

And since this matter cannot be conceived [in terms of] what is with respect to us, the Rav, the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing), decreed that the matter is, in this respect, equivocal [התחלף] —

[Book p. 131, continued]

— [namely] God's knowledge (blessed be He) relative to our knowledge; and this is possible for Him, since "knowledge" is predicated of God (blessed be He) and of us by complete equivocation.

And see how the Rav, the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing) [held] that [it is] in respect of the grade [מדרגה] of God's knowledge (blessed be He) [that] we cannot attain how He knows or in what manner; and that the reason we are [so situated] in coming to know this — how it is — is as if our [very] application [to it] had been our [act of] erring, and our straying had led us astray. And it is for this reason that there have newly arisen for us the great distances [i.e., difficulties] in our inquiry into this knowledge by which God (blessed be He) knows the things — how it is; for the very nature of this

knowledge requires that it be [something] not conceivable for us and not apprehensible.

[Book p. 131 — gathering signature "9" at foot; remainder of page blank. Chapter 2 ends here.]*

פרק שלישי [Chapter Three]

[Book p. 132]

[Heading-summary, set in smaller type beneath the title:] *An inquiry into the arguments which the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing) recalled — whether they are sufficient or not.*

It is fitting that we inquire whether what the Rav, the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing) recalled, in order to remove from upon him all these arguments which it is possible the philosophers who dispute with him might argue, is sufficient — [doing so] before we inquire into these arguments whose recollection [serves] to establish their view, [namely] whether they are sound or not, and if [so], what they oblige with respect to it, [and] whether [the premises] that were [posited] were sound. And this [is the question]: if what the Rav (may his memory be a blessing) argued, in order to remove from upon him these arguments, was sufficient, then there is no need [further] to inquire into them in any other manner.

And we say that the path by which the inquiry [proceeds] is the [following]: whether it is possible that the equivocation [השתוף] which reaches between our knowledge and the knowledge of God (blessed be He) be [merely] partial [התחלה — "at the outset / a beginning"], or whether what is between the two of them is the manner of the distinction [ההבדל] which the Rav (may his memory be a blessing) recalled — I mean, that God's knowledge (blessed be He) would be a thing corresponding —

[Book p. 132, continued]

— to our knowledge, until what is with respect to us [is] either thought, or error, or bewilderment, [whereas it is] knowledge with respect to God (blessed be He); or whether the equivocation [השתוף] in them would be from a side such that it is not possible that there be between the two of them [anything] like this [aforesaid] distinction.

And we say that it has already seemed that there do not issue, as roots [משרשים], speculative [conclusions] for the Rav, the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory

be a blessing) [regarding] this view that he holds concerning the knowledge of God (blessed be He) — for the speculation [reaching] this was far [from it], as has been explained — but rather that the knowledge which the Torah compelled him [to hold] in this matter [pressed him] greatly outward, perforce. Yet if this view be obliged from the side of the Torah, behold, [the question] of whether it is sound is something one ought to inquire into, [each part] of it according to what speculation draws it [to]. But [if] the speculation should distance what the Rav, the Master [Maimonides] (may his memory be a blessing) set down regarding the knowledge of God (blessed be He), then indeed this will be explained from what we shall say.

And this is that, since [the thing] which is likened [נדמה] is already, in some respect, mixed together with our knowledge — I mean, that the very name "knowledge" is predicated of God (blessed be He) primarily [בקודם] and of [things] other than Him secondarily, and predicated [secondarily, "afterward," באחור] —

[Book p. 132, continued]

— [secondarily]. And this is because His knowledge is [identical] with His very self, whereas a knowledge other than His [self] is the effect [העלולה] of His knowledge. And what is equal in their [respective] manner [of being known] — behold, the [thing predicated of God] is said of Him primarily, while [predication] of the rest of the matters concerning which it [the name] is said is "afterward" [secondary]. And it is likewise fitting that the matter follow in [the case of] the name "existent" and "one" and "substance" [העצם] and the rest of the names that are [thus] customary [in usage] — that they are said of God (blessed be He) primarily, and of [things] other than Him secondarily. And this is because His existence, and His unity, and His very self, and whatever resembles this here — behold, the name is said of [things] other than Him secondarily; and concerning the rest of the matters in which they themselves are called by the [common] name, the name will be said of them "afterward" [secondarily].

All this is made clear to one who reflects upon it in this book, and it will be explained in [its] fullness in the fifth treatise [המאמר החמישי] of this book.

And since the matter is so, it has [now] seemed [נדמה] that there would [therefore] not be an equivocation between God's knowledge (blessed be He) and our knowledge; but rather, [it has seemed] that God's knowledge (blessed be He) is more on the side of perfection than our knowledge — for this is the matter of the names that are predicated [of God] primarily and "afterward" [secondarily].

And if the matter were as we have set it down, then it would be, as has [already] been made clear, that the knowledge —

Treatise III, Chapter 3 (continued)

The more perfect knowledge is the one that is more true in the sense of being more precise and more distinct. It would therefore seem to follow that God's knowledge, blessed be He, must be more true in being more precise and more distinct. On this view it would not be fitting to call "knowledge" what we would call falsehood in our own case, or error, or confusion. But it has already been explained in another way, from the standpoint of speculation, that God's knowledge, blessed be He, is not of a different *kind* from our knowledge; rather, the difference lies only in the manner — and this is the way taken by the Rav [Maimonides], of blessed memory.

This [difficulty arises] because we follow, in the matters that we are obliged to predicate of God, blessed be He, the path of the things that hold in our own case. It is as though we were saying that we are obliged to assert of God, blessed be He, that He knows — on account of what is found in us of knowledge; and we drew our analogy from the fact that what we apprehend by the knowledge found in our intellect is a perfection for the intellect, one which it is impossible for the intellect to lack, and that, insofar as it is an intellect in actuality, we say that He, blessed be He, knows — by virtue of what has been made clear to us: that He is wholly intellect in actuality, beyond doubt. And from what has been explained concerning their being a single subject — that, because one thing cannot have its existence on account of another, the term can only be predicated of the two things in complete equivocation [שיתוף גמור]. For things that share a name in complete equivocation do not coincide in their underlying notion at all. The illustration is that one would not say that "intellectual," as predicated of man because the thing he apprehends is conjoined to him, can likewise be predicated of the intellect in the same respect, with respect to its act of conjoining. If we grant that there is one name applied both to the intellect and to that which is conjoined to it, it is applied to them in complete equivocation. This is self-evident.

Now, since the matter is so, it is clear that "knowledge" is predicated of God, blessed be He, and of us in complete equivocation. And since it is likewise impossible that it be said of Him, blessed be He, and of us in the case of wisdom, it is clear that it is not proper for it to be predicated of Him, blessed be He, and of us as "prior" and "posterior." This will be explained in connection with the remaining notions predicated of Him, blessed be He, and of us. From this it will

be explained that there is no difference between God's knowledge, blessed be He, and our knowledge except that God's knowledge, blessed be He, is more true with respect to perfection to a wondrous degree, and more precise in being more delimited and more distinct.

In sum, the community of name between His knowledge, blessed be He, and our knowledge is like the community of name between His essence and Himself and the acquired intellect found in us — for knowledge and the knower are one thing, in number, as we have explained. And just as His essence is more perfect than the acquired intellect found in us, so too the matter stands with His knowledge itself as against our knowledge. This has already been explained, from the standpoint of speculation, in another way as well: that is, that God's knowledge, blessed be He, is not of a different *kind* from our knowledge — this being the way taken by the Rav, the Moreh [Maimonides], of blessed memory.

These are the matters into which we must inquire — whether they are predicated of God, blessed be He, [affirmatively] or whether they are denied of Him. It is clear that we judge concerning these predicates [applied] to Him in a single intention, with respect to both affirmation and negation. The illustration is that, when we inquire whether God, blessed be He, is corporeal or is not corporeal, it is clear that "corporeal" indicates a single signification for us in both of these alternatives. For if the [name]

"corporeal," along with that of which it is predicated as the thing it obligates, were [used] in complete equivocation, then the divisions of contradiction would not hold with respect to our thinking — this is self-evident. The illustration is that one would not [meaningfully] say, when we inquire "whether the wall, for instance, is corporeal or non-corporeal." For one would not say "here" [of the wall] if one meant a [merely equivocal] name "wall," any more than one would [if there were] no single subject; since these [equivocal senses] would not be of a single kind, neither would they be divisions of a [genuine] contradiction.

Since the matter is so, it has been explained that, regarding the predicates that hold [of God], when they are denied of God, blessed be He, this does not indicate to us that the subject in question is itself God, blessed be He. Rather, when something is denied of Him in some respect, [we mean] only that it is denied of Him by reason of [its incompatibility with] the things found in us. The illustration is that we say of God, blessed be He, that He is not "moved" — for if He were "moved," He would be a thing necessarily moved in some respect. Now, were "moved" predicated [of Him and of us] in the same sense, then if the matter were so, there would here be no proof that God, blessed be He, is non-moved. For

"moved," which obligates [the predicate] "corporeal," is what would indicate that He is corporeal in the respect in which it is predicated of us; but "moved," predicated of Him in complete equivocation, does not entail that He be corporeal.

Since the matter is so, it has been explained that the predicates which are predicated of God, blessed be He, and of us — and are *not* predicated in complete equivocation — that is, the predicates that are necessitated of Him, blessed be He, are not predicated of Him, blessed be He, and of us in complete equivocation. For if these predicates were, according to our thinking, doubtful from the outset — whether they are obligatory of Him, blessed be He, or denied of Him — until our thinking is perfected by the inquiry, then [in the end] we would either be obligating them [of Him] or denying them of Him.

In sum: if the things obligatory of Him, blessed be He, and predicated [of Him] were [predicated] in complete equivocation, there would be here no names of things more fitting [to be applied] to God, blessed be He, whether by obligation or by privation. This [follows] from the fact that one would [then] be saying, for example, that God, blessed be He, is corporeal and is not corporeal — and this corporeality would not be a thing [predicated] of any subject, but rather a thing shared in complete equivocation. For every thing that is shared in complete equivocation with what we call "corporeal" — and likewise when one says "God, blessed be He, is not corporeal" — accordingly, since this name does not indicate of God, blessed be He, anything [determinate]: this discourse [concerns] that which is indicated of Him in the respect in which we call it "knowledge." And there is no [warrant]

to say that we mean only this — that we deny of Him corporeality, since corporeality is a privation in us, and we are obliged that knowledge be in Him in perfection. This [follows] from the fact that there is no privation of corporeality in Him; He is one of whom corporeality is denied. But, as we have seen, when we are predicating of Him by way of corporeality, [it would be] as by the name "knowledge"; and [predicating] by the name "knowledge," [it would be] as by that which is indicated by the name "corporeality" — [whereas] knowledge would be a perfection in us, and knowledge is perfection. And we are not obliged to predicate of Him, blessed be He, anything, nor to deny it of Him; rather, when we inquire whether the existence of that thing is fitting for Him, blessed be He, or not fitting, we do not base our inquiry into this on whether it is a perfection in us or an imperfection in us. Since the matter is so, it has been explained that speculation has shown that the knowledge predicated of Him, blessed be He, and of us is [predicated] in complete equivocation.

It has already been explained in another way that speculation has shown what the Rav, the Moreh, of blessed memory, indicated concerning the matter of God's knowledge, blessed be He. This is what we [maintain]. And if we have shown that God's knowledge, blessed be He, is shared with our knowledge in complete equivocation, then it would not be possible for this kind of knowledge to be reconciled with that contradictory [character of] knowledge — that is, that it be unchanging and not differing, together with its being newly originated and changing. The Rav, the Moreh, of blessed memory, has already received, concerning this matter, these corresponding things, as we have explained, and that by which they are rooted in this knowledge.

Moreover, since He [the Rav] kept his distance from attributing to God, blessed be He, [certain] privative-laden perfections — and he said that [it is] because of this, namely, that He knows all things and that no matter escapes Him, as has been explained from what has been established concerning the knowledge of God, blessed be He — that is, because such knowledge is called in our case "ignorance," not "knowledge." But rather, the Torah has shown, on one side, concerning the knowledge of God, blessed be He, as we have mentioned; and we have seen that speculation disputes concerning this belief — the belief in the knowledge of God, blessed be He — and we have shown that on this belief there is great dispute. Let one say what one may say concerning the knowledge of God, blessed be He: [namely,] to remove from Him all the objections, and to establish what one is obliged to establish of what the Torah has obligated concerning Him. We have already inquired into this by way of [the name] God, after we completed the speculation in this inquiry.

Now, there is some manner among the manners revealed concerning what the Rav, the Moreh, of blessed memory, said — that knowledge is predicated of God, blessed be He, and of us in complete equivocation. And this [follows] from what has already been explained: that there is no fellowship for God, blessed be He, with anything of the existing things. From this, it would not be possible for anything of what is predicated of the existents to be predicated of Him except in complete equivocation. It is also not proper that God, blessed be He, be described by any description, since every description necessitates multiplicity — [there being] the notion of the "description" and of the "described." And this too is clear: that when something is described by some description, that description is predicated [of Him] and of us in complete equivocation. For it would indicate of Him, blessed be He, a notion in His essence itself, the corporeal. And the Rav, the Moreh, of blessed memory, has already elaborated, in the elaboration of this, in his honored book, the *Moreh Nevuchim* [Guide of the Perplexed].

After this argument, it would seem to follow that the descriptions predicated of Him, blessed be He, and of us are predicated in complete equivocation; and the preceding arguments by which we argued in this [matter] would not

be a subject for discourse alone. And likewise would the matter stand if the individuals attained what they attained — as though one were to say that it is an intermediate appearance between blackness [השחרות] and whiteness [הלובן], leaning more toward blackness than toward whiteness. Here they would all indicate but a single thing, and there would be much variation in the conditions and the particulars in making clear which of the simple things this appearance is. And likewise the matter stands, in itself, with things that have no subject for them — that is, things of which multiplicity is not predicated.

The illustration is that, if we said concerning the intellect — of which no multiplicity is predicated — by way of example, "the sphere of the intellect [גלגל השכל] sets [the heaven] in motion" — that is, that it is the intellect which apprehends the particular harmonies [הנימוס] from which the orders of the motion of that sphere are arranged — here this discourse would not indicate multiplicity, since there is no name there, "intellect," as a subject, but only by way of discourse, not with respect to existence. And even though "intellect" is predicated of it and of others among the separate intelligibles [השכלים הנפרדים], and they would be differing in their differences, yet it would be said that they agree in being a subject. This is what we are inquiring into in this discourse. And this is [the case with] these simple intelligibles, which are differing in their essences — some from others — since some agree with others in the extremity, up to a [certain] thing.

When the matter is so, they would not be composite but simple. Now, the manner of this differing of these intelligibles is precisely the manner of the differing of their apprehensions [from one another]. And since the matter is so, it is clear that, when God, blessed be He, is described by some description — whatever it be — or by many descriptions, these descriptions do not necessitate multiplicity in Him, since there is no subject for Him; and on this account these will all indicate nothing but a single, simple thing.

It has already been explained that the descriptions predicated of God, blessed be He, are predicated "prior" [קודם], and of the remaining existents [they are predicated] "posterior" [באחור], together with our showing that there is no relation between God, blessed be He, and His creatures. And this [is so] because there is already found, among the names predicated [of Him], the prior and the posterior — and what we are accustomed to in this is the manner in which

"existent" is predicated of substance "prior," and of the accidents "posterior," as has been explained in what is said in natural [philosophy]. And this is clear: that there is no relation between substance and the accidents.

It is proper that we know that the descriptions by which it is here impossible that God, blessed be He, be described — as though one were to say that they are a substance itself — are not [such] that the name "substance" is predicated of Him in His essence and His essential constituent; but rather it is predicated "prior" and "posterior." For the thing of which the name "substance" is predicated — of all the things described by the description, in the manner in which they are described by that description, by reason of what is established of it in its own essences first — here it is more fitting that it be that of which that name "substance" is predicated. And here God, blessed be He, of whom is the name [by which] all things [are described] by the description that they be substances — for He it is who establishes their essences themselves — here it is more fitting that He be called "substance." Moreover, since His essence is found of itself, while all the rest of the existents are found of another, and that which is found of itself is more fitting to be called "substance" than what is found of another and exists of another. In this manner it will be explained that God, blessed be He, is more fitting to be called "existent" — more found, and more one, than anything. And we have already explained, in our elaborations, that what is said by way of nature is a blemish; on this account it would be a stumbling-block to keep [oneself] at a distance [from saying] that God, blessed be He, be described by these descriptions. And it has already

Milchamot HaShem — Book III (מאמר שלישי), On God's Knowledge of Particulars

Chapter 3 (פרק שלישי), conclusion

the Torah's wisdom regarding these two attributes [התארים]. And this is what David designated by the name composed of the four [letters of the Tetragrammaton] together with the [name] of the One [בן ארבע אותיות … ובשם האחד]. This is explained in their saying, "Hear, O Israel" [שמע ישראל]. And this matter has already been clarified elsewhere as well, in connection with what Moses asked of God [מה ששאל מ(שה)] — "What is His name? What shall I say to them?" [מה שמו מה אומר אליהם] — and the answer came back to him, "I am that I am" [אהיה אשר אהיה], which is a name indicating existence and being [ההיוה והמציאות]. So these attributes [האברים] indicate, more than all others, His own

essence [על עצמותו], for they point to being and existence — and this is "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one" [שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד].

This being so, it is impossible that the name with which God is described should not designate that it is He who is the Living [שכל חי], who apprehends, who acts well, who has the power and the will [משיג ומטיב ויכול ורוצה] — and this more excellently than anything other than Him [מזולתו]. He is therefore more deserving of these names than anything else, for it is He who is most existent and most abiding, while everything other than Him is so by posteriority [באיחור]. This has been explained, somewhat, to one who reflects on these matters; and it will be further clarified, in another manner, in the fifth treatise [במאמר החמישי] of this work [מזה הספר].

These names, then, are far removed — though they bear a likeness — from the multiple names [השמות הרבים], since the one term is simple in its utmost simplicity [פשוט בתכלית הפשיטות], as we have explained. They are removed from the situation in which such names are said of God and of others, for what is said of Him by priority [בקדימה] is said of others only by posteriority [באחור]; that is to say, they are said of God by priority [בקדם] and of others by posteriority.

Now that all of this has been settled — namely, that this term [the attribute] is said of God and of others, the one by priority and the other by posteriority [בקדימה ובאחור] — we have thereby distanced ourselves from what the Rav, the Moreh [the Guide], of blessed memory [הרב המורה זכרונו לברכה], rooted in his position, by which he sought to remove from Him the objection of the philosophers [טענות הפלוסופים].

Chapter Four (פרק רביעי)

[Chapter-summary rubric, set in smaller type beneath the heading:] In this treatise is included [an account of] how God's knowledge of things [בידיעת השם יתברך הדברים] is, by way of speculative inquiry [בדרך עיוני], and there is clarified that there is nothing in the prior objections [בטענות הקודמים] requiring [us to say] that He does not know what will be [מה שיתבאר]. ...how things are known to Him by way of speculation [איך הוא בדרך עיוני], and it is clarified that there is nothing [requiring us to deny] what will be explained to us regarding this matter of [divine] knowledge [מה שיתבאר לנו מענין זאת הידיעה].

Since it has already been explained that what the Rav, the Moreh [the Guide], of blessed memory, set down [שהניחו הרב המורה זכרונו לברכה] in order to remove from God the objection of the philosophers is, as has been demonstrated, what

would properly be said from the standpoint of speculation [מצד העיון] — not from the standpoint of the Torah alone [לא מצד התורה לבד] — it follows that we must now investigate the very thing the philosophers obliged with respect to God, namely, the contingent particulars [האפשרים הפרטיים]: whether they are correct [צודקות] in what they obliged concerning Him — that is, whether their reasonings are indeed correct — before we examine their arguments [שנחקור בטענותיהם], so that we may complete, as best we can, [an account] of the philosophers' arguments [טענות הפלוסופים].

It is fitting, then, that we investigate the philosophers' argument: whether [God] does or does not know any of these contingent things [הדברים האפשרים], and, if they oblige something concerning Him, whether that thing is in fact obligatory or not. Now, prior to investigating whether their arguments [are correct], it is fitting first to investigate God's knowledge as far as our capacity [כפי קצורנו] permits, [and] concerning the philosophers' arguments, in a more complete and fuller manner.

Let us say: it is already evident that God knows these particular things [שהשם יתברך יודע אלו הדברים הפרטיים]. For — as has been explained [מבואר] — it is from this lower world [העולם השפל] that substances and accidents [מעצמים ומקרים] [arise], and these stand to Him in the relation of an instrument [במדרגת הכלי] [to a craftsman]; for it is by the influence [מ(ש)פע] …

that is shed from Him upon all these matters, and [God] stands to them as an instrument [מענין הכלי], inasmuch as it is impossible that the instrument should belong to anything but the craftsman through the craftsman's knowledge [כי אם בידיעת האומן]. From this it follows that God knows these matters, since He would necessarily be obliged, by His name, to know His own essence [שידע עצמותו]; and His essence is such that from it has already been shed [forth] [שכבר ישפעו ממנו] [all these things]. It thus follows that God knows all existing things [כל הנמצאות].

For were [God] not to know them, His knowledge would be of His own essence [in such a way as] He could know what it is possible should be shed from Him in accordance with how the matter [actually] is [לפי מה … העניין כן]. And it is evident that everything that is shed from Him — it is evident that He knows it all. It therefore follows that God [knows it all], and that He must necessarily know all these particulars [אלו הפרטיים כלם].

And from [this it follows further]: it has already been explained, in what preceded, that the matters newly arising in this lower world [העניינים המתחדשים בזה העולם השפל] are shed forth [yet again] by the active intellect [משכל הפועל]

[which has] knowledge of these matters in some manner [ידיעה באלו העניינים באופן מה]. This being so, it follows that God [knows them], like the other separate intelligibles [לשאר השכלים הנפרדים], as has been explained [כמו שהתב(אר)], such that there must necessarily belong to Him knowledge [like the knowledge] of the other intelligibles [שאר השכלים]; for the active intellect's procedure [מהלך] in God's knowledge [מידיעת השם יתברך] is like one who knows the form of the bricks and beams [צורה הלבנים והקורות] that serve the work of building a house [למלאכת בנין הבית] — except that [God knows] them in a more complete manner [באופן יותר שלם], and this is the aspect we mentioned before [שזכרנו במה שקדם].

This being the matter — that the active intellect [שלשכל הפועל] [has knowledge] of these things — they [exist] in God in a more excellent manner than [they exist] in [the active intellect] itself [ממנו], inasmuch as God knows these things [שהשם יתברך יודע אלו הדברים].

Now, when this is settled, my intention is to ask the [following] questions concerning these particular things — and the arguments [the philosophers raise] concerning them [והטענות … אותם]. For [the question] is not left except as to whether [God] knows these two alternatives [אלו השני צדדים]: who [it is] that gives and who [it is] that knows [מי יתן ואדע]. And [the question further is] whether these contingent matters are limited [מוגבלים] in [one] respect and not in another [respect]. This being so, it is evident that they are ordered and limited [מסודרים ומוגבלים], like the matter [as described]; for from the respect in which it is possible that knowledge of them should fall under [a knower] [שתפול בהם הידיעה], they are ordered, [and] from the respect in which it is impossible [that knowledge should fall under them], they are not ordered [בלתי מסודרים] — that is, [this is so] inasmuch as it is impossible that knowledge should fall under contingent things [אפשריים] which would arrive only from the standpoint of [free] choice [מצד הבחירה] which …

[man] has, by which God [exercises providence over] him [שם אותם באדם השם יתברך] — to complete what is lacking of [His] guardianship [מן השמירה] from the standpoint of the heavenly bodies [מפאת הגרמים השמיימיים], as has been explained in the preceding treatise [במאמר הקודם]. And [were God] not to know which of the two contingent alternatives [is to occur, that] would not be possible [לא יגיע] — that is, in respect of the fact that they are contingent [שהם אפשריים] in a respect, [namely] that, had the matter been so, there would here have been no contingency at all [לא היה בכאן אפשרי כלל]; and there is no [way that] one of the two contingent alternatives should arrive in respect of what is possible [שהוא אפשר].

[For God's] absence of knowledge [העדר ידיעתו יתברך] as to which of the two contingent alternatives [is to occur] [is not a defect:] knowledge of a thing is according to what that thing is [כשיודע הדבר לפי מה … מה שהוא עליו]. When one apprehends [something] other than what it is [על זולת מה שהוא עליו], this is an error, not knowledge [הנה זה טעות לא ידיעה]. This being so, [God] surely knows [these things] in the most complete manner possible [באופן היותר שלם שאפשר], inasmuch as He knows them in respect of their being ordered, by way of clear [apprehension] [שהם מסודרים בדרך בירור], and [He knows] what there is in them of contingency from the standpoint of [free] choice [מן האפשרות מצד הבחירה], according to what …

God commanded, by the hand of the prophets [על יד נביאיו], concerning men [באנשים] whose ways are evil [רע], that they may better their ways through repentance, that they may be saved [שייטיבו דרכיהם בדרך שינצלו] — as [in the case] of that which the Torah teaches [ממה שיורה] that God knew, though it is not necessarily changeable [שהוא בלתי מחויר שינוי]; but His knowledge [ידיעתו] is such that it is possible it should not [necessarily] arrive [from the standpoint of free choice] [אפשר שלא יגיע מהצד] …

This is among the things of the future [מהעתידות] that are a known thing to Him — [a thing] which is, in itself, not necessary [שהוא בלתי … מהצד אשר הוא בו מסודר] from the respect in which it is ordered, [yet which is included] in His knowledge in the respect in which it is possible [עם ידיעתו אשר הוא בו אפשר].

Now let us explain these arguments that we mentioned, [concerning] these matters: how it is that it does not follow from any of them that He knows [things] more [perfectly]. The philosophers cited [their arguments] to nullify God's knowledge [לבטל ידיעת השם יתברך]; but the true nullification [בטול אמתי] of [their position] is [a nullification] of the manner of knowledge [מהיריעה] which [they ascribed to God]. Yet that nothing follows from the arguments we mentioned — [namely, that He does not know] the [contingent] particular [השעור] — this is evident.

For the argument [טענה] that the Rav [the Moreh] [raised — that God] does not know these matters [according] to the fact that the active intellect [שלשכל הפועל] [could not] perform these actions [לעשות אלו הפעולות] — and it is evident that, since He knows the ordered things [הסדורים] that are shed forth from Him [יושפעו ממנו], [these things] He, the separate [intellect] [נבדל], performs in everything; whoever is prepared to apprehend [the thing] in its parts [בחלקיו], in the manner that this [thing] is performed [by] the agent [הפועל], performs all these things — as …

it would be correct in [the case of] an agent that is corporeal [בעל גשם], that it would not perform [an action] in truth except when there is in it an apprehension of this [object] [כשתהיה לו השגה בזה]; the perfect actions [הפעולות המלאכותיות] [are performed] by means of the rational soul [באמצעות השכל הנפש], and so it is, inasmuch as the [agent] would [otherwise] need [matter] [שהוא יצטרך]: were the one being acted upon [המתפעל] not to receive what he [the agent] wills, [it would be] no [defect in the agent], [but rather] in the form he wishes [התמונה אשר ירצה]. But the matter [החומר] sometimes obstructs [the form] greatly [גדול … (בל)מק], and the separate agent [הנבדל] would not need [matter] in [its] action, [the agent] which attains [its] particular [פרטי … שישיג]. And we have already dwelt upon the slowness of the reception of matter [קלות קבול החומר] …

the movement of man, measured according to his conception [המשוערות לפי ציורו]. And the parable [המשל] is that of man: when he wishes to compose [לשורר] something [מה] conceived in his soul [מצוייר בנפשו], he straightway moves [יתנועע] from the conception [מהציור] to those wondrous movements [התנועות הנפלאות], until the work [המלאכה] is completed by the instrument of [musical] composition [בכלי הזמר] — and in this his fingers move [יתנועעו אצבעותיו] [as] the hand of the player of [musical] instruments [בעל הזמר], to bring forth, by the instrument of [musical] composition [כלי הזמר], such [tones] as these movements [require]. [This is so] by the soul's [conceiving], with the slowness [בקלות] of a great power [רב], in the conception of a movement [שיהבונן בתנועה], how it is fitting that it [the movement] should be made [איך ראוי שתעשה].

So too the matter of speech [ענין בדבור]: for man utters and speaks [יבטא וידבר] in the letters [באותיות] he wishes, with [a power] beyond [mere] reckoning [מזולת שיחבונן], in that he utters the letter [בבטאו אות] — and [he understands] how it is fitting that those letters should come forth [ואות איך באות אות מהם כראוי]. [Similarly, man understands] how he should move the instrument of speech [כלי הדבור] in the manner in which letters are uttered [שיבוטאו].

This being so, it has been explained, as already shown, that He [stands ordered] [יתכן] toward these matters [in a way] beyond [what] He attains [in respect of] another respect [מזולת … ישיגם בצד אשר ישיגם], in a more complete manner [באופן יותר שלם].

But the [first] argument [הטענה הראשונה]: [it claims] that, since God knows these matters from the standpoint of His knowledge [מצד ידיעתו], it does not follow [from] this argument [that it is otherwise] than that He knows the things which are shed forth from Him [ממנו יושפע מציאותם].

The second [argument is] the standing [claim] that God [knows] His own essence [שיהיה השם יתברך … עצמותו]. And this too is evident — that the intelligible order [הסדור המושכל] of these matters does not [render Him otherwise].

But the third argument [הטענה השלישית] stands [in the claim] that, inasmuch as the active intellect [שלשכל הפועל] has knowledge of them [ידיעה בהם], this argument [says] only that He knows the intelligible order [הסדור המושכל] of these matters, in the manner that [the active intellect knows them], from the standpoint of the active intellect's [own knowledge of] these matters, which [knowledge] is by priority [היא על שקדם]. But God's knowledge differs [תתחלף ידיעת השם] — in respect of [the fact] that God's knowledge of [things], [as compared] with [knowledge] from the standpoint of the active intellect [הפועל], in this [respect] [is by priority] [בזה … שקדם]. And this will be explained more fully [יתבאר זה באור יותר שלם], God willing [בגזרת השם].

And so let us say: it does not follow that God did not know the measure [שלא חויב שידע השעור] — [a point] among those we mentioned, which the Rav, the Moreh [the Guide], argued, [claiming] that God [does not] know all these matters [יתברך יודע אלו הדברים כלם].

This [argument too is answered, for] God does know all these matters — to remove [the objection] [להרחיק] [against the position] that, when He knows the matters in the manner that …[they are] in His knowledge [בידיעתם], but knows them in [their] completeness according to what [their order is] [ידעם בשלמות לפי מה], [as] we have already mentioned in our discussion. This being shown, it follows [that the active intellect knows] these matters [by] the intelligible order [הסדור המושכל] [which is] of this measure [מזה השעור] — and this is what we have laid down [שהנחנו].

When this is explained, then, it has been explained that [the position] of the philosophers, [namely] that God does not know these matters [שלא ידע השם יתברך אלו] — this is the first argument [שהטענה הראשונה] of these [their] arguments [מאלו הטענות], [the one] saying that God does not attain [these things] [שהשם יתברך לא ישיג הדברים] [as] the hylic [intellect] [היולאני]; it does not follow from it that God [is ignorant] [שיהיה השם] …

[of all this]. This is the first argument, which stands [in the claim] that [these matters must be] removed from Him as [implying] folly [להרחיק ממנו הסכלות] — and it is explained, in the manner we have set out, that no folly remains for Him [לא ישאר לו סכלות] according to what [those matters] are [לפי מה שהם עליו].

But the second argument [הטענה השנית]: it has already been shown that it is necessarily entailed by it that God knew [שידע השם יתברך] [these matters] — every [thing] that is shed forth from Him [ממנו יושפע מציאותם] — no [less than] [לא יותר], and we have laid this down here [as belonging] to God's knowledge [מידיעה השם יתברך].

It has [thus] been explained that nothing follows from a single one of the arguments we mentioned [מאחת מהטענות אשר זכרנו] [requiring] that God [not] know these matters in the manner we have laid down [על האופן שהנחנו].

From these arguments which we mentioned [as belonging] to the philosophers, it [also] follows [that the claim] — that He does not attain the particular things [הדברים הפרטיים], inasmuch as He has no power [שאין לו כח] [to do so] — [is the claim] that God [would then be] one who does not know the intelligible order [בלתי יודע הסדור המושכל]...

[The chapter continues.]

of these things from the side on which they are bo[unded] — for what follows from this [position] is that God, blessed be He, is not [ignorant] of particulars.

— Now as for the second argument, which [held that, since] these particular matters cannot be grasped [as the hylic intellect grasps them], so too it does not follow from it that what we have assumed concerning these things is annulled. For we did not assume that He knows them as temporal things; rather, what we assumed is that He knows the intelligible order [הסדור המושכל] arranged within Him, and these [things, considered in their order] are non-temporal [things] — and this is the [matter] addressed by the third argument. What is to be said about it is that [God's knowledge does not reach] these things in respect of their being universal, nor in respect of their being particular — neither was this possible — [but rather it is the most] honorable [knowledge], complete in the [highest] degree, since on inquiry we found that no ignorance [הסכלות] follows from it. Nor does it follow [from what] we assumed that God, blessed be He, is [ignorant] of the essential things and the accidents belonging to these things; rather God, blessed be He, is complete with respect to these things. This is so because [these matters, considered] from the side on which they are bo[unded] and limited [are knowable], yet what God, blessed be He, is not ignorant of are them from the side on which they are non-temporal, which is the [side] addressed there [in the argument], since they are temporal [only] from this [other] side.

— Now as for the [further] argument — that it is impossible for God, blessed be He, to grasp [these things] in respect of their being universal, nor in respect of

their being particular, [from which it would follow that He is] complete in the [lowest] degree — this too is shown to be void, for the conditional inference drawn here follows from what preceded. [It has been shown] that God, blessed be He, knows the intelligible order [הסדור המושכל] in which these things [are arranged], such that God [knows them in this way]; and [it does not follow] that God, blessed be He, did not acquire this knowledge by way of his [own essence], for their knowledge in Him rests upon the intelligible order [which is in His soul]. [Whatever follows from this] is shown not to entail that God, blessed be He, is incomplete with respect to these things — rather, that very thing [shows] that God, blessed be He, is complete with respect to these things. So this is what was [to be shown]: that God's intelligible knowledge of them belongs to them from the side on which [they are knowable], and [from] this side itself [follows] this knowledge. And yet it is not that He acquired this knowledge from them; rather, it is the [intelligible] order which is the acquisition by which these things came to have their existence — so that this argument is not valid.

— And as for what was said [there] — that if God, blessed be He, were grasping [these things, then] it would follow that God, blessed be He, did not know these [things] of which they have a share, and these are the essential things and the contingent things [האפשריים] — behold, with the [preceding] this is bound up with what was drawn from the foregoing. And [the answer is] that it does not follow from what we assumed here that it would be [annulled, etc.]…

the things are all of one kind — that is to say, complete [in respect] of them — many times more than they fall short. And from the side on which the grasp [reaches] them, they are non-unitary; and this is the side on which [that argument holds], for it is impossible that one should err except by the power of [a faculty], for that very [side] is also one of deficient grasp, since it is [a thing] reached by way of accident. And it does not follow that they be [from such a side that] God, blessed be He, were grasping these things [in that deficient manner]; rather, [He grasps them] in the most honorable manner and in the most complete perfection. This is a plain matter, and so too the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה], together with [the intelligible order]…

[the inquiry] will make clear that it does not follow from it [what the argument supposed]; and what we assumed — that God, blessed be He, knows these things — is itself many times more [perfect]. This is so because the orders which [belong] to these [things] are of one side [only], as we have recalled; the side by which God, blessed be He, grasps them is not the side on which they are particular and to which [the argument] alludes, but [rather He grasps them] by

the power of the hylic [intellect], and the grasp which would be in this [deficient] way would not be what it [in fact] is — rather, [the truth is] that they are [grasped] as belonging to God, blessed be He. But as for what was said — that if [He were] grasping these things, He would Himself be composed of a part — that is something untrue; and this is because the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], even though this manner is many times [removed] in [the objects of] their grasp,

and indeed this matter will be made clear in its full light in [what follows] concerning God.

— Now as for the fifth argument, [which held that the] particular [things] have no purpose, so too it does not follow from it that what we have assumed is annulled in the [following] respects: namely, that the intelligible orders [הסדורים המושכלים] which [belong to these things] are themselves of necessity additional [to them]; and from this side it [follows] that what is required by this argument is that He not gra[sp] them in respect of their being particular — and this is the side on which they are [non-temporal].

The sixth argument, which is what was said [there] concerning these newly-generated things [המתחדשים] — that if [the grasp] were [prior to their coming-to-be], or [if He knew] them together with their coming-to-be, or if He knew them [in some other way] — and if He knew them before their coming-to-be, then [either His knowledge] would be dependent on [their] non-existence; and this likewise is not [forced]. So too, if [it were that] they are [grasped] by their nature, [from which it would follow] that the things are possible, or that He knew them in the completeness of [their being], whatever [its] opposite [would be] is [also] possible. And if we assumed that He knew them according to [what they are], then it would follow on this knowledge that what comes to them [comes to them] together with their coming-to-be, for they were contingencies [אפשריים] that arrived [as] newly-generated [things], the lack of contingency [removed]. And inasmuch as [this] would entail that God, blessed be He, were Himself [subject to change], and if we assumed that God, blessed be He, knew [them] in the completeness of [their being], then the nature of the contingent [טבע האפשר] would be abolished. And if it were assumed [that He knew] their coming-to-be alone, then there would be in Him a perpetual newness [of knowledge]; and when that thing came to be, this whole [knowledge] would be annulled, [so that] He would be [ignorant] of it altogether.

— Behold, it must be said that it is plain that what we assumed concerning the knowledge of God, blessed be He, [is] that God, blessed be He, knows these things [from the side on which they are knowable, etc.] He also knows the nature of the

contingencies [טבע האפשרות] that [belong] to [them]. It follows from this that one of the abovementioned voidings [namely, the supposition] that His knowledge would be dependent on [their] non-existence [is removed], since [His knowledge] rests upon an intelligible order [סדור מושכל] which is in His soul concerning the newly-generated things [המתחדשים]. Nor does it follow from this that there is in Him [any change] when something is newly generated of these things, for we are not [referring] to these particular matters but rather to [the order]; and [along] this [order] God is perpetually [unchanging] in His soul, in one and the same matter. And it does not follow that He know any one [particular] part of the parts of the contingent [חלקי האפשר]...

will reach [it]. Indeed, what we assumed [is] that He knows that the things are arranged within Him — not in the absolute [sense] — such that it would not arrive by way of [free] choice [הבחירה]; and this is the side on which these things are contingent.

— Now the seventh argument, which is [what was said there]: if God, blessed be He, knows these particular things, then [His knowing of them would be] upright and complete — and the contrary of this is what is found [among them], for [men's] will already finds in them iniquity, and the absence of [order]; [yet] equal is [the value] of the sphere, to which these contingent things [belong] — [this argument too is to be answered]. It is [shown] that the purpose of uprightness and the goodness of the sphere [are precisely] what we have explained concerning it [the sphere] in the completeness of [our account], by the determination of God in the fourth book of this work.

It is also what was said there: if God [were the one who arranged these things, it would be fitting] that they be found in [right] order, [yet] we find these particular things [lacking it], with the absence of much order. — Behold, as has [already] been explained, the [things grasped] are contingencies and possibilities, which have been assumed in [them]; this argument is therefore void. — And behold, this [too is what] we have explained in our account, to atone for [the sufferings of] Job, and it will be explained [further in this work].

— Now the eighth argument, which is [what was said there]: God, blessed be He, knows these things in respect of their being possible [insofar as that] is impossible — and this is because [a thing] known [by Him], the part of it which is fitting, comes to be from the side [on which] these things are possible. — Now this is what was said there: if God [were] arranging [these things], it would be fitting that He have an arrangement [or order] within them, such that one would find these particular things by sense, [yet] there is the absence of much order. —

Behold, as will be explained, [these] possibilities and the contingency assumed in them have been laid down, [and] this argument is void. — And behold this [matter] of [the divine] perfection [is what was discussed] in our account; and what is explained [here is] this [point of] the book.

And it is what was said there: if God, blessed be He, were arranging these things, it would be fitting that this be possible — that is, [a thing] possible to be di[vided], in respect of being a quantity, [pertaining] to the conjunctive science [החכמה המתדבק — i.e., the science of continuous magnitude, geometry]. It has already been explained in our discussions that every intellect that is divided [is divided] in respect of being a quantity. And if [it pertained to] these things, then it would follow that He know all the divisi[ons], [namely those of] the conjunctive science; and if so, then [the divisions] are possibilities receptive of division; and these are the parts [reached by] God, blessed be He — these parts being such that, if the [matters] were not laid down, this knowledge would be deficient.

— Behold, it has been said there: we have informed [you] that God, blessed be He, knows [whether] a body [גשם] [is divided] by [way of] division. Now it follows from this that division would have an end [תכלה]; but He knew, by His own will, that the intellect knows what is divided, [though it] remain a quantity. He did not know an end to the division — for were this knowledge so [conceived], it would be called error, and [it would] not [be] knowledge — [contrary to] what we have explained concerning the matter of God's knowledge, blessed be He…

[how many divisions] there belong to it, [in respect of] receiving all the divisions [in such a way that] each one of them is [endowed] with quantity. For if [the matter] were so [as the objection supposes], then it would be a deficient knowledge, for it would not be that the division [proceeds] for each one of the particulars except [insofar as] it is [a thing] of wood or copper, for example.

— Now as for what some of the moderns explained concerning this, [namely] that it is non-divisible from the [side of] division, by reason of their informing [us] that God [knows it], in that it is possible to count it in [its] completeness — [the answer is] that if it were divided, then there would be no knowledge for God, blessed be He, [as to] how many [divisions] belong to them. Behold, this too is plainly void; that is to say, it does not follow that God [know the things in such a way that He know] all the divisions [as] a [completed] quantity, for what has no end cannot be [counted]. He [does] know that what is divided is [endowed with] quantity, [though] in what manner [it is so He does] not know; an end to the division [there is none] for what has no end by [its] nature; rather, knowing this division according to what it is by its nature [suffices]. The division [proceeds] in

respect of being a possibility for what is divided, in respect of the division to which there is no [end] by nature, [and so it is not] called an end [תכלית], and [there is] no knowledge [of an end]. And again [as to] what we said — that He, blessed be He, knows the universal nature [הטבע הכולל] which [is endowed with] division — perpetually [He knows] up to whatever is divided; He did not know [an end], for if the matter were so, then His knowing would [be deficient]; nor [would it be] in what manner it is, [but] my will [is] that [the matter is grasped] not in respect of the particulars but only in respect of its being a quantity — not in respect of how many [divisions], for example.

— Now as for what some explained concerning this argument, [namely] that the [conjunctive] science is composed of parts — [the answer is] that God, blessed be He, knows this division which [belongs to them], such that if the parts were possible, they being [contingencies], then God, blessed be He, encompasses all the parts that He divides [up to whatever] He divides them into, [in] this respect. Behold this too [is what we say]: that by their informing [us] that God, blessed be He, knows [the parts] — [namely those parts] which it is possible for Him to divide them into, this [is what the] holder of the [view says], [namely how many]; [yet] it is void, that is to say, [when] we said all the divisions, [we did not mean] that He divides [them up to that] which it cannot [reach], for what has no en[d] He knew [only] that everything He divides is [endowed with] quantity, [though] in what manner it is [so He does] not know.

— And behold, the resolution which the sage Ibn Rushd [בן רשד / Averroes] understood from the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, i.e., Aristotle] is invalid, since the doubt remains together with it. [It was] there in this resolution [supposed] that the part [החלק] is not removed from every aspect; but it is possible from [one] side. For with us the part is possible in potentiality [בכח], not [in actuality]: [we do] not [hold] that the points which [are] in it [are] together [actualized]; for if this were so, then the body [הגשם] [would resolve] into non-divisible things — and [the divisions] are not in potentiality, [reaching] up to every point of the points, [though] a [potential] division [proceeds] in actuality. And this is something that does not follow; rather, when the [matter] is such that one receives the division up to [some] equal limit, such that they would all [be alike], so [too] the body is divided over them together. And if [the matter] were [an actual] equal limit — as it does not follow for a man, by reason of [his] wisdom, that he receive them together, this being [the point] — [it would be] necessary that it be valid for the [separate] thing; [yet] it does not follow that one [should] be valid in the *Book of Sophistical Refutations* [ספר ההטעאה — Aristotle's *Sophistici Elenchi*]. And behold, this fallacy [ההטעאה] [is what was said about it]:

that the [body] possibly be divided over the points together; [but] these [are points] — and as is said of the fallacy [ההטעאה] from this place [in Aristotle]…

but [the matter] was [thus]: if a point were to meet [פוגשת] a point [as the objection imagines]; and already… a point [is] dependent on a point — and this is what would be seen, [namely] a point on which it is impossible that the divided [thing] fall, on the point [adjacent to] the point on which the division [already] fell; and when…

the part fell upon it first, the possibility within the part was nullified once the point upon which it depends came to meet it. For when we take a single point, it is possible that the magnitude be divided at it in some place we choose; and once we have divided the magnitude there, in that place, it is possible that it be divided by a second point in some other place we choose. After that, it would be impossible for us to divide upon a point adjacent to that same point. Yet equality of demonstration is plainly correct: for by the nature of wisdom, division is not prevented at any one of the points within the magnitude. That is to say, division is not prevented at a point on which the part fell, [but only] at a point adjacent to it.

Now if what we have heard here pertains to body, it pertains to it insofar as it is a natural body — for what side could put an end to division up to a received limit? It would not, on that account, receive any less of the form that belongs to that body, as has been explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע]. And as for the doubt that still remains attached to it, it too is plain. For this is the point: between any two points whatever there is no end to the number reached in counting them, since whatever is a body in potentiality is divisible in potentiality. According to what has been assumed, it is therefore something that does not receive division [as completed]; and if those things were so [as the objection supposes], then the things would be composed of indivisibles. Yet the things are [divisible] in potentiality, and this doubt does not establish that the magnitude cannot be divided at them in actuality — as has been said concerning this doubt.

Now we say, in resolving this doubt, that we can say: when something assumed is found such that it does not occur [יקרה] from its being assumed, it is void — that is, when it is found that something which was possible was not. As has been explained, when the continuous magnitude is found to be divisible, it is divisible into a part with respect to that into which it is possible to divide it, as has been explained in its [proper] places. From this it has already become necessary that it be something not impossible to divide — that is, with respect to that into which it is possible to divide it. And once we have assumed that the body is divided in actuality, in every respect in which it is possible to divide it, then we find what

was not possible: namely, that it was not possible to divide it [further] except into things that are themselves divisible. And the cause of the error that enters here was that the place was such that one would suppose the parts could be set down together, and that the possibility [of division] would be exhausted altogether and entirely. But this doubt is itself more void [than the others]; for between any two of these points there is no end to the number reached in counting them.

[Lower margin: signature "10"]

What pertains to the magnitude, then, pertains to it [only] in potentiality, in accordance with what is assumed, since it is not receptive of division as a completed thing. And were it so, then the things would be composed of indivisibles — yet the things are [divisible only] in potentiality. From this doubt we have drawn out that it is not possible that it be divided in actuality, as has been said — for this is the [whole] doubt.

This too is what we have mentioned: that the later [thinkers] doubted concerning the division of the continuous [magnitude] by reason of God's knowledge, blessed be He — and He is aware of it. For they assumed that God, blessed be He, knew this division which, with respect to the continuous [magnitude], cannot be brought to completion as a finite thing. It is not necessary that this division of things be non-divisible at God's knowledge, blessed be He; rather, the whole of this division [is known] according to what it is by its nature. What was obligatory was that He know this division according to what it is by nature — namely, that everything that is divided, [being] continuous, proceeds toward something it is possible to divide. He did not [need to] know an end of the division, the division being something that has no end by its nature.

And here, in this very respect in which a doubt was raised concerning the continuous division, it was possible to raise a doubt by way of number. One might say that it is already possible to find a number to which a number cannot be added, and that this number is known by God, blessed be He. For number is what is added to that to which it is possible to add; and were we to say that God, blessed be He, knows it in its completeness, then either all these additions are found in actuality — yet here a number such that nothing could be added to it is not possible — and so this too is void.

The cause of the error in this is that they assumed there is found something that cannot be, and that there is no upright [knowledge] of it. But there is nothing that should be called knowledge except according to the nature of the known thing — not such that it would be otherwise than the nature of the known thing. For [to

call] this knowledge — it is more fitting to call it falsehood, folly, and an error of falsehood than to call it knowledge.

It is fitting that it not escape us that the error already fell into what we have mentioned — namely, that which Ibn Rushd [בן רשד / Averroes] understood from the words of the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, i.e., Aristotle], the other side besides the one we have mentioned. For this is what assumes that in the magnitude there are found together, in potentiality, points without end as to their number, [such that] it is possible to divide it at each one of them. This is plainly void. For were the magnitude finite, then these limits [גבולים] would be finite in potentiality, since these two limits would not be drawn out to their end in part, in accordance with what has been explained in the sixth [book] of the *Physics* [ספר השמע]. And accordingly there would be, between any two limits whatever, some measure. And insofar as they were not finite, there would be, between any two of the measures, a number that is finite. And insofar as this is explained — by which it is shown that this measure, when the limits are doubled, has no end as to its number — there is already generated from the doubling a measure that is finite, while the magnitude [would be] finite [yet] without end. And this is plainly void.

And since the matter is so, it is plain that there is, in the continuous [magnitude], no power over [parts that are] non-finite in number, neither in potentiality nor in actuality. But the absence of a limit found in the division of the continuous [magnitude] lies in the actuality of division — not in the number of the parts; for the number of the parts into which it is possible to divide them is always finite, and this is always so. Rather, this number is added to: with respect to whatever it is added to, that always pertains to the things that are finite, and this is always so.

And the analogy is this: when we imagine that we divide it into two parts, then each one of them, behold, it is possible to divide into two parts, so that the parts would be four; and likewise each one of them — it is again possible to divide it into two parts, so that the parts would be eight; and in this [way] the number of the parts is always added to with respect to that to which it is possible to add, while [the parts] are always finite in number.

And in this respect the absence of a limit [in division] resembles the absence of a limit which [arises] from the addition of number. Just as number is not added in actuality, but only in potentiality, to that which is finite in number, so the matter [stands] in this division which pertains to the continuous [magnitude]. But that number is not added in potentiality so as [to yield] something non-finite in number is plain from two earlier matters. The one is that every number is a number — and accordingly every number is finite, if it is something separate, and

each one of these is finite. The second is that number, in this respect, has no power [to be such] that there would be an addition to it [making it] not a number, but only [such] that it be a number greater than what it was. And since the matter is so, it is plain that number has no power for such addition [to proceed] without limit, until there would be a number that is non-finite. From this it will be explained that there is no power, in the continuous [magnitude], over parts that are non-finite in number; and from this it is explained that there is no power in it over limits that are non-finite in number. We have already explained this matter at length in our exposition of the *Physics* [ספר השמע].

But we were compelled to explain here the nullity of this doubt — [namely] the assumption that Ibn Rushd [בן רשד / Averroes] laid down in resolving it: that in the magnitude there are found, in potentiality, points without limit as to their number, it being possible to divide it at each one of them. For if [the doubt] were correct, the doubt that would be exhausted on the side of [God's] knowledge and on the side of the assumed possibility would [still] remain attached to its subject; and this is plain, with a little speculation. — And here it is explained that there is nothing in the philosophers' argument we have mentioned that would require God, blessed be He, not to know these things, in the manner in which we have assumed that the knowledge of God, blessed be He, [extends to] all these things.

פרק חמישי — Chapter Five

In it will be explained, with completeness, that what we have made clear concerning the matter of this [divine] knowledge is the most fitting course of all the approaches. [chapter rubric, set in larger type]

What will add disclosure and completeness to what we have mentioned concerning the matter of God's knowledge, blessed be He, of these things — [namely] that no nullity follows for it from this assumption — is what follows from what the great Rabbi, the Master [הרב המורה — Maimonides], of blessed memory, laid down concerning the knowledge of God, blessed be He. And they are the five matters which we mentioned earlier, which are found in the knowledge of God, blessed be He, according to that assumption; and it is impossible that any one of them be conceived [otherwise] in our [way of] knowing.

Now the first of them is this: that what is heard [as] one [in kind], and exists for many things differing in species, is a thing that is necessary likewise in our knowing — when our knowing of these many things [comes] from the side on which they are among one another; that is, when one understands the intelligible

orders that are perfected for them, and apprehends in them the form and the completeness of their boundaries [as drawn] to their end. And inasmuch as we already have knowledge of God, blessed be He, of these many things in this manner — I mean, that He knows the intelligible orders which [pertain] to them from the side

on which they are ordered — this is something that does not require us to assume the [contrary] side, [namely] to lay down the distinction in division between God's knowledge, blessed be He, and our knowing, which the great Rabbi, the Master [הרב המורה — Maimonides], of blessed memory, laid down. For He is not one who acquires knowledge from them; rather, the existents acquire [their being] from the knowledge [He has] of them — I mean, their existence is brought about [as an] effect from the intelligible order which [pertains] to them in the soul of God, blessed be He. And since the matter is so, behold, it does not follow from this that His knowing be nullified by privation; rather, it is suspended upon a thing perpetually found, [the same] in one respect that does not change. — Now the second of them is this: that His knowing is not nullified by the privation [of things]. This too is something not impossible from what we have assumed concerning the matter of God's knowledge, blessed be He, of these things which are [in question] here. For we have said that the knowledge of God, blessed be He, of these things [comes] from the side on which they are ordered — that is, it is supported upon the intelligible order found in them — and not from the side on which they are these renewed things.

Now the third of them is this: that His knowing, blessed be He, encompasses, with respect to that which has in it no limit, no end. This too is a thing not impossible from what we have assumed concerning the matter of God's knowledge, blessed be He. And this is what we say: that His knowing them [comes] from the side on which they are one, not from the side on which they are many — and it is from the side on which they are particulars. — Now the fourth of them is this: that His knowing them, blessed be He, of things destined to come into being does not require that the known thing arrive [necessarily], but that its possibility remain. So too is the matter in our knowing, when knowledge reaches us of these things in a dream, in divination, or in prophecy. For this knowledge that reaches us of them [comes] from the side on which they are ordered, while their possibilities remain from the side of [free] choice [הבחירה]. And from this came to us that very notice [which prophets give] — namely, in order that, by what remains of evil [for] the discerning person, he may come and take counsel to guard himself, so that it not arrive — as has been explained, all of it, in the preceding treatise. And we have already established this concerning the matter of what the prophets,

peace be upon them, told them: when they would inform them of some evil, it would [then] be found that they gave them counsel to guard themselves from that evil, so that it would not arrive. So too is it found in what Joseph [יוסף] interpreted for Pharaoh [פרעה]: he gave him counsel about the famine, so that the evil would not arrive — in the manner in which it would have been fitting for it to arrive, according to what the knowledge reaching [him] in the dream [indicated]. So too is it found in what Daniel [דניאל] interpreted for Nebuchadnezzar: he gave him counsel — once his understanding had departed and he was like the beasts for seven years — to guard himself from that evil, so that it would not arrive.

And since we already have knowledge of God, blessed be He, of these things from the side on which they are ordered, behold, it is no stranger that there remain possibilities from the side of [free] choice [הבחירה]. And in this manner the difficulty of the doubt is removed, [the difficulty] that men do not [escape] doubting concerning it — [namely] that God, blessed be He, knew the renewed things, while their possibilities remain. And this indeed is [resolvable] from two sides, not from one. — Now the fifth of them is this: that His knowing, blessed be He, of the renewed things is renewed by no change [in Himself] through the renewing of these things, of which He had knowledge before they came to be. And even though that thing, of which the knowledge [is had], was at first possible, and afterward found in actuality — behold, that is what is necessary likewise in our knowing of these things, from the side on which they are ordered. This is so, even though, by reason of what falls short in [our] knowledge, the knowledge remains [only] upon what would be…

upon it from the standpoint by which these things are ordered — that is, whatever defect there is in the knowledge that would reach Him, were it not for free choice [הבחירה], so that He would not attain what He ought rightly to attain. And so this defect that befalls our own knowledge of these things is, on God's part, knowledge from the standpoint of the intelligible order [הסדור המושכל] that they have in His mind. He knows them perpetually in His mind in a single manner, as has already been explained regarding these things — for His knowledge does not depend on them; rather, it is they that depend on His knowledge. Thus there is no ground to say that the things which are contingent [אפשרים] from the standpoint of free choice are such that God would know them, and that His knowledge would then change with the coming-to-be of the things that come into being anew [המתחדשים] — for we do not concede that God has knowledge of the things that come into being anew, nor does He know the things to which these point; rather, He knows them by way of the shared possibility that they have, such that He has knowledge of them.

פרק ששי [Chapter Six]

[Chapter rubric:] *In it will be explained that what we have been led to by inquiry on this subject — namely, this account of [divine] knowledge — is also the view of our Torah [דעת תורתנו].*

We say that what inquiry has led us to on this matter is also the view of our Torah [דעת תורתנו]. And we say that the design of the Torah, and the inference one is meant to draw from it, accords with this — for here are things that are contingent, and acting in some way is within our power, while refraining from that act is likewise within our power. This is the design toward which the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, are directed in their entirety. For the prophets, peace be upon them, were forbidden [to suppose] that these things are [otherwise], since "God will do nothing without first revealing His counsel to His servants the prophets" (cf. Amos 3:7), and that He had not made obligatory [as fixed] — when He foretold some evil — what He foretold; for "the Lord relented [חנון ה'] and repented of the evil" (cf. Yoel 2:13–14; Yonah 4:2). Were these matters not so — that is, were they not contingent — there would be no point to the prophet's turning [the people] toward repentance, except that He simply changed [His decree]; rather, these matters are [genuinely contingent]. And this is the standpoint under which knowledge falls regarding them, namely the standpoint by which they are contingent. And since God knows all these things from the standpoint by which they are contingent — which is to say, He knows that they are contingent — this is exactly what inquiry has led us to regarding the matter of God's knowledge: that the view of the Torah is that God knows these things in a particular manner. As it is said, "Who fashions the hearts of them all" (Tehillim 33:15) — that is, He who fashioned together the hearts of human beings, and their thoughts [ומחשבותיהם], which are linked to the heavenly bodies from which they derive [their inclinations], [knows] all their deeds. The phrase "together" [יחד] does not mean that His knowledge fails [to extend to particulars]; it has already been explained that He comprehends all their deeds. And it is the view of our Torah that God does not change [does not vary in His knowledge], for "I the Lord do not change [אני ה' לא שניתי]" (Malachi 3:6).

And Balaam said when he was a prophet, "God is not a man, that He should lie, nor a son of man, that He should repent" (Bamidbar 23:19) — and it is already found in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, that God does repent in some measure [as it appears] regarding the evil, as they said, "and the Lord repented of the evil" (cf. Shemos 32:14), "the Lord relented and repented of the evil" (cf. Yonah 4:2; Yoel 2:13). [The resolution is that] He repents of the evil that

He had decreed to do to His people, [whereas in His own knowledge He does not change].

Now if it is impossible that this doubt [should arise] — namely, on the supposition that God knows the particulars in the respect in which they are particular, and knows them in the manner that we do — it is explained [that He does not know them so]; for that knowledge would be such as belongs to this man here [a finite knower], whereas judgment over all the events ordered within Him does, together with His knowledge, reach [its object] from the standpoint of human free choice [הבחירה האנושית]. [He does not know] the particular man insofar as he is particular [in the way a finite knower does]. And, in sum, no contradiction is to be found in the statement that God had knowledge of this matter to which inquiry has led us; and since the matter is so, this is what inquiry [confirms]. For when the Torah's account was at variance [with sound inquiry] in the respect in which it is taken according to the plain sense of what appears [from its words], it is fitting that one harmonize it with inquiry, so long as this involves no demolition [of the text] — as Maimonides [הרב המורה], of blessed memory, [did] in [interpreting] perplexing passages [in his treatment of] *The Guide of the Perplexed* [מורה הנבוכים]; for whatever is such that the Torah is at variance [with inquiry] regarding it [must be reconciled]. Now Maimonides, of blessed memory, in chapter twenty of part three of his honored work *The Guide of the Perplexed*, [holds] that the masters of inquiry have already shown that [God's knowledge] does not extend over the other individuals of the species in a single uniform manner; and this is the view of every master of Torah, according to what [he supposes]. But it has already been explained that his view is identical to the view [we have reached]; and it appears that the sage Rabbi Avraham ibn Ezra [אבן עזרא], in his commentary on the words of the Torah, [followed] this path in part. And one who looks closely will see all the more clearly that God [agrees] with what this discourse has brought us to concerning providence according to the view of our Torah.

[Colophon:] *Here is completed the third book [המאמר השלישי] of this book — praise to the Blessed Name, who has helped us on its path; and may He, in His kindness, help us in the knowledge of Him, in love of Him, in the keeping of His Torah [תורתו], and in standing firm upon the truth [ועמידה על האמת] in which no doubt falls. Amen.*

מאמר רביעי [Book Four]

בהשגחה [On Providence]

[Table of contents — chapter list, p.151:]

- **Chapter One** [פרק ראשון]: which examines the views of those who preceded [us] on this [question].
- **Chapter Two** [פרק שני]: which examines what difficulties there are [for] the ways of demonstrating [a position] toward one extreme of these views.
- **Chapter Three** [פרק שלישי]: in which will be explained the nullity of an extreme [בטול קצה] of these views.
- **Chapter Four** [פרק רביעי]: in which will be explained how the matter [of] this — providence [ההשגחה] — [stands] in some manner; … in which will be explained in what manner what has been explained concerning God's knowledge of things may be posited [שיונח] [?].
- **Chapter Five** [פרק חמישי]: in which will be explained the matter [of] this providence — that it should enter into [the question of] death [מכניס למת] [?].
- **Chapter Six** [פרק ששי]: in which will be explained the matter [of] [providence], [showing] that it is in no way contrary to inquiry nor contrary to the Torah, neither from the standpoint of inquiry nor from the standpoint of the Torah.
- **Chapter Seven** [פרק שביעי]: which examines what we have been led to by inquiry into this [question] — namely, the view of Elijah [דעת אליהו] [recte: דעת תורתנו, "the view of our Torah"?].

פרק ראשון [Chapter One]

[Chapter rubric:] *Which examines the views of those who preceded [us] on this question.*

It is fitting that we inquire into the matter of divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] — whether it is over the human individual [איש האדם], or whether the matter [stands] as with the other species. Since those who preceded [us] in this question were sharply divided, and there were for each of [the views] aspects [drawn] from the appearances [of things], it is fitting that we inquire into their views, clarify the places [where they hold true], and [identify] the places where assent [is to be given] to the correct views.

We say that the views which we have found held by those who inquire are three in number. The first of them is that which [holds that] divine providence is not over the individuals of the human species, but only from the standpoint of the species — just as the matter [stands] with the other species. And the second is that which [holds] that divine providence is over each and every one of the individuals [of the human species]; and from this they saw that good already reaches a person from God in righteousness and in justice [בצדק ובמשפט] — that is, that it reaches the good according to the measure of their righteousness, and that evil reaches the wicked according to the degree of their wickedness. The greatest of those who inquire among the people of our Torah [hold] that providence is over each and every one of the individuals of the human species — over all of them. And it is explained [that this is] the fourth [matter]. And this is because these views which they have enumerated [are three]:

[Continuation onto p.152:] The first of them is that which the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] saw — that providence is from the standpoint of the [order of the] species, as is the matter [stated]. The [second] is that which the multitude of the people of our Torah saw — [that providence reaches] each and every human individual from the standpoint of [their individual] nature, [such that] good and evil [reach] them from God according to their deeds: good reaching the good according to their degree of righteousness, [and evil reaching the wicked according to their degree of wickedness]. And the third is that which [some] saw, that divine providence is [present] only in part [בקצה]. And it is explained that it is impossible that there be here [in this place] a view [that contradicts these], for they are numbered according to the number of the parts that [the matter admits].

the [difficulties] of this division would be borne [by the position] in this matter of inquiry — that is, [the difficulty] that divine providence not be over one [of the human individuals], or that it be at their extremes and not at their [other] extremes; [and likewise] the heresy [view] of Epicurus, [namely] the force of al-Ashʿariyya [the Ashʿarite school] and the Muʿtazila [?], [whose] corruption it is fitting one examine in this book — and this would be a need for it [to be treated].

פרק שני [Chapter Two]

[Chapter rubric:] *Which examines the difficulties confronting the ways of demonstrating some of these views.*

After we have already mentioned the views which [those who preceded us held] on this question, as we have explained, [it is fitting to clarify] the parts of the contradiction that fall within them, and that we set apart [from them] the view

[that is correct], and that we clarify, beyond this, the [truth]; this is what will guide us to [reaching] the truth [in falling away from error] [?].

And we say that when one examines closely the view [held by some] of them, there is already found, for each one [of these positions], an aspect [drawn] from the appearances [of things]. And this is what the Philosopher saw [regarding] the matter of this providence — [the views] are sustainable according to what one might suppose, and they are [substantial]; God knows these particular matters, and [it is explained] how each one of the difficulties [these] views [raise] regarding the individuals of the human species [is to be answered], according to what one [might] say. And [as for] the human being [judged] according to his deeds, [it] was incumbent that [he be requited] — [these are the requitals] for which they are recompensed [for good] or punished [for evil] — [and this is] not impossible, according to what has been explained in [the discussion of] one [respect]: that God has knowledge of the particular operations [פעולות הפרטיות], [such that it is] not impossible that divine providence be [over particulars]. And the greater singularity [lies] in the difficulties they [raise], in this place [המקום] — [namely] that God should visit [punishment upon] the human being according to his deeds; for [if so], good would reach the good [according to their measure], [and likewise evil to the wicked], from the standpoint of [their individual] nature. [It is explained] that there would be in this [view] difficulties, [namely] that providence reaches each particular individual of the human species — for the matter of [providence], [as we shall show], [holds that] God [does] visit [reward and punishment].

[Continuation, p.152 lower:] …reaching the human being according to his deeds — [then] there would reach [him] the good [of] order and uprightness [in] good things, and [the corresponding] evils, which befall [people] in great number. To what extent should there be a falling-away from the good things and the evils — for there is found many a time a righteous man, and evil [befalls] him; a wicked man, [and good befalls him] — [if] God visits [requital upon] the human being according to his deeds? And further, [some hold] that there is no providence [from] God, and that it is not fitting on account of this that He should watch over [particulars], [as it is said,] "What is man, that You should remember him, and the son of man, that You should attend to him?" (Tehillim 8:5) — that [in] this is the [problem of] faith, [namely] that which the adversary [שטן] raised regarding [the suffering of the righteous]. Many of the difficulties to which [these objectors] point in this [matter] — we shall already complete their full clarification in our exposition of the Book of Job [ספר איוב].

Now consider what the proponents of the second view [בעלי הדעת השני] saw — namely, that God [השם יתברך] exercises providence [משגיח] over each and every individual human being. They too have grounds, drawn from the observable facts. For if God governs and directs the world, then it is clearly established by [our] trust [in Him] that, through the operations [פעולות] He performs, the proper requital reaches each person according to his deeds, and that nothing worthy [of reaching him] fails to do so. The more perfect a master is, the more closely he watches over each of those he governs, so that what is fitting reaches each of them in accordance with his conduct, and the more he intends to bring to each of them, in the most perfect way possible, that which is fitting for him to attain. This being so — since man alone, among all other [creatures], possesses understanding [מבין], and is requited according to his deeds by virtue of being a possessor of intellect [בעל שכל] — it follows that those who perish [הנפסדים] deserve to be punished and requited by God for their individual conduct: that is, that they be punished for raising themselves up against [the divine order].

For it is established that it is fitting for God to be vigilant over the individual conduct of human beings — namely, to punish those who exalt themselves [על מרים], in proportion to their rebellion [שעור המרי], and to requite [them] with good according to their righteousness, in proportion to the measure of justice. — Furthermore: we find that the divine watchfulness [השמירה האלהית] is greatly [present] over the wicked, in whom all their intent is [evil] and their thought to [do harm]; and the multiplying of these operations reaching human beings is [no] small thing. — And this is [also a sign] that [God] is exalted, the guardian of the righteous, who does not abandon them into the hand of [the wicked]. So too it is fitting that the evils reaching them [come] through the rest of the deeds [מלאכות / works] that are found [in the world] — those for whose sake the agents of those works [בעלי המלאכות] act — for much [retribution] would [thereby already] reach the wicked, in [due] measure. It is as if one were to say that the murderer [shall] be slain, [where] it is impossible that this be a matter of chance and accident [בקרי והודמן]. For what reason is there [in saying] that, when the matter is so, man alone, among [other creatures], should have understanding? Rather, it is by necessity an ordered cause, an operation that intends [an end] [פועלה הכוין]: that the punishment reaching [a person] for rebellion be in proportion to the measure of the rebellion.

Now the proponents of this view divided into two views, in accordance with [their account of] divine providence — namely, [the view] that the divine providence applies to each [and every individual] human being, so that the good things and the evils [reaching him are] in accordance with the divine providence,

and that some of [these] are ascribed to another cause; and [the view] that they are the good things and the evils that befall [נופלות] a person without [any] order or justice. The other [view] is that this [all proceeds] in accordance with divine providence. — These [proponents], too, were divided into two views. This is because [some of them held] that the [apparent] absence of order and justice in these good and [evil] things [reaching] a person is such that [already] many of the righteous have been found in [marvelous] evils and many of the wicked [in marvelous prosperity].

[—prospering] in tremendous successes; one of them [strove to resolve] the doubt. He proposed that the evil reaching the [righteous] is not truly evil, but is rather a good [that comes] without a [clear] path leading to the attainment of the [evident] good. So too the good reaching [the wicked] — that is, that it is a path leading to [an end] — is such that we see it reaching as evils to those [who are] good, [though] to those [who are] good in truth [it is good]; and so too what we see reaching as good things in our thinking, [reaches] not as evils by way of truth. [Thus it may be] that a man righteous from the standpoint of the operations [that are] good [appears otherwise], [yet he is] righteous by way of truth; and so it [may] happen that [a person] has been negligent in performing the good operations [yet appears otherwise] by way of truth. This is what [one would] see [in saying] that it is possible for a man to do good [actions] in accordance with the [good operations] possible for him to do, in accordance with his [own] disposition [הכנתו], [while] we reckon people [to be] good, [whereas] they fall short by much of doing the [evident] good. [In that case] it would be fitting that a strong punishment reach them, for the sin [is in proportion to] the advantage of his [favored] disposition. — And it [also] happens [vice versa] that [those whom] we reckoned to be wicked [are not so]; for their negligence in deeds [is the case], [though] they fall short of doing the possible good [yet it would be] fitting that good reach them in accordance with their [actual] deeds, [those] in whom there were evil [operations] that performed the [good] operations [that reached others] — so that their punishment [comes] for exalting themselves [על מרים], by reason of [their] disposition.

[Such] grief and heartache and whatever resembles it, [reaching them] from the evils that [reach a person] — evil reaches these people for exalting themselves; and [this is what] the divine wisdom [החכמה האלהית] has decreed. And since the matter is so, in accordance with this premise — that there is here nothing [unjust in what] reaches the individual human beings — one might suppose, arguing [the case], that one [cannot] know the measures of the particular dispositions [שיעורי ההכנות הפרטיות] that [belong to] a person; and therefore it would be hidden from

us who is righteous and [who is wicked], and what measure [of good or ill] it is fitting should reach [a person] from the good and [the ill, in proportion to] his [righteousness]; that is to say, [it would be hidden] whether [good or ill] has reached [a person] without [its] proceeding by way of [a just] order and justice. For the measure [of the good and evil] [reaching a person varies], the operations and their punishments [vary], such that it would be fitting that [it] vary [from individual to individual] — in [excess] of the [proper] measure and in [deficiency] of the [proper] measure. My intention [רצוני]

[is] that the very same operation [varies] in [its] good [quality],

[and so the] requital for it [varies] in accordance with the elevation [or degradation] of the [agent's] disposition. Thus, the higher his disposition [had been], the greater the requital due for it among the [marvelous evils] — for the greater the sin's elevation, the more degraded the sinner. And conversely [in the case of] punishment for the [good] deed: this is the whole [point] — that the higher [the agent's] disposition, the smaller [his] requital [for a given good deed]; and conversely [in the case of] punishment for the deed: the greater the sinner['s elevation], the more fitting it is that the punishment [be greater].

Now as for the one who said that none of what reaches [a person] is [unjust], in accordance with divine providence — this is Eliphaz [אליפז] [the Temanite — אליפז התימני], as is set forth in our exposition of the Book of Job [ספר איוב], and we have already addressed this in our discussion. He ascribes the [openings and the absurdities] [הפתיות והאולה] to whatever [we find] reaching [a person] from the evils, [though it occurs] without [a just] order and justice. This is because, when a man strives to acquire [some good], and that [good] comes to him by a path leading to that good without [its turning into] an evil for him — and the evils [reaching him] he reckoned [to be] good already reaching [him], and he supposed that there had already come to him a cause [of his] downfall — this is because man is a creature lacking [a certain] perfection, and God [השם יתברך] created for him [—] not [a path] by which to attain [them]. And if [there is] no [proper] path in their acquisition, they would [then be called] an evil, [in the sense] that the acquisition [of his desire] was not perfected for him; for it [comes] not by way of acquisition by [appropriate] causes. He strives in his thought to do as a [proper end], by [a means that is] inadequate, [and] so the deed of doing [the thing] is not perfected for him, [it being] devoid of [—] like this deed [done] in no [proper] way.

And it is established [—] good from the standpoint of the [openings and the absurdities] [הפתיות והאולה] — that is to say, [what reaches a person is no] better

[or] greater than it [for him], but rather it [is so] that there were, in the view of Eliphaz, the good things and the evils that proceed [—] that the good things and the evils reaching the individual human beings without [a just] order and justice are [in fact] not [merely] good things and evils [proceeding] by way of [—]; we have already addressed this in our exposition of the Book [of Job]. We find that the good things and the evils [reach] the individual human beings without [—]

[—our thought] is from the standpoint of [our] folly [סכלותנו] in [reckoning] the particular dispositions [ההכנות הפרטיות] of a person; and that what is reckoned [to be] one in whom there is good in accordance with [—], [and one] in whom there is evil in accordance with his disposition [yet it should have been] good, [is so]. We have already addressed this in our exposition of the Book of Job [ספר איוב]. And this [view] —

many of the sages of our Teachers [חכמי הורתנו] were drawn after it, [holding] the view [that some of them held] — and there is here no place for adducing all the [statements], for [doing so] would lengthen the discourse [המאמר] in this [matter] beyond what is fitting. Now after [—] the true view that we have laid out in the matter of providence [ההשגחה], [there is no need to] examine [further] in our words; rather, [it remains only] to expound the words of our Rabbis [רבותינו], [of] blessed memory [זכרונם]

[—of blessed] memory, who are at variance over the view that [—the] truth. And it is fitting that we recall here these statements [—].

It is fitting that we should know that these three views that fell [—] the number of the parts into which it is possible [for them] to divide [—]. For an objection has already been raised against the proponents of this view: that one finds, at times, a righteous man to whom evil [befalls], and a wicked man to whom good [befalls] — [an objection raised] over this very contention. [The question is] whether, in [the matter] over which [they are] divided, [the dispute] lies in this — namely, in [the claim] that this [order] is not ascribed to the divine providence — or [whether] one says [that this] is the [error of] the openings and the absurdities and the rest of the causes that [Eliphaz —]; [this is] the view of Eliphaz. — However, the resolution of this doubt [—] sides only. And this is because, in [the matter] over which the parts of this contention [were divided], [it is] the carrier and the carried [הנושא והנשוא — subject and predicate], as is explained: that no [—] should [befall].

[The question is] whether the dispute lies on the side of the subject [מצד הנושא], if [—]. But [if] the dispute lies on the side of the subject, it is [—] evil [befalls] a

[genuinely] righteous man in truth — but [if] he is a righteous man [—]; [or whether] good [befalls] a [genuinely] wicked man in truth — but [if] he is [the kind of person held by] the view of Tzofar [צופר]. However, [if] the dispute lies on the side of [—]: the evil [befalling] a [genuinely] righteous man [is] evil in truth — but [if —]; [or] the good [befalling] a [genuinely] wicked man [is] good in truth — but [if this is] the view of Bildad [בלדד].

Now one finds, [if] one examines the view among these three [—], that one will see why Eliphaz saw [—] in this the matter of [—]; for what we see [befalling] some of the good things and the evils that fall [—], and that some of them proceed without [a just] order and justice, [these] are [—] two species [admitting] of contrary beginnings [התחלות מתחלפות].

[—the evils] that fall [befall] the individual human beings, [without a just] order and justice; it is established that it is fitting that they be ascribed [—] contraries. Now in accordance with [what] is fitting that there be [—]; to God [is ascribed —] proceeding [—] from them [by a just] order and justice, [which] is ascribed to God [השם יתברך] [—]; while what proceeds without [a just] order and justice is ascribed to another beginning [התחלה אחרת]: the agent and the recipient [are] two contrary beginnings [שתי התחלות מתחלפות]. [What] proceeds in the natural things [הדברים הטבעיים] in a perfect and [—] arrangement, and what proceeds without [an] arrangement and justice, is ascribed [—]; [these are the matters] that are found in the natural existent by the necessity [מהכרח] of [—] their addition and their privation [חסרונם] and whatever resembles this. — [The —]

the matter in these things [is] so. My intention [רצוני] is that what [—] the evils that fall [befall] the individual human beings is ascribed [—]

[—the] evils that fall [befall] the individual human beings without [a just] order and justice — it is established that they are fitting to be ascribed [to contraries]. — Now in accordance with [the fact] that he is fitting that there be [—] to God [השם יתברך], it is established that [what proceeds] [—] another beginning [התחלה אחרת]. — The agent and the recipient [are the matters]; and they are the things [that exist] by the necessity of the matter [מהכרח החומר], like the mixing of the [bodily] limbs [בליטת האברים]. — [As for] this: it is established that it is fitting [—] what proceeds in [an] arrangement and justice [from] the good things [—] is ascribed to God [השם יתברך], who is the agent [—the] efficient cause [הפועל].

Treatise IV — Chapter 2 (continued)

in its truth. And what proceeds otherwise — out of due order and proper justice, as it appears to us — of this Solomon, peace be upon him, said: "The folly of man perverts his way, and his heart frets against the Lord" (Mishlei 19:3).

One may also find, on this same line, grounds drawn from what Tzofar showed him concerning this matter of providence. For this is so because man was created for the sake of his perfection [שלמותו], which is his [true] life, and his disposition for receiving perfection [ההכנה לקבל השלמות] differs from one person to another by reason of the particular nature [מצד הטבע הפרטי]. Now it has already been made clear that the perfection of which men are worthy varies from one man to the next. And since this is so, it cannot be that a man here who is reckoned to be righteous, yet who walks toward perfections lower than the perfection that is his [true] life — this being itself "a sin and a transgression against his decree" [חטא ופשע בחקו], I mean his being negligent and failing to make every effort to attain the perfection that is his [true] life — and likewise it cannot be that a man here who is reckoned by his fellows to be deficient and lacking with respect to his way toward a lesser, defective perfection should [truly be so], when in fact he is whole with respect to his disposition; for perhaps it is not understood of him that he is fit to be weighed as worthy of more of the perfections than the [apparent] measure.

The parable for this: suppose there were here two craftsmen of a single trade, and the one was highly expert in the tanner's craft [מלאכת הבורסי], while the other was less skilled in the tanner's craft, yet performed in that craft according to his understanding of the craft and produced in his tanning the finest work of which he was capable in that craft. The skill available in that craft [exceeded him]. Now the master will surely shield the [second] craftsman over what he was able to make, [granting him] more of the good than what he [actually] made, and will praise the tanner for having done, of what was within his power, the best.

Moreover, in keeping with this supposition, it may be that the more perfect man is the one over whom there is the most doubt in all that befalls him, whether of good things or of evils, with respect to his fellow men — namely, whether it reaches him in order and justice [כדר ויושר]. And this same doubt arises from two sides. On the one side: it is sometimes found that the righteous attain good things that reach them out of order — I mean, that their just desert in this was [really] less, according to our reckoning; and likewise the matter of the evils that appear to reach the wicked, yet reach them not in proportion to their wickedness — I

mean, that they should befall others. On the second side: it is already seen that there reach the righteous evils, and the wicked good things.

great evils, as though they were of slight account, since they were not felt; and so it is reckoned, on account of this, that no evil reached them in proportion to their rebellion. According to the [true] measure, both the righteous man and the wicked man are [judged] by his particular disposition, which is hidden from us. It may therefore be reckoned that the evils that reach the righteous, and the good things that reach the wicked, are [in fact ordered] — in that something is reckoned of a man, that he is righteous, when he is [really] deficient with respect to his disposition; I mean, that what is possible from his deeds is too little; and someone of whom it is reckoned that he is wicked is [really] good with respect to his disposition, in that he [merely] failed to make every effort [befitting] a man who is good with respect to his disposition.

This too may be found on the line of what was shown, which the second view held concerning this matter of providence. For this is so because we find in nature that a certain order of evils is arranged, so that there may be a way toward the attainment of good. The parable: it is like the use made of the bile [מרה השחורה] in the stomach [האצטומכא], so that it may provoke through it and there reach it [a measure of] pain when a deficiency of nourishment comes, in order that the living creature be roused then to take nourishment, [having] felt hunger. So too is there arranged a certain order of good things by way of an evil [reaching] the lustful appetite [רבי התאוה], in that the bile is set within a certain portion of the foods, so as to be a way for the lustful to take of them more than is fitting, and so be harmed by them, beyond the measure that is proper, and be injured by them. And since the matter is so, it may be that the matter [stands] thus also in these good things and evils in which there appears to have fallen a privation of order and justice, according to what is reckoned: I mean, that the good things reaching the wicked are a way toward the attainment of evil, and the evils reaching the righteous a way toward the attainment of good. This too is found often: I mean, that good things already reach a man as a way toward an utterly evil end — as though one were to say that the [good] fortune a man finds in his sailing the sea may be the cause that he persist in sailing the sea, and so sink in the sea; or that his nature drowns [him] in the sea. And good things may likewise already reach a man toward an evil end — as though one were to say that men were dwelling together, one of them setting out to go on a journey or in war with other men, and there befell him on his way some illness that kept him back from going on with them; and afterward those men died on their way, for

some cause. It is then made clear that the illness which befell that man was [in fact] a way toward his deliverance from death.

that the illness which befell that man was a way toward his deliverance from death. And on the like of this David, peace be upon him, said: "I thank You, O Lord, for though You were angry with me, Your anger has turned and You have comforted me" (Tehillim 12:1)[?] — according to what our Rabbis, of blessed memory, explained.

As for the third view among the views whose mention we began regarding providence: we have not seen [fit] to recall the arguments that would establish it, since we have no way to them save after the refutation of these two preceding views shall have been clarified. This is something that will not be hidden from one who examines our words in the establishment of this third view.

פרק שלישי [Chapter Three]

[Subtitle: In which the refutation of some of these views will be explained.]

After we have already recalled the arguments establishing each of these two views which we recalled, it is fitting that we investigate, in a complete manner, whether there is among them a correct view — [and] if so,

[or] not. For this is among the things that will lead us to knowledge of the third view that remains, whether it is correct or not. For if neither of these two were correct, it would be made clear that the third view is correct, since these three views are the contradictory parts that fall within this inquiry.

Let us say, then, that what the Philosopher [Aristotle] held concerning the divine providence — that it does not reach man except from the side of the species-nature [הטבע המיניי], not from the side of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי] — is among the things whose refutation was [already] established, when the discourse preceded concerning the cause of the perfection [הסבה התכליתית][?] in the [foreknowing] notification [ההודעה] that reaches them in divination [קסם], dream, and prophecy. I mean, that it was there made clear that men are prepared to receive this notification, and that this notification reaches them so that they may be saved through it from many of the prepared evils [destined] to come upon them; and especially [in the case of] those men whose intellect succeeded in attaining this notification by way of prophecy — for to them this notification reaches in perfection beyond the rest of men, as was made clear earlier. And since the matter is so, it is made clear that this providence is for them [the prophets] from the side of the particular nature [הטבע הפרטי] which was in them

in this respect — from [the side of] the wisdom and perfection for the sake of which they are apprehended in this respect of providence. Therefore it is made clear that the divine providence is, for some men, from the side of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי]. And Ibn Rushd already conceded this matter to us, in his Epitome of the *Book of Sense and the Sensed* [קצורו לספר החוש והמוחש], according to what he understood of it.

Likewise let us say that what those who held the second view supposed — that the divine providence is over each individual man from the side of the individual existence — is also refuted, both from the side of speculation [העיון] and from the side of revelation [ההוראה]. As for [its] refutation from the side of speculation, it is to be made clear according to what he [the proponent] says: that this knowledge of God, may He be blessed, is not divided among particulars insofar as they are particulars, as was made clear earlier without doubt; but rather, that He knows what is ordered from the side of the spheres [הגלגלים] and the stars among these particular things, and what is ordered from another side — [namely,] whether there was here an arrangement in [these] things from another side. And know this too, that it is possible that it not reach [a man] from the side of human choice [הבחירה האנושית].

And if God, may He be blessed, were to call man to account according to his deeds — whether good or whether evil — then the matter would not escape division. Either He requites them with good and punishes them according to what He knows of their deeds from the side of the ordered, bounded things; or He judges them according to their [actual] deeds. If we say that He judges them according to what He knows of their deeds from the side of the [celestial] order, then this would be an injustice on the part of God, may He be blessed — for perhaps they did not conduct their deeds according to that order; and this is the opposite of what those who hold this view intend. And if we say that He judges them according to their deeds [themselves], then it would be obligatory that He know their deeds insofar as they are particular — and this is a thing whose impossibility was already made clear earlier, that it is false. And further: it is among the things made clear of itself, from the side of speculation, that evil does not come from the side of speculation [העיון] except by accident [במקרה], from the side of the matter [מהברת החמר][?]; and this too is the view of our Sages, of blessed memory —

— for they said: "No evil thing comes down from above"; and this is the view our Torah taught us, [for] it said: "And God saw all that He had made, and behold, it was very good" (Bereishis 1:31). But the clarification of this matter from the side

of speculation is according to what he [the proponent] says: because every form [צורה] arranged [to flow] from it [is for] good things and a safeguard [שמירה] for that of which it is form and perfection — not evils, nor a privation of safeguarding; and the more excellent the form, the more honored were the good things flowing from it, whether in quantity or in quality, and the more so if in both together. This is made clear by examining the form of forms among existing things. The parable: the form of man, which is more honored than the form of matter, has tools more fit for safeguarding it than what is fit for it from the good, in that it is a form possessing for its [own] end what is possible to it from the good; and the good things flowing from the human form are also more honored, for man, than the good things flowing from the corporeal form to matter. And what is found of this matter in the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] is made clear to be found also in the non-hylic forms; for this is [the case], since what is found of this in the hylic forms is from the side of the form, [and] all the more so in the non-hylic forms — as though one were to say [that] the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] and the rest of the non-hylic forms, from which these things in this lower world were arranged, [are the more so].

And since the matter is so, it is made clear that, since God, may He be blessed, is the most perfect of all forms — to the point that the rest of the forms have no relation to His perfection — it is fitting that there reach from God, may He be blessed, good things to the heart, toward the utmost end of what is possible of the good; and a safeguarding for that of which He is form and perfection — which is [the whole of] existence in general.

And in general, these evils that fall are, taken together, ascribed to the hylic cause [הסבה ההיולאנית] or to chance [הקרי]; that is, the evils do not escape having their beginning in the recipient [המקבל] itself, or [coming] from without. But indeed the evils whose beginning lies in the recipient — [these] are either from the side of the temperaments [המדות] and the psychic dispositions [התכונות הנפשיות]; and that they are from the side of the temperament [המזג] is made clear to be ascribed to the matter, for this is the cause in it, since the passive powers [הכחות המתפעלות] are not [properly] proportioned to the active powers [הכחות הפועלות], as will be made clear in the fourth [book] of the *Meteorologica* [ברביעי מהאותות] [?].

[I mean,] whether [they are] from the side of the temperaments [המדות] and the psychic dispositions [התכונות הנפשיות]. And likewise this matter — concerning the evils that fall from the side of the temperaments and the psychic dispositions — will be made clear as is fitting for [a man] who is worthy. And this will not be

from the intellect [מהשכל], for the way of the intellect is to lead a man in his proper guidance in [each] matter of human affairs. But indeed the evils whose beginning is from without — these do not escape having their beginning [in] the temperament and choice [המזג והבחירה], or [in something] other than this. And those whose beginning is the temperament and choice — [these] are as has been made clear earlier of matters ascribed to the matter; for choice [הבחירה] is the evil that rouses a man toward something that does not benefit him, [but] harms him from [the side of] the intellect. And likewise the temperament that departs from the [mean] balance [מן השווי] is what is sometimes a cause for that which does not benefit a man — [something] not itself ordered in its own essence from the form; for the form strives to maintain the temperament…

against the perfection in its affairs — [something] of which it would have no escape. As for those [evils] whose beginning is not from the temperament [המזג] nor from choice [הבחירה] — such as the overturning of lands, earthquakes, and fire that falls from the heavens, and the like — it has been explained that no evil reaches men from these except per accidens [במקרה]: as when we say that it happens by chance [שקרה] that fire falls upon a particular individual and burns him and kills him, or that the earth is overturned upon those dwelling in it, so that it happens by chance [שקרה] that they are there.

It has already been explained, moreover, that this evil that befalls them does so by reason of these things being per accidens [במקרה], inasmuch as the events that proceed from them are themselves directed toward the good and toward preservation [לשמירה] of all the lower existing things [הנמצאות השפלות], not toward evil. This is so because here there were [first] the foundations of the contraries [יכודות הפכיים], and it was the way of the contraries that they should corrupt one another in [their] extremity [קצתם לקצה]; and one [contrary] would be corrupted because of this composite [המורכב] [formed] from them. They were therefore obliged to have causes here [for] their activities and for the preserving of their existence and of the coming-into-being [proceeding] from them. And since this could not be brought to completion except by one of the contraries prevailing at one time over the other, and the other prevailing at another time, [all] this [occurring] in a straight and constant rotation [בסבוב ישר וסדור מתמיד] — as has been explained in the natural science [בטבעיות] — then fire must necessarily prevail at one time, and air and water and earth [each] prevail at another time, according to the proportions [היחסים] that obtain, by way of activity, in the recipient acted upon [אצל המתפעל]. And in this [process] the lower existence [המציאות השפל] is preserved.

For its preservation lies, in truth, in the equilibrium [השווי] found among the foundations [היסודות] of which it is composed; and the cause of this equilibrium [השווי] is the influence reaching it from the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמיימים]. And since the matter is so, it has been explained that the evil which reaches [a man] from the prevailing of one of the foundations over the other is per accidens [במקרה], for this prevailing is directed toward the good and toward preservation [לשמירה], as was said earlier.

And from this [it follows] that whatever evil [מה שיקרה מהרעות] reaches an individual man by reason of the configuration of the stars [מערכת הכבבים] is likewise per accidens [במקרה], as has been explained — that is, it [the configuration] is not [evil] in itself; rather, by the primary intention [הכוונה הראשונה], the configuration intends [its effects] by these orderings [בסדורים ההם], that is, [it intends] the attainment of the good; but evil reaches [a man] from them per accidens [במקרה]. And God, may He be blessed, has already given man the intellect [השכל] to guard himself from these evils [הרעות] as far as he can. And in this respect [it may] be said, in a certain manner, that the evils that befall an individual man from the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים] are tied to prime matter [ההיולי]: for if a man follows his intellect [שכלו] in accordance with what is fitting, he would be guarded from them, as has been explained in the third chapter of this book [במאמר השלישי מזה הספר].

In sum, then: because God, may He be blessed, was the beginning [התחלה] of the existing things along the path of the good and of perfecting [ההכלית] and of [bestowing] form [הצורה] — as has been explained in the *Metaphysics* [במה שאחר הטבע] — He is, then, of those from whom there proceeds nothing that is evil in itself for existing things [רע לנמצאות]. And to this the [those] who reason rightly [המטיבים] in speculation [בעיון] have agreed: that the evil found in existing things is from [the side of] the matter [מצד החמר], which is the recipient [המקבל]; since it is not possible that it should reside in [the matter] from the side of the agent [מצד הפועל], which is [God] — and this is [the view of] the Torah [הצורה — reading uncertain [?]].

Now as for [the view] that the beginning [התחלה] of the good is the good and the beginning of the evil is the evil — this is a view [held] from of old [דעה קדם מאד], as though the nature of the [primordial] stone compelled the speculators to believe it. From this [arose the view] of some of the ancients [קצת הקדמים] who posit these [two] beginnings [as] love and strife [האהבה והשנאה], and another group [קצתם] who posit them [as] the One and the Many [האחד והרבוי]. And some of them [קצתם] would posit them [as] the finite and the infinite [בעל תכלית והבלתי

בעל תכלית]. Some of them, again, would posit them [as] gathering and separation [הקבוץ והפירוד]. And many of the later [thinkers] [מהאחרונים], the masters of [our] Torah [בעלי התורה], would posit them [as] God, may He be blessed, and the harmful ones [המזיקין] — I mean, the demons [השדים]. To this, indeed, some of the men of our Torah [אנשי תורתנו] have assented; and they are sustained, in this view, by certain dicta found among our teachers, may their memory be a blessing, in the Talmud [בתלמוד]. Yet it has been explained that there is no difficulty in expounding what is found in [the words of] our teachers, may their memory be a blessing, in this [matter] in a way that accords with the truth.

And when this [view] is examined [התישב זה], [namely] one that would say that evils do not proceed from Him, may He be blessed, in their own right [בעצמות מהשם יתברך], then it is readily explained that it is false [שקר] that there [could] be divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] for individual men in the manner that the holders of this view supposed. For if God, may He be blessed, were to requite a man according to his deeds [לפי מעשיו] — [reward] for the good he did, if good, so that good would reach him, and [punish] for the evil he did, [bringing] evil — as the holders of this view supposed, then it would necessarily follow that this evil reaches [him] from God, may He be blessed, in [God's] own right [בעצמות]. And it has already been explained that this view is refuted [בטל] by reason of the senses [מצד החוש], inasmuch as we find, many times over, evils reaching the righteous and good things reaching the wicked.

Now as for what Eliphaz [אליפו = Eliphaz], Bildad [ובלדד], and Zophar [וצופר] supposed — this [too] is something refuted by the readily-explained [point] that not one of them escapes the doubt [הספק] in what he supposed. As for Eliphaz [אליפז]: if it were necessarily required, on his supposition, that there reach the righteous, from God, may He be blessed, good things in the measure of their righteousness [כשעור צדקתם], and to the wicked evils in the measure of their wickedness [כשעור רעתם], then this [is] something not found to be so. And this [is] because it is already possible to remove the doubt [שיסולק הספק] regarding what reaches the righteous of evils and the wicked of good things; that is, [it can be removed] by saying that these are things that do not proceed along an order [סדר] and a straightness [ויושר] — and [along] the custom [המנהג] [of how things go].

Yet, in truth, the doubt [הספק] is not removed by [his] supposition [as to] what is found, [namely] that the good things befitting them [the righteous] do not reach them, nor [do] the evils befitting them [the wicked reach them]; for [if his thesis held] it would have been fitting that there reach them, from God, may He be blessed, [things] according to his view. But we do not find the matter going by the

senses [בחוש] in this manner. Rather, we already find many righteous men in great evils for the count of the days of their lives, with no good things befalling them but a little; and many wicked men in vast prosperity [בהצלחות עצומות], with no evils befalling them by anything they sense at all. Moreover, we find that we [find] many evils befalling some of the righteous together with their striving in the guarding against [those] evils that they should not reach [them] — yet they are not guarded from them; and we find, too, [men] striving in the acquisition of the good [things] [בקנית הטובה] by the means proper to them, yet evil and the absence of success [רוע ההצלחה] in their acquisition reach them. And this is something readily explained: that it is impossible to ascribe this to the folly [האולה] and ignorance [הפהיות] [of the sufferers], as Eliphaz [אליפז] supposed; and this is readily explained, for the senses [החוש] contradict what Eliphaz [אליפז] supposed. For Eliphaz [אליפז], in sensing these doubts [הכפקות האלו] — I mean, in [the matter] that he heard, [namely] that some of the wicked, [for] all their setting their hand to do evil for the count of the days of their lives, no punishment [עונש] reaches them — has, [he] said, fixed his hand upon [the claim]…

that to escape this doubt [הספק], [he says] that even if the wicked man is not punished, his seed [זרעו] is already punished. And it is readily explained that this answer [התשובה] does not escape the doubt [הספק]: that he [Eliphaz] would strive to clear God, may He be blessed, [of the charge] — yet [on this] there is no rightness [היושר], inasmuch as there is no fitting basis for this supposition; for [on it] one man would be punished for the sin of another [על חטא זולתו]. — And it has already been explained that the senses [החוש] likewise contradict what Zophar [צופר] supposed. This [is] because it is explained from the senses that the people one finds with good things [are] in much greater [number] than those reaching whom is some evil [רעה]; the matter being [also] thus: [that] their activities incline more to the activities of righteousness and perfection [היושר והשלמות] at the time when good things reach them than [their activities incline] to the evil from which evil reaches them at the time when [those] good things reach them.

It is not possible [to ascribe] the doubt [הספק] in this to the variability of the disposition [התחלפות ההכנה]; for the disposition by which [a thing] is guarded [נוצר] is one and the same in [God's] sight [בעינו]. God [האלהים], if there be no wonder that the variability of requital and punishment [התחלפות הגמול והעונש] among men should be by reason of the variability of men's disposition in the goodness of [their] deeds and their perfection [שלמותם], [yet] not by reason of the variability of the particular disposition [ההכנה הפרטית] — as he [Zophar] supposed. [It is rather] my view [רצוני] that whoever's deeds are the more perfect [שלמה] would be requited for [each] one [of his] deeds with more good, [and] the

lesser [in deeds] would be requited with less good — whoever was lower in the goodness of his deeds [than] those [others]; and the reverse, [there being] punishment for the evil deed. And were this [thus, then] one who [were to] grant this — behold, here would be the doubt [הספק], which one who would clear God, may He be blessed, in [God's] own sight [בעינו] remains [unable to escape]: I mean, this [doubt] that we see [in] the reaching of evils to the righteous and good things to the wicked.

This [too] is readily explained by the senses [החוש], together with what preceded — that is, [it is] something the senses contradict, as Bildad [בלדד] supposed. And this [is] because we find evils reaching the righteous in much greater [measure than] would [be the case] if their way [דרכם] were toward the good; rather, the righteous man remains in that evil [ברע ההוא]. And so [too] the matter [stands as to] the good things of the wicked [בטובת הרשעים]; and the evils of the righteous [ורעות הצדיקים]. And in sum, the matter is not found [to be] in the good things of the wicked and the evils of the righteous in the manner that Bildad [בלדד] supposed, except [in something] minor [אם לא על המעט]; and this [is] readily explained, that the doubt [הספק] does not escape Bildad [בלדד] on this supposition [ההנחה]. It has already been recalled, in the perfection of the disagreement [המחלוקה] over these men, by reason of the senses [מצד החוש], in the Book of Job [בספר איוב], according to what we explained there in [our comments] on the words of Job [מדברי איוב].

Now [the reason] that this view, [the one] that for these men is refuted [מבוטל] by reason of the Torah [מצד התורה], [is so] is explained. This [is] because the Torah [התורה] has made known that when men do evil according to the great rebellion [המרי העצום], it is explained that this evil will be [such] that God, may He be blessed, will not look toward them and will abandon them to the accidents of time [מקרי הזמן]. [Scripture] said: "And I will hide My face from them, and they shall be devoured" (Devarim 31:17); and [Scripture] said: "And I, I will surely hide [My face]" (Devarim 31:18). And the prophet, peace be upon him, said: "He who hides His face from the house of Jacob" (Yeshayahu 8:17); "and you forgot the Torah of your God, I also [will forget your children]" — "I also will forget your children" (Hoshea 4:6); [and:] "all the nations that forget God" (Tehillim 9:18). And this [theme] is already doubled many times over in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, and of those who speak by the holy spirit [ברוח הקדש] — [namely] my point [רצוני] that the punishment [העונש] reaching the wicked is directed toward the hiding of the [divine] face [בהסתר פנים] and forgetting; and our meaning is that God, may He be blessed, abandons them to the accidents of time [מקרי הזמן], and there reaches them what reaches them according to the

[astral] arrangements [הסדורים] that [come] by reason of the configuration [המערכה], and He does not deliver them. And evil [מרע] [whatever] would be fitting to come

upon them, He does not visit upon them by their deeds [על מעשיהם] in the sending of evils to them in the measure of [their] rebellion [המרי] — as the holders of this view supposed. And what [further] shows that the [scriptural] teaching is revealed [as bearing] upon the refutation of this view [is] what the prophet, peace be upon him, said: "I [did] not destine evil; I will not visit it upon your daughters when they go astray" [מייעד רע לא אפקד על בנותיכם כי תזנינה — citation compressed; reconstruction uncertain [?]]. He has already made clear to you that, just as when [men] sin by [their] rebellion [כשיפליגו במרי], God, may He be blessed, abandons them to the accidents of time [מקרי הזמן] and does not visit [recompense] upon them by their deeds [על מעשיהם] — so, too, what comes in the Torah [as] a teaching about the coming of the punishment [העונש] upon the transgressors [העוברים] by reason of His word [דבריה], [now] it is explained how it could be that this [is] from a respect that accords with speculation [העיון], and with what is recalled in the Torah and in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them.

פרק רביעי (Chapter Four)

[Subtitle, smaller type:] It will be explained therein how the matter [stands] in this providence [ההשגחה], in a certain manner [באופן מה].

After it has already been explained that it is false [שקר] that divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] should not exist for one of the individual men [מאישי האדם] by reason of the particular nature [הטבע הפרטי], and [after] it has likewise been explained that it is false that the providence [ההשגחה] [should exist] for any one of them by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי] — for it is explained that what would necessarily follow [from each thesis] is that the providence [be present] in [only] some of them, and not be [present] in [only] some of them [as well] — it will already be seen, too, in another manner: my point [רצוני] [is] that the divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] is for individual men by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי], and that it [is present] in some of them and not [present] in some of them.

This will already be seen [from the fact] that whoever is more honored [נכבד] and nearer in degree [במדרגה] to the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] — [him] God, may He be blessed, watches over [the more], and [there] are in him more instruments [כלים] for preserving his existence [מציאותו]. This [is] something already

explained, [as] explained in the *Book of Animals* [בספר בעלי חיים]: that whatever living thing is more honored [חי יותר נכבד], the more are the instruments [כלים] prepared in it for preserving its existence [מציאותו]. And [it follows] that, since men [vary] in degrees [מדרגות], varying in nearness and in farness from [their] being acted upon by the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי], then it [is] necessarily required that those who are nearer [it] should have stronger relations [יחס] [to it], [and be] more watched over [מושגחים] by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי]. And [for those few] men who remained, with the disposition [ההכנה] that is theirs by reason of the species-nature [הטבע המיניי], and did not strive to walk toward perfection [לשלמות], [so as to] draw near to the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] — but rather some of them [קצתם] [even] added deficiency [חסרון] upon their [own] deficiencies [חסרונם], the [deficiencies] which are theirs by the root of [their] formation [בשרש היצירה] by reason of the species-nature [הטבע המיניי] — for these it is explained that, from this faculty [הכח], divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] does not depend [תתלה] upon men, if [it be] not by the species-nature [בטבע מיניי]; for they have no [other] respect, [no respect] by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי], by which they would be watched over [מושגחים].

And since the matter is so, it is explained that the divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] is for some men by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי] [varying] in [their] degrees [במדרגות], and for some men is not found at all. And this will already be seen, too, in another manner. This [is] because God, may He be blessed, is, in our meaning, [the one who] knows all the intelligibles [המושכלות], and man [has] the disposition [ההכנה] to receive the intelligibles [המושכלות], to the [point] that he, by his very life [בחיי], [is so] in a certain manner. And since the matter is so, [it is] my point [רצוני] that, since God, may He be blessed, is the master of [all] the intelligibles in actuality [רב המושכלות בפעל], and man [is] the master of the disposition [רב ההכנה] toward receiving them, then it [is] explained that, from what is [present] in actuality [בפעל], whoever perfects what is in him in potentiality [שישלים מה שבכח], and brings it forth…

the Agent [הפועל]. For it has been explained that God, may He be blessed, perfects in man what is praiseworthy [in him] and brings it forth into actuality [אל הפועל]. And since the bringing-forth, from the side of the Agent, of the intelligibles [המושכלות] is found in him in this way, and the patient [המתפעל] [is so] in a certain manner, then it [is] explained that whoever has already drawn near to God, may He be blessed — that is the manner of his being-conjoined [התאחדות / conjunction]. And what this way [of his] is, [is] explained, [namely] that it is fitting that providence [ההשגחה] be present in him by reason of this conjunction

and cleaving [התאחדות והדבקות] — God, may He be blessed, not abandoning him to that which is base [המאוס] (since he is more lowly and despicable in His eyes [פחות ונבזה]), as those who said that there is no divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] over any of the individual men by reason of the particular nature [הטבע הפרטי] held, [namely] that he is lowly and despicable in the eyes of God, may He be blessed. And [it is] according to the measure of this conjunction — that is, the measure by which a man attains intelligibles in actuality [מהמושכלות בפעל], not by reason of what is the species-nature [הטבע המיניי] — that it is explained that it is fitting that divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] be present in man, [the man] who attains intellect by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי].

פרק חמישי (Chapter Five)

[Subtitle, smaller type:] It will be explained therein in what manner there is a difference [in degree] as to what is to be explained [concerning] the matter of this providence [ההשגחה], such that it [will] be confirmed [as agreeing] with what God, may He be blessed, has explained in His words.

After it has been explained that divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] is present in some of the individual men by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי], it is fitting that we investigate in what manner it is possible that there be a difference [שינוי] in this — with the guarding of the root [שמירת השרש] which has been explained, [namely] that whichever men strive after the knowledge of God, may He be blessed (my point [רצוני] being [the men] from whose side there are individual [features], and [things] relating to them [as individuals]) — for it has already been made known that there will be in this [a] difference [from man to man] according to the measure of conjunction [המקושי] [?], to the [point] that already he whose name is reckoned [worthy] would will [for him] a gathering [קבון], so that these would be in [their] knowledge [a difference] in degree according to the gathering of the contraries [לקבון ההפכים] together.

And we shall say that it has already been explained that the apprehension that the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] watches over [as present] among existing things [is so] if there be in them bodily instruments [כלים גופיים] [and] there be in them psychic faculties [כחות נפשיים]: [the existing things] guard their own existence [מציאותם], [these being] the individuals possessing those instruments, and [the faculties] distance them from the harmful [המזיק] or remove [it] from them. [It is] as if one were to say that there are there [in the animal] horns [הקרנים], and hooves [הפרסות], and round [shapes] [העגולות], and the like, in some animals possessing life — [these being] like that which comes, by what is fitting, to be of advantage [לדויק] to them; and [so too] the apprehension of prey [הטרף] by the

predators [בטורפים]. And in some of them providence [השגח] watches over [as present] in them a desire [תשוקות] of the soul [נפשיות], [as] if one were to say that there has been placed in [the animal] a desire [תשוקה] by nature to flee from that which it sees as harmful [המזיק] to it — even though it does not sense [הרגיש] that it [is] harmful [מזיק], nor saw it before. And by this manner the [bird-]migrations [העפיפות] of the [birds of] prey are increased; and if they [did] not see them before, [yet the manner of] the flight [העפיפה] of the birds of prey, going toward the south [side] [לפאת הדרום] in the days of cold, and toward the north [side] [לפאת הצפון] in the days of heat, [is by] a constellation [מזולה / innate disposition], and the existing things [האחות הנמצאות] found for them in their places [are such] that they are moved toward them; and there is placed [in the animal] the hidden [innate] knowledge [הצפון], an herb [עשב] that it knows [to be] something whose healing [רפואה] is fitting to its eyes [לעיניהם] — that is, an *afroha* [אפרוהה] herb [?] [unidentified medicinal plant], a constellation [אוהה מזלה] [?] which [the animal] knows. And here [is] the likeness [דמיון] of the [providential] activities [הפעולות], [as] if one were to say that there are there [in nature] things [whose] activities [are such] that…

there are [things] in them, and in the making of honey [הדבש], which are nourished [יוזנו] from it at the time when food [המזון] is lacking to them — [the disposition being] that all the activities ordered [יסודרו] from it [come] from these crafts [המלאכות]. And here [is] this manner of providence [ההשגחה] [present] in man insofar as he is more perfect [שלם], very greatly so: for there has already been prepared [הוכן] for him every one of the activities ordered [יסודרו] from it — many crafts [מלאכות] of advantage [מועילות] to him for his preservation [בשמירתו] — and there has been prepared [הוכן] for him the intellect [השכל], from which are ordered the desires [התשוקות] [directing him] to flee from many harmful things [מזיקים] and to aim toward many advantageous things [מועילים]. And in some of the men this providence [ההשגחה] will be in this more perfect manner — that is, that He makes known to them, through prophecy [בנבואה], the evil things and the good things destined [הנכונים] to come upon them, so that they may guard themselves against the evils [מהרעות] and aim toward the good things [הטובות], as is explained in the second treatise [במאמר השני] of this book. And here it [is] fitting [that it] be thus: that this [is so] because God, may He be blessed, is not slow [לא יקצר] to emanate from the good and the perfection [מהטוב והשלמות] according to what is possible for that which is found [to receive it]. And [it is] according to this manner of providence [ההשגחה] that He watches over much among the living beings [מהבעלי חיים]:

[He watches over them] insofar as there are placed in them desires [השוקות] of the soul [נפשיות], to flee from that evil and toward that good which He has measured out [שיעורו] [for them] as the good and the evil thereof [בטוב ההוא וברע ההוא]; [and] it is possible that this be in a more perfect manner — that is, that He makes known to them [שיודיעם] the evil and the good [things] destined [הנכון] to come upon them, so that they may guard themselves from the evil [מהרע] and aim toward the good [אל הטוב]. Here it [is] fitting that there be in them this providence [ההשגחה] in this respect. And here, in some of the matters, providence [השגח] watches over the individual men [באישי הנמצאים], [men] who attain some matter [by which] they guard themselves from it [the evil] — [it is] as if one were to say that there is there a sickness [חלה] [as to which] He guards [שמרו] them by the stomach [האצטומכא], so that [the body] may be sustained [שתדרגד] [?] according to the stomach [האצטומכא] at the time when the need [צורך] [for food] comes regarding nourishment [המזון], and [the body] be aroused [ויצטער] by sensing this and seek nourishment [המזון]; for in this manner [the body] will be guarded [נשמר]. And just as there is, in [some] of the kinds [מין] of living beings [מהבעלי חיים], the casting away of seed [השלכת זרעו] [from a vessel] toward an instrument of preservation [כלי אל השמירה] — this [being] because, in the multiplying [בשיפהד] [?] of other living beings, when there befell it [some] precious [vessel], from [its] being burdened by it [מהפחה], [the animal] would cast away its seed [שישליך זרעו] and be guarded [be relieved] by it.

And when one has considered [התישבו] the manners of providence [ההשגחה] that are found [as coming] from God, may He be blessed, [directed] to these things which [we have spoken of] here — and it has already been explained that God, may He be blessed, watches over [as present in] some of the individual men [באישי האדם] by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי] [varying] in [their] degrees [במדרגות] — here it [is] fitting that we investigate in what manner [from among] the manners of providence [ההשגחה] that we have recalled it could be that there be this providence [ההשגחה]. And it is explained that it is not possible that this providence [ההשגחה] be [present] in [those] men [who are] the more watched over [המושגחים], [as] more guarding [as to] their existence [מציאותם] by [bodily] instruments [אברים / organs] — because they all [share] of one kind [ממין אחד], and the individual men of the one kind are equal in pattern [על המנהג] [as to] the natural [features] in the number of their organs [אבריהם], their figures [ותמונותיהם], and the psychic faculties [הכחות הנפשיות] which are in them, [given by] God [האלהים], if there be not here a multiplicity of organs [רבוי אברים] [varying] among the individual men [באישים] necessarily by reason of [their] matter [מהכרח החמר]. And what this [shows is so] is that their way [is] not by reason of providence [ההשגחה] and beneficence [וההטבה]. And in [the very] being

of the matter so, here it is likely that there be this providence [ההשגחה] by one of the manners that remain [הנשארים], or by [something] equal [שיאות] to them. And [it is] according to what is explained [from] what God, may He be blessed, has already made known [as] to some men [as to] the good things [הטובות] and the evils [הרעות] destined to come upon them by way of providence [על צד ההשגחה] [in His] guarding of them [בשמירתם], [that] here it appears that this providence [שהשגחתו] of God, may He be blessed, [is present] among the individual men [באישי האדם]

[in this] insofar as He makes known to them the good and the evil destined [הנכון] to come upon them, so that they may guard themselves from the evils [מהרעות] and aim toward the good things [אל הטובות].

And here this notification [ההודעה] from Him will be in differing manners according to the difference [התחלפות] in the degree [מדרגת] of the men in nearness [בקורבה] and farness [והרוחק] from the Active Intellect [מהשכל הפועל] — that is, that the men in whom the conjunction [ההתאחדות] with the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] is the stronger, to them this notification [ההודעה] reaches in a perfect manner, by way of prophecy [בדרך הנבואה]. And this [too is] by degrees [על מדרגות], according to the difference [החלף] in the degrees of the conjunction [מדרגות ההתאחדות]. [And as for the men] who [did] not [have] their degrees [מדרגתם] reach the [point] that this notification [ההודעה] in this manner be perfected for them, God, may He be blessed, watches over [as present] in them [in this]: that He places in them desires [תשוקות] of the soul [נפשיות], to aim toward the things from which good [will] reach them [in] a constellation [מזולה / disposition] He has measured [שיערו] [for them] as the good thereof [בטוב ההוא], and to flee [from] other things [from which] evil [will] reach them, [namely] by reason of the [astral] arrangements [הסדורים] which [come] from the heavenly bodies [מהגרמים השמיימים], [the things] [from] a constellation [מזולה] He has measured [שיערו] [for them] as the evil thereof [ברע ההוא]. And this notification [ההודעה] too [is] weak [גם כן חלושה], [as we shall see].

And in this manner it has happened, for some men, [that there came] the fear [הפחד] [encircling] around [them] at the time when it [was] destined [נכון] that there reach them evil — [from] a constellation [מזולה] He has measured [שיערו] [for them] in [some] matter [שיהיה] — that fear [הפחד] coming to be on its account [בעבורו]; and this [is] like the manner of what happens to those weak of vision [לחלושי הראות], [that] they [do] not see the luminous things in themselves [המאירים בעצמם], but [rather] there reaches them, from [these things], a brightness [זוהר] and [a] scintillation [וניצוצם]. And like this our Rabbis, of blessed memory [רבותינו

זכרונם לברכה], said: "Even though he himself does not see [a portent], his constellation [מזליה] sees [it]" [Aramaic: אף על גב דאיהו לא חזי, מזליה חזי — Megillah 3a / Sanhedrin 94a]. And here, the intention [כוונת] of this treatise [המאמר] is explained, with [but] a little investigation [עיון], from what we explained in the second treatise [במאמר השני] of this book. And [it is] for this reason [ולזאת הסבה] too that one finds, among the men [who are] more distant [מתרחקים / from the Active Intellect], [that] they [do] not attain to what they have been distanced from; and after it has been explained to them that, if [those distant ones] had not been distanced from them [the apprehensions], the touch [מגיעם] of [those apprehensions] would have been an evil [רע] [to them] — and some men draw near to the things which they did not attain, and after it is explained to them [that] they should draw near to them [להתקרב להם], and after it is explained to them [that] their drawing near [שהתקרבם] to those things would be a cause that there reach them good [אל שיגיע להם טוב].

And [as for those] who [did] not [have] their degrees [מדרגתם] reach the [point] that there be in them this conjunction [ההתאחדות] and desire [התשוקה], here it is possible that there be the providence [ההשגחה] in them [in this]: that He brings them [בשביא] [into] matters [עניינים] [that are] painful [מצערים] [to them] by way of providence [על צד ההשגחה], to guard them [לשמרם] [from] other harmful things [מדברים אחרים רעים] prepared [מוכנים] to come upon them, or to aim [them] toward [the point] that good things reach them [אל שיגיע להם טובות]. An example [משל] of what would be [done] to guard them from the evils [מן הרעות]: [it is] as if one were to say that a good man [is] walking on the way [הולך בדרך] with merchants [סוחרים] to embark on the sea [לרכב הים], and there enters a thorn [קוץ] into his foot [ברגלו] in a manner [such] that he is not able to walk with them. And this came to be a cause that he escaped [שנמלט] from the drowning [מהטביעה] at sea [בים]. And concerning the like of this [על כיוצא בזה] David [דוד], peace be upon him, said: "I will thank You, O Lord, for You were angry with me; let Your anger turn back, that You may comfort me" [אודך ה' כי אנפת בי ישוב אפך ותנחמני — Yeshayahu 12:1; in the body ascribed to David, see note (b)]. And an example [משל] of what would be [done] to aim [a man] toward [the point] that good things reach him [is] as if one were to say that So-and-so [פלוני] [was] aroused [התעורר] to go on a journey [בשיירה / with a caravan], and there entered the thorn [הקוץ] into his foot [ברגלו], and this came to be a cause that he did not heed [שמע] to go with the people [עמם] and remained [ונשאר] in the city [במדינה], and there reached him vast successes [הצלחות עצומות] which would not have reached him had he not remained in it [בה]. And the like of all this [כלו] is that to which our Rabbis, of blessed memory, gave the name "afflictions of love" [יסורין של אהבה].

פרק ששי (Chapter Six)

[Subtitle, smaller type:] It will be explained therein how what has been explained [concerning] the matter of providence [ההשגחה] is of [the kind] in which no doubt [ספק] should fall at all — neither by reason of speculation [העיון], nor by reason of the senses [החוש], nor by reason of the Torah [התורה].

And it is fitting that there be explained [the way] in which this manner [האופן] by which we are guided [הנחנוהו] regarding divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] [present] in some of the individual men [is one in which] no doubt [ספק] would fall, [a doubt] difficult to escape from — neither by reason of speculation [העיון], nor by reason of the senses [החוש], nor by reason of the Torah [התורה] — but [in which], rather, [the considerations] agree to this position [ההנחה] from all sides [מכל הצדדים]. For, as will be explained, when this [holds], our position regarding this providence [ההשגחה] will be the more perfect [שלם]. And this [is so since] it already seems that we have arrived at the goal of verification [תכלית ההאמתה] regarding a matter [בדבר] such that there remains for us in it no doubt [לא נשאר לנו בו ספק]; and on account of this [ומפני זה] it is fitting that there be explained, first [תחלה], that the claims [הטענות] by which there were upheld [שיקיימו] [those] views of theirs [דעותיהם], [those of] those who say that there is no divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] [present] in any of the individual men by reason of the particular nature [הטבע הפרטי], and [those of] those who say that He [providence] is found [as present] in each one of the individual men [— that these claims do] not necessitate [לא יחויב] from them the nullification [בטול] of this position [ההנחה].

And we shall say that it is explained, in our matters, with [but] a little investigation [עיון], together with what preceded [מה שקדם], [as to those] from among the things [in] which there is no claim [שאין באלו הטענות] [that] what is fitting necessitates the nullification [בטול] of what we are guided [שהנחנוהו] [to] regarding this divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית]. And this [is so] in [the case of] the claims [שהטענות] which the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] [= Aristotle] argued, in [his] way [בדרך], to uphold [לקיים] that there is no divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] [present] in any of the individual men by reason of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי], on the ground that His knowledge [שידיעתו] cannot possibly be [knowledge] spread out over the particular things [בדברים הפרטיים] insofar as they [are] particular [פרטיים] — [a claim] which is explained [as] not contradicting this position [ההנחה]. For this [is] because the providence [ההשגחה] by which we are guided [הנחנוה] is possible together with our teaching [הוראתנו] that the knowledge [שידיעת] of God, may He be blessed, is not [a knowledge] spread out

over particular things [בדברים הפרטיים] [from] the side [מצד] by which they [are] particular [פרטיים]; for this providence [ההשגחה], which was [directed] toward the good things [לטובים] by reason of the notification [ההודעה] [as to] the good and the evil destined [הנכון] to come upon them, [was] already perfect [שלם], [obtaining] together with the being of [the source] that emanates this notification [המשפיע זאת ההודעה] [being] one that does not apprehend [בלתי משיג] this particular man [האיש הפרטי] who receives the emanation [המקבל השפע], [and] together with the being of [the source] from which [שמאצל] emanates [המשפיע] [a knowledge] not [consisting] of knowing [נודעים] the particular things [הדברים הפרטיים] [from] the side [מהצד] by which they [are] particular [בו פרטיים] — [the source] from which there was the notification [ההודעה] [as to] them. We have already explained

this in the second treatise [במאמר השני] of this book; and there we explained that the notification [ההודעה] [which] reaches [the man] from the Active Intellect [מהשכל הפועל] in actuality [הפועל], [reaching him] regarding the particular thing [בדבר הפרטי], [comes] by reason of the emanation [מצד השפע] which the receiver [המקבל השפע] receives [as to] the existence [מצד מציאות] of the sensed thing [המוחש]. And the providence [וההשגחה] which there was [in] His making the fear [הפחד] arise for them, to deliver them [להציל להם] from the evils [מהרעות], and His furnishing for them [ולהמציא להם] the remainder [שאר] of the desires [התשוקות] of the soul [הנפשיות], to aim toward the things [אל הדברים] from which good [will] reach them [אשר יגיע להם מהם טוב], and to distance themselves [ולהתרחק] from the things from which evil [will] reach them [מהדברים אשר יגיע מהם רע] — this too, in like manner [גם כן], [comes by means of] the notification [ההודעה] [that is] weak [חלושה], as we explained in what preceded [במה שקדם]. And the law [ודינה] of [this] perfect notification [דין ההודעה השלמה] in this matter [בזה הענין] [is as already established]. And this [is] explained in itself [בנפשו]: that is [רצוני], just as it [is] not impossible [שלא ימנע] that the reaching [הגעת] of the perfect notification [ההודעה השלמה] regarding the particular thing [בדבר הפרטי] [come] from God, may He be blessed, so [too] it [is] not impossible [לא ימנע] that there reach [him] from Him a notification [הודעה] not perfect [בלתי שלמה] regarding the particular thing [בדבר הפרטי] — for the absence of the perfection [העדר השלמות] found in this notification [ההודעה] [is] by reason of the receiver [מצד המקבל], and [it is] he [who] attains [ישיג]

[that] this particular thing [הדבר הפרטי] [is] destined [נכון] to come upon him in this manner [בזה האופן], such that the emanation [ההשפעה] [would not be]…

in the particular matter. Now, as for what we have posited — that this providence already exists [as something laid down] — it consists in bringing about, for the good, the removal of a more grievous evil, or in causing good things to reach them. (Were there here knowledge of a particular thing, it would indeed be of what is particular; yet such [making-known] reaches Him only because His making-known [ההודעה] reaches whoever is prepared to receive this manner from providence — just as the Active Intellect [הפועל] is prepared to bestow upon whoever is prepared to receive it, [though] without there being in it any particular knowledge of what is particular.)

Since this is how the matter stands, it is already explained that we are not bound, by our making-known, to hold that the Lord's knowledge, may He be blessed, extends to the particular thing on the side of its being particular [מהצד הפרטי] — that is, that His providence over the individuals of mankind should be from the side of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי], in the manner we have laid down.

As for the objection one might raise here from the side of the disorder [רוע הסדר] found amid the goods and evils of the individuals of mankind — to this we reply that those [goods] are dispatched and sent toward the accidents [המקרים] that are ordained from the heavenly bodies; and the Lord, may He be blessed, does not guard against the evils set in order to come upon them from the side of the [astral] configuration [המערכת] in the case of one who lacks the degree [needed] for cleaving [שהדבק] to this divine providence. Nor are we prevented — given what we have posited — [from holding] that He waits upon the righteous in a time of evil, when they sit watchful, by reason of the bond and union [הקשר וההתדבקות] which are between them and the Lord, may He be blessed — that [bond] which is from their side; for then their providence orders [for them] either the turning-aside of the evil upon them in some manner, or that they sit watchful against the accidents [המקרים]. Since this is how the matter stands, it is explained that on this side no doubt falls upon what we have posited regarding the matter of divine providence.

But one may yet raise a doubt regarding what we have posited about these matters, in which the absence of order [העדר הסדר] has fallen. For we have already made known that we are not prevented [from holding] that great goods reach the wicked at the time of the dissolving [התרחם] of the bond and cleaving between them and the Lord, may He be blessed, and that evils [reach] the good [at such a time]. Since this is how the matter stands, one may say that the order [הסדר] which the Lord, may He be blessed, has set in motion from the heavenly bodies over the individuals of mankind — from which there befell, for the

individual man, the order found amid the goods and evils that reach them according to what we have posited — [is such that] their welfare does not escape Him, may He be blessed, [whether] for high [degree] or for low.

And this is because He knows this order, as has been explained earlier; namely, that this [order], which is set down for the wicked and for the righteous at the time of the dissolving of the bond and cleaving between them and the Lord, may He be blessed — behold, He already knows that there may chance to come from it evils to the good and goods to the wicked. Since this is how the matter stands, the matter does not fall into [self-]contradiction [מחלוקת] — [the question being] whether the Lord, may He be blessed, is able [to bring it about] that this order be perfected with respect to the individual in his deeds, and whether He does not exert Himself in it: for without doubt there will be no injustice in His statute, Heaven forbid [חלילה] for us [to say] so, nor that He sees this [and does nothing] — and this too would be a defect [חסרון] in His statute, may He be blessed.

Let us say, then, that if requital and punishment [הגמול והעונש] for man lay in these goods and evils which are found amid them in the absence of order and uprightness, there would indeed be in this some doubt arising from what appears [מההראות]. But it is already seen, with a little speculation [במעט עיון], that the true requital and punishment do not lie in these bodily-sensed goods and evils [הטובות והרעות המורגשות]; rather, the requital and punishment found for man lie in that wherein man is properly man. They lie, that is, not in the human goods, nor in the goods and evils that are not human. Since this is how the matter stands, and since the human goods lie in the acquisition of the felicity of the soul [הצלחת הנפש] — for it is not in respect of his sustenance [the satisfaction of appetite] and the sensed things [המורגשים] that man is man, since the nourishing and the sentient [faculties] [ההזון וההרגש] are not [that] in respect of which a man is man — so too the human evils lie in the absence of the felicity of the soul, that is, the diminution from its perfection. It is therefore explained that the requital and punishment found for man, in respect of his being man, lie in the felicity and the absence of the felicity of the soul, not in these bodily-sensed goods and evils that are ordained from the heavenly bodies.

And in proportion to the matter of the felicity of the soul — which is drawn essentially out of upright and good deeds, while its absence is drawn out of base deeds — and this is the true good and evil: the good and evil [found] for man insofar as he is man, [the man] who walks in order and uprightness, will not fall short of [receiving] anything from it.

So too, when one considers the orders ordained from the heavenly bodies, in which there are placed sufferings [יסורים] [for some] — the sensed goods and evils [הרעות המוחשות] that are found for mankind — behold, there is found in them nothing one could suppose belongs to the Lord, may He be blessed, [as] injustice or defect; rather, they are found at the limit of perfection [בתכלית השלמות] possible for the good of providence and the good [טובה] in these matters. For there is preserved in them this lower existence [המציאות השפל], wherein [reside] the good and the perfection, such that man's intellect cannot attain to grasp it in its perfection. And this is because, by them, the elements [היסודות] and the contraries [ההפכים] are preserved — by which all the compounds [המורכבים] stand in the most perfect manner possible — and the elemental heat [החום היסודי] is preserved in them for the possible time, to the utmost limit possible for its preservation, up to a point one might suppose [the limit at] which the activity of these heavenly bodies departs [שיסתלק]; [for] in this short time it has here, the good and the perfection found in them was [at its fullest], and they would not be left without the life [from] the living beings [בעלי חיים].

And there are already found things that are watched over more than [those] things which they watch over apart from them, [it being so] up to [the point] that all His activities are the [things] ordained from them. And it has already been of necessity that there cleave [שתדבק] to it, from this providence, more than cleaves apart from it to these things which are here; for were it not so, [there would be] in these matters putrefaction [decay]. For thereby it comes about that what is acted upon by the things outside [follows] with ease [בקלות], and were it not for the bulk of the watching [רוב השמירה] that reaches it from the heavenly bodies, it would be corrupted with ease. And further, because of the great breadth [הרחב הרב] that is in its temperament [במזגו], it was of necessity that there be variation [התחלפות] among the temperaments [מזגי] of men. And since the psychic dispositions [התכונות הנפשיות] vary by reason of the variation of the temperaments [מזגים], it was of necessity that there be great variation falling among the individuals of mankind in their dispositions, the psychic ones; and on this account it was of necessity that they always be in quarrels and disputes [במריבות וקטטות], up to the point that they would slay one another, were it not for this

watching [over them]. And it is already explained [as to] this degree of watching which reaches them [from the heavenly bodies] when one considers the evils that reach men at the hands of the wicked — who, being many, exert themselves with all their might to do evil to their kind, while [yet] the wise [men overcome] them, in this always, according to what is possible for them: for, with all this, the evils

found reaching men from them are few. Since this is how the matter stands, it is explained that the [things] ordained, by which the Lord, may He be blessed, has set their order, hold within them, of righteousness and uprightness and favor [מהצדק והיושר והחנינה], what cannot be measured. And even though it is already drawn, by the necessity [given] from these bodies, [that] some evil [touch] one of them by chance [במקרה] — they being watchers of the contraries [שומרים ההפכים], by which there stands the standing of every compound, sometimes overpowering it one way and sometimes the other — and it chances thereby [that] an evil overpowers [some] men, behold, there is in this no shortcoming nor weariness [קצור ולאות] for the Lord, may He be blessed, [in the matter of] ordering them in such manner that no evil reach them. And this is because there [exists] in man a faculty whereby he may be saved from these evils — and that is the intellect [השכל]. For man may already be saved by it from these evils, whether on the side of free choice [צד הבחירה] [or] on the side of providence, in one of the manners aforesaid. And behold, whoever does not exert himself in the perfection of the intellect according to what is fitting, in the way by which one cleaves to this providence — there is, for him, no [remedy] for the harm coming upon him [from] these evils except [that it is] of his own [doing]; for it was by his own hand that this came to be his.

So too, then, the reaching of these few evils that fall [is] by reason of the small profit [from] the explained benefit — that is, that there already reaches, by this, an evil sensed [רע מוחש] to the wicked, while there is preserved in them [the welfare of] the rest of mankind, and they are saved from their evils — and it is as if our intent in this [were] these evils that reach by chance [במקרה] amid the [things] ordained, [of which] they said: "all the work of the Lord [is] for His purpose [למענהו], and even the wicked for the day of evil" [Mishlei 16:4]. And, in general, whoever does not wish that these few evils, falling by chance, be ordained from the side of the order of the heavenly bodies, [in effect] wishes that there should not be here good from the goods found here from the Lord, may He be blessed, by their mediation [באמצעותם].

And it is explained that it is not fitting [to hold] that the Lord, may He be blessed, refrain [from causing] these wonderful goods [to come] by the mediation of the heavenly bodies, on account of a little evil that reaches by chance [במקרה] from them; for it is the way of the Lord, may He be blessed, to do good, [so] as to be found for whoever is possible [to receive] of the good and the perfection. And just as it is not fitting [to hold] that the Lord, may He be blessed, withhold the form [הצורה] from these things which are here, on account of the corruption [ההפסד] that may chance to befall them in the end — [the corruption] which is evil — so

likewise there is no [reason that] it be fitting [to hold] that He refrain from the influx [from] these wonderful goods, by the mediation of the heavenly bodies, on account of the little evil [המעטי] that reaches them by chance [במקרה]. Since this is how the matter stands, it is explained that there is in this no shortcoming [קצור] for the Lord, may He be blessed, [in] the order of these [heavenly] bodies, [set] in a manner such that no evil reach from them. That is to say: in respect of what is dispatched to the individuals of mankind, that man may walk in uprightness besides [apart from] the evils, by reason of these bodies — [it being] a thing for which it is fitting [to ascribe] to Him, may He be blessed, no injustice [עול]. For this absence of order found amid these things [comes] from two sides: whether on the side of the goods that are found

reaching the wicked, [or] on the side of the evil which is found reaching the righteous. And it has already been explained that there is in neither of them anything one could ascribe [as] a thing that would be injustice [עול].

Now, [that] the reaching of the goods to the wicked, from the side of the [things] ordained from the heavenly bodies, [involves] no injustice [עול] — this is explained from what is to be said. For the good comes to them on the side of the comprehensive providence [ההשגחה הכוללת]; I mean, on the side of these [things] ordained which they share, insofar as he is man. Behold, were these goods [to come] to them [at the moment] when they are born at a time [of astral configuration favoring] the wicked, [it is] not on the side that they are wicked. And it is explained that it is not fitting [to ascribe] to the Lord, may He be blessed, who watches over the human species in this manner of providence — the necessary providence [ההשגחה ההכרחית] [exercised] in His watching [over them] in the face of the wicked, in [the manner] which it is possible for them to have — [that there be injustice]; and there would be injustice [עול] [only] if there reached them good on the side of their being wicked, or [if it came] from the side of the individual nature [הטבע האישיי].

And just as it is not [conceivable] that one should say that the providence which the Lord, may He be blessed, exercises in the formation [ביצירת] of man — that there are in him many organs [אברים רבים] for the preserving of his existence at the limit of perfection [בתכלית] possible — is injustice, because already there reached perfection [from] the felicity to the wicked together with the [excessive] increase of wickedness [הפלגת רשעם]: so likewise it is not [conceivable] that one should say that this — that the good [should] reach the wicked from the side of these [things] ordained from the heavenly bodies — is injustice [עול]. And this is because it is not fitting [to ascribe] to the Lord, may He be blessed, who does good

to the human species, by way of the comprehensive providence [ההשגחה הכללית], in the face of the wicked, [that He withhold] in [the manner] which it is possible for them to have.

And further, [it is] because it is the way of the Lord, may He be blessed, to do good to the existents at the limit possible [בתכלית מה שאפשר]. This is explained from what [follows]: namely, from what is found [in respect of] the surplus of the beneficence and the favor [מיתרון ההטבה והחנינה] in the formation for each one of the individuals of existing things [מאישי הנמצאות], up to what is possible — [though] this is [but] little. And were it possible for Him to bring [it about] that there reach each one of the individuals of existing things the more perfect good that is possible, it would not have fallen short of this. And, given this, it is not fitting that there fall [any] doubt regarding what reaches the wicked of the goods.

And, in general, behold, just as there is no injustice for the sustenance and the pleasure [המזון וההתענוג] [coming] to one of the living beings — those without [rational] life, and the beasts of prey [החיות הטורפות] — so [likewise] there is no injustice if there be found these good things, presumed [as goods] for the individuals of evil men, whose degree is [that of] the degree of the beasts of prey [החיות הטורפות]. And indeed, were there found, for them, human goods [טובות אנושיות], [that would be the question]. And here it has been explained that the reaching of the goods to the wicked, in this manner, [involves] no injustice [עול].

But [that] what is found of the reaching of the evil to the righteous [involves] no injustice [עול] — this is explained from what is to be said. For it is already possible that the evils reach the good [from] one of four causes [מארבע סבות], and [in] none of them is there injustice [עול].

The first of them is this: the cleaving [המשך] of these righteous men, after the sensed [faculty] [המורגש] [is left behind], to the bond and the cleaving [הקשר וההדבקות] which are between them and the Lord, may He be blessed — that [bond] which is from their side — being left unattended-to [מושגחים]. For when the matter is so for them in this regard, they will be dispatched and sent toward the evils that reach by chance [במקרה] from the side of the [things] ordained from the heavenly bodies. And if there reach them, then, these evils that are not human [הבלתי אנושיות] — there is no injustice [עול],

After God, may He be blessed, had already taken pains to guard them, by the equivocal sense in which there is in [the celestial bodies] an instrument for guarding [people] according to their capacity — and this is the intellect — and after it has become clear that [the celestial bodies] are in themselves the cause of

these evils reaching [people], not God, may He be blessed — there is yet a second [point]. It is this: that goods would [otherwise] befall those righteous ones for whom evil was [about to] arise from the side of a fixed [astral] evil that was due to reach their forefathers. It would have been hard for [such an evil] to issue from them [the celestial causes] if there were not in [the celestial array] some way of doing away with [it], by reason of the [accumulated] merits and the cleaving [to God] in the name of God, may He be blessed. And there has [already] befallen those who were righteous, and were repaid with evils by them [the celestial bodies] — [men] who did not reach the rank [achieved] through the strength of cleaving in the name of God, may He be blessed, [the kind of cleaving] that would draw them out of the [reach of] evils by way of the wondrous providence — or who would be drawn out of the evils from the side of the [astral] array. Something similar to this is what the prophet, peace be upon him, said: "Our fathers sinned and are no more, and we have borne their iniquities" (Eichah 5:7) — He desired this, [namely] in accordance with what I think: that since our forefathers sinned in a manner such that their guilt became publicly known among the nation, it was right that their seed who came after them should bear this punishment and [its] guilt. For [the seed] were not privileged to return [in repentance] so as to take hold of their land in the manner [described] above; [yet] they would not have departed from [that punishment] had they not committed evils such as oblige this punishment — whether from the side of the wondrous providence, or from the side [explained earlier]. And it is possible that this [verse] has another interpretation — but we have already mentioned [the matter] within the body of the treatise.

And similar to this is also what he said: "Fathers ate sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge" (Yirmeyahu 31:28 / Yechezkel 18:2). For it is explained that there is in this no [implication that] the yoke of the evils that befall the righteous [comes] unjustly [from] God, may He be blessed; rather, [the celestial bodies] have given them an instrument by which to come out of these evils against which they were guarded. And as for this kind of evil [arising] from evil — it resembles what our masters, may their memory be a blessing, said in [the dictum] "a righteous man and it is ill with him; this is a righteous son of a wicked man." For it is explained that there is no contradiction in [the case] that goods should befall the wicked from the side of [their] being guarded by [the celestial bodies], and that those goods should persist among them — [namely] that there does not befall them an [astral] evil from the felicity that comes from the side of the array, the [evil] which would do away with these goods. And this resembles what our masters, may their memory be a blessing, said in [the

dictum] "a wicked man and it is well with him; this is a wicked son of a righteous man."

And in accordance with this principle there persists the [providence] whereby the wondrous good found for the perfected man is preserved, [carrying on] righteously for many generations after him. For the evil that would reach [him], doing away with these goods from the side of the array, is slight; and it is, likewise, possible that it would be done away with [altogether], if there were [acting] that very disposition [from the side of the array]. And the evil that is drawn down upon the wicked from the side [of the array] is not drawn down through the multitude of the generations, for the good that is set in order from the array is more enduring, and this [good] would not be done away with over a longer span of time. And it is in this manner that what He said is set right: "for I the Lord [your God am a jealous God,] visiting the iniquity of fathers upon sons, upon the third and upon the fourth [generation] of those who hate Me, and showing kindness to the thousands [of those who love Me]" (Shemos 20:5–6) — for in this there is set right the yoke that is upon this [matter].

And the second [point] is this: that there has already befallen those whom God, may He be blessed, has caused to reach goods to the good [people], from the side of the providence — [in His] saving them from the evils that were fit to befall them. And similar to this [is] what Elihu said by way of admonition: "He opens their ear to discipline, and says that they return from iniquity" (Iyov 36:10) — that is, [in the case] where [a man] has thus taken pains, and God, may He be blessed, has saved him in this manner from the evils, [evils] sensed but not human [in origin] — all the more so, then, that it is fitting for [the celestial bodies] to bring upon them these evils, [in His] saving them from the evils [that come] from the side of the soul-faculties, which are human. — And here it has [further] been resolved, [a matter] concerning which there could be a doubt regarding the question of providence: namely, the absence of the order found among the goods of individual men and their evils — [a problem put forward] in order to make clear that this absence in [the world], an absence of order and equity, is something already explained in what we have said earlier: [namely] that God's knowledge, may He be blessed, when it is extended to these matters from the side of the absence of the order found among them, is null [as an objection]. And we have already shown in what way that knowledge of God, may He be blessed, precedes [as] extended to these matters, and in what way it is not so extended.

But as for what the Philosopher held by way of [his own approach] — to uphold that the divine providence cannot be [directed] toward any individual man, by

reason of man's being far, in relation to God, may He be blessed — behold, we have already shown in the explanation we gave that the matter is the reverse [of this]. For from the side that there is in man the conjunction [achieved] by cleaving in the name of God, may He be blessed — in the manner in which it is right that God, may He be blessed, be cleaved to — there is no [proper] side from which [a man] is worthy that God, may He be blessed, should be cleaved to him; but rather it is right that the providence should be [directed] toward [man], from this side, [namely] that of conjunction and cleaving. And further, [as for the fact] that the Philosopher held that divine providence belongs to species insofar as they are eternal, and to individuals insofar as they are eternal — as [in the case of] the heavenly bodies — and [held that] if there were providence for him [an individual], from the side of the individual nature, then [it would have to be] the case that providence belonged also to species insofar as they are eternal: yet it is possible that there should be divine providence over the individual men in whom there is the perfection [of intellect], from the side of the eternal nature that endures in them, which is the acquired intellect. — And here it has been explained that there is not, in one of the claims we have mentioned to uphold the Philosopher's view, anything obliging us to do away with what we have laid down concerning providence.

And by this it will be explained that there is nothing in what we have laid down [obliging] those who say that man is charged [with answering] for all his deeds in accordance with the divine providence [obliging us] to do away with what we have laid down. This [is] in [the case of] those who held — concerning the view we have mentioned, to uphold them — that, by reason of what we see reaching [people] from the punishments measure for measure, it is explained that there would not be lacking, from this [account], the divine providence over every individual man, in the manner laid down — were it not to be explained from the senses

that all the goods and the evils that reach men reach them according to their deeds, measure for measure. For this is, beyond doubt, a necessary [consequence], from what is to be explained by the senses: namely, that there reaches the wicked much sensed evil, and many of the goods are great evils [in disguise]. But sometimes it happens that the evil reaching the wicked [as] measure for measure is hard to bring to completion against them. And this is possible [to occur] either from the side of the matters [as they are] in themselves, or [from the side of] the political ordinances, [or] from the side of the orderings that are [established] by reason of the [celestial] bodies. For sometimes the evil befalls a man, from the side of the matters [as they are] in themselves, [as] a

punishment in accordance with his rebellion, measure for measure; and [it is], for example, [as] when [a man] takes pains to harm people, or to kill — it befalls him, from the side of his [own] deed, that one [of them] should prevail over him and kill him; and [as] when a man stretches out his hand against one beloved of his fellow, [an evil] befalls him from the side of the vengeance [taken] by [the friend] who is eager [to wreak] it. And this matter has already befallen also from the side of the political ordinances — that is, [as] it has befallen the wicked, this [punishment], by way of the [legal] judgments and the leaders of the polity. And the matter has already befallen from the side of the array, [namely] that there should be due to him either felicity, or [its] command in some matter [coming] from the side of the array. Behold, it happens to him that his felicity is reversed into the worst evil instead of the felicity, in the very matter in which it was right for him that the felicity should [come] — and it issues into the worst evil in that matter in which it was prevailing; and this is what befalls. By way of example: if there had been an oppressor, [then] the oppressed would settle [in place of] the oppressor; and if there reached him a pleasure from the side of [unlawful] women, harm would befall him from them.

And further, [it happens] that, in accordance with what is set in order from the array, the so-and-so man should judge [the case] and the punishment should reach the so-and-so [man]. And this is explained from that whereby the making-known [foreknowledge] reaches [a prophet] concerning this matter through prophecy, or through divination, or through a dream. And were this not possible, it would be possible that there reach the wicked, from this [array], that punishment in another manner; and this [is] from the wisdom of God, may He be blessed, and from His taking pains that there should be in these matters the end of what is possible of the equity. And just as our masters, may their memory be a blessing, said concerning this matter: "Even though the four [modes of] execution [by] the court were abolished, the [law of] the four [modes of] execution was not abolished." And by this it is explained that the second claim which we have mentioned, to uphold their view, is [in fact] what appears to men [as] the highest good of the [astral] guarding from the evils. For although the taking-pains of the evils [is such] that they harm them [the wicked] always, [yet] the evil that reaches them [the wicked] from [the array] is slight; [hence] it is not obligatory, from this [account], to do away with what we have laid down — but it is rather possible that there appear from it [only] a doing-away with [some part] of what we have laid down. And [the answer] is this: that according to what we have laid down it is not hard to extinguish this [matter of] the guarding [provided], whether from the side of the [astral] bodies which [come] from the side of the array, [such] that there be guarded in this [way] the evil [persons] and the good [persons], or

[whether] from the side of the providence — and it [the array] is the one [suited to act] among the good ones. But when the matter is in accordance with what those who hold this view have laid down, the harm in it is not made complete. This [is] because, according to [their] view, it would have been fitting that the evil reach the majority of the wicked who are fitted to do harm to others — for the majority of men are not good — and there would [then] be many [who] are prepared to receive the evil from the wicked. But this is the reverse of what is found by the senses. For it has already been found that their [the wicked's] reaching [a state] is little; rather [it is] the case that one finds the majority of the wicked, and the majority

of their efforts [directed] to harm men. And likewise, let us say that the claim which we have mentioned to uphold their view — [namely] that, by reason of God's being, may He be blessed, the ruler over the world and its governor, it is not obligatory, from this [account], to do away with what we have laid down — that this is not obligatory, by reason of the governor of the polity being one who exercises providence over the particular matters that are done in his polity, insofar as they are particulars, so that the matter would [have to] be thus [also] in the name of God, may He be blessed. But there will be in this a difference between God, may He be blessed, and the governor of the polity, like the difference [in degree] of the perfection [whereby] God, may He be blessed, [governs] in [His] perfecting [the world] over the governor of the polity. And it is obligatory that His governance of the world be in a manner more perfect, beyond [all] measure, than the governance of the governor of the polity over the polity. And this [claim] is [in fact] set right with what we have laid down, as we have explained: for it has already been explained that the providence of God, may He be blessed, in the world is [directed] to the end of what is possible of the good and the perfection, and that what is conceived [as that] whereby [the world] proceeds without [any] order and equity is [in truth directed] to the end of the ordering and the equity. And [the matter] being so, it is explained that there is not gainsaid, by these claims which we have mentioned to uphold the view of these men who are divided as

to what we have laid down concerning the matter of the divine providence, [anything obliging us] to do away with what we have laid down.

And it is explained that there should not fall a doubt, from the side of the sense [evidence], against what we have laid down concerning providence. For that wherein a doubt could fall, from the side of the senses — by reason of the absence of the order found among the goods of individual men and their evils —

is not hard to resolve in accordance with what we have laid down. And this [is] because here there are many causes, [acting] according to this [our] supposition, [bringing about] the arrival of the evils to the righteous and of the goods to the wicked.

And after the doubt has been resolved — concerning that wherein there could be a doubt, against what we have laid down, from the side of the claims that uphold the [other] views remaining concerning providence, and concerning that wherein there could be a doubt, [from] the side of the absence of the order found in the felt and [tangible] goods of individual men and their evils — and [given that] there were here other doubts, from the side of speculation and from the side of the sense [evidence], against what we have laid down concerning providence: behold, it is fitting that we take pains to uproot them. And let us say that there have already befallen, in [regard to] what we have laid down, doubts that reach the righteous [as] the making-known [of foreknowledge] by way of providence. One of them [is this]: that it is possible, according to this supposition, that this providence should cleave to wicked men [in the case] where they were perfected in intellect — that is, [in the case] where there has already befallen them a felicity such that this making-known reaches them, from the side of the cleaving [achieved] for them in the name of God, may He be blessed, even though their deeds are not upright. And this [is] a thing not [in keeping with] the equity that would be divine, [such] that it should be so. I mean, that this particular providence should be [directed] toward this [one] righteous [man] and toward this wicked [man] at one [and the same] rank. And the second [doubt] is this: that, as is explained by the senses, it has already happened that this making-known reaches [those] lacking intellect, [those] of small [account] — and [this] when they are not masters of upright deeds — by way of divination, or by dream, [reaching even] the lacking-in-intellect and the youths. And we have already completed [the answer to] the reason for this in the second treatise of this book; for it is [explained] from what is made clear there, that it is fitting, in accordance with the equity that would be divine, that this particular providence reach these men. And the third [doubt] is this: that, as is explained by the senses, this [making-known] already reaches

the making-known to the wicked, by means of the good men to whom this making-known [of foreknowledge] reaches. That is to say: I mean that the men [the wicked] would know that there is among them a false report of the goods and the evils [to come], and the [astral] guarding would reach them in the very respect in which the touch [of evil] had reached them, had this making-known reached them in their own [persons]. And since the matter is so, behold, there

would be exercised, by this individual providence, [a providence over] those who are not worthy of it — and this would not be fitting by the standard of divine equity. — Now these are the doubts about which one could be in doubt regarding what we have laid down concerning the matter of providence, in accordance with what appears to us.

And it is fitting that we exert ourselves to resolve them. Let us say that if this making-known had been [given] in accordance with what we have laid down — namely, on the side of the true requital to the righteous man inasmuch as he is righteous — then these doubts would [indeed] be a manner [worthy] of appearing [i.e., a real difficulty]. But since it is, as has been explained from what we said earlier, [a making-known] that is not on the side of the true requital to the righteous man inasmuch as he is righteous (for the true requital to him is the felicity of the soul, and that is explained in a comprehensive manner such that no doubt falls upon what we have laid down concerning providence from these sides) — and since it is already possible that each one of these doubts [should be resolved] on a single side.

And this is so because that wherein there is doubt from this [quarter] — [namely] the reaching of this making-known to the intellectually-perfected together with their being wicked, [together] with the possibility of its reaching them along with their possessing goods — is [in fact] not contrary [to equity]. For the failure-to-be-perfected of this making-known among the intelligibles, if [a man] inclines toward the disordered actions: there is already lacking, of necessity, [for such a one] the conjunction that he had with God, may He be blessed. And indeed it was so. For, according to [the principle] that these disordered actions are, of necessity, on the side of the absence of the use of the intellect among the intelligibles, and the absence of the attainment of the perfection of the intellect — on the side of the intellect's inclining toward the appetite of matter, and the powers of the body being dominant over it — until thereby [a man] exerts himself to remove [his attention] far from the perfection of the intellect: behold, [the making-known] withholds him from apprehending among the intelligibles that which he had already apprehended. And since the matter is so, behold, the failure-to-be-perfected of this making-known [comes] on the side of the deficiency in the rank of the making-known, and the withholding [of it] from the intelligibles. This is explained in a [certain] manner: that the failure-to-be-perfected of this making-known to him who is perfected among the intelligibles is according to his rank — if his actions did not incline toward the disordered actions in accordance with his rank. — And this is the reverse of what was [supposed] in this doubt; and it is explained that it does not happen except [in a manner] that is not contrary to

providence. For it is already explained that what reaches them [comes] from the side of the providence [itself].

But as for what one could be in doubt about, on the side of the reaching of this making-known to those lacking intellect and to the lesser [ones], even though they are not masters of upright actions: behold, there is no contradiction [arising] from what is hard about it. For this making-known does not [come] to them on the way of the species-providence, and no doubt would fall about this, if there reach them this lesser making-known — just as no doubt would fall regarding what reaches the wicked on the way of the species-providence. And further, the difference is already found, the wondrous distinction, between this making-known and the making-known that was [given] to the good ones on the way of the individual providence. And this is already explained in the second treatise of this book — that this making-known is most deficient, and it is explained,

[so] that there should not reach from it the benefit that reaches from the perfected making-known. But it is possible that there reach from it a false report, [which is] a deficiency [and] a harm [rather than the help of] this making-known [proper]. And this is because the one to whom there reaches [only] this deficient making-known does not know in what manner he should be on guard — that is, whether he was knowing in a perfected way that which would come upon him from the evils and the goods. For he does not know with clarity that which would be a false report to him; [he is] like one who [trusts] "an evil parable of an evil [thing]," which removes him far from the [proper] guard — [this on account of] a judgment that he had estimated in [the matter]: [namely] that this foreknowledge reaching him is precious [reliable], whereas sometimes it inclines toward the false report, [so] that the evil reaches him in [the very respect in which] it would come upon him in truth. And in this manner it is explained, [for] he who would already conceive that there could reach him, from this making-known, the deficiency in the good that was correct to come upon him.

And this is what has been explained — that there is a great difference between this making-known and the making-known [given] on the way of the individual providence. And since the matter is so, no doubt falls here from this quarter; for the difference between these [two kinds of] foreknowledge is immense. And in general, behold, it is already explained — in what has been explained — that it would be possible that the order of the existents [be such] that there should not reach [a man] an evil from it [the foreknowledge]; [yet] the making-known that reaches [a man] from the harm, [as] a deficiency, is to him a harm. For if there reached [a man] from this making-known some little benefit, [the matter] would

not fall short on the part of God, may He be blessed. And this is explained: that if there reached a little benefit from this making-known that occurs to the men lacking intellect and to the lesser [ones], no doubt would fall here from this quarter. But as for what there is doubt about, on the side of the reaching of this making-known to the wicked men by means of the prophets and the dreamers and the diviners: behold, there is no contradiction [arising] from what is hard about it. For [the reason] that I say there is no benefit reaching them from this making-known, in the rank of the benefit that reaches by this making-known [proper] to him to whom it reaches by his very self [directly] — this is because these men, to whom there reaches a false report, [are such] that they would not believe the words of the men who make [things] known to them, [namely] that there is a false report to them; and on account of this the benefit is lacking from them, [the benefit] that it would be fitting to reach from the making-known. And this [is] a thing [that becomes] a false report to them, on the side that there is no [proper] conjunction in their case — without doubt, since the truth of that which the men announced to them is [a thing] that they would not [accept]. And this appears [as] a complete [demonstration of] the proof, from what one hears in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them — [namely] that there were [those] who declared to Israel the correct evils that were to come upon them, and [the people] did not believe in them, and they fell into [those] evils.

And by this is explained this matter also, on the side of the senses, [namely] from what is found [in the cases] that the diviners announced to men [things] which they had divined for them — and this is because there reaches them a false report, [so] that they would not believe in their [the diviners'] words. And on account of this it happens, sometimes, that they fall into an evil in [the very respect in which] it would be correct for it to come upon them, [when] they were not on guard against it; just as a thing is told [of] a man for whom there was made a false report by a certain female diviner [קוסמת] who declared to him her divination — that he should go on the way of so-and-so, [and] he would be killed; and he did not believe in her [the diviner's] words, and he was killed on that road in that land.

And since the matter is so, it is explained that the difference between these [two kinds of] foreknowledge is great. And this is explained — [there is] no doubt here from this quarter. For [the reason] that we have already mentioned, [namely] that it is not fitting that one be in doubt as to what would reach [a man, as] a false report, [as] a deficiency [coming] to some [men] from this making-known to the wicked men: it is because God, may He be blessed, does not fall short from emanating the good upon His creatures according to what is possible. And this

[is] the cause [for which] there are found, among the prophets, peace be upon them, [those] who informed men of what was fit [to be] a false report to them, [yet] are upright with this —

[the prophets] who would direct [men's hearts] toward the actions of righteousness and of equity, and [bid them] forsake wickedness and violence; and they [the people] are answered in this, by [reason of] the intention of the Torah, which exerts itself that all men should be good, on the side of the purity that is complete to the extent possible. — And here these doubts have been resolved, all of them.

And after we have resolved all the doubts that fall upon what we have laid down concerning providence — on the side of the sense [evidence] and the speculation — behold, it is fitting that we explain that which comes [to us] in the Torah, and in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, and [in the words of those] who speak by the Holy Spirit, concerning the matter of providence, requital, and punishment — [showing] that it [all] agrees with what we have laid down. And this [is] what comes [to us in those passages]: namely, the hiding of the face and the forgetting [by God] that [come about] when [men] perform the disordered actions; and [that there is, from] providence [the good] over the good ones, [a matter that] is, according to this disposition [of ours], without doubt. And this is found among them [in Scripture] in many [places]. He said, in choosing [to use] the hiding of the face and the forgetting: "and I will hide My face [from them]," "and I, hiding I will hide My face [on that day]" (Devarim 31:17–18). And He said: "[when He] hides [His] face — who [then can] behold Him?" (Iyov 34:29). And the Torah has shown [it]: "You forgot God who formed you" (cf. Devarim 32:18); "I, even I, am He"; "[the Lord] your God" — "and your iniquities have been the dividers between you and your God" (cf. Yeshayahu 59:2). And He said, in [speaking of] providence over the good ones: "Behold, I am with you and will guard you [wherever you go]" (Bereishis 28:15); "for the Lord your God walks in the midst of your camp, to deliver you and to give up your enemies before you" (Devarim 23:15); "for the Lord your God [is with you]"; "[the matter] has gone forth, [it is] found in My eyes" — "and I know you by name" (cf. Shemos 33:12); "for the Lord knows the way of the righteous" (Tehillim 1:6). [And:] "Behold, the eye of the Lord is toward those who fear Him" (Tehillim 33:18); "the eyes of the Lord are toward the righteous" (Tehillim 34:16); "and [the Lord] does not withdraw His eyes from the righteous" (cf. Iyov 36:7); "[the Lord] does not abandon [him] in his hand, [nor condemn him when he is judged]" (cf. Tehillim 37:33); "[for] His pious ones are guarded [forever]" (cf. Tehillim 37:28); "like one whom the destitute [does not] forget — [the poor man] who seeks bread" (cf.

Tehillim 9:19) [?]; "I have not seen a righteous man forsaken, [nor his seed seeking bread]" (Tehillim 37:25) — and this [matter] is much told [of].

And it is already found also, in the Torah and in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, that the punishment [that comes] when the evils reach the wicked would be on the side of the [astral] array. He said: "Vengeance is Mine, and recompense, at the time their foot shall slip" (Devarim 32:35) — that is to say: at the time that there shall come to be, from their [astral] array, an evil reaching them, the punishment would come upon them through it. And this is so because this evil is precious [i.e., ordained] to them, [coming about] through the hiding of the face from them on the part of God, may He be blessed — and that hiding-of-the-face is "their foot shall slip." And He said: "and in the day of My visiting, I will visit upon them their sin" (Shemos 32:34) — and this teaches that here, at one and the same time, the punishment reaches them through it [the array]. And He said: "All [things] the Lord [has made] for His own purpose, and even the wicked for the day of evil" (Mishlei 16:4) — He means by this, [namely] that everything that God, may He be blessed, emanated is for the good.

And also that which is ordered upon the second intention [comes] from the strengthening [of the evil reaching] the wicked at the time the evil [reaches] him; [this] is profitable, for in this there is a benefit to the rest of men, as before. And it has already come, in this matter also, in the words of God, may He be blessed, to Job — that the finding of the evils which reach a man by chance is as [if] aimed at the second intention, in order that there should reach through them a punishment to the wicked. He explained, in [discussing] the atonement, that which is ordered by the emanation of the heavenly bodies in this lower world — [an emanation] that, together with their being [directed] toward the complete annihilation [of evils], behold, it is impossible without [there being] an evil reaching from it, whatever it may be. And [the Lord] withholds from the wicked their light; He explained in this [verse] that there [is something] in these evils [which is] a benefit in them, to harm the wicked among them. And He said in this matter, [in] the verse that comes next: "Have you entered into the treasuries of the snow? Have you seen the treasuries of the hail" — which, [the Lord] has shown — "I have reserved for the time

of trouble, for the day of battle and war" (Iyov 38:22–23). And this [is] also so, [as appears] when one investigates [the matter]: it is found [to be] much-doubled [i.e., much-repeated] in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, and [of those] who speak by the Holy Spirit. And so is found [also] the view of our masters, may their memory be a blessing — that the true requital and

punishment is [reserved] for the world to come, and that there should not be here a requital and punishment according to [the standard of] righteousness and wickedness [as expressed] in the bodily goods and evils. They said: "the reward of a mitzvah in this world there is none" (Kiddushin 39b). And it is fitting that we understand, from this, that so [it is] also with punishment: [God] does not desire for [the wicked] [a recompense] in [matters of] the body, [matters] that have contraries to them. For [otherwise] the requital and the punishment would be [borne] by one [and the same] bearer — I mean, that the bearer in which the requital is found would be the very bearer in which the punishment is found. And our masters, may their memory be a blessing, said: "Where [is the reward of the mitzvah here, and where the length of days]?" — Behold, [as in the case of] "go up to the loft and bring me [the young birds]" — [a son] went up to the loft, and a [bird's] nest came before him, and he sent away the mother and took the young; and in his returning he fell and died. [So] where is the goodness of [his] days here, and where the length of [his] days?

Rather, "in order that it may be well with you" — [it refers] to the world that is wholly good — "and in order that you may prolong your days" — [it refers] to the world that is wholly long. And they said there [further]: Rav Yosef said, "Had Acher [Elisha ben Avuyah] interpreted this verse as Rabbi Yaakov, the son of his daughter, [did], he would not have sinned." What [was it that] Acher saw? Some say [it was] this very deed [the falling and dying] that he saw [happen]. And some say [it was] from the matter of the false report [made] to the man — Rabbah said: This is [why it is] dragged [forth], this matter [namely]: "the mouth that produced [these teachings] — shall it lick the dust?" — and he [Acher] did not know that "in order that it may be well with you" [refers] to the world that is wholly good, and "in order that they may prolong your days" [refers] to the world that is wholly long (Chullin 142a; cf. Devarim 22:7).

It has already been explained to you that there is no requital and punishment found in these bodily goods and evils [as such]; and that [those goods and evils] do not, of necessity, follow upon those who walk in this [way], [walking] in order and equity. And they said: "Children, [length of] life, and sustenance — the matter does not depend on merit, but it depends upon mazal [fortune]" (Moed Katan 28a). And there is no doubt that this dictum came [to teach] the division [of opinion] concerning the Torah, [the Torah] that designates in many places that there would reach [men] these bodily goods, [for] those who walk in His way. But [the sages] said that this matter is dependent in [its] entirety on mazal. And this is not [a thing] of which one should be in doubt, [as to] whether there reach the

wicked [goods] like these goods — for they [come] to them from the side of mazal, not from the side of their [evil] actions.

And after this is settled [in the mind], it is fitting that we recall the doubts [concerning] that which reached [men], [bearing] upon what we have laid down concerning providence, on the side of that which comes in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them — and it is fitting that we exert ourselves to resolve them.

One of them [is]: that which is mentioned in the Torah concerning the bringing of the wondrous punishments upon Israel, in their being most wicked, on account of an utmost rebellion; and it [the Torah] has explained that [these punishments] would not reach them by chance, but rather upon the first intention. And "if you walk with Me [in] chance [casually]," He desires by this [verse]: that if these evils were [to be supposed by them as coming] upon them by chance, and they would not take [it as] a moral lesson [thinking it] chance — behold, God, may He be blessed, would add to strike them in the heat of [His] chance[-dealing], until it should be explained to them that this is not by chance. And so, [too,] that which comes in the Torah and in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, concerning the emanating of the evils by [God] Himself, may He be blessed, upon the rest of the nations — as [in] that which the Torah recounted concerning the bringing of the wondrous plagues upon Pharaoh, and upon his people, for the sake of Israel; and that which is mentioned concerning the smiting by the angel of the Lord in the camp of Assyria — and the like to these. For all this

It would seem to be at odds with what we have laid down, for, according to our principles, it is not fitting that an evil should reach the wicked [לרעים] [?] except by chance. And the second [point against us is] what comes in the Torah and in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, [namely] that man is judged for all his deeds, whether good or evil. He said: "for all His ways are justice" (Devarim 32:4). And He said: "whose eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of men, to give to each man according to his ways and according to the fruit of his deeds" (Yirmiyahu 32:19). [The sages] said: "Say [of] the righteous that it shall be well [with him], for they shall eat the fruit of their deeds; woe to the wicked, it is evil, for the recompense of his hands shall be done to him" (cf. Yeshayahu 3:10–11), [meaning] that according to a man's deed shall be requited to him. And so a man finds it for himself [i.e., experiences it]. So this matter too seems to be at odds with what we have laid down, according to what one would think.

Now these are the doubts that may possibly fall, from the side of what comes in the Torah and in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, [against our

position]; and it is fitting that we exert ourselves to resolve them. We say that, as for what may be doubted on the first count against our principles — [namely] from what the Torah recounted concerning the bringing of the wondrous punishments by God, may He be blessed, upon Israel because of the greatness of their rebellion — there is no deficiency [against us] in this, [nothing] worth being troubled about. For this matter, [namely] that there should come about from this [providential] making-known, to the wicked, a punishment of this kind — for it is impossible, in this respect, that there should not reach them from it a punishment of this kind, however slight — [yet] the providence does cleave to them, in this respect.

Now it is possible that the cleaving of providence should occur in this manner: that those whom we singled out from among the whole nation, by reason of the rebellion that was theirs, are [nonetheless] those in whom the good [providence] is found, and to whom it is fitting that providence should cleave in this respect. And together with this, when there cleave to the nation some of its individuals through disordered actions, God, may He be blessed, exerts Himself to keep watch over the providence that belongs to the nation as a whole, so that the whole [nation] should not be drawn off into that [same] rebellion. And this is just as the providence that [comes] from the side of the [astral] array, [which] was [operative] over the men, [coming] from two sides: either by way of the particular [providence], and this [is] what is ordered by the providence to the individual man; or by way of the general [providence], and this [is] what is ordered by the array to the nation as a whole, or to the whole of the [body] politic. So [too] is the matter in this [kind of] providence: it is His will that the good man, when he is good, should cleave [to the good], and that the whole nation, when it is good, should cleave [to it]. And this is the cause [for which] the divine providence cleaves to the nation as a whole, and singles out its individuals on account of this; and if they are wicked, [it singles out] the evil which it began to reckon upon them, in order that they should return through it onto a good way, so that the felicity of the soul should reach them.

He said: "as a man chastens his son, [so] the Lord your God chastens you" (Devarim 8:5); "in vain have I smitten your sons; they accepted no chastening" (Yirmiyahu 2:30). And this is the cause [for which] there is mentioned, in the Torah, [that] the chastisements of the curses [come] because they are chastisements from the ways of God, may He be blessed; and it is mentioned that they do not reach them by chance, but rather [that] they are aimed [at them] by God, may He be blessed. And as for [the fact] that the Torah taught that these punishments [come] from the side of providence, not from the side of

[retributive] punishment, [the verse] said: "and I will chastise you, even I, sevenfold for your sins" (Vayikra 26:28). And if this were [done] from the side of punishment, it would be [done] out of [the measure of] "what shall not be exceeded" [i.e., strict measure]. Yet [in fact] when it [is done] from the side of providence, it [is done] from [the side of] the fitting; it is His will that the chastisements that reach them, from God, may He be blessed, [come] by way of the rebuke,

so that they should not [merely] chastise [themselves and yet] still hold fast to rebellion. Behold, [in such a case] it is fitting that He chastise them for their sins. And this [is] because there is no [worse] rebuke [than this]: that one who is reckoned [to receive] little [chastening], being entangled in rebellion, [should receive] a rebuke like the rebuke of him in whom [the chastening] was deficient and abated [namely] when that evil intention [the rebellion] became a strong possession [in him]. And this [is] because the sinking [of a man] through disordered actions does not issue from them [the chastisements] except by way of mighty rebukes. And in this manner, too, may be understood what is said, "and even in the iniquities of their fathers with them shall they pine away" (Vayikra 26:39), [the case of one] in whom there should be iniquity. And this [is] because, when their fathers had grown accustomed to rebellion, and their sons saw their ways, that [same] intention which is the lowliest [of all], a strong possession, would [come to] dwell in them; and they would not issue out of it except by way of mighty rebukes — to remove from them what would [otherwise] reach them, [had] their fathers not been wicked. And on this account, it is fitting that they be reached by a rebuke greater [than usual] by way of rebukes. And perhaps in this manner He said: "visiting the iniquity of fathers upon sons" (Shemos 20:5; 34:7) — [meaning that] fathers ate sour [grapes] and the children's teeth were set on edge (cf. Yirmiyahu 31:28; Yechezkel 18:2).

Now it would seem that, just as the evil reaching the righteous [man] from the side of providence — the rebukes which we began to reckon upon him — would not be perpetual, but rather [comes] when he holds fast to rebellion: [in just this way is] the removal of this [particular] providence from him, [it being] fitting that providence [otherwise] cleave to him. So [too] is the matter, in our view, regarding the providence that cleaves to the nation as a whole. It is His will that, when the whole [nation] should return in that [same] manner, [a manner] which would be no good [one], this [particular] providence should be removed from it; and it does not refute them [our principles], for then God, may He be blessed, [acts] upon their iniquities.

He said: "and this people will rise up and go astray after the alien gods of [the land] into the midst of which they are coming, and will forsake Me and break My covenant which I made with them. Then My anger will be kindled against them on that day, and I will forsake them and hide My face from them, and they will become [prey] to be devoured" (Devarim 31:16–17), [meaning] that, when the people should return to be a worshipper of foreign worship, the providence of God, may He be blessed, would be hidden from them. And similar to this is what was said: "I will heap evils upon them" (cf. Devarim 32:23); "[I will visit upon them]" [?] — and "I will surely [hide My face]." [The verse] has already explained [it] in this passage [?]: the deficiency from them of the divine providence in this manner — that is to say, that the rebukes shall not refute them from the side of [retributive] punishment, but rather they are forsaken to the accidents of time.

And behold, it would seem that there is a difference between the evil that reaches a good man from the side of providence — the rebukes whereby we reckoned upon him in part —

and the evil that reaches the [nation as a] whole from the side of providence — the rebukes whereby they reckoned upon the whole from the side of providence: and this [is] because, when the evil reaches the good man from the side of the rebukes, it is not fitting that it should be in a manner that there should be [utter] devastation in his substance, for when it should be in this manner, it could not be said that he [is reached by it] from the side of providence. But as for what reaches the [nation as a] whole, by way of rebukes — [namely] the evil reaching the nation as a whole — it does not single out [individuals], [there being] many in it, in order that there be taken a moral lesson by the rest who remain, and [by] the generations that come after them; nor are they all [together] held fast in rebellion, for this [partial chastening] is the more good for the nation as a whole. [It is fitting] for another nation [from outside], which it is impossible should chasten them, except [it be] in this manner from the rebukes. And on this account the Torah ordained in these rebukes [a measure] in [proportion to] what should reach [them] unto death.

And here is resolved what was doubted on the first count, [namely] from what appears in the Torah, that He ordained that the evil should reach Israel by Himself, may He be blessed, when they would not walk in the ways of God, may He be blessed. Now what may be doubted on it [the first count], from the side of what comes in the Torah and in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them — [namely] the reaching of evil by [God] Himself, may He be blessed, to the rest of the nations — [is] as [in] that which the Torah said concerning the bringing of the

evil by God, may He be blessed, in [His] coming and in [the very fact that] He smote [them], such that He hardened Pharaoh's heart and made [it] heavy, to bring upon them the punishment; and what is mentioned concerning the smiting by the angel of the Lord in the camp of Assyria; and what was found [recorded] in the wars of Israel with the rest of the nations, [where] it is said that God, may He be blessed, had already aided them and given them victory — behold, there is no deficiency [against us] in this, [nothing] worth being troubled about.

And this [is] because the reaching of evil to the wicked from God, may He be blessed, in this manner, would already have had its conclusion [arrived at] by way of the miracle, as [in] the drowning of the Egyptians in the Sea of Reeds, and the smiting of the firstborn, and the rest of what befell the Egyptians from the plagues; and as [in] the smiting by the angel of the Lord in the camp of Assyria, and the like to this. And behold, what came [about] in these matters in this manner is not [anything] at odds with our principles, for we have not spoken here except [of] what is drawn off from providence by way of the [appropriate] order toward the order of existence — not by way of what is changed in it [from] the natural order. And, moreover, these [other] evils reach the wicked by way of will,

by way of the miracle, which is not [included] in this [class] that is impossible without it according to what we have laid down, as before. And as for [the case] where that evil reaching the wicked is drawn off to them from the side of the [astral] array — for so it is also fitting it should be ascribed to God, may He be blessed, [it being] that all the matters revolve about Him. Now as for what is mentioned in the Torah concerning the hardening of [Pharaoh's] spirit and obstinacy — behold, [the answer] is: if it had been from the side of providence over Israel, to bring the evil to [Pharaoh], it would be — and this [is]

the matter [coming] from God, may He be blessed, by way of the miracle; or [the case] was that the evil [was] properly destined to come upon him — and [in either case] it would be ascribed to God, may He be blessed, from the side of the miracle, or [from the side of one] of the heavenly bodies, one of the instruments by which that evil reaches him. And it has already been ascribed [that] this matter [comes] from God, may He be blessed, [the question being] whether this matter was on this count, [namely] by reason that it [the situation] was a cause to that which would be newly-brought-about, on whatever side it should be newly-brought-about. — And here is resolved this doubt.

Now what may be doubted on the second count, from the side of what comes in the Torah and in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, and [of those]

who speak by the Holy Spirit — [namely] the mention that man is judged for all his deeds, whether [for] good [or for] evil — behold, [the answer] is explained: there is no deficiency [against us] in it, [nothing] worth being troubled about. And this [is] because, according to what we have laid down, that man is requited and punished without doubt for his righteousness or his wickedness, in [the matters] which are [properly] called "requital and punishment" in truth — that is to say, in the felicity of the soul or [its] privation — and it is explained, together with this, that man is requited and punished for his righteousness and his wickedness in the bodily goods and the evils, in accordance with what is possible [for them] in [terms of] their final end, from [the side of] the [providential] order and equity; and this is so, [it being] that the divine providence [is that] whereby man is guarded, [made] to cleave to the good things, from the evils, according to the degrees of their importance in thoughts, and [whereby is brought about] the privation of the evil [men]. And this is [what] is explained: that it is already possible, in every respect, that it should be said [of] man that he is judged for all his deeds, whether [for] good [or for] evil. — And here is resolved this second doubt.

And according to what has been explained — [namely] that we have spoken concerning the providence on the side of speculation — [it appears] in the manner which we laid down, fittingly, [as] regards what is found by sense [evidence] in these matters, and [regards] what is mentioned in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them, such that there should not be found in it any doubt, neither on the side of speculation nor on the side of the Torah; [and] it is explained that the providence is over the individuals of man, in the manner which we laid down.

And here is explained the manner of the divine providence over the individuals of man, in a manner of which there is no doubt; and there are resolved the many doubts in the matter of providence, [doubts which] the predecessors did not depart from on their account, [doubts] which were [a stumbling block] for them until this very day — [doubts concerning] which the prophets, peace be upon them, and [those] who speak by the Holy Spirit have already prophesied, and they too were [perplexed] in this, according to what is recounted. And this is [what] is explained from the words of David, peace be upon him.

For so [too] Habakkuk the prophet, peace be upon him, [was perplexed] in this, according to what is recounted. David said: "for I was envious at the boastful, [when] I saw the peace [prosperity] of the wicked; for there are no pangs at their death, and their body is firm. Behold, these are the wicked, and ever at ease, they

increase [in] wealth. Surely in vain have I cleansed my heart" (Tehillim 73:3–4, 12–13). And the end of the matter [was], that "[when] I thought to know this, it was a wearisome toil in my eyes" (Tehillim 73:16). And Habakkuk, peace be upon him, said: "why do You look upon the treacherous, [and] keep silent when the wicked swallows up [one] more righteous than he?" (Chavakkuk 1:13). And this [is what] it teaches: that they were perplexed by the privation of the order that is found, according to what one would think, in the [matter of the] bodily goods of the individuals of man and their evils. And our masters, may their memory be a blessing, have already said that Moses our master, peace be upon him, was [perplexed] in this; and this is what Moses said when he said: "show me now Your way" (Shemos 33:13). They said that he had already asked concerning [the question] why [it should be that] a righteous man fares ill and a wicked man fares well; and it has already been seen [from] this what God, may He be blessed, answered him concerning this question; and it is "the Lord, the Lord, a God merciful and gracious" (Shemos 34:6). And it is fitting that we give thanks to the Name, may He be blessed, who has helped us.

[continues from the prophetic-testimony coda of Book IV ch. 6, p. 184]

To find the truth in this deep inquiry, and to set our feet straight before us, we have relied on His mercies and the abundance of His kindnesses; for what we have found of [the views of] our predecessors in it has been very deficient and confused [משולל] in its speculative investigation — apart from what we have found of this in the Book of Job. And here, in our understanding of these great difficulties, [we have proceeded] in such a way that no doubt should remain — if not for whoever knew these views, [seeing] which of them it was possible to fault as falling short in [the matter of] providence, and what each of the holders of these views could allege in upholding his own position and refuting the words of the others.

פרק שביעי [Chapter Seven]

[Heading-gloss:] *In it we recall the conclusion to which speculation has brought us on this question, namely the [correct] view concerning it.*

You should know that the view to which speculation has led us regarding providence is this view, and it is the one to which the investigation in this inquiry has arrived [as] its final goal in the Book of Job. [The Book of Job] recalled many of the arguments that we have recorded in upholding this view, as we have already explained when we discussed it [in our treatment] of the Book of Job.

And here you should know that the view toward which this opinion already inclined is likewise that of [the great Rabbi,] our Master the Guide [Maimonides], of blessed memory, in his honored book *Moreh Nevuchim* [the *Guide of the Perplexed*]. He said so in the seventeenth chapter of the third part [Guide III:17], and this is his statement in this matter [in his own words]: *"And what I myself believe in this regard"* — that is, concerning divine providence [בהשגחה האלהית] — *"is what I shall now relate to you. And in this belief that I shall relate, I do not rely on what the demonstration has led me to, but I rely on what has become clear to me to be the intent of the Torah of God, may He be blessed, and of the books of the prophets."* This view, which I myself believe, departs least from rational analogy [ההקש השכלי] and is the closest [to it] of the preceding views: namely, that I believe that divine providence [ההשגחה האלהית] is indeed present here in this lower world — that is, below the sphere of the moon — over the individuals of the human species alone. This species is the only one whose individual members have all their circumstances — good befalling them or evil befalling them — meted out [to them] in accordance with [their] deserts [אחר הדין], just as he said that "all His ways are justice" (Devarim 32:4); whereas concerning the rest of the animals, and all the more the plants and the others, my view is the view of Aristotle [in this regard]. —

Now [as for] divine providence: in my opinion, it [follows] after the emanation [השפע] of the divine influence [השפע האלהי], and the [human] species that cleaves to that intellectual emanation is the one [provided for]. Thus, whoever among them came to possess intellect, and to whom there was revealed all that can be revealed to one who possesses intellect — he is the one who joins himself to divine providence, and all his actions are reckoned to him with respect to requital and punishment [הגמול והעונש]. Indeed, that is its nature [as it is], and so forth. —

Now understand my view, in order that you may not believe of me that I hold that God, may He be blessed, does not know [some] thing, or [that I attribute to Him] weakness [לאות] [in this] or deficiency. Rather, I believe that providence follows upon intellect and is bound up with it — because providence can be granted only to one who is intelligent [bearer of intellect], and whoever is a perfect intellect, [to that degree] providence has cleaved to him. The perfect man, whose apprehension never ceases from Him, may He be blessed — providence over him is constant; whereas the perfect man who has turned his thought aside [from God] for moments — providence is [present] over him during the time he was contemplating Him, may He be blessed, alone, and providence departs from him during the time he is occupied [with other things]; yet providence does not

depart from him then as it [wholly] departs from the one who does not understand at all. Rather, only that [degree of] providence diminishes — since there is, for that perfect man, in the time of his being occupied, no actualized intellect [שכל בפעל]. And indeed he then apprehends "by a near potency," and so forth. — And he said in chapter fifty-one of part three [Guide III:51], and this is his wording:

And along with the turning-aside of man's thought, and the attainment by them of the true ways [in which] God, may He be blessed, [is apprehended], and their rejoicing in what they apprehend — it is impossible that calamity should befall such a man, [or] any kind of evils, for he is [then] with God, may He be blessed, and God is with him. But [when] he removes his thought from Him, may He be blessed, [in which case] he is separated from God, may He be blessed, [and] God is separated from him — then he is exposed [מזומן] to every evil that may befall him. For the thing that brings about providence and deliverance [from] the chance event [מקרה] is at once that intellectual emanation; and some of those pious ones [are] already separated from that good emanation, or [the emanation] did not reach that pious one at all [as] an evil [to him] — and [thus] it befell them, what befell them, accordingly. Up to here are his words, of blessed memory.

Now [the Rabbi] has already explained, from his words, that calamities may indeed befall the pious one at the time he loosens his bond and his cleaving, which exists between him and God, may He be blessed; for he is then exposed [משולח] to the chances of time [למקרי הזמן]. And it may happen, for this reason, that no evil befall [him] at all — as the Rabbi, of blessed memory, recalled. And this, indeed, [obtains] when there will be for him no [evil] ordered from the chances [of time].

And since the matter is so, it is already clear that what the Rabbi, of blessed memory, said — that in all the affairs of the individuals of man, and whatever they attain of good befalling them or evil befalling them [as] meted out according to [their] deserts [אחר הדין] — [obtains] if he chooses the human good [הטוב האנושי], that is, requital [הגמול], and the punishment [העונש] [is] found in the soul; and [this] is called "cleaving to good providence" or "[its] turning-aside," and "the turning-away [סורה] [from] the good" and the "evil's befalling [him]." And this [is so]: if he desired in this the good, and the bodily evil and good [befall him], then his words have already contradicted [themselves] a little. And this is because he has already conceded that evils may befall the pious one through his removing his thought from Him, may He be blessed — [his] being exposed [משולח] and

forsaken to the chances [למקרים] — and that it is possible, for this reason, that no evil should befall [him] at all.

[continuation of פרק שביעי, p. 187]

And you should know that what the Rabbi, of blessed memory, [maintains] in the matter of providence — that God's knowledge, may He be blessed, of particular things [does not extend to] the respect in which they are particulars — this [means] that, if His knowledge of them is set down to be in this way, then He has not assessed what providence is, which cleaves [to bring about] good things, to deliver [people] from the chance events [מהמקרים], and the hiding of the face [הסתר פנים] which cleaves to evils, to the end of not delivering them [from those evils]. — For this [is so] because the chance events do not cease to be, for them, [things subject] to division [מחלוקה]: whether those chance events were such that God, may He be blessed, knew, for the righteous man who is to be guarded from them and for the wicked from whom [the guarding] is withheld — [and so He] delivered the righteous from them and did not deliver the wicked from them; or [whether] those chance events were such that God, may He be blessed, knew that they would befall the wicked and would not befall the righteous, and knew the good things that would befall those upon whom there is providence [מצד ההשגחה]. — And if we suppose that God, may He be blessed, knew that these chance events would not befall those righteous ones — what is this providence, [if] there does not befall him [anything] but what God, may He be blessed, [already] knows will not befall [him]? Is this not just as one may also find, among the wicked, that God, may He be blessed, knew that good things would befall them — that the harm should not befall them, [though] He knew the harm that would not befall them? — And if [we suppose] that those chance events were such that God, may He be blessed, knew [them], delivered the righteous and did not deliver the wicked — it is [then] clear that there is no [special] knowledge [of His] beyond [knowing] these chance events in the respect in which they are particulars; for in what respect would His knowledge be [of] these chance events that befell the righteous, if that [knowledge] were a false [knowledge]? — And further, [it is] because He [Himself] knows [them], too, [that] according to this supposition — that there should not befall him [anything] except through His knowing [it] — every one of the particular things that fall out here, and [His] knowing that providence cleaves to such-and-such a man, and how it can be supposed that God, may He be blessed, knew that these chance events would befall him, and that they would not befall him — here this [leads] to the utmost nullity [תכלית הבטול].

And this is clear from this: that His knowing these chance events [is] with respect to the universal order [מצד הסדור הכולל]. — And if it be supposed [as something] that should be [otherwise] pictured, that providence and the hiding of the face are otherwise — this [too means] that He knows what is to be, what is fit to come about according to the universal order [הסדור הכולל]; [namely that] from all these chance events [befalling] the righteous and the wicked, He delivers the righteous from them by way of providence, and does not deliver the wicked. And according to what we have already explained, in accordance with the view of our Torah, cleaving to providence [bestows] good things, and the hiding of the face [comes] from the wicked. And it would be obligatory, [given] this supposition — that there was no knowledge [on the part] of God, may He be blessed, of the particular things in the respect in which they are particulars — it is clear that it would already be obligatory, according to the view of our Torah, that there be no knowledge of God, may He be blessed, of the particular things in the respect in which they are particulars. And this [is] what would add disclosure [גלוי] and completeness [שלמות] to what we have explained from our discussion of the manner of God's knowledge, may He be blessed, of these things.

[Book-IV colophon:] *And here is completed the Fourth Treatise of this book. Praise to God, may He be blessed, above every blessing; and praise to Him forever, and unto the eternity of eternities. Amen and Amen.*

מאמר חמישי [Fifth Treatise]

[Title-gloss:] *On the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים]: their movers, their ranks one relative to another, and the rank of God, may He be blessed, above them.*

חלק ראשון [Part One]

[Part-One gloss:] *This is [contained in] the science of astronomy [מחכמת התכונה], and [in it is] what was explained in the book of the* Almagest [המגסטי]*; and this part is a great book in its own right — this is not its place.*

חלק שני [Part Two]

[Part-Two gloss:] *On the causes of the things found [to obtain] for the heavenly bodies.*

[Chapter-list / table of contents for Part Two:]

- **Chapter One:** In it we apologize for [the limits of] what we have undertaken in this deep inquiry — [an inquiry] of which nothing is to be found from anyone but ourselves, except [for] a very little.
- **Chapter Two:** In it we investigate the quiddity [במהות] of the body [הגשם] that does not preserve its figure [תמונתו] — [as it is] in what we have explained: that there is found, between one sphere and another, a [further] sphere [for] the second planet; and there remains a doubt about what befalls this supposition.
- **Chapter Three:** In it is explained that the stars [הכוכבים] are in the spheres [בגלגלים], by reason of the things that are here [established].
- **Chapter Four:** In it is explained that there is not, upon the sphere of the constellations [גלגל המזלות], a diurnal sphere [גלגל יומי], as the masters of speculation [בעלי העיון] supposed.
- **Chapter Five:** In it is explained that the fixed stars [הכוכבים הקיימים] are all of them in one sphere; and [it is explained] why there are, in the first sphere, many stars, whereas in the [sphere] whose perfection is from it there is not found, in one sphere, more than a single star. —
- **Chapter Six:** In it is explained how the sun heats the air, and there it is explained in what manner a cause may reach [us] from one of the stars — [as to] what is seen of the special [effects] in its actions. —
- **Chapter Seven:** [It is] counted [among the topics] in which [are] the inquiries that we needed to investigate, [drawn] from what there is, of what we [must] judge concerning this, [taken] from the Introduction [מן ההקדמה]. —
- **Chapter Eight:** In it we set out some roots [שרשים] explained in themselves [בנפשם], for the one who studies this book, that they may serve him to stand [firm] by means of them on the cause of what is found in the heavens. —
- **Chapter Nine:** [In it] it is given [to explain] all the causes of what is found in the heavens, [explained] in the most perfect way that is possible for us.

פרק ראשון [Chapter One]

[Heading-gloss:] *In it we apologize for [the limits of] what we have undertaken in this deep inquiry — [an inquiry] of which nothing is to be found from anyone but ourselves, except [for] a very little.*

Before we investigate the causes of what is in the heavens, it is fitting that we apologize for what we have undertaken in this deep inquiry — [an inquiry] of

which nothing is to be found from anyone but ourselves, except [for] a little; for this [is] what [text breaks at the foot of p. 188; continues in the following pages]

that we might add to our difficulty in this. Moreover, because these matters are so very remote from our own nature in both their substance and their depth, our apprehension of them is necessarily weak, and for this reason it was fitting that our judgment in this inquiry be circumspect. Yet human perfection consists precisely in this: that a person investigate a thing to the extent that is possible for him and according to what his nature allows — that is, it is fitting that one investigate this matter to the limit of our own apprehension. It is not fitting for us to scorn the meager and slight gains we make in these deep matters; rather, it is fitting that we take note of the great effort and the trouble we have devoted to investigating the thing as far as it can be investigated.

Moreover, something must be said here about what it is possible for us to say of the causes of these matters; for it will become clear from what we shall say that it is improper for us to keep silent about this inquiry. For human felicity is attained through apprehending these matters — indeed, the more of them a person apprehends, the greater the honor he attains; and given that our longing to apprehend the more honorable thing is the stronger, our longing to apprehend these three [more excellent things] is all the more intense. For we are still left wanting in our apprehension of these things, with respect to what is beyond our complete apprehension of them.

In sum, then, if the heavenly bodies were uncaused, it would be impossible for us to enter upon this inquiry, as the Philosopher mentioned in *On the Heavens and the World* [Aristotle, *De Caelo*]. But inasmuch as they are caused — and there exists an Agent of the caused things, insofar as they are caused, and that they have something in them that admits of cessation — for this reason the matter has opened for us the gates of speculation in this inquiry.

Furthermore, since these honorable [heavenly] bodies are in some respect possessed of soul, and the operations of an ensouled thing have some [purpose], it follows necessarily that there be a [final] purpose in the matter; and from this aspect it is possible for us to investigate the purpose toward which their operations are directed. Moreover, it is well established that the motions of these honorable [heavenly] bodies have regard for those lowly existents found here below. This is very plain from the motion of the sun, whose powerful impress upon coming-into-being is already found in existing things — and through it the purpose of the revolutions is manifest in the plants. So too it appears in many of the animals, whose generation occurs at particular, distinct times of the year.

And in sum, the stability of these matters here below is brought to completion through the four seasons, by means of the motion of the sun in its inclined sphere; for in this way is achieved the balance among the contraries, which, were they to combine, the existing composites would be found wanting [of it] — and through this too the balance among the elements is achieved, as we have mentioned earlier. So too a powerful impress appears in coming-into-being through the daily revolutions and the monthly revolutions [of the moon]; and from this we find that the times of certain animals' lives are measured by monthly revolutions and the times of others by daily revolutions, as is mentioned in the *Book of Animals* [Aristotle, *De Animalibus*]. So too it is fitting that the matter have regard for the bodies found among the stars; and this is plain from what is truly demonstrated in the science of the laws of the stars [astrology], in which there are indeed found matters that sense itself confirms — and concerning these the masters of that science have said that there were here matters which they could expound, and they were not found to be false.

This indeed [is so] only because of the brevity of a person's apprehension of what he ought to apprehend — that a star [planet] should be in a definite place in its proper position. This brevity belongs to a person on account of the very remoteness of these things from us in their substance, and the place is such that it is not possible for him to attain to it by experience; for it is possible that what holds for one star be ascribed to another star — as the masses [ההמון] ascribe the exceedingly intense heat to the rising of the Dog Star [עליית הכלב: the rising of Sirius / Canicula], when in fact it is from the action of the sun. But should it be that the heat is by the action of the sun, then [it is wrong to ascribe it to those things].

This [arises] because it is impossible to distinguish one star from the rest of the stars, since they all act together, so that it is not easy for us to be precise about which is the action of that particular star. And it is not possible for us to perfect the sense-perception [needed] for the change that ought [to be discerned] among the stars, except with great difficulty and over a wondrously protracted span of time. Moreover, because there is so much order set in motion by them, human choice is confounded by it, as is explained in the second [book] of this book.

Here, then, is a precious thing — for this gives us no [means] by which what ought [to come] to us from the stars [could be isolated], save what is ordered for us from the heavenly bodies. And from this [it follows] what a person must necessarily come short of: knowing which star it is. He is bound only [to know] that what comes newly into being is here ordered by them, as is explained in the

second [book] of this book. And from this aspect it was possible for what is lowly to come newly into being — known here beforehand, [as to] the time of their coming-into-being — in a dream, or by divination or by prophecy, as is explained there.

It has already been shown, in a comprehensive manner, that this order which is found, set within fixed bounds, must hold for the things that come newly into being here from the side of the heavenly bodies. And this [is so] because this order is found persisting in one arrangement, while there follow from it changing things — that is, [the same heavenly cause produces] a thing now and corrupts it at another time, as is explained in [the science of] nature [Aristotle, *Physics*]. Hence it must be that the cause of this is found permanently, and that there be found among the matters [things] that change at [different] times.

For [if there were] nothing here under this description other than the heavenly bodies, [the things below] would not be movable; and this is precious to the stars found among them — that they should at one time be near to the inhabited world and at another far from it. The matter proceeds in its revolution by them; and this is plain. For the heavenly bodies are, by their very nature, the cause of this order which persists permanently. And this [holds] because the cause is permanent — inasmuch as that which proceeds from it is permanent — and yet it is bound to be that the relation of the effect to its cause be a changing one, inasmuch as the effect proceeding from it receives from it changing things; and it is bound to be that this change proceed in a circuit, inasmuch as this change proceeds in a circuit in that part of the things which is here. And from this it must be that this cause be in circular motion, drawing near at one time and growing distant at another, and proceeding in a circuit and in conjunction, since the one is brought to completion by the other.

But whether this action is directed by the heavenly bodies according to the first intention or according to the second intention is something that will be explained in what follows. And however it be, it is plain from this the aspect by which it is fitting for us to investigate the matters of the heavenly bodies — why they were made in the manner in which they are.

And among the things that will add clarity and completeness to what has been explained here regarding the matter of the stars is this: the philosophers have already likened them to beings that act in the manner [we have spoken of] here, and so too the prophets, peace be upon them, and the Torah have likened them. For the Philosopher said, in the *Book of Generation and Corruption* [Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione*], that the generation and corruption occurring in

these things — this perpetual cycle — is by reason of the motion of the sun in its inclined sphere; and the continued endurance of these existents is measured by the revolution of that motion, until the number of revolutions in which their growth occurs is found to equal the number of revolutions in which their waning and corruption occur.

And the commentators said there that the Philosopher mentioned, of this matter concerning the motions of the sun, only what was fit to be reckoned of it — that the matter stands likewise in the motions of the [other] stars. This is something the Philosopher already agreed to, according to what is seen of his words in many places of his natural science: namely, that the stars exercise providence over what comes into being from them; and he said, in what follows this, that the nature of the motions of the heavenly bodies is for the sake of the stars. From this he took a proof, from the apparent motions of the stars, regarding the number of the heavenly bodies.

And this [accords] with what the Philosopher held — that the motions of the heavenly bodies are for the sake of these things that are here; for had they been for their own sake, it would not have been right that this motion be in them for the sake of the stars. And though it be true that this treatise holds it right that they be moved [thus], yet this [is the deeper reason]: what overflows here from the heavenly bodies overflows by the mediation of the stars, and what overflows from the stars overflows by the mediation of the motion — so that, when the star draws near at one time to [some] place upon the earth, and grows distant from it at another, it is, as is already explained, made right according to this assumption: that the motions belonging to the heavenly bodies were for the sake of the stars.

This is among the things that will be well explained in what follows in this book — that is, that the motions of the heavenly bodies were for the sake of these things that are here. So too the prophets, peace be upon them, and the Torah likened it. Said the Holy One, blessed be He, to Job: "Do you know the ordinances of the heavens? Can you set their dominion upon the earth?" [Iyov 38:33] — this is among the things that signify that they [the heavenly bodies] watch over this lower world and govern it and act within it. And indeed [Scripture] said "their dominion" [mishtaram]: for the *shoter* (officer) is one who rules, and "their dominion" is the rule of the one who governs them — that is, that there is over them an officer who is master over them; and so too the matter stands with the heavenly bodies. For this providence is, for them, an officer who is master over them, namely the Name, blessed be He, as will be explained in what follows in this book by the decree of the Name [biblical: בגזרת השם].

And as for what the prophet, peace be upon him, said to Israel — "and be not dismayed at the signs of the heavens" [Yirmiyahu 10:2: ומאותות השמים אל תחתו] — it [signifies] guidance: that when they cleave to them, [namely] to the divine providence, they have no need to fear the evils that come to pass from the side of the heavenly bodies, as has been explained earlier. For this reason you find that the Torah, when it recounts the creation of the stars, recounts that this creation was for the perfection of what is here, as will be explained when we come to the account of the creation of the world mentioned in the Torah.

And concerning this Solomon, peace be upon him, said: "The Lord by wisdom founded the earth; He established the heavens by understanding" [Mishlei 3:19]. For "wisdom" [ḥochmah] is said, in our language, of the knowledge that falls upon the things in their own selves, while "understanding" [tevunah] is, in our language, applied to the deriving of one thing from another. For this reason the philosophers were called the masters of understanding [baalei tevunah], as I have explained in many places of the *Book of Mishlei* [Proverbs]; for it is the [faculty] that produces inference, and it employs the well-known premises that are not self-evident in themselves. And concerning this our Rabbis, of blessed memory, said: "An understanding one [navon] is one who infers one thing from another" [Talmud Chagigah 14a].

And inasmuch as knowledge falls upon these lowly natural things from the very substance of the things in themselves, it is made clear that the [intellective] grasp of these things is the pattern [nimos] found in them and their order; and that their being rectified is the beginning of their existence — as was explained at the beginning of this book — [namely] that the things which necessitate parts of them necessitate them in this manner, as if you were to say that it is the heat and the cold and the dryness [that do so]; and this is clarified from the causes that bestow upon these things their natural quality.

But the heavens — that which necessitates them does not [proceed] from this, in this manner, for there is nothing of [these qualities] in the heavens. [Rather,] the thing among the things that overflows to them from these [higher things] — and it is by [the faculty of] understanding, such that there overflows from it that which [exists], according to the divine power that is in them from the Name, blessed be He — He, the Name, blessed be He, established the design [tekhunah] of the heavens in a manner such that there is in it, by [His] understanding, that which brings these things to completion in the manner in which these things are here.

And here there is no necessity of any kind binding these things which are here in some part, since the heavenly bodies have nothing of the qualities by which they overflow to what is here, as [we have shown] according to what has been explained in natural science. And this matter recurs many times in the words of the prophets, peace be upon them — that is, that from the heavens are the foundations of the operations among these things; and the disclosing of this matter [is what] the ancients claimed [wrongly], for they reckoned the stars to be divinities, as has become widely known concerning them.

And the manner of their error was that they reckoned that these operations belonged to them [the stars] of themselves, without any cause prior to them. This is plainly null and void; for it cannot be that of many things [there be] one single action, unless there were ordered for them a single cause, as will be explained in what follows. And inasmuch as the matter is so, it is plain that there is here a single cause prior to them, which is that which sets them in motion to act in a single action — and that is the providence over this lower world.

פרק שני — Chapter Two

[Chapter synopsis, set in smaller type below the heading:] In it we investigate the essence of the incorporeal body that preserves the form belonging to it — that body which we mentioned is found between one of the spheres of the second star and the second [star's other sphere] — and we resolve the doubt as to what happens with respect to this assumption.

It is fitting that we now investigate, regarding the incorporeal body that preserves its form — the one we discussed in the preceding chapter, which lies between one of the spheres of the second star and the [other] sphere of the second star — what it is; that is to say, whether it has a form, as is the case with the rest of the natural things, or has no form at all.

We say that, since it has already been shown that it has no form — for the argument that it has a form has been refuted, and since this body has no movement of its own but is merely an instrument for setting in motion the [sphere] that [belongs] to the second star — it is clear that it has no form of its own. Rather, its existence serves to guide [the spheres] toward the perfection of the motions of the heavenly bodies, in the manner in which the parts that are lacking [for the perfection] of the living being are found in living beings, [namely] for the completion of their partial motions. Indeed, when one ponders the matter, there can be no strong doubt about this.

And this [is the case], for we find here that no body that lacks a form is found [otherwise] without [serving a purpose] — yet there would be [no purpose] in the existence of a body lacking a form such as these, were it not for the slight share they have in life and perfection. For indeed, the heavenly bodies, since they have attained life and perfection, [require this], as has been made clear in these treatises — there being no doubt of the intellect about it; for these heavenly bodies are intermediate between [the higher beings and the lower]. It has already been explained in the *Physics* [בטבעיות, i.e. the natural-science works] that the term "body" is said there [of the heavens] and of the things [discussed] here only [by analogy], and what is necessary [follows].

Moreover, since this [body] is already found among these [heavenly things], with their primary forms, and their differing in [a kind of] mixture [מזג] — [though] this [mixture] is always [present] in things possessing quality, [it is] together with the loss of form, which would be incompatible with [a true] mixture — and there would not be found among the heavenly bodies [any] that lack their primary forms by reason of this. Likewise, then, just as those things found [in the lower world] with a small share of life — to the point that they are like dead bodies, and [yet are] perfect bodies — it is possible [to find] in these [heavenly] existents [that they have, by] degrees, differences in this matter, to the point [that there is among them] the more perfect life that can possibly be found in them, [in respect of] the actions that emanate from them. I mean to say, [this is so] from [the side of] the heavenly bodies, [whose order] is itself ordered.

These [forms] and the motions of the spheres are for their sake, as will be explained after this, and there is among them [a gradation of] parts according to the deficiency of life; and these [parts] are these bodies, which lie between the spheres of the first star and [those of] the second star, while those intermediate between these two existents are [intermediate], in that the spheres in which the [fixed] stars are set have life, and after them are the spheres that serve them — [namely] the sphere in which the [particular] star is. Furthermore, since their conditions are reversed [הפכים] from your perspective at differing times — if [their] parts differ [too] — [then] the form preserves a condition corresponding to the absence of preservation of [the proper] configuration [התמונה], and this would be [so]; and to the degree that [the conditions of] these heavenly things differ at differing times, accordingly [the form] receives them in differing parts. And just as [the form] receives [in this body] the lack of [its] enumerable [parts] and the absence of countings in parts limited from it — [the absence of] reckonings and the absence of illumination in other parts — so it is possible that one [body] should be borne by a single subject, whether at differing times — if

[its] parts differ — [the form] receives the matter of preserving the configuration in [some] parts, [and the] configuration in other parts. And so too, then, since the heavenly bodies are all [governed by] the providence [ההשגחה] that is here, and this providence was the motion belonging to the [particular] star, as has been set forth and as will be explained in [its] completeness — these are the parts that lack life in them, in that they [have] the partial [motions] in such a way that completes the matter of their totality, just as one of the parts lacking [for] the living being [is supplied], such as the bones; and what [pertains to] its partial motions and its matter is its totality.

פרק שלישי — Chapter Three

[Chapter synopsis, set in smaller type below the heading:] In it we explain that the stars are in the spheres on account of the matters [treated] here.

It is fitting that we should now begin investigating the matter of the stars — whether they are in the spheres on account of themselves, or are in them on account of the things [explained] here — for this investigation is profound and highly doubtful. This [matter] has already been seen [to be such]; and [their forms] and their magnitudes are more perfect, [in respect of] what is within them, to the point that, were this order to be lost, it would be lost [entirely]. So [the matter] will be explained after this. We have already mentioned this point.

Likewise, Ibn Rushd [בן רשד, Averroes] in his commentary on *De Caelo* [ספר השמים] [held] that the stars are [in the spheres] on account of the things [explained] here — [the matters of] the natural sciences [בטבעיות], and on account of what the [other] nature is [there]. Yet it is not fitting to investigate this [matter] here. Rather, this [requires] a prior investigation, derived from [the consideration of] the rest of [the matter], regarding this part, because this investigation is among the matters held in common, and one [end of the matter] of the stars [must be investigated to its conclusion].

We say that, from what has been explained in the natural sciences concerning beings that possess a soul [בעלי הנפש] — those that are here, [where] the subject is borne toward [its] form in its own essence as something potential — yet [as for] those that we called "matter" [החומר] in name, even though it is not borne in the manner of the truth, as [the matter] settled [the question] for us, we say that this [too] is clear. Likewise, then, it is explained on the side of the composite [מצד ההרכבה], and on the side of the perfection of its existence by means of many instruments [כלים רבים]. For [the matter] of preserving [a particular] thing requires, on the side of composition, [that there be many instruments]; for the

preservation of the contraries [requires it]. The [organ] of the gall [המרה] in [the living being] possessing a soul is prepared for it, [with] some [instruments] preserving the one contrary, and after them [instruments] preserving the living [contrary]; for the gall is that in which the hot nature [resides], [and there is] the cold-dry nature; [there is also the organ] in which the cold-moist nature [resides]. The liver [הכבד] is that in which the [hot-moist] nature [resides]; [and there is the organ] in which the cold-moist nature [resides]. Yet from the side of [the heavenly body], it [too] has many instruments, and these matters are [included] in this generality. The entire treatment of this is in the *Book of Animals* [ספר בעלי חיים, the *De Animalibus*], at [the discussion of] the treatise [there]. And since the matter is so, my intention is [to say] that the being possessing a soul that is here is the more composite [thing] from [the side of] the moving bodies, and on the side of the need [it has] for [its instruments]. [And it acts upon] it according to what is possible; and it has been made clear [that this proceeds] from the heavenly bodies, in that [the heavenly body] is simple [פשוט] in the utmost simplicity, and [there is] nothing [needed] to bring it into existence and to perfect it. For there is in its own essence nothing requiring [perfection] — for example, no mixture [מזג] [needing] to be changed by [something else].

[That is to say], the heavenly body has no need for instruments [כלים] to set up its existence, for the soul is the first perfection of the body. To suppose that the existence of the heavenly bodies is necessitated by [bodily organs] is [absurd]. And when this has been explained, my intention is [to affirm] that [the heavenly body] has no instruments; and even though it possesses a soul, it is [such]. For we posit that the sphere possesses a soul [בעל נפש]. This is one of the things [that show] the spheres [to be ensouled] on account of themselves. And likewise too, if [a sphere] has [no] instruments, [yet] inasmuch as it possesses a soul, it would [follow that] there is an impression in [the matter] that posits the sphere to possess a soul.

This [accords] with what has already been said in the book [De Animalibus], for the soul that possesses a natural body has instruments — this being what [yields the conclusion] that the heavenly bodies are [ensouled], in that they possess [the requisite features]; but the condition of the heavenly body that possesses a soul [is such that] it [need have no instruments]. It is clear that there is no impression for the [particular] star, in that the spheres possess no [bodily] need; from what is seen of [the spheres], it [follows] that the stars are [not such]. So if we have made known that the condition of the sphere is that it should be [ensouled], this will be explained — together with the fact that all this [shows] that there are no

[instruments] for the stars; and that it is impossible that the star should differ [from] the [other] instruments.

[It is] what one needs to posit for the sphere, to set them up [as ensouled], [for] the matter [of the] being that possesses a soul is found in every individual of [its] species and in a single manner, and by [a difference of] magnitude they correspond to the magnitude of [the bodies]. The illustration [is] that you will not find one man whose heart is in the middle of his body, and another man [whose heart] is in his head or in his feet — as [stated] in the *Book of Animals* [ספר רב הלבבות, lit. "the Book of the Many Hearts" — a corrupt rendering] [recte: a reference to the *De Animalibus*]. You will also find that [the parts] correspond [to one another] in the magnitude of their bodies, and likewise too [there is correspondence in] the one. And there have already been found among the stars some that [do not possess a soul]; and this is because the star is found at the edge [of the sphere], and at their edges there issues a great number of stars — the small ones — and what [is found] between them, and between the middle of their edge, [is] without correspondence [in any] difference; and at their edge no star whatever is found, as [is the case with] the head, in which the star is [set], according to what [befits] it.

It is luminous on the side of [its] brightness [הזהר], which belongs to it. If [a star] had brightness in its own self, and some of them [had brightness] from another — there would be found a brightness in another appearance — and this [shows] that the sphere possesses a soul, even though [the matter] differs [as to] their being possessors of a soul. Furthermore, the brightness shows that there is no entry-point for it in [the supposition] that they are borne [as instruments] in nature; and it is impossible for [there] to come about a rejoicing in [things] possessing a soul, even [if they were] divine — except [to] say that it is on account of [the heavenly bodies] that [the lower beings] were depicted, and they were [such] that this order [in which] these [things] are completed should be set up. The instrument [does not effect] that this action [should be performed] by it; rather, [it follows] that the stars [acquire nothing] in the spheres on the side of their depiction, [serving] to complete these lowly existents on the side that they possess intellect, and there is no need [for instruments].

And if we have made known that it would befit them to have a certain motion [in the direction of] their poles [הקורמים, recte: הקטבים, "the poles"] [?], then no [necessity is implied] thereby — that their motions should be in this manner in which they are [moved]. This has already been explained in [its] completeness in the *Sixth Treatise* [מאמר השישי] of this book [Book VI of *Milchamot HaShem*], by

the decree of the Name. And since the matter is so, it is [clear that the heavenly bodies act] on account of themselves; but rather, [the truth is] that they have within them [the power] to influence [the lower world].

—it follows that the matter is so. Now this is required by the preceding doubt, and it was already required that the existence of the heavenly body should be on account of the deficiency [in life], yet this is false. For nothing prevents the heavenly body from being [as it is], since this is indeed found to be so. Rather, in this way the heavenly body would be influencing what is more deficient and acting upon it — as though one were to say that God, may He be blessed, brings to actuality whatever has been completed by Him and watched over within it. The intellect, [in turn,] is the agent acting upon these things that are here; and behold, this emanation is found in it on account of the things that are here. In this respect, the matter is that there will be the brightness [הזוהר] and the illumination in the stars on account of these things that are here, yet they exist on account of themselves. We have now completed the discourse on this matter by the decree of the Name, may He be blessed, in the Sixth Treatise of this book.

פרק רביעי — Chapter Four

[Chapter synopsis, set in smaller type below the heading:] In it we explain that there is no [separate] sphere for the sphere of the constellations [גלגל המזלות], [a sphere of] diurnal motion, as some of the masters of speculation [בעלי העיון] have supposed.

It is fitting that we now investigate whether there is above the sphere of the constellations an incorporeal sphere [גלגל בלתי מכוכב, a "starless sphere"] moving with the diurnal motion — as the ancients supposed, namely Ptolemy [בטלמיוס] and his school — there being a new intention [in positing it]; or whether there is no sphere above it in this respect, as Ibn Rushd [בן רשד, Averroes] held.

We say that it has already appeared, for each one of these [views], by way of the requisite considerations. Now it would seem proper that the sphere of the constellations should be this sphere of the diurnal [motion], inasmuch as the sphere by itself appears to be moved by the simple motion; and it would [therefore] be proper that the higher sphere should be incorporeal in this respect. For everything found among the spheres that is more perfect in respect of [its nearness to] the elements [היסודות] is the more composite of them in their motions, and so it is proper that the more remote [sphere] in respect of deficiency should be of the utmost simplicity in motion.

Moreover, since this simple motion is proper to that which is found as a simple body, behold, the diurnal sphere is the [body that is] composite; and it would be proper that the first body [הגרם הראשון] should have the diurnal motion, which lies in the lower sphere [that derives] from it. But what has been said does not appear consistent with the elements, just as one ponders [the matter]. And since the matter is so, it would be proper that the sphere whose stars are composite should be in a certain way; behold, it is then proper that it should not be the first body, but rather there should be above it a sphere, incorporeal and starless [בלתי מכוכב] — this being the encompassing [sphere] of all the spheres.

Moreover, since each one of the rest of the motions found among the stars is found first as simple and afterward as composite — as is the matter in the motion of the sphere of the constellations, for it is found in the sphere of the constellations, in that it has its own particular motion, and afterward it is found composite with the rest of the stars together with other motions — likewise the matter in the solar motion, which is found simple in the sun [לשמש], and is found composite with the other motions—

—of Venus and Mercury [לנוגה ולכוכב]. So too it would be proper that the matter should be in the diurnal motion: I mean to say that there should be a particular motion belonging to one of the spheres. Now it has already appeared in another way that it is proper that there should not be here a [separate] diurnal sphere, since, according to the motions of the spheres, the matters that appear in them [come about] on account of the stars — as in the precession [שקדם, the prior motion] and as will be explained. This is the matter Aristotle [ארסטוטלוס] mentioned in the discussion in the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע], as we mentioned earlier.

And since the matter is so, it is shown that there should not be here a diurnal sphere, since the sphere is one in which there is no star, and it is not an instrument serving a sphere that has a star within it, [such] that its motion would be in vain [לבטלה]; and the nature [of this matter] requires this. This is what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד, Averroes] used to say, against those who would assert that there is a diurnal sphere placed above the sphere of the constellations: that this is something void [דבר בטל].

And since the matter is so, behold, what we must look into is this. We say, fully [שלמה, adverbial], that the motion of the fifth body [הגרם החמישי, the celestial body] is on account of the things [explained] here, as in the precession; and the more honored it is, the more it emanates from itself many actions in this lower world, [in order] to complete the various [modes of] coming-into-being that are

here, [each] emanating from it one [single] action; and it would be made clear that the influence of these many actions from the body would be in respect of the multiplicity of motions and the multiplicity of relations that the star [bears] to the [several] places of the earth. It has [also] been made clear that it is not proper for [the sphere of] the most remote [stars] to have a simple motion without a star — all the more so [is it] not proper that there should be a [starless] sphere [moving] without a star.

And [all] this [shows] that the motions found among the spheres, if they were on account of the things [explained] here in respect of the first intention, as we explained, then it is clearly shown that this supposition is void. And if they were on account of the second intention in respect of the things [explained] here — as some of the moderns have asserted, [holding] that their perfection [comes] from the side of their own perfection, [which] is more excellent for them and more honored than it would be without [it] — that they should be such that they emanate from them [an influence] in a way they would not [emanate] otherwise: this is [also] clearly shown, in that it is proper that this emanation [should reach] the more remote body more excellently from them. And this is clearly shown, [in establishing] that this supposition is void: namely, how the matter differs in this — and this is clearly shown by what we have said.

But as for what we mentioned in this argument: that because the simple [motion] is prior to the composite, it would be proper that the diurnal sphere should be the first incorporeal sphere, inasmuch as it is prior to the rest of the spheres, since it encompasses them — this is not correct in every respect. For that the simple is prior to the composite, in priority — what is true of it is, rather, that this priority is not always found in such a way that the simple should be the more honored body, [more so] than the other things, and [more] in the degree of form and perfection absolutely. But rather it would be [that] the composite is found going along the gradation of form and perfection, and this is clearly shown by much of what we drew from existing things. For all that is added to the composition in the first matter [is] that which is found, [and] that which is more honored. And this [is so], for the inanimate [הדומם] is more honored than the elements, and the growing [thing] is more honored than the inanimate, and the [thing] possessing sensation is more honored than the growing, and man is more honored than the rest of living beings. And since the matter is so, behold, the difference is known to us: that the simple is prior to the composite among other things, [in respect of] the hylic priority [הקדימה ההיולאנית], and the composite sphere whose stars [are within it]—

—is the highest sphere encompassing all, and below it would be the sphere of the diurnal motion. Behold, the composite motion [comes] from the diurnal and the lagging [המאוחרה, precessional]; and the attainment of the composite [motion] by the sphere of the stars [is] going along the gradation of perfection toward the diurnal motion that [obtains] in the lower sphere [deriving] from it. But as for what we argued—that, because the heavenly bodies [closer to] the elements are nearer to the perfection of the composition of motions—behold, it would be proper that what is at the utmost [degree of] remoteness from them should be at the utmost simplicity of motion: and it would be proper that the first sphere should be moved with a simple motion, [and] it is something that necessarily follows from this argument. The reason for this is that, because what is found among the spheres whose stars are nearer to the elements is more in the composition of motions, behold, it is proper that what is more remote among the spheres should be at less of a composition of motions. And this is consistent with what we supposed: that the body of the stars is the first sphere, for there is no sphere possessing a star to be found in it [that has] more of the composition of motions than what is heard of this for the sphere of the fixed stars [הככבים הקיימים].

But the argument that requires [there to be] a diurnal motion above this sphere—behold, even though we concede it, it does not require, on its part, that the first sphere should be incorporeal [bearing] this motion. For this, indeed, was the diurnal motion of the first sphere, incorporeal, as we supposed: [namely] of the incorporeal sphere [bearing] the constellations, just as we suppose, in the intention [of positing] the sphere of the fixed stars. But the argument that requires of us [that] there be found there a sphere of the diurnal [motion] above the sphere of the constellations, [comes] from the side of what is found of the rest of the common motions among many stars—for they are found at first simple, and afterward composite—this is not correct. For this would be true [only] in the motions of the constellations whose courses we see in the stars, and they are the composite motions; and they [are] composite from the diurnal motion and the lagging [המתאחרה, precessional] motion. And likewise the solar motion is composite of three motions. But the simple [diurnal] motion is not correct in this respect, for there is no simple motion fitting to influence what is needful here [in this world] for the various [modes of] coming-into-being, as in the precession [שקדם], and [this is so] even though it should be in the sphere of the star. And all the more so [is it] not proper that there should be here an incorporeal sphere moved with a simple motion—[and certainly] not for the labor of [serving] a sphere that has a star; for the existence of this motion in it would be empty and in vain [לריק ולבטלה], since there is in it no benefit to influence anything here. For

the influence of the spheres upon this lower existence [comes] from the side of the stars; and behold, among natural things there is nothing in vain [לבטלה], and all the more so [is it] not proper that there should be anything like this in these honored bodies. And since the matter is so, it is clearly shown that there is no diurnal sphere above the sphere of the constellations, as some of the predecessors supposed. This is what we wished to explain in this chapter.

פרק חמישי — Chapter Five

[Chapter synopsis, set in smaller type below the heading:] In it we explain that the fixed stars [הככבים הקיימים] are all in a single sphere, and there we explain why there were in the first sphere many stars, and to what extent it was perfected by them, [whereas] there is not found in the one sphere more than a single star.

It is fitting that we now investigate whether the fixed stars are all in a single sphere, as we have supposed, or whether there should be for each one of them a sphere [of its own].

We say that it has already appeared that it is proper that they should all be set in a single sphere, from several sides. Of them: that they are always found at a constant distance, one edge [of the configuration] from another, as Ptolemy [בטלמיוס] mentioned; and this is part of what shows that they are all in a single sphere. For if they were in many spheres—how greatly do I wonder how this number among the spheres would be found [moving] with equal motion in some respects and unequal in other respects! And [as for] the rest of the spheres, there are not among them [any] in which their motion is equal but unequal in other respects. And of them: [the argument] that, because it is possible for the perfection that appears in their motions [to come about] in a single sphere just as it would be perfected in many spheres, and it has been made clear concerning natural things that there is nothing in them in vain [לבטלה], and all the more so [is there nothing] like this in these necessary bodies—it is clearly shown that it is proper that they should all be in a single sphere. For if they were in many spheres, the existence of the multiplicity of the spheres for them would be in vain, since [the perfection] that they attain has already arrived at them from a single sphere.

And of them: [the argument] that there is already found among the spheres [a case in which] the distance of [one] star from [another] star is at one time at a greater remove and at another time nearer; and it is fitting for them—if this were the case—that the place [of variation] should be the more honored [place] found

in the sphere in respect of the speed of motion, and it would be proper that the star should be in the more honored part [of the sphere], in which the star is. The most honored part is that which is in the parts of the sphere, and this is seen from its actions, as in the precession [שקדם]. Moreover, since when the place was at this [degree], it would be possible that it should be at times upon the horizon, at some part of the earth, and would not be so for [another] star; if it were near to one of the points [מהקטבים, of the poles], it would already be better that it should reach by its action a particular part of the parts of the earth, [reaching] in a particular part [a thing] more honored than [reaching] from it [as a whole] alone.

And when we ponder this, our wish [is to say] that it would be proper for the spheres that there should be in them one star alone—[such] that the distance of that star [from another] should be at one time at a greater remove and at another time nearer—and it would be clearly shown [that] this is a thing not found at all in these stars. If [it were] that for each one of them there is a star, it is clearly shown that it would be proper that these fixed stars should all be in a single sphere.

But [as to] why there are among them many stars, [there are] two reasons. The one is that this sphere would [otherwise] have [it possible] that there be in it [only] one motion, if [there were] some motion other than the diurnal motion; and for this reason this would be impossible, were it not that there be in it [more than] one star, [for then there would be] emanating from it the various actions that are needful to complete what is in it. As the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] said: by the multiplicity of the stars in it [come] the various interchanges [התמורות] for the various motions, and there would [then] emanate from it the various actions in this respect. And the second [reason] is that, since the matter is in this way, [it is fitting] that there should be in this sphere stars whose perfection is to send forth from them many actions in a certain way. This is what would be found—

in this sphere [בזה הגלגל] stars that differ in their actions, and a variation in the action of the wandering stars [הכוכבים ההולכים], since [the stars] that bear upon those concerned with the judgments of the stars [משפטי הכוכבים]... are not [all] in one zone — and there is room for this here too, [given] the variation in their actions. This is apparent from their natures, as their parts differ from it [i.e. from one another], just as the variation in the action of the wandering stars [follows] from their being in [different] parts that differ from it.

[As to] the horizon together with the star, and what is perceived along with it of the heavens [as] one, by its being in one place of the sphere of the zodiac [גלגל

המזלות], [these] differ. — And here it has been explained why the first sphere had many stars, and how it was perfected by them, so that there would be found in it no fewer stars than the multiplicity of its motions [רבוי התנועות], as is the case with the other spheres, where one finds in each of them [but] one star. And it has been explained that the fixed stars [הכוכבים הקיימים] are all in one sphere [בגלגל אחד].

Chapter Six [פרק ששי]

[Subheading, smaller type:] In it will be explained how the sun heats the air [איך יחמם השמש האויר], and there will also be explained the reason why one of the stars [presents] what it appears to present, in which respect each one differs from the others.

[Main text:] It is fitting that we investigate how the sun [השמש] heats the air [האויר], for this inquiry is a deep one, [as it bears] upon all the stars in some manner. For when it is explained in which respect this is effected by the sun, it will be explained in which respect this is reached by the rest of the stars through their actions, which are distinctive [ייוחדו] to each of them, one by one.

Let us say that it has been explained in their natures [בטבעיהן] that these stars have none of the elemental qualities [האיכיות הנמצאות] [present] in [the things] composed of the elements [ליסודות ולמורכב מהם] — and for this reason it is not possible that they should be hot [חם] in their own right. Yet according to what has [already] been explained in the general principles [בשרשים הכוללים], every thing that brings another from potency to act [מן הכח אל הפעל], such that there is found in the [thing] acted upon, [proceeding] from it, in act, [the very quality that was] in it in potency — [for that to hold here] the sun would [have to] be hot [חם]; for if the heat [החום] reaching from it were not so, in which respect would heat reach from it, [if the sun is] not itself hot in its own essence? And accordingly, since it is not possible that the sun rest [שיונח השמש] [as hot]…

[if it is] hot [חם], the heat would not reach in its own essence from the sun, for if this were not the case [with] these things, or if it were not possible that the sun rest [as] hot [חם], then [it would be] as though the heat reached its essence from the sun, and this would be reckoned [נחשב] [as though] the matter were so. And after this has been explained, it is fitting [to proceed].

Let us say that the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] gave two causes for this. [The first is:] the light [האור] that reaches from the sun, for it was [explained] that when it is reversed [יתהפך] the heat is renewed [יתחדש החום]; and this is [explained] in what

the Philosopher says. And accordingly, since this reversal [ההתהפכות] [serves] to renew firm angles [זויות נצבות], or [angles] near to being perpendicular [קרובות לנצבות]…

[the heat reaching from] the sun [is] stronger at the time of summer [בעת הקיץ], since the sun is then higher above the horizon [גבוה על האופק] in all the inhabited region [בכל הישוב] than it is during the rest of the days of the year. This is what the Philosopher means [when he says] that the cause [שגרם] of [the heat] is the motion [התנועה]; for the heat occurred [ויקרה] to the motion [the heat that occurred] to the parts of the sphere [חלקי הגלגל].

The second cause is: that the sun [השמש] is harder [מקשיי, i.e. more forceful] than the rest [in respect] of the heat [החמום], for the path of the motion that heats them [שתחמם] brings their extremity to its extremity [תביא קצתם לקצתם], and there occurs from this [an] exceedingly strong heat [מהחום … חזק], just as the lower [region] is renewed [as] the more healthful [מהבריאות המעטי] in respect of full health [בריאות שלם], according to what is said in some matter that is after [the] nature [שאחר הטבע, i.e. in the Metaphysics]. And in this manner the air is heated by the sun [בחמום השמש האויר].

And it is fitting that we examine these causes that the Philosopher gave for this matter. Let us say that the cause given on the side of the reversal [מצד ההתהפכות] [for] the sun's light is not correct [איננה צודקת] [in this] respect; and this [is] already apparent, [from the fact] that the light would [still] remain with it [שישאר עמו האור] [even when] the sun [is] reversed away from the place of the light [מהמום האור], for the light [האור] is not [identical with the reversal]; and [the matter] being so, [the heating] is not as [great as] the reversal [makes it].

Here the heat is found [to attach] to the light in respect of its being light, for it is illuminating [מאירה]. And even though there is no [necessary connection]… it is [the case that] it is nearer to the earth [קרובה אל הארץ], and the sun [is then] in most of the inhabited region [ברב הישוב], and it [being so], its standing is longer [ארוך זמן עמידתה] over the earth at the time of the head of Cancer [ראש סרטן]; and this would be fitting, if [it were] the case that the heating of the air [חממת האויר] at that time were an extraordinary heat [חמום מופלג] — and it [is] at the head of Cancer [בראש סרטן]. Yet this occurs [also] in the nights [בלילות] [when] the matter is the reverse of this; and this [shows] that the cold [is] then found [ימצא הקור]. So the [reason] given on the side of the motion [מצד התנועה] is not correct [בלתי צודקת].

[As to] the sun being harder [מקשיי] than [the rest in respect of] the sphere [מהגלגל] — which [is] all the more so according to the opinion of the Philosopher [לדעת הפלוסוף], for it appears [to be] one [matter]: — yet there is nothing arising from this supposition [בזאת ההנחה], in which respect the sun [presents] this respect [מזה הצד], for the bodies [הגשמים] that [the sun] heats [המשמשים, i.e. served by it] have [a heat], and by their mediation [ובאמצעותם] the rest are heated [יחממו שאר]… between us and the sun [בינינו ובין השמש], and they are the rest of the [heavenly] bodies [שאר הגרמים] that receive the heat [מקבלים החמום]. And so, if this is not [the case]…

And if someone says to us that it has [already been] found that the mean is acted upon [יתפעל האמצעי] in the manner of that action [באופן הפעולות ההוא] — just as one would say of the fish [בדג] that, [in] those who dive after them [in the] fishing [הדייג] by means of the net [באמצעות הרשת], the net acts upon them [yielding] the kind of those actions [ממין הפעולות], that they receive a torpor [יקבל ההרדמה] — we have said to him that in every respect the net would act [as] the cause of the torpor of the hand [סבת תרדמת היד]; yet it does not [itself] make [the diver] drowsy [לא ירדם]…

the net [הרשת], inasmuch as it is not a living being [שאינו בעל חי]. And further, the sun, when it comes to the spheres of the rest of the stars [לגלגלי שאר הכוכבים]… that the heat reaches the elements [שהגיע אל היסודות], yet [there is] destruction and corruption [תכלה ותפסד] in the spheres of the star that are beneath them [לגלגלי הכוכב אשר תחתיו]. And further, [seeing that] it is exceedingly small [קטן מאד] [in proportion] to the sphere in which it is [מהגלגל אשר הוא בו] — [if] the mover [המתנועע] [is] not the sun, then it is more [properly] ascribed to the motion of the sun [מיוחס לתנועת השמש] than [to] the elements [היסודות].

And if this were so, then they would attribute it to one matter [the heat for] one day in its entirety [על ענין אחד כיום כלילה], by their [own] reckoning [כסתו כקיץ] — [yet] the heat [follows] the motion [החום התנועה]. So it is the more fitting that the [heat] be that [which] is the swiftest [היא היותר מהירה], since it is in the motions [whereby] the bodies [הגרמים] [reach] to the elements and touch them [ומגעה אליהם], until…

And further, it has already been explained in what preceded, that the motion of the rest of the stars did not bring the body [the heat] between the spheres of the sun [בין גלגלי השמש]; and that [is] explained, [in] that the [body] is not corrupted and ceases [to reach] the body which is between the spheres of the sun [בין גלגלי השמש]. And further, that it has [already been] explained that the cause [שגרם] of

the sun's [heat] is more [in] it [than in the others]. And [the matter] being so, the sphere [הגלגל] [is]…

[it is] the more fitting that the heat [be] ascribed to the motion of the sphere [לתנועה הגלגל]; for the motion [התנועה] is one, and at a single distance [ובמרחק אחד מן]… then it would be necessary that the heat be found in the air always [נמצא באויר תמיד], in its reckoning [as] summer [כסתו כקיץ] — and this [is] false [שקר]. And further, [seeing] that there was a star [כבת, i.e. כוכב] [whose heat] it would be fitting to ascribe to the motion of the daily sphere [הגלגל היומי], and it [is] likewise near… the motions of the heavenly bodies [תנועות הגרמים השמימיים] — and it [is] so near to us [קרובה אלינו] of the air [מהאויר], and accordingly there is found some of the flames [קצת הלהבות] that are in the daily motion [בתנועה היומית]…

the heating of the air [נחמם האויר]; but the heat would reach on one day [יהיה החום מגיע ביום] in one manner [על אופן אחד], and this [is] the reverse of what is found [in fact] [חלוף מה שימצא מזה]. And further, [as to the heat] that is in the air from the sun by the [daily] motion [מהשמש באויר בתנועה], it is the more fitting that it be nearer to the elements than the sun [קרוב אל היסודות מהשמש], [given] its motion and the sun's motion [ותנועת השמש], and that what its path [is] is the more fitting at the extremity [להם … לקצה]. And if the matter were so, then it would be necessary [that the heat reach] the elements of the air [יסודות … האויר]; and this [is] a thing [that is] not found [to be] so [דבר בלתי נמצא כן]. And being so, [there is] no [sense] in [holding that] these are like the causes that the Philosopher gave for them [הסבות אשר נתן בהם הפלוסוף], [pace] the commentators on his books [מפרשי ספריו], [seeking] to complete [להשלים] what appears to the sun [as proceeding] from between [the bodies].

For the radiation of the sun [ניצוץ השמש], [yielding] the friction [להתחסות] that [arises] between it and… the fire and heats the air [האש ויחמם האויר] in this manner — this matter [is] on the side of that intermingling [זה העירוב]. And accordingly, when it [the radiation] is reversed [יתהפך] and the radiation is doubled upon itself [ויכפל הניצוץ על נפשו], the heat [is then renewed], [for] when the reversal of the radiation [is] stronger [ההתהפכות הניצוץ יותר חזק], [it serves] to renew firm angles [לחדש זויות נצבות]; and being so, the heat [is] then the greater [היה אז החום יותר]. The evidence [הראיה] for this [is] what [is] already apparent to sense [לחוש] in the burning-mirrors [במראות השורפות]: [there] subsist [קים] paired rays [קוים ניצוציים] at one point [בנקודה אחת], and there the place of the burning [מקום השריפה] [is].

This matter [is] in respect of [the thing] being illuminated by what is the sun's light [שהוא אור שמש] — [yet] not… and accordingly there would be found [light] for the light, in respect of the light being the sun's, [as a matter of] the nature of the foundation [טבע יסוד] of the sun [השמש]; [and] there would be found this heat [שימצא זה החמום] also in respect of the light. And this [is] a thing we [have already] taken our stand upon [from] sense [עמדנו עליו מן החוש], [in] that we took our stand [שהעמדנו] [on the] appearance…

[Main text:] …the burning [שורפת] over against the light of the candle [כנגד אור הנר], and at the point of the meeting of [the paired lines] [בנקודה פגישת הקוים] we found a burning [שורפה]. Yet [in] the light of the moon [לאור הירח] there does not [arise]… from the appearance of burning [מהמראה השורפה]; and this [is] all [in accord with] what indicated this matter, [namely] that the heat [is] found from the sun's light [לאור השמש] in respect of its being the sun's light by [the sun's] divine power [בכח האלהי], in [which power] there is [the capacity] to set the foundation in motion [להניע היסוד], [as] last [in the order] [האשיי]. And in this manner there is found for the light of the moon [the same] impression [לירח רושם], for there is [already] found by sense an increase of water [הוספת המים] and of the moistures [והלחויות] in respect of their increase [בהוספה], and their diminution in respect of their lessening [בהסרונה].

And this [is because] the color of the radiation of the moon [צבע נצוץ הירח] is more conformed [מתיחס], and the color of the radiation of the sun [צבע נצוץ השמש] differs from them, and [each is] suited to the nature [נאות לטבע] of the [heat]… [we shall] find the matter [המצא העניין] in the colors of the rest of the stars [בצבעי שאר הכוכבים]. I mean, that [it differs] according to the nature that [belongs] to that star, [yielding] an impression [רושם] in respect of [its] presenting [בהמצא]… in [matters] concerning the judgments of the stars [במשפטי הכוכבים] [requires] a little inquiry [עיון מעט]. Now indeed, the action of the star on the side of what reaches it [מה שיגיע] [comes] here from its radiation [מנצוצו], [in such a way] that it has preserving causes [סבות שומרות], each one [following] from the [things] that present themselves [מההפכים הנמצאים]. Now of necessity, the colors of the radiations of [the stars]… their being radiated [נצוצם], what it is fitting [that] should be [supplied] from it of what is fitting to complete [להשלים]… [if] the stars [were to be] perfecting the elements [פועלים היסודות] and preserving them [ושומרים אותם]… And [God,] may He be blessed [יתברך], the Maker who formed the whole [יוצר הכל], whom none of the [creatures] that apprehend [מהמשיגים] can attain [לא תושג על השלמ]… [except] from another [מאחד … זולתו]. And perhaps this [is] what the Philosopher meant [אשר רצה] in his words about this [בזה], and

it is possible that the commentators erred [שהמפרשים החטיאו] [as to] his intention in this [כונתו בזה].

And it has [already been] found in the matter of the moon [בעניין הירח] [that there is] no small doubt [ספק אינו מועט] [which] it is fitting that we investigate [in detail] [שנחקור בהתרתו]. And it [is] what already appears, [that] since it has been laid down [שהנחנו] that there is for the radiation of the moon [שיש לנצוץ הירח] an impression in the strengthening of the foundation [רושם בהגברה היסוד] — [such] that the waters [המים] and the moistures [והלחויות] increase [שיתוספו] in [respect of] increase [בהוספה], and lessen [ויחסרו] in [respect of] their lessening [בחסרונה] — and we [find that] this appears together with the multiplicity… and it [is] around [the time of] the conjunction [סביב המולד]: and behold it would be fitting [for the moon's radiation to produce] the reverse of what appears to sense [שיראה לחוש]. Let us say that it has [already]…

It is possible that these two things [שני אלו הדברים] are entailed [מתחייבים]… [for] one of these things, [namely] the swiftness of the moon in [its own] body [מהירת בעצם], [obtains]; and its light increases [in proportion] to the nature of the waters [בטבע המים] and the moistures [והלחויות] in [their own] essence [בעצמות]; [hence] there is found the lessening of the moistures [חסרון הלחויות] in plants [בצמחים] and in living beings [ובבעלי חיים]… by chance [במקרה] the being of the bodies [הויה הגשמים] at the end of the [lunar] renewal [בסוף החדש] [coincides with] the radiation of the moon [נצוץ הירח]; and the sun acquires from it [ויקנה ממנו] this radiation of the sun [נצוץ השמש זה]… the natural heat [החום הטבעי] in the lowly [things] that are found [בנמצאות השפלות] at the time of the conjunction [בעת המולד], [these being] the ones chosen for the sick [הבחראן לחולים] around the time of the conjunction [סביב עה המולד].

But the radiation of the moon [נצוץ הירח] is then [its own], because the moon is then beneath [תחתיו]… the inhabited region [ישוב] [where] its rays [shine] upon the sun [נצוצו אל השמש] in a manner that, in its [own] kind [בעינו אשר]… the lowly things found [at] the conjunction [נמצאות השפלות בעת המולד] [follow] the intermingling of the radiation of the sun [התמזג נצוץ השמש] with [that of the moon]; and accordingly there is found [a thing] tripled [שיתלש, i.e. threefold]… the conjunction [המולד], and there was, on account of this, a danger [סכנה], [its being]… And yet the intermingling of the radiation of the sun [התמזג נצוץ השמש] with… is then beneath [תחתיו], and the part of the moon that gives light [המאיר מן הירח]… that comes to us [יבא לנו] by the radiation of the sun [נצוץ השמש],

comes to us from this radiation of the sun, [arising] from the intermingling of the nature of the sun's radiation and the nature of the moon's radiation.

פרק שביעי (Chapter Seven)

[Subheading, smaller type:] In it are enumerated the inquiries that one must pursue concerning them [the planets], by what we have taught of this from the foregoing premises.

It is fitting that we investigate, regarding the matter of the planets, twenty-seven inquiries. **[1]** Why have all the planets a share in the diurnal motion [התנועה היומית] and in the lagging motion [precession, התנועה המתאחרת], while the anomalistic motion [תנועת החלוף] in them differs somewhat? **[2]** And why do the more distant planets — the higher [outer] planets, and the chief points of their anomalistic motion [ראשי חניהם, i.e. the apsidal/nodal points of these motions] — share in these motions? **[2, cont.]** Why are most of the planets that travel in the solar motion [בתנועה השמשיה] in a certain manner? This is because Jupiter [צדק] and Mars [מאדים] are in some manner [governed] by motion: when the gathering [תקובץ, the combined/mean motion] of the motion of length [longitude] together with the anomalistic motion is taken, the gathered [result] will be equal to the mean motion [התנועה האמצעי]; and Venus [נגה] and Mercury [כוכב] have, [taken] in their motions, [a result] equal to the mean solar motion. **[3]** Why does the moon [הירח] receive its light from the sun and have no light of its own? **[4]** Why are Jupiter and Mars in the length-motion [longitude] and the anomalistic motion in agreement, by their gathered [combined] motion [המקובץ]? **[5]** Why is the length-motion in most of the traveling planets variable [מתחלפת] — I mean, that it is at one time swift and at another time slow — according to what appears to us? **[6]** Why is the length-motion at the far-distance [apogee, המרחק הרחוק] in [some] planets such that the matter is so found in them, or at the place of the near-distance [perigee, המרחק הקרוב] such that it is so found in them? **[7]** Why is the time of the [planets'] travel longer for the swifter motion [in some], [while] for the rest of the traveling planets the matter is found to be the reverse? **[8]** [And the variant of 7:] Why is the time of the joined [composite] motion longer because the anomalistic motion is longer? **[9]** Why are the planets that travel found to have greater deviations [נזורות, divergences] at the time of their being a hundred and eighty degrees from the anomalistic motion [i.e. at opposition in anomaly], and slighter inclination [נטיה] when they are at the beginning of the anomalistic motion? **[10]** Why are the perplexing planets [הכוכבים הנבוכים, the wandering planets] found swifter in their motion when they are at the beginning of the anomalistic motion, and slower when they are a hundred and eighty degrees in the anomalistic motion? **[11]** Why is the inclination [נטית] of the anomalistic motion such that, at the beginning of the anomalistic motion, the sphere of the constellations [מגלגל המזלות] inclines to one side, and turns to the other side of

the sphere of the constellations when it is a hundred and eighty degrees in the anomalistic motion — yet the matter is not found so for Jupiter and Mars, while for the whole [of them] there is some inclination of the anomalistic motion toward one side of the sphere of the constellations? **[12]** Why is the planet more distant from the earth in a certain manner? **[13]** Why are the perplexing planets nearer to the earth when their anomalistic motion is greater — that is, when they are in a hundred and eighty degrees from it, just as it appeared to sense in what preceded? **[14]** Why are some of the perplexing planets nearer to the earth in a hundred and eighty degrees of the anomalistic motion than they are at the beginning of the anomalistic motion — as appears, for instance, in Mars, if the matter accords with this in it? **[15]** Why is the moon nearer to the earth at the quartiles [aspects, ברבועים] than it is to the earth at the oppositions [בנגודים]? **[16]** Why are the moon's deviations and divergences [רבוי הנטיות והנזורות] in the matter just as the rest of the planets have in their anomalistic motion? **[17]** Why is it found that Jupiter and Mars have a measure greater [than what they would], [in respect] that the anomalistic motion was longer because of the anomalistic motion [being longer]? **[18]** Why is the anomalistic motion smaller, much, in the planet that is Venus, even though the length-motion in them is equal? **[19]** Why was the anomalistic motion swifter in the planet [Mercury], even though the length-motion in them is equal? **[20]** Why were the sun and the moon greater in their bodies [the size of their bodies] than the rest of the traveling planets? **[21]** Why are Jupiter and Venus, when they are at the limit of their northerly inclinations [נטיותיהם הצפוניות], near the head of the constellation Libra [ראש צורת מאזנים], and the limit of their southerly inclinations [נטיותיהם הדרומיות] near the head of the constellation Aries [ראש צורת טלה]; and for Mars and Mercury it is found that the limit of the northerly inclination is near the head of the constellation Cancer [ראש צורת סרטן], and the limit of the southerly inclination near the head of the constellation Capricorn [ראש צורת גדי]? **[22]** Why are Mars and Mercury found inclining southward more than is found for them northward, and for Venus the matter is found the reverse — if the matter is so, as Ptolemy [בטלמיוס] recorded; and for Saturn and Jupiter [בשבתאי וצדק] is found an inclination northward and southward in equilibrium [בשווי]? **[23]** Why is the planet Mercury twice in a year at the far-distance [apogee] and the near-distance [perigee], if the realities [המציאיות] be so, as Ptolemy explained? **[24]** Why is the time of the latitude-motion [תנועת הרוחב] of the moon variable from the time of the length-motion in the reverse [manner from] what is found in this for Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury? **[25]** Why do the traveling planets differ in the measure of the lagging motion [precession, התנועה המתאחרת] — as one might say that their period of revolution [שקטם סבובה] is completed in about twenty-

four thousand years, as is the matter with the sphere of the fixed stars [בגלגל הכוכבים הקיימים]; while in Mars and in some [planets] it is about fifteen thousand seven hundred years, as is the matter with the sun, Saturn, and their period of revolution, in a time other than this? **[26]** What is the [body] whose place it is found to be in, in which it is swift? **[27]** What is the moon's shadow [הצל הנראה] that appears in the moon, in which limit it is found, in the place where it is swift? **[And:]** What is the Milky Way [העגול החלבי] that appears in the sphere of the fixed stars, and in which limit it is found?

This, then, is what we have known of this — the matter of the heavenly bodies — according to what was possible for us; and behold, it is already explained that we have reached as much as could be of their being known, [yet] their matters require still more knowledge. And this, indeed, will be [taken up] in the chapters that come after this.

פרק שמיני (Chapter Eight)

[Subheading, smaller type:] In it we shall set down some of the explained principles [roots] in themselves, that one may, on inspecting this book, set them straight, [so as] to stand thereby upon the reason for what is found in the heavens.

We set down first what may direct us to the falling [of doubt] upon the truth in these inquiries that were stated before, [namely] their causes — and they are six principles [roots, ששה שרשים], all of them explained in themselves, or [easily] explained in themselves to one who inspects this book.

The first principle: the planets perform variable actions, as one would say that the sun produces a great impression [רושם גדול] upon the generation of heat and dryness in the temperament [המזוג], whereas the moon [produces] an impression in the generation of cold and moisture; and likewise the matter in [each] planet by planet.

The second principle: the planets perform variable actions according to the variation of their places, which are [their places] in the sphere of the constellations [מגלגל המזלות]. This matter is exceedingly well known to sense [for] one who investigates it. By this manner [of variation] are found there planets of an enduring [character], that they have, for example, an impression by [their] qualities, or in rain [במטר], or in [other things] by nature, more than the rest of the natural [bodies], so that not [even] one of the investigators of this is in doubt of it.

By this manner is found the action of the traveling planet to receive its full [extent of] reception [תכלית הקבלה] — when its places in the sphere of the constellations are favorable [נכחיים] at its extremity [points], even though [the various planets] do not differ in their inclinations [בנטיותיהם]; I mean, that they did not differ in the relation [ביחס] of one to another from the altitude [מן הגובה] above the horizon [האופק]. This indeed occurs when the place of the one is at the head of [the constellation] Aries [בראש טלה], and the other at the head of [the constellation] Libra [בראש מאזנים]. And indeed, when this difference [anomaly, החלוף] reaches them, it is from the side of the variation of the nature of the radiations [נצוצי] of the enduring [fixed] planets that are in those places.

The third principle: for all that requires the standing [station] of the planet at a place in the sphere of the constellations, the stronger the action that reaches us from it, because [of] the nature of the radiation of the constellation's planets that is in it. This principle, too, is well explained in itself to one who inspects this book; for the relation of the agent to the patient [יחס הפעל אל הפועל] is [as] the relation of time to time, the analogy being that fire heats the thing it warms more in two hours than it warms it in one hour, as is mentioned of this in the *Physics* [בספר השמע].

The fourth principle: the planet performs variable actions on account of the anomalistic difference [חלוף] of its inclination to north and to south. The analogy being that all that is higher [in altitude], passing over more than half the heavens, the greater will be the action reaching us from it, [the] stronger. This is a thing explained by sense in the case of the sun: the heating that reaches us from it when it is at the head of [the constellation] Cancer [בראש סרטן] is far stronger than the heat reaching us when it is at the head of [the constellation] Capricorn [בראש גדי]. And from this we take a sign [a demonstration, ראיה] for the rest of the planets, in [the respect] that the analogy [the case to be investigated] is one [and the same].

The fifth principle: all that the radiation [הנצוץ] is greater, the action that reaches [us] from the planet is stronger. This is because the action of the planet that reaches [us] is by means of its radiation; behold it is necessary that all that the radiation is greater, the stronger will be the action reaching [us] from the planet.

The sixth principle: all that the planet draws nearer to the earth, the stronger will be the action that reaches the earth from the planet — because the relation [היחס] is greater [the] larger the circle [העגולה] in which the planet revolves; and on account of this, the radiation reaching the earth from it will be greater.

פרק תשיעי (Chapter Nine)

[Subheading, smaller type:] In it we give the causes for everything found in the heavens, [insofar as] the more complete [account] is possible for us.

Now that we have reckoned up these principles [roots], which are, as it were, known in themselves to one who inspects this book, behold it will not be hard for us to set down the causes for all that we have aimed to investigate concerning the matter of the planets.

We say that the reason for the planets all having a share in the diurnal motion [בתנועה היומית] and in the lagging motion [precession, התנועה המתאחרת] is this: because the times of these things that come to be [later] were prior [in nature], and [because] they are measured in the four seasons [בתקופות הארבע] newly produced from the planets, as is mentioned in natural science [בחכמה הטבעית]. And since some of them are short-lasting [קצרי הקיום] and some of them long-lasting [ארוכי הקיום], it was of necessity that all the planets should share in the preservation [בשמירה] of what is found of the natural existents [מהנמצאות הטבעיות]. Behold, it is fitting that they all share in the seasons — the short [seasons], and the long seasons — in [whatever] manner is shared.

Now the things long-lasting [ארוכי הקיום] in this [matter are governed] in the wondrous manner [whereby] those things do not fall into ruin and corruption for long times — by a wondrous length [of preservation], as [in the case of] the mountains and the seas and the great [bodies of] water [the oceans], and what is similar to this of the comprehensive [universal] things. Behold, they all share in this in the lagging motion [precession], and if [at all] their extremities differ at the extreme. But since the more distant motions of the more distant [outer] planets share in these motions in order that the anomalistic difference may reach what [reaches] the traveling planets by the lagging motion [precession] — together with the preservation of the relations that were prepared for them [the elements] by the inclinations [מהנטיות] of the fixed-planet sphere — by this the nature [will be such] that the radiations of those planets are preserved.

The analogy being [a thing] that has already occurred: that there was a breadth [רחב, latitude] for Mars [in] the sphere of the constellations [מגלגל המזלות], being always at one breadth [latitude], as when the anomalistic motion was in one place; and it occurred to Mars that the anomalistic difference of the lagging [precessional] motion was always [such] that it was there more distant [at] the limit of the northerly [inclination] — I mean, that it is more distant always from the [point of] reversal of the summer [solstice, מההפוך הקייצי], until it should be at

the place of the lion's heart [לב אריה, the star Regulus] at the reversal of the equinox [בהפוך הסתווי]; and then Mars begins to draw near, [in] its being at this place toward the northerly quarter [לפאת הצפוני], until it should reach the lion's heart [Regulus] at the summer-reversal [solstice, אל ההפוך הקייצי]. And by this manner will be the action reaching us in Mars — its being at the lion's heart [Regulus] — variable always.

This is [the case for] all that the planet draws nearer in its being complete to the summer-reversal [solstice]: the action reaching from it will be stronger, as was explained in the third principle of the principles we mentioned. And all that it [the planet] draws near in its being inclined to the equinoctial-reversal [equinox], the action reaching from it will be the weaker; and this is the matter as it proceeds…

will [its cycle] revolve, and this period will be completed in the time it takes the lagging motion [התנועה המתאחרת — precession] to be completed. This is indeed the case with Mars [מאדים], for which the lagging motion is equal to the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars [גלגל הככבים הקיימים]. Now in the other planets, too, you will find that the lagging motion varies: the variation occurs by way of the long-radius motion [תנועת האורך — the apogeal motion] of the sphere of the zodiac [גלגל המזלות], and a differing motion [תנועת החלוף — anomalistic motion] is likewise found in them, arising from the motion of the far distance [המרחק הרחוק — apogee].

For example: it was the case that when Saturn [שבתאי] was, together with the heart of the Lion [לב אריה — Cor Leonis, Regulus], at the far distance, then its effect upon us was diminished by reason of the far distance; whereas the effect reaching us was strengthened if it was with the heart of the Lion at the near distance [המרחק הקרוב — perigee], for then it is closer to us.

So, in another mode: when its differing motion altered such that, while it was at the far distance, its effect upon the heart of the Lion became as the effect reaching us when it was at the near distance — this came about by reason of the swiftness of the motion forward and backward. Thus these alternations of relation gave rise to many kinds of alternation of effects; this alternation of relations proceeds in a cycle, and the time of that cycle is the time it takes the lagging motion to be completed. So here it has been completed, according to what we have known from the premises, [the account of] how the planets share, all of them, in the daily motion [בתנועה היומיה] and in the lagging motion, and in their sharing of the distances and the heads of the nodes [ראשי התנינים] in these motions.

But the relation in which the planets that move in the solar [annual] motion [התנועה השמשית] share — in what manner it is, such that they all share in some manner in the four solar seasonal points [בתקופות הארבע השמשיות — the four equinox-and-solstice points] — [is this]: for these leave a strong impression upon natural things, such as growing plants and living animals. And note, this sharing has been explained for Venus [נוגה], Mercury [וככב], Jupiter [וצדק], and Mars; but for Saturn the sharing is by reason of the variation in them [the planets] in the long-radius motion, the differing motion being the [factor] added to the motion of the average sun [לתנועת השמש האמצעית — the mean sun].

But as for the solar seasonal points that are renewed in them — these four seasonal points are completed because the sun's differing motion, in the course of a year, is thirteen days and a fraction of a day, approximately. This is because, when Saturn is at the beginning of the differing motion, it will be together with the sun; and when it is at one hundred and eighty degrees, the differing motion will be at the quartile aspect [במבטו מרובע] to the sun in accordance with the mean progress [לפי מהלך האמצעי]; and when it is at two hundred and seventy degrees, the differing motion will be in the opposition aspect [במבט נכחי] to the sun in accordance with the mean progress. In this manner Saturn renews [its four seasonal points in] three hundred and seventy-eight [days?] [שלש מאות ושבעים ושמנה] [?]...

[and] one day and two hours, approximately. As for Jupiter, these four seasonal points are renewed in a year, two days and fifteen hours, approximately. As for Mars, these four seasonal points are renewed in two solar years, forty-eight days and eleven hours, approximately. And in these seasonal points there will be found a sharing with the sun, in that they [the planets] combine with it [the sun] from this [aspect] in its seasonal points, according to their relation to it.

And note, these were the times of the motions that were renewed, so that these things — whose periods are measured in the seasonal points of one planet of this kind — might be completed; for it resembles [the case], as one says in natural matters, that here things whose periods are measured in the seasonal points of one of the planets [are completed]. And note, nature is equal in this: for in the planet whose differing motion is the swifter of these three planets, in this manner were the things whose periods are measured by the seasonal points of the long-radius motion the more measured. So, too, is the inference drawn for Jupiter together with Mars.

But for the planet by reason of whose differing motion the matter is found to be the contrary — this is the side of which we said that nature is equal in this; for,

with all that, this manner [would] not have been possible, [namely] that these planets should share the seasonal points of the sun in the manner we mentioned, since this would require that their motions be measured equal to the motion of the average sun. And this is requisite [precisely] when there is in the long-radius motion something the more measured, so that the differing motion be the swifter in it.

But the cause that, these planets' motions being of differing kinds, it was of necessity that their periods be measured in differing times — the [cause for] which here was the necessity that their periods be measured in differing times by reason of the variation — is the maintenance of the long-radius [motion] and its smallness. As for the motion of the long radius of Venus and Mercury, it is equal to the motion of the average sun, and they were always with it in the mean progress, so that their radiations [נצוציהם] might always be with the radiation of the sun in a manner suited to natural existents. As for the differing motion, four other seasonal points are renewed in them too, by reason of the variation in [their] swiftness forward and backward, and in the multiplicity of their inclination [נטיה] and its smallness; for in proportion to what natures incline, [they receive] from them, acquiring a seasonal point, as has been explained from the earlier roots.

[the moon's] sharing in the solar seasonal points; and this is by reason of the conjunction [הדבוק] which the moon has with the sun in twelve signs of the zodiac in one year, as it were: that the first conjunction [המולד — new moon] would be in Aries and the second in Taurus, and so this is drawn out [from] one [lunar] month to the next nearby. And the matter being so, it was the case that for the one for whom the sun has a small effect — by reason of the laws of the planets [במשפטי הככבים] — the moon acquires [from it], in that at the moment of the conjunction nature is drawn out in the portion of the lunar month [בקצה החדש הירחי]; and from this side the moon will be in sharing with the sun in its seasonal points by reason of this side. And here it has been made clear that all the planets that move [in their orbits] share with the sun in their seasonal points in a certain manner; and the clarification of the cause for this [is] according to what is possible for us.

But as to why the long-radius motion of many of the moving planets is alternating, until it is at one time swift and at another time measured — this indeed is so that the multiplicity of the coming-into-being which is here [in the lower world] might be completed, by reason of the alternation of the motion forward and backward, as has been explained from the second of the two roots

we mentioned. And the cause of this was, in its essence, that the planet was at one time at the far distance and at another time at the near distance; and this is so that there might be renewed from this many relations of the planet to a [varying] near-and-far distance, and that the multiplicity of the effects too might reach from it, in the [explained] manner, as has been clarified from the fifth root.

And note, the measured motion was longer in time in them than the swift motion, in order to equalize their four seasonal points; this is because the effect reaching us from this [planet] is weakened by reason of the far distance — that is to say [ר"ל], by reason of the far distance, [there is here] the equalizing of the [things of] nature. And there [where] the motion is measured, there too the time is longer than the measure of swiftness, in order to equalize the four seasonal points in a manner suited to these things which here receive their effects. And this was, in its essence, that the time of the measured motion was longer than the time of the swift motion, by reason of the differing motion which resembles [that of] the moon; for the moon would more resemble it [the sun] in the differing [motion], in that, while it [the moon] is at one hundred and eighty degrees in the differing motion, except that we have not yet verified this by aspect [במבט — by observation].

And if the measured motion were at the near distance — as it resembles what would be the matter in Mars, according to what we mentioned earlier in the prior portion [בחלק הקודם] — or if there were no place for the measured motion that [is] swifter than the swift motion, then this would be because these things which [are] here need to act upon the seasonal points which this planet renews; for, the planet being at a measured motion, [it is] more in your reckoning toward [strengthening] the effect of the seasonal points which this planet renews when the planet is at its swift motion. And note, two causes — or three — are fixed here to strengthen the effect of these seasonal points: the first is the measuredness of the motion, for this is what strengthens the effect of the planet; the second is that the time is long in the case of these seasonal points, for it is because of this that the effect of the planet is strengthened by these seasonal points, which are the longer in time; and the third is the nearness of the planet to the earth in the case of these seasonal points.

And this indeed will be [the case] in the planets in which the matter is found in this manner — that is to say [ר"ל], that they are closer to the earth at the moment of their being in the place of the measured motion.

But as to why the moving planets are found to have a greater [נזורות] inclination at the moment of their being [at] one hundred and eighty degrees [in the

inclination], by reason of the differing motion found in them at the beginning of the differing motion; and why the swiftness of the motion in these planets was [found] at the beginning of the differing motion, and backward at their being one hundred and eighty degrees [at] one hundred and eighty degrees — the cause of this is that Saturn, Mars, and Jupiter are, at the beginning of the differing motion, together with the sun at one place on the sphere of the zodiac; and because of this there is between them a [conjunctional] combination then, in some manner, by reason of which their radiations descend together with them [the fixed stars] which are with them. And in their being one hundred and eighty degrees in the differing motion, they are in opposition to the sun, and there is found between them the [opposite] combination by reason of the nature which the fixed stars acquire — for they are in the sign opposite to the sun.

And in proportion to the rays of the sun strengthening with it, the cities of nature [הערים הטבע — the regions of nature?] [?] grow very strong; these planets, at the moment of their combination, [act] with a weaker effect, by reason of the swiftness of the motion and the smallness of the possible inclination in finding it there toward the inhabited quarter [פאת היישוב — the oikoumene side] at the moment of the sun's being in the northern signs, and toward the southern side at the sun's being in the southern signs — for the sun has already added a little help to itself by reason of the strong combination of its radiation. And there [where] these planets — at the moment when their effects are received toward the effect of the sun [act with] a stronger effect — by reason of the lateness of the motion found in them in that place, until, they having already returned and gone again to that place a second time, they stand still in that place of the sphere of the zodiac, and this [standing] is lengthened. And this is for two causes: the one is the lateness of the motion; and the second is that, by reason of their returning to that place a second time, there is another cause that strengthens their effect at that time. And this [happens] by reason of the multiplicity of the possible inclination in finding them in a place where the receiving from it [the sun] is to the effect of the sun, that is, toward the southern side at the sun's being in the northern signs, and toward the northern side at the sun's being in the southern signs. In this manner the receiving with it [is] found to be stronger.

And even though the inclination is found at times to be the contrary of this, behold this would be on account of strengthening the relations, in order that the multiplicity of the effects might be completed. As for Venus and Mercury, there is found between them too a [conjunctional] combination, in that they are with the sun at the beginning of the differing motion at one place, its inclination being measured and small. But at their being one hundred and eighty degrees in the

differing motion, there is found between them a receiving with the sun, of the kind [arising] by reason of the multiplicity of [their] inclination; and this would [obtain] also when there is found to them swiftness of motion at the moment of their being at the beginning of the differing motion, and backward at their being one hundred and eighty degrees in the differing motion. And at times there is no inclination at all, as we mentioned, in order that the multiplicity of the requisite effects might be completed from this — by which this lower existence [המציאות השפל — the sublunar world] is perfected.

And so too the matter of the latitude [נטיה] found in the case of Saturn [שבתאי], Jupiter [צדק], and Mars [מאדים], when they are at one hundred and eighty degrees of the alternating motion [תנועת החלוף] — which is at times small, and at times there is no latitude at all, as was said earlier. There is yet another cause for this matter in the case of Venus [נוגה] and Mercury [וכבב, i.e. וכוכב, Mercury], [namely] that in this manner it is possible that there be renewed in them, by reason of the alternating motion, the four seasonal periods [התקופות ארבע], with their alternations from one extreme of them to the other. And for this reason, too, their latitudes [נטיוותיהם] — in their being at the commencement of the alternating motion — were toward the other side from that toward which they were inclined at one hundred and eighty degrees of the alternating motion, [this being] by [way of] the difference of what issues from this for Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars. For if they were, in one manner, [uniform] in the swiftness of the motion and in the latitude in their being at one hundred and eighty degrees of the alternating motion — together with what [latitude] is theirs in their being at the commencement of the alternating motion — there would be no alternation at all by reason of the alternating motion, whether in their being at the commencement of the alternating motion or in their being at one hundred and eighty degrees of the alternating motion. And inasmuch as the change of the balance [תמורת השווי] among the planets occurs at the four seasonal periods that are renewed by reason of [their] motion, as is mentioned in the *Physics* [בטבעיות], behold, of necessity this alternation was found for these planets in their being at the commencement of the alternating motion — whether in their being at one hundred and eighty degrees of the alternating motion.

But as for what we mentioned earlier of these planets — that, when they have latitudes [נזורים], there is no force [אין כח] in them: this is the saying that issues from the analogy [מן ההקש]. And this is because, if their motion were found more slow [מהוניה, i.e. of slower uniform motion], then their action would be stronger, as we have explained. Rather, by reason of all the [physical] aspect [פנים] of the common sense [החוש] regarding this, [behold] that there were found for them the

impressions [הרושם] reaching from these planets in their being [where they have] very small latitudes [נזורים]: this, indeed, is by reason of the sun's being [the source of] action, or of an action received from them. And in the being of the matter so, behold the impression reaching from them — or [the deficiency] from them [as] a deficiency [חלוש, i.e. חלישות] — was the sun, which was stronger upon it according to the magnitude of its nature. Rather, what suffices [from] these three is not from them, since it is fitting that their action be stronger; and indeed this was by reason of the sun's received action belonging to them at this place. And as for Venus and Mercury, there is found for them, too, the reception [המקבלה] of what is with the sun at this time [העה, i.e. העת], as was said earlier.

But as for why the planet was more distant from the earth, with a later [slower] motion, [namely] for the multitude of [the variations of] the motion of the planets — behold this [is] for the deficiency [להבליה, i.e. להחלשת] that its action reaches here, in accordance with what is fitting for the perfecting of these lower existents [הנמצאות השפלות]. For by reason of the planet's being more distant from the earth, [as] [its] later [slower] motion is more delayed, there is aroused [העריס, i.e. הערים] the [physical] nature [הטבע], and there [its] motion was more delayed, to complete for it what was lacking from it of the strength of the action, by reason of [its] distance from the earth.

And this cause [pertains], by the same token, to the planets of the deep [the inferior planets] [כבבי הנבוכה, i.e. כוכבי הנבוכה] [that are] nearer to the earth in their being [there] — for the deficiency found in them by reason of the alternation, [arising] from the alternating motion, [is in measure of] what they have at the commencement of the alternating motion, and [at] one hundred and eighty degrees from it, just as is seen in the case of Venus. For there is at times found for them the reception [הקבלה] of what is with the sun, whether in the case of Saturn and Jupiter and Mars, by reason of their being at the quartile aspect [במבט מרובע] with the sun; and as for Venus and Mercury, by reason of their being at the extreme of distance from the sun. From this it follows for them, together with the sun, that the agreement [of action] is small, owing to what is possible for them in the alternating places of the sphere of the constellations [מגלגל המזלות], [namely] the extreme of the alternation possible for them. This is because they were nearer to the earth in their being [there]; whereas in their being at one hundred and eighty degrees of the alternating motion, these planets did not need to be nearer to the earth in order to strengthen their action — for what suffices here is that there be in them a great deal of latitude [נטייה] and slowness of motion [מתינות התנועה] at this place, as was said earlier.

It is fitting that this not be hidden from us, [namely] the reason we mentioned, in the case of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, that the moon [הירח] was nearer to the earth at its quarter-points [ברבועים] than it was during the rest of the days of the [synodic] month — in order that the action of the moon at this point be strengthened from this side. But in the case of the others there was no need for this, since the moon is of complete light [שלם האור]; and what suffices it [to compensate] for the deficiency [מיתרון, i.e. חסרון] of its light at this time is that there be found for it from the [reflected] light double what is found for it [from the source] at its quarter-points [ברבועים]. So this did not require adding latitude to the moon in its being opposite the sun [נכחיי לשמש], nor slowness of motion to strengthen its action; for what suffices it [to compensate] for the deficiency of its light, in its being opposite the sun, is as was said earlier. — And this was the cause: the moon had no latitudes [נזורות], and there was in it no single latitude.

But Mars, if it were nearer to the earth at one hundred and eighty degrees of the alternating motion, as we may reckon in our matter, behold its action would be strengthened at the time of its reception from the sun, by way of equalization with that which is here. This is because its motion, too, in its being at one hundred and eighty degrees, would not be the action reaching from it in the manner of the strengthening required for that which is here; and so it was placed then nearer to the earth, were the reality so. And here the cause is clarified [for] the alternation's being greater in proportion as the alternating motion is more, in the case of the planet whose alternating-motion period [תנועת החלוף במספר החלוף] is greater — as appears from what is apprehended in the [physical] aspect [במבט] of Mars, Venus, and Mercury, according to what Ptolemy [בטלמיוס] recounts of the aspects [המבטים] in which the largest planet among them was at the far distance from the sun. For in this manner it is right that Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars be at the quartile aspect with the sun in their being at the extreme of the alternation in which they are nearer to the earth — which is the [station] disposed by nature [המכוון מהטבע] for the cause we mentioned. But Venus and Mercury — this was for [the sake of] equalization [להשוות] between the four seasonal periods [התקופות הארבע] that belong to them by reason of the alternating motion. And this is because the action that belonged to these three planets, in the slowness [חלוש, i.e. חולשת] of their motion being swift, was placed there [as] the time of the swift motion; and this [is] a great equalization in the matter. And this cause is comprehensive [כוללת] for Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars as well.

But as for why there is found, in the case of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, something whose later motion [מאוחר התנועה] was the alternation, by reason of which the

alternating motion is greater in it — behold this is in order that there be completed for them the latitudes [הנזורות] required for them in the planet's being opposite the sun [נכחי לשמש], by way of a parallel action [פעל מקביל] reaching from it corresponding to the action of the sun, in the manner of the strengthening required to complete that which is here.

But as for why the sun and the moon have a greater relation [ביחס] to their spheres [גלגליהם] than the rest of the traveling planets have — this is according to what we may consider. For the natural things, in respect of the heat [בחום] and the natural qualities [וההלחות הטבעיים, i.e. הלחויות הטבעיות] found in them, the sun was the most special in conferring heat [בנתינת החום], and the moon the most special in conferring the [natural] qualities [הלחויות], as has become publicized in their matters. Behold, then, the recognition was that these [two] planets were larger, in order that their action be stronger than the action of the planets that parallel them [המקבילים להם]. And this was the cause, similarly, why Jupiter and Venus [were] larger in respect of their spheres than Mars and Mercury — for Jupiter has some impression upon heat and [natural] quality [רושם מה בחום והלחות], and Venus [ולכבב נוגה, i.e. Venus] has some impression upon cold and [natural] quality [רושם מה בקור והלחות], as has become publicized in their matters. And indeed Saturn, Mars, and Mercury all have, in some manner, an impression upon dryness [רושם להם ביובש], according to what has become publicized to one who has gazed somewhat into the laws of the stars [משפטי הכוכבים].

But as for why the extreme of the northern latitude [תכלית הנטיה הצפונית] in the case of Saturn and Jupiter is at the head of Libra [ראש מאזנים], and the extreme of the southern latitude [תכלית הנטיה הדרומית] in them is at the head of the constellation Aries [ראש צורת טלה] near by — while in the case of Mars and Mercury the extreme of the northern latitude is found near the head of the constellation Cancer [ראש צורת סרטן], and the extreme of the southern latitude near the head of the constellation Capricorn [ראש צורת גדי] — this is according to what we may consider. By reason of what, [namely], these planets' nature being such that the emanations of the enduring [fixed] stars [מניצוצי הכוכבים הקיימים] were quieted [שיקטו, i.e. שישקטו] for them, until their action be in the most complete manner possible here — behold, the nature would already vary the quieting of the emanations of the enduring stars [שיקטו מניצוצי הכוכבים הקיימים] on account of the variation of their latitudes [נטיחתם, i.e. נטיותיהם] in their multitude and their smallness. And [as for] what could yet be possible — that there be the proximity of the times among these planets, between Mars and Venus and Mercury [וכבב, i.e. Mercury], in their meeting them [בהפגשם עמהם] — behold this

was [such] that the extreme of the one latitude was near the place of the commencement of the other latitude [התחלת הנטייה האחרת].

But as for why there is found, in the case of Mars and Mercury, more from their latitude toward the south [that is] greater [than what is found] from them — that there be completed the reception fitting [for them] at the seasonal periods, this [being] the planet of the solar [periods] [זה הכבב השמשיות, i.e. the planet [related to] the solar seasonal periods] — for it is plausible that what is intended in this [respect] of the planet is in accord with the nature of its powers [הגבריותו, i.e. גבורותיו]: with the need of the things found at the [far] distance from the northern quarter [מהפאה הצפונית] greater than what they required for their proximity [לקורבתו]. And by reason that there was need for these things which [are] here to receive an impression more nearly [related] to [that received] here, from this [it follows that] their reception of the impression from the northern quarter [הפאה הצפונית], by [way of] what they receive [as] an impression [arising] from their distance from it, was placed [as] a latitude toward the north, greater. And by reason that there was need for these things which [are] here to receive an impression that they receive here at the equalized place — Saturn and Jupiter near, Mars and Mercury near — and [as for] the impression they receive at their distance from it, their impression was placed [as] a latitude toward the north and toward the south, equalized [שוה].

— And this was the cause, too: the magnitude of Mercury's distance from the sun was greater than the magnitude of Venus's distance from the sun — that is to say, that these things which [are] here need to receive a stronger impression from Venus than what they receive from the action of Mercury. And this is because all that these planets distance themselves from the sun, you see their action being more particular [וייוחדו, more singled out] in them, [the action] being stronger, by reason of the smallness of the mixture [התמזג, i.e. ההתמזגות] with them [as] the sun's spark [ניצוץ] is then. — And this, too, was the cause: the alternating motion was more slowly-moving [מתונית, of slower uniform motion] in the case of Venus than in the case of Mercury — that is, that these things which [are] here need to receive a stronger impression of Venus's actions than they receive of Mercury's actions; and this is because all that the motion was more slowly-moving, the action reaching [from it] was stronger, as was said earlier.

But as for why each planet [is found] twice in the year, at the far distance and at the near distance — if the reality were so, as Ptolemy explained — this is to complete, in the half of the solar year [בחצי השנה השמשית], these four seasonal periods, in order that there be measured in them these four seasonal periods of

these things which [are] here, [the periods] being equalized in them according to what these seasonal periods change for them by their nature [as to] the length of duration and stability [מארך הקיום והעמידה]. — And this was the cause, too: the time of the wide-latitude motion [תנועת הרוחב] was different from the time of the longitude motion [תנועה הארך], in order that there be renewed by the wide-latitude motion the four seasonal periods, and that there be measured in them the seasonal periods, the [boundaries] of these things which [are] here, until there be already renewed, by the swiftness of the moon, many kinds from the seasonal periods,

which are completed by it [in] the four seasonal periods in a new lunar [reckoning] [בחדש הירחי]. The first [reason] is by reason of the renewing motion [התנועה החדשיית] which is completed of it [in] the four seasonal periods in a new lunar [reckoning]; and the second is by reason of the moon's distance from the sun, for it is by reason of this that the alternation [התחלף] is renewed [as to] the multitude of the light and its smallness. The third is by reason of the longitude motion [תנועת הארך], which is completed in twenty-seven days, seven hours, and forty-three daqim [דקים] approximately. And the fourth is by reason of the alternating motion [תנועה החלוף], which is completed in twenty-seven days, thirteen hours, and eighteen daqim. And [there is] the wide-latitude motion [תנועה הרוחב], completed in eighteen solar [units] [שמשיים [?]] and two hundred and four days approximately. And this is because all of these were already of these four seasonal periods, apart from the diurnal seasonal periods [התקופות היומיות]. And the seasonal periods [התקופות] which [belong] to the moon, by [its] later [lagging] motion [התנועה המתאחרת] — in the manner we explained earlier — and they are measured by the kind [of variation] from these four seasonal periods which [pertain to] some of these things which [are] here, in some manner.

Now as for why the shadow [הצל] was in the moon at the place where it is — and what it is: behold, it appears that it is a thing belonging to the body of the moon, [a thing] not receiving the sun's light in the manner in which the other parts of the moon receive it. For this is something that cannot be said — that there should perpetually be darkened, in this [same] character, a certain part of the moon's body. For were this so, [that part] would not always appear in one [and the same] place — not even in a single clime. Rather, there is found in it the alternation of vision [of how it appears], and it appears, by way of example, that the place [from which it is seen] at which it rises upon the horizon [differs from] the place where it is seen at the time of its setting, because the alternation of vision is itself the

variation in these places — and this thing does not appear so concerning the shadow.

And further, if the matter were so, then this — what is moved in it [thus] — would be moved by the moon's [own] motion in [its] equalized course, until there were found all the variations to be found in the moon's motion, both in longitude and in latitude. Behold, of necessity there would be required for it spheres in the number of the spheres found for the moon; and this, by [the implication of] nullity and falsity [it involves]. Or let us say that the moon's nature is such that there is renewed, perpetually, in this its body, that [darkening]. But if the matter be so, the doubt is removed which we recounted concerning the alternation of vision.

And further, if the matter be so, the moon ought to be round, by reason of the nature of the parts of the moon being uniform [as] one; and it ought also that they should resemble — in the begetting of this its body — that condition in which they perpetually exist. And there is no [way] to say that it should be a vision [appearance arising] by the gradation of the bow [קשת] and the corona [halo, הילא]. For if this were the matter, the moon ought to be round, because [that which lies] between us and the luminary, and between our vision, [is] upon one straight line — and this is explained in the mathematical sciences [בלמודיות]. And further, [it would] already [have been] fitting, if the matter be so, that this vision[-appearance] should be at the time of the clearness of the air [צחות האויר], and grow strong and grow larger in [proportion to] the thickness of the air [עובי האויר]. But according to what has already been explained, this [appearance] is not a thing [that lies] below the sphere of the moon, and it is not so [as it would appear] to vision; rather, it is something that is in the body of the moon, as we have said. And so it was, according to what we may consider, for one of two causes, or for both of them together.

The one cause is to make the alternation [of action] among the four seasonal periods [התקופות] that are renewed swiftly in a new lunar [reckoning] [בחדש הירחי]. And this is that, at the [first] quarter-point [שבמרובע], the eastern part will be illuminated swiftly, and there will be found in it [shadow] from the moon but little, except that the shadow is of small [extent]; whereas at the last quarter-point the western part will be illuminated, and there will be found in it the whole of this shadow apart from a little. And the illuminated [part] which appears [grows] swifter [in illumination] more than the little that there is in it, and this is at the first quarter-point; but at the third quarter-point of the moon, the illuminated [part] which appears [grows] less swift. And in this manner the first quarter-point

will alternate at the place of the third quarter-point. And [it is] by reason that the body [of the moon] acts upon what it acts [upon] here, at its midpoint, that it was illuminated. And this was [the case] because the strength of the planet's action, when there was [conferred upon it] a greater measure [of] illumination, was the more strengthened — as has already been explained, [namely] that this its swiftness has already been renewed by reason of this alternation of action in the four seasonal periods of the lunar [reckoning].

And the second cause is this: that because the moon guards the conjoining of the waters and prevents [their dispersion], and [because] it follows from the recognition [of this] that there would not be — were [this] not [so] — the conjoining

of the waters surrounding the whole globe of the earth, in order that these existents not be corrupted: behold, the cities [settled lands] are by nature in the sixth [part] of a moon that does not receive the [full] light; that is, [it is] of a measure such as to preserve this northern part, which is exposed [uncovered by water] from the earth. And this was the cause [for which] this shadow was great in the swift [eastern] part [at the time it sets near the earth].

Now as for what the milky circle [העגול החלבי, the Milky Way] is, and why it was found [to be]: behold, it has been likened [explained] that it is a thing in the body of the sphere of the fixed stars, [whose] nature is near to the nature of the moon, in that it receives the light from the sun — or it receives the sun's light and [the light of] the rest of the stars, just as the moon [does] — except that it receives this light [in] some weak [manner], such that there is not given to it light perceptible [to the senses] in what is here; and behold, what reaches from it acts in some manner upon what is here, and this is of the great [celestial] circles. And this is what Ibn Rushd already explained in his exposition concerning the *Book of the Meteorologica* [ספר האותות, the *Book of the Signs*] — that there is no thing [that] would be in the air below these stars, [for] if the matter were so, then there would have been found the alternation of vision in the [different] places [made] by the stars of the climes [as they] vary. And this [too] is a thing that cannot be, for if the matter were so, then there would be found, in these [different] places too, [a varying appearance] in this circle of the fixed stars [as it] varies, by reason of the alternation of vision in the climes — in that one observes it, at the times of its being [observed], by way of example, at the eastern horizon and at the western horizon. And this is of what does not arise [as a difficulty] for one who has given attention, in our words, to the measure of the alternation of vision concerning the moon.

And neither is this [established] by way of vision [observation], because there is not there any sight [of a] perfect appearance in it [in which] this conjunction which exists for it [is seen]. And accompanying [this] determination [is the saying] that the [explanation] which has reached me [allows] three matters [to be considered], if there should be a vision [observation] without a perfect appearance in this conjunction. And [as to] what is the cause of this dim conjunction, [namely] the weakness of the vision: [it is] according to what Ibn Rushd says — that the cause of the conjunction [as it appears] is the weakness of vision; as that the place is observed where, in this [place], there are very weak stars in vision [observation], whose apprehension too [is by reason of] their smallness, and the circles of the conjunction [join] their extremities in part, and there appears, with this, the form [התמונה], by reason of the stars being close to one another [in] their extremity.

Or it [may be] that the part [of the sphere] is thicker than the rest of the parts, and it receives the light of the stars which are upon it — there, on the side at which the moon receives the sun's light. Or it [may be] that there should be in this place gathered stars, very [numerous, whose] bodies are not perceived, and there appears [from them] a strength, by reason of the mingling [of their light]; and it occurs that there is seen [from them] something whose appearance [is] this conjunction, as Ibn Rushd says — for [it is] like a place [that] is seen [where] there are very weak stars whose apprehension too [is by reason of] their smallness — and there appears, with this, the form; and [he] supposes that this [explanation] is something known in itself [self-evident].

And let us say that, if this were the cause of this [conjunction], [namely] the weakness of vision, this impression would be the more strongly [seen] by that which is from the better [conditions] of vision; yet it would not have appeared to all people in one [and the same] matter — and this is something that cannot be. But [rather] there is found, to [those of] weak vision, that they do not see this [conjunction in] vision. And further, [as for] weakness of vision, indeed it would be the cause that there should be for it

the conjunction [as it is] when there is some sickness in the eye, in such manner that there should be there water, or air, or thick [matter] — as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] mentions; but in the matter [pertaining to] the healthy [eye], this would not occur. And further, if the matter be so — as I am amazed how this accident occurred — [then] in all this [matter] of this part of the sphere, behold these small stars were found [arranged] by [way of] conjunction in the manner that this [appearance] is seen, [these being] the small stars [found] in every place

[of it] by [way of] conjunction; and what is this accident in this part of the sphere, [that] it is a circle of the great circles? And this doubt indeed occurs, if we suppose that this [the] sign [appearance] [is] according to the third matter that Ibn Rushd mentioned.

But as for [the matter being such] that the matter should be according to the second matter that Ibn Rushd mentioned, [it] is possible by the manner we mentioned. And this is what we laid down: that this part of the sphere receives the light of the stars which are upon it, [which] is a saying not [in any way] impossible. And this is that, if the matter were so, it ought the more to receive the sun's light. And this is what we [have established], [namely] that we do not [hold] otherwise — that the moon alone receives the sun's light, and does not receive light from any other than the stars. For if it were receiving light from any other than the stars, the swift part would be illuminated at times [when] it is not facing the sun — and this is a thing that cannot be. And behold, we [have established] that this part of the sphere receives the sun's light, and is not [at a] distance [so] far that it should receive, together with this, the light of the rest of the stars.

Now behold, the benefit in it is that there should already be in it a part [of light] from it [the sun] perpetually upon the horizon, and [that] there reach [an action] which acts here [in] the place where, at the time at which [it acts], it was not possible for these stars to have heat in that place; and [this is] for the reason that it is from [those things] of which it is necessary that they should be of the great [celestial] circles, in order that its action reach [in]to all the parts of the earth — just as the matter [is] with the planets that travel in great circles, or near to this, as we mentioned earlier.

— And here are completed the causes, in all that we have measured of what is to be investigated concerning the cause of the planets [stars], in the most perfect manner possible for us. May He be blessed and exalted, the God who set us straight unto the right [path] in all [things]; for blessing and praise.

[Center, beneath the text, set off by a rule:] And [thus] was the completion of this Part [reckoned] by the number, on the twenty-fifth day of the month of Kislev of the year five thousand and eighty-nine [תשע ושמונים לפרט האלף הששי = nine (תשע 9 =) and eighty (80 = ושמונים) = 89, of the sixth millennium (5000 = האלף הששי) → AM 5089; 5089 − 3761 ≈ 1328, Kislev → December 1328 CE].

חלק שלישי [Part Three]

In the name of [Him who is] blessed, and concerning the movers of the heavenly bodies [ובמניעי הגרמים השמימיים].

Chapter One: in which is recounted the opinions of the predecessors concerning the matter of the Agent [הפועל], what is its essence — [the Agent] of these lower things. — Chapter Two: in which is recounted what the manners of demonstration are, by which to know which of these opinions is the true opinion. — Chapter Three: an investigation, [to determine] from which of these proofs [is generated] the obligation that obligates them, and which of them [is] true; and which from among them is more obligated than [that] which would obligate it [as] a true obligation. — Chapter Four: an investigation, [conducting] in this [chapter] the inquiry according to the truth of itself. — Chapter Five: in which it will be explained that the Agent of the existents here is, in general, a single Agent in respect of which they [the existents] are one. — Chapter Six: in which it will be explained that the heavenly bodies are ensouled [possessing soul]

in respect of conception [הציור] and desire [התשוקה], and that they are not [ensouled] with a hylic soul, as Ibn Sina [אבן סינא] saw [held], according to what is recounted of him. — Chapter Seven: in which it will be explained whether the separate intellects apprehend their causes and their effects, and how. — Chapter Eight: in which it will be explained that the movers of the heavenly bodies are causes [of motion, but] are not causes of some of these lower existents apart from what flows [emanates] from them and apart from the temperaments [התמזגות] that issue from their stars upon them, in part. — Chapter Nine: in which it will be explained that the movers of the heavenly bodies do not apprehend the laws [נימוס] of the lower existents apart from what flows from them, and apart from the temperaments that issue from their stars upon them, [together] with their stars, in part. — Chapter Ten: in which it will be explained that there is no [proper] relation between the periods of the motion of the stars, in part, [and] some [of the things] that are not rational [inanimate]. — Chapter Eleven: in which it will be explained that the Name, blessed be He, does not move the sphere of the fixed stars in the manner that [some] men have supposed. — Chapter Twelve: in which it will be explained in what respect it is fitting that the Name, blessed be He, be characterized, and how the movers which emanate from Him [relate], according to what is possible for us. — Chapter Thirteen: in which it will be explained in what respect He is the Intellect which is the Agent that acts upon

[brings] the lower things into being. — Chapter Fourteen: in which it will be explained the gradation of this Treatise [in respect] of the sciences [מן החכמות].

פרק ראשון [Chapter One]

In which is recounted the opinions of the predecessors concerning the matter of the Agent — what is its essence — of these lower things.

Inasmuch as our investigation in this [Part] was [into] the matter of the place [origin] of the separate existent [הנמצא הנבדל] — whether it exists, and what it is, according to what is possible for us — and inasmuch as in this investigation [there are] two sides [aspects] to be explained: the one side is [taken] from the aspect of the existence of ensouled beings [בעלי נפש] here, as is explained in the *Book on Animals* [ספר בעלי חיים], according to what the commentators [המפרשים] have all understood — apart from Ibn Rushd, according to what appears from his words in his exposition concerning the *Metaphysics* [למה שאחר הטבע]; and the second side is [taken] from the aspect of what is to be found [concerning] the matter of the motion belonging to the heavenly bodies, as is explained in the *Book of the Physics* [בספר השמע] and in the *Metaphysics* [ובמה שאחר הטבע].

And it has been explained that our knowledge concerning these existing ensouled beings which [are] here is, in this [respect], stronger [more cogent] than the knowledge [we have] concerning the heavenly bodies, by reason of the [great] magnitude of their distance from us in substance and in place. Behold, it is fitting that we set the beginning of this investigation [into] the existence [of the separate Agent] from the ensouled beings which [are] here — whether it [the existence of a separate Agent] is obligated from this, as Ibn Rushd sees [holds], and whether there is obligated from this coming-into-being that there should be there a separate Agent. And behold, we shall investigate by what manner this [conclusion] may reach us from it —

[and how], with [our seeing to it] that we set ourselves straight unto the knowledge concerning the essence of the separate [existent] which is distinguished in this character [respect], behold, we shall set ourselves straight to take a stand [arrive] at [knowledge of] the essence of the rest of the separate [existents], as will be explained in our words. And inasmuch as the error in this investigation removes [drives] a man far [away] from the truth, to the utmost remoteness — by reason of his [misplaced] confidence in his success [obtained] in the speculative and the political [civic] sciences [המדעיות והמדינית], as will be explained for the one who gives attention to it in this Book — behold, it is fitting that we set apart this investigation in [a manner] such that there should not

remain in it [any] doubt. And for this [reason] it is fitting that we recount, at the start, the opinions of the predecessors who were fitting [worthy] that we should give attention to their words in this investigation, and [recount] what their opinions stood upon in respect of these opinions, [namely those] of [the predecessors] who held opinions among the masters of speculation [בעלי העיון] — for in this manner there will be for us, by these [opinions], help to find the truth in this investigation, in a manner such that there should not remain for us in it [any] doubt.

And let us say that there appears [to us] that the essence [המהוה, that which brings into being] of all these existents

the lower [existents] is the intellect; and from it [these lower things] are arranged so that there comes-to-be from them what comes-to-be in this respect. This has been explained by Ibn Rushd's followers in their commentary on the [seventh] book [of the *Metaphysica*?], and Ibn Rushd reports that Themistius [שהתמסטיוס/Themistius] would not maintain it [solely in this way]; yet it would appear that this [holds] equally for the rest of the comings-to-be, [namely] coming-to-be of the ensouled beings [בעלי נפש].

This is what he said — that the soul [הנפש] is that in which all the [things] are intelligible alone[?]; he means to say that all the intelligibles and the forms [הצורות] potentially [present] in the matters and in the bodies [are in it]. Now Ibn Rushd investigated this, according to what Ibn Rushd reports in his commentary on the [book of] *Metaphysica* [שאחר הטבע, lit. "what is after nature/physics"]. And it would appear that this is so not in the coming-to-be of the ensouled beings alone, but rather in the coming-to-be that is here [in the sublunar world], according to what was said in the [book of *Metaphysica*]: that the soul [הנפש] is not that in which all the forms — the intelligibles and the perceptibles — [reside], but rather it is that in which there is grace[?] of all… And Ibn Rushd also investigated this; [he held] that the heavens [הכבים, *recte:* הכוכבים?]/[the stars], that this [active mover] which brings-into-being [המהוה] is [the one] that Ibn Rushd investigated in his exposition of the *De Animalibus* [ספר בעלי חיים], and in his commentary [he held] that this was Ibn Sīnā's [אבן סינא] view in this matter, according to what is said in the [book of] *Metaphysica*, and in his commentary on the [book of *Metaphysica*]. Now al-Fārābī [אבינצר/Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī] was in doubt about this — a doubt [against] Ibn Rushd; except that we have found that al-Fārābī [אבונצר/Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī; the spellings אבינצר/אבונצר are compositor variants of one name[?]]…

[The argument continues:] …named upon him the intellect [השכל] — that it [the intellect] is the agent which agrees that the intellect [is operative] in these existents. And this is evident: for behold, all these [thinkers] agree that the active mover [שהפועל] acts upon them, whether [it acts] in itself, or whether by means of [some intermediary], in bringing-into-being [המהוה], as appears from the words of Themistius [המסטיוס/Themistius].

According to what we have found from what some have argued in order to nullify the separate [intellect] [הנבדל]: [namely] that the form gives [יהן, *recte:* יתן] coming-to-be at the end [of the process]; for to receive the form is not something attributed to them; and we do not know whether Ibn Rushd found this to be their view, for there is among us none of these statements of the philosophers — for we have found among us little [of it]. And yet, with respect to Ibn Rushd, we have found [it] in the *De Animalibus* [ספר הנפש / *De Anima*?], and there [is] the heavens[?] that cleave [שדבקו]…

and the lower [things], it is the cleaving [דבקות] that is not in their own essences[?], [but rather] the active intellect [השכל הפועל] when there comes-to-be from them what comes-to-be in this near [respect] — as is the matter with the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים]: a near form to the bodies that are moved [המתנועעים] by them, [as he explained] in the *De Animalibus* [ספר בעלי חיים] in his exposition. And there [he held] that it is not an intellect, but rather it is the soul-power [כח נפשיי] that…

the soul-power is separate [נבדל]. And he said that just as [the heavens are moved by] the separate [mover] without the [first] mover [המניע] who is [logically] prior to this by nature — for just as[?]… and the matter is not found to be the reverse, that is, when [the matter is disposed]…

[the soul-power] flows by means of the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים], the soul-power being in the seed [בזרע]. And it would appear that Ibn Rushd intends by this that the soul-power [הכח הנפשיי] is the active intellect [השכל הפועל]; and it will be explained by this that this separate power [הכח הנבדל] is the soul-power [הכח הנפשיי], in the discourse in which it brings-into-being [המהוה], because [of] this power.

It will be explained in this [matter] that it is impossible for the active intellect [השכל הפועל] to be the first cause [הסבה הראשונה] of all the existents [הנמצאות]: for if it [the intellect] had not prepared the matter [החמר] of the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים] (as was said of the intellect), [then] he means to say that there is not in the intellect [the power to be] the first cause of all the existents, because it

[the intellect] would need to begin from another [principle] more prior than [itself]. We have found this for Ibn Rushd in the seventh book [מאמר השביעי] of the [*Metaphysica*]…

[The argument concludes:] …who agree there that this power that brings-into-being [הכח המהוה] is the [agent of] the seed [הזרע] and of the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים], and that they are not an intellect [שאינו שכל]. For the hylic form [הצורה ההיולאנית, the material/potential form] — and behold, it does not enter into these comings-to-be alone, [as in the coming-to-be] of man — for the intellective powers [הכחות השכליות] are not mixed with the hyle [ההיולי, prime matter], [unlike that] which is not separate, mixed with the hyle. And he also mentioned this [point], that it would not be necessary to posit here a separate form [צורה נבדלה] [for the coming-to-be] of man alone.

פרק שני [Chapter Two]

Subhead (smaller type): [Concerning what there is among the modes of demonstration / the views [held] by those who hold those views.] [נזכור בו מה שיש מאופני ההראות, לדעת דעת מאותם הדעות]

Now after we have already recalled the view of the predecessors among the philosophers who expound the words of [concerning] coming-to-be [ההויה], it is fitting that we recall what there is among the modes of demonstration [מאופני ההראות] — [to test] the views among these views, according to what we have found in their statements or in the force of their statements.

Let us state what Themistius [התמסטיוס/Themistius] and his followers held among the expounders — among them, [there is one view] which already appears to hold that there is no power in the hylic form [הצורה ההיולאנית]: that what comes-to-be is the hylic form, [and] that some of them are [brought about] by some, and some of them are acted upon by some of their own essences [העצמיות] — as if to say that what is said has already been completed in part, or [as if] it changes or dries[?]; but not… in itself, and all the more so the soul [הנפש]; and this, [in the case of] that which is not [a soul]… as it appears that the heat [החום] produces [the effect], as… But also in the rest of the essential forms [הצורות העצמיות] that come-to-be… It is illustrated by fire [האש]: for when fire acts as fire [does], by its essential [power] which is in it — namely the lightnesses [הקלות]/[its lightness] — by that same [power]…

[examining] what we have found from their statements or from the force of their statements. Themistius and those who hold his way among the expounders —

among them [there is one view], which already appears [to hold] that there is no power in the hylic form, and this [is the view] that bodies [הגשמים] indeed act, some of them upon some, by their qualities [באיכויותיהם], not by their [substantial] forms [צורותיהם]; [so that] some of them heat some, or some of them cool[?] some — but [substantial] form is not found in the essential form [הצורה העצמית] that is acted-upon [שהתפעל]. This [view holds] that it does not appear that the soul [הנפש] produces a soul [נפש], [just as] it does not appear that heat [חום] [produces] its like; nor does this appear of the soul [בנפש] alone. The essential forms of the existents [הנמצאות] [belonging] to these lower things [הדברים השפלים] — [namely that] fire [produces] its like as a body — already [show that] form does not act in the form…

by natural [properties], for there is no power in fire other than this [namely] the bringing-about of the form of fire [צורת האש] — by way of example, the burnt body [הגשם הנשרף]. The mode would be one of two ways: the [first] way [הוא] is that the burning [נמשך] is consequent upon the bringing-about of the [primary] heat [[החום הא[שיי] in the bringing-about of the forms [חדוש הצורות], and this is laughable[?] [מגונה]/[disgraceful]. Together with [the fact] that it would already be necessary that there be the form that comes-to-be anew [מתחדשת], full[?] of form — and this is false [שקר]; for already the thing would emerge from the power [מהכח] to the active [mover] which brings-into-being [המהוה]. And the second way is that there would be the form that comes-to-be anew [הצורה המתחדשת]; and this form is required[?] of the hylic [forms] [ההיולאניות] — there will not be found in them [a power] like this; this [is] the objection against the expounders [המפרשים], according to what Ibn Rushd recalls in the *De Animalibus* [בעלי חיים] and in [various] places in his commentary on the [book of] *Metaphysica* [מה שאחר הטבע]. This [point] he already considered[?], and it would appear from some of the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות]…

[The argument develops:] …the hylic [forms] will not be found in them like this [power]; this [is] the objection against the expounders, according to what Ibn Rushd recalls in the *De Animalibus* and in [various] places in his commentary on [the book of *Metaphysica*]. And in this [book] the discourse[?] should be examined[?]: that the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] that come-to-be anew in the hyle [בהיולי] — this is [the case] that the nutrition [הנזון]/[the nourished] returns [ישוב] the nourishment [המזון] to the very essence of the nourished [הנזון], and [thereby] acquires for itself the forms similar to the parts [המתדמי החלקים] in it — as if it were said that what returns[?] the nourishment [the nourished thing] [comprises] the constituents[?] that resemble the parts in it — as if it were said that fire [האש] brings-into-being [the thing] like itself [in] the essential form

[בצורה העצמית], that which belongs to fire — that is, the heat [החום] — not the lightnesses [הקלות], although their existences [מציאותם] follow upon the primary qualities [לאיכויות הראשונות].

[The objection continues:] As for fire [the discourse turns] to what is said: this [shows] that the form [in fire] is acted-upon… from it [come] the actions of the thing[?]. And behold, the lightnesses [הקלות] are not… and this [holds] when there is, in addition to its [proper] place [מקומו], the natural [motion] [הטבעי]: for the motion [התנועה] does not belong to fire [לאש] except by accident [במקרה] — for the rest is natural to the [elements]/foundations [ליסודות], [and] the motion was not [present in them]… in their place; but the heat [החום] — its [the fire's] constituents [יסודרו] were [arranged] from it…; and for this it would be fitting that there be the heat [החום]…

its own [proper] form [the heat]. And when this was so, behold the rest of the actions[?]: in the burnt body [הגשם הנשרף] from another fire [מאש אחרת] like it, [the thing] is rendered obligatory; the [first] way is that there would be the bringing-about of the form of fire [צורת האש], the primary heat [החום האשיי] in it — just as the accidents [המקרים] continue[?]; together with [the fact] that it would already be necessary, from this, that there be the form [הצורה]…[that is] false [שקר]; for it has already been explained, in the statements that comprehend [the matter], that the active [mover] possesses [בפועל] a thing of that genus [מהסוג ההוא]: that what would be here [as] a form is that which brings-into-being [המהוה] — and this form is necessarily separate [נבדלה], for the forms [הצורות]… [are not] like this active [mover] [הפועל]. Behold, thus we have found that Ibn Rushd recalls them in his exposition of the *De Animalibus* [ספר בעלי חיים], [and] of what is in the *De Animalibus* [שאחר הטבע, *Metaphysica*?]…

[Lower argument:] …the hylic forms [ההיולאניות] that come-to-be anew in the hyle [בהיולי]; and this is [the case] that the nourishment[?] acquires for itself the forms similar to the parts, [namely] that the nourishment [המזון] [becomes] flesh [בשר] as fitting [כבשר], and so [too] the matter in the rest [of what] is said of it. And further: we have found that the essential form [העצמית] in it — this [shows] that the essential form [is] the lightnesses [הקלות]; but the lightnesses are [derived] from the qualities, the secondary [qualities] following the primary [ones]. It has already been explained that the lightnesses are not a form, in [the respect] that they are the form that their constituents [יסודרו] [confer]; the lightnesses are not constituted [from a] action [from it] except by accident [במקרה]; and the natural place [המקום הטבעי] toward which [the element] moves [is moved] to its [proper] place — and this [is] by accident [במקרה], as is explained in the *Physica* [ספר

השמע]. For there is not [present] the motion [התנועה], and for this reason there would not be [present] in them the motion [from] it [namely] the actions of fire; [the heat] would be in its place or in [a place] other [than its own] — [and yet] the heat is the form [צורת] of fire. And further:…

[and yet] there are found in it [fire] actions in the respect of [the place] toward which it moves[?] [שילך ממנו], by way of the form [מהלך הצורה] — and this is the intellective power [כח השכלי]. In that the matter is so, it is [now] explained that there is already… something; behold, this is evident: that if there were [present] only the lightnesses [הקלות] — for [then] fire would already be compounded [מורכב] — [and] prior to it [logically] the heat [החום] would have its form. And this is… that the lightnesses [הקלות] are not a form for fire, but the heat [החום] [is]. But what is said in the book of the [Metaphysical] discourses [ספר המאמרות, *Categories*?/*Metaphysics*?] is said according to what is well-known [המפורסם], not according to the truth [האמת] in their own [essences]; and in this mode there would [merely] be constituents[?] [יסודות]/[elements].

[The proof that the predecessors require a separate form:] …that which the predecessors argued — [namely] that there must be, in [the coming-to-be of] the forms in these comings-to-be [a separate agent] — among them[?]: for[?]… from the active [mover] in that genus, that of [the] thing[?] in this respect, [things] are generated from the seed [מהזרע] in which there is not here [present] the hylic form [צורה היולאנית]…

…it [the actions found in fire are] in the respect of [the place] toward which it moves[?], by way of the form, and this is the intellective power [כח השכלי]. Behold, the constituents [יסודרו] of the heat [are] from [it]… which [are] in fire [as] actions: if the heat were [present] in fire by the gradation of the hyle [מדרגת ההיולי] toward… compounded [מורכב], not simply, [then] there would be found there another body [גשם אחר]… form, and this is the explained-nullification [הבטול]. And this is explained… but the heat [החום] — and this is the reverse [הפך] of what they posited [for] it. The [Metaphysical] discourses [המאמרות] [say] that the substance [שהעצם] has no opposite [אין לו הפך]; this [is the case]… according to the truth [האמת], for the elements/foundations [היסודות] are the opposites [הפכיים] in the respect [of] constituents/elements [יסודות]. And from this [proceeds] the side [הצד] [that is] nullified [הבטל], and this [is] the argument [הטענה]:

[The core thesis of ch. 2:] [The argument is] that there would be here [present] a separate existent [נמצא נבדל] which gives [the form] to them — for inasmuch as that which emerges from potency [בכח] to the active [actuality] [אל הפעל] [does so] in some respect, and it is explained, from [the case of] the things that are not

the hylic [forms] [הבלתי היולאנית], in actuality [בפעל] — [these] agree[?] [in pointing] to a thing that brings-into-being [המתהוה]:

Behold, it is required here that there be a separate form [צורה נבדלה]. And this has already been explained — this [holds] also for [things] generated from the seed [מהזרע]; and indeed it [the form] is in it [the seed] in potency [בכח]; and whatever is in [a thing] in potency, for this it is required that there be here a separate form. And this argument was recalled by Themistius [תמסטיוס/Themistius] in the mode that has been learned [transmitted], and Ibn Rushd recalled [it] more fully [בשלמות] in [various] places of the [*Metaphysica*]. — And among them [the arguments]: [the argument] which is [thus] explained — that it is impossible… that there be here relations [יחסים] and forms [צורות] that have already been placed [in things], together with [the fact] that they find the matter [החמר] [to be a] suitable[?] [הנאות]. And this [pertains to coming-to-be of] man [האדם]: behold, the father [האב] possesses no craft [אומנות] in [the] composing of him [his child], [and the act] would be more fitting [to be done] in another matter than our matter [more pertinent to us]; and indeed [each one] is placed by [the] nature of each one of the substances [העצמים] — from the heat [of] the father [האב] — but from the [warm] heat[?] [היחס] and the body [הגשם] there is not for it…

[Concluding the section on page 224:] …[that which is] generated [is generated] from the seed [מהזרע], [in] that there is no hylic form [צורה היולאני] here; [the form] is suited to them [the generated things], [namely] to their existence [הוייתם]. Behold, [the form] is that which brings-into-being [הפועלה] this coming-to-be [ההויה]. And it has already been explained… that there is no seed-bearer of soul in actuality [אין בורע (recte: זורע) נפש בפעל]; and indeed [the soul] is needed [צריך]… toward what is in potency [שבפעל]; and to this it [points] — that it is the [agent] bringing-into-being [המהוה] these comings-to-be. And this argument [was already explained] in their exposition of the [book of *Metaphysica*] in the mode that has been learned [transmitted], and [the matter] is expounded in [the book of] *Metaphysica* [מה שאחר הטבע]. — And [also] without [the assumption] that there would be in these things [present] in their nature what produces [in them] what these [forms] produce — that is, [in the case of] man [האדם]; and if [the offspring] were generated from man, behold…

This [argument shows] that it is impossible that there be in this matter… they would be in this matter on account of what is placed in the nature [of things]; and the forms [הצורות], [acting] not by a craft from the father [מן האב], indeed[?]…act in a body [בגשם] only toward its perfection [תכליתו] alone. And the body [הגשם] in

general — behold, this is the nature [הטבע]; and it [the nature] does not… intended toward it [the body]; for [if] it were not so, the [agent] without thought [בלתי חושב] would [act]… something that resembles [שיורה] [the fact] that they have already been acted-upon [נתפעמו, *recte:* נתפעלו]…

[Hierarchy of agents — the close of the section:] …among them [there is one] more honorable [נכבד] and higher in its rank [מדרגתו יותר עליונה]. It would appear that Plato [אפלטון] [held] that it [the form] comes-to-be anew from… [and that] Aristotle [ארסטו] [held] that it comes-to-be anew from the sun [מהשמש] and the heavens[?] [הג…]: [the agent] performs its action [פעולתה] [in a way] leading [מוליכה] toward the intended end [הכונה]; and it would already appear that some men [מאנשים] would be acted-upon [יתפעמו, *recte:* יתפעלו] toward a thing…

[Final lines, page 224, continuing past this opening:] …in a matter other [than ours] more pertinent to us [טוב מענינו]; and indeed the [forms] are placed by [the] nature of each one of the substances [העצמים] — from the heat [of] the father [האב]; but from the relation/warmth [היחס] and the body [הגשם] there is not for it… alone. — Yet nature [הטבע] indeed acts in a body [בגוף], though it does not understand [לא יבין]: it leads [יוליך] what they make [act] toward the intended end [אל הכונה]; [it acts] not [as] a thinking [thing] [חושב] [and] understanding [משכיל] in [the] actuality [בפעל] of what it does [מה שעשה]. And this… [it is] those relations [היחסים] belonging to that which is more generous[?] [נדיב] [and] higher [in rank] [יותר עליונה] — and it [namely] is the soul [הנפש] which is on the earth [בארץ], which… is consequent[?] upon the movers of the heavenly bodies [ממניעי הגרמים השמימיים]. And it would appear [that this is the soul] of the sun [השמש] and of the inclined sphere [הגלגל הנוטה]. And for this reason the soul [הנפש] would be [acting toward] the intended end [הכונה], although it does not understand the [intended] end [לא תבין הכונה] — just as [is the case] with… [the agent that acts] toward a thing: a thing [is] known [ידברו, *recte:* ידובר] of it [בו], and they prophesy[?] [וינבאו, *recte:* ינבא?] of it [in part]…

would be the case, yet they do not understand what they say. This, then, is the objection we have found raised by Themistius [תמסטיוס] in his commentary on the treatise designated by the letter *lamed* of the *Metaphysica* [מה שאחר הטבע].

Now, as for what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] held — according to what is found in his *Epitome of the Book of the Soul* and in his commentary on the *Book of Animals* — he in some manner agreed with Themistius and his school, namely that this coming-to-be [ההויה] ascends to the Intellect, which is what gives the forms. But as for what Ibn Rushd held in his commentary on the seventh treatise of the *Metaphysica* — that the form-giver [המהוה] is not separate [from matter] — this

has several aspects, according to what we find in the words of Ibn Rushd. Some of these aspects, on one reading, hold that it is impossible for the separate [intellect] to give the forms, neither through an intermediary nor without an intermediary. Others of them hold that it is impossible for the separate [intellect] to give the forms in the way the ancients understood it — that is, that the body gives the change of matter by reason of the qualities within it, while the separate agent gives the form.

Among these arguments: If the matter were as the ancients posited — that the separate [intellect] gives the form, while the body, the agent in the process of coming-to-be, gives the change of matter — then it would follow that the form has a coming-to-be in its own essence. This is evidently false, in light of what the Philosopher [הפלוסוף = Aristotle] established concerning the nature of coming-to-be; and it has likewise been demonstrated fully in our own discussion — in the fourth [book] of this work — that this [acquisition of form] is possible without [the form itself] coming-to-be.

And if someone should argue that this would be so [only] when the form comes-to-be not in its own essence, but rather acquires an attachment to matter — Ibn Rushd replies that, if this were the case, the form would not require a substrate except in the way that a body requires place. You would then find, for example, the form of the horse existing apart from [other] forms; and this is plainly absurd in the case of these material forms [הצורות ההיולאניות].

Moreover, if this were the case, then the form belonging to the thing that comes-to-be could not escape one of two alternatives: either it exists in that thing prior to the coming-to-be, or it is transferred into it from outside. The claim that it is transferred from outside is plainly absurd, since everything that moves is a body, and so it is impossible for a form to move in its own essence. And if we posit that it exists in [the thing] prior to its coming-to-be, then it is evident on slight reflection that it would follow that there exist together, in each one of these bodies here [below], all the forms for whose reception prime matter [החמר הראשון] is potentially disposed. There would then be present together in actuality, in each of the things here below — whether simple or composite — the form of fire and of water at once; and this is plainly absurd, I mean that opposites would be found together in a single subject. ✻ Furthermore, this claim is the view of Anaxagoras [אנבסגוריש [recte: אנכסגוריש] = Anaxagoras], who used to say that all things were commingled at the beginning in an unlimited mixture; whence it followed, for him, that every thing is in every thing — and the Philosopher [Aristotle] has already explained the absurdity inherent in that view.

This objection we have found in Ibn Rushd's commentary on the *Book of Animals*, and in [several] places in his exposition of the *Metaphysica*. And even where we did not find it

in this exact form, we have drawn it out from the force of his words, together with what we ourselves have brought to completion in this argument.

Among them [further arguments]: When we posit that a separate form brings into being that form [in matter], while the body brings into being the disposition of matter to receive it, then it follows that the form is something — for one cannot maintain that the form comes-to-be from the separate form by the latter's changing in its own essence so as to become a material form; rather, [the separate form] acts upon it. But when this coming-to-be is posited in the manner that Ibn Rushd posited, no absurdity results; for the coming-to-be belongs to the thing composed of matter and form, inasmuch as it is one coming-to-be in number, and it is indeed from a subject — namely the matter — from which this generated thing comes-to-be.

Among them: It is impossible for the separate form to act upon a form within matter, according to what Ibn Rushd said in his commentary on the *Book of Animals* — namely, that the action of the separate intellect is upon itself, not upon another, whereas the agent [of generation] acts upon what is other than itself. (Thus did Ibn Rushd record this argument in his commentary on the *Book of Animals*.) [As for the generation of ensouled beings: it acts through a bodily instrument, and what acts through an instrument resembles…] It seems his meaning here is that the separate intellect performs what it performs by itself, not through an instrument; whereas this form that brings ensouled beings into being acts through some instrument — namely the soul-heat [החום הנפשי] in seeds, or through whatever corresponds to it in things that are not born from seed. Or it may be that he means by this that the separate intellect's action is its very self — namely apprehension [ההשגה], since apprehension is the activity proper to it — whereas this [generating] form has its action [directed at] something other than itself, namely the material form that comes-to-be. That this form [the generating one] is something other than [its product] is evident, since it acts upon [the product] through a bodily instrument, the body being the recipient of it. The first interpretation is the one [given] in the treatise designated by the letter *lamed*, for there he stated that this view accords better with the apparent sense — according to what is found of this matter in his commentary on the *Metaphysica*, [namely] the first interpretation.

Among them: The claim that the material form is created from the separate form that corresponds to it — as Themistius [תמסטיוס] and many of the commentators hold — resembles the doctrine of the [separate] Forms that Plato [אפלטון] asserted; and Aristotle [ארסטו] has already explained the absurdity that follows from that doctrine in the *Metaphysica*.

Among them: If it were posited that the separate form gives the form after the matter has been changed and prepared to receive it, then a single act, one in number, would proceed from two agents — one giving the act, the other giving its completion. This is plainly absurd, for a single act, one in number, necessarily proceeds from a single agent, one in number. And if someone should say that perhaps the completion which the soul-form [הצורה הנפשיית] gives belongs to the ensouled beings — [namely] that which gives [matter] that which alters it is the temperamental form [הצורה המזגית], while the separate agent is responsible for its existence when the soul receives it — Ibn Rushd replies to him that the name [of form] is then applied to them [both] only by agreement [i.e. equivocally]. For were it possible for the temperamental form to have its existence when it is found in its own right, just as

it [exists] when received by the soul, the matter would be as [that objector supposes]. For the term "flesh" is predicated both of flesh in which there is no soul-power, and of flesh in which there is soul-power, by sheer homonymy. This being so, it is evident that the temperamental form does not come from one agent and the soul from another agent; for were the matter so, the temperamental form would not undergo [its proper] change when the soul undergoes change in the temperate compound [הנמזג].

Among them: If the matter were so, then the subject and its form would be two in number, since they would come-to-be through two separate processes of coming-to-be; and it is evident that whatever has more than one coming-to-be in number is more than one in number.

Among them: I do not grasp what necessity would compel one to posit that [the separate form] does not give that which prepared the matter to receive the form that attains it at the conclusion of the coming-to-be. For it is evident that when [an agent] prepares the matter it gives certain forms — namely, the forms that stand at the rank of the hyle [the substratum] relative to the form that is the completion of the coming-to-be — which are in essence forms belonging to the lowest of the things here [below]; and so nothing prevents [that same agent] from giving the [higher] forms [as well].

Furthermore, if the matter and the thing standing to it at the ranks of [intermediate] form were posited [as receiving their forms from the separate agent], these forms newly arising in the thing standing to it at the rank of hyle [would come from] whoever prepares [matter] from the separate agent — in which case the [several] other forms themselves would be coming-to-be from differing agents. And this is plainly absurd: as if you were to say that the vegetative soul [הנפש הצומחת] comes-to-be in plants from the separate agent, while it comes-to-be in animals from whoever prepares the matter to receive the sentient form [הצורה המרגשת]. Moreover, if the matter were so, then the form coming from whoever prepares the matter would be more honorable than the form coming from whoever gives the [higher] form. The illustration: that the vegetative soul in animals would be more honorable than the vegetative soul in a plant — just as the wall that is a part of the house is more honorable than the freestanding wall. This objection none of the ancients raised; rather, it belongs to what nullifies coming-to-be's being in the manner the ancients supposed, according to what Ibn Rushd understood from them — I mean, that the agent producing the completion of the coming-to-be is other than the agent producing the coming-to-be itself.

Among them: If the matter were so, then it would follow — on this supposition — that there would come-to-be here [below] many forms producing the one selfsame generated thing; and this is plainly absurd, for a single act in number must proceed from a single agent in number. As for how it can be shown that it is indeed [thus] supposed to follow that there would come-to-be here many forms producing the one selfsame generated thing — this is according to what I say: There are already found, in the one generated thing in number, many forms, some of them at the rank of completion relative to others; and it follows, on that supposition, that there would be there many forms producing these material forms, corresponding to them in some manner — for what is in potentiality is brought into actuality only by what is preparatory to it, which exists in actuality. And these producing forms must — it is supposed — be many; for the [several] other forms are completed by reason of the matter, since some of them are completions relative to others,

for [the matter] receives some of them by the mediation of others. ✻ But as for the forms that are pure of matter, it seems that this sort of succession cannot apply to them. This objection, too, none of the ancients raised; rather, it is among the things that may be raised as a difficulty against the view of one who says that there exists here a separate form which is what produces a form in the hyle — and for that reason we saw fit to record it in this place.

Among them: If there existed here a separate form bringing into being the material form that corresponds to it, then there would be no felicity [אושר] in this coming-to-be; for the separate forms exist by an existence more honorable than the existence they have in matter. This being so, what was the need that they be set in their matter? And how did they pass from the more perfect existence to the more deficient existence? And if someone should say that this was done only so that the [material] things might be more comely in [their] existence — then it would follow that the coming-to-be of these forms is for the sake of matter, and this is contrary to what Aristotle holds. Hence what follows from this — on [Ibn Rushd's] supposition — is that the coming-to-be of the material form is *not* from a separate form corresponding to it in some manner, as Themistius and the commentators who follow him posited.

And from this objection, too, it would appear that the coming-to-be of the material form is not from the separate form, as was demonstrated in this argument. For if the matter were so, I do not grasp in what manner this act would be ordered from it. For from the intelligible of a craft it is possible for there to come-to-be the artificial form arising from that craft, because [the intelligible] corresponds to that form: it is evident that from the intelligible of a chair there will not arise the form of an axe in the craft, but rather there will arise from the intelligible the form of the chair. By this it is shown that it is impossible for the separate form to bring forth a material form that does not correspond to it; for the separate [intellect] necessarily produces what it produces by means of conception [הציור] and apprehension [ההשגה].

פרק שלישי [Chapter Three]

In which we inquire which of these proofs entails what it was meant to entail with a true entailment, and which of them does not entail what it was meant to entail with a true entailment.

Now that we have set out the modes of demonstration for ascertaining which of these views [is correct], it is fitting that we inquire into these arguments — whether what they were meant to entail is entailed by them with a true entailment, or not.

We say: The first of the arguments we have mentioned in support of the view of Themistius [תמסטיוס] does not yield the truth in every respect — that is, unless one asserts in it no more than this measure. For it has already been found that a material form brings into being a material form like itself, as is evident from the matter of the elements [היסודות], as we explained when we recorded this

argument. The like of this is found, too, in the partial coming-to-be that occurs in nourishment [הנזון]: the illustration being that iron restores [renews] the nourishment by which it is nourished as iron; and so it is with the rest of the parts of nourishment. Hence it is evident that nothing prevents, on the part of…

this being so, the newly generated material form [הצורה ההיולאנית המתחדשת] agrees with the [pre-existing] material form. And one should likewise not say that there is no warrant for the claim that the material forms suffice for generating the [new] artificial forms — that is, one might say that, since the artificial forms are already more honorable than the elemental forms [היסודות], they resemble them [in being self-sufficient]; but this is not found in the case of the other forms. For in this matter, the [form] that newly arises does not arise as a form arises in nourishment [הנזון], but rather it is renewed [in something] like it. — And yet the second argument [הטענה השנייה], among the arguments we recorded, is what Themistius's [תמסטיוס] view derives [from the premise] that the separate agent [פועל נבדל] is what constitutes the quiddity of these generated things [ההוויה]. And this is because we cannot say of the things born [הנולדים] from a seed [מין] that this material form would come to be in them from the possessor of the seed [the parent], as we explained in the sixth chapter of the first treatise [מאמר הראשון], and as was further explained adequately in some manner. Granted, even so, it may be that the possessor of the seed is a heat suited to be an instrument for the coming-to-be — a heat fitting to be that.

And since the matter follows, in respect of what issues from the heat by the potency, [the heat being] in actuality the sort of [agent] of this kind in some respect — it then follows necessarily that there arises here a form to which this coming-to-be [ההוויה] is referred, [a form arising] if soul-potency [כח נפשיי] is emanated from it through the seed; from this the coming-to-be is completed. [And this holds] whether this separate form is acted upon in this coming-to-be without an intermediary [בזולת אמצעי], or whether the elemental heat [החום היסודי] is acted upon — that [heat] being the agent of the form that constitutes the quiddity, [the form] which is the instrument. And how could it be? It does not follow from this that the coming-to-be has two agents, the act of the one being the coming-to-be and the act of the other being its completion [תכליתה], as the commentators supposed, according to what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] argued in disputing them.

And yet, as for what Ibn Rushd said in refuting this argument — namely, that it does not become clear to me that this coming-to-be could possibly come about without a separate form [צורה נבדלת] — this is what he said. For in his exposition of [Aristotle's] treatise designated by the letter Lamed [Metaphysics Book Λ], to

dispel this second argument, [he held] this matter. For consider: Aristotle [ארסטו] held that the agreed-upon [המוסכם — the thing in its agreed-upon form] would come to be from the agreed-upon that is near to the agreed-upon, [and] there is no respect in which the agreed-upon acts upon itself, by its own essence and by its own form, to bring forth the agreed-upon form belonging to it. Rather, our meaning is that what brings forth the agreed-upon form is from the potency toward the actual, and it is not an agent [פועל] that restores the hyle [ההיולי] to the actual by means of something external, or a thing outside it. And the matter…

[that has no motion] is not fire; rather, it is [something] which we posit to be a fire potentially that is fire in actuality. And the matter of the relations and the forms found in the quiddities [the essential natures] of living things [בעלי חיים] is what brings forth the relations and the forms which are from the hyle [ההיולי] into actuality. And it follows necessarily that there comes to be in them, in some respect, that very matter which issues them from potency into actuality — not [coming to be] in them in every respect. Now, the potencies [הכחות] are what is in seeds [בזרעים], and they are what act upon living things [בעלי נפש] in actuality; and yet they are potencies in possessors of soul [בעלי נפש] potentially — as one might say of the potency in the builder, which is a potency [present] in the builder who builds a house [while there is yet] no house in actuality. And by this Aristotle [ארסטו] likened these potencies to the artisanal potencies [the potencies of a craft], and said in the *Book of Animals* [בספר בעלי חיים] that these potencies are divine, after [stating] that there would be in them a potency for the life of living things [לחת חיים], and they are similar to the potencies that are called instrumental [שכליים], in that they conduct [the things they govern] to their final end [התכלית].

And as for why these seeds act in this way by means of heat — and the heat, in the respect in which it is heat, does not act except by [the heat], or by dryness or hardness, [acting] not with figure [תמונה], and not [as] a form possessing soul [צורה בעל נפש] — Aristotle said in the *Book of Animals* that the heat which is the heat of living things is not fire, nor anything of fire, since the deprivation of it is what causes the cessation of [the life of] the living thing [the possessor of life], and [it is] not the quiddity [מהוה] belonging to it. And by this it is made clear that this heat is similar to the artisanal heat [the heat of a craft], [the heat] by which the craft, in its operations, is fitted to the [thing] acted upon by them. And this makes clear that, in all that the craft accomplishes by means of heat, the heat is, of necessity, [acting as] the possessor of a form [בעל צורה], the [form] in which the relation [היחס] and the proportion [והשיעור] are preserved. And this form is not a soul in actuality; rather, it is a soul potentially, and it is similar to [the soul] in a

craft. They do not say of it that it possesses soul. So this heat is the possessor of the form, [the form] which in the things born of seeds is brought forth by the possessor of the seeds and the sun [the parents and the celestial heat]. And on this Aristotle said that man-and-the-sun engender a man like himself; and the heat is brought forth in the earth by means of the heat of the sun mixed with the [native] heat of the rest of the stars [הכוכבים]. And by this, the sun and the rest of the stars are the beginning of life for every living thing whose life is by nature. And so the heat of the sun and the rest of the stars, brought forth in waters and in earth, is what constitutes the quiddity of the living things engendered by putrefaction [מהעפוש]. And in general, in everything in which there is [life] without a seed — as is the case here, where a soul is brought forth by the actual [potency of] the inclined sphere [הגלגל הנוטה] and the sun, as Themistius [תמסטיוס] recounts from it — all of this has already been explained in the *Book of Animals*.

Granted, this relation [of life] is referred to the sun, since it is the agent more manifestly [active] than the rest of the stars in this. So the heat-potencies engendered by the stars give birth to the species [מין], [each] according to its kind, from among the kinds of living things; and they are [as many] in number as are the species among living things. And the measure [השיעור] found in the heat of a man is, granted, on account of the measures of the stars' motion and the configurations of the stars — some near, some far. And this measure, [attained] through the touch of the divine intellectual artisanship [the divine craftsmanship], is similar in some respect to the one form belonging to the one master craft [המלאכה הראשית] beneath which the various [particular] crafts are subsumed. So [it is] just as it is fitting that one should consider that nature, when it acts toward the goal of the ordering [הסדור] without intermediary, is an intellect [משכיל] surveying [the field of] its actions…

more honorable than itself, this being what it calls "intellect" [שכל]. And the conclusion of the treatise is this: that Ibn Rushd [רשד] said that all the relations [היחסים] and the forms are found in the potency of the prime matter [החמר], and that they are in actuality through the first mover [המניע הראשון], existing in a respect proceeding from the [several] sides, just as [there exist] the modes of the existence of the thing made in actuality [by the soul of the maker]. So this is what Ibn Rushd said on this point.

And yet, in his exposition of the seventh treatise [chapter] of [Aristotle's *Metaphysics*], that which the [treatise] "After-the-Natural" [the Metaphysics — מה שאחר הטבע] derives, Ibn Rushd said, in dispelling this second argument — [namely] this matter. For when it becomes intelligible that the demonstration

[מופת] of Aristotle on this point [shows] that the material forms are what is born from the material forms, you should see that the seeds [הזרעים] give the forms born from the seeds, with the forms which the begetter [המוליד] gave to them. But the things that newly arise of themselves — behold, the celestial bodies [הגרמים השמימיים] are what gives those things [the measure of] what sustains the place of the seeds, and the potencies that arise in the seeds when they are born of seed. And all of these natural divine potencies will exist in their quiddities, as the artisanal craftsmen [האומנים המלאכותיים] are in their [own] makings. And on this Aristotle said in the *Book of Animals* [בספר בעלי חיים] that these potencies are similar to the intellect — meaning that they act [as] an actual act; and these are the potencies of which the intellect has likened them, in that they do not act in [mere] corporeal instruments [בכלי גשמי].

And in this matter these life-potencies are distinguished, [the potencies] which the physicians [הרופאים] call the natural depicting [forming] potencies in living things — [distinguished] in that they act [as] the practical intellect [השכל המעשי], because they act in limited instruments [בכלים המוגבלים] and in particular organs. Granted, the depicting potency does not act in a particular limb; and Galen [גלינוס] differed [over this], saying: I do not know whether this potency is the Creator [הבורא] or not. If not — [then] rather it does not act except by the heat, which acts as a seed [כזרע], not in the respect that it possesses a form [שיהוא צורה בו], as the soul is a form acting in the elemental heat [החום היסודי]; rather, it is held back, in some respect like that, [insofar as] the soul would be held back in the celestial bodies [הגרמים השמימיים]. And on this Aristotle [ארסטו] magnified this potency and referred it to the divine beginnings [ההתחלות האלהיות], not to natures. And granted, if this potency would be an intellect intellecting itself, then necessarily it would be separate [נבדל] — and behold, this matter is not the truth.

And the conclusion of the treatise is this: that Ibn Rushd [רשד] said that, if there be found here something that is not corporeal [שאינו גשם], then behold, it is not possible that the element [היסוד] should change, except by the mediation of another body that does not change; and these are the celestial bodies [הגרמים השמימיים]. And it would be false to say that the intelligibles [the separate perfections] are the separate intellects [השכלים הנבדלים], [as] a form distinct from the forms compounded in the hyle [ההיולי]. And granted, the matter reached Aristotle [ארסטו] by way of the assumption that everything distinct from the hyle [comes about] through the origination [בחדוש] of the intellectual potencies alone, since the intellectual perfections in him are not compounded with hyle [בלתי מעורבות להיולי] in some respect, [being] that which is not compounded in the hyle. So this is what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] said on this point, to dispel this argument by

which Themistius [תמסטיוס] argued, [in seeking] to affirm that there exists here a separate form [צורה נבדלת] which constitutes the quiddity in the manner agreed-upon for the thing whose quiddity is the [thing] newly arising [המתחוה].

And I say that what we have said does not entail that the material forms suffice for the coming-to-be of the material form; but rather it does entail…

that there exists here a separate form [צורה נבדלת] to which this coming-to-be [ההוויה] is referred, as Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] said. And it is the first mover [המניע הראשון], from which these forms are found in the manner of the existence of the thing made in actuality, [made] by the soul of the artisan [נפש האומן]. And in general, by this it is made clear that the measure [השיעור] in the heat of the seed [בזרע] — namely, the measure from which this wondrous formation [היצירה הנפלאה] arises, which is a thing the holders of [these] opinions [הדעות] are unable to apprehend of the wondrous wisdom [contained] in it, except a small portion [חלק קטן] — that the heat is the measure more fitting to be an instrument of the agent [פועל] that constitutes the quiddity [than to be the agent itself]; for the heat is the agent, and this is made clear in itself from the elemental heat [החום היסודי] which is in possessors of soul [בעלי הנפשות], that is, [the heat] which is the instrument of the soul in performing its operations, as is explained in the natural [sciences] [בטבעיות].

And likewise it is made clear, in [the matter of] the measure [השיעור] in the heat that performs in it the craft, that what makes it [act so] is that it is an instrument for the craft — not that it is the craft itself; and this is because the axe [הקרדום], for example, does not newly arise from the heat in the [making of the] craft, apart from the craft, [but rather it arises] as it were from the intelligible of the axe [ממושכל הקרדום] which is in the soul of the artisan [נפש האומן]. And were it possible that these would be [generated] as these ordered operations [are] from the measure of the heat, then there would be no need to introduce a soul into possessors of soul [בעלי נפש]; but rather the elemental heat [החום היסודי] would be the perfecting and completing form [הצורה המשלמת] found in plants and in living things — and this is plainly absurd [מבואר הבטול]. And in general, behold, the matter is made clear, as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] says, that the [thing which is] potentially in something is found again in actuality, [proceeding] from that which is in actuality, in the manner in which they agree, [namely] in the manner in which what brings them forth into actuality [brings them forth].

And yet, as for what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] objected — that the fire is already born from the motion [מהתנועה] — [the reply is] that he is not bound [to admit] that it should be possible for the thing to issue from the potency [מהכח], [arising] from

the agent without there being [an agent] other than the agent who issues it forth, [an agent] who has, in some manner, [a respect in which] the thing is the very [thing] living upon it. And this is because the motion acts — as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] says — by means of the weak heat which, in the matter, is heated by a more intense heat. And behold, that heat is the agent in this, not the motion. But it is, without doubt, [acting] by reason of the fact that the actual brings the parts of the thing to its extremity [אל קצת], as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] said in [his treatise] permitting this doubt in the natural [sciences] [בטבעיות]. And Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] has already clarified this matter in his exposition of the *Book of the Signs* [the *Meteorologica* — ספר האותות].

And the weak heat does not warm, [so as for] there to be a more intense heat — just as there would be from the weak [exhalations] of the sick who suffer in healthy lungs [בריאות שלם], as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] recounts in [the treatise] "After-the-Natural" [the Metaphysics — במה שאחר הטבע]. In this respect the matters are referred [to it]: the warm thing, the thing warming itself, by reason of what acts upon it — [namely] that in its [own] action they [the parts] settle as a heat potentially. And if it were the perfecting agent [פועל] in its completeness [בשלמותו], they would settle in their [proper] rank [במדרגתו], as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] recounts in the natural [sciences] [בטבעיות]; and by this [matter] this thing is found, [newly] arising from the agreed-upon [המסכמים — the pre-existing forms] in some manner.

And yet, as for what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] recounted of [Aristotle's] wisdom [מהחכמה] — that it [the form] is not transferred into the existing thing from without, [a quantity] descending upon it from outside — [he held] only this: that it does not become necessary that the thing should newly arise except from the agreed-upon [the pre-existing forms]; this is his reasoning [הטעאי — recte: הטענה?]. For [Aristotle's reasoning] is that the thing that newly arises, [arises] from [a cause] [whereby] there newly arises what newly arises in itself, by its own essence [בעצמו]; and from it [there newly arises] what newly arises by chance [במקרה]. And behold, it is possible that what would newly arise [arises] by chance [במקרה]…

[*p. 233*]

[what] is newly brought forth apart from the things agreed upon — not in what is newly brought forth in itself. The illustration is the house: it is newly brought forth in itself by the ordering that the intelligible has in the soul of the artisan, which agrees with it in some manner. But as for what comes to be in a house by chance [במקרה], it is not necessary that it agree with the things agreed upon. So

too is found, in the case of fire, that heatings do not all agree with one another — yet the heat itself, that is a thing drawn forth [drawn out as a degree]; and for this reason it is not necessary that the thing brought forth in it agree with the things agreed upon.

The same holds for the matter in the quantity in the coming-into-being [בכמות ההווה]. This is so because the quantity of the coming-into-being [הכמות ההווה] is found, newly brought forth, in one of two ways: either by reason of the quantity newly brought forth in the thing that receives the coming-into-being — by reason of the sponginess of the matter and the difficulties [of it], at the time of receiving the coming-into-being — if there be found for it the sustenance by which it should be newly brought forth, [reaching it] from the quantity by means of nourishment; or [the quantity] that is newly brought forth by reason of the sponginess of the matter and its difficulties is not newly brought forth in itself, but rather is drawn forth in consequence of what was brought forth in itself; and it is the figure of the crasis [הצורה המזוגה], and it is what is newly brought forth from the things agreed upon. And just as the matter [stands] with respect to heat — that heat is a thing drawn forth to them in accordance with the obstacles of the matter and its remoteness — so too there will be sponginess or difficulty.

Furthermore, [it follows] that the quantity that comes to be has its proper limit, by reason of the form it will receive. For there will not be found a form smaller than it that comes to be from a thing smaller than it, nor will there be found there a form greater than it that comes to be from a thing greater than it. This is clarified in the *Physics* [בטבעיות]. And from this the matter of this quantity is drawn forth, and for this reason nature does not begin in the coming-into-being unless there be found in the matter a measure in which it is possible to receive the coming-into-being in some manner.

And by the existence of the matter, behold, one may say that the form is what is newly brought forth from things agreed upon, and from it is drawn forth the matter of the quantity, inasmuch as it is possible that there come to be, in a subject that has a [given] form, some quantity according to the time.

[*p. 233 cont.*]

Likewise, the quantity that comes to be by reason of the nourishment [ההזנה] is something brought forth by chance [במקרה], for what comes to be there [comes to be] in itself; and it is the form of the flesh insofar as it comes in the flesh, and the form of the bone insofar as it comes in the bone — this is what is agreed upon. And furthermore, when it is said that the quantity that comes to be is from

things agreed upon, this is a matter clarified from what is clarified concerning the image [התמונה] that comes to be in [a work of] craft. For [the craftsman] makes what he makes from the image, in the measure of quantity fitting for what is done by means of that craft. The illustration is that he does not make the axe in any measure of time whatsoever, but rather makes it in some particular measure of time, in which the act of the axe is completed by him.

But as for what Ibn Rushd [רשד] mentioned concerning the matter of motion, it is also clarified that it is not necessary that there come to be a thing in itself, apart from things agreed upon. This is so because the motion, in the very way it is agreed upon, is composite [made] of potency and actuality [מורכבה מהכח והפעל]. Behold, all that comes to be from it is the act of the last species of act, which is the final end of the change [תכלית השנוי]; and according as the final end of the change is something agreed upon, behold, the whole change will be from things agreed upon, except that the thing that comes to be comes to be little by little. The same holds for the matter in the coming-into-being itself, since what comes to be from it [proceeds] from the figure of the crasis [מהצורה המזגיה], so that

[*p. 234*]

it is agreed upon, as before. And what comes to be from it [proceeds] from the universal form, by reason of the soul itself. And this generation [היצירה] is not bound to be agreed upon in every respect — rather, it would be from things agreed upon in some manner, as is the case in the things that come to be by [a work of] craft, where the image that comes to be in them is from the image, the intelligible, that is in the soul of the artisan.

And behold the matter of growth [הצמיחה] is just like the matter in this coming-into-being and this motion, in the way [explained]; and this is well clarified in itself, and it is greatly clarified by [the fact] that it was already among the things agreed upon.

As for the motion that does not come to be from it [as] a final end — as is the case in the motions of dances [המחולות] [proceeding] from song — behold, it too is likewise from things agreed upon in some manner, and it is the conception [הציור] belonging to those who move in the matter of the motion of that song. And according to the relation of swiftness and slowness, behold, the motion of those who move in the dance will be swift or slow — and this is well clarified in itself.

For this reason it is clarified that all these things that come to be are from things agreed upon in some manner, and this is a thing necessary in some manner, according to what the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] mentioned. It will be seen that Ibn

Rushd [רשד] also agreed that everything that comes to be is from things agreed upon in some manner. For this reason he likened this — that the formative power [הכח הנפשיי] which sows in the house [is] like the soul of the builder, which agrees with it in such a manner as the house agrees with what is done in the [work of] craft.

But we have undertaken to remove the doubt that there is in these things which Ibn Rushd mentioned — in which one might suppose that there is in them the things newly brought forth apart from the agreed-upon ones — so that there not remain, in this premise, [any] doubt. That is to say, the premise stated in it, namely that all that issues from potency to actuality is newly brought forth from what is in actuality in that species: according to this premise, it is from what serves us to find the truth in many precious inquiries, as will be clarified for whoever looks into [these things] in natural philosophy and in theology [בטבעיות ובאלהיות].

And when we consider this, behold, it is to be said that there is not, in the coming-to-be of the things that have soul [בעלי נפש], in the measured heat [בחום המשוער] which reaches in [the work of] sowing — and in what is appropriate that there reach them from the heavenly bodies [מהגרמים השמיים] — anything that does not suffice for the coming-to-be that is newly brought forth in the [work of] craft, [the formation] which the image performs by the measured heat that acted in that [work of] craft. For the heat is an instrument [כלי] for the [work of] craft, and the [work of] craft is not in it.

[*p. 234 cont.*]

For this reason it is clarified that the begetters who sow [שבזורעים] have a formative power [כח נפשיי] from which the [work of] craft is brought into existence; the [works of] craft are themselves servants to the master craft [למלאכה הראשיית]. And it is already agreed upon in this [by] Ibn Rushd, as will be seen from his words. And concerning this he said that the measured heat reaches [only] from the divine intellectual sciences [מהאומנות האלהי השכלי], which are likened to one form belonging to the master craft, which has beneath it various [works of] craft — that is to say, that those [works of] craft are servants to the master craft.

And it is not fitting that one suppose, by his words, that the measured heat itself is what comes to be from it alone, but rather that the divine sciences are what come to be from it, [namely] the sowers, the relations [היחסים] and the forms that there are in them — and by these this act, which is for the sake of the final end of the

ordering [תכלית הסדור], is performed. And concerning this he said: "the relations [היחסים]"...

[*p. 235*]

and the forms are found in actuality in the first mover [במניע ראשון], in the aspect of those-that-are-arrayed [מהמצדדים], in the likeness of the existence done by the soul of the maker [הנפש העושה]. And this is clarified by [the fact] that Ibn Rushd agreed that this coming-into-being ascends up to a separate intellect [לשכל נבדל] — which is what those things that come to be are found by in actuality, in some aspect.

Rather, since it is already seen, by his words, that he thinks that this act will be the same — that the first mover acts, by means of him, what reaches from it by the measured heat — the formative natural power [כח נפשי טבעי] acts what it acts toward the final end of the ordering, while it is non-intellectual [בלתי משכיל]; and this is the soul which Aristotle [ארסטו] likened to a thing that is emanated [נאצלת] from the sun and the inclined sphere [מהשמש והגלגל הנוטה].

And behold the matter in it is just like the matter in the acts of the soul in the matter of growth and nourishment [הצמיחה וההזנה], which is for the final end of the ordering, without the nature being intellectual — [doing] what it acts upon. And just as that which acts in this particular coming-into-being is the formative hylic power [כח נפשי היולאני], so [too] the matter in this universal coming-into-being. That is to say, this would be by means of the formative hylic power, which sows, or [by] that to which it is likened.

But as for what Ibn Rushd said in his commentary on the seventh chapter [למאמר השביעי] — [that] nature, which they agreed equals the power that is in the sowers, is a separate one [נבדל] — concerning this he said that all of them have natural divine powers [כחות טבעיות אלהיות], like them in their quiddity, just as the [works of] craft of the artisans are in their makings. And he also said that these powers were likened to the intellect [לשכל], in that they act in a body what they act by way of the conception and the image [מהציור והתמונה]. And he also said that this very power does not act in a body except in the sowers' heat — not because it is a form in it, as the soul is a form in the elemental heat [בחום היסודי] — but rather it is restrained [נעצר] in it by [the same] likeness as the soul is restrained in the heavenly bodies [בגרמים השמימיים].

[*p. 235 cont.*]

All this [shows] that this power is the same as the separate power. For this is a property of the separate [thing], that what it acts it does not act by means of an instrument, and that it not be tightly bound to matter [בלתי דבק בחומר], as Ibn Rushd says about this power, the power that sows. Rather, what Ibn Rushd says in this chapter [is] that it would be that this power is the same quiddity as the separate [thing].

And behold he has brought us [to this]; and behold, he thinks that, because it acts what it acts by means of some instrument, this is a thing they said in the clarification — in their clarifying what nature is, in the chapter named by the letter lamed [באות הלמ"ד] [Metaphysics Book Lambda]. And behold, this is not without warrant [בלתי צודק], just as we clarified in the sixth chapter of the first treatise [בפרק הששי מהמאמר הראשון] of this book — namely that the separate [thing], inasmuch as it acts apart from itself, will necessarily [act] by some instrument in a certain way, and it is the instrument in which the matter is prepared to receive what is willed [לקבל רצונו].

And the upshot of the matter: behold, in what way and what it would be. Behold, it is clarified that Ibn Rushd agreed that this coming-into-being ascends necessarily to a separate power [אל כח נבדל], which is an intellect [הוא שכל], and that it agrees in the manner [described] toward what comes to be by this coming-into-being from the form; and this is so because the intellect is the first mover for it. [That he] did not undertake, in this chapter, to remove this ascent — but rather to nullify, by this, [the claim] that there be here separate forms [צורות נבדלות] equal to them in the aspect that Plato [אפלטון] held.

[*p. 236*]

And this aspect is partly [in agreement] with Themistius [תמסטיוס] concerning this matter. For Themistius indeed maintained, in order to establish the existence of the separate forms [הצורות הנבדלות], what Ibn Rushd maintained in order to remove [it] — and this is clarified [from] what Themistius said in his clarifying the chapter named by the [letter] lamed [Metaphysics Λ].

But [the question] whether this act, [proceeding] from what comes to be by the agency of the separate [thing], is a hylic form [צורה היולאנית] [coming] from a sower other than the elemental heat [החום היסודי] which is in it, or whether it would be from something other than [that] agency — this is a matter in which there is doubt and confusion. And behold, the inquiry into this [proceeds] from this. —

And behold, what appears from the words of Ibn Rushd in this [is] that he agreed that what is alike [in] quiddity, the separate, performs this by means of the hylic form [צורה היולאנית], which is the [act of] sowing. Indeed, Abu Bakr [אבוכבר] [Ibn Bājja / Avempace] is seen [to hold] that what performs this does so apart from this being an intermediary [בזולת זה אמצעי] — for this they agreed: that what acts toward the coming-into-being that is in the sowers is a power conjoined in the sowers [כח מסתבך בזרעים] — it is an intellect [הוא שכל], according to what Ibn Rushd recounted of him.

[*p. 236 cont.*]

But as for the third argument, [drawn] from the arguments we mentioned in order to establish the view of Themistius — that this coming-into-being [ascends] also to a separate agent which is an intellect [אל פועל נבדל הוא שכל] — this too is from what is fitting that this coming-into-being [proceed] from it. And to this reaches this generation [היצירה], in this manner, [a degree] of perfection such that the human views [הדעות האנושיות] are inadequate to apprehend from it [anything] but a small part.

For this [comes] without doubt: it would necessarily be transmitted, [as] an act, from one [thing] that apprehends the final end — except that this will be clarified [only] if [we say whether] this is transmitted from it apart from an intermediary, or by an intermediary. And this is so because there is [reason] to say that it is transmitted from it by means of a formative power [כח נפשי] that it emanates [ישפע] from it by sowing, and it leads toward the intention, apart from its intellecting this — as is the matter in the nourishing power [בכח הזן] and the [power of] growth [והצומח] — that it leads toward the intention, toward the final end, [doing] what is possible that this apprehend; and this, indeed, would be in [a way] that is transmitted to it from this in actuality, [proceeding] from the separate agent that resembles it.

And behold the matter in this [is] just like the matter in the things that are done by [a work of] craft, in which instruments are set, by which they lead toward the intention what it intellects. This, indeed, will be by reason of what is there, in those instruments, of preparation in them, for the artisan to do this act. The illustration of this: that there are found, by it, mills [רחיים], instruments that move them by the revolving [בסבוב] that we have set apart for it — and yet between this and the artisan in them are these instruments.

And it is clarified that it would not be necessary that there be, in the coming-into-being, [a coming-into-being made of] two agents — the one preparing the matter

to receive the form, and the other supplying the form — as Ibn Rushd mentioned in the foregoing [discussion]. It will be seen [in] the words of Themistius that he did not understand that this coming-into-being be in this manner, the manner Ibn Rushd understood it [to be], from those who interpret him.

And we shall say also that the arguments we mentioned, in order to establish the view of Ibn Rushd, do not require that this coming-into-being be transmitted [as] something ordered, by means of the intellect, [whether] from another power, or from something other than an intermediary. And this is what is said in the first argument, from the arguments we mentioned: it is clarified that this coming-into-being does not necessarily [ascend] to a separate agent [לפועל נבדל]. But as for that which is necessary, from it — this is what it is possible that there be, in the coming-into-being, one [thing made] of two agents: the one being the form, and the other acting the preparation of the matter to receive [it].

Milchamot HaShem — Book V (מאמר ה'), Part 3 (חלק ג'), Chapter 3 (פרק ג') — continued

But suppose we grant that every coming-into-being [ההויה] is ordered out of the separate agent [מהפועל הנבדל], whether through the mediation of the elemental heat [החום היסודי] that belongs to the thing coming-to-be, or through the mediation of the soul-potency [כח נפשיי] within it—just as it comes to be in the master craft [בעל המלאכה] through the mediation of the matter, whose disposition [ההכנה] makes it fit to receive the form. Even on this supposition, nothing of value falls away by reason of the [present] argument. And in just this way will the matter be clarified for those who consider these arguments—the second, the fifth, the sixth, and the seventh of these arguments—which we adduced to establish the view of Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד].

What necessarily follows from them is this: that it is possible there should be in a single coming-to-be [בהויה האחת] two agents—the one bringing the form into being, and the other acting to prepare [הכנת] the matter for the reception of the form—yet it does not necessarily follow from them that this coming-into-being should ascend to [its termination in] a separate agent [לפועל נבדל]. This is clear to whoever has considered these arguments.

Now as for what was said in the third argument among these arguments that we adduced to establish the view of Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד]—namely, that it is impossible for the [hylomorphic] form to be acted upon as a form in these

ensouled beings [בעלי נפש], since by that very form the quiddity [המהוה] of the ensouled being is what acts through some instrument [כלי], and this is the elemental heat that is the soul-potency [כח נפשיי] which is in the seeds [בזרעים]—or [in the case of] things that come to be without being born from a seed [שאינם נולדים מזרע], where their mode of operation is something clarified as separate [נבדל]—behold, this is clear: that, even granting this difference set out in the [present] discourse, it does not necessarily follow that this coming-into-being does not ascend to a separate agent [לפעל נבדל]. But as for what does necessarily follow—that the proximate agent [שהפועל הקרוב] of the coming-into-being is hylic [היולאני], since it is that which acts by means of an instrument [כלי]—it is nonetheless possible that this proximate agent [הפועל הקרוב] in the coming-into-being be generated [מחודש] from a separate agent [מפועל נבדל]. As Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] himself said in his explanation in the *Book of Animals* [ספר בעלי חיים]: I mean that the agent [שהפועל] for this soul-potency [הכח הנפשיי] in [things grown from] seeds [בזרעים] is something separate [נבדל], for it performs this its action without any instrument [בזולת כלי].

We have already, moreover, explained this in chapter six of the first treatise of this book [בפרק הששי מהמאמר הראשון מזה הספר]: that it does not necessarily follow that this be the hylic potency [הכח היולאני]. And this is because the separate agent [הפועל הנבדל] has two kinds of operation [שני מינים מהפעולות]: the one is that which is overseen by its own [providential] governance [השגחה], and the second is that which emanates [שיושפע] from it as a consequence of the operations or of the actions [that occur] in bodies [בגשמים]—[an emanation] in which it makes no difference whether [the operation reaches it] by way of some instrument or not, when this instrument is something whereby the matter is made ready to receive its form.

And this is so because the motion that is ordered [שהתסודר] from the movers of the heavenly bodies [ממניעי הגרמים השמימיים] is [an operation] of theirs by means of an instrument [כלי]—namely, the configuration [התמונה] which the heavenly bodies present to the bodies, [the configuration] by which it is impossible that there should be found in the bodies the motion that appears to them [the heavenly bodies] except through it. And likewise there is in this motion [the role of an] instrument [כלי] of [the] nature [הטבע] that belongs to the heavenly bodies —which are neither light nor heavy [שהם לא קלים ולא כבדים], as has been explained in the natural sciences [בטבעיות]; for were they light or heavy, it would have been impossible that this perpetual circular motion [התנועה הסבובית המתמדת] they have in common should be completed by them. And behold, these movers are separate [נבדלים], as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] explained and clarified

in this matter; and inasmuch as they are movers of the heavenly bodies [מניעים הגרמים השמימיים] by means of an instrument [כלי] in some manner, this matter too will [now] be explained from another side.

I mean that the separate agent [שהפועל הנבדל] does not act upon bodies [בגשמים] except through the mediation of an instrument [כלי]. This is because the things that the movers of the heavenly bodies caused to flow forth here are [accomplished] through the mediation of an instrument—namely, the star [הכוכב]. And since the matter is so, it is clear that, even granting [the agent acts] through an instrument in some manner, this instrument [כלי] is that which is in the matter, made ready to receive its will [its proper form].

Now as for what was said in the fourth argument among the arguments that we adduced to establish the view of Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד]—namely, that the discourse [המאמר] which holds that in coming-into-being [בהויה] there is a separate agent [נבדל] which is wholly the bestower of blends [מסכים] in some manner upon the hylic forms that come to be from it [המתחדשות ממנו]—this discourse resembles the discourse concerning the forms that Plato [אפלטון] posited, which is clearly false [בלתי צודק]. And this is clear from the nullifications [מהבטולים] to which those who posit the [Platonic] forms as existing are obliged, in the way Plato [אפלטון] posited them—from which not one of them is exempt according to this supposition. I mean: [it would follow] by way of [supposing] that the forms that come to be from the craft are found [pre-existing] in the soul of the craftsman [בנפש האומן]. We have already explained something of this, a little, with clarity, in chapter six of the first treatise of this book [בפרק הששי מהמאמר הראשון מזה הספר].

Moreover, what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] said—that the blends [הסכים] are what is ordered [שהסדור] [as] the intelligible in the soul of the first mover [המניע הראשון]—is the cause [הסבה] of the order [הסדור] of the sensed object [המוחש] in these things; and this is to say that every one of the relations [היחסים] and the forms is, in actuality [בפעל], in the first mover [במניע הראשון] in some respect on the side of these [things], just as in the likeness of the made-thing [בדמות העשוי] in actuality in the soul of the craftsman [בנפש העושה].

Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] has already acknowledged, decisively, this matter, in each one of the movers of the heavenly bodies [ממניעי הגרמים השמימיים], in his commentary on the discourse noted by the letter Lamed [המאמר הנרשם באות הלמ"ד] [Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Book Λ (Lambda)]. For there he said that the heavenly bodies [שהגרמים השמימיים] are moved according as their souls conceive [שישכילו מנפשם] the perfection [שלמותם] that is [attained] in motion [בתנועה], just as the moved thing [המתנועע] conceives [it], in order to preserve [לשמור] its being

[בריאתו] which lies in its [continued] being in motion [בריאתו היא בתנועה]. And further: that they conceive [שישכילו] that their motions [שתנועתם] are what bring forth into actuality [אל הפעל] whatever is in potentiality [מה שהוא בכח], in the manner [in which] the separate forms [הצורות הנבדלות] [bring it forth]—and these are the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות].

For [these] are of the likeness [מן הדומה] that these forms have two [modes of] existence—existence in actuality [מציאות בפעל], and hylic existence [מציאות היולאני], which is existence in potentiality [מציאות בכח]; and this is the existence belonging to them in the manner of the separate forms [הצורות הנבדלות]. I mean by "in potentiality" [בכח]: as when one says that the artificial forms [הצורות המלאכויות] have existence in actuality [מציאות בפעל] in the prime matter [בהיולי], and existence in potentiality [מציאות בכח]—that is, the existence belonging to them in the manner of the separate forms [הצורות הנבדלות].

And this is something that follows from [the fact] that these forms have two [modes of] existence: separate existence [מציאות נבדל], and hylic existence [מציאות בהיולי]; and the separate [existence] is the cause [סבה] of that which belongs [to them] in the prime matter [בהיולי]. And this is what they were occupied with [in] what those who speak of the [Platonic] forms call "the forms" [האומרים בו בצורות], in which they erred and fell short [ונפלו למטה ממנו]. End of his words.

Behold, this discourse has already clarified to the full the explanation that Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] holds: that coming-into-being [שההויה] ascends to a separate agent [פועל נבדל] in respect of all the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] in some manner—and this is the respect in which they are found in the artificial forms [הצורות המלאכותיות] in the soul of the craftsman [בנפש העושה]. And this supposition is the supposition that does not agree with the positing of those who speak of the [Platonic] forms [להנחת האומרים בצורות].

Now as for what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] said—that these forms are found in potentiality [בכח] in the separate forms [בצורות הנבדלות]—behold, my intention in this is not that these forms should not have existence in actuality [מציאות בפעל] in some respect in the separate forms [בצורות הנבדלות], [that respect] being the ordered intelligible [הסדור המושכל] that belongs to them. But the will [הרצון] in this is that they have no hylic existence [מציאות היולאני] except in potentiality [בכח]; for the hylic form [הצורה ההיולאנית], which touches upon the craft [מהמלאכה], is not found in the soul of the craftsman [בנפש האומן] except in potentiality [בכח]. And what is found from it in actuality [בפעל] in the soul of the craftsman is the ordered intelligible [הסדור המושכל] that belongs to it. This is exceedingly clear from the words of Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד].

Now as for what was said in the eighth argument: that if the hylic form [הצורה ההיולאנית], coming to be from a separate form [מהצורה הנבדלה], had a single coming-into-being from many agents [מפועלים רבים], then no [coming-to-be] would be completed in separate forms [בצורות נבדלות] that are united [מתאחדות]—just as this is completed in them when they are in the prime matter [בהיולי]—[behold,] it is [a difficulty arising from] the strength of the depth and the perplexity [העומק והמבוכה] of this matter, [yet] the contrary is so. For from the place from which the inquiry [החקירה] will be explained [it follows] that the matter in this is the reverse [בהפך]: my will is that the forms that are separate [שהצורות הנבדלות] are completed in them in a manner more perfect with respect to that which is completed in the hylic forms [בצורות ההיולאניות]; and this will be explained afterward, when we set forth what is necessary, namely that the intelligible [המושכל] of the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] is united [ההתאחדות].

This will be explained from what we shall say: namely, that the ordered intelligible [הסדור המושכל] in the soul of the craftsman [בנפש האומן]—[the soul] of the maker [המהדבר] who carries out the thing made in the craft [הנעשה במלאכה], in which the forms have their extremity [קצתם] [only] at a small degree of perfection [במדרגת השלמות]—is as the matter [stands] in the case of the form of the house [בצורת הבית] which is in the soul of the craftsman: that the figure [שהתמונה] of the stones and the bricks [האבנים והלבנים] is what proceeds in [its] degree from the prime matter [ההיולי], [up] toward the walls and the openings [doorways] [מהכותלים והפתחים]; and the form of the walls and the openings proceeds in [its] degree from the prime matter [ההיולי] toward the chambers [מצורת החדרים] and the rest of the parts of the house [שאר חלקי הבית]; and the form of the chambers and the courtyards [יהחצרות] and the rest of the parts of the house proceeds in [its] degree from the prime matter [ההיולי] toward the figure of the house in its entirety [מצורת הבית בכללו]. And according as the order [הסדור] is equal [in this], the soul of the craftsman [בנפש האומן] is necessarily separate [נבדל], as has been explained in the *Book of the Soul* [בספר הנפש]—for the one apprehending [המשיג] and the apprehended [והמושג] are one thing in number [דבר אחד במספר].

And if these forms were not united [בלתי מתאחדות] in the soul of the craftsman [בנפש האומן]—what wonder [תמה], then, can I [resolve] from any side as to how the builder [הבונה] makes [them]? [That is:] the extremity [קצה] of these forms [is] for the sake of [some] extremity [בעבור קצת]. Is it possible that I should make of it something I attain by means of what I attain, when [the thing] other than it has no apprehension in it [שתהיה לי השגה בו]? Behold, this discourse is a discourse of utter nullity [בתכלית הבטול]; for how could the linkage [ההתישר] toward the more

perfect be completed for me—the felicity [התצלית] [intelligibility] that I attain by it [שתשיג אותי]—and not [a felicity attainable] by something other than it, [something] whose apprehension [שיהיה לי השגה בו] would belong to me?

Behold, were this so, it would be by chance [במקרה]; and this is something that does not proceed from it [the soul] truly [מאדי], in the way that the matter [stands] in those things that come to be from the craft [מהמלאכה] or from nature [מהטבע]. And already it has been explained that this too: that the intelligibles [המושכלות] in respect of which the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] [is constituted] are many [רבים], and this together with [the requirement] that it be one in number [שיהיה אחד במספר]; and that which is its perfection [שהוא שלמות] toward each one of [the items] in number necessarily must be one in number [שיהיה אחד במספר], as we mentioned in the first treatise of this book [במאמר הראשון מזה הספר].

And further: that we find a man [נמצא האדם] who draws an analogy [שיקיש] between these intelligibles [המושכלות] and their extremity [קצת]. And if the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] were not one [אחד], this would not be possible; for I would not be able to draw an analogy [להקיש] between my knowledge and your knowledge, [each being] unknowable [הבלתי ידועה] to me. But it was possible [for there to be] in the intelligible [במושכלה] that they be united [שיתאחדו], [such] that they all be one in number [שיתאחדו], for they are all of them [items whose] extremity [קצתם] [is found] for the sake of extremity [בעבור קצת], and their extremity [is] a perfection toward [some] extremity [שלמות לקצת]; and the perfection [והשלמות], and that which is its perfection [for it], is by one [act of] knowing [לידיעה אחת], since they are correlatives [מצטרפים], and correlatives [מצטרפים] belong to a single [act of] knowing [לידיעה אחת].

This is something that follows from [the fact] that the union [ההתאחדות] is already completed in the acquired intellect [בשכל הנקנה], as the intelligible [כמושכל] of all the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] that belong to the matter—which [matter] is the life [חיי] [proper] to them. And if the matter were so, [then] together with the [intellect] gathered [העלם] from it from many of the things by which they set in place this ordered intelligible [הסדור המושכל] [as] united—as has been explained in the first treatise of this book [במאמר הראשון מזה הספר]—[it follows that] this union [ההתאחדות] of the coming-into-being [להויה] in the separate agent [בנפש הנבדל הפועל] does not necessarily follow [in such a way] that there should be completed from it some thing in respect of which the ordered intelligible [הסדור המושכל] is united; rather, this is the ordered

intelligible that belongs to them, as has been explained in the first [treatise] of this book [בראשון מזה הספר].

And in general, behold, it is clear that these forms—the intelligibles [המושכלות]—are united [מתאחדות] in the [acquired] intellect that apprehends them [בשכל המשיג אותם]. And this is because the order [סדור] of the existents [הנמצאות] is such that, from the side that [each] one is an effect [עלול] of another intellect [משכל אחר], behold it is an effect of another intellect; and that which would be an effect of it [עלול ממנו] in this wondrous manner [באופן הנפלא]—it does not apprehend [לא ישיג] what is an effect of it [עלול ממנו] from some side.

And it was the Philosopher [הפילוסוף] who found [established] that the blessed God [שהשם יתברך] knows all the intelligibles [כל המושכלות]—not that He conceives them [שהוא ישכילם] one after another [in succession], but that He conceives them [שהוא ישכילם] all together [יחד]; and behold, they conceive [ישכילו] them together [יחד] in respect of their being included in a single order [בכללם סדור אחד]. This is what he said in the discourse noted by the letter Lamed [במאמר הנרשם באות הלמ"ד] [*Metaphysics* Book Λ (Lambda)].

This is what he said in this discourse [במאמר], because the intention of the Philosopher [שהיתה כונת הפלוסוף] was to explain that the First Intellect [שהשכל הראשון] is one, simple [אחד פשוט], in every respect [בכל הפנים]: that the one apprehending [שהמשכיל], the apprehension [וההשגה], the intellect [והשכל], the intelligent [והמשכיל], and the intelligible [והמושכל] [reached] from it are one thing in number [דבר אחד במספר], and that there be no multiplicity [רבוי] in it from this side. And this is because anything that has no foundation [יסוד], behold there would be in it the apprehending [המשיג] and the apprehension [וההשגה] and the apprehended [והמושג], [each] another [thing] in number [אחד במספר].

But [as for] that which does have a foundation [יסוד], there would be in the apprehended [במושג] [a multiplicity] other than the apprehension [זולת ההשגה]; and all the more so [in] that which is other than the apprehending [זולת המשיג]. And the analogy [והמשל] is that the nature [שהטבע] which appears to sight [בנראה] is something other than the nature [זולת הטבע] which is in the seeing potency [בכח הרואה]—and this is the apprehension [וההשגה]; and all the more so [as] that which is other than the seeing potency [זולת הכח הרואה].

But [as for] that which has no foundation [יסוד], it is not possible that there should be in it the apprehended [המושג] [as] other than the apprehending [זולת המשיג] or other than the apprehension [זולת ההשגה] or other than the apprehended [זולת

המושג], as has been explained in the first treatise of this book [במאמר הראשון מזה הספר].

And when this explanation is completed for him—that there be in the blessed Name [בשם יתברך] no multiplicity [רבוי] in this respect [מזה הצד]—he took pains to explain that there is no [occasion], from the side of multiplicity [רבוי], for the intelligible substance [עצם המושכל] to be composite [מורכב]; and it would still remain to argue that, were the blessed intelligible [המושכל] composite [מורכב] in the blessed Name [לשם יתברך], as appears from the order [מהסדור] which the world [לעולם] is an effect of [העלול ממנו], behold, it would [then] be divisible [מתחלק]—as the matter [stands] in the parts of the whole [בחלקי הכל]. [That is,] one would wish to say that the intelligibles [שהמושכלות] would be many divisions [רבוי מתחלקות], as the matter [stands] in the parts of the whole that are many [שהיו רבים]; and there would be in them the whole [הכל] multiplied in some manner [מתרבה באופן מה]; and there would be, accordingly, a multiplicity [רבוי] in the very substance of the First Intellect [בעצם השכל הראשון]—and this is clearly false [מבואר הבטול].

Or we may say that the intelligible [המושכל], although it is one and indivisible, is nevertheless not subject to multiplicity in this respect — for everything that has no foundation [יסוד] is incapable of division, as is the case with the human intellect [השכל האנושי]. What I mean is that, granted His intelligibles are many in number, He is nonetheless one simple, indivisible thing — as we have already explained in what preceded in this chapter, and in the first treatise of this book.

By contrast, with regard to things composite from their parts, both their order and their rightness consist precisely in this: that the matter is divided in some particular way, [advancing] toward the perfect from the deficient; and along with this there was multiplicity in its parts in some particular way. So it is here too, since they have a foundation. But what is most excellent in this is that it should be something which is a whole, and itself a single thing. What I mean is that the most excellent thing is one that comprises the entire order and rightness which exists among existing things — and this is one thing in number, and this is God, may He be blessed.

Now this can indeed apply to a thing which has no foundation, inasmuch as it is one thing in number. And since it has already been explained that the intellect [השכל] which is intelligized [המושכל] from Him is one thing in number, it follows that, if the intellect should exist in His blessed name in this way, He would Himself comprise within Himself the order of all existing things at all times.

This is what we intended in this discussion, and it accords with what the Philosopher [the Philosopher = Aristotle] said — according to what the meaning of his words gives us to understand, and according to the truth in itself.

Ibn Rushd [Ibn Rushd / Averroes], however, expounded this here with a different exposition that does not accord with the words of the Philosopher — and this is his text [וזה לשונו]: "It still remains for us to consider whether the intelligible [המושכל] was composite, such that the whole is changed when there is change in the parts of the whole. I mean: it still remains in doubt, regarding the intelligible drawn from Him, whether it is simple or composite from many intelligibles. But if it were composite from many intelligibles, then it would necessarily be other than its indivisible parts; and whatever intelligizes many things, behold, it thereby intelligizes something outside itself, and the intelligibles drawn from Him are themselves the cause of itself.

"And they said: it is not divided, that which has no foundation, as is the case with the hylic intellect [השכל ההיולאני], which is capable of being something for whose intelligibles there is no foundation; and it is that in which the intellect, the intelligized, and the intelligible are one thing in their essence, in the way that division is impossible in it — just as it is possible for the human intellect [לשכל האנושי] to be other [than itself], such that the cause of division in the human intellect is that the intelligible [המושכל] is, on its part, something other [than it].

"[The cause of division in the human intellect is] that the intelligible is, on its part, something which has a foundation; that is to say, it [the human intellect] is not [the one] whose intelligibles are not unified, and the intellect and the intelligized do not become one in all respects. [The First's intelligibles] are many [only] in this respect, for since the perfection [שלמות] of the separate intellects [השכלים הנבדלים] is completed precisely through the unification — when the material forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] are perfected — and this material [potency] proceeds by degrees toward perfection. And it is possible that what He intelligizes is on the part of His own self, and there is nothing seen which would be the cause of His attaining intelligibility from Him.

"So too the matter would necessarily be with regard to the rest of the separate intellects [השכלים הנבדלים], except that the First is the most purified of them, and along with this it was the one in the absolute sense — for it was not multiple at all, neither by reason of a difference in the intellect from the intelligible, nor by reason of the multiplicity of the intelligibles in the intellect itself in respect of its essence. What is drawn from Him is something whose continuity in language is such that there is found in it [a distinction] between the intellect and the

intelligible. Since, when the intellect and the intelligible are perfectly united, it is necessary that the many intelligibles which are united for that same intellect be one intellect, simple in every respect — for, given that the intelligibles arriving at the intellect were many, other [than one another], it would not be united in itself, given that it was other than they.

"And this is what Themistius [Themistius] failed to grasp regarding the change [whereby] the intellect intelligizes many intelligibles all at once. And what he meant to refute is that we said it intelligizes its essence and does not intelligize a thing outside itself, and that the intellect and the intelligible drawn from Him are one in every respect. And this is what he said: that it intelligizes all the things, because it intelligizes that which is the beginning of them — and this is the whole of the treatise, such that Aristotle's demonstrations [מופתי ארסטו] are understood from it."

But, behold, he already grasped this doubt: it is that God, may He be blessed, would intelligize foolishly that which is in this [whole]; and along with this men are far from saying that He does not know anything — but rather, by a universal knowledge, not in a partial manner. And the truth of the matter is that He knows His own essence alone, [and thereby] knows all existing things insofar as He is the cause that brought them into existence. And an illustration of this is one who knows the heat of fire alone: it cannot be said that he knows the things found in hot things by knowledge; rather, it is that he knows the nature of that heat insofar as it is in the absolute sense.

— from the simple primary [thing] in that same genus. What I mean is that, when there is found here some [intelligible] whose parts are removed in [the direction of] the composition, that is to say, beyond the intelligible to the intellect, behold, the most excellent of them is that which is of less composition in that same genus, but is the simple [thing] in that same genus. And when he said that "the addition in the genus" is what he meant by the diminution of the composition, he said: "But the most excellent thing is what is the whole, and it is one thing." What I mean is, rather, that it is necessary that what is most excellent in every genus be the simple thing, the whole that is not divided — and it is a thing separate, outside the composite — that is to say, a thing that is not itself in composition.

An illustration of this is that the wise ones [the philosophers] indeed remove the parts of fire, some of them, in [the direction of] the diminution of heat and its multiplication; and along with this, the hot thing in the absolute sense is that in which there is no composition, and it is fire — for, given that nothing else is mingled in it, it is a body other [than fire] by reason of which it would have a

little heat. So too the First Intellect [השכל הראשון] must necessarily be simple and one in the absolute sense.

And they said: in accordance with this meaning, that the intellect which is intelligizing is in itself at all times. What I mean is, rather, that it does not intelligize a thing outside itself, given that it is the simple [thing]; behold, it intelligizes its own essence eternally, and there is nothing seen which is the cause of its attaining intelligibility from Him.

So too the matter would necessarily be the same with regard to the rest of the separate intellects [השכלים הנבדלים], except that the First is the most purified of them, and along with this it was the one in the absolute sense — for it was not multiple at all, neither by reason of a difference in the intellect from the intelligible, nor by reason of the multiplicity of the intelligibles in the intellect itself in respect of its essence in the matter of the intellect. What is drawn from Him is something whose continuity in language is such that there is found in it [a distinction] between the intellect and the intelligible. Since, when the intellect and the intelligible are perfectly united, it is necessary that the many intelligibles which are united for that same intellect be one intellect, simple in every respect — for, given that the intelligibles arriving at the intellect were many, other [than one another], it would not be united in itself, given that it was other than they.

And this is what Themistius [תמסטיוס] failed to grasp regarding the change [whereby] the intellect intelligizes many intelligibles all at once. And this — that we said it intelligizes its essence and does not intelligize a thing outside itself, and that the intelligible drawn from Him is one with Him in every respect. And this is what he said: that it intelligizes all the things, because it intelligizes that which is the beginning of them — and this is the whole of the treatise, such that Aristotle's demonstrations [מופתי ארסטו] are understood from it.

But, behold, he already grasped this doubt: it is that God, may He be blessed, would intelligize foolishly that which is in this [whole]; and along with this men are far [from saying] that He is one who knows nothing at all, but [they say] rather that [He knows] by a universal knowledge, not in a partial manner. And the truth of the matter is that He knows His own essence alone, [and thereby] knows all existing things insofar as He is the cause that brought them into existence. And an illustration of this is one who knows the heat of fire alone: it cannot be said that he knows the things found in hot things by knowledge; rather, it is that he knows the nature of that heat insofar as it is found in the absolute sense. So too the most excellent name is that He is the one who knows the nature of that which is found in the absolute sense — that which He is in His own

essence; and if there were no knowledge there, it could not be said of His knowledge that the most excellent name praises it.

And our knowledge is by equivocation [בשתוף] of the [divine] name, since His knowledge is the cause of the existing thing, whereas the existing thing is the cause of our knowledge.

Now His knowledge, which is most praised, is not described as universal nor as partial. For, with respect to which His knowledge is universal — He knows it in its parts in which they are found in potentiality [בכח] — behold, His knowledge is by necessity in potentiality, since the universal is in fact the knowledge of the partial matters; and given that the universal was a knowledge in potentiality, and there is no potentiality in His knowledge, which is most praised, behold, His knowledge is not universal.

And it is yet more manifest than this that it is impossible for His knowledge to be partial, since the parts have no end [תכלית] to them, and their totality cannot be encompassed by knowledge. Behold, He is most praised, [in that] His name is not described by a knowledge that we have, nor by the comprehensions which it [our knowledge] receives — just as no one of them is described by the way [in] which there is found no existence that is not described by the knowledge that is in Him, nor [is there a separation] between His existence and His knowledge. Up to here, the words of Ibn Rushd [עד כאן לשון אבן רשד].

Now, in accordance with what we have already thought regarding the saying that God, may He be blessed, does not know the pattern of existing things [נמוס הנמצאות] and their order on the part of [things] divided — and this is what has been explained in what preceded — behold, it is not fitting for us to recall here what they said, and to consider it, whether it is necessary or not. But it is manifest that, if Ibn Rushd held this view of the matter, behold, there is in it no exposition that accords with the words of the Philosopher. For the Philosopher said: "But the most excellent is that which is the whole, and it is one thing"; and if the knowledge in the intelligibles by which He knows them were in some way [partial], then it could not be said of Him that He is "the whole" — and this is what is manifest, that the Philosopher meant that God, may He be blessed, knows the pattern of existing things [נמוס הנמצאות] universally; and in this way it follows for Him, just as the pattern which is found in the soul of the leader [the conductor] of the host is the cause of the order found in the host — as Aristotle [ארסטו] said elsewhere in this chapter.

And the Philosopher has already explained that there is no multiplicity in the First Intellect, because it has no foundation, and the multiplicity found in this is the order of the things found in it by reason of [their having a] foundation, as has been explained.

Now Ibn Rushd here changed the meaning of every word in his exposition, and in its place [used] the word "simple"; and he inclined toward saying that God's knowledge of things, may He be blessed, is at the level [in the degree] of one who knows the heat of fire. For He already has a knowledge of the nature of the heat found in hot things. And it is manifest that the heat of fire is the hot thing in things which are hot in respect of their being brought to completion, since it is simple, and not the temperament [המזג] in coldness; and so it cannot be said of it that the [whole] of heat is "said of" all heat.

And in this way [is to be understood] what Ibn Rushd said in this treatise — that his word [מלת] in this treatise, the meaning of which the Philosopher gave [for] every word, cannot be said equally [in all cases], but rather can be said only of things that are divided in some way, as is the case with the matter of the heat of fire, which is divided when the temperament is divided; until there has already been found some heat by [reason of] another heat. And it would be necessary that there be in the intelligible a multiplicity of the [divine] name in some way.

And this is a matter on which Ibn Rushd has already agreed, as we recalled in what preceded — namely, that he said that all the orders and forms are in fact existing in the First Mover [המניע הראשון] in actuality [בפעל], like the existence of the made [thing] in actuality in the soul of the maker.

— on the part of [things] divided. And it is not [as] Ibn Rushd's secret here [intends], that his intention was, or that his intention was also in this, that God, may He be blessed, knows the pattern of existing things [נמוס הנמצאות] and their order on the part of [their] being one in Him — as is the truth in itself.

And I think Ibn Rushd's intention in this treatise was that God, may He be blessed, knows the order of existing things, the intelligible, which He came to be the cause of the sensible order [הסדור המוחש] found in them; except that this knowledge — God, may He be blessed, did not acquire it from existing things, but rather the matter is the reverse: it is that existing things acquired their existence from the intelligible order [מהסדור המושכל] in the soul of God, may He be blessed — just as the craftworks acquired their existence from the intelligible order [מהסדור המושכל] which is [present] for them in the soul of the craftsman [בנפש האומן].

But [the question is] whether God, may He be blessed, intelligizes some thing drawn from Him toward existing things, or not — that is, [intelligizes] something in which there is speculation. And, behold, Themistius [תמסטיוס] seems to hold that the emanator [the One who emanates] intelligizes from Him only on the part of what has from Him a beginning. And Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] seems to hold that He does not intelligize it, since [if He did] what would be explained from the words of the Philosopher is that God, may He be blessed, does not intelligize anything but His own essence.

And we say that He intelligizes the emanated [thing] on the part of His own essence — and that is the more honorable side regarding its existence. What I mean is [that He intelligizes] on the part of what the pattern [נמוס] and the order [הסדור] which is in the soul of God, may He be blessed, has acquired. But [it would not do] that the emanated [thing] should be from Him [as] a strange thing on all sides of the intelligible which it has, [for then] it would not be fitting that He should intelligize it. But, given that what He intelligizes accords in some way with what He emanates, behold, it is manifest that He intelligizes what He attains on the part of [its emanating] from Him in this respect.

Moreover, since the beginning and that which has a beginning for it are correlatives [מצטרפים], and the correlatives are [grasped] by a single knowledge, behold, it necessarily follows that there should be in God, may He be blessed, a knowledge of that which has a beginning for it.

And, moreover, since God, may He be blessed, attains His own essence with the perfection which is in Him, behold, it is fitting that there should not be hidden from Him that which He has already emanated from Him — for, were this not so, His apprehension of His own essence would be deficient. And, moreover, since it is among the falsehoods that He should emanate from Him what He emanates with the utmost perfection that is possible — [in order] to attain the intended end — and He would [then] not be possessed of this, and would not know it: this is something impossible in [the case of] the subordinate craft [המלאכה המשרתת], but

in the master craft [המלאכה הראשיית] this cannot be. And, behold, it is possible that God, may He be blessed, should know the emanated [thing] on the part of His apprehension of His own essence — for the emanated [thing] drawn from Him accords with Him in some way, in respect of their essences, as those who [posit] the order [הסדור] hold, [the order] which is found in the soul of the craftsman with regard to the things craftworked. And this is what Ibn Rushd did well [to say]: that the intellect [השכל] and the intelligible [המושכל] in man are one thing in

number. Behold, this is an epithet [a designation] for the fact that His apprehension is of universals [לכללים].

And we have already said, [though it stands] in contradiction with this, in the first treatise of this book, that His apprehension is not of universals nor of particulars; but rather it is [according to] the nature of the intelligible of these things found in the soul that brings them into being [actualizes them], as we explained in the first treatise of this book — and on this account there would be no difference between our knowledge and His knowledge, may He be blessed, in this respect.

It has already been shown that there is no doubt as to the position the Philosopher [Aristotle] held on this matter: that God, may He be blessed, knows the pattern of existing things [נמוס הנמצאות] and their order, on the basis of what he said after the chapter we recalled, in the treatise marked by the letter Lambda [Metaphysics Book Λ]. For there he stated this very thing, in his own words. And let us further inquire into the nature of "the whole that is good and most praised" — whether it is a thing distinct in itself, or whether it lies in the two species, as in the case of an army; for the good lies in the army's order, and in its commander, but this latter more so, since this [commander] exists only for the sake of the order. Yet [in another sense] the order exists for the sake of this [commander]. And [the army] already had with it all the things in some manner, except that there was no order in which the flying and the growing [things] move; up to here are his [Aristotle's] words. And this is what we have set out to explain in this chapter.

Let us now further inquire into the manner in which "the whole that is good and most praised" exists — that is, whether it is a thing distinct in itself and separate from the [other] things, as if one were to say that the good exists by the name of God, may He be blessed, alone, as something heard [to be] the good through the agency of the rest of the things. (This [view] is itself explained as null, for the good [we] find in each one of the things, and if it is in their parts, it is in a more praiseworthy manner.) Or [one might] say that this good is found in these things in respect of the order and proportion they have, such that here there would be a thing distinct in itself, from which there overflows the order found in these things. (This too has already been explained as null, as we set out earlier, for it does not suffice for these things that there be found in them these wondrous productions [היצירות הנפלאות], if there were not something underlying them that intellectually grasps and aims toward the end.) Or one might say that the good lies in the two species together, as in [the case of] the army; for here the good is indeed found under two aspects. The one is found in the army's order, in the

perfection of their operations, in the most perfect manner possible; and the second is found in the commander of the army, from whom the order of good [present] in the army is established — and this, [the good] found in the commander of the army, is the more perfect, since the commander of the army exists only for the sake of the order, while the order [exists] for the sake of the commander of the army.

And it has been objected — and this [objection] is more to the point regarding the good — that the good found in the commander is more [perfect] than the good found in the order of the things; for what they intend by this is that the commander is "the whole" that brings about the greater good — more than the good found in the order of the things. The reason is that God, may He be blessed, exists only by reason of the order of these things; whereas this order is found in being only by reason of [its] being attributed to the name of [God], may He be blessed. But as for the commander of the army, the matter is not so for him; for the commander of the army would already be commander of the army even if no order at all were arranged by him for the army. And this is what one would see [in arguing] that "the good and most praised" rightly applies to the [matter of] existing things — meaning that [the good] is a thing distinct in itself, namely God, may He be blessed; and so too it is found in the order belonging to existing things.

And, behold, the Philosopher [Aristotle] would say that "the good" is found [as] a thing distinct in itself, namely God, may He be blessed — that is, [the good lies] in the [whole] genus, in a certain manner; for the desire of all the things [is for] the good that they [each] hear [i.e., derive] from the order and proportion belonging to them; except that in some [things] the good is taken from it [from God] more, and in some [it is taken] less. The parable for this is that those who rejoice acquire more of that good — more than what the soaring

[thing] acquires of it. And, in general, the more closely a thing approaches to perfection through [its share in] the order of the emanation, the more it [shares in] the First Cause [הסבה הראשונה]. This is what we have explained in this chapter — and it [the Philosopher's view] accords very much with the language of the Philosopher and with the truth in itself. Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד], however, gave a different interpretation here, one that does not accord with the language of the Philosopher.

And [as to] how this would be: behold, it is explained that the Philosopher agrees that here there overflows, from the order — the intelligible [order] which belongs to the name of [God], may He be blessed — just as the order found in the soul of the commander of the army [there] overflows [into the army]. And here the

explanation requires that this intelligible be from these forms in one [single thing]; but it is impossible that it be so, since it [the matter] is the cause of the multiplicity in these forms. And this, indeed, would have two aspects. The first aspect is [the multiplicity] arising from the multiplicity in quantity, [namely] that the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] are grasped on the part of the subject — as if one were to say that this figure [צורה] is so-and-so [in] number, distinct in number [from another]. The second aspect is that the underlying [matter] makes the one order [come to be] in a multiplicity through division, because its part is not disposed to receive [anything] except [insofar as] part [of it receives] from that order. The parable for this is that the underlying [matter] makes the part [come] from the sentient faculty [מהכח המרגיש] — by reason of the nature of the matter, which is from the growing [things] — such that it does not receive in its nature the [degree of] perfection that is greater than this. But the intelligible order belonging to these forms is not divided in this manner; and this is explained in itself. And it is likewise explained that what is intellectually grasped from this in these hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות] is by way of the unification in the hylic forms, since it makes them [come to be] from one [thing]; and this is [the case of that which is] divided in the hylic forms. And here the explanation [serves] to nullify this contention which was thought to be [the case] in respect of its potency — namely, that here there would be a separate agent [פועל נבדל] toward which the coming-into-being of these hylic forms [could be] traced, [an agent] which accords with them in some manner.

But as for what was said in the ninth contention — that if there were here a form distinct in quiddity, accordant in [respect of] the hylic forms with it, there would not be here that proper coming-into-being — [the reply is] that, in accordance with [the principle] that the separate forms [הצורות הנבדלות] are more honorable in existence than the existing [forms] belonging to matter: behold, we say that it does not follow from this that this coming-into-being [should] not be traced to a separate agent. Rather, what one ought to think is that there is here nothing [of the sort that would be implied if] there were separate forms [הצורות הנבדלות] accordant in all respects with the hylic forms [הצורות ההיולאניות], as Plato [אפלטון] would hold according to what the Philosopher [Aristotle] understood from his words. But [as for] what would [actually] be here [as] a separate agent [פועל נבדל]: behold, in these forms is found, on the part of the artisanal forms [הצורות המלאכותיות] [present] in the soul of the maker, [only] that which does not reach to this [extent] — that is, [it falls short of] the perfect agent of the good. [The good] is not so honorable as is possible, since the matter is itself deficient [חסר בעצמותו]. And if it were possible for it [the matter] to receive of the good and the perfection, the thing would be like something intermediary between the perfect existence

belonging to these forms in [their being] a separate agent and the existence belonging to matter; behold, it would be fitting that there should overflow from the separate agent that second aspect, which belongs to these forms [drawn] from [their] existences. And if one were to say [in objection] that, if the matter were so [disposed], the existence of the form

would be on account of the matter — and this [would be] the reverse of what the Philosopher saw, since it [his view] is the truth in itself, namely that the matter is on account of the form — we say to it [in reply] that this does not require that supposition [הנחה]. The reason is that we do not say that the hylic form is found in order that the subject which it has should be found, but rather we say that the agent that produces the quiddity is the one who creates the matter in this manner, by way of generation, so that the form which is perfect for it may attain in it [its end]. And indeed, were this null [view] required, [it would mean] that in the coming-into-being there would be two agents — the one [being] the maker of the matter, and the other the form, when the matter is suited to be received [as in our tradition]. And, behold, the author [Gersonides] has already explained that these contentions which we recalled do not obligate us to maintain [the view] that the coming-into-being of these things [could] not be traced to a separate agent. [Rather] these hylic forms come to be newly generated [מתחדשות] on the part [of the fact] that the artisanal forms [הצורות המלאכותיות] are found in the soul of the maker.

פרק רביעי [Chapter Four]

[Rashi script: An inquiry, in this [chapter], into this investigation according to the truth in itself.]

Now that it has already been explained that these contentions which we recalled do not obligate us to maintain that the coming-into-being [does] not [trace] to a separate agent — and now that, with some illumination, it has been explained, [from among] the contentions we recalled, [how] to maintain the view of Themistius [תמסטיוס] that there is here a separate agent toward which the coming-into-being is traced (which is also a thing the Philosopher [Aristotle] and Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] agree upon, as we set out in the preceding chapter) — it is now fitting that we should bring this investigation to its completion, as far as is possible.

Let us say that it is explained that what comes to be newly generated, when there is no aim toward an end in it, is [something] attributed to chance and accident;

and this is said of man, when he attains by his actions [an outcome] toward which there was no aim — for that would be [a matter] of accident. And since the matter is so, behold, it cannot be said here that this wondrous coming-into-being [ההויה הנפלאה] belonging to ensouled beings [בעלי נפש] should be [a matter] of accident and chance, or [something] in which there is an agent that does not aim at the end for which it [the thing] came to be. And it is explained that there is no third division here, [namely] that it [the coming-into-being] should be required to be by this coming-into-being [merely], such that the thing would have no end of its own, as is explained in the natural sciences [בטבעיות, the *Physics*]; nor [is the coming-into-being one that traces] to an agent toward which this coming-into-being is [traced but] which aimed at no end, [as would be the case] if the end for which it came to be were [merely] accidental. And, behold, the agent that does not aim at an end — the attaining of the end [in its case] would be attributed to accident and chance, as we set out earlier; and it is explained that it is among the falsehoods that this wondrous coming-into-being should be attributed to accident and chance, since by this [latter] route it would not attain the perfection in it except in [a degree] little and small, [little] in time and [few] in number among the things; whereas this coming-into-being attains in it a wondrous measure of perfection, and so it is also in many of the things, and continually, and

it is explained that it is impossible that there should be an agent toward which there is no aim at an end. And since the matter is so, behold, it remains only that this coming-into-being [be] from an agent that aims in it at the end for which it came to be, and that the whole coming-into-being should be aimed toward the most perfect end — be [the agent] ensouled [בעל נפש], or be it separate [נבדל]. And if it were hylic [היולאני], behold, it would be like a seed from which the ensouled being comes to be — [whether] by an external thing, as if one were to say [by something] in the seed; for there can be here no external thing in which the hylic potency [could] be the agent toward bringing the ensouled being into being apart from the seed; and this is explained in itself. And further, since [it would follow] that, were this potency [external], this potency in the seed would [also] be nullified — that is, [the supposition] that this potency [acts] by an external thing. This is explained at length by the demonstrations [המראות] which we shall bring [forward] concerning them.

And, behold, the saying that this agent — which constitutes the quiddity that aims toward the end — is in a seed [an internal principle] is explained as null in several ways. — Among them: that, were the matter so, then it would necessarily follow that this potency, namely this apprehension [ההשגה], should be newly generated by a seed, as [is the case] with the rest of the hylic forms [הצורות

ההיולאניות]; and so it would necessarily follow that there should first be apprehension in potentiality [שיהיה תחלה משיג בכח], and afterward it would apprehend in actuality [בפעל]. The reason is that the new generation of the apprehending potency would necessarily be generated [anew] before being [actually] apprehending, as is the matter with the rest of the hylic apprehensibles [המשיגים ההיולאניים]. And since apprehension is acquired only by means of the senses, as is explained in the Book of the Soul [בספר הנפש, De Anima], behold, it would necessarily follow that there be a seed [containing] the instrument of sensation [כלי ההרגש], and this is explained as null, for it [the apprehension] is something underlying the [bodily] parts, not [itself] an instrument. — And among them: that, were the matter so, then that which would be found by reason of the end attained from it [the coming-into-being] would be more honorable than that very coming-into-being — and this [is so because] the seeds are [merely] matters of concern for them [the offspring], on account of the things that come to be from them. And if this wondrous apprehension were [present] in the seeds, behold, the seeds would be more honorable than the things that come to be from them — namely the growing things and the living things — since one does not find in them [in the offspring] this wondrous apprehension; and that which is in [respect of] potency would be more perfect than that which is in actuality, and this is the end of nullity [תכלית הבטול]. But we have said that the apprehension that sets [orders] the things — those things by which they are apprehended — [is such that], according to what is explained, since the things would be exchanged in honor

and in [comparative] honor on the part of their being exchanged in apprehension, [it follows that] that whose apprehension is more honorable is the more honorable [thing] — [a point] which we [need] not [further] illumine for the reader in this book. — And among them: that it is explained that all the forms which the matter of the first [generation] is upon, by which they live, are perfect for them in part, and in part [imperfect] for the sake of [some] part; and so the coming-into-being would be, in [its] entirety, one. And this is among the things that would require — were it [the agent] to be wholly an agent — that there be one [agent] who orders from itself the whole of the comings-into-being in this manner — [namely] the wondrous wisdom and the perfection of which it is impossible there should be found anything more [perfect], and this is what is aimed at in it as an end, as is explained in what preceded — or that some of these agents should be [merely] subordinate in part, as is the matter with the subordinate crafts [המלאכות המשרתות] in relation to the master craft [המלאכה הראשיית]; and the master agent [הפועל הראשיי] is the one who orders.

from which all coming-to-be derives, and toward which He [Himself] is the directed end. And if it were the case that this came to be from a single agent, then it would necessarily follow that the material [agent] must be a separate one — for the material [agent] cannot have its source from one of the many [things], whereas it is impossible that the single material agent should be in each one of the seeds. It is, however, possible to picture this when it is supposed that this is the separate agent; and so they [the agents] are bound together in a conjunction that is not [a conjunction] in their very substance.

And if it follows for us that there were a multiplicity of agents serving in part, then it necessarily follows that the primary agent is that which originates the [agents] who serve, as is the case in the [productive] arts: the master craft [המלאכה הראשיית] is that which originates the crafts that serve it, for apart from this it would not be possible for those crafts to be set in order toward that for which the master craft directs them. Therefore the primary agent must be one who knows, by the universal principles, these existents, their order, and their arrangement; and whatever its mode [of being] is, it is a separate [agent], not a material one — as is explained in the [Book of the] Soul.

In sum, then: because that which comes to be afresh in this coming-to-be is, in its very substance, the quiddity of the thing which the apprehending faculties [of the soul] do not [themselves] reach, it necessarily follows that the quiddity-bringing agent [פועל המהוה] is that which apprehends the quiddity, for the sake of which it brings the quiddity into being; and the faculty that apprehends the quiddity is altogether [a faculty] of necessity. Hence it necessarily follows in this case that the quiddity-bringing agent is a separate one. And this is the argument that requires that it be impossible for the agent of coming-to-be to reside in the seed [בזרע], nor in the possessor of the seed [בבעל הזרע].

Among them [the arguments]: that since it is explained as impossible that there be a soul in the seed [נפש בזרע] — all the more so that there should be in [the seed] a soul that attains this wondrous apprehension. For this has already been explained from the definition of the soul: that it would be the first perfection [שלמות ראשון] of a natural organic body [לגשם טבעי כלי]. And since the matter stands so, it is also explained that the seed is not an organic thing [דבר כלי] — rather, it is prior to [the stage of having] parts [מתדמה החלקים]; hence it is explained that there is no soul in the seed [שאין בזרע נפש], and therefore it is explained that there is in it no soul attaining this wondrous apprehension.

And among them [the arguments]: that what appears to us to be more honorable among the eighth [class] are the sowers [הזורעים] which are the begetters [מימיי

נגר]; and however that may be, it cannot be that [the seed] should be ensouled [בעל נפש]. For [if it were] the possessor of soul, it would necessarily follow that there be in it bodily organs [גופיות], and that there be in it a standing and a persistence [עמידה] for whatever span of time is possible for it; and this is explained as refuted by the investigation among all ensouled beings [הבעלי נפש].

In sum, then, we find that whatever is more honorable [book p. 249, foot] is that in which there is a soul — for in it nature has already provided more, inasmuch as it sets within it many organs to preserve its existence, as is explained in the Book of Animals [ספר בעלי חיים] [Aristotle, *De Animalibus*]. And since the matter stands so, it is explained that it would be false [from the start] for there to be a soul in the seed [נפש בזרע] for the sake of [attaining] honor; nor does nature set within it an organ to preserve its existence — rather, it is the readiest of [all] things to pass toward corruption [אל ההפסד], as is explained in the Book of Animals. [This is said] regarding the seed of the ensouled being, which is the more honorable among the sowers.

And among them [the arguments]: that if there were in the seed a psychic faculty [כח נפשיי] that apprehended the thing it was to produce [יפעלהו], then it would be that it apprehends — and yet [it could] not [be] that it should apprehend [anything], if [there is] nothing else [in it]: it [would] apprehend the engendering [היצירה] proper to the species belonging to the possessor of the seed [בעל הזרע], or [else] it would apprehend something else [too]. And if it should follow for us that it does not apprehend anything else [דבר זולתה], then how, I ask, is the something to be created —

the seed of the mule [פרד], since there is no apprehension in it except in [the case of] the engendering of the horse [הסוס]? And if it should follow for us that it apprehends engenderings other than the engendering proper to its own species [למינו], then it would necessarily follow that it apprehends — [and yet] how could it [be the case] that this species [should] encounter [פגש] something [foreign to it]? — so that it might know which engendering to produce in it. As if you would say that, if the seed of the female were that of a mare [סוסיא], it would create within it the engendering of the horse, and if it were that of a she-ass [אתון], it would create within it the engendering of the mule. And since this apprehension [belongs] to the seed of the female [לזרע הנקבה], it is impossible that there be in it, apart from [this], a sense [חוש] that discerns of which species this seed is — whether by way of the sense of touch [המשוש], by way of the visible appearance [המראה], or by way of the rest of the sensed objects [המוחשים]. Hence it would necessarily follow that there be in the seed sensory organs [כלי חושיי], and this is

explained as null [הבטול], for there is no sensory organ in the seed [בזרע כלי], all the more so [no organ] without which there can be no sensory organ.

And among them [the arguments]: that if there were in the seed a material psychic faculty apprehending the engendering which it is to produce — how, I ask, does it produce this, [the thing] which it brings about by [providing], at certain times, additional limbs [אברים נוספים]? And this [is so] because we cannot attribute this matter to the apprehending of matter [להכרת החמר], and because the intellect [הבונה] would not be compelled to make, within the [coming-to-be], additional things for the sake of the surplus of matter [יתרון החמר]; and the writer [הכותב] would not be compelled to write, within [it], additional things for the sake of the surplus of knowledge [ידיעה] and the like.

And this is explained: that if the matter stood so, then it would necessarily follow that this psychic faculty in this seed differs from the rest of the [psychic] faculties belonging to this species — [those] in which they did not make additional things; as if you would say that this faculty is reckoned [present] in this apprehension. And [if so] one would have to think that the quiddity-bringing [agent] [המתהוה] in this needed this additional limb [האבר הנוסף]; and if the matter stood so — how, I ask, is there in this apprehending faculty [the discernment of] the precious thing? — [namely] that it should not happen, in [the course of] its forming what it forms [שחשתבש השגתו], that the limbs come to be in a manner [other than as they should], in another place [than their own], or in some other place. And further: if it were possible for there to be a corruption [שיקרה השבוש] in its forming, for the most part — and this [is so] because of the wondrous depth and difficulty [העומק והקושי] which belongs to this material apprehension that brings about quiddity [המשיג ההיולאני המהוה] — it would be fitting that this corruption [happen], in such cases, on the side of the good [על הטוב]; yet the contrary of this is what appears, regarding the matter of this coming-to-be.

And among them [the arguments]: that if the matter stood so, it could not be that the seed produces several passing-over limbs at once [מזרע... אברים עוברים רבים]; and this [is so] because it is explained, by the investigation [conducted earlier], that an ensouled being whose [soul] apprehends [book p. 250, foot] cannot, when it is divided, be such that each of its parts is [itself] ensouled [בעל נפש]. And since the matter stands so, it is explained as impossible that there be in the seed [a soul], all the more so [it is impossible] that, when it is divided and its parts enter into many chambers of the womb [בחדרי הרחם], there should be in each of its parts a psychic faculty that apprehends — [a faculty] of such a kind that each of the parts of the seed, [now] a passing-over part [עובר], should produce a

[complete] passing-over [embryo]. And further: if we should grant that the seed, when it is divided, would be such that there is in each of its parts a soul that apprehends — then, behold, this apprehension would be either the engendering of the male [יצירת הזכר] or the engendering of the female [יצירת הנקבה]. For it is impossible that, when the ensouled being is divided, its parts [should divide] into [several] souls — [souls] other than the soul that belonged to the whole [נפש זולת הנפש שהיתה לכל]. And since the matter stands so, it is explained that if there were in the seed a psychic faculty apprehending whatever it is that it produces in the coming-to-be, then it would necessarily follow that, when the one seed produces several passing-over [parts], they would be —

all males or all females, since [the seed] produces whatever it apprehends out of its engendering [מהיצירה]. And if there belonged to the totality of the seed the apprehension [proper] to the engendering of the male, they would all be males; and if there belonged to it the apprehension [proper] to the engendering of the female, they would all be females. But this is altogether false, for we see that from the one seed there pass over [come forth] many [offspring], some of them males and some of them females.

And if one should say that within the totality of the seed there is an apprehension [embracing] the engendering of both the male and the female, so that it produces the male in the matter fit to become a male, and produces the female in the matter fit to become a female — then it would necessarily follow that [the seed] apprehends what [kind of] matter it encounters [יפגש], [namely] whether it is fit for the form of a male or for the form of a female. And this [belongs] to those things which would require that there be in the seed sensory organs [כלי חושיי] by which it might apprehend this; and this is explained as null [הבטול].

And I say also thus: that it is impossible that this be the material apprehending faculty [הכח המשיג ההיולאני] that brings about coming-to-be by something external [בדבר מחוץ], as if one would say [it resides] in the possessor of the seed [בבעל הזרע]; and this is explained in several ways. — Among them: that we see, regarding this coming-to-be, that it [the offspring] is already complete and is already separated from the possessor of the seed [בעל זרע], that is to say, from the male [ר"ל הזכר], inasmuch as at times this coming-to-be is complete even when there is no longer one of the possessors of the seed living [מהבעלי זרע קיימים] — as in the case of the egg [בביצה], where the form of the male and the female has already been completed, and there comes afterwards from the egg [a creature] that hatches [אפרוח], when there has been brooded over it [a brooding] from [the bird] of the egg's own species [מין האפרוח], or [even] from something not of its

species [מזולת מינו]. And this [belongs] to those things which require that there be no psychic faculty in the possessor of the seed for [bringing about] coming-to-be — [a faculty] neither apprehending nor non-apprehending [לא משיג ולא בלתי משיג].

And among them: that we find ensouled beings, many in number, that come to be from putrefaction [מהעפוש] [i.e., by spontaneous generation]; and this [belongs] to those things from which it is explained that there is no possessor-of-the-seed as a condition of the coming-to-be of an ensouled being — all the more so [it follows] that there is in it no psychic faculty that apprehends, which would be the agent of coming-to-be [פועל להויה]. And this [belongs] to those things which require also that it not be the psychic faculty in the possessor of the seed [that brings about coming-to-be] — [the faculty being] neither one that apprehends nor one that does not apprehend.

And among them: that it is explained as impossible that this agent, which acts by [way of] the possessor of the seed [בעל הזרע], should be — apart from it [the seed] — the material psychic faculty [כח נפשיי היולאני]; [for] this engendering [is brought about] either by something that apprehends or by something that does not apprehend. And this [is so] because what produces the possessor of the material form [בעל הצורה ההיולאנית], apart from it [the form], is something external to the [thing] spoken of [חוץ מהמדבר],

as is explained from the matter of the master craft [המלאכה], which a man performs and the rest of the ensouled beings [perform]. But this coming-to-be is [a coming-to-be] in [respect of] all the parts of the thing brought into being [הדבר המהוה]; and this is explained: that there is no agent that brings about the quiddity [הפועל המהוה] [save] the psychic faculty in the possessor of the seed [בבעל הזרע]. — And among them: that there is no way for the material form [הצורה ההיולאנית] to be brought into being [שתברא] as a form even in a subject [בנושאה], and on this account whatever should be lacking a limb [חסר אבר] could not be brought into existence in its very self [להוותו בעצמו]. And since the matter stands so — who [is it] then, and how could it be, that all the limbs of the body would be brought into being in [some] subject other than [their own] subject [בזולת נושאה]? Behold, [the form] in [its] subject is the more strongly [fitted] to be acted upon, [a subject] in which it is not possible to create even a single limb. But [the truth is] that it is the more strongly [fitted] to be acted upon in [its own] subject than in another, as is amply explained; for the actions of the material form [פעולות הצורה ההיולאנית] are arranged [מסודרות] first of all, and in [respect of] their very essences [ובעצמות], in the subject, and within it its actions are to be found.

And this [belongs] to those things which require also that there be no agent that brings about coming-to-be [as] the psychic faculty in the possessor of [the seed] [book p. 252]

the seed [בבעל הזרע] — neither one that apprehends nor one that does not apprehend. — And among them: that we do not find, in a man, a craft [אומנות] in [respect of] his making the act of begetting [עשייתו ההולדה], all the more so [we do not find in him] this wondrous craft [האומנות הנפלא] which surpasses the [highest] human conceptions [הדעות האנושיות] — and human apprehension is [but] the smallest part of it [חלק קטן ממנו]. And this [belongs] to those things which require that the possessor of the seed have no craft in [respect of] the engendering of the passing-over [offspring] [העובר].

And among them: that we do not find any man able to apprehend the order [הסדר] that is in the engendering of the human being [ביצירת האדם] — and this [is so] because a man cannot apprehend the measured heat [החום המשוער] which is [present] limb by limb among the limbs of the human being, by which it performs the action proper to it [פעולתו המיוחדת לו]; nor [can he apprehend] the engendering of the limbs in their totality, and the relation of some of them to others in [respect of] quantity — and this is amply explained, [too much] to set forth at length in [the place] best suited for it. And since the matter stands so, how could it be that this should be the psychic faculty that apprehends this wondrous engendering [המשיג זאת היצירה הנפלאה]? — when no man is found to apprehend it [at all]. Behold, this is explained as null.

And among them: that if the matter stood so, then all existent things [הנמצאים] and ensouled beings [הבעלי חיים] would apprehend this wondrous engendering which they [are supposed to] produce; and this is already explained as null, for there is no plant [צמח] that apprehends at all — all the more so that there should belong to it this wondrous apprehension.

And there would already necessarily follow, on account of this premise, many of the absurdities [הבטולים] that we have [already] recounted, which would necessarily follow upon our premise [were one] to suppose that there is in the seed this psychic faculty that apprehends [כח הנפשיי המשיג]; and this is explained in [our] brief discussion [במעט עיון]. And since this is so, it is plainly my will [to hold] that it is impossible for the agent of coming-to-be [הפועל בהווייה] to be a material faculty apprehending the engendering — neither [residing] in the seed nor in something external [לא בזרע ולא בדבר מחוץ]. And it has already been [shown] to be obligatory: if the agent of coming-to-be is something [answering] to this description — [whether] it resides in the seed [אם בזרע] or [acts] by

something external [אם בדבר מחוץ] — it is explained as impossible that the agent of coming-to-be be other than a separate agent [שיהיה הכח הפועל להויה נבדל], one that apprehends [ומשיג] the engendering which it produces.

And it is fitting that the agent of coming-to-be be a separate one, and this [is so] because the [productive] craft is that which serves nature [משרתת לטבע], and the [productive] craft is ordered by an intellect [מסודרת משכל]; for nature, which is the more primary in [respect of the] craft, is the more fittingly ordered by an intellect [מסודר משכל], inasmuch as that which is the more honorable than the intellect, and prior to it, is in every case [a thing] of necessity [שכל בהכרח].

But [the question whether] this would be from Him [Himself], apart from an intermediary [בזולת אמצעי], or by [way of] an intermediary [באמצעי] — this is among the things that will need to be clarified. And my will, in saying "apart from an intermediary," is that there be no separate agent acting by [way of] an organic instrument [כלי]

to bring about this coming-to-be [save] the elemental heat [החום היסודי] [acting] by [way of] those things to which the things that are born from seed [נולדים מזרע] are bound — and this [heat] is in itself what sets in motion the matter that brings about the quiddity [יניע החמר המתהוה]. This wondrous setting-in-motion [is performed] by the intermediation of the elemental heat that is in the seed [אשר בזרע]. And my will, in saying that this is acted upon by the intermediation of [the heat] which is ordered out of it as the natural faculty in the seed [כח טבעי בזרע], is that [the heat] completes within it this wondrous engendering.

And we shall say: it has already appeared that the separate agent [הפועל הנבדל] brings about the coming-to-be of the ensouled beings [הויית הבעלי חיים] apart from an intermediary other than the elemental heat that is in the seed [החום היסודי אשר בזרע]. For if it should follow for us that this is acted upon by the intermediation of a psychic faculty given [to it] by [way of] the seed [כח נפשיי יתנהו בזרע], then this would be [a case where] the seed has a nature more honorable than the nature found in the thing that comes to be from it [הנמצא במתהוה ממנו]. And this [is so] because the actions which the seed performs are more wondrous, [admitting] of no measure compared with its [own] action [אין שיעור מפעולתה].

Milchamot HaShem — Book V, Part 3, Chapter 4 (continued)

from the seed. And we always take as evidence, from the actions, [conclusions] about the forms that are their principles [על הצורות אשר יסודרו מהם אלו הפעולות]. It would therefore necessarily follow that the form of the seed is more precious than the soul of the being that comes to be from the seed [נכבדת מהנפש אשר בעל נפש המתהווה מן הזרע]. And what would follow from this is absurd. For if it were the case that the more excellent [principle] is that which is more complete than that which is acted upon, this has already been shown to be false.

And if, secondly, it should be claimed that the form which is the temperament [הצורה המזגיית — the form-as-blend] is more precious than the soul — since we cannot say that the seed has a soul, because it is [merely] a preparation of the parts [מהדמה החלקים], whereas it would be said that the form which is in it is the form-as-temperament, more precious than the soul — this claim too has been shown to be false.

And if, thirdly, it should already be claimed that the seed's power is more precious than that of the being possessing the seed [מבעל הזרע], because nature watches over [השגיח] in the seed more than nature watches over in the being possessing the seed — for everything that exists by nature, the more precious it is, the more nature watches over its preservation, [giving it] more instruments to preserve its existence — yet what we observe is the very opposite of this. For nature does not watch over in this manner [what is] more precious among seeds; rather it is the opposite [in the case of seeds]. With these [seeds], their corruption proceeds [readily] toward [their] destruction, [arriving at] a wondrous swiftness [בקלות נפלא]. And this is shown [to be the case]: that the seed lacks a precious form whose principles would be arranged from it, [a form] such as these actions [would require].

However, the well-ordered actions [proceeding] from the seed are far more wondrous, without measure, than the well-ordered actions [proceeding] from that which comes to be from the seed — this has [already] been clearly shown. For the being possessing the seed cannot bring even one small one of its parts into actuality, whereas the seed brings about an addition in quantity, even while the form remains [unchanged] in its [own] matter. Indeed, the seed brings about all the parts [of the future being]. And so it has been shown that there is no comparison between the well-ordered actions [proceeding] from the being possessing the seed and the well-ordered actions [proceeding] from the seed. And

since it is impossible that this power [הכח] which is in the seed should give it form on its own account [מפני צורה בו], it is clear that the separate agent [הפועל הנבדל] performs the formation [יפעל היצירה], whether with or without an intermediary [בזולה אמצעי], apart from the elemental heat [החום היסודי] which is in the seed — [that elemental heat being] the power [in the seed] that is prepared to receive [the form] fittingly [מוכן לקבל רצוי].

Moreover, the elemental heat — it has been clearly shown in our discussion — is in the seed [coming] from the being possessing the seed. And the heavenly bodies help to preserve the elemental heat in the measure found [in living things] during the four seasons [התקופות], which renew from them, as has been explained: for it is in this [process] that the change between the contraries [the seasonal opposites] is completed.

And if we grant that the form which is renewed in the seed [שתתחדש בזרע] is a natural form [צורה טבעית], [its production being] well-ordered from it [the seed] — [namely] this wondrous formation [היצירה הנפלאה] — then the matter [הענייין] will not be free of this twofold division of this form: either it is renewed in the seed [coming] from the being possessing the seed, or [it comes] from the separate agent [הנבדל] to which the coming-to-be is traced back [העלה אליו זאת ההויה].

And if we grant that this form [comes] in the seed from the separate agent to which the coming-to-be is traced, then there would be renewal of the seed by two agents [חדוש הזרע מהפועל...משני פועלים]: the one being that which gives the temperament [המזג], and the latter being that which gives the form [הצורה] — and this, too, is shown to be false, as it has already been explained: just as it has already been explained that the will [רצוני] gives that which precedes — [where there] is one coming-to-be from two agents, the one gives what is prior to the end [שלפני התכלית] and the other gives the end [התכלית].

And if we grant that this form which is renewed [comes] in the seed from the being possessing the seed, on the ground that there is renewed from it the form of the flesh and of the bone [צורת הבשר והעצם] in a [proper] balance [במזון — by way of measured nourishment], then it would necessarily follow...

from them [certain absurdities] in some way. For [it might be claimed] that if this power were in the seed from the being possessing the seed, then it would be more fitting that it be such [a power] as it was in the latter temperament [the parent's] — in which there is a greater resemblance to the nature of the being possessing the seed — [more fitting] than [to be] for the one who is acted-upon [לבעל המוחר — the offspring]; for the [one] acted-upon is a stranger to the [one] acted-upon

[the parent]. And if the manner [by which] the nourishment gives [form] is just as that form which is related [in its degree of resemblance] — in the measure that the nourishment is something foreign by nature — then it is clear that it would be more fitting that this power be in the nourishment. For the forms that are related [to one another] are mutually disposed and mutually agreeable in some measure [of agreement], in the degree that their subjects are mutually related and mutually agreeable in some [degree of] agreement.

And if the matter were so, then there would be in the nourishment a power [כח] that conceives [a form — כח מצייר] — and this matter has already been shown to be false, as was explained in the sixth chapter of the first treatise of this book [בפרק הששי מהמאמר הראשון מזה הספר]. For if the matter were so, the nourishment would not be nourishment, and what is consummated by it [the being so nourished] would not be that which is fed [thereby].

And further, if the matter were so, then the being possessing the seed would impart to the seed a form more precious, without measure [than its own]. This has been shown to be false; for this matter resembles what is in its nature, or [something] less than that. As though it were said that the heat of fire grows hot from below itself when the [thing] acted-upon receives its action incompletely [בלתי מקבל פעולתו בשלמותה], yet grows hot when it receives its action in completeness — and this too has been clearly shown. For it has been shown that the [thing] acted-upon either resembles what is in its nature, or [something] less than that. But that it should give a thing more precious than itself, without measure — this has been shown to be false.

And if it were said to us that there is in the seed an intelligible [מושכל] more precious than itself — we have answered them: the intelligible is not given to it [the seed] in itself [בעצמותה], nor in [any] potency given to it from the sensed object [מהמוחש]; rather the intelligible is given [to a being only by] the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], as has been explained in the *Book of the Soul* [בספר הנפש] — and the sense [faculty] is to it [the intellect] as a rung in the instrumental [order] [במדרגה הכלי]. And so, if this power were in the seed from the being possessing the seed, the being possessing the seed would be giving a thing more precious than itself — and this matter has been shown to be false.

And in sum, the matter would not give a thing more precious than itself, but it does give what is below itself in preciousness [בכבוד], just as in the matter of things produced by craft [בדברים הנעשים במלאכה]. For the craft [המלאכה] is more precious [than its product], since it is intellect [שכל], and the forms produced by craft [המלאכותיות] are configurations and accidents in a body [מקרים בגשם]. Or

[the product] is something equal to it [the craft], as is the matter with fire when it makes [something] hot equal to itself.

And further, if this form were [present] in the seed from the being possessing the seed — since it [the seed] is something agreeable in some way — then how could it be that the matter [should yield] beings born without seed [בנולדים מבלתי זרע]? Who [could] grant [this] — and I know [it is not so]. For this matter would be that there comes to be from it [a being] by putrefaction [העפוש], [should] the elemental heat be [present] in it by the aid of the [heavenly] bodies [בעזר הכוכבים]; and it would not be that there should come to be, from the things putrefying, beings possessing differentiated souls [בעלי נפש מתחלפים] — as though it were said that what putrefies, the beings that come to be from it would be [these ensouled beings]. And it has been clearly shown that the forms which [are] here are not in agreement [as to] giving the perfect [form] by which this separate agent is completed in it [שישלם בו זה הפועל הנבדל]. And it has already been explained that it is impossible that the separate agent should give this form [שיתן הפועל הנבדל זאת הצורה] in the seed — for if the matter were so, the one coming-to-be would be from two…

agents, and this [premise] has been explained [to be] false. If so, then it is clear that the separate agent [הפועל הנבדל] does not perform this coming-to-be by means of [באמצעי] something other than the elemental heat — for it is impossible that this [coming-to-be] should be [accomplished] by means of [some] form in the seed [which is] acted-upon by the separate [agent] or by the being possessing the seed. And this is impossible also [on the ground] that this coming-to-be [should be] by means of a form which is in the being possessing the seed — this has been shown [to be false] from what precedes.

And further, if this [coming-to-be] were performed by the separate agent by means of a form which is in the seed or in the being possessing the seed, then we would not have explained how the [given] species sometimes generates its own kind and sometimes generates other than its kind — as though it were said that the horse sometimes generates a horse and sometimes generates a mule [פרד]. And this [would be so only] if this form were in the being possessing the seed; for there cannot be in it [the seed] formations [proceeding] from differing [things] in this manner. The single form cannot have principles arranged from it from differing things — this has been clearly shown by itself. And if this form were [present] in the seed, then it is also clear that there is no power in it for making except a single species from [the act of] formation [מין אחד מהיצירה].

And if it should be said that the seed has already been altered, when the female seed [זרע הנקבה] mixes [with it], such that it is other than its kind, and there has been corrupted from it the form that was [in] it, and there has come to be in it another form, complete in this latter formation [in place of] this first formation — we have answered him: for there is no warrant [לו פנים] in this claim. For it is not known that the seed should be corrupted while another seed persists [in its place], just as the being possessing the soul is not corrupted while another ensouled being persists [in its place].

However, when we lay down [the principle] that this coming-to-be [is] from the separate agent [working] with [or] without an intermediary [בזולה אמצעי], it is not difficult to assign this cause: namely, that the separate agent acts by means of the elemental heat which is in the seed; and according to the degree of [that] heat, that formation which it performs will be. And so, when the female seed mixes [in], [a seed] whose kind is not [of] the strength of the alternation [לחזק החלוף] which is in [the male] seeds — here it is precious [that is, it happens] that the heat of the female seed is altered, by degree, [in proportion] to the heat of the [male] seed that the female seed meets, which is of the [male] kind [שהוא ממין בעל הזרע]; and so the separate agent makes, from these seeds, the coming-to-be [of] differing [kinds]. And it has already been explained that the separate agent is the agent [working through] a soul-power by means of the elemental heat which is in the seeds — apart [from which] a single form would [come to] be in the seed, in the middle degree [במדרגה האמצע]; and in this the Philosopher [Aristotle] did well, in what he said: that there is in the seed a divine power [כח אלהי], which is intellect [שכל]. And indeed this is the power that is related, by its coming-to-be, [in the way] the craft [המלאכה] is related to the things produced by craft — as Ibn Rushd said in the name of the Philosopher [כמו שאמר בן רשד בשם הפלוסוף].

However, as for what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] was distant [from the truth] regarding — [namely] that this should be the agent which is the seed-agent [bearing] intellect, because what it does, it does by means of an instrument [באמצעות כלי] — this has already been shown to be false from what precedes. And here Abu Bakr [אבו ב'כר — Abu Bakr ibn Rushd / Averroes] [?] also continued in this argument, according to what Ibn Rushd mentioned of him in his commentary on the *Book on Animals* [בספר בעלי חיים].

And one may already raise a doubt about what has been explained here, and say: if this [coming-to-be] were [accomplished] by the separate agent [working] without an intermediary [בזולה אמצעי], then how is it possible that there should be — here, in the formation [of the embryo]…

of the embryo [העובר] — just as we observe sometimes, that sometimes there are there [in the embryo] additional limbs [אברים נוספים]? For this thing cannot be [accounted for] by a knowing agent [בפועל היודע] in [terms of] what it intended and aimed at [the embryo's] final end [התכלית] — [the end] for whose sake this action is performed, as has been explained from what precedes. However, if this action were [performed] by [the separate agent] by means of an intermediary [באמצעי], then this [anomaly] would not be wondrous — and this is not the absurd [thing] — for the intermediary does not aim at what [the principal agent] does, and so this [defect] would not be prevented from [occurring] in it [the embryo].

And let it be said: if this were [accomplished] by the separate agent which apprehends the particular [המשיג הפרטי] that it brings to be, there would be in this no room for [such] mishaps [מקום מההראות — for the appearances/anomalies] [?]. But [the truth] is what has been explained: that the separate agent does not apprehend the particular [לא ישיג הפרטי]; rather, the continuation of its action [המשך פעולתו] is upon whoever is prepared to receive [it] fittingly [מוכן לקבל רצוי]. And in [the case] where the matter [החמר] is not prepared to receive [it] fittingly, [a defect] happens by reason of the matter [מהכרת החמר] [?], as [in the case of] these flaws [השבושים] in [the embryo's] formation [ביצירה].

And one may already raise a doubt and say regarding this: what is the apprehending [agent] [משיג], if [the embryo is] acted upon by a non-apprehending universal [agent] [מפועל בלתי משיג כללי] which acts upon it [שיפעל אותו]? And [the answer is] that we find in [each] kind a power, in the being possessing the soul, which emanates from it [שישפע ממנו] what it emanates of coming-to-be [מההויה] — the partial [coming-to-be, החלקית] — in this wondrous-completion manner [מהאופן מהשלמות הנפלא]; and it [the seed] does not understand what it does [והוא לא יבין מה שיעשהו].

And let it be said: that which is shown from what precedes [is] that this power [the nourishing power, הכח הזן] performs the actions [proceeding] from it, [actions] whose order is arranged for it by the separate agent [מצד הכח אשר סודר לו מהפועל הנבדל]. For it is among the false [conclusions] that these actions, which are for the sake of the perfections of [the being] acted-upon [שהם בתכלית מהשלמות מפועל], should not be aimed at the final end [התכלית] for whose sake they were performed. For this [final end] is what is referred [attributed] to the prepared [agent] and to the chance occasion [אל הקרי וההזדמן], as before.

And behold, the matter in this is just as the matter in the thing done by craft [בדבר הנעשה במלאכה], whose actions are arranged for it from the side of [the knowing artisan's intent] — what the artisan prepared in it [שהכין בו האומן] in producing these actions; as though it were said that the artisan [האומן] will perform [his work] by the millstones [הריחים — the grinding tools], and will aim at the end for whose sake they are [made], and he prepares for them instruments by which the circular motion [התנועה הסבובית] is performed — the [motion] by which the grinding [הטחינה] is done — yet they [the instruments] do not understand what they perform; and indeed it is the artisan who understands this. And there is in them [the instruments] something whereby they are completed in the manner by which this action is completed [שתשלם בדרך שתשלם מהם זאת הפעולה].

And likewise [is] the matter in this coming-to-be: for the separate agent is [the one that] brings a soul [יביא הבעל נפש] and sets in it [the matter] that whereby they are completed — [completed] by the power that is given to them, [given] what they need for their completion by that [given] soul-power. For the complete agent [הפועל השלם] does not suffice [merely] that the thing should [come to] be; rather, it gives it, along with this, the causes that preserve its existence [הסבות השומרות מציאותו], according to what is possible.

And here it has been explained that the agent [working through] the coming-to-be of a soul-bearing being [להוויית הבעל נפש] is separate [נבדל], and that it performs the formation [היצירה] in [the offspring's] possessing a soul [בבעלי נפש], [working] without an intermediary [בזולה אמצעי], apart from the elemental heat [החום היסודי] found in the seeds. And [it follows] that, as for all the forms whose prime matter [שההחמר הראשון] is that upon which their life [is grounded] [שעליהם חיי] — they being extremes [הם קצתם] [generated] for the sake of [other] extremes [קצתם], and some of them being completions to an extreme [קצה] — it would necessarily follow that all these forms are interrelated [שתיוחס הוויית כל אלו הצורות], the coming-to-be of all these forms [being traced] to this separate agent [הפועל הנבדל]. And the coming-to-be of the one [form] — inasmuch as it is one — is by necessity [an act] of recognition [בהכרח] of a single agent in number [מפועל אחד במספר]. And so it would necessarily follow that the separate agent is the [agent of the] quiddity of coming-to-be [המהוה], [the agent] of these things which are here, [such] that there should be…

[Continues into the following pages.]

the pattern [נמוס] of these lower existing things, and their orderly and well-arranged disposition [סדרם וישרם]. For these existing things acquired their

existence from the order in them, that is, from the intelligible [המושכל] belonging to the soul that issues from this separate agent [הפועל הנבדל]. And this, too: the equilibrium [שיקנה] [in them] is not [other than] the intelligible itself in its existence — just as the matter has been explained in our [account]. Therefore it necessarily follows that the agent should be the separate agent whose existence has been explained in this very place, [namely] the intellect whose existence was explained in the *Book of the Soul* [ספר הנפש].

And in accordance with what emanates from the heavenly bodies by means of the stars upon these things which are here in the rank of an instrument relative to this separate agent — behold, it necessarily follows that this separate agent should be something that emanates [a derived power] from the movers of the heavenly bodies, in such a way that they share in the giving of the form. [And it is so] just as they share in the giving of the instrument by which it [the form] comes to be in it. Now this separate agent [is], whether [it be] one of the movers of the heavenly bodies, or [whether] this [agent] be something that emanates from the movers of the heavenly bodies, or [whether] [it be] all of them together.

But it has [also] been made clear that not all the movers of the heavenly bodies are given together [as the source] for these things which are here; for the form which would fittingly come to be [from] a single agent in number is not many [agents], as has been explained from what precedes. However, the measured heat [החום המשוער] in [the matter of] each thing of these things — it is fitting that its [the heat's] giving [agents] be many, since it [the form] would come to be [only] with the [right] degree of blending [כהמזגות]. And the [many] blendings are [the work of] many agents [working through] the measured heat, by which their [the things'] blending comes to be. And so it would necessarily follow that all the heavenly bodies share, with respect to the measured heat, in [bringing about] the existence of [each] found thing. Yet it is impossible that they should share in [giving] the form, unless [it be] that there emanates from all of them one separate agent — [this] being that which performs the formation [היצירה].

And it follows that this [account] is not made correct except by this division: either that this separate agent emanates [its power] from all the movers of the heavenly bodies, or that it be one of them, or that there be something that emanates from them — [from] the movers of the heavenly bodies. And which of these divisions [is the true one] has been made clear from what precedes in this chapter — that it [the separate agent] is the pattern of these existing things and their order and arrangement. This, then, is what it is possible for us to know in this place [concerning] this separate agent. But the inquiry into which of these

divisions is the [true] one — this will be explained after the completion of the discourse [המאמר] concerning the movers of the heavenly bodies, for then this will be understood by us, [and] the explanation of it [made clear].

פרק חמישי [Chapter Five]

[Chapter heading-gloss, in smaller type:] In which it will be explained that the agent in which exists the pattern [נמוס] of [all] existing things in their totality is a single thing from a certain side [בצד שהם בו אחד].

Now after it has already been explained that there is here a separate agent which is the agent for [the existence of] these comings-into-being which are here, and it has been explained, along with this, that it is the pattern of these existing things and their order and arrangement — behold, it is [thereby] made clear that the First Intellect [השכל הראשון] is necessarily that which would be the pattern of [all] existing things and their order and arrangement absolutely. And this is what we have explained that the Philosopher [Aristotle] agreed upon in the treatise designated by the letter Lambda [Λ] of [the *Metaphysics*,] *that which is after nature* [מה שאחר הטבע]. For [it is so] that all of existence is one in number [from a certain side], and it [follows] that you would find that the world of the spheres [עולם הגלגלים] watches over [is concerned with] these things which are here in the most perfect way of the [several] ways possible. And by means of it [the First Intellect] does this separate agent perform whatever…

it performs. For [this comes] from [the consideration of] that which is required [in order] that there should be such [an agent] [as] would convey this order [as derived] from this [whole] order. And, in general — behold, if the First Intellect were the separate agent whose existence has been explained in this place, then the heavenly bodies would be for it in the rank of an instrument relative to the master craft [המלאכה]. And it would necessarily follow that there should emanate from it the pattern of the heavenly bodies, and [from it] their order and arrangement, in the manner by which the pattern of the lower existing things is perfected through their [the heavenly bodies'] mediation — just as it is the pattern of these existing things [as a whole] and their order and arrangement. And the existence [of all this] is so. And [for] this matter [to be] so, behold, it is to be explained in the manner [established] earlier, [namely] that the form [or: the First Intellect] is the pattern of the lower existing things and their order and arrangement absolutely.

And it will be explained, too, in this manner, that he [it] is intelligible [שהוא ישכיל] [of] this pattern which is in [the things] in [their] one [aspect] [בו אחד]; and this is

the more honorable side, [being] more precious in its existence. For the order which is the derivative [המתאחר — the consequent ordering] necessarily entails that there should be [as its source] an ordered intelligible [מסודר מושכל] which is one. And if this separate agent were the consequence [the derived term, עלול] of the First Intellect, behold, it would be explained, with a little reflection, that by the degree of the rank of the First Intellect [above it], so [too] is the rank of the master craft [המלאכה הראשיית] above the serving craft [המלאכה המשרתת]. For the serving craft [is such] that you would know that the defect [the deficiency] from it [stems] from that which is in the master craft, and the master craft [is such] that you would know the law of that pattern in its totality.

And if not [— if the First Intellect were not such a single ordering source —], behold, it would not be possible that there should be perfected the unification [ההתאחדות] between the heavenly bodies and the lower existing thing. For it is impossible that one should say that this unification [merely] reaches [them] by chance and by accident [בקרי ובהזדמן], together with that which is found in it [the world] of perfections and permanences. And it [therefore] necessarily follows that the First Intellect should be the pattern of [all] existing things and their order and arrangement [from] the side in which they are one.

פרק ששי [Chapter Six]

[Chapter heading-gloss, in smaller type:] In which it will be explained that the heavenly bodies are ensouled [בעלי נפש], [there being] a separate intellect that moves them, [acting] upon the side of conception and desire [הציור והתשוקה], and that they are not [merely] hylomorphic souls [נפש היולאנית] in the way that Ibn Sina [Avicenna] held — as will [be shown] from what follows from it [from this inquiry].

Now it is fitting that we inquire concerning the matter of the movers of the heavenly bodies: whether there belong to them [the heavenly bodies] separate movers, or non-separate [movers]; or [whether] there be in them both of the two things together. For of these [questions] there still remains [something to settle], beyond [the matter of] the existence of the First Intellect, which we have clarified in what precedes. Together with this, this inquiry is also exceedingly precious and honored in itself.

And let it be said: as has been explained in what precedes, in the prior part [בחלק הקודם], that the motion in which the heavenly bodies are moved — all of it is the most perfect [motion] of the [several] motions possible to come to be in [the bodies] which are here; and this is something that cannot [come about] by chance

and by accident [בקרי ובהזדמן]. For that whose way is so [— perfect —] would not be found from it [in] many things of [this] sort, in this manner of perfection, always; rather, if it were [to occur by chance], it would be slight, and would be found also [only] rarely in [the course of] time. And [for] this matter [to be] so, behold, it necessarily follows that the beginning [התחלה] of this order — this order which belongs to these lower existing things and their order and arrangement — should be from a conceiving intellect [מציור שכל], as [is] the matter in [the order] in the pattern of these lower existing things and their order and arrangement. And from which side is it possible that this order should be [from] a conceiving intelligible? It is by reason of the fact that we attain that it [the order] is intelligible [מפני היות הגעתו מושכל].

And the parable [המשל] in this [is] that which we know of this, [namely] that which is done by craft [במלאכה], [which] is [made] so [as] to illuminate it [a place] with the illumination [needed], in order that it [the place] would be fittingly seated for [one] to dwell upon it. This is by reason of the fact that the agent who makes it [aims] at the illumination [needed] for this dwelling; and this is a matter explained of itself. And when we consider, for ourselves, [that] this motion is a conception of the intellect [מציור שכלי], behold, it is explained — already — that it necessarily follows that there should be here a separate intellect which is the beginning [התחלה] of these [motions]; or [that there should be] non-separate intellects [שכלים נבדלים] in which is their beginning [התחלתם]. And indeed it necessarily follows that this agent should be an intellectual order [מסודר שכלי], by reason of the fact that it is explained that it is impossible that there should suffice for this [order] a hylic conception [ציור היולאני]; and that [a hylic conception] is [the kind] in which the apprehension [ההשגה] would be of a particular thing [בדבר פרטי].

For if it were so [— if it were a hylic conception —], the agent that arrives from it [for] this conception would not be continuous [מדובק]; and this [is] because it would be many conceptions [מציורים רבים], [conceptions] that are accompanied [נלוים] and consequent [ונמשכים]. And whatever there would be in this conception [as] not perfected in it would [come about] by conjunction [בדבקות] — that is, by chance and by [something] slight [arising] from time. But this agent that arrives from it [for] this conception is continuous [מדובק] and one in number, in accordance with that whose [character] has been made known to us. And if it is so, behold, it is explained that this ordered agent from them [the conceptions] — it is wholly a single conception in number [מציור אחד במספר]. However, the one conception, [taken together] with the number [it embraces] — encompassing [the

whole] in all time — it [too] is by [way of] the recognition of an intellectual conception [בהכרת ציור שכלי].

[And] behold, if it is so, then that which necessarily follows is that this agent should be [an agent] for the spheres [from] an ordered, intellectual conception [מסודר מציור שכלי]. And in general: behold, by reason of the fact that the one agent is in itself a single conception in number [מציור אחד במספר], even though [it works] in such a way that this agent should not be continuous [מדובק] — as has been investigated [שקרה] in the craft of medicine [במלאכת הרפואה], [where] a single non-continuous agent performs [its work] in striving for the health of the [bodily] constitution [לבקשת הבריאה]; [it is] as if one were to say [that] the giving of drink [is by] the drug [first] from the beginning [תחלה], and afterward the purgative [המשלשל] to evacuate the offending humor [להריק הליחה המהליאה] [?]. Behold, it is [thereby] explained that it is rather more fitting that one should say of the action [פעל] that is continuous [המדובק] that it should be a single conception in number.

And given that this is established for us, behold, it is fitting that we inquire whether the heavenly bodies apprehend [משיגים] this order in themselves, or [whether] there belonged to them this sphere [הכדור — i.e., the spherical body] [from] something other [than themselves], which conceived [שיצירו] something from it — as [is] the matter in many of the natural things, whose order, [the order] of their natural actions, is conceived [as] intelligible [שסדור פעולותיהם משכל], yet they themselves are not possessors of intellect [בעלי שכל]. And if it were [the case] that the heavenly bodies apprehend this sphere [the spherical body], behold, it is fitting that we inquire whether they are possessors of intellect [בעלי שכל], or possessors of soul [בעלי נפש], or [whether] there belong to them both of the two things together.

And let it be said: if there were to belong to them this order — [coming] from something other [than themselves] which conceived it [as] something from it — behold, this action [would belong] to them either upon the way of nature [על דרך הטבע], as [is] the matter in elemental motion [בתנועה היסודות], or upon the side of necessity [על צד ההכרח]; [if one] wishes to say that there should be for them a necessitator [מכריח] that moves them in this manner. And it has [already] been explained that it [the order] does not belong to them upon the way of nature. For the motion which [exists] in this manner [is such] that they [the heavenly bodies] have, by necessity, something from which would [come] their motion; and the thing toward which their motion would be — [this] is as [is] the matter in the elements [ביסודות] and in the rest of the things-that-are-moved [המתנועעים] whose

nature is not [that of] possessors of soul. For that which is moved [by nature] [is such] that its way is to seek rest [המנוחה], not motion. And in general: behold, that which is moved upon the way of nature would not find [rest] for itself [otherwise] than in [its proper] place [if it be] by nature, [namely] when it would be at rest. But the motion that would belong to it by chance [במקרה] [is so] when it [the moved thing] would be in a place not fitting for it by nature; and then it moves toward the place…

[where it comes to] rest [where it would be at rest] [ההוא וינוח]. And [for] this matter [to be] so, behold, it is impossible that there should be found, in the motion of the heavenly bodies, something from which would be their motion, and [some other] thing toward which their motion would be — and there belong to it [that motion] thereafter [some place of] rest [מנוחה] at all — in accordance with [that we sense, namely] that the sphere is moved by that very [thing] toward which it is moved [שממנו יתנועע יתנועע הגלגל אליו יתנועע], in accordance with that which our matter [requires] in this — [namely] the long time which has been transmitted to us [reckoned] from its [first] roots [קורותיו].

Behold, it is [thereby] explained that it is impossible that this motion should be one that belongs by [the] way of nature. For that whose way is so [— natural motion —] is something that does not endure, and would be found from it [only] slightly [rarely]; whereas the opposite of this is what is seen [to be the case] in this motion. Moreover [we say], because we find [that it is] by the way of nature that there exists a beginning [a starting-principle, התחלה] for some of the things, [a beginning] for the actions ordered from them; and we find, with this, [that] the thing would be [the] more honored [the] more sufficient [is] its beginning [in [its] foundations] [for] the actions of that thing. And the parable [המשל] [is] that the plant [הצמח] [is such] that it has a beginning [התחלה] [for] the [coming-]to-be and the begetting [להוויה ולהולדה]; and so [too is] the matter in the irrational living things [בבעלי חיים הבלתי מדברים] and in the human kind [ובמין האנושי].

And behold, the plant — in accordance with the fact that it is the lowest of these [in] rank — would be found to need [things], more [than] these [its own] actions, [namely] those things by which the plant would need to be aided, [things] outside these [its own] actions. For [it is] that the plant would not be [brought] from beginning to [its] completion [except] for that which there would belong [to it] in [its] right measure [in] this — [a measure derived] from [something] other than it; and there is [a measure] of this from the tilling of the ground [בעבודת האדמה]. For [it is] because the plant is not moved of itself [that] there is lacking to it nourishment [המזון], and its days [would not be completed] in the place where it

is [planted], standing [קיים] in it, [except] through the tilling of the ground that prepares for it the nourishment there. And so [too] it is found, in begetting [בהולדה], that the plant [is such] that there is needed for it, more [than that], the tilling of the ground in the sowing of seed [לזרוע זריעה] in a land fitting [for] the place [from] which the plant would grow.

However, the living thing [the animal, הבעל חיים] [is such] that it needs of this [aid] somewhat less than what the plant [needs], by reason of the fact that it is something moved of itself toward the nourishment [המזון] that is fitting for it; and likewise [it moves] of itself toward the female [נקבה] of its kind by which their begetting [the perfection of generation, ההולדה] would be perfected — except that it, too, needs in this matter [aid] for [the perfection of] this matter [as it bears] upon the human being [האדם]. And this is explained from [the case of] the domesticated [animals, הביתיים] among the living things, [for] which there belongs to them a sustainer [מזונם]. However, the human being [האדם] does not need in this an aid. And so it is found that the plants [הצמחים] [are such] that, [in] their need [in] this for something outside these [their own] actions, there would be found in them an impression [רושם] from the sun [מהשמש] more wondrous than what would be found of this in the living thing [בעל חיים]; and more [— this impression] would be found in the living thing of this impression [רושם] than what would be found of it [— of this impression —] in the human being [האדם].

And this [is so] because, by reason of the fact that the sun is [present] in the [signs of the] zodiac [במזלות] of the south [הדרומיים], there are stirred up from [among] the plants [מהצמחים], [made] great by [its] many actions, until there has already come to them [a state] resembling death [דומה למות]; and this is explained from the majority of the plants [הצמחים]. And [conversely], by reason of the fact that the sun is in the [signs of the] zodiac of the north [הצפוניים], the plants perform their actions in the most perfect way possible for them. And this [is] from [among the things] showing that the plants need more help from the strength of the stars [הכוכבים] in [that by] which their actions are performed. However, the living things [בעלי חיים] [are such] that there is not found in them [a state] that they would receive [— things received] from the seasons of the sun [מתקופות השמש] in [respect of] that whose foundation [is] from them, of [their own] actions, like this impression [רושם] which the plants would receive; rather, [it is] that in every way [there are] already found differences [between them], passing over [from one season to the next] [מתעברים] in determinate [fixed] times [בעתים מוגבלים] [in respect of] the change [from one season to the next], just as the plants give [their] fruits [פירים] in determinate [fixed] times [בעתים מוגבלים]. However, the human being [האדם] receives from the stars [מהכוכבים] in [respect of] his nourishment

[בהזנתו] and in his begetting [ובהולדתו] a slighter impression [רושם], slighter [still] — until you would [already] find that he is…

it generates and nourishes throughout all the divisions [chapters] of the year in one and the same manner. And once this has been reckoned by us, my intent is that it has already become clear by way of nature that something attaches to the things from which a beginning [of motion] is set going. Likewise, the more a thing was intellect, the more honorable [perfect] was that beginning in it — that is, the beginning by which its actions are more sufficiently ordered. And it is clear that the heavenly bodies are more honorable than the rest of the natural things.

Now it is clear that it would be false to ascribe to them a nature that does not place in them a beginning to perform their actions in an ordered way. Rather, it is fitting — given the greatness of their rank — that this beginning be such that their actions are more ordered than [those of] the rest of the natural things whose actions are ordered from them. And from this it is clear that it cannot be that there be no motion in them by necessity.

And if one were to say that this motion is not ordered for them by an intellect, but that we [merely] see that their figured [orderly] formation is ordered by an intellect — and that they [themselves] do not [thereby] apprehend, [being] without intellect, as has been explained earlier — we say in reply to this:

Granted, it can be the case with a particular thing [an artifact] that something attaching to it [its order] is needed [as coming] to it from outside itself; for the thing [the artifact] does not bring itself into being. But as for the things whose coming-to-be is complete — [things] in which is found the beginning of their actions ordered from them, as we have mentioned — and inasmuch as the heavenly bodies are the most complete in coming-to-be, see, then, that it is obligatory that there be in them a beginning [of motion] from them [from themselves], as we have explained.

And in sum: we find in these things [the heavenly bodies] features required of things possessing motion — that the motion is mediated through a conception [ציור] set in them by nature, this being the beginning of that motion, in such a way that it is not [a thing] to be remembered [i.e., a learned thing] in them. And if the matter is so in these lower things, which are moved by them [the heavens] for [only] a little time — all the more so is it fitting that the matter be so in these honorable bodies, which are moved by them [from within themselves] permanently, by [continuous] adherence [הדבקות].

Moreover, if this motion of the heavenly bodies were [imposed] by necessity, then it would be required that there be a body that compels [them] — a body from which, through whose mediation it acts upon the celestial body, would come this order [הסדור] in the way [in which] this motion is performed in it, [the body performing] this motion in this wondrous manner [or] in that [other] manner. [But] if [the celestial body] were not possessed of soul, and if it did not conceive the matter of that motion and move itself toward it by way of vision [insight] and of [free] activity — whether by way of desire [תשוקה] and of [free] choice [בחירה] — this is clarified in itself.

And inasmuch as the matter is so, it is clear that, were the celestial body without soul, it would be impossible for it to be moved by the intellect that orders these motions from it, unless there were some other body [present]; for this motion that [we said] is mediated [by conception] cannot be moved except by a thing that moves it, as has been explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע] — see, then, that it is required that there be one possessed of soul that moves itself by way of conception [ציור]. Or [else] one would have to change [the requirement to] some other body. But [to require] that this be so is impossible, for there are no [further] existent bodies beyond their number [the heavenly spheres], as has been clarified. See, then, that it is clear that the matter is already brought to completion — toward a body possessed of soul…

[a body] moved by way of conception [ציור]. And once this was so, see, then, it is required that this matter be so from the beginning of the matter; for no benefit would be found in nature [in providing] the multitude of the spheres in this manner [otherwise], and nature does no thing in vain. And it is clear that it is obligatory that these spheres be possessed of soul — and this is the opposite of what we [first] posited [in the objector's view]. And inasmuch as the matter is so, it is clear that the heavenly bodies do not lack this order [הסדור] for which they would [otherwise] need a thing [coming] from elsewhere [than themselves].

And from this clarification it will be explained that it is obligatory that they be moved by way of conception [ציור] — except that it has not been clarified from this whether this conception is hylic [היולאני] or intellectual [שכלי]; that is to say, [whether] one is to say that this act is ordered for them by an intellectual conception [ציור שכל], they [merely] figuring forth a hylic conception [ציור היולאני]. And let us say that it is impossible that the heavenly bodies be possessed of a hylic conception [ציור היולאני] — unless this [conception] were [accompanied] by an intellectual conception [ציור שכלי]; and this will be explained from what [the author] says. For it is clear that the hylic conception [הציור ההיולאני] would be only

of a particular thing that is here [present], singled out [as such]; and for this reason it cannot reach from it an act [coming] except [from] a particular thing, and at a [particular] time. And inasmuch as the matter is so, it is clear that it cannot be that the hylic conception [ציור היולאני] [yield] an adhering [continuous] act [פעל מדובק]. For if this were so, then there would be two attendant [נלוים], consequent conceptions; and it is clear that the attendant conceptions [הציורים הנלוים] cannot have an adhering act from them.

And in sum: see, then, [the matter of] the motion of the spheres — because it is one [act] and adhering [continuous], as has been explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע] — it is required that it be a conception that is one in number [מציור אחד במספר], and the one conception [in the case of] the surrounding number [the encompassing sphere] reaches, throughout all time, [a thing] intelligible by necessity. For the hylic conceptions [הציורים ההיולאניים] are coming-to-be [things] perishing by necessity, for [they are] of a particular thing found at [a particular] time and in [a particular] place. And inasmuch as the matter is so, see, then, it is required that they be possessed of intellect [בעלי שכל].

But as for whether, along with this, they are possessed of a hylic soul [נפש היולאנית] or not — this is a matter that needs to be brought to clarity. For some of the philosophers have already held that it is obligatory that they [the heavens] be possessed of a hylic soul [נפש היולאנית] by which they would apprehend the configurations [המצבים] that come to be in them at [a given] time — [for] this could not be so unless they had a power apprehending the particular thing alluded to in them [in their motion].

And it seems that what strengthens this opinion is what has already been clarified by our words: that the configurations [המצבים] which their motions produce vary in [their] aspect [angle], equal at [different] times, in relation to certain matters bearing upon a [given] part of the sphere — for this is [a thing] that brings [one] to reckon that they apprehend the configurations [המצבים] proper to them. And from this it would be necessary to make equal [reckon equivalent] these aspects [angles] in this manner.

And let us say [in reply]: it is clear that, were the spheres not in need of [reckoning] the configurations [המצבים] when [supposing them] to be possessed of a hylic soul [נפש היולאנית] — for the completion of what would appear to come from them as actions — see, then, the upshot would be that the spheres [were] possessed of a hylic soul [נפש היולאנית] [for] a vain thing; for nature does no thing in vain. And it seems that they [the spheres] would not need that they be

possessed of a hylic soul [נפש היולאנית], on account of what appears to be influenced by them [some other] thing…

[a] particular [thing]. And this [is so] because the intellect — [namely] the Agent [הפועל] of these comings-to-be [in the manner] which it apprehends from it [from itself] — [acts] just as has been explained: by the act of a particular thing [coming] from something other [than] that which would be in it [as] a hylic power [כח היולאני]. For [the heavenly body] does not apprehend at this time that it is acting in this [particular] matter, as we have already explained earlier. And [given] the weariless way in which the spheres [act] — [it is] in this very way that they would not need the configurations [המצבים] that would be theirs at [a given] time; but rather they would apprehend, for themselves, the particular configurations [פרטי המצבים] [only] by means of their motions. And the apprehension [וההשגה] that is that [apprehension] of their motions [is what] they would need — [no more] than [does] one who is moved [as] an instrument by the player [מהמנגן], who does not need to know, in [the matter of] the motion, which motion is the more fitting to be done. But the very substance of their figured-forth, universal formation [ציורם הכולל] moves their members [parts] in the way in which the fitting motion would be perfected in this [whole], as we have mentioned many times earlier.

And once it has been explained that they would not need to be possessed of a hylic soul [נפש היולאנית], it is clear that it is unfitting that there be one [a soul] for them; for there is no thing in vain among natural things. Moreover, [as to] whether the apprehension of the configurations [המצבים] proper [to them] would be [by means of] a hylic soul [נפש היולאנית] — [this would arise] by necessity from one of the senses, or from the rest of the hylic powers that follow upon them [המשכות להם]. And if it is clear that they have none of the senses — as the Philosopher [Aristotle] has explained — then they have none of the hylic apprehensions that follow upon them, and so it is clear that they are possessed of intellect [בעלי שכל] and are not possessed of a hylic soul [נפש היולאנית].

And here there have been clarified for us three precious matters. The first is that there are separate intellects [שכלים נבדלים] which are the beginnings of these motions belonging to the heavenly bodies. The second is that the heavenly bodies which appear to be moved by them are, in their substance, possessed of intellect [בעלי שכל]. And the third is that the heavenly bodies are not possessed of a hylic soul [נפש היולאנית].

And from what we have stated, the number of these movers will be explained — and this [number is] by necessity [bound up] with the number of the spheres.

[The author] means: it is clear that for each one of the planets — Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, and Venus — seven spheres are found, besides what is needed for them, of the spheres [serving] the motion of latitude [תנועת הרחב], which are two spheres for each one of these four. If [the motion] were such that there were attached [to it] the surface-motion of the anomaly [תנועת החלוף] in the surface of [its] length [as they are] at the head of the Dragon [ראש התלי] or its Tail [זנב]; and there are, moreover, two [further] spheres for each one of the planets Mars and Venus, if it were that they had an inclination toward one side only, in the manner that Ptolemy [בטלמיוס] posited.

And if the matter were [reckoned] in this last manner, then the number of the spheres of these planets would be forty [ארבעים]; and the number of the spheres of Mercury [ככב] would be, on the first manner, eight [שמנה]; on the second manner, ten [עשרה]; and on the third manner, twelve [שנים עשר]. And the number of the spheres of the Moon is nine [תשעה]; and the number of the spheres of the Sun are three [שלשה]. [Thus] the number of the spheres is "four-and-sixty" [printed 64 = ארבעה וששים; the running sub-totals — planets 40 + Mercury 8/10/12 + Moon 9 + Sun 3 — close to 64 only on Mercury's third manner (40+12+9+3), so the figure is flagged] [?].

But if there were [some thing] that appeared, in the matter of the motion of the planets, [to be] a thing that would compel us to posit spheres more in number than this number — see, then, [the case] would be [one] in which the number of the movers, by necessity, [would be] more than this number. And if there were not found here, among the things [pertaining] to the motions, [anything] that would compel [us] to posit for the planets spheres…

[that are] more [in number], see, then, the number of these movers would be, by necessity, like this number — no more than it; for [if] the doctrine were [such] that there were there [in the heavens] other spheres being moved, [then] no [planetary] body would be moved by any of them in vain, as has been explained, as we said earlier. And this [is] a thing that the Philosopher [Aristotle], too, has already mentioned in the *Metaphysics* [במה שאחר הטבע].

But as for whether there are here separate intellects [שכלים נבדלים] besides the movers of the spheres, or whether there are here no separate intellects [שכלים נבדלים] besides them — see, then, this is among the things not yet clarified, and we shall investigate this in [what comes] after this.

And you should know that the Philosopher [Aristotle] has explained, in the *Physics* [ספר השמע] too, that the heavenly bodies have separate movers [מניעים

נבדלים] — except that he did not give us a sufficient explanation of that. And this [is so] because he explained it from this side: that the disposition found in their movers [is one of] a time without limit [unlimited duration]. And [the author] says: if there were power in a body, [the power] in their movers would be a power having a limit, for [any] power in a body is divided in [proportion to] the division of the body. And if the matter were so, it would be required by necessity that this disposition [for moving] be cut off [eventually]; yet it has already been explained that [their motion] is eternal — [therefore] this is impossible.

But as for how it can be explained that this disposition [for moving] would be cut off if it were so — see, then, [the explanation is] according to what [the author] says: that we find, in the matter of the motion of one in whom there is power in a body, that, the greater its power, the more complete is the disposition of motion — [yet still] limited in a longer time, [the power] being a power in a body; and for this reason it is required that its disposition be cut off [eventually]. And inasmuch as the motion of the heavenly bodies is permanent [continuous], it is clear from this — from the clarification found in this [account] — that they are moved by a power that is not a power in a body.

And let us say that when one investigates this clarification, there is found in it [a point] needing clarification. For what appears to be [the case] from the motion: that the more powerful the power, [the more] its time would be shorter [or] more weak [?] in [the case of] those possessed of soul, [the matter resting] on one of two causes — or on either [both] of them.

The one cause is this: that there is not found in them [the difference] between the mover and the moved which [could] weaken [the motion]; rather, this time [the persistence of motion] is weakened on account of the disposition of the motion [as it stands] in natural [things], or on account of their being trodden down [worn] toward corruption — for they are corrupting [things] by necessity, as has been explained in [the discussions on] natural things.

And the second cause is this: that the thing which moves it — [namely] the possessor of soul which has here a natural motion received [as proper] to the motion that moves it — [it is] from the mover [that] weariness and fatigue would befall it, and so the cessation of this motion comes about. And the analogy [is] this: that a man, when his motion is brought to ceasing [naturally] by necessity, because the natural [motion-]power within him weakens on account of the motion, [then] there does not remain between the mover and the moved the fitting relation. And there is already [a place] for this [to hold] for a second cause too — namely that a man finds, by the nature of [his] motion, [a tendency] toward

the center [of the earth] on account of [his] heaviness; and inasmuch as his volitional motion [תנועתו הבחירית] is toward [a place] other than that side, see, then, his natural motion is contrary to the volitional motion [התנועה הרצונית], and the [former] would reach him [bring him] to fatigue. And were it not for [this] fatigue, he would reach [his goal] more quickly, [in the case] when this reception [of motion] were stronger. And the analogy [is] this: that a man, when he wearies of climbing a hill, [does so] more on account of what… …whether because of its descent into the depths, or because of its proceeding along the level — and this is not [the operative] cause. By way of example: three [bodies] heavier than a sixth [body] will move more quickly than the sixth, for the load that belongs to a single [body], whose nature is suited to the motion it reaches, [is one thing]; and the greater the load was, the greater this proportionality is, and the stronger [the motion], since the heaviness of the load is greater the greater [the body] is. But the proportion which the mover bears to the moved [body] is a single proportion, and the [mover] has no nature suited to the motion it reaches such that its motion would necessarily cease. This is explained with respect to the elements, for it is just as in the case of the stone: when the moved body is in a place other than its natural place [מקומה הטבעי], its nature has no necessity that its motion should cease unless the [body's] motion has been completed. So it is according to the proportion the mover bears to the moved [body], which is always one and the same — [for] that which abides perpetually [exists], whereas that which does not abide does not come to be — and it has no other natural motion contrary to this motion. But as for that whose nature does not require that its being-in-motion should cease unless by the completion of the motion, it is explained from what is said. ✻ And this [is so]:

For we have posited, by way of example, that there is for it [the body] a nature which necessitates that its motion should cease when it has persevered in the motion for some span of time — if that were possible — and let that time be, by way of example, one year, or whatever time you please. It then follows necessarily that there would remain to it [a portion of the distance]: the stone would remain in the air and would not descend to the center; and this [would be] to the utmost nullity [absurdity]. ✻ For we have posited that the motion of this stone [continues] for that bounded, limited time, namely the measure designated by [the letter] ב, and that the time at which its motion would cease — if that were possible — be the [time] designated by ג; and it is explained that, since some measure may be multiplied many times over, [the time] that arises from the multiplication [of ב] would be greater than the time ג; and the product [of] א, which is greater than the time ג, [would be] ה times; and we posit by the measure of ב multiplied by ד what is by the measure of א multiplied by ה, which is greater

than the time ג; and we posit by the measure of ה multiplied by ב what is by the measure of ד multiplied by א. ✻ Now if, then, the stone is set in motion — by way of example — without the cessation of the stone's motion occurring before it completes [traversing] the distance ה: and if we posited that the distance of the stone from the earth were the distance ה, then it would necessarily follow…

that there is for it [a quantity] by which the stone's [motion] is multiplied, namely the measure ב, which it is multiplied by ד. ✻ For if, by way of example, the cessation of the stone's motion does not occur before [the stone] completes [traversing] the distance ה — and if we posited that the distance of the stone from the earth were the distance ה — then it would necessarily follow, from [the premise] that the stone rests in the air (it being a stone, and resting, then, upon the light [body]), and this is false. ✻ It is explained that this falsehood does not issue from our positing that the distance of the stone from the earth is the distance ה; and even though the distance ה is greater [than] the distance of the highest plane of the fire-element from the earth — for this positing is [itself] possible, and not prevented [from being] prevented. ✻ Now the positing here [is taken] from the side on which it is possible, not from the side on which it is prevented; and that the star not fall — that its being-set-in-motion be nullified — and to this it is necessitated that this nullification [proceed] from [our] having necessitated, regarding the stone, that there be for it a nature which requires that its motion cease when it has persevered in the motion for some time. And whatever is false in respect of it is nullified, as has been explained in its place. ✻ It follows, then, from what it requires here, that the example is such that [it does] not…

[there] be a nature belonging to the stone which requires that its motion cease unless by the completion of its [own] completion — and this is what we wished [to show] in its explanation. ✻ But as for our positing that the distance of the stone from the earth be the distance ה, that the star be at a distance from [some] side: it is explained that this [positing is taken] from the side on which it is possible, [namely] that the elements be greater than they [actually] are, in respect of there not being there more matter than this measure; or because of these things [being] composed of them, which have for them some bounded measure in some manner — as though one were to say that man would find a measure bounded in quantity [in himself]; and if [the matter] were such that there be for it some breadth, then it would necessarily follow that the measures of the elements be bounded, so that man not receive activities stronger than what is fitting from the conquering [overpowering element], in order that there not be for one element, when it conquers, [an excess] in its being-conqueror; or so that man not

receive activities weaker than what is fitting from the conquering [element] which is for the element when it is conqueror. ✻ But the elements' being greater than they are — from the side of the corporeal nature, and not from the side of their forms which are the causes of the motion — this [pertains to] the nature of the body, which would [then] be finite, possessing an endpoint in measure; inasmuch as it is impossible that there be found a body without an end, and [yet] it is not necessary that they be at some time greater than they are. ✻ Now behold: the forms of the elements are also necessitated to be such that they have an endpoint in measure, for without this it would not be [the case] that there be found there the contrary elements, but [rather] they would be necessitated not to be greater than they are; the analogy [is] that the form of fire already had the form of fire, and likewise the matter in the rest of the elements, [each multiplied] many times over — and if there were a measure greater than that for fire [as] fire. ✻ And since the matter is so, it is explained there: [as for the fact] that we posited the stone's distance from the earth as the distance ה, which has an endpoint, what would the measure of its distance from [the earth] be? — and this [pertains] from the side of the nature of the form, [i.e.] the mover. ✻ And here it has been explained that it is impossible that there issue, in the elements, a nature requiring that their motion cease unless by the completion of their motion. ✻ It has already been explained that this [holds] in another manner as well, namely: that if the matter were so, the motion of the elements [would be] weaker [the more they] persevere — and this [is] the contrary of what is found [to issue] from it, for it [the motion] is the [thing] that grows stronger the more it endures, as is mentioned in the *Physics* [בטבעיות] — and this is not found…

in the one stone in the same respect, [namely] that everything which falls from a higher place is the heavier [the more] its impact upon the body is the stronger. ✻ And since the matter is so, it is explained by what manner this motion is found in the elements, [a motion] that ceases before its completion. ✻ When we have considered this, it is our wish that, just as the proportion was between the mover and the moved [body], it remains [constant]; and there was not for the moved [body] a nature suited to that motion. ✻ It is not necessary, then, that its motion cease — and this is explained from the nature of the heavenly body [הגרם השמימיי], which has no contrary; and this [is so] because it [the heavenly body] does not change in any of the changes apart from change in locomotion [תנועת ההעתק]; and this [is so] because it has neither heaviness nor lightness, and there is no [mover] suited to the motion in which it moves. ✻ It is explained that it follows according to [the premise] that the form which belongs to the spheres [is] a power in a body: it does not, then, necessarily follow that their motion cease — and this [is] because the proportion which always obtained between the mover

and the moved [body] would remain [constant], inasmuch as the moved [body] does not change, and there is no [mover] suited to the circular motion in which it moves — [this is] because it [the heavenly body] is neither light nor heavy. ✻ But [as for] that which requires that the motion be always in one manner: it is explained that there is not enough in this explanation to explain [the matter], to clarify that the heavenly bodies are separate [from matter, hence require separate movers].

✻ Likewise, what the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] explained on this point: that here there is a mover that does not move, since when two composite things are found, and the one is found [to be] separate, then it follows necessarily that the other be found [to be] separate, [for otherwise] it [the argument] is insufficient. ✻ This is [so] because it has already been explained, in the *Physics* [בטבעיות], that the place to which the hylic way [the path of matter] goes is possible [to be] separated from that to which the way of form goes; but the form is not separated from what is in the rank of the hylic [matter]. ✻ And it is explained that it is not necessary that there be an explanation here [for] there being a mover that does not move. ✻ This [is so] because it is already possible that there be found a mover that does not move, since the moved [thing] is in the rank of the hylic with respect to the mover; and it does not necessarily follow from this that there be found a mover that does not move, because [it would suffice that] the mover were in the rank of the form with respect to the moved [thing] — and what the way of the form goes [to] does not find in it [any] separation [from] what the way of matter goes [to]. ✻ The analogy: for the sentient soul [הנפש המרגשת], [which] proceeds from the vegetative soul, is in the rank of the form, and the sentient is not found [as] something in the rank of the form apart from the vegetative — yet the vegetative is already found apart from the sentient, in plants. ✻ Now we have found this argument [stated] in another, more complete manner by the Philosopher in [the book] *On What Comes After Nature* [the *Metaphysics* (מה שאחר הטבע)], but there is in it some doubt. ✻ This [is so] because [as for] that which he says, [in] what is inscribed [under] the letter ל [Lambda] — and the teaching of this matter [is] in his language: behold, it has already necessarily followed that there be found a [mover] that moves while not [itself] being moved, since there is already found a [thing] that moves [while it is] in-motion, and likewise there is found a mover that does not move. ✻ For [if] there is already found, then, a mover that does not move — and this is what we explained concerning it: ✻ behold, it has already necessarily followed that there be found a [mover] that moves while not [itself] being moved, since there is already found a [thing] that moves [while it is] in-motion, and there is found a mover that is the mover [itself]…

[and] it is our wish that there be [a mover] that proceeds, in [the order of] its existence, toward a mover prior to it, and [is] a mover [only] when it is [itself] in-motion. ✻ But since it is not possible that the [chain of] causes ascend to no endpoint upon this manner — as though one were to say that there be for a mover [another] mover, and this [proceeds] to no endpoint — it follows necessarily that there be a mover that does not move, just as one would not find a primary [first mover] from the side of what some [thinkers] said [about it] first, [namely] from the side of nature. ✻ Behold, it is explained that it [the mover] is necessarily a [thing] whose substance is finite [comes to an end] at the end, [issuing] toward a mover that does not move. ✻ But there is [reason] to say that this is not necessary — that the mover be a separate [intellect]; rather, it is possible that there be for it [the moved thing] a hylic form, namely [a form] which is set-in-motion incidentally when [the body] is in motion. ✻ The analogy: that the imaginative conception [הציור הדמיוני] is a [thing] which is in-motion incidentally in that motion. ✻ And since the matter is so, behold, one would say that this first mover [is such that] it does not necessarily follow that it be the conclusion…

that it be separate. And on this point these arguments which the philosophers argued for were not sufficient for us; and we have striven to explain these precious inquiries in a manner that leaves no doubt in [the mind of] any one of the masters of speculation [בעלי העיון], for it is not fitting that these precious inquiries be built upon the foregoing premises — given that what we have explained on this [topic] is more self-evident and more proper to this inquiry than the explanation which the Philosopher made of it; and this is self-evident.

פרק שביעי [Chapter 7]

[Chapter argument, Rashi script:] *In which it is explained whether the separate intellects [השכלים הנבדלים] apprehend their causes [their "ascents," i.e., what is above them] and their effects [their "descents," i.e., what proceeds from them], and how [they do so].*

It is fitting that we inquire whether it is possible that, in these separate intellects, the effect should apprehend its cause and the cause its effect — whether their tops [the highest of them] were [arranged as] causes and effects [in order from a first cause], as some of the foregoing [thinkers] said; or whether it is impossible that the effect apprehend its cause. ✻ Now we say that it has already been explained, from what we mentioned earlier, that there is apprehension [in them]; and the apprehended is one [and the same] thing in everything that is apprehended through number. ✻ And if we posit that the effect apprehends its

cause, then it necessarily follows that whatever the effect apprehends be its cause; and since [the apprehending] is by this manner, [the apprehended] is an [intelligible] effect [arranged] in this [same] manner. ✻ The analogy: that the primary act [the first work] together with the work that serves it — behold, it is explained that there be no difference between cause and effect, according to the apprehensions which they have in respect to the cause; they are found as effects of the cause as well. ✻ And since the [intelligibles] themselves are apprehended in their apprehensions, behold, the cause and the effect would be in a single rank; and the effect is one in number, [arranged] in one and the same rank — and this is a thing explained [to be] nullified [absurd]. ✻ And further: what I posit, that the intellects, which are above the effect and the effects, [are] in number — [the masters] posited regarding them so that there be in them the multiplicity, [though] he posited that there not be found in them multiplicity in number, the matter being [really] necessitated upon this description. ✻ And if we posit that the cause has no apprehension of its effect, nor the effect [any apprehension] of its cause, then this would be a thing that issues from the [proper] syllogism. ✻ This [is so] because if its [the effect's] cause were not [a thing] which apprehends its effect in a complete manner, behold, it would not [itself] be apprehending its own self in a complete manner, since it is an effect, and it does not apprehend this; and since the way of the intellect is that it apprehend its own self in a complete manner, it is explained that it [necessarily] apprehends its effect in some manner. ✻ And likewise, were the effect not [a thing] that apprehends the cause [from which it issues], behold, in what respect [could there be] for it [a cause] at all? — who can grant [this], and who can know? ✻ And in sum: behold, it is explained with respect to the intellect that, when there was for it an ascent [a cause], it is not [the case] that there be no way for it [to apprehend its cause] — but rather, when it apprehends what is emanated from it, [and] what is emanated from it [proceeds] toward the endpoint of its possible perfection in respect to what is fitting for it, then by this it would be seen [evident] that it is necessitated that the effect apprehend the cause. ✻ And since the matter is how the matter [stands] in this, who can grant [it], and who can know? ✻ And we say that it already appears that what is left over of this doubt [is] deficient: [namely] that [the effect] apprehends its cause in some deficient manner — that this [is] what it apprehends from the side of what it apprehends of its own essences [itself]… … that it is an effect [עלול]. And since the effect and its cause [העלה] are correlatives [מצטרפים], there would necessarily belong to the cause [the same] apprehension [השגה] that belongs to the effect — except that the cause's apprehension is more complete [than the effect's]; that is, [the cause's] is not a deficient apprehension, whereas [the effect's] is. The effect's apprehension is deficient because it is an

effect. But the cause apprehends its effect in a more complete way than that by which the effect is [present] in it. And [as for] what the cause apprehends of itself, this is nothing other than what the effect apprehends of it [the cause]; and this will be clarified from what we shall say.

This [latter point] is the very thing on account of which these [separate] intellects [השכלים] are the law and order and right-arrangement [נמוס וסדרם ויושרם] of the existents [הנמצאות]. Since this is the way the matter stands, it has been made clear that, on this account, the [lower] parts proceed from the higher [intellect's] degree to the degree of prime matter [ההיולי] — that is, the intelligible [object] of the effect proceeds [downward] within the degree of prime matter, [as] something intelligible by the intelligible [intellect] above it.

But the cause apprehends this [lower] part by way of the universal [מצד הכללות], which it [the cause] possesses as a form [צורה], whereas the effect apprehends this part [only] as something said of one [particular] [מדבר אחד]. Rather, it [the effect] already apprehends [these] existents [as] this part, [which] is an effect [predicated] of one [single subject]. ✻ An illustration: the master craft [המלאכה הראשיית] of building houses [comprehends, with respect to] that which the subordinate crafts [המלאכות המשרתות] perform for it, that [the master craft] made them — [that is,] it is the part that [stands as] the source [for them] [מהבית], just as the master of the building-craft set down the rule [תורת] of the stones, by which [rule] the [stone-]cutters trim the stones, and likewise the rule [תורת] of the bricks and the beams which the [several] masters of those crafts perform.

Yet [the workers,] the masters of the subordinate crafts, are not obliged to know these parts [in respect] of what they are in themselves [מצד עצמותם]; but they apprehend them [only] from the side of [the function for which] they are made. And it is possible that they [the subordinate craftsmen] apprehend, along with this deficiency, something of [the full purpose] for which [the parts] were made — namely [the deficiency] that [arises] because [they apprehend it only] for the sake of something else.

This, then, is the difference between what the cause apprehends of its effect [העלה … מעלולה] and what the effect apprehends of itself [העלול … מעצמו]. And here is a precious [conclusion] arising from this: that the cause apprehends its effect by [the very] apprehension of its own essence [בהשגה עצמותה] — for the way it proceeds [as] prime matter, in the manner [we have described], in the apprehension that [the cause] has, [is] the way the form proceeds from it, in this manner. And we have [already] spoken of this matter in the First Treatise [במאמר הראשון] of this second [book/section] [השני מזה הספר].

✻ And here it shall be explained in what way the separate intellects [השכלים הנפרדים] apprehend their causes [עלותיהם] and their effects [ועלוליהם]: that the effect [העלול] does not apprehend its cause [עלתו] [directly], but rather from the side that it is itself an effect, and that its existence is [derived] from another than itself [מזולתו]; and that the cause [העלה], in apprehending [itself], apprehends its effect [עלולה] in a more complete way [than the effect apprehends itself] — by the [very] existence that [the effect] has in it [the cause].

[Book p. 270 — מלחמות ה']

It has been explained that, with respect to what precedes them [במה שקדם], these [separate intellects] are the law [נמוס] of the existents, and their order and their right-arrangement, inasmuch as this law emanates [שופע] from them in [respect of] that wherein lies the perfection [התכלית] of what is possible to perfect by way of the intermediation of the stars [הכוכבים] — as we have said. And [this holds] whether each one of them apprehends a part of this law, or whether [it is] one [intellect] of them [that] apprehends this whole law of the existents in its universality [בכללותו], while the rest [each] apprehends a part of this law.

And when one reflects upon this, it is clear that, even if we grant that one of them apprehends this law of the existents in its universality while the rest [each] apprehends [only] a part of this law, then [still] what the highest intellect apprehends [proceeds, going] from the degree of the form [מדרגת הצורה] to the part which the lower intellect [השכל השפל] apprehends. And indeed, we have said that the lower [intellect] apprehends, of the intelligibles, [only] that which proceeds to it by way of the form [דרך הצורה]; and the perfection [is] not [reached] if it does not apprehend what proceeds to it by way of prime matter [דרך ההיולי]. This is clear to one engaged in natural science [למי שעיין בטבעיות], and from what precedes in this book.

And if we are satisfied [in] this matter [as set out] in this first inquiry — and [if it is] the lower [intellect] that knows, in the perfection of this law of the existents, the lower [existents] [הנמצאות השפלות] and their order and their right-arrangement — then how greatly do I marvel: were this the way [of it], these movers [המניעים] would [have to] long [for / be drawn toward] [שישתוקקו] [the very] substance of their forms [מעצם צורם] [needed] to move their spheres [גלגליהם], in [just] the way [needed] so that this law would be perfected by [it] — [namely,] the law [נמוס] found in [the realm of] the sensible [המוחש].

What is [the meaning of] one [intellect] singling itself out [שייוחד אחד] from another to make this part of the law, while [yet] the form [ציורם] of this law is one

thing in itself? This is what makes [us] see that the lower existents [הנמצאות השפלות] would be perfected by what [the higher intellects] cause to emanate to them [שיושפע להם] from the stars [מהכוכבים] — all of them — and that [each] one would cause to emanate something other than what the [other] star causes to emanate [מהכוכב האחר].

✻ And if it be said to us that they [the intellects] do not long [for this], but rather that there is in them an instrument [כלי] by which to make this [part of the] law — and that, because there was no instrument for them to cause [it] to emanate here, [therefore] except for [its] part [there is] this law — [then we reply that] this [could] only be caused to emanate from them other than the part that is unique to it. We have already said to them [in reply] that this is not the way of natural things [הדברים הטבעיים]: [it is] my will [רצוני] that there be [in] them powers [כחות] [as] agents, and [yet] that nature not let instruments [כלים] [merely] act upon them.

In sum: [the reason] we are obliged to [ascribe to] them the form [הציור] on account of what is found in them by [way of] the emanation [מההשפעה] — rather than [from anything] besides — is what [obliges us]: that [whatever] is found in them [comes] by [way of] the actions [מההשפעה, recte: מהפעולות — "from the effects/actions"]; ✻ [for] we always take a demonstration [מופת] from the actions transmitted [המסורות] from the form [מהצורה] concerning the matter of the form, as is recalled in the Book of the Soul [בספר הנפש] (Aristotle, *De Anima*). And it is not fitting that an instrument [כלי] [merely] act upon them, but rather [that they be] ordered [as] [the source] of their actions.

And further: if it be the case [that they each have a part of the law], it is my will [רצוני] that there be [in] each one of these intellects [the] apprehension of the law of the lower existents [נמוס הנמצאות השפלות] and their order and their right-arrangement, in perfection — [so] that each one of them would apprehend what there is of this single law, and [yet] it [is] what proceeds [going] from the degree of the form [מדרגת הצורה] to what the lower [intellect] apprehends. And if the matter were so, [the verse] "Who can give [it], and [who can] know?" [מי יתן וארע] [an idiomatic expression of the difficulty] [?]: this [is] the thing that the highest [intellect] apprehends, [the very thing] that the lower [intellect] would not apprehend; and it [the apprehension] would proceed within the degree of the form to what the lower [intellect] apprehends.

So, were we satisfied [with] this matter [as set out in] this inquiry, it [would be] obliged [to be] in [such] a manner that there are obliged [to be], from them, the actions [המתחייב … מהם] —

[Book p. 271 — מאמר ה' חלק ג' פרק ח']

[the action] proceeding [in] the degree of the form ordered from them [המסודר מהם]; and this is what is possible [for it] to be perfected by. [In that case,] this would be: the degree of the form proceeding from a part of this law, and it would be the part which the intellect causes to emanate [in] this [matter] by means of the stars [הכוכב]. But [in fact] the degree of the form [would] not proceed to the law of the lower existents [הנמצאות השפלות] in their universality [בכללם], [in] their order and their right-arrangement.

And if we grant [that it is] what the highest [intellect] apprehends [that] makes the degree of the form proceed [as] the lower picture [מצור השפל] — this [is] the apprehension we recalled [earlier] — but [if] another matter makes the form proceed by way of the lower picture, [then] indeed there is no [telling] what this matter is. And it is impossible that a man [should] settle this matter in a fitting way, even if he should wish to order it according to what arises in his heart, [for that would be] vain [and] devoid [of foundation], [pointing] to this sensible [reality] [המוחש].

And since the matter [stands] thus, it has been made clear that it is not fitting for one of the masters of speculation [מבעלי העיון] to settle [the view] that these intellects all apprehend the existents [הנמצאות], [in] their order and their right-arrangement, in perfection. And if we grant that they were all causes [עלות] and effects [ועלולים], such that the lower [intellect] [also] knew the law of these existents and their order and their right-arrangement, [and the part] that proceeds from it [שיושפע ממנו] — [then] the higher [intellect] [also] apprehends the part of the law that proceeds from it, and apprehends, along with this, the lower picture [ציור השפל].

So there would be [an ordered] order proceeding from the higher [intellect], proceeding within the degree of the form to what proceeds [to] the lower [intellect]. How greatly do I marvel: were this the way [of it], how [could] the picture [singled out by] the lower [intellect] [be the very thing] that proceeds from it [in] the actions transmitted [המסודרות, recte: המסורות — "transmitted"] from the lower? — [the very] thing that the elements [היסודות] did not [originally] order, [these being] their actions [in] their own essence [בעצמם] [as derived] from the higher [intellect] — after [it is granted] that the picture [הציור] is already laid down as existing for it [going] down to the lower [picture].

And in sum: just as, when one settles [the question of] this matter in this manner, the first doubt [הספק הראשון] which we recalled in the preceding premise [בהנחה

הקודמת] is [made] obligatory [i.e., resurfaces], so too, if the matter were [thus] — it is my will [רצוני] that their pictures [ציוריהם] proceed [going] within the degree of perfection [מדרגת השלמות] in [respect of] what proceeds to them from the actions [מהפעולות] — [then] in [the relation of] each picture to the second picture, [it follows that] the power [כחם] of the [picture] that proceeds from the one picture to the second picture is what proceeds from the second picture.

And if [we ask] what there is [of difference] between what proceeds to them from the [two] pictures in this manner — [namely] it being my will [רצוני] that there be the [picture] that proceeds from the higher [picture, as it] proceeds within the degree of the form to the lower [picture] — [then] this [reckoning] would be necessarily [reducible] to one of two faces, and each of them is false [שקר]. For one [face] is the manner in which the star [הכוכב] proceeds [going] within the degree of the form by means of the element/instrument [מהיסוד] by which the star causes to emanate [ישפיע] [whatever] the intellect causes to emanate by means of [it] [שישפיע].

[Book p. 272 — מלחמות ה']

✻ And the second face [האופן השני] is that the star [הכוכב] would [have to] be an instrument [כלי] for the higher [intellect] — [an instrument by which] the agent of the composite [המורכב] would proceed within the degree of the form to the composite, or simply [to] that which the lower [intellect] causes [it] to act upon [יפעלהו השפל]. But [against this] there is the [point] we settled in the first manner [באופן הראשון]: it is fitting [to ask] what the number of these movers [המניעים] [would be], for the number of the elements [היסודות] is [precisely] this number; and they [the elements] are already found [to be] more than this number [of movers], as has been explained concerning the matter of the stars and the spheres [הכוכבים והגלגלים].

And further: it would be that each star is found to have a record [רושם] [borne] in the preservation [בשמירה] of the four elements [היסודות הארבעה], and the seasons [התקופות], the four [of which] are renewed [יחדש] by its motion [בתנועתו]. An illustration: in the days of summer [בימות החמה], fire [האש] and air [והאויר] grow strong [יגברו] by reason of the sun's nearness [קורבת השמש] to us; and in the days of the rains [בימות הגשמים], water [המים] and earth [והארץ] grow strong by reason of [the sun's] being distant [מרחקו] from us. And since the matter [stands] thus, it has been explained that it is not possible that a single element [היסוד האחד] be assigned [שייוחס] to a single star [לכבב האחד] on this manner; for to every one of the stars there is found a record [רושם] in all the elements [ביסודות כלם], and were

the records [הרושם] [each] distinct in this [way], they would [each] be of one kind, as [is] visible in their matters [מענינים].

And if we grant that there were [each] some part of them [as] elemental movers [מניעים … היסודות] over their degrees [מדרגותיהם], and the rest [as] movers compounded [מניעים המורכבים] from them over their degrees, then it would be, in [just] this manner, that what proceeds from the higher [intellect] proceeds within the degree of the form [as] that which the lower [intellect] causes to emanate [מהשופע השפל]. And this would be obligatory: when we grant elemental movers [מניעים … היסודות], the doubt [הספק] [concerning] the elements [recurs], which we have [already] recalled; and it is [the case] that there would already be found a record [רושם] [for] each one of them in the elements, and this [too] would not be fitting to be so, according to this premise [ההנחה].

And it would also be obligatory, according to this premise, that the number of these movers [המניעים] [equal] the number of the elements and the composite [from them] — [but] this is the [premise] [whose] nullity has [already] been made clear [מבואר הבטול]; for the number of the elements and the composite from them is greater than the number of these movers by many multiples [כפלים רבים].

And further: if the matter were so, the preservation [שמירת] of the composite [המורכב] [would have been] assigned [מיוחסת] to [just] one of these movers alone, and we [should then] see [as] visible the matter [taking place] in this alternative [בחלוף זה]. An illustration: that we find [that] all [the elements] share [משתחפים] in the preservation of man [the human being] [שמירת האדם] — and this is [the very thing] which suffices for whoever makes use of the laws of the stars [משפטי הכוכבים] [astrology], [though] the use [of them] is slight [השתמשות מעט]. This [is] a thing [that is] not possible, according to this premise.

And in sum: were we to wish to recall all the doubts [הספקות] [that follow as] obligatory from these premises, we would [be obliged to] gather [them into] a long discourse [למאמר ארוך]; and so [we are compelled] to be brief, and to stand here upon what there is in [it] [that is] sufficient by [way of] its nullity [בבטולם].

And when one reflects [on the fact] that there is nothing that proceeds from them, of the actions [מהפעולות], proceeding within the degree of perfection [as] some part of these movers [המניעים] [does] to a [completed] end [לקצת] — and it has been made clear that, were these [intellects' pictures] [as] their pictures [ציוריהם] [are], proceeding to a [completed] degree of perfection, it would be fitting that the matter be so in their actions [בפעולותיהם] — [then] it has been made clear that their pictures [ציוריהם] do not proceed to a [completed] degree of perfection. And

here it has been explained that these intellects [השכלים] do not [all] have, [each] of them, some part [of the law], [in] the way the preceding [philosophers] laid down [שהניחו הקודמים].

✻ And [now] we grant that none of these intellects is a cause [עלה] of another. [It would then be] difficult for us to give [account of] the cause [הסבה] [present] in the motion of the spheres [בתנועת הגלגלים] — [the spheres] in which there is no star [שאין בהם כוכב] — for it appears that their motion [שתנועתם] is [due to] something [arising] from the actions [מהפעולות], yet it does not proceed from them in their own essence [בעצמם] [as] a thing [arising] from the actions. And accordingly it is fitting to say: that because the spheres of the star [שגלגלי הכבב] of [any] one [planet] are servants [משרתים] to the sphere of the [main] star [לגלגל הכבב], its movers [מניעיהם] are [in fact] movers [moving them] from the [main] mover, [namely] the mover of the sphere of the star [ממניע גלגל הכבב]; and this [main mover] is what gives them the order [סדר], [these movers] for which the [secondary] pictures [הציורים] are [such] that their elements [are] ordered [as] the motion of the sphere of the star [גלגל הכבב].

But [we ask]: if there is in them one intellect [שכל אחד] that is a cause [עלה] to the rest of the separate intellects [השכלים הנפרדים]; or [whether] there is not among them one that is a cause to another; but [in any case] each one of them apprehends a part of this law of the existents and their order and their right-arrangement — and there is not among them one [single intellect] that apprehends this law of the existents in perfection — then [the question] of this [is] among the things it is fitting to investigate. And we say: because this law is not perfected for these existents [unless it be] in [respect of] the universals [בכללות] of these spheres [הגלגלים], it would not be the case that each [single] intellect apprehends the law of the existents in their entirety [בכללם]; [rather,] it would be that the attainment of perfection [הגעת השלמות] in these existents [comes to be] in [the form of] a species [במין], [arising] from chance [מן המקרה], as [is] the matter…

[Book p. 273 — מאמר ה' חלק ג' פרק ח']

among the masters of the subordinate, interchanging crafts: their whole [enterprise] is not completed by a single craft taken alone, because the [individual workers] who serve the one [master] craft are not [each masters] of one [whole] craft. Rather, it is in the way that their actions are completed by a single craft taken as a whole [out of all of them], and this is plain in its own right.

Now since the matter stands thus, this very thing must be the case [here too]: that there be assigned to these [movers] an underlying cause, higher than they, by which their [actions] are completed and from which they all flow as one. That cause orders these movers and their spheres in such a way that it brings to completion the pattern of the existents, their order, and their right-arrangement in the most perfect way possible.

But it has not yet been explained whether this higher cause is itself one of the movers of the heavenly bodies, or whether it is something else apart from them. This is among the things we must still investigate.

And since the matter stands thus, the following is clear: that the spheres of the [planet] in which there is a star are subordinate to the movers of the [principal] spheres they serve there. Now the movers of the spheres of the stars are all effects in a single way — that is, if one of them is the first cause, then [the rest follow from it]; ✻ and if none of them is the first cause —

[Book p. 273, cont.]

as will be explained further on — then they are all effects of the first cause in a single way, with no one of them being a cause to another, as will be explained further on. (It is my intent [to say] that no one of them is a cause to another, as has [also] been explained earlier.)

It would then [follow] that each one of the movers of the spheres of the stars apprehends [only] the part of the pattern of these lower existents that is singled out for it by [the mover's own] action; and that the first cause [alone] apprehends the [whole] pattern of these existents, their order, and their right-arrangement in the way [in which] these [individual movers] and their spheres complete it.

And we apprehend, regarding this [arrangement], in what way these effect-movers are obligated [to be derived] from it. For this is what is fitting to be intelligible to it [the first cause]: namely, that they [the movers] are appointed [to bring about] in them [the existents] the [most] perfect end possible — these [effects] being what flows from that from which it flows. And this cannot but come about by chance and by accident, as has been explained earlier.

Now [consider]: which of the spheres serving the sphere of [a given] star is the more noble [נכבד]? Here it appears that the one whose motion is the slower [המתאחר התנועה] is the more noble, since it is the one that apprehends the matter [requiring] the longer duration of [its] preservation [arising] from the [mover] that hastens the motion [הממהר בו התנועה]; for what flows from it [the slower] is

[present] in an action more diminished than the action by which what flows from the [mover] that hastens the motion is reached.

[Book p. 273, cont.]

But [now consider]: which among the spheres of the stars is the more noble [גלגלי הככבים … יותר נכבד]? Here it appears that this [too] becomes plain, and is something a knowing person would judge by two sides [considerations]:

The first side is their differing [התחלפם] in the multitude or the paucity of their stars, and in the magnitude of the star or its smallness, as measured against its sphere. ✻ And the second side is their differing in the swiftness of motion and its slowness, and in the multitude or paucity of the instruments [הכלים] serving them. Thus, that [sphere] in which there are more stars is the more noble, for what flows from it is reached by a single motion in [a] far greater number of actions, on the side of the multitude of the stars that are in it. And it has [also] been explained that the sphere of the fixed stars [גלגל הככבים הקיימים] is the more noble out of all the [other] spheres, on the side of the multitude of stars that are in it. ✻ And the cause for which the spheres of the sun and the moon are more noble than the rest of the spheres of the [other] stars [is] that there is no [matching multitude]—

[Book p. 274 — מלחמות ה']

—in them, [for there is] only a single star [in each]; [yet they are nobler] because these stars are larger in their bodies, relative to their spheres, than the rest of the stars. So the sphere of Venus [נוגה] will be more noble than the rest of the spheres of the stars. And the sphere of Jupiter [צדק] will be more noble than the spheres of Saturn [שבתאי], Mars [מאדים], and Mercury [כוכב]; and the sphere of Jupiter will be more noble than the sphere of Mercury. ✻ And by this [same] syllogism the rest [of the rankings] will be explained, as to which is the more noble than [its] neighbor.

And it has already been explained, from this, that the sphere of the sun is more noble than the sphere of the moon, since the light of the sun is always great, whereas the full light of the moon is found complete only at the time of opposition; and further, since the moon receives its light from the sun. ✻ But on the side of [its having] the lagging motion [אחור התנועה — precession-direction motion], it will be explained that the sphere of the fixed stars is the more noble, in that there belongs to it a slower-lagging motion [along] the length [longitude] than is found in the rest of the stars.

And from this [latter side] it will [conversely] follow that the sphere of Saturn is more noble than the spheres of the sun, Venus, and Mercury; and that the spheres of the sun, Venus, and Mercury are more noble than the sphere of the moon. ✻ But on the side of the paucity of [serving] instruments, it will be explained that the sphere of the fixed stars is the more noble, and after it—

[Book p. 274, cont.]

—the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, and Venus; and after them the sphere of Mercury; and after them the sphere of the moon. And this [holds] entirely, if no [further] spheres are added [beyond] those mentioned for these stars.

But if [further] spheres are added to them in the manner we have recalled, then the rank [degree] of the moon will be, on this [count], equal to the rank of Saturn and Jupiter, and after them Mars and Venus, and after them Mercury. ✻ And here it has been explained, as well, that the sphere of the fixed stars is the more noble among the stars, by all these [considerations] taken together.

And it has [already] been explained, too, that it is the more noble of them in [yet] another way — namely, that it is the [thing] complete [in respect] of what is given to them of the actions in [a particular] way, on the side of the parts that differ from it, as [we said] earlier. And from this it is plain that the sphere of the fixed stars is the more noble [out of] all the spheres [taken] together, and that it is encompassing them all [מקיף בכולם — the outermost].

פרק תשיעי [Chapter Nine]

[Small-type descriptive line:] In which it will be explained that the movers of the heavenly bodies do not apprehend the pattern of the lower existents except [insofar as] what flows from them, apart from the temperaments [התמזגות], makes [those existents'] stars individuate their parts somewhat.

[Book p. 275 — מאמר ה' חלק ג' פרק י']

[Note: the running header at the top of p. 275 reads "פרק י'" (chapter 10), one chapter ahead of the body, which still completes chapter 9 here — a premature running header, recorded per rule 10.]

And since it has [already] been explained that each separate mover of the spheres of the stars apprehends the part of the pattern of the existents that flows from it [singled out] in itself, it is now fitting to investigate whether the mover of the [given] sphere of the star apprehends, on the side of the temperaments [ההתמזגות] that come to be newly [in matter], what is individuated by the

conjunction [נצוץ] of [its] star with the rest of the stars; or whether it apprehends only what flows from it [singled out] in itself.

And we say [first the supposing party's case]: if we grant that [the mover] does not apprehend what is obligated [to come about] from [these] temperaments — [namely,] that it apprehends [only] what flows from the stars with which it conjoins — this would be thought to be the reverse of what has been explained, namely [the proposition] that [the mover] is fitted to apprehend

[Book p. 275, cont.]

each [thing] that flows from it. And if we grant that it apprehends what is obligated [to come about] from these temperaments, then it would by necessity have had knowledge of what flows [to it] from the stars with which it conjoins; and there would be present to it the conception [הציור] by which they [the stars] are all conceived; and it would be obligated that each one of them [the movers] apprehend the [whole] pattern of the existents and their order in perfection. But the nullity of this has [already] been explained earlier.

Now [we ask] how is it to be explained which [horn] is obligatory: if one posits that [the mover] apprehends what is obligated by the temperaments — that is, that it apprehends what flows from the stars that mix [temper] together with it? On this [we say]: this matter of the temperament — since the temperament is a compound of the simples [הפשוטים] out of which it is compounded, and their natures are [present] in it according to the proportion of the temperaments — must [be apprehensible only] by one who knows the nature of the temperaments [as] he knows the nature of the simples whose temperament and proportion are in the temperament.

And we say [further]: it has [already] been thought-likely that each one of the movers of the spheres of the stars apprehends what flows from it, apart from the temperament; but [that] it does not apprehend what flows from it within the temperaments. And [yet]

[Book p. 275, cont.]

this consideration [too] would be a [legitimate] objection to the first cause [העלה הראשונה], for what these movers and their spheres flow [forth] suffices to complete the pattern of the existents, their order, and their right-arrangement. ✻ This is just as [it is] in the matter of the serving crafts [המלאכות המשרתות]: each [craftsman] apprehends what is related to the [master] craft, but not what is joined to his own craft from the rest of the serving crafts; rather, the joining-

together belongs to this master craft, [and only it] apprehends the joining-together of this master craft. So [too] is the matter here.

And here it has been explained that the difference between the conception of the first cause and the conception of these movers is exceedingly wonderful [נפלא מאד]. For these movers do not apprehend any part of the pattern of the existents, their order, and their right-arrangement except the [single] part that flows [from each of them]; and even that part they do not apprehend in perfection, since they do not apprehend [it within] the temperaments. But the first cause apprehends the pattern of the existents, their order, and their right-arrangement in perfection. ✻ And this will be explained [together] with what was [already] said in the First Treatise of this book — that there is no [proper] relation between the conception of the first cause and the conception of these movers.

[Book p. 275, cont.]

פרק עשירי [Chapter Ten]

[Small-type descriptive line:] In which it will be explained that there is no [common] ratio between the [time-]periods of the motions of the stars — [namely] that some of them, in relation to others, are irrational [בלתי מדבר — incommensurable].

It is fitting that we investigate whether the ratio [יחס] of the [time-]periods of the motions of the stars, some to others, is such that it could be irrational [incommensurable], or whether this is impossible. ✻ And we say that, because it has [already] been explained that these motions are ordered in a way that completes through them what was [described] here, and that the intellect [השכל] is what orders them in this [way] so as to complete through them these existents — here it is plain that it would be impossible for their ratio to be irrational. For if it were so, there would be something not [fully] grasped that is obligated by the temperaments belonging to them, in that they [the periods] would not return [to a common cycle] within [a span] in which their [end-]point now [lies] with [its] endpoint to eternity, since their motions, some to others, are [posited as] irrational; and there would be newly produced

[Book p. 276 — מלחמות ה']

—relations among them that are not encompassed [by knowledge]. And [the reason] this [matter's] way cannot [contain] within it a [grasped] knowledge is that knowledge [must be] of a thing that is encompassed and bounded; but these relations [in the irrational case] would [have to] be such that they could be

known [completely]. ✻ Therefore, if this be so, it is impossible that this relation be irrational.

And if someone says that [the motions] have already returned, in [a span] near to the [common] point in which they [coincide], and that no relation comes to be from [their] difference [other than] one already imprinted [מהחלוף ... רושם מוחש — a perceptible record] — we say to him: by [taking] the multiple of this measure many times over, there will come to be from it something for which there will be a perceptible measure, and these encompassed relations — which the first intellect [השכל הראשון] knew [of] these stars — would be thrown into confusion by this. And since the matter stands thus, it is plain that it must [therefore] be the case that the time-periods of the motions belonging to the stars, some to others, are not irrational [incommensurable].

פרק אחד עשר [Chapter Eleven]

[Small-type descriptive line:] In which it will be explained that there is no [created] entity — the Name, blessed be He — apart from the mover of the sphere of the fixed stars, as people have reckoned [שחשבו אנשים].

[Book p. 276, cont.]

It is fitting that we investigate whether the mover of the sphere of the [fixed] stars is the Name [God], blessed and exalted is He, or whether [there] is a deity higher than it [the mover] in rank. For the earlier [philosophers] already said that the [supreme] deity is [nothing] other than the mover of the sphere of the stars; and some of them said that the deity is the mover of the sphere of the stars [itself]. And here we find one of these opinions [arising] from [each] view.

Now [in favor of] this: it has [already] appeared that the mover of the sphere of the stars is the deity, blessed be He, [as one judges] from [these considerations]. For inasmuch as we have found that these [other] movers move the spheres in the way that what flows from them flows to the existents according to [what is fitting for] the conception [the design], here it would be thought to be obligated, from this, that the deity, blessed be He, [be] the mover of [some particular] sphere — that being [the one] which apprehends the [whole] pattern of the existents; and were this not [so], there would be present here a cause [עלה] that has no agent [אין פועל לה].

And this is the contention [הטענה] upon which Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] leaned in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע]; and he explained, from

it, that the mover of the sphere of the stars is the deity, blessed be He — and he reckoned this to be the opinion of the Philosopher [Aristotle].

[Book p. 276, cont.]

And [in favor of the contrary]: it is from [the consideration] that, according to what we explained earlier — that the movers of the spheres of the rest of the stars [are not the deity] — namely, that the mover of the sphere of the fixed stars [גלגל הככבים הקיימים] has [its] arrangements [יסודרו] flowing from it [in] many actions, on the side of the multitude of the stars in it, and on the side of the temperaments that come to be newly by their conjunctions [מנצוציהם]. And just so, [the deity] has also given to the rest of the stars [their proper] arrangement, [each] in the way [in which] there belongs to them what there is of the actions. ✻ Therefore, [as to] which of those endowed-with-properties [הסגולות] it is fitting to find [posited] as first, here it would be thought-likely that the mover of the sphere of the [fixed] stars is the deity, blessed be He.

— But it has already appeared, in [yet] another way, that the mover of the sphere of the stars is not the deity, blessed be He. ✻ And this [is] what has [already] been explained — namely, that the mover of the sphere of the stars does not apprehend the entire ordered pattern [of all] the rest of the stars, nor [does it apprehend] the temperaments that are individuated by the conjunction of its star [with others], nor the temperaments that come to be from some endpoint of the rest of the stars [conjoining] with [another] endpoint. But the first [cause] must by necessity apprehend the pattern of the existents in its entirety, in that it is ordered [as proceeding] from it [from God], blessed be He; and it is [that] which…

it arranges some of the spheres with respect to that part of the order [נמוס] which belongs to them, and arranges others with respect to another part, in such a way that the whole of this order is completed through all of them taken together — in the manner in which a part of the people complete the work [מלאכה] [assigned to] them, and another part complete the rest of it, so that from the totality of their efforts there results the ordering of the city. Were it not for this wondrous arrangement, this ordering of the city could not be brought to completion by way of chance; and the completion of an affair as wondrous as this cannot possibly come about by way of chance. Therefore it necessarily follows that what completes this [order] from its own side, in its totality, is that which is the cause of them all — as we explained previously in this connection, according to what was set out earlier. And [the mover of the star-sphere] will be explained [to be] the Deity, may He be blessed.

Moreover, [we maintain] that the First [הראשון] and the most perfect [is such] in a manner whereby there obtains no relation [יחס] or comparison between Him and any one sphere [taken singly]: His matter [i.e., concern] bears upon all of them and is shared among them all, in a way it would not be fitting to attribute to Him, may He be blessed [if He were the mover of but one]. And further, since from Him there proceeds the existence [המציאות] of all the existents in their totality — not a part to the exclusion of [another] part — [it follows that He cannot be] a body particularized from among the [heavenly] bodies, which would receive an influence [שיושפע בו] [only in part].

Now we have already said this much: it is evident that the movers of the heavenly bodies [מניעי הגרמים השמימיים] are bound to their respective spheres in the manner that the intellect of a man is bound [to him], as we mentioned in the First Book of this work [מאמר ראשון מזה הספר]. And from this it follows that the [supposed] difficulty is removed — the objection which obliged [the conclusion] that the mover of the fixed-star sphere [מניע גלגל הכוכבי] is God, may He be blessed.

This [objection ran as follows]: it would be the case that God, may He be blessed, moves some particular sphere, and so there would be no act [פועל] belonging to Him [beyond that one sphere]; but it would indeed be obligatory upon Him [to be the cause of the order of the whole]. Yet [the objection supposed] that, were we to grant that there is here a mover that has no act [extending] to [the rest], then it would not follow that He is the cause [of all] — and this is something that does not follow from this premise [הנחה], for the First [Cause] is itself the mover of all the spheres [in the sense that] all the spheres are [arranged] in this manner. [It moves them] by reason of [its being] the soul of the First Cause, the very [cause] from which there proceeds the [order belonging] to those which are moved by them; and through this their action would be [ordered].

And further, [we say] that it is fitting that the matter be so [arranged] with respect to the First Cause — for it is from Him that the universal order of all the existents [נמוס הנמצאות בכללותו] is poured forth, in such a way that it would be fitting that it be bound to a body particularized from among the [heavenly] bodies which are influenced [by Him] [recte: read as "it would NOT be fitting that the universal order be bound to a particular body"]. [That is,] the order of these existents [proceeds from Him], and so it is fitting that it should [proceed] from Him [alone]. And since the matter is so, the great point [העקר] follows: that He would be the agent over and above [שיהיה פועלה משאר] the rest of the movers which act, and what He sets [in order] is other than what these [lesser movers

set]; the [agent] thus described in this respect, may His name be magnified — as is described of the One who speaks [המדבר המתואר], may His name be exalted from this [station]. And by this it is made clear that He is the most genuine [agent], being…

[the One who] orders them and sets them straight: He is God, may He be blessed. And behold, [we now consider] all these existents, all of them, according to what is said: the movers of the heavenly bodies [do not] attain the order of the existents [in its entirety], for they attain only a small part of it — each one of them [attaining only] his [own portion], apart from the [total] blendings [התמזגות]; and [we have said] that their motions [תנועותם] are by way of yearning [התשוקה] and representation [הציור], [a yearning] which is for them this wondrous, perpetual yearning toward the universal order of the existents [נמוס הנמצאות]. Behold, it is made clear from this that the form [ציורה] of this order is [but] a part of the perfected order [הנמוס השלם], and through it they are perpetually [moved] and ever desire to perform [their part]; [this is] the perfect desire [החשק השלם] which is in them by virtue of the First Cause [הסבה הראשונה], may He be blessed, who is the agent [who acts] perpetually [upon] all the existents. To Him [each of these movers turns], for each one of them yearns [כוסף] to attain its own perfection from the order which belongs to it by virtue of the soul of the First Cause.

But [as for] that which it is obligatory should belong to God, may He be exalted — namely, that He [does that] which it is obligatory He should be found to bring about for that mover, [which is] a property [סגולה] of His — [this] is not improper [to attribute to Him]. Rather, the matter is the reverse: that very [mover] attains the universal order of the existents [נמוס הנמצאות], and this — as I mentioned — is, to my mind, what is obligatory: that He be the one who orders them and sets them straight. And here it is made clear that God [is the mover], not the [star-sphere itself], and the doubts [הספקות] that fall under this [head] are dissolved.

פרק שנים עשר [Chapter Twelve]

[Sub-rubric:] In which it will be explained by which of the descriptions [התוארים] it is fitting that He, may He be blessed, be described, and how they are related to the movers [המניעים] that are caused by Him, according to what is possible for us.

It is fitting that we inquire — according to what is possible for us — into which of the descriptions [are such that] it is fitting that God, may He be blessed, be described [by them], and by which of them not, and how [these descriptions] are related to the movers caused by Him. For it has been made clear that the path of

this inquiry is to begin from God, may He be blessed, [proceeding] from [His] acts [הפעולות]; and [we must consider] by which manner [these descriptions] are found of Him, that we may know what it is fitting [to say] regarding that by which God, may He be blessed, is described.

Let us say, then: it has already been made clear, from what was said previously, that the [movers of the] heavenly bodies attain in part [a measure of] that universal order of the existents — [namely] that part which is related and proper to them, [according to] what is poured forth upon them — but this [particular] order is not perfected [in them] save in the universalities of these [orders taken together]. This matter is ordered for them from a higher cause…

[a cause] which perfects all these movers together. And through this, their being poured forth [from it] [proceeds]; the universal order of the existents is more perfect in the inward [intellects] [שבפנים], and from the First Cause [proceeds] the apprehension [ההשגה] of the universal order of the existents in [those] inward [movers]. And through this [it follows] that what it apprehended therein [is such that] its level [מדרגת] of form [comes] from it [the First], inasmuch as that which is intelligized [המושכל] is itself the First Cause [הסבה הראשונה]; for that which is intellect and that which intelligizes [המשכיל] is one thing of necessity, as the Philosopher [הפילוסוף] explained, and it has [also] been explained in the First Book of this work [מאמר הראשון מזה הספר]. Therefore this would be the cause that the apprehension [השגה] itself is the apprehension of all the existents together, just as it has already preceded in the First Book [מאמר הראשון] that the First Cause [or: First Intellect] apprehends its own essence [עצמותה]; and in its apprehending its own essence [it apprehends what is] most perfect among the inward [movers], for it is the [apprehension] which apprehends them, having attained them by the side [by which] they were all one thing, [that is,] of necessity [their being apprehended is] one in number [אחד במספר]. And this is what proceeds from them in [respect of] their grade of perfection [מדרגת השלמות].

And it is made clear that the meaning of this apprehension is that it cleaves to it [רבק לה] perpetually, cleaving with a cleaving [such that] it is impossible [for it to be] otherwise — for were it not so at some time, there would then be no intellect [שכל], and the soul would be lost, [that is,] that which is impossible should be lost [שאי אפשר שיפסד]. It is also made clear, in like manner, that it apprehends all these intelligibles [המושכלות] together, not one [intelligible] apprehending them one after another, [and] so it does not require [recourse] to memory [הזכירה]. And this is made clear…

[Lacuna: a faint horizontal blank — appears to be a paragraph rule, not lost text]

[A new paragraph:] And behold, it has been made clear that the sweetness [הערבות] and the joy [השמחה] [are present] in this apprehension in the most perfect manner that is in the inward [movers], just as the Philosopher [הפילוסוף] explained — namely, that apprehension is a thing [in which there is] sweetness for those who apprehend, and the more honorable [נכבד] the thing [apprehended], the more honorable [the apprehension]. Through this [the First Cause] has its joy [שמחתו] and its sweetness [ערבותו], in proportion to what it apprehends; and it apprehends all things, attaining them in the most honorable manner — the grade of this sweetness and joy, as we mentioned, [being] the mighty joy [השמחה העצומה] and the strong sweetness which are found among the honorable beings [הנכבדים]. From this it follows that there is found, of this joy and sweetness — the sweetness which is attained through corporeal things [דברים הגופים] and that which [is attained] from the First [Cause] [a measure beyond compare]. And [a measure] equal to this we shall find for ourselves [in but a small portion of time]…

[an amount] of [it]. The intellect cannot, in [a span] of time, isolate itself [להתבודד] in this apprehension save for a small amount of time, and [even] this is for us [achieved only] with mighty difficulty [בקושי עצום]. And [that apprehension] which is desirable [מחמדת] to us without interruption [בלא הפסק] would be the apprehension [that is] more wondrous, without measure [לאין שעור] — for there is no relation [אין יחס] between difficulty [קושי] and what is found [accompanied] by little [difficulty]; with [great] difficulty [we attain] a little, [whereas the First Cause attains] in all things the most honorable side [בצר היותר נכבד] without measure, for there is no relation between the intellect [המושכל] which it [the First Cause] apprehended [and our own]. The First Cause [הסבה הראשונה] [is so].

[New paragraph:] And from this side it is likewise made clear that there is no relation [אין יחס] between God, may He be blessed, in respect of His apprehending Himself, [and] joy [השמחה] and [the joy of] the heavenly [movers] [השמימיים]. And in this the early Sages [חכמינו הקודמים] concurred: that [the highest joy] is with God, may He be blessed; and this is their saying that the [ultimate] purpose [תכלית] of joy is in the grade of God, may He be blessed — [thus] they said upon this matter. And in this, likewise, the [early Sages] concurred — [namely] that [the apprehension comes] from God, may He be blessed; and this is what David, peace be upon him, said of it: "the fullness of joys is in Your presence" [שובע שמחות את פניך] [Tehillim 16:11], according to what [we said]: the more honorable the thing apprehended, the more honorable the joy.

And behold, it is made clear, likewise, that He is the life [החיות], the [most perfect] life; and that to which a [greater] portion of it is allotted will have [more of] life — the gathering [האספוג] of the days being least in the eighth [grade] of life, [namely that] which is apprehended by the sense of touch [חוש המשוש]. And man is the most honorable [in this], according to that which is in him, for his apprehension is more [perfect], by which the living, perceiving [being] [החי מהבלתי חי] [recte: read "by which the living is distinguished from the non-living"] [is distinguished]; and the more perfect his life, the more perfect the [being's] life.

[New paragraph:] He [God] is life, the most perfect that can be — for it has been made clear from this that there is no relation [שאין יחס] in the matter of the life [of God to other beings], inasmuch as there is no relation between its apprehension and their apprehension [השגתם]. And since [its] life [is so], there is a sweetness [ערב] possible [to it] without measure [לאין שעור].

[New paragraph:] And behold, it is made clear, likewise, that He is the most [perfect] [being] — [for] each of the substances [העצמים] are posterior [מאוחרים] to Him, and [it is fitting] that He be a substance [עצם], inasmuch as substance is prior [הקודם] — as has been explained in [the science of] what is after [the study of] nature [i.e., the Metaphysics] [מה שאחר הטבע]. And in [the respect] that He is substance, He is substance [עצם], and God, may He be blessed, is in some respect a substance of necessity [עצם בהכרח]. But [yet] in some manner — inasmuch as He did not acquire this [substantiality from another] — this matter [stands] the reverse [in His case]: it is from [Him] that there are poured forth the matters [העניינים] that come to be [in] the work [במלאכה], in the manner [in] which they are in the soul of the craftsman [נפש האומן].

[New paragraph:] And behold, it is made clear, likewise, that He is the most [genuine existent] — [for] the existent [הנמצא] is said with respect to priority [בקדימה] of the substance [העצם]; and [it] is said also of nature [הטבע], and is said in a posterior [sense] [באחור] of the accidents [המקרים], according to the side of substance by which they are found [in it]. And from this [it follows] that "existent" [נמצא] is said first of God, may He be blessed, for…

existence from itself. Each of the other substances [העצמים], by contrast, has acquired its existence from Him. For this reason it has been shown that He is more truly designated by the name "Existent" [הנמצא] than is any other existent apart from Him. For with respect to anything by which the other things are described as bearing some description, He, may He be blessed, possesses that description more truly than they do. In sum: since form is what makes a thing exist in the manner in which it does exist, and since God, may He be blessed, is

the form of all things — the form from which all forms emanate — it is clear that He confers existence upon all things in the manner in which they are designated as bearing the name "existent."

By this same investigation it becomes clear that He is more truly designated by the name "One" than is anything else. For it is form that renders each of the parts of a thing one in the way it is one — this being the unification of things that comes by way of their form. And it is by this consideration that it is fitting to describe God, may He be blessed, by both these attributes together — I mean, to assert of Him "Existence" [ההיוה] and "Oneness" — as it is said: "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is One" (Devarim 6:4).

Here Ibn Sina [אבן סינא] erred, by no slight error [טעות אינו מועט]. He held that it is not fitting to describe God, may He be blessed, by both these attributes, since (on his view) it appears that existence and unity are an accident befalling the essence — that is, something superadded to the essence [העצם]. But Aristotle [ארסטוטלוס] has already shown — in a way that leaves no doubt as to the nullity of this position — in the third chapter of the treatise marked with the letter gimel, which is the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע]. This is the language of that chapter: that "the one" and "the existent" follow upon one and the same thing, or that their natures are one; for each of them is drawn along with the other in the primary entailment, and the removal of one of them carries off the other to its furthest extent — and not according to anything one of them signifies beyond the other.

There is no difference between them in reference. Even if we should distinguish them in thought — as when one says "one man" and "a man exists," when a man is in fact one — these do not signify distinct things when both are applied. For it is known that the word "man," given that a man is one thing, does not signify distinct things, and the one term does not signify anything other than the other beyond the same existent. So too the expression here: it is known that what is added here signifies one and the same thing and does not signify anything other than the other beyond the same existent.

And let it further be said that the very essence of all things is not of the genus of accident; and therefore it is said that the very essence of each existent is an existent. It is known, moreover, that the count of "one" goes by the count of the existent's form. This is what we explained on this point in our exposition of the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע].

But "the one" and "the existent" are unified, in that they are one and the same thing in reference, since by some single nature they come to be one and the same existent; and therefore their distinction is borne in reference alone. It is clear how this is so: each is drawn along with its fellow in the primary entailment, and the removal of one of them carries off the other to its furthest extent — in keeping with their signifying one and the same thing. Were there terms signifying distinct things of it, it would be clear that there is no such unity, for in that case the matter would turn on each one's being defined as some other thing.

This would hold of both terms together, since "the existent" and "the one" stand in the rank of synonymous names. For if the matter were so, then just as we said "the existent stands in one rank," we would also say "the existent stands in a distinct rank" — yet they signify one and the same quiddity [מהות], with their distinction. In sum, then, "the one" signifies it from the side of the privation of division, and "the existent" signifies it from the side of the existence belonging to it.

Aristotle made clear that, even though the matter is to be conceived in thought in this way, his intent is to say that the two are not one in definition [בגדר], though in themselves they are the very same thing. With all this, there is no difference between them — between "the one" and "the existent." He said this because most things are drawn along together in part and are interchangeable in their respective referents, as is the case with the risible and the rational [the laugher and the speaker]. Aristotle labored to make clear that "the one" and "the existent" are the very same thing in itself.

This is made clear from this side as well: when one says "one man," "a man exists," and "a man," these all signify one and the same thing — namely the sensible man, of whom this word is predicated in this expression. For these predicated terms add nothing to the essence of man. By contrast, when we say "a writing man" and "a white man," these do signify distinct things in themselves, and they signify the same one thing only by accident; the intent is what is predicated of a man by accident, that he should be a writer.

It is therefore clear that such predicates signify distinct things, yet when doubled they signify the same thing — as when we say "this is one," "this is a man," "this is one existent," or "this man exists." Were the matter otherwise, then, inasmuch as each of them signifies the essence of the thing in one respect, [we would find] it signifying the essence of some distinct thing.

The point is that these doubled predicates necessarily signify distinct things [only] when the doublings are redundantly doubled — as when we said of Reuben [ראובן] that "Reuben is white" and that "he writes." For the one predicate there signifies, of the thing besides him, the accident of existence that befell the white one, Reuben; and the other signifies the existence of writing in him. But where they are not redundantly doubled, we should reckon both of them as signifying one and the same thing — namely "Reuben," by way of example. For when "Reuben" remains as the subject that is "white," this signifies the predicating of the name "white" upon him, the subject being Reuben; and so too when he is called by his name.

Since the matter is so, our point regarding these predicates — when "the one" and "the existent" are doubled — is that they do not signify distinct things. For there is no difference between the expression "a man exists" or "a man is one" and the bare term "a man" [recte: the bare "a man" signifies no more than "a man exists" or "a man is one"]; they signify distinct things only beyond the second predicate, where it is joined to the first, the two being the other [predicate]; and the predicate by which these two predicates are reckoned together — "one man" — stands neither in coming-to-be nor in corruption. The point concerns the term "existent": insofar as it tends toward coming-to-be, it is not yet an existent in actuality such that it should be an actual man; rather, what it is stands in corruption — and so this expression is, as we said, "a man exists."

Aristotle did not, however, intend to compare this case to "another man," so that one would say "one other man," in the way most people compare the matter in order to make plain that a thing is what it is. And it is possible that what is meant by those who say there is no difference between "a man" and "a man exists" is that in corruption too there is no such difference —

— no difference between saying "the man is one man," "not by acquisition" and "not by privation"; for none of these signifies anything beyond what its expression signifies of the other. It is clear that the former explanation is the more fitting. And likewise the matter of "a thing is one": we said there is no difference between "a man is one" and "a man" [recte: "a man exists"], just as there is no difference between our saying "a man exists" and "a man is one," in coming-to-be or in corruption.

If so, then, it is clear that these doubled predicates signify one and the same thing; and it is therefore clear that "the one" does not signify some other thing besides the existent — for were it signifying some other thing besides it, then these doubled predicates would necessarily be signifying distinct things when doubled.

Let it further be made clear, in another way, that "the one" is nothing other than the very existent itself. This is because the very essence of each thing is one not by way of accident. The intent is that it is not one by reason of an accident befalling it, as would be the case were the property of the white thing found in it; rather, it is one by way of itself, and "one" does not signify in it anything superadded to it.

This is clear: for if "the one" were predicated of all things by reason of an accident befalling them, then "the one" would be a genus to all things, just as quality [הכמיות] is a genus to all the qualities — and this is impossible. For if "the one" were a genus, it would be impossible for "the one" to be predicated of the differentiae by which the species under it are divided, since a genus cannot be predicated of the differentiae by which the species under it are divided — just as "living" is not predicated of "rational" and "flying" [as differentiae]. Yet "one" is indeed predicated of the rational and the flying. Rather, "the one," as our argument has shown, is predicated of each of the differentiae of the existents.

So too here: if each thing were one by reason of an accident befalling it, then — as has already been shown — it would be possible that the alteration befalling that thing from that accident, when it is named by a name signifying that thing simply as derived from that accident, would be a thing not yet posited; and that thing would then be described by that description as a thing not [genuinely] one — which is false, for there is no accident in it that one might name by its name. This is false, for it has already been shown that "a thing exists" can be described as "one."

And further: were each thing one by reason of an accident befalling it, then it would follow from this accident — when we designate it by a name not yet posited — that the thing named by that description, from the side of its other accident, is itself another accident found in it; and one would proceed in this way without limit.

Since the matter is so, it has been shown that "the one" does not signify a superadded accident, nor any [distinct] quiddity. For this reason, too, it is said that the very essence of each thing is an existent — I mean, that "the existent" does not signify of the thing an accident superadded to the quiddity. This too is clear from what was shown before: for if "the existent" signified of things an accident superadded to their essences, then "the existent" would be a genus to all things — and this is impossible, since "the existent" is predicated of each of the differentiae by which the existents are divided, [whereas a genus cannot be]. It is therefore clear by this, in the manner [shown] —

— that there is no doubt as to the nullity of what Ibn Sina said concerning the matter of the existent and the one. And from what has been made clear about these attributes, it is fitting that God, may He be blessed, be described by them, as the Torah laid it down.

Likewise it has been shown, from what was said before, that He is more truly than every existent besides Him fit to be called "Agent" [פועל]. For He sets all the other things acting in their rank within the master crafts [המלאכות הראשיות], together with the crafts subordinate to it. For the master craft is that which directly governs the crafts subordinate to it, so as to do what it sets them to do, by way of the work's coming to the fitting end the master craft purposed. And this comes about through the desire [התשוקה] found in each of the movers of the heavenly bodies [ממניעי הגרמים השמיימים] for attaining their portion of the order [emanating] from the soul of the First Cause [נפש הסבה הראשונה], in the respect in which that portion is part of the complete order — as we explained before. They yearn after the greatness of that conception [הציור], to realize it in their spheres in this wondrous manner. And this First Cause is the first agent in this way, the agent from whom proceeds this mode of all the existents, all of them.

And inasmuch as this act, which proceeds in ordered fashion from Him to the existents, is their perfection and their final end, which is the good — it is fitting that God, may He be blessed, be described as the one who does good and is gracious [מטיב וחונן], who emanates more good than every existent besides Him.

And inasmuch as the final end is the good, and God, may He be blessed, is the form of all the existents — being the order by which all the existents are one — He is more truly fit to be called "good" and the final end of every existent besides Him, since He gives to all things the good and the final end that belong to them; and they are distinguished in this according to the difference of their ranks in the order set down for them by the First Cause.

Likewise it will be shown, too, that He is more truly fit to be called eternal and enduring [נצחי וקיים]; for it is He who gives to all the other things their endurance and continuance, whereas His own endurance and continuance are from His own self.

Likewise it will be shown that He is more truly fit to be called righteous and upright [צדיק וישר], since the rightness and uprightness of every existent besides Him are acquired entirely from Him.

Likewise it will be shown that He is more truly fit to be called [possessed of] might, dominion, and power [העוז והממשלה והיכולת] in attaining the final end; and

this is clear from what is emanated from Him in this manner, in which there is neither weariness [לאות] nor any [coming to an] end.

In sum, then, He is the one who gives the might, the dominion, and the power to the other forms, to bring about what they bring about in this wondrous manner. It is therefore clear that God, may He be blessed, is more truly than every existent besides Him fit to be called "mighty" and "valiant and powerful" [עזוז וגבור].

And it is fitting that you know that all these names point to one and the same thing in number, even though they differ in their sides of signification.

And it is fitting that it be made known to the multitude that, just as God, may He be blessed, is described by these accidents [המקרים] and these attributes [התארים], He is described by them in a manner more honored, without measure, than the manner in which the other existents are described by them. And so it is fitting to strip away from Him the imperfections that are deficiencies — even where it would otherwise have been possible to suppose them found in Him.

But the relation [יחס] of God, may He be blessed, to the separate movers [המניעים הנבדלים], previously mentioned [אשר קדם זכרם], lies in the utmost remoteness and separateness — so much so that no relation of comparison [יחס שיפול] can fall between Him and them.

And this will become clear to you, if you grant that all the intelligibles found in the soul of the First Cause are present in each one of these movers, while granting that they did not attain what was present in all those intelligibles — for that is what we sent forth from them by way of the Torah [i.e., by the order established for them]. In that case, then, there would be no proportion or relation at all between them and the prime matter and the form [בין ההיולי והצורה], since no relation whatever falls between the movers and the prime matter. But if we grant, instead, that each of them attained only some part of those intelligibles, then these movers will be at a still greater remove in rank from God, may He be blessed, beyond all measure. And so too, when one of them attained that which was sent forth into the existents — the smallest part of the rank of all the existents — as has already been explained concerning the matter of these movers. For it has already been explained that one of them did not attain what is bestowed upon him in actuality, nor what is bestowed upon him from the rest of the movers, nor what is bestowed by way of the blending of the planets [מהתמזגות נצוצי ככביהם].

And here it has been explained that there is no relation at all between God, may He be blessed, and the movers of the heavenly bodies, since they fall exceedingly

short with respect to their perfection, and concerning this it is said, "Behold, He puts no trust in His servants, and His angels He charges with folly" [Job 4:18]. And further: there is no relation between His existence — His self-subsisting existence, identical with His essence — and their existence and subsistence; for their existence and subsistence and apprehension derive from another than themselves.

And it is fitting that you know that when one grants this matter concerning these movers — as has been explained — my intention being that the intelligible found in one of them is at the smallest possible remove from what is found in another, so that one need not posit them as rising in rank to their utmost extreme — so that the one would be a thing other than the other. For the intelligibles whose intellects are of one and the same kind are, in essence, all of them necessarily one thing in number, since there will not be found a multiplicity among things that agree in form, except by reason of the prime matter [מצד ההיולי]. And as for those intellects that are without prime matter, it is impossible that there should be found in them a multiplicity of contents in this manner. But the intellects whose intelligibles differ — as is the matter with these movers — these, according to what has been explained of their contents, are necessarily many in number.

Chapter Thirteen

In which it is explained what the intellect is that is the agent of the lower generations.

It is fitting that we inquire here into a deep and very difficult question, namely: this agent intellect of generation that is here — that is, the agent intellect whose existence was explained in the Book of the Soul [De Anima], as we expounded in what preceded — is it one of the movers of the heavenly bodies, or a thing emanated from all of them, or is it the First Cause itself, or a thing emanated from it?

Now it will already appear that it is impossible that the agent intellect should be one of the movers of the heavenly bodies, for it is impossible — were the matter so — that the agent intellect should have the pattern of all these existents that are here. For one of the movers of the heavenly bodies does not have apprehension except of a part of this pattern, as has been explained. And it has already appeared, from another side, that it is necessary that the movers of the heavenly bodies be the agents of these generations, since by them is given the temperament [המזג], and from the temperament generation and formation, since the one who gives the temperament is, with respect to the whole, the one who

brings about the becoming. And the one becoming is fittingly, in number, the effect of one agent. But by way of speculation it will be explained that this is not necessary, since the temperament, it is possible, is given to them by one of them, and the temperament is renewed by reason of the differing things which they give it, each one of them. But formation [היצירה], and the giving of formation, it is not possible should be from many agents — and this is explained in the Book of the Soul [De Anima].

But this becoming would be from one agent if the becoming had a single proportion to the intellect that is the agent of these generations, and if the heavenly bodies were in the rank of an instrument for it, with respect to that which they have given of the temperament; or if this intellect emanated from the movers of the heavenly bodies, as the rays emanating from the heavenly bodies give the temperament. And it may also be thought that it is not impossible that the agent intellect should be a thing emanating from the movers of the heavenly bodies, since, were the matter so, it would not be the case that the agent intellect's apprehension of the pattern of these existents was anything but a gathering together of what all of them apprehend. And inasmuch as, when the gathering of all that they apprehend would not be a complete whole but only some part of the pattern of these existents — since they do not attain what is bestowed upon them by reason of the blending [מההתמזגות], as was stated above — then the agent intellect would not have a complete apprehension of the pattern, but only an apprehension of a part of the pattern of these existents. And it has already been explained from what preceded that the agent intellect has an apprehension of the pattern of all these existents — so this alternative is impossible.

And it may also be thought that it is impossible that the agent intellect should be a thing emanating from God, may He be blessed; for, were the matter so, this question would not be removed — namely, whether the agent intellect and the heavenly bodies emanate from God, may He be blessed, the one of them being in a rank prior to the other, or whether the agent intellect emanated from God, may He be blessed, while the agent intellect emanated [in turn] the movers of the heavenly bodies; or whether the agent intellect and the movers of the heavenly bodies emanated together from God, may He be blessed. And if we grant that they emanated together, in one rank, from God, may He be blessed, then it has been made clear that this supposition is not correct, because of what concerns the agent intellect of knowing the pattern of these existents in their universal aspect — and knowing, together with this, what it is necessary should befall the heavenly bodies. As has been explained in the first part and in the second part of the book, the mover of the heavenly bodies has no apprehension except of a part

of this pattern — so it is clear, according to this supposition, that its apprehension is by way of inference up to the rank of the master craft [המלאכה הראשיית] together with the crafts that serve it.

And further, this supposition will be necessitated — the supposition that there would be a disposition of the matter for another agent, and a giving of the form for another agent — and this is fitting it should be so. For, inasmuch as the disposition of the matter is ordered by the One who gives the form, and inasmuch as this disposition of the matter is intended in the most complete manner possible, so that the final end — which is the form — may be reached, then it is fitting that the agent for these two things be one thing in essence. And this is what moved the Philosopher to posit that the souls that give the forms are emanated from the spheres [מהגלגלים]. And if we grant that the agent intellect is the one who gives these ordered movers, by which the disposition of the matter is completed in them, and that it itself gives the form — as is the matter with the master craft together with the crafts that serve it — then this supposition is renewed with two doubts.

The one of them is that, if the matter were so, then there would be found, at the least, a venerable body more venerable [than the moving body] — that which moves being more venerable — this, in that the agent intellect would not have an act except in the lower matter, while the movers of the heavenly bodies, [though] emanated from it, would have an act in a heavenly body which is more venerable, beyond measure, than the lower matter. And this doubt also necessitates that the agent intellect — by which the investigation is conducted — should not be God, may He be blessed.

And the second doubt is that, if one granted the matter so, then there would be — according to our supposition here — a thing prior to the agent intellect; for, as is sufficient in this — when the intellect is granted thus — the rest is given over to the completion of all the existents. And were it so, then the first agent would be more venerable, at the least, than the agent intellect, by a body smaller, beyond measure, than the rank of the heavenly bodies, in respect of which the intellects emanated from it would have an apprehension which is the final end of venerability — and this is the final end of disgrace [for the lower].

And if one says that God, may He be blessed, is the agent of the whole — for the heavenly bodies are, with respect to Him, in the rank of an instrument in that which they bring about, since their acts derive from what they apprehend of the greatness of God's rank, may He be blessed, as was stated above — and that, since the agent intellect is God, may He be blessed, there is found in Him that which is

not in conjunction with the heavenly bodies, while as for what He receives, He is fit to receive [it] in the manner that is fitting that it be received from Him by way of acceptance — behold, the prior doubt remains in itself. But His act, in all that it is fitting He receive [its effect], is fitting to be received in essence; and this is what this supposition will already draw down — the supposition that there would be an act from God, may He be blessed, singled out for the lower matter, and that He should act, apart from another beginning [התחלה אחרת], in it; the temperament being fittingly given to the matter as it ought.

But concerning the heavenly bodies, the act would not be theirs except by way of the beginning that is in them — the element from which this act derives. And further, as it has been granted that the matter is so, the question is difficult, [namely:] how was the First [Cause] always idle from acting, prior to its [the world's] creation, and afterward became the perpetual agent of formation in this manner? — as will already be explained in what comes after this, in that concerning which there is no doubt: that the world is something originated absolutely [מחודש חדוש מוחלט].

But when this supposition — that the agent intellect emanates from the movers of the heavenly bodies — is granted, this doubt does not fall, since this is the act of God, may He be blessed, singled out, in which there is His own apprehension; and this act has neither lapse nor any thing forbidding it. And indeed, His formation of the world was by way of the act of the agent [intellect] who completed the thing, He having acted it in the manner [of act] in which there is to Him a cause of the things that preserve its existence in the most complete way possible — and this is explained in the matter of the perfection of the craftsmanship. And this is more fully explained, since the creation of living things [בריאת בעלי חיים] is life in the manner most complete for preserving its existence, in that there is in it the possibility of time, in respect of the actions that come from the actions. And concerning this it is explained that it is fitting there should be a formation of God, may He be blessed — the originating of the world — in this manner, since He is perfectly complete; and concerning this it is necessitated that His act should be of complete perfection. And behold, God, may He be blessed, preserves the existence [of things] always, in that He has given the things, by way of the desire [מהחשק], the causes that preserve them, to do for them that which is ordered for them on the day they were created.

But when one grants the matter thus, the question is difficult — it would seem — in the matter of the agent intellect: what preceded? Behold, this is the depth that is in the matter of the agent intellect, according to what appears to us.

And we shall say that it has already been likened that the agent intellect should be a thing emanating from the movers of the heavenly bodies, as has been explained, and that just as it is bestowed by them, by the mediation of their rays, what is conceived from this pattern — and what is not conceived in them — so it is what would be necessitated and emanated by way of the blending [מהמזגיות].

And perhaps it does not suffice, and one will say: How could it be that the thing emanated from the speaker [המדבר] is not a thing conceived to it in any of the modes? And we shall say that this doubt is greater from this side, namely that, were there not present an intellect to it [for] this apprehension, this would be a doubting mode from the [apparent] visibles. But as for [the fact] that there would be here an intellect to it [for] this apprehension in its universality — that is, God, may He be blessed — behold, it is not impossible that there be emanated from Him, by the mediation of the heavenly bodies, what is not conceived [otherwise] than by these movers. And further: just as the perfect health befalls the sick man whose health is lacking [merely from defect], so it is possible that there be bestowed, from the apprehension, the lacking apprehension, in a more complete way. And further: by reason of what is bestowed from these the conceptions which they attain, the gathering of the separate conceptions which are bestowed from the blending [מהמזגיות] would be necessitated. Behold, it would belong to the agent intellect — from these movers — the attainment of what is bestowed from the blending, since there is in them the acceptance of all these conceptions.

And here this doubt has been removed, in accordance with what is possible for us. And it has been explained that the agent intellect is a thing emanated from the movers of the heavenly bodies. And from this manner it would be a thing emanated from them — that is, into the lower existents [המציאות השפל] — in that they make the disposition of the matter by the mediation of the rays of their planets [נצוצי ככביהם], and the form [הצורה] is given by the mediation of the agent intellect from them.

And behold, this matter — that the intellect that is the agent is a thing emanated from the movers of the heavenly bodies — is the opinion agreed upon by the philosophers who preceded, whose words are fitting to agree [with one another]: that the agent intellect is in a rank lower than the movers of the heavenly bodies. And this, moreover, is the opinion of our Torah, according to what appears in the matter of the cherubim mentioned in the Torah; and it is also so according to the opinion of many of our rabbis, of blessed memory, as appears from their words scattered through the Talmud.

And behold, the matter of the form [הצורה] is by degrees [במדרגות]; and this is because the name "form" has no relation [comparable to that between… — continues].

particular [forms], in one of the parts of the world; and they bestow [forms] from themselves — first, [those] forms that are found to have a relation [יחס] to that which is more honorable among the parts of the world. These are the movers of the heavenly bodies [מניעי הגרמים השמימיים]; and through their mediation a bestowed form is found to have a relation to that which is in the lower matter [בחמר השפל]; and through their mediation are bestowed the hylic forms upon their [several] degrees.

Yet this supposition leaves us with a weighty doubt [ספק חזק], one we ought to labor to resolve. It is as follows: granted that what the Active Intellect apprehends is the measure [נמוס] of these lower existents in their totality, then God Himself and the Active Intellect would [together] be [reckoned] under one number, and it would be entailed [that they are one thing]. This [is so] if the prior doubt holds.

And we shall say that this doubt is [even] greater, when it is stated thus: granted that what the Active Intellect apprehends is the measure of the lower existents — their order [סדרם] and their right arrangement [וישרם] — [the apprehension] that is necessitated [as coming] from the movers of the heavenly bodies, then there would be no apprehension complete in the measure of the heavenly bodies; [and] how, then, could that very measure be necessitated [as coming] from them — [namely] the measure of the lower existents — [given] this deficient knowledge [הידיעה החסרה] which [some] hold belongs to the cause in its very self?

By contrast, in the case of the First [Cause], may He be blessed, the apprehension would be of [all] the existents together — both the upper and the lower — in the most complete way possible. And by this it is explained that there is no relation [יחס] between God, may He be blessed, and the Active Intellect [in the manner first feared].

Now, since the Active Intellect is equivocally [named] [משחתף] together with God, may He be blessed, in the apprehending of the measure of the lower existents in their totality — [it is] of this [that] our Sages, of blessed memory [Chazal], spoke [when] they called him by His very [own] Name, as is well known. And behold, Elisha [ben Avuyah / Acher] erred in his speculation, and thought that this [Active Intellect] is the one that governs [המנהיג] the lower things — [an entity] other than the God who governs the upper [things].

And his error was this: that he thought that the beginning [התחלת] of the perishable things [הדברים הנפסדים] would be by way of the cognition of the beginning of the imperishable things [הדברים הבלתי נפסדים]. This is one of the questions [מהשאלות] which the Philosopher [Aristotle] investigates in the *Metaphysics* [במה שאחר הטבע]; and when this was [properly] answered for him, [it was found] that he thought the beginning of the perishable things must [itself] be perishable. And [it was] this [that] led [him] to think that there is no survival of the soul [השארות] for man at all here [in this world] — for, [given] that there is in these perishable things nothing in which there can be permanence [קיום], [it follows] that the beginning is [itself] perishable. And the manner of his error has already been explained in the *Metaphysics* [במה שאחר הטבע].

Now [some] supposed that the Active Intellect is ʿAravot [ערבות] [the highest heaven], according to what we have understood of [the words of] some of our earlier Sages [מהחכמינו הקודמים]; for they said of it that within it are the souls of the righteous [נשמות של צדיקים], and the souls and spirits [ונשמות ורוחות] destined to be created, and that the Sages and the Prophets called it ʿAravot — [namely] that there should be blended [להתערב] within it the bestowal [שפע] of all the movers of the heavenly bodies; and they called it ʿAravot, [meaning] that there is blended within it the [products of] many activities, [both] from the side of the fixed stars [הכוכבים הקיימים] and from the side that it gives, in [its] mode [באופן], what [it gives] to the rest of the stars from their activities. And this, too, [accords with] the view of our ancient ones, of blessed memory, according to what they said in [the] chapter [beginning] *Ein Dorshin* (Talmud Chagigah, ch. 2, "Ein Dorshin").

And it is possible that what is intended by ʿAravot [as a designation] is the totality of all the spheres [כלל כל הגלגלים]; for in respect of what is blended [from] the bestowal [that] from them perfects the lower existents, God, may He be blessed, called Himself "the Rider upon ʿAravot" [רוכב בערבות] (cf. Tehillim 68:5), for He is the one who governs these

spheres in their totality, and gives to them what belongs to them of their activities, as has been explained earlier.

And here is completed what we intended to investigate in this chapter — namely, the explanation that there are here two separate intellects [שני שכלים נפרדים] apart from the movers of the heavenly bodies [מניעי הגרמים השמימיים], and these are God, may He be blessed, and the Active Intellect. According as the number of the movers of the heavenly bodies is forty-eight [ארבעים ושמנה], as [explained] earlier — according to the supposition that the first sphere has no additional

[mover] added to it on account of the motion in latitude [תנועת הרחב] — then the number of the separate intellects [השכלים הנפרדים] would be fifty [חמשים]. And it seems that this is the view of our Torah, for therefore God, may He be blessed, commanded to sanctify the fiftieth year as a Jubilee [שנת החמשים שנה ביובל], and the fiftieth day as Atzeret [Shavuos] [והיום החמשים בעצרת] — to indicate [להורות] that to all these intellects, which number forty-nine [תשעה וארבעים], [there corresponds the fiftieth, God]. And the matter of the tithe [המעשר] was likewise for this reason: for the movers of the spheres in which there are stars [שיש בהם כוכבים] — these are the principal movers [המנהיגים הראשיים] of them, since the rest [of the spheres] derive from them [עלולים מהם] — are eight [שמנה], and the Active Intellect is the ninth [התשיעי], and God, may He be blessed, is the tenth [העשירי], who is holy [אשר הוא קדש] (cf. Vayikra 27:32, "the tenth shall be holy").

פרק ארבעה עשר [Chapter Fourteen]

[Rashi-script summary line:] In which will be explained the rank of this Book [מדרגת זה המאמר] among the [other] sciences [מן החכמות].

It is fitting that the rank of this Book among the [other] sciences should not be hidden from us, [namely] that its rank is more honorable [נכבד] than the rest of the sciences; for already there is found in them [the other sciences] a rank exceedingly great, [up] to [the point] that all the sciences are their final ends [כלם תכליתם]. This [is so] because the sciences are, all of them, three: they are the mathematical [הלמודיות], the natural [הטבעיות], and the divine [theological] [האלהיות], as the Philosopher [Aristotle] mentions in many places.

Now the first part [החלק הראשון] of this Book is the fruit [פרי] of the mathematical science and its final end; for the final end of the mathematical science is the knowledge of the science of the stars [ידיעת חכמת הכוכבים] [astronomy] — this is explained in its own discipline [מעיינה]. And inasmuch as the investigation in this part has [already] been completed in [it] in the most complete way possible — [up] to [the point] that it is comprehensive [מקיף] in the true configuration [בתכונה האמתית], and precise in its measures [ובדקדוק השעורים], whether in potentiality or in actuality, [and] if in potentiality, very nearly [in actuality], as has been explained in our words — then this is indeed the fruit of the mathematical science and its final end in the most complete way possible.

And behold, the second part [החלק השני] of this Book is the fruit of the natural science [החכמה הטבעית] and its final end. This [is so] because the heavenly body [הגרם השמימיי] proceeds [in] the rank of form [במדרגת הצורה] and [in] perfection above the rest of the natural things [הדברים הטבעיים]; and so the apprehension of

it would proceed [in] the rank of form and perfection above the rest of the natural things. And this [is so] because the relation of the one thing to the second is [as] the relation of the one intelligible to the second [המושכל… המושכל השני]. And inasmuch as there has already been completed in [it] this part — the apprehension of the causes of the things found [to belong] to the heavenly bodies, in a complete manner, according to what is possible for us — then this is indeed the fruit of the natural science and its final end, in the most complete way possible for us.

And behold, the third part [החלק השלישי] of this Book is the fruit of the comprehensive science [החכמה הכוללת] and its final end; for it [pertains] to the divine science [the theological matters] required

of [it] in its great [scope] [רביב], [as to] which investigation is obligatory, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] has explained — and what proceeds from them [by] way of nullification [ההכלית / utter nullity] [?] and of form [הצורה], that is, the apprehension concerning God, may He be blessed, and concerning the movers of the heavenly bodies [ובמניעי הגרמים השמימיים], according to what is possible for us. And this is explained in [the part] itself. And inasmuch as the investigation in this part has already been completed in the most complete way possible for us, then it is indeed the fruit of the divine science and its final end, in the most complete way possible for us. And this is what we sought to seal [לחתום] this Fifth Book [המאמר החמישי] with.

[Doxology, Rashi script:] May God be blessed, who has helped us [עזרנו] by His mercies and the abundance of His kindnesses [וברוב הסדיו].

[Colophon, Rashi script:] And the completion of this Book was on the second [day] of the month of Teves, of the year eighty-nine [שמנים ותשע] of the [reckoning by the] detail [לפרט] [i.e., the minor reckoning, omitting the millennium] of the sixth millennium [אלף הששי] [= 5089 AM; 5089 − 3760 = 1329 CE].

[The remainder of the page is blank parchment. Gathering signature at foot: "19*".]

מאמר ששי [Book Six]

בחדוש העולם [On the Origination of the World]

חלק ראשון [Part One]

[Rashi-script summary beneath:] In which is completed the investigation in this inquiry [הדרוש], and [in which] are removed the doubts that fall [bearing] upon it [הספקות הנופלות בה], according to what is possible for us.

[Chapter table of contents for Part One — the chapter-by-chapter summary of headings, printed run-together with em-dash separators:]

- **Chapter One** [פרק ראשון]: it recalls what results from the inquiry [from the standpoint] of the difficulty [raised] [מה שתבאת החקירה מהקושי].
- **Chapter Two** [פרק שני]: it recalls in it the view of the predecessors concerning this inquiry [דעת הקודמים בזה הדרוש].
- **Chapter Three** [פרק שלישי]: it recalls in it the modes there are for demonstrating [להראות] the view of [each one] of them [לדעת דעת מהם].
- **Chapter Four** [פרק רביעי]: it explains in it in what way it is not obligatory [שלא יחויב] [to accept] what was recalled [from] the claims of those who uphold one of these views [המקיימים דעת מאלו הדעות], [as to] the justness of that view [שיצדק הדעת ההוא] [?].
- **Chapter Five** [פרק חמישי]: it explains in it the beginning [התחלת] of the investigation in this inquiry, [from] the things it is fitting that we set down at the beginning of the investigation in [it] [as] true premises [הבלתי הווה] [?].
- **Chapter Six** [פרק ששי]: it explains in it in what [way] this is more honorable [than the foregoing] [במה זה יותר ההובלתי הווה] [?].
- **Chapter Seven** [פרק שביעי]: it explains in it that the heavens are originated [שהשמים מחודשים] from a side other than the first side [מצד אחר זולת הצד הראשון].
- **Chapter Eight** [פרק שמיני]: it explains in it that the heavens are originated [שהשמים מחודשים] on account of [certain] properties [סגולות] found in them — [features] distinctive of the existents [that come] into being in respect of being something that comes to be [המסגולות הנמצאות להווה במה שהוא הווה].
- **Chapter Nine** [פרק תשיעי]: it explains in it [the matter] of what time is [מהו הזמן] and what its existence is [ואיזה מציאות מציאותו].

- **Chapter Ten** [פרק עשירי]: it explains in it that time is originated [שהזמן מחודש].
- **Chapter Eleven** [פרק אחד עשר]: it explains in it that motion is originated [שהתנועה מחודשת].
- **Chapter Twelve** [פרק שנים עשר]: it explains in it that the revolution of the earth is originated [שהגלות הארץ מחודשת].
- **Chapter Thirteen** [פרק שלשה עשר]: it explains in it [a matter] originated [מחודש].
- **Chapter Fourteen** [פרק ארבעה עשר]: it investigates in it whether it is obligatory that the world that comes to be should be of finite power, [it being] embodied [in] this world that comes to be [שיהיה העולם הזה הווה], on account of what the precise investigator [המדקדק] claims, [namely] that an infinite power [כח בלתי בעל תכלית] [cannot exist] in a finite body [בגשם בעל תכלית].
- **Chapter Fifteen** [פרק חמשה עשר]: it investigates in it [the matter] from the demonstration [מצד ראיה] that adds [תוסיף] revealing and perfecting [גלוי ושלמות] concerning what we have explained of the origination of the world [מחודש העולם].
- **Chapter Sixteen** [פרק ששה עשר]: it explains in it that it is impossible for the world to perish [שאי אפשר בעולם שיפסד].
- **Chapter Seventeen** [פרק שבעה עשר]: it explains in it how the coming-into-being of the world was [איך היתה הוויית העולם].
- **Chapter Eighteen** [פרק שמנה עשר]: it is destined [נתיד] to be explained in it many of the doubts that fall [bearing] upon it [מהרבה מהספקות הנופלות בה].
- **Chapter Nineteen** [פרק תשעה עשר]: it explains in it that there is no [world] except [for] one world [שאין שם כי אם עולם אחד].
- **Chapter Twenty** [פרק עשרים]: it is destined to explain in it the doubt [whose] falsity [שקרה] [is shown], on account of what the Philosopher claims from the side of the nature of time [מצד טבע הזמן].
- **Chapter Twenty-one** [פרק עשרים ואחד]: it is destined to explain in it the doubt [whose] falsity [is shown] from the side of the *now* [מצד העתה].
- **Chapter Twenty-two** [פרק עשרים ושנים]: it is destined to explain in it the doubt [whose] falsity [is shown] [from] the nature of coming-into-being [מטבע ההוויה].
- **Chapter Twenty-three** [פרק עשרים ושלשה]: it is destined to explain in it the doubt [whose] falsity [is shown] from the side of the nature of the things that come to be [טבע הדברים המתחדשים].

- **Chapter Twenty-four** [פרק עשרים וארבעה]: it is destined to explain in it the doubt [whose] falsity [is shown] [from] the nature of motion [מטבע התנועה].
- **Chapter Twenty-five** [פרק עשרים וחמשה]: it is destined to explain in it the doubt which [is shown] false, on account of [its arising] from the side of the nature of the heavenly body [מצד טבע הגשם השמימיי].
- **Chapter Twenty-six** [פרק עשרים ושש]: it is destined to explain in it the doubt which [is shown] false, from the side of the nature of the first matter [מצד טבע החמר הראשון].
- **Chapter Twenty-seven** [פרק עשרים ושבעה]: it is destined to explain in it the doubt which [is shown] false, from the side of the eternal nature [טבע הנצחי] [as against] the [nature] that comes-to-be and perishes [הווה והנפסד].
- **Chapter Twenty-eight** [פרק עשרים ושמנה]: it is destined to explain in it the doubt which [is shown] false, on account of what the Philosopher claims [as to] the impossibility that the things [should be] falling under coming-into-being [נופלים תחת ההוויה].
- **Chapter Twenty-nine** [פרק עשרים ותשעה]: it is the conclusion [בחתימת] [of the Book], [comprising] what this Book has comprised [מה שכללו הספר הזה] of the speculative matters [מהדברים העיוניים], and the giving of praise and thanksgiving [השבח וההודאה] to the Name, may He be blessed, [from] whom is all [אשר הכל מאתו].

Book Six — On the Creation of the World, Part One

Chapter One [פרק ראשון]

In which we recall what results from this inquiry by way of difficulty.

It is fitting that we first indicate what results from this inquiry in the way of its great difficulties, and likewise what we have observed concerning the manner in which this investigation of the present problem may be brought to completion. For once we have come to know the difficulties of a problem, we set ourselves straight upon the path that leads us to attaining the truth in it.

This already points to the difficulty of the matter: the disagreement among investigators concerning it down to the present day has been great. For one reason is that, regarding the nature of existing things, many objections may already be found to be raised against them, or one part of one of these objections

may be overturned by another — yet however much they balance one another, the investigation of the matter remains exceedingly hard. Another reason that points without doubt to the powerful difficulty surrounding this inquiry is this: because what is examined here concerns all existing things — whether they were brought into being by God, may He be blessed, after not having been, or whether there was for them no coming-into-being at all. And it would be manifest that, when by way of speculative inquiry we wish to take a stand on the question whether a given thing is found to exist or not, it is already necessary that we first know the quiddity of that very thing whose existence we are investigating. For something of these matters can stand upon what we have already verified within our own knowledge — as has been made clear to whoever wishes to investigate, in order to make the investigation of any problem complete, that he must first know the quiddity of the thing about which this inquiry is conducted, and that his apprehensions concerning it accord with what it is possible for a human being to attain.

From this it likewise follows, for one who wishes to bring this inquiry to completion, that he should know the nature of existing things in general and their apprehensions, to the point that he can come to know whether there is among them something — or some apprehension — that necessitates that the world be everlasting [בלתי הווה, ungenerated], or whether there is among them something, or some apprehension, that necessitates that the world be generated [הווה], or whether there is among them nothing — neither a thing nor an apprehension — that necessitates either that the world be generated or that the world be everlasting. And given that this is the state of the matter, behold: whoever can grasp some piece of knowledge about it, according to what is possible for a human being, will achieve through it the perfection of the inquiry, to the extent that the inquiry is possible for a human being in this problem. For it has been made clear that the perfection of possible knowledge attainable by a person, in matters of existence and of their apprehension, is itself the very thing whose attainment is the most difficult.

And what adds further difficulty to this inquiry is that one is obliged to investigate whether it is possible, with God, may He be blessed, to investigate at all whether this world had a beginning — and afterward to investigate, in turn, the existent and the newly-generated — or whether the world was always found together with Him. This has been made clear, in the manner previously discussed, in the very point already laid down: that for whoever wishes to complete this inquiry, he must know in himself what God, may He be blessed, makes possible, to the point that he can render a correct judgment as to whether

He may be an agent who acts at one time and does not act at another [פועל פעם ולא יהיה פועל פעם], or whether it is impossible for Him

[that He should act at all in this way] — this being among what adds great difficulty to this inquiry: namely, that our knowledge in the very First Cause [הסבה הראשונה] would necessarily be exceedingly weak; and this is clear from what was already said.

What further adds difficulty to this inquiry is that it is already hard to come to know, regarding the essences and the apprehensions, which of the existing things accord with the truth, so that one can take a stand upon them in this investigation. For one who wishes to complete this inquiry is obliged first to know [whether such knowledge is attainable]; and if not, then no truth in it will be attained — only by chance [במקרה].

What is also difficult is the dictum of the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle], according to what the Rabbi, the Master [הרב המורה, Maimonides], reports in his book, and his very wording is this: "those against whom we have no argument, or who are greater than we." Behold, we say in their regard that it is difficult to attain truth in this matter — as when we say whether the world is eternal [העולם קדמון] or not. And what likewise points to the difficulty is that this question itself remained, with the Philosopher, perplexed and entangled at the limit of difficulty, even with all the abundance of what he reports of the arguments for establishing that the world is eternal [שהעולם קדום]. This was, without doubt, [a question of the first rank,] for since the Philosopher had already, in [his] *Gate* [שער], found many arguments for establishing also that the world is eternal [שהעולם קדמון], yet his arguments do not yield the truth in this — as will be explained hereafter. And if this question was exceedingly difficult for the Philosopher, with his great superiority in wisdom, all the more so will it be harder for the rest of mankind, who are below him in the rank of wisdom.

Chapter Two [פרק שני]

In which we recall the opinions of those who preceded us in this problem.

Now the opinions of those who came before us, which we have found concerning this inquiry, [stand] at the limit of disagreement. For some of them held that the world is generated and corrupted [נתחדש ונפסד] times without number. And some of them held that it has already been generated only once [פעם אחת לבד]. And these latter divided into two opinions: among them, one who held that the world is generated from a [pre-existing] thing [נתחדש מדבר] — and this is Plato [אפלטון],

and the ones who follow him hold by the way of those who came after; and among them, one who held that the world was generated absolutely [מלא דבר במוחלט, ex nihilo], and these are the foremost among the speakers [המדברים, the dialecticians / mutakallimūn], such as John Philoponus the Grammarian [יחני המדקדק], according to what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] reports of him in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* [למה שאחר הטבע]. And the speakers [המדברים, the dialecticians] who came after them already inclined to this opinion; and to this opinion already inclined the eminent Philosopher, the Rabbi, the Master [הרב המורה, Maimonides], and many of the sages of our Torah.

And some of them held that the world is eternal [קדמון] — and this is the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle], and those who follow after him. It has been made clear that the cause of the difference of their opinions in these views is either on account of the diversity of the matters that they took as evidence [ראיה] from the nature of existing things, or because the Torah compelled them to combine the two causes together.

Chapter Three [פרק שלישי]

In which we recall what there is, by way of the things that appear, to know the opinion concerning them.

Now they have already found grounds to know one of these opinions, according to what appears to us, in many respects from the things that appear. This is what might be said concerning the coming-into-being and corruption of the world: that there is no end to them. There are some who hold this. From among them: that since corruption [הפסד] has already been found in all the things in our world, for this reason it would be reckoned that this matter must hold in the world as a whole; and given that this is the case, and that this is so, it would be fitting that God, may He be blessed, act at one time and not act at another [פועל פעם ובלתי פועל פעם]. Hence it would be necessary, according to what is reckoned, that there be worlds without end, the coming-into-being of some of them after others — just as one human being comes after another, without end.

And from among them is what might be reckoned to follow on account of the nature of time, namely that it is not possible that time itself be generated absolutely [מחודש במוחלט]. The Philosopher [הפלוסוף] has already recalled in this regard two arguments. The one is that if time were generated [הווה], then time would have been generated in time — and this is something that points to the fact that there is no coming-into-being for time [שאין לזמן הווייה]. And the second is that, if time were generated [הזמן הווה], then there would be a *now* [עתה] found

there at present, in actuality, from which it began [התחיל] — and this is impossible, for there is no *now* found in time except in potentiality [כי אם בכח]. And given that this is the state of the matter, it would be fitting, according to the foregoing argument that the world be generated [הווה], that there be before it another world [עולם אחר] — this, without end [אל לא תכלית], in the manner that there would be time without generation [בלתי מחודש].

And from among them is what might be reckoned to follow on account of the nature of motion: that it is not possible that motion be generated absolutely [מחודשה במוחלט], as the Philosopher recalled in the argument by which he established that the world is eternal [העולם קדום]. For this, too, is among what might be reckoned: that, since the world is generated [העולם הווה], there would be before it another world [עולם אחר], without end — in the manner that motion would be ungenerated [בלתי מחודשה].

And from among them is what might be reckoned to follow on account of the nature of prime matter [החמר הראשון]: that it is not possible that it be found stripped of form [ערום מצורה]. For this is among what might be reckoned: that prime matter has already put on this form and is divested of [a prior] form, in a manner such that it is not stripped [ערום] of form altogether. And since the thing is, in itself, made clear — that the thing comes to be only from a [pre-existing] thing, and as something full [מלא דבר], and that there is no coming-into-being from nothing and no corruption into nothing

— but rather matter [החמר] remains; behold, it would be reckoned from this that there would be, before this world, another world [עולם אחר], in the manner that this matter is found only as something formed [מצורה].

And from among them is what might already be reckoned: that everything generated is corrupted [שיהיה כל הווה נפסד], as the Philosopher explained. And given that this is the matter, and that it accords with what was previously laid down — that the world is generated [הווה] — behold, it would be fitting that it be corrupted [נפסד]. And this is upheld by anyone who sees [it] in the coming-into-being and the corruption of the world. And from among them is what might be reckoned: that one is obliged [to hold] that the world be generated [שיהיה בעולם שיהיה הווה], since it is impossible that a power without limit [כח בלתי בעל תכלית] be found in a finite body [גשם בעל תכלית], as the Philosopher explained. And for this reason it would be necessary that the heavens [השמים] be corrupted [נפסדים], since they are finite in measure [בעלי תכלית בשעור]. And if there were in them a power by which they could endure and be moved for a time without end [אין

תכלית לו], then there would be in a finite body a power without limit — and this is something already laid down

— as false. And given that this is the matter, behold, the heavens would be corrupted [נפסדים] of necessity [בהכרח]. And if they are corrupted, then they too are generated [הווים], since everything corrupted is generated [נפסד הווה], as the Philosopher explained. And this is upheld, according to what is reckoned, by anyone who sees [it] in the coming-into-being of the world and its corruption. This is the argument that John the Grammarian [יחני המדקדק] argued, according to what Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] reports of him in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* [למה שאחר הטבע].

Now the opinion of one who held that the world came into being once [שינוה העולם הווה פעם אחד] and is not corrupted [ולא יפסד], leaving it ordered [הסדר] — for this [view], too, there are several respects from the things that appear. For it has already become apparent that the Intellect [השכל] is the beginning [התחלה] of all things, in view of what is found in this from the goodness of order [מטוב הסדר] and of rightness [והיושר], and from the things found to be unified in this matter. This is among what points to the fact that the Intellect is one [שהשכל אחד], the beginning of them all, and is that in which there are found the goodness of order and rightness — and this is what Plato [אפלטון] said, according to what is reckoned: that the Intellect is that which moved all things from the absence of order toward order [מהעדר הסדר אל הסדר]. And since we find every generated thing to have already been made into a thing [מדבר], behold, one is compelled to lay down there

a generated thing [דבר נתהווה] from which the world came to be [שיהיה יתהווה ממנו העולם]. And since one cannot conceive [שלא יצוייר] of motion having a beginning [לתנועה התחלה], as was previously [shown], one is compelled to lay down there a motion confused, without order, lacking an ordered beginning [מבולבלת בלתי בעלת סדר], prior to the coming-into-being of the world. And on account of the nature of the fifth body [הגרם החמישי, the celestial body], its corruption would not be a thing on the side of the form [מצד הצורה]; but rather it would be on account of the nature of matter [טבע החמר]. And this — that we see every form acting [מפועל] as that which is fitting, striving to preserve what has form for it [לשמור מה שהיא לו] to the limit of what is possible — to the point that the matter overpowers [שיגבר החמר] and the form is overcome [וינצח הצורה]: this would be when the recipient powers [הכחות המתפעלות] overpower the active powers [על הכחות הפועלות] and overcome them. Behold, it has been made clear that the heavens are

fit to be incorruptible [שיהיו בלתי נפסדים], and for this reason it is necessary that the world be incorruptible [בלתי נפסד].

And if one were to say that, if they were incorruptible [בלתי נפסדים], one would be obliged [to hold] that they were ungenerated [בלתי הווים] — for the Philosopher already explained that everything ungenerated is incorruptible [בלתי הווה הוא בלתי נפסד] — this is the opposite of what Plato laid down. We have said to him that this is not necessary; for it has already been explained in the first part [בראשון] of this book, in this very place, that a thing may be generated [הווה] yet be obliged to remain everlasting [נשאר נצחי] — and that is the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה]. And further, it has already been explained, in a matter wherein there is no doubt that the explanation is sound, that there are [further] things in this [doctrine] of the Philosopher's; from among what is obliged for him is the truth of what they obliged of him.

Now the opinion of one who held that the world came into being from an existent [from a pre-existing something], it [too] has several respects from the things that appear. From among them: that whatever we find to be generated, we find it to be generated [as] something full [מלא דבר], and this is because everything that we find to be generated comes to be from forms [מצורות]; but it comes to be when there occurs in it the [taking-on] of the forms [כשיתהוו בו הצורות] by the way of which the body received them — this being either heat, or cold, or the rest of the forms that arrive by their intermediaries [המגיעות באמצעותם]. And according to what the form is, the coming-into-being would be something full [מלא דבר]. And given that this is the matter, behold, it appears that it would be possible

Treatise Six, Part One, Chapter Three (continued)

that the world came to be already full of substance, just as form comes to be already full of substance—that is, that the renewal of matter took place in something already full of substance. And when you consider this carefully, the matter was already full of substance. So when it is held that there must already have been a world in which coming-to-be occurs—and that coming-to-be is something that befalls a substance already there, in the manner that Plato held—they are necessarily forced into grave perplexities from which there is no escape, as has been explained concerning what moved the Philosopher [Aristotle] to reject Plato's view. For it appears that the world ought properly to have come into being already full of substance, since on this account the perplexities about it would be resolved according to what he supposed.

And the analogy for why this assumption need not be made—namely, that the world's coming-to-be should require a thing that existed before the world's coming-to-be for an unlimited time, without limit—is something false, by what the words of the Philosopher are seen to imply; for on that view there would be no thing there from which the possibility of coming-to-be could be received. For this assumption—that matter is found before the world's coming-to-be—does not necessarily follow for Plato's view; this is the point of perplexity. Yet Plato is forced into it according to what the words of the Philosopher, and Ibn Rushd [Averroes], are seen to imply, by what he explained in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע].

So too Plato was forced to hold that the world existed before the coming-to-be, on account of his assuming that the disordered motion [התנועה המבולבלת] existed before the world came to be. And this nullity is not necessary for the holder of this view. Now here I suppose that the cause of the Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], inclining toward this view, and saying that it is the view of our Torah—is that he wants it to be that he had already settled the matter in this way, so as to escape the perplexities into which the Philosopher fell in supposing that the world is eternal [הווה]. And the witness for this is that he wrote, in the twenty-fifth chapter of the second part of his honored treatise, the *Guide of the Perplexed*, that Plato's view too agrees with the view of our Torah, if it had been correct by way of speculation [מצד העיון].

But that form is something that comes to be already full of substance is a thing explained; for there is no thing in coming-to-be that changes in its own essence and persists so that from it the form of coming-to-be should arise. Nor is what is said—that form is that by which the form of coming-to-be is "formed"—the same as what we mean. For example: the newly-arising form, produced by the craft, arises from the form within the soul of the craftsman, of which it is said that it descended and became from non-being. But it is not said that the form within the soul of the craftsman is itself the form's activity; rather, the form within the soul of the craftsman became the form arriving in the workmanship, and this is explained in [the soul] itself.

And as for what likewise strengthens the view of the Mutakallimūn [המדברים] who hold this view—namely, in what they supposed: that the world is composed of parts that do not divide [atoms], and that this is the manner in which the Name, may He be blessed, would always be the Agent of the world, as the Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], mentioned of their views—the point is this: it seemed to them right that the world should be one upon which the Name, may He be

blessed, always emanates; and if it were not an agent except at the time it is an agent, then this would be among the things that follow but little upon Him, and the world would be of limited existence at certain times. But [on their view] its existence would always be emanating from the Name, may He be blessed.

—built upon many false roots, as has been explained by what the Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], set down concerning their views—together with the fact that this assumption necessarily entails that the world will not be subject to the totality of coming-to-be in the absolute sense; for they posit that the Name, may He be blessed, is its agent always. Hence, by reason of a little speculation, it follows that the world is not in existence at certain times, but rather that its existence is always emanating from the Name, may He be blessed.

But the view of the Philosopher [Aristotle] has its own aspects from which it is seen to be reasonable. — One of them is that it is impossible that time should have come into being in the absolute sense; for if it had come to be, it would have come to be in time, and there would be time before the first time, and this is manifestly absurd. And since the matter is so, it follows that the motion which is time was eternal [נצחי] and ever-moving; for time cannot be conceived apart from motion, nor motion apart from time. And since the existence of an unlimited time is impossible except by our supposing a continuous, single motion, and this is impossible except in circular motion, as the Philosopher explained—behold it appears that this requires that there be here an eternal body that ever moves in a circle.

By this explanation it will be made clear, in its own way, that it is impossible that time should have perished; for if it had perished, it would necessarily have perished in time, and there would be time after the perishing. And this is why Aristotle held that time is eternal—neither passing away nor ceasing; and by what is explained there: that there is an ever-moving thing in circular motion that neither passes away nor ceases. — And of them: that it is impossible for there to be a change in time in the absolute sense; for if it were so, there would have been "now" [העתה] in actuality before the "now" began from it. But the truth of the "now," and its meaning, by what is seen of its matter, is that it is what divides between the prior and the posterior. Hence, if there were no "now" there from which the "now" begins, the beginning would be absolute; and if this were possible, then the "now" there would not divide between the prior and the posterior in time, and this is false by what is seen of the matter of the "now."

Furthermore, what I say is that, in the coming-to-be of time, there is no escape from making use of the words "prior" and "posterior" concerning its existence

before it came to be. For if time existed before it was not found, and afterward came to be, then the matter of the "prior" and the "posterior"—which is in them by way of recognition—has necessarily come to be. Hence, if there were time before its coming-to-be,

[it would be self-contradictory]. So too the matter, if we suppose it has perished; for the thing that has perished is what is absent after it had existed, and this is called "after," which is time. And for this the Philosopher was forced to hold that time is eternal.

And by what is explained in the preceding manner, it is already entailed that the world is eternal. — And of them: that the Philosopher [held that], if the world came to be, it would necessarily follow that its existence was in potentiality, prior to its existence in actuality, in time; for every coming-to-be is of this character; and this would necessarily be in time before the world came to be. And if there were time there, then there was motion there; and if there was motion there, then there was a moving thing there—whether by nature or of necessity. And if it is a moving thing by necessitated motion, then there cannot fail to be there a natural motion; for the necessitated motion is in truth said to be "by force," in relation to the natural. And it is impossible that there should be there a motion natural to anything except these natural motions that exist; hence it would follow that the world existed before its coming-to-be, and this is false. And the falsehood follows of necessity from the premise doubted in it—namely, what we have assumed: that the world came to be. And the proposal from which this falsehood arises is itself false; hence it necessarily follows that the world is not subject to coming-to-be. — This argument we have not found for the Philosopher in [his own] explicit statement, but we have drawn it forth from the force of his words.

And of them: that it is impossible that the motion be renewed in the absolute sense. For if we posit here a first newly-arising motion, it necessarily follows that there is a moving thing there, if there is such, and if not. And if it had come to be, then the first motion was the motion that came to be, since a motion of coming-to-be already precedes it. And if we posit that this motion is the first coming-to-be, then it necessarily follows in it too that it was not first, and this follows of it whether from the side of the agent or from the side of the patient.

As for the necessity from the side of the agent: it is that when the agent acts at one time and does not act at another time, there must be there of necessity something that newly arose for it, by whose passage it was roused to act now, to do this act; and there would then be, before the first change, [another] change. And if it is said that the change which is that thing is itself the prior one, then

there would necessarily be there a cause for this change occurring before its own change, and this without limit. And this is the necessity whether the first moving thing was eternal or came to be. — But the necessity from the side of the patient is from the side of the patient, for every coming-to-be when it is brought into actuality and not yet brought into actuality—behold there is there of necessity something that came to be for it, on whose account the rousing now arose to do this act; and there would then be, before the first change, a change. And if it is said that the change which is that thing is itself the prior one, then there is necessarily here a cause for the change occurring before its own change, and this is without limit. And the necessary thing is whether the first moving thing came to be or not.

—that it moves at one time and not another. Behold there is here of necessity a change in the mover, or in the moved, or in both. And it would then be the case that the supposed motion was not first. And if it is said that the change is itself the prior one, then it necessarily follows in it that there was [a change] before it, just as we entailed concerning the first. And this is without limit. And here the Philosopher made two further illuminations by which there is no first motion. — The one is that he says: when the mover was a mover in potentiality, and afterward returns to be a mover in actuality, it necessarily follows that there is here a change; for what brings the actuality forth from the potentiality is a change. And, this being the matter, it is explained that there is no first motion there. — The second is that, if the supposed motion were newly-arising in the absolute sense, there would be a renewed combination [צרוף] in the first mover. By "combination" I mean that which is between the mover and the moved; and the renewal of the combination is impossible apart from a second change. And this being the matter, it necessarily follows that there was, in the second [moment], a change before the first—and this necessarily follows that there was not there a first newly-arising motion. This is what is necessary, that the motion be eternal, and that there be there an eternal ever-mover in circular motion, as we said before.

And by this manner it will be explained, in its own way, that it is impossible that the last motion should be there [i.e. a final motion]; for this necessarily follows that the ever-mover there moves in a circle that neither passes away nor ceases. — And of them: that it is already explained that it is impossible there be a change in the prime matter [החמר הראשון] in its totality. And this, because this matter necessarily entails that it should not come to be and should not perish in itself; for if it came to be, there would be for it a subject from which it would come to be; and if there were a subject from which it came to be, that subject would itself

be prime matter; and this, because, by what is in the subject, it does not separate from itself. And it necessarily follows that this matter is either found before [something] there, or comes to be in actuality—and this is wholly false. So too it necessarily follows in it, if it perished. And this being the matter, and matter being by way of prime matter, which is found stripped of form [ערום מצורה], it is explained—as has been explained from the Torah—that it was already eternal, as has been explained. — And of them: that, because it is explained concerning the fifth body [הגרם החמישי] that it has no contrary, it has been explained that the fifth body is not subject to coming-to-be.

For all that which comes to be does so from its contrary and perishes into its contrary, and it necessarily follows—according to the contrary of privation—that what cannot have its coming-to-be from a contrary, nor its perishing into a contrary, cannot perish. But this fifth body has no contrary from which it would come to be, nor into which it would perish. Hence it necessarily follows that the heavenly body, the fifth, neither comes to be nor perishes. — And of them: that, because it is explained concerning the fifth body that it cannot perish, since it has no cause of perishing, as we mentioned before—behold it appears, by what the Philosopher held, that it is necessary that it be such as neither comes to be nor perishes; and that what is seen to be such as neither comes to be is necessarily such as does not perish. This is a matter that we will explain concerning it, and this is already…

[*The chapter continues beyond this opening.*]

It is seen to be impossible that there should be a thing-in-coming-to-be [a generated thing] that remained eternal. For that thing-in-coming-to-be would necessarily have, prior to its coming-to-be, the potentiality to come to be throughout all the time the past extends, without limit. And when this potentiality is found actualized throughout the whole of that time, it would necessarily be false; for it would amount to saying that two contradictory acts are found together. And since the matter is so, it is plainly impossible that they hold it. By this is established that what they have assumed is false.

And this too is seen to be impossible, by reason of what one may say: namely, that the thing which exists without limit in time would necessarily have a final cause [תכלית] both in the prior and in the posterior; for if it had a final cause from one of these two sides, then it would have an end on the side from which it has no end—and this is false, by what the Philosopher [Aristotle] is seen to hold.

And this too is seen to be impossible from yet another side. It is this: if there were here a thing-in-coming-to-be that remained eternal, it would have a potency over both existence and non-existence; and the two powers, when they are in a single thing, are necessarily defined [as contraries], since it is impossible that there be found two mutually contradictory powers together in them whose mean is not [their own] middle—as is the matter in the powers of which this treatise speaks, namely, existence and non-existence—just as it is impossible that there be found together two mutually contradictory acts in a single thing in actuality. And concerning that of which it is said that it has defined powers: were they not defined, there would not be found a greater span of time in which this potency lies; and there would be there a power that has no final cause. And if the matter were so, two powers would be found together. For the time in which the one has no final cause is the very time in which the other has its final cause, since there is no time except by the [succession of] "prior" and "posterior." And this—that the powers should have a final cause, since they are defined—is fitting, in all the categories, by what the Philosopher held. That is to say: the power, in that it is defined, when the power is exhausted at its nearest, most determinate place [its term], is by its nature such that the time in which it extends comes forth into actuality.

And this too is seen to be impossible from yet another side, and it is this: that the nature of existing things requires that there be for them coming-to-be and corruption, or [at least] their privation. And since the matter is so, it is plainly impossible that there be found, on the side of coming-to-be, a thing whose existence has no final cause in time; for [it would require] supposing that a time should be found that has no final cause—and if it is not so, then nature has been uprooted, and the necessary [course of nature] has been prevented.

And this too is seen to be impossible from another side, that of corruption; and it is this: that whatever is in coming-to-be is also, in every respect, corruptible. This holds in all four kinds of change. And from this it would necessarily follow—contrary to corruption—that what is not corruptible is not in coming-to-be, and that what is not in coming-to-be is not corruptible. And the Philosopher has already strongly confirmed this view from the side of [its] fame, in that it was already well known among people in his time that the heavens are a dwelling-place for the Name, may He be blessed—as if they wished by this [to claim] that the heavens are eternal in His eternity.

And of them [further proofs]: that the Philosopher is seen to hold it impossible that all things should fall under coming-to-be; and this, because every existent is

either a body or corporeal. And if all things were corporeal, then the body in its totality would have to be generated absolutely. He means to say: a full body. And it would be necessary that the body precede in [its] coming-to-be a void [רקות] that is then made into [body]—for the place [of any body]

is also of the [class of] things-in-coming-to-be. Behold, the coming-to-be of a full body in the absolute sense is impossible. And likewise the coming-to-be of a corporeal body by potentiality—that is, of matter without form—for it is impossible that matter strip itself of form; since, if it were thus stripped, then what is not found in actuality would be found, and this is false. Behold, then, if the corporeal is what is generated, it is without limit.

The Philosopher has already mentioned these arguments—some of them in the *Physics* [ספר השמע], some in *On the Heavens* [ספר השמים והעולם], and some in the *Metaphysics* [במה שאחר הטבע]. And I judge that what most moved the Philosopher to believe that the world is eternal is what he believed concerning the very substance of the Name, may He be blessed, namely, that He is the mover of the sphere of the fixed stars, and that He is the law [נמוס] of the existents, their order and their rectitude. For when the Name, may He be blessed, is set down as a special mover for one of the spheres, it is plain that the world cannot but be eternal; and this, because it is not fitting that this sphere, of which He is the mover, should be in coming-to-be. For the Name, may He be blessed, has at one time a bond with this sphere—of which He is the mover—in the manner that He is its perfection and its vivifier, and at [another] time has no bond with it. (And this is something you do not need [me] to make clear in this book.)

And it has likewise been reckoned thus: that, were the Name, may He be blessed, the law of the existents, their order and their rectitude, then it would not be fitting that the Name, may He be blessed, should be found apart from the existents—since to the intellect there can be no subject [נושא] except what is reckoned as necessarily a star [i.e., a celestial intelligence]. So Ibn Rushd [Averroes] has agreed in his *Epitome of De Anima* [קצורו לספר הנפש]. This, with them, is what compelled the Philosopher to believe that the world is eternal; for this is already a chapter [a topic] of [the kind that has] aspects on every side, as we have mentioned, [in which] the truths are given over to it on every side, as we shall explain concerning them in our investigation in the *Metaphysics* [מה שאחר הטבע].

Now behold, the Philosopher did not mention these arguments according to that second [manner], because these are matters that are divine [metaphysical] and for which no demonstration [מופת] can be furnished; but rather they are, for the

most part, the fewer-in-certainty among the rest of the views which others besides him believed—as Alexander [of Aphrodisias] recounted, according to what Ibn Rushd and the Rabbi, the Master [Maimonides], mention. And since the matter is so, it cannot be that things such as these constitute the beginning of a demonstration establishing that the world is eternal; for the Philosopher did not verify their matters, but rested [merely] on the side of the more praiseworthy opinion.

פרק רביעי — Chapter Four

In which we shall explain in what manner it does not follow, from what we have mentioned of the arguments upholding the views, that some one of these views is correct—that view [being any one of them].

After we have already explained in what manner there is something in the modes of indication for ascertaining one of these views, and it has been made clear to one who studies this book with a little speculation that there are no demonstrations by which we have established any of these views, [the question becomes:] in what manner are these men confirmed in [holding] them as true views?

apart from what we have mentioned in upholding the view of the Philosopher. This is plain from what the Philosopher argued in nullifying these [other] views. — For it has already been made clear that it was first fitting to investigate whether the arguments that the Philosopher argued have substance in them, [whether they are] truly verified or not; for if these arguments are such as one would reckon them to be sound, then surely [they stand] apart from the rest of the arguments we have mentioned. Rather, [we must investigate] this matter to its depth—[though] this investigation will not be made clear to us in its fullness in this place, until it be explained, by the way of speculative inquiry, what is the truth of this investigation; and then it will be explained what one is brought to: that speculation agrees with the truth on every side and escapes from every doubt. And it is impossible, too, that we should otherwise give, concerning these arguments, some answer; and this, because, on account of our having grown strong in these arguments and reckoned them to be true, it is hard for us to believe their contraries, if there is not first made clear to us the manner in which they do not yield the truth on every side. And for this reason we have seen fit to answer them here with some answer.

And we say: that which is seen [as the claim] that the world was eternal—prior to [our] being persuaded that the Name, may He be blessed, is a special mover for

one of the spheres—is not necessary. And this we have already explained, in that there is no doubt that He is one of the movers of the heavenly bodies. But if one were to say that, with this, what was made clear from our words concerning the matter of the First Cause [הסבה הראשונה] would necessarily entail likewise that the world is eternal—this, because we have already explained that the Name, may He be blessed, is the agent of all the existents, and that He is the truest agent, called more truly "agent" than any other agent besides Him—and since the matter is so, behold it would be reckoned that it follows from this that the world is eternal; for it [would be] of the absurd that one should set down for Him an idle, useless act that has no final cause in time—[to this] our reply is here, by the way of speculative inquiry: behold, this does not bring us out from this doubt, [namely] from the belief in it that the world is eternal. — For there is room to say, concerning the origination of the world, that the first act was always an act to which a "now" is referred, and it is providence itself; but the act ordered from it [proceeds] by way of beneficence [ההטבה] and favor [החנינה], and it is the giving of form to the existents [as] the perfection that is within them, [a form] not referred

to it [merely] in the moment of coming-to-be, but referred to it [as] the longing for the moving forms [the celestial movers], and [as] the side of the desire by which they emanate the deeds of the world below in accordance with what was decreed for it—according to what those [intelligences] that attain to the existents attain, [those] which are with the First Cause. And in general, behold, if this act of the Agent were [done] in order to perfect the existence of the Name, may He be blessed, there would be room for doubt in the matter [only] from the side of [some] appearance; but rather, this [act] is not [done] by the Name, may He be blessed, except by way of beneficence and favor. And what is it whose way is such that it would not necessarily come forth into actuality? This doubt has already been made clear in a more complete manner, after we have completed this investigation.

And likewise we say: as for what was reckoned—that, the Name, may He be blessed, being the law of the existents, the existents would necessarily be always with Him—this is so [in this sense]: that this law is not [a thing] He acquired from the existents, as the matter is in our knowledge; but rather, the existents acquired their existence from this law. And since the matter is so, behold it does not necessarily follow that the law be found [only] because their existences are found [together] with this law. And the example: that if a man originate the craft of [making] a vessel for himself, behold the value [of that craft] would be precious to him, in that the law of that craft is found in him, even if he has no subject

[material] outside the soul [on which to work]. And we have already explained this at the beginning of this book. And since the matter is so, it is plain that it does not necessarily follow, from these arguments, that the world be eternal.

But as for the rest of the arguments which we have mentioned, [those] in which we judged that they uphold the view of the Philosopher [with] true confirmation —we shall answer here with some answer, by way of generality, until the truth in this investigation be made clear to us; and then we shall return to investigate them with a complete investigation. And we say: these arguments, when we investigated them, [we] found most of them to be taken from [the realm of] the universal coming-to-be [ההוויה הכללית]—[the very thing] which is investigated—and from these particular comings-to-be which are renewed by nature. And it is made clear that one ought not to draw an inference between these comings-to-be, [arguing] up to what is necessary for the universal coming-to-be in respect of all that is necessary to a coming-to-be that is found as a part of the parts of the world. For there are things that are necessary for the [particular] coming-to-be from the side of its being a part, and these are things that need not be found in the universal coming-to-be—if the coming-to-be that is there [in the universal case] is of this description.

You have already been made to stand upon the difference there is between these comings-to-be, when one infers between the coming-to-be of a man in his totality and the coming-to-be of that part of him which is a part of him; for this inference is itself [parallel to] the inference between the universal coming-to-be—which is investigated—and the particular coming-to-be that is found as a part of the parts of the world. And this—that the world in its totality is a single man—is a thing many of the ancients have explained, until they called the world a "great man" [אדם גדול] and a man a "small world" [עולם קטן]. And since the matter is so, it is made clear that, just as the coming-to-be that was [posited] as a part is one to which the coming-to-be of the parts of the world is related, [so] the world in its totality is related to the [great] man hinted at by [the analogy of] the man, [related] to the coming-to-be of that [great] man in his totality. And this relation is very plainly [seen] between these comings-to-be. That is to say: the coming-to-be [of a man] is a part, and in it the [great] man stands upon a single description; so too the totality of the world stands upon a single description, together with the comings-to-be of its parts and their being made manifest. And just as it is necessary, in the coming-to-be of that man, that the man be prior, found in actuality—since in him are found the causes of [that] coming-to-be, as one would say [of] the nourishing soul [נפש הזנה], the heart [הלב], the liver, the stomach [האצטומכא], and the rest of the instruments of digestion, and it is impossible that

these limbs be found separate from the rest of the limbs, as is explained in *On Animals* [ספר בעלי חיים]—so too it required that this [great] man be found, in actuality, in his totality, prior to this coming-to-be: just as the parts of the world's coming-to-be [require] that this man be found in actuality. For there would [otherwise] be found a cause of this coming-to-be such that, according to the coming-to-be, there would not [first] be this man; according to [the principle] that there is a prior motion, as is explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע]. And all the motions go up to

[*The chapter continues beyond this page.*]

the motion of the celestial body, as has been explained there. And when there is a heavenly body there, it follows necessarily that all the elements are present, and that what is composed of them exists as well — as has been explained in the *Physics* (ספר השמע הטבעי). Now once this relation [between the world and a single living individual] holds, let us say, by way of illustration, that just as it does not follow necessarily, in the coming-into-being of the individual man taken as a whole, that the individual already exists prior to his own coming-into-being, so too it does not follow, in the coming-into-being of the world taken as a whole, that the world already exists prior to this coming-into-being, nor that some part of it exists prior to that coming-into-being — if [the world] indeed has a coming-into-being.

Rather, that world has a coming-into-being [of its own kind], and no part of it exists prior to that coming-into-being. Yet it does require, in order to bring it into existence, a separate mover external to it — namely the mover that is the proximate [cause] of the partial comings-into-being — just as it requires the entry of a separate external mover for the coming-into-being of the living thing itself, as is explained in *Sefer Baalei Chayim* (ספר בעלי חיים, *De Animalibus*); and this is what we said earlier, [namely] that there is a mover proximate to the nutrition of that individual.

As for one who would hold that the universal coming-into-being must possess all the properties that necessarily belong to the partial coming-into-being [of the individual] — to which this world here is, as it were, the [pointed-to] analogue — [and that] it must therefore be without [beginning in time], as the Philosopher [Aristotle] argued: [his argument fails], because this inference [requires] that the world be without beginning in time. And the [proper] illustration of what has already been said is that Reuben [as an individual] stands before us [already existing] without beginning [only by] inference — drawn from [the relation]

between the universal coming-into-being and the partial coming-into-being that is found in him — and this is the [act of] nutrition.

But it is when Reuben [himself] has a coming-into-being that it follows that he must exist prior to his [own] coming-into-being. And this [holds] because we find that in the partial coming-into-being present in him there must be a soul, [a thing] here [present], and the like — for example, the heart, the liver, and the stomach (האצטומכא, Greek: στόμαχος, "stomach/gullet"), since the [act of] nutrition is not performed without a tool. And these tools cannot possibly be found as separate [organs] apart from the other limbs; rather they exist only as limbs [united] by the equivocation of the name [בשתוף השם]. One might wish to say that, were they to be limbs separate from the others, there would not be found in them these psychic potencies [הכחות הנפשיות] which [in fact reside] in them. And once the matter is so, this inference would lead [its proponent] to conclude that, if this individual [Reuben] has a coming-into-being, then this individual will exist prior to his own coming-into-being.

And by this [very same inference] one would be led to think [the same about] the world — namely, that the world is without beginning in time, [on the ground] that if this individual has a coming-into-being, then this world too would exist prior to its own coming-into-being. But [in truth] this is plainly explained to require no such conclusion. And in this way are dissolved many of the arguments by which the Philosopher [Aristotle] holds that the world is pre-eternal [קדום].

I mean: because there has here been explained the wonder of the difference between the universal coming-into-being and the partial coming-into-being, [it follows] that the universal coming-into-being does not have to possess all that the partial coming-into-being must possess. And what gives a [sound] conception of this matter, [namely] in the arguments by which the Philosopher held that the world is pre-eternal — [this we defer] until the matter has been explained with the completeness of our discourse.

And perhaps someone will say that what errs here is precisely the respect in which we drew our analogy from these comings-into-being. For [in the analogy] the individual [man] does not come into being, taken as a whole, but rather [comes into being only] when some species [of his being] exists in actuality, to which his coming-into-being rises in some manner. And in the same way it would follow that the matter [holds] in [the case of] the world — [namely] if it has a coming-into-being. [Yet] this is unsound, [precisely] because of what the Philosopher held, [namely] that if there were…

[that] which would lead us to the truth of this inquiry. For if there were among them a thing that must exist [eternally], then indeed it would be explained, without doubt, that the world is without beginning in time. And this would be explained, by way of illustration, [on the ground] that the heavenly bodies are generated, [from which] it would follow necessarily that the whole world is generated — since it is to them that the coming-into-being of the parts of the world rises, as the Philosopher explained, and as we ourselves explained in the preceding treatise concerning this. And if it should be explained that time or motion is generated, then it would follow necessarily that the world too is generated. For the statement that the heavenly bodies were found [first], and time afterward, and that motion then began to move — this is a statement plainly [shown to be] null, as has been made clear to one who examines [the matter] in this book.

And if we should grant [the supposition] to be explained that the revolution of the earth (הגלות הארץ) is generated, and that these [bodies] are generated because of it, [then] all the things found here, whose existence is continuous [מציאותם מדובק] in some manner — and these are the species [present] here — [then] it would be explained that the world is generated. For if the matter were [a matter of] something generated absolutely [מחודש במוחלט], then it would follow necessarily that the heavenly bodies were prior to the generation of these things, since these things [present] here exist; [and] if [the bodies] had been prior to the generation of these things [over a time without limit], there would here be a natural impossibility that does not pass into actuality except in time [that is] without limit — and this [too] is plainly null.

And if it should be explained, concerning these things whose existence is continuous, that they are without beginning in time, then it would be explained that the world is pre-eternal — this is plainly [shown] of itself. But if we set our inquiry upon those things whose existence is not continuous — and these are the things that perish, in respect of which they have a coming-into-being and a perishing — then we will not draw any benefit from this inquiry by way of explaining from them that they come into being, for it is already known in advance that they come into being. The matter is rather that these are perishing things, [whereas the question concerns] those whose existence is continuous.

And if it were necessary that they have a coming-into-being, then it would be explained that the world has a coming-into-being; and if there were among them that which must be without beginning in time, then it would be explained that the world is pre-eternal. And if there were among them no thing that must come

into being, nor any that must be without beginning in time, then it would be impossible, from this respect, [to decide] whether the world is pre-eternal or generated.

And it will thus also be explained that it is yet more fitting to set the beginning of the inquiry in this investigation upon the matters which we mentioned — [namely] that we set the beginning of our inquiry upon [the question] whether He, may He be blessed, must [be such that] He brings the world into being after it was not, or whether the matter [stands] the reverse of this. For we have, in this respect, [a thing] in which we err: that in [the matter of] the very essence of the Name, may He be blessed, our [grasp] is exceedingly weak; and for this reason it is not fitting to set the beginning of the inquiry upon an investigation in which we wish to acquire complete knowledge. And when it is judged best for us to set the beginning of the inquiry in this investigation upon things found in the world whose existence is continuous, [then] that of which our inquiry [will treat] — whether [the question] from them would be whether they come into being — it would be made plain that it is fitting that we should know what is more fitting to be conceived concerning the coming-into-being [as against] that-which-is-without-coming-into-being; for when we know…

this, and have inquired into these things whose existence is continuous — whether there is among them anything generated in respect of its coming-into-being, or whether there is no such thing among them — then it will be possible to stand readily upon their matter, [namely] whether they come into being or not. And here it will be explained which of the existents it is fitting to set [as the object of] this inquiry, and how it is possible to stand from them upon the truth of this investigation.

פרק ששי

[Chapter Six.]

[Small-type chapter-summary subtitle:] *In which we shall explain in what respect the coming-into-being [ההוה] is to be preferred to that-which-is-without-coming-into-being [ההבלתי הווה].*

The most particular property belonging to coming-into-being is that it is made for the sake of some end — God [as final cause] — except where its coming-to-be was by chance. And as for that which has its way [of generation] by chance, this is [merely] a paucity [of the rule] [מעטי]. This is explained in everything that comes into being either by nature or by way of craft [המלאכה], because nature performs

everything it does for the sake of some end, as is explained in the *Physics* (בטבעיות); so likewise is the matter in [the case of] craft.

But that which does not come into being — since it is not the product of an agent — has in it no final cause [סבה תכליתית]; this is plainly [shown] of itself. For the predication [התאר] [made] of that which is not the product of an agent — that [predication] of "final cause" — is itself a description plainly self-contradictory [סותר נפשו]. This is because the contrary [holds]: that which is said to have a final cause is precisely that of which it is conceived [first] that it is the product of an agent. And since that which is not the product of an agent has no final cause, no final cause would have been given by anything in the mathematical sciences [הלמודיות], unless there were in them something [arising] either by nature or by choice [הבחירה].

The illustration: one would not say of any benefit [or end] [that there is one] for the angles of a triangle being equal to two right angles, nor for the diagonal of a rectangle being incommensurable [בלתי שוה] with its side; and the matter is likewise in the rest of the mathematical inquiries [הדרושים הלמודיים]. This is so because there is here no agent who [posits] that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and for this [reason] the thing is not the product of an agent, nor [has it] a final cause in the mathematical [sciences].

But the triangle that is made by craft for the sake of some end — it is already possible that one would say of it [that there is] some benefit, [namely] that the matter was so in the triple figure [בתמונה המשולשת], because in this manner it was the product of an agent. But one would not say of [just] any benefit [that it pertains to] the [object] there of which its outer angle is equal to the two interior angles, since this matter is not, in the triangle, the product of an agent.

And it is fitting that it not escape us that there already may be a final cause for the thing of which there is coming-into-being always. And if its existence has no [absolute] coming-into-being, in accordance with [the supposition] that its existence is always the product of an agent — as one would say [of him] who would have it concerning the celestial bodies, [namely] that the spheres move — there already flows [emanates] always, from the mover, [the conception] from which that very conception of the spheres [proceeds], in the motions by which they are moved. And for this [reason], if the spheres and their movers were without beginning in time [בלתי מחודשים], it would be possible that there should be brought to completion from them a motion absolutely without beginning in time, even though…

[The argument continues.]

[Continuation of פרק ששי / Chapter Six, begun on the preceding page]

that motion in the most perfect manner by which it is possible to bring to completion what is to be brought about by it, since that thing [i.e., the heavens' configuration] is always [eternally] generated through that conception, and in this respect it is the product of an operation [that has] an agent. And in this respect alone it is possible that there should come to be the operation of an agent for that which has no [temporal] beginning to its existence, since it is always generated. But as for that which cannot be always generated through conjunction with an agent — that is, [a thing] which, when it is the product of an operation [that has] an agent, [is such that] its existence has no beginning at all, since it is not the product of an operation [that has] an agent — and by way of illustration: just as the house, when the builder is at rest, [is such] that it is impossible that its existence should always be emanating from the builder; for the builder is what newly produces the house after [a time in] which the house did not exist — and this is explained in itself.

[New movement of the argument:] It is fitting that this not be hidden from us: that what is generated [as a coming-to-be], when it is not in the manner [proper] to that which is [the product of an operation that has] an agent — as was [the case] above — concerning a thing in which there is found no benefit, [for] it is already possible that the thing was thus [merely] by chance. But as for that which has been explained — that it is necessary, when there are found in it things [directed] to some end — that thing is the product of an operation [that has] an agent; and this is well explained.

Now this matter is comparable to casting up [a sum] in a [reckoning] book. That is to say: when you cast up the [accounts] at the time you test whether you erred in that book, [the result] is that the casting-up does not give the truth concerning the equality of that reckoning [as] done in this way; rather, the verdict is forced upon the error [you committed] — if there was [an error] in that [reckoning of the] number. So too the matter [stands] equally [in both cases]. Thus, by this consideration, no true verdict can be passed [to the effect] that that thing is something un-generated; but a true verdict can be passed [to the effect] that it is something generated, when it is among the things [directed] to some end. And this is well explained. From this, [then,] one derives the benefit that the thing is something generated; but one does not derive [from it] the benefit [proving] that the thing is something un-generated.

It has already been mentioned, further, concerning the coming-to-be from the un-generated, that the coming-to-be [may] be among things that are not necessitated for it from the side of nature and from their own selves — as is the matter in the things that come to be by art [craft], in that the form of the chair or the form of the chest is already found in the wood from the side of art. None of these is necessitated for it from the side of nature. But as for that which is un-generated, it is explained that it is possible that there should be found among them things not necessitated for it from the side of nature and from its own self, [these being] the [things] which are un-generated; for if there were found for it a thing necessitated for it from the side of nature and from its own self, then its existence would be in it by chance — [a thing] which has no nature requiring its [coming-to-be] to be in it — and there would be there also an agent [generating] the thing in it. Now this [is] a thing that cannot be found among the things that endure perpetually [the eternal things], for everything that is not fit to be found in them always [is found] only [in] a small portion of time.

And further: it is already difficult to grant that there should be a thing which is [the very] thing found together with the quiddity, [in such manner] that this thing should be necessitated by nature, [namely] that this thing should be found in it [its quiddity]; for this [is] from what is impossible — that its assumption be other than this — if [there be] not here some [other] agent…

[and this is] what was meant: that these things are connected and conjoined, some of them with some, with this [further point], which is explained in itself. The Philosopher has already conceded this, for he said what amounts to this premise's being acknowledged in [his] natural science and in [his] theology [metaphysics].

And from what may further be mentioned concerning the coming-to-be from the un-generated: it is possible that there should be [a thing] whose existence is for the sake of something other than itself — and this is explained — whether the coming-to-be be by nature or by choice and will, this being the coming-to-be by art. An illustration of the coming-to-be by nature [for the sake of another]: it is for the sake of the living being, so as to set its equilibrium in order through it. And an illustration of the coming-to-be by art: the garment, which is for the sake of the human being, so as to be for him a covering [to shield him] from the cold that surrounds him. But as for the un-generated, it is impossible that there should be in it a thing existing in its own self for the sake of something other than itself; this is explained, [for] it is impossible that there should be for it a final cause at all —

all the more so where it is not fit that there be in it a final cause for the benefit of something other than itself.

And this [matter] has already been shown, too, from what we say: namely, that the thing which is for the sake of something other than itself is bound up with it and tied to it, and the perpetual quiddity is not bound up with another quiddity unless [there be] from some side an agent overseeing them in their totality — He who connects these existents and sets some of them [in order] for the sake of [some] portion. And this is explained in itself to one who studies this book.

[Body heading, p. 310:] **פרק שביעי — Chapter Seven**

[Smaller-type argument-line beneath the rubric:] In which it is explained, from a certain aspect, that the heavenly bodies are generated [created in time] — apart from the first aspect [already given].

After it has been explained — what is to be mentioned concerning the coming-to-be from the un-generated, according to what is possible for us — it is now fitting that we inquire whether there be among these things [a case in which] there is something among the apprehensible features found [as belonging] to the coming-to-be in respect of its being a coming-to-be, or [whether] there be among them no thing of these apprehensible features. And we set our inquiry into this beginning from the heavenly bodies, for they are the cause of [their] being connected together [with] the rest of the things whose existences are conjoined — such as time, motion, and what resembles them.

And we say that it has already been explained — concerning what there is no doubt that it precedes [is prior] — that everything found in the substance of the heavens is of [a kind] by which it is possible to bring to completion these existents, [such] that, if [any] small portion [of it] were lost from that order, these existents would [thereby] be lost.

By way of illustration: that the distance of the heavenly body from the earth is such [as it is] in order that there may emanate from it that which is needed to emanate from it, so as to bring to completion these existents. And this [is] what has already been explained: that, [if] the distance were varied, the operation [emanated] from that order would be varied. So too will be explained the measure of the heavenly body [as being] of the [kind] by which it is possible to bring to completion what emanates from it; for if it were larger or smaller, this order would be lost. So too has it been explained concerning the figure of the spheres of the heavenly body, such that some part of it [the heavenly bodies] is not without curved surfaces, and there is [thus] a great distance…

the surfaces, [namely] that great distance which is found in them, [is] according to what has been explained; it too is in the most perfect manner by which it is possible to bring to completion what is here [in the lower world], because of what is newly produced by this through the body's being near to the heavenly body at times and far from it at [other] times, and through what is newly produced by this from the variation of motion — [now] swift in motion toward the body, [now] tardy — until the motion comes to be at times swifter and at times more tardy.

So too will be explained that the order of the spheres of the heavenly body is likewise in the most perfect manner by which it is possible [to bring to completion] that which is to emanate from the heavenly body's operations, [such] that it is necessary that this [order] should emanate from it, [to the end] that these existents should be brought to completion; for if its order had been in another manner, it would not have been possible that there should be newly produced from them this composite motion found [as belonging] to the heavenly body, by which it is impossible that there should emanate from it what is needed for the completion of these existents — [a completion which] is found only in it. So too will it be explained that the orbits of the stars are of [a kind] by which it is possible [to attain] the most perfect [completion] that may emanate from them [of] the varied operations needed for the completion of what is here. And this is the [reason] that the sun's situation is [as it is]: by way of illustration, the differing situation of the moon, in order that there may emanate from the sun a hot heat to the air, and from the moon a giving of moisture. And this is the cause [that] these varied orbits were [as they are], as [stated] above.

So too will be explained that the place of the heavenly body in its sphere is in the most perfect manner by which it is possible [to attain perfection], in the way by which it is possible to emanate from it that which is needed here, [such] that, if the heavenly body had been nearer to the northern side or to the southern side, there would not have emanated from it that which is needed to emanate from it for these things, as was explained above. So too has it been explained that the number of the spheres of the heavenly body is in the most perfect manner by which it is possible to bring to completion that which [is needed] for the perfecting of [this composite] motion found [as belonging] to the heavenly body, by which it is impossible that there should emanate from a [single] heavenly body that which is needed for the completion of these existents — [a completion] found only in it.

So too has it been explained that the being of the supreme sphere [the topmost orb] [contains] many stars, in the manner in which they are found, [is] in [a way]

by which it is possible to bring to completion that which [is needed] for the perfecting of these lower existents, since by this there are newly produced from the stars varied operations [that] bring to completion, in this manner, the many existents. So too has it been explained that the being of some part of the stars [possessing] light from their own selves, and the being of some part of them [possessing light] from elsewhere, [is] in [a way] by which it is possible to bring to completion that which is to be brought to completion of these existents. So too has it been explained that the variation of the parts of the moon — some of them, [such] that some part of them receives the light, while some part of them does not receive the light — [is] in the most perfect manner by which it is possible to bring to completion that which is here. So too has it been explained that the Milky Way and the place of the fixed stars [is] in the most perfect manner by which it is possible to bring to completion these existents. So too has it been explained that the measure of the body which preserves [unaltered] its figure between the spheres of one heavenly body and the sphere of another heavenly body [is] in the most perfect manner by which it is possible — for the sake of which the motions of the heavenly bodies should not be confounded — so that there may be brought to completion through them that which is here. So too will be explained that the number of the spheres as a whole, and [of] the stars, [is] in the most perfect manner by which it is possible…

by which the operations [that are] proper to emanate from each star [emanate] from them, and [proper] by reason of the relations newly produced from their conjunctions and their orbits, for through this there is brought to completion the pattern [law] of these lower existents and the ordering of them, and the setting of them in order, in the most perfect manner possible. And, the matter being so — [as] has already been explained — that what is found [as having] a final cause is necessarily the product of an operation [that has] an agent, it is explained that the heavenly bodies, and all that is in them, are the product of an operation [that has] an agent.

And in this, the Philosopher erred in the second book of the *Physics* [ספר השמע, Aristotle], concerning [the doctrine of] chance and spontaneity. They erred grievously — those who would say of these heavenly bodies that they [exist] from their own selves; nay, [it is even] a greater error than that of him who would say that the heavenly bodies [are] a thing that could possibly be referred to chance and spontaneity, and [refer] these many things [found] in them to chance and spontaneity. These [chance and spontaneity] are the accidents found in the living being and in the plant, not by reason of the nature of the species. So this [view] is

the intention of the Philosopher in this [matter], even though he did not say it in these [express] words.

And when we consider this [matter], it has been explained to us that the thing which is, in this respect, [self-]subsisting in its own self [as] a coming-to-be is so of necessity, since its being is the product of an operation [that has] an agent. This, then, is explained — that of which there is no doubt that the heavens are [things that] come to be.

But how it is to be explained that the thing [which is] perpetual is necessitated in its own self to its being absolutely [as] a coming-to-be — in that its being is the product of an operation [that has] an agent — this will be explained from what we say. Now it is already possible that the thing should be the product of an operation [that has] an agent — if [it be such] that, when its existence always emanates from [the agent], as we should say that the conception is what always emanates to the heavenly bodies, by [virtue of] the pattern [law] of [these] existents, [there is] some perfecting of [their] motions; or [it be such] that, when its existence emanates from [the agent], its existence [is] at the [particular] time required, alone.

And it is explained that it is impossible to grant [this latter alternative] concerning the heavenly bodies. And as for what we mentioned of [the] matters which it has, in the perfect [manner], by which there emanates from them that which is to be brought to completion of this lower existence — [namely] that its existence should emanate, [as] emanated from God, blessed be He, always — when we have granted this, there are already necessitated for us many refutations, [from which] there is no escaping at all: if first, that it would already be necessitated by this that the time would be a coming-to-be, a thing that does not perish, [referred] to nothing [as its cause]; and if second, that it would already be necessitated by this that the time should be conjoined with [some] quiddities; and if third, that it would already be necessitated by this that the heavenly bodies should not be…

[that the heavenly bodies should not be there] except potentially; and if fourth, that it would already be necessitated by this that there should not be here one continuous motion; but rather there would be to the heavenly bodies varied motions in [their] swiftness and tardiness, [in a manner] altogether [unintelligible]. And in sum, if we were to count up all the refutations entailed by this assumption [the assumption of the world's eternity], we should need to make a long discourse; and in this [present place] it is too brief, so let us stand upon what suffices for the rejecting of this assumption.

But how it is to be explained that there are already entailed by this assumption [refutations] such as these refutations which we mentioned — this [is] according to what we say. For when we have granted there to be an existence to the spheres, and to that which is in them, of [these] matters which we mentioned, emanating from God, blessed be He, always…

it is necessitated that the spheres should not have ceased to exist before the agent that emanates them ceased; rather, that agent's emanation should never have been interrupted at all. And this holds [only] on the supposition that, were the Name, blessed be He, to act so as to emanate from the spheres these operations that are now found, this would not [in fact] proceed from Him at all — except [on the supposition] that they always [emanate] from Him in one and the same manner, by virtue of [their] existence. And in sum, the thing that is generated [in this respect] would have to be a generated thing in its own self, [and] not other than itself — that is, not a thing produced [anew] in any respect at all.

To illustrate: the wheel-rim already shaped from copper, when this generation has occurred and the rim has not yet come to be in its own self in any respect — [this is not the case here]. Rather, [the right account] is this. If it is granted to us that an existence belongs to the spheres, and that what is in them is something always emanating from them as the Name, blessed be He, emanates — like the way the sun emanates light from itself — [such] that the spheres' existence would always be that of generated things never perishing, then [this would amount to saying] that everything is null [self-defeating]. So, too, will it be explained that it would already be necessitated that there be at one [single] *now* both [the spheres'] coming-to-be and their perishing. For if, at the *now*, the coming-to-be has been posited, and [at] the *now* immediately adjacent to it the perishing, and [the coming-to-be] is restored to it, and the coming-to-be is in the third *now*, then the celestial body would not be continuous [in its existence]; rather, the time of its privation would be equal to the time of its existence — and this is what is meant by [its being] "null."

[which holds] on the supposition that, in this same manner, their existence is not always emanated from Him, blessed be He. And if it has been granted to us that, at one [single] *now*, a perishing comes to be — [a perishing] which is in fact a coming-to-be — then this too is null. For my intention is that the contraries should be gathered together at one [and the same] perpetual instant. — And, further, [the same is necessitated] from this: that the celestial body would [on this view] be something that always emanates from Him, blessed be He, [and] from this it would be necessitated that the *now* should always be conjoined [to it]; and

from this it would be necessitated that, [if] there be time, then this time would [have to] be conjoined to the *now*. And this [is so] because, were there [some] interval between the [several] *nows* in which this very coming-to-be occurred, then there would not be at that time the existence of the spheres emanating from Him, blessed be He, always — and this is impossible. And it has already been explained to us that what is emanated from Him, blessed be He, is perpetual.

And it has further already been necessitated from this that the heavenly bodies should not be [in being] except potentially. For the existence of the heavenly bodies is not perpetually [a fresh production], since [on this view] they are now [in being] otherwise [than before]. And it would [thus] be explained that the things now found are present only potentially,

not in actuality — as has been explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע, Aristotle]. Hence it would be necessitated that the heavenly bodies are not [in being] except potentially. — And, further, it would be necessitated from this that there should not be here one [single] continuous motion belonging to the heavenly bodies. And this [is so] because the continuous motion would necessarily belong to one [continuously] moving thing, as has been explained in the *Physics* — yet here there would be no one [single] moving thing, by [the force of] this same assumption. — And, further, it would be necessitated from this that there should not be here favor [continuity], since [on this view] the heavenly bodies would not be [in being] except now, and there would be no motion now. And when there is no motion belonging to any one [of them], the totality of [their] motion could not be completed by the totalities of [their separate] motions, since the [whole] motion would [already] consist of the doubling of the motion belonging to each one of them in [the moment of] its existence. And by this it would be explained that

there could not be in them an [evenly] proportioned motion, nor a swift motion. — And by [the force of] this account it will be explained to you that, on this assumption, many falsehoods are already necessitated — falsehoods from which there is no escaping in any way at all. And since the matter is so, it is explained that it is impossible that what always emanates from Him, blessed be He, should be the heavenly bodies and what is in them — [namely] the [fixed] stars. And in sum, this resemblance [this analogy] cannot apply except in the case of accidents that have no permanence — such as motion and the like — but as for things that do have permanence, this could not apply in any way at all.

And when we have reflected on the fact that the existence of the spheres is not something always emanating from Him, blessed be He — and that they would [on

the eternalist view] be necessitated [to exist] in accordance with what precedes [them] [in time], such that their coming-to-be would be the product of an [efficient] operation — then it [follows] that [their existence] does not [merely] emanate; rather, what emanates [to them] is the existence that comes to be at [the very] moment of their coming-to-be. And [in this] is [contained] what brought the heavens into being. And if someone were to say that it is possible that the existence of the heavenly bodies should always be emanated from Him, blessed be He — just as the [continued] subsistence of [lower] matter

is emanated to natural things from Him, blessed be He — in the manner explained as to their natures: from this it would be necessitated that not one of the aforementioned refutations should follow. [To this] we have [already] answered him, that the existence of the heavenly bodies would [indeed] be perfected in this manner, [namely] by causes [conferring] the subsistence of the heavenly bodies; but the [final] cause of [their] operation would not be perfected by this for the things that exist by [its] operation. And what was explained in the foregoing demonstration is that their existence is [the work] of [an agent's] operation; and since it is impossible that their existence should always be emanated from Him, blessed be He, it is necessitated that their existence should be [the work] of [an agent's] operation, at [the very] moment of their coming-to-be — as we have explained.

And, further, [it is to be noted] that the manner by which the subsistence of [lower] matter is emanated is not [the manner] in which it would be [if] it were said that the natural heat sustains [a] thing — that is, [sustains] the life and the vitality — and preserves the thing in respect of that [same] form which [the heat] is [able to confer], according to our [understanding of] what is possible for the operations to emanate, and [for them] to overpower the [opposing] powers that act [against them]. But the heavenly bodies do not stand in need of this, since they are not composite, and there is in them no nature necessitating corruption to them; and for this [reason] it cannot be said that their existence should be something always emanated from Him, blessed be He.

And here it has been explained that the spheres are generated from the [very] outset, in this respect: that one of them is [such] that it is, in respect of the perfection in [its] interior aspects, [ordered] toward the [final] end for which the lower existents are completed. For it is impossible to say that their figures [came to be] by chance, [nor that] the remaining matters found in them [came to be by chance] — [since] they are [ordered] to the perfection of [those] interior aspects, in [the very] best manner possible. [This holds] in regard to whatever is seen [in

them] without [any] doubt being aligned [against it], by [the force of] [their] operations. — And, further, [it is to be noted] that it is impossible also to say that there should be in them, by chance, the cause from which their figures [arise] and the remaining matters [arise], and [that] their operations should be ordered [arising] to them from [some such] cause. For if the matter were granted to be so, then their operations would be [the work] of [a] cause, in [the very] manner whereby they are [in fact] found to be by it [the cause]; and this is the contrary of what is seen, namely that the figures are found in natural things on account of the operations, and not the operations on account of the figures.

The Philosopher has already explained this in the *Book of Animals* [ספר בעלי חיים, Aristotle]. And the illustration we [gave is] that it is not said that the eye was [first] able to see, and that on account of this its figure and its composition already came to be in it; rather, it is said that [it is] in this manner — that on account of the figure and the composition [whereby it is constituted], it became able to see. And so likewise it has been explained that the heavenly bodies were [constituted] in this manner, [namely] that [it is] on account of the figure that is in them, and on account of the rest of the matters found in them, [that there arise] the ordered operations which proceed from them — [operations] not perfected save in this manner. — And, further, [it is to be noted] that here it has not come about by chance [that there should be] their figures and the rest of the matters found in them, [ordered] to be intelligible, on account of what they are. For if their existence had not been ordered, who would order it [and] who would know [to do so]? — And, further, [it is to be noted] how the design [in them] should be depicted as coming about by chance, [so] as to be perfected with respect to the figure of one [member] of the spheres — [as regards] the stars, [namely] what is wanting [to make perfect] the perfection [present] in the rest of the spheres. Behold, this is [a thing] null at its [very] end [absolutely null]!

But [the truth] is explained without doubt: an [evenly] proportioned order belongs to them, of necessity, in this manner whereby they [exist] — [as regards] what is in them of [their] stars, and their magnitudes, and the qualities of [their] luminance, and their figures, and the number of the spheres serving each star — so as to perfect [in] them whatever is most aligned [most fitting] in them, in [the very] best manner possible. And when it is granted that this matter is something [the work] of [a] cause [acting] upon them — as has been explained in their interior aspects [in their own selves] — then it has been explained that it is necessitated [to follow] from what precedes [it] that the heavenly bodies were generated.

And in sum, [we say] this. If, indeed, the apprehension [of one] who would say of these things — which are [present] here, such as the animal and the plant and the rest of natural things — that they are [the work] of [a] cause [is sound], then it is the more fitting that an apprehension [of one] who would say this of the heavenly bodies [should hold]. And this [is so] because [of one] of the things from which we are obliged [to reason] — [namely], on account of what is found in them of the good and of the [final] end. For [the more] aligned the good and the [final] end are found in [a] thing, the more fitting [it is] that it be [the work] of [a] cause. And this [is so] because it is already possible that [a] thing should reach a little of the good and of the [final] end, apart from [its being the work of a] cause — [namely] when it might be said of [a thing such as] lowly stone and chance [coming-together], in the manner whereby there should be in it some portion of [the good] [such as] is [worthy of] praise on its account. And since the matter is so, and it has been explained

of the heavenly bodies that they have acquired more of the good and of the [final] end — to [the point] that there is in them no [trace of] anything by chance, as is the case in [the matter of] these natural individuals — [it is explained] that what is found in them of the accidents [pertains] to the individual qua individual; and there is in them no nature [acting] at [some particular] time apart from [some other], as is the case in [the matter of] these individuals that perish.

It is explained [thus] in the most aligned manner — [it is] null and void [to hold] that the heavenly bodies are not [the work] of [a] cause! For [a thing] is [the work] of [a] cause — such as the animal and the plant, and the rest of the things that [exist] here, which are not [the work] of [a] cause [in the manner the heavenly bodies are]. And to this the Philosopher [Aristotle] assented in [the matter of] these heavenly bodies, that they are [the work] of [a] cause — as though the nature of the truth had compelled him to it. And it has [thus] already been explained, [as] we have stated, that when it is granted that the heavenly bodies are [the work] of [a] cause, it is necessitated that the heavens were generated. And here it has been explained that the heavens are generated, [as to] that wherein there is no doubt. — And by [way of] the number of the demonstrations that will be explained concerning them, this

explanation lies in the number of the things essential to the very substance of the heavens — [things] of which there is in them nothing that should not be of [some] use, as has [already] been explained as to what preceded. And the most wondrous thing [of all] in this demonstration is that it is constructed from premises that are

all of them known in [their] own selves; and as for the unfolding of the matter, [it is] as we have explained it.

And here I thought it already necessary to draw out a portion of the final consequences that follow upon the opinion of the Philosopher [Aristotle] — [the opinion] whereby he taught that the Name, blessed be He, together [with] the affair of the heavens, set them in order, and arranged them, according to what they are — as the Rabbi [author of] the *Guide* [Maimonides, *Moreh Nevuchim*] recounted, [namely] as though [the Name] willed to gather together [a coincidence] of contraries. For this assertion necessitates [the conclusion] that the heavens were generated — and yet they [the philosophers] believed them to be ungenerated!

And when it has been explained that the heavens are generated, it is not [thereby] hard to explain from this that the world is generated. For [had it not been the case] that here there were heavens, there would not have been here "up" and "down"; and when there is no "up" and "down," there are no elements here; and when there are no elements here, there is no composite [made up] of them. And in sum, [it is so] because the heavens are, from the [very] outset, [the work] of [an] operation, in the manner [that holds] for the rest of natural things; and it has been [made] clear, from what was explained, that when the [efficient] cause is not found from the [very] outset, that which is [its] conjoined effect is not found [either], nor does that [effect] continue on after it [the cause]. [Therefore] it is explained that when it has been explained that the heavens are generated, it has [thereby] been explained that the world in its totality is generated.

פרק שמיני (Chapter Eight)

[Argument-line, smaller type:] In which it is explained that the heavens are generated, by reason of certain special properties [סגולות] found in them — [special properties drawn] from those special properties found in the [process of] coming-to-be in that which is [now] coming to be.

It is fitting that we inquire, so as to undo [any] doubt — [as to] what participation [in common] there is in saying of the world that it [exists] by [way of] coming-to-be, and [in] saying of it [that it exists] by [way of] eternity — before the [several] modes of inquiry into the rest of the things are perfected, [the things] from which there might be taken a demonstration as to whether the world is eternal or generated. And this doubt is one taken from [the matter of] the things found in the heavens — [namely] whether the nature of the heavens is [such] that they could not have been [other than] found [as] they are. For if they had been [other

than] they are, behold, [then] we should reckon that there could not be in them [a fixed nature] — by way of illustration,

that to one and the same matter there belong alternating [interchangeable] forms, just as is the case in [the matter of] the rest of these things now coming to be among natural things; for we find [that] in [the matter of] their substrate [there is] a single distinct form, and the alternating forms that are in them are [the various] forms belonging to [the various] alternating substrates. And if they [the heavens] were [things] that come to be, behold, [then] it would be the more clearly explained [that they are] [things] necessitated [to be so], since it is impossible to conceive that there should be, in the case of a thing that is [now] coming to be, only what is necessitated to it from the side of its nature and its own self.

But [the truth] is that there are in the heavens many things not necessitated to them from the side of their nature and their existence — [a thing that is] clearly explained. And this [is so] because it has already been explained as to the nature of the celestial body that it is one, [admitting] of no alternation at all in itself; but it is [a thing] simple, and [its existence as] member-and-member [individuated into parts] [holds] in respect of [its] portions [chalakim], for its nature is neither light nor heavy. And when [the matter is] reflected upon, [the case] is this: there are found in the heavens many things [such] that the nature of the heavens [could] not [have] given that they should be found in them. And this…

מאמר ו' — Book VI · חלק א' — Part One · פרק ח' — Chapter Eight (continued)

in such a way that the matter of the movers of the heavenly bodies — which are their forms — should differ in species. And this is so because, on the very basis on which we explained the matter, it is clear that these things differ in species: by the foregoing argument it has been made plain that the matter differs in species in this case, and that the things were posited as coming-to-be and as emanating just as the commentators on the words of the Philosopher have left it. According to what they understood from his words, then, these things too differ in species — without any doubt.

And this is so because, from the perspective from which we have taken our point of view, we always draw a proof from the operations that are ordered out of these very elements [שאנחנו נקח ראיה תמיד מהפעולות אשר יסודרו מהם אלו הפעולות].

Now it has already been explained that these movers were ordered out of differing operations — for, given what has been explained, namely that the influence flowing here from one [thing] differs from that flowing from another, it is plain that these movers themselves differ. And since the matter is so, it is my wish [רצוני] [to say] that these movers — which are the forms belonging to the spheres — are differing [forms]; yet it has been made plain that the heavenly body, all of it, is of a single nature [כלו מטבע אחד]. So it is explained that the differing forms found in these spheres are something that the nature of the spheres does not supply [לא יתנהו טבע הגלגלים].

And I say, further, that the fact that the spheres differ in their quantities [בכמותם] is likewise something that the nature of the spheres does not supply. For it has already been shown that wisdom [חכמה] is what assigns to each of the things that have a nature its proper measure [שיעור], according to its own nature — by way of illustration, an ant is found in the measure of an ant, not in the measure of a camel, and a camel not in the measure of an ant. Yet here it would have been possible for these things to be so [arranged] that the individuals of a single species should differ in their quantities — because they are composed of contraries [מורכבים מהפכים], so that the matter should be ample [רחב] in quantity and in quality, and the temperaments [מזגי] of the individuals of one species should accordingly differ somewhat by reason of their particular nature. And it is on this account that we find some of them somewhat larger and some somewhat smaller — because the temperament of the one is somewhat more conducive to growth and to the development of their parts than the temperament of the other. But the heavenly bodies are not possessed of a temperament such that there might be a difference between one sphere and a second sphere in respect of its temperament; and so it has been explained that no difference in their quantities can be supplied to them from the side of their particular nature, since there is among them nothing apprehensible from the side of a particular nature, as is the matter with respect to the individuals [of a species] here [below].

Now, what makes this obligatory in the case of these things [whose existence is] here — that the matter [should be ample] in quantity and in quality — is the perpetual reception of the variation in quality [להיותו מקבל תמיד השנוי באיכות], whether by reason of the surrounding air [האויר המקיף] and what is conjoined to it from things outside, or by reason of other circumstances — such as the nourishments [המזונות] and the like. For were the matter not ample in quality for them, it would not be possible for them to subsist except for a very short time, since the temperament particular to that which has come-to-be would at once depart from it; and death would necessarily ensue upon the departure of its

particular temperament. For this reason it was obligatory in its case that the matter should be ample in quantity; and this, because what is conjoined to it from the things outside, and growth by way of nourishment [—] behold, it is impossible that the individual subsist [unchanged] in its quantity at all. And were the quantity of the individuals of the species limited so as to receive neither less nor more, then the coming-to-be of the individuals of the species would of necessity vary toward death in [their] quantity [—].

With this it would be impossible for the individuals of the species which are here to come-to-be, were the matter of theirs not ample in quantity. And this is so because they could not be [as they later are] from the beginning of [their] coming-to-be in the perfect quantity that is found in the individuals of that very species — as is illustrated by the fact that an individual of the living being is not [at birth] as large as it [later becomes]. And so it is with the matter in [the case of] plants that grow from seeds: this is very plain. And it is explained that the variation found among the individuals of one species in quantity is on account of the variation that belongs to them in quality — as though one were to say that the temperament of this one is somewhat more conducive to growth and to the magnitude of the body than that temperament.

And since the matter is so, it has been made plain that it is impossible for the heavenly bodies that there be a variation among them in their quality, since they are not possessed of quality. It has [also] been explained that there is no variation in their natures, for they differ in species [—] still more plainly is it explained that there could not be in them variation [arising] from their surroundings [מקיפים] at their extremities. And this is something we find in things whose way it is that they are possessed of differing natures, as is the matter in the elements — for already a nature differing from theirs is found in the [body] that encompasses [each of] them.

Hence it was fitting, from the side of the nature of the heavenly body, that there should be here nothing other than a single [thing] in number, just as the matter [stands] in the nature of the four elements. And it has been explained, likewise, that its nature does not supply that the planes [should be] otherwise than facing each other [—], inasmuch as the sphere is heavier from one side, the side that is uppermost, than from the other side [—]. And this is so because it is of a single nature; behold, its nature is uniform on every side.

And further, since the parts of the sphere are all of a single nature, its nature [too] does not supply that there should be in it one part differing from the rest of the parts of the sphere — such that that part should be luminous and non-

transparent [מאיר ובלתי ספיריי], namely the star, while the remaining parts of the sphere are transparent and non-luminous [ספיריים ובלתי מאירים].

And this is so because the composite thing [made] of contraries is what makes it possible that there be in it a variation in its parts, since the composite consists of corresponding [contrary] things [מדברים מקבילים]; and so it would be possible that some of its parts should differ from others, as if one were to say in the case of a living being that its heavier nature differs from the nature of death. But in the heavenly body no variation between its parts is to be found, since it is of a single nature, as our matter has been explained.

And this, too, is explained: that the nature of the heavens does not supply that these stars should be [as they are]. And it has been explained in the foregoing manner that, because the stars are all of a single nature, their nature does not supply that they should differ in their quantities, just as is found with respect to their matters. And by this it is explained that, because the stars are all of a single nature, there could not be any variation among them at all [—]; for were their nature to vary, their color [too] would vary, to the point that some of them are somewhat red and some somewhat white in their visible appearance, otherwise than [their actual state], as our matter has been explained. For this is indeed possible for things which it is possible here to vary in heat and in cold, in moisture and in dryness, as is the matter of their natures. But the stars — it is not possible that there be any variation among them at all; behold, their nature does not supply that there be found among them a variation in their colors.

And by this it is explained that, because the stars are all of a single nature, [the fact] that they are diffused [as] influences differing from one another — [that] one is diffused [as] one influence and another diffused [as] another influence — [is not from their nature]. As an illustration: it is not possible that the nature of the stars should be such that the sun should be hot and dry, warming and drying what is moistened [—] as in the temperament that is in it, while the moon [should be] cooling and moistening [מקרר ומלחלח], as their matters have been made known. And by this it is explained that, because the stars are all of a single nature, their nature does not supply that some of them should be self-luminous [מאירים מעצמם] while some receive their light from another, as is seen in the matter of the sun and the moon. And by this it is explained: were the nature [of the stars uniform], there would not be found among them a variation between the extremity of some of their parts — in that some receive their light at the extremity of their parts and some do not receive it — as is the matter with the

moon. And this is explained from the shadow visible upon it, as we explained earlier.

And by this it is explained that, because the heavenly body is of a single nature, the nature [of it] does not supply that some of the spheres should be [furnished] with many stars while some [are furnished] with [only] a single star, and some with no star at all. And by this it is explained that, because the heavenly body is of a single nature, its nature does not supply that some of the parts of [a sphere] should be keepers of their positions [שומרים את תמונתם] while some do not keep their positions; for this is a thing found in that which is here [below], on account of [its capacity] to vary at the extremity of some of the things in respect of thickness and thinness [בעובי ודקות], by reason of their differing in heat and in cold, in moisture and in dryness.

But in the heavenly body this cannot be supplied, inasmuch as it is all of a single nature. And since the matter is so, it has been explained that, if the heavenly body were eternal [קדום], these things — which the nature [of it] does not supply that they be found in it — would not be found in it. And this is likewise so on the supposition that one should think that, had the heavenly body been coming-to-be [הווה], these things too would not be found in it — inasmuch as, on the foregoing argument, [a body] that comes-to-be has by its nature [only] that which it found here [—] such that there be found in them only what their nature has supplied them. Behold, then, how the matter stands in this — whatever it may be.

And [now] we say: it has already been explained in the foregoing chapter that the heavens are renewed [מחודשים], in [respect of] that wherein there is no doubt; and it was [there] explained that they were renewed [not] by way of the renewal of the coming-to-be that is [the way] here — and this is the side that makes obligatory the contrary of this. But this is the difference of the coming-to-be [—]

— the universal [coming-to-be], from the partial comings-to-be [ההוויות החלקיות]; for there is, between these comings-to-be, a wondrous difference [הבדל נפלא], necessarily, as before. And it is on this account that it does not follow upon this [universal] coming-to-be that it should be in this manner — in [a manner] not resembling the partial coming-to-be. And so, too, behold, we find with respect to the coming-to-be that is by way of craft [במלאכה], that this differs from the [natural] custom [המנהג]. And this is so because the master of the craft [בעל המלאכה] supplies to the one matter differing forms [drawn] from the figures [מהצורות] of that composite [thing], such that they reach it [the matter] from this [craftsman] as [they reach it] from the [primary] agent [—]; and what the maker effects in this [—] the silver [—] by the figure indicated [in his mind] is a goblet

[גביע: cup], or a ring [נזם], or whatever else he wishes of the things which it is possible to make from the silver [מהכסף].

And since the matter is so, behold, the coming-to-be of the heavens from God, blessed be He, was after this manner: it is my wish [רצוני] [to say] that the beginning of that coming-to-be was the will and the choice [הרצון והבחירה], as in the matter [of coming-to-be] by craft — except that the craft of God here supplied [the matter] only the figures [התמונות], inasmuch as He is outside [and above] the maker. And God, blessed be He, supplies a nature to the universals of the thing [בכללות הדבר], as is found from the operations of the rest of the Separate Intellects [שאר השכלים הנבדלים].

And it is fitting that the operation that proceeds from Him, blessed be He, should be a more wondrous [נפלא] and a more exalted operation than the rest of the operations of the [intelligences] caused [to act] by Him — inasmuch as His rank is higher than their rank, without measure. And [it is fitting] that His operation, on account of its being limited and ordered [מוגבלת ומסודרה], should not be capable of varying in that order — as the matter [stands] with the officials of the state who are beneath the chief head [תחת הראש הראשון]. And the operation of God, blessed be He, was according to what His will determined — as the matter [stands] with the chief head of the state, who arranges the affairs of the state according to whatever he wishes.

And since the matter is so, behold, that which it was obligatory [should follow] from the demonstration above — that the heavens be renewed [מחודשים] — would [obtain] when that which is renewed is renewed by way of the choice and the will [מהבחירה והרצון], not by way of that which is renewed from nature [מהטבע]. But how is it possible that this matter be renewed in God, blessed be He, in a way that there be no doubt of it from Him? — behold, we shall inquire into this after we have completed the inquiry into the eternity of the world [קדמות העולם] and its renewal [וחדושו] in every manner possible to us.

And here it has been explained that the coming-to-be whose beginning is the choice and the will [הבחירה והרצון] is prior to the coming-to-be whose beginning is nature [התחלתה הטבע]. And it is fitting that it be so; for, just as the motion of choice [תנועת הבחירה] is prior to the rest of the motions [לשאר התנועות], as has been explained in Sefer HaShema [Aristotle, *Physics*], so the renewed coming-to-be [הויה המתחדשת] from choice is prior to the renewing comings-to-be [להויות המתחדשות] by way of nature. But whether it is necessary that there be a coming-to-be — a motion — prior to this coming-to-be, or not, is something we shall

inquire into after we have completed the inquiry into the eternity of the world and its renewal in the manner possible to us.

And it is fitting that there should not be hidden from us [ראוי שלא יעלם ממנו] [the truth] of all these things which we have mentioned — that they are found in the heavens [in a way] that the nature of the heavens does not supply: behold, they are all of them demonstrations [מופתים] that the heavens are renewed [מחודשים] by [the way of] will and choice [מהרצון והבחירה]. And so there would [also] be here, [in addition,] many [other] demonstrations besides these — the demonstrations set forth above [that] make it explicit from them that the heavens are renewed.

Chapter Nine [פרק תשיעי]

[Heading rubric, p. 321:] "It will be explained on what side the heavens are created [מחודשים], apart from the two prior sides."

We say, then, that there are in the heavens many features that exist on their account [i.e., requiring an external cause], and these belong to the special properties [סגולות] of existing things in respect of what is in process of coming-to-be [הוה], as we explained earlier. This is because the motions that exist in the spheres proceed in the manner whereby the composite motion that appears in the stars [the planets] is completed from them — by which the lower existence [המציאות השפל] is brought to its fullest possible completion, as was clarified in the preceding treatise. These motions exist of necessity on account of those things [they serve], as was explained. But as for everything found in the heavens — their figures [תמונות], their distance from the earth, and the features of the stars — according to what magnitude they have, and their luminosity, and the inclinations [הנטיות] we mentioned as belonging to them: this is so because of what is realized through them in existence, just as these motions are required for the completion of what arises from existing things. If, that is, the features found in them issue from these very motions —

And since the matter is so, it is clear that everything found in the heavens, of the features we mentioned earlier, exists on their account [i.e., for the sake of the ends served], and this is the lower existence [המציאות השפל]. And when one reflects on this, it becomes clear, from what was said before, that what exists in them on account of something other than themselves [ולא בעבורם] exists of necessity in respect of what is in process of coming-to-be. Hence it is obligatory that the heavens be created [מחודשים]. And here is the count of the features that

obligate this, on this side, in respect of the count of the things found in the heavens.

But [as for the claim] that the motions found in the spheres exist in the manner in which they do on account of something other than themselves, of necessity — this is what will be explained. It is not possible that they exist for the sake of something at which they aim of themselves [לעצמותם], or for the sake of fleeing from something contrary to them, as is the case with living beings [בעלי חיים], because they do not require, for their existence, anything contrary [to them] — as, for example, [the need to flee] toward the temperate or away from the heat [warmth], or whatever else those things require for the maintenance of their existence. The heavens have no such thing: there is nothing for them to flee from that is contrary to them by nature, since they have no contrary [אין להם הפך], nor is it possible that their motions be [directed] toward fleeing from something contrary to them, or toward aiming at something —

[*Page 322 [p. 322]:*] — and were this the case, this perpetual motion would exist in them on account of themselves, with nothing impelling them in their own essence in respect of what is better for them in their motion. And if one says that this motion belongs to them on account of the temperate state [הערבות], in the manner that they apprehend it — just as falsehood [שקרה] befalls a person at the time he apprehends something that moves in a place — we reply to him that the motion belongs to a person at the time he investigates something, because he has already moved, by his speculation, through rational matters, conducting them to the attainment of the truth in that very inquiry; for the motions that exist in circular dances [במחולות] follow upon a particular order, as in the manner whereby [the motion] is moved. Just as the fourth note [הקול הרביעי] has a relation [יחס] to that note in respect of speed and slowness, so too this very thing befalls a person on his way to the truth in some inquiry; and according to the speed of his thought, his speculation, and its lagging, so will be the speed and lagging of his motion. The conclusion drawn from a part of the matters is at the start of his investigation — that was his motion at first — and then [comes] its lagging and being at the rear. But the spheres have no motion enabling them to apprehend what they have not already attained, because there is in their apprehensions nothing in potentiality, but rather there is always found in them knowledge and apprehension; nor does motion belong to them.

Rather, [their apprehension] is at rest, as the Philosopher mentioned, and on that account this motion is not obligatory for them by reason of apprehension. Moreover, if we acknowledge that motion is obligatory for them on account of

this apprehension — behold, this is not obligatory for them, since this would be the wondrous manner in which the multiplicity of activities would be drawn out from them, [activities] which it is not possible that these existing things be completed except by it [the motion]. And further: that motion appears to be of a defective kind [מעונה], as the Philosopher mentioned, for it [motion] is what prevents apprehension. This is the reason that the drunken man [השכור] does not understand at the time of his drunkenness — on account of the strong motion found in him; and likewise the youth [הנער] at the time of growing up [recte: בעת הגדל]. And this is what was clarified concerning it: that there are no conditions of apprehension that bear motion along with them [שיש עמה תנועה].

And in sum, then, there is no way that these motions should exist in them on account of their apprehensions, unless we grant that the features of these existing things were ordered, arranged, and set right [נטוס... וסדרם ויושרם [?]] according to what is possible for them — those that yearn for the very essence of that conception [הציור] — to be moved in the manner that is possible. From them [proceed] these existing things, which are here [brought] to their fullest possible completion. And this is what obligates that these motions be in them on account of something other than themselves [בעבור זולתם], as we have set forth.

[*Page 323 [p. 323]:*] And when we reflect that the motions belonging to the spheres are of necessity [there] on their account, and it has been clarified, too, in the preceding treatise, that the existence of the stars in the spheres is likewise on account of something other than themselves [בעבור זולתם] — and it has been clarified, too, that the rest of the things found in the heavens, [namely] their figures [תמונות], their number, their arrangement, their inclinations, and what resembles these among them, [exist] on account of the completion of these motions belonging to the stars — it is clarified that all these things are in the heavenly bodies on account of something other than themselves. And since the matter is so, it is necessarily obligatory, from each one of these things found in the heavens on account of something other than themselves, that the heavens be created [מחודשים], as we have explained — in [the inquiry into] what was [the manner of] the coming-to-be [ההויה], in respect of that whose coming-to-be is incomplete [מהבלתי הוה].

And see what the Philosopher has already remarked [שער] concerning this doubt — and this binds the knot [התר לתח [?] = "unties/binds the knot"]:

These matters that exist in the heavens, were they to exist because of their own nature [מפני שיהיו מפני טבעם] — and on this account he who seeks to find a cause for them, for the diurnal motion's being from east to west, says that the matter is

so [arranged] in order that the motion be from the right and toward the front [מהימין ולפנים], for this is the more honorable, the more weighty [נכבד יותר]. And this is because the Philosopher sees that the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים] have a right and a left, a front and a back, in respect of what they are as ensouled beings [בעלי נפש]. And it is explained that it is obligatory that the position of the rest of the heavenly bodies in motion be toward the east, contrary to the position of the diurnal sphere [גלגל היומי], as though one would say that the "up" [המעלה] would be in the rest of the spheres on the side of the "down" [המטה] in this sphere — in the way that the rest of the spheres' motion is also from the right toward the left and toward the front [מהימין אל השמאל ולפנים].

And likewise it is found that he [the Philosopher] gave a reason for the upper stars' [העליונים] being more lagging in motion in respect of their nearness — closer to the first body [הגרם הראשון], the mover [המניע] that moves them in the opposite [direction] from the side of their [own] motion; and on that account their rightward [direction] is prevented from being moved to the opposite of that side, in respect of their desire [השוקה] to draw out their motion. And likewise it is found that he gave a reason for the upper sphere's having

[*Page 324 [p. 324]:*] two things, namely the sphere of the fixed stars [גלגל הכוכבים הקיימים]; and the intellect [השכל] that moves the sphere, which is lower than it in rank [במדרגה]. And it is said that this obligation is nothing but a [matter of] conception and apprehension [ציור והשגה], and it is not prevented, by the law of the One [בנמוס האחד], that differing things be apprehended from Him. And it is clarified, from what Ibn Rushd said, that the doubt is obligated for him — that it should not be hidden [from us]. And this [point] — which already remained with them [unresolved] in the question of what the essences of the spheres [עצמי הגלגלים] obligate, since they are caused [עלולים] — is as the Philosopher mentioned in the *Book of the Heavens and the World* [ספר השמים והעולם — De Caelo]: as though the nature of the truth compelled [הכריחו] him to this. And this is because what is completed in this manner is the emanation of apprehension and conception [השפע ההשגה והציור], not the emanation of the essence [השפע העצם]; and were their essence not itself caused [עלול], behold, how did it come about that what is found in their essences, in respect of their [own] completion, is completed by what emanates from them?

But [as for the view that] they are obligated from things prior to them [מקדמים] — that when the sphere always assumes [a state], there is obligated from God, may He be blessed, and from the movers [המניעים] belonging to them, that the spheres of the world be filled, with each thing lacking nothing [מלא דבר ונפסדים אל לא

דבר], in every "now" [עתה] and "now," and that the [points called] "now" [העתות] follow consecutively, together with the rest of the dispositions [הבטולים] we mentioned. And on that account some of the later thinkers among the philosophers did well, when they posited that He, may He be blessed, [together with] them, [is] one — and they arranged what is in the spheres [accordingly]. And this is what obligates that the world be created [מחודש], save that they fell short in this, in respect of what the great Rabbi, the Master [הרב המורה — Maimonides], mentioned, of their views.

And it is fitting that it should not be hidden from us that the Philosopher already gave, among the causes [בסבות] he set down, [reasons] for these matters which we mentioned, so that there be for them a cause from the side of the essence of the spheres [מצד עצם הגלגלים] and their nature [וטבעם], without doubt — [reasons] such that the bringing-forth from Him cannot in any way be obtained — as though the nature of the matters itself obligated that there should not be found for them a cause from the side of the essence of the spheres and their nature. And this is what is added to the clarity and completeness of what we have explained: that all these things are in the heavenly bodies on account of something other than themselves [בעבור זולתם].

And this is what he [the Philosopher] said: that the motion of the diurnal sphere [גלגל היומי] is from east to west — because the start of the motion was fitting that it be from the eastern quarter, which is the right; for the right [הימין] is more honorable, more weighty [נכבד יותר], than the left. And when the heavens move toward the western quarter, they move with the second intention [הכונה השנית], so that the motion return toward the right — as is the matter with motion in living beings [בבעלי חיים]. And here this argument [המאמר] — his apprehension, his beneficence [מהדבה], and the doubt as to what should not be hidden [from us] — [comes to this:] that the right being more honorable than the left, in living beings, is on account of the difference [חלוף] of the limbs found in these quarters. But the sphere has no contrary [אין בו חלוף] at all; it is altogether impossible that we posit in it a right more honorable than the left, even though the right [is the side] from which the leftward direction sits.

And if one says that this [right] is in respect of the eastern place [המקום המזרחי] — as Ibn Rushd says — behold, this is insufficient [בלתי מספיק], for this means [a mere] change of place from place [שחלוף מקום ממקום] in the "above" [במעלה]; and the honor [כבוד] [of a side] is not from the side of the mathematical distances [המרחקים הלמודיים]. But [if it be] from the side of the body [הגשם] which is in [that side] by nature [בטבע] — the matter being so — and the body whose right is by

nature [the body], the body whose left is on the left [בשמאל]: it is clarified that there is no contrary [חלוף] there from the side of the places [המקומות]. And further: that the right and the left in the sphere are not such that there should be for it, from the side of its own essence, a place defined as "right" or a defined part. Yet [if] indeed it has no defined part —

[The argument on the sphere's "right" and "left" continues beyond this page.]

[*Page 325 [p. 325]:*] —would be a defined right [ימין נגדר], as has already been explained in what preceded. This will be clarified according to what I am about to say. And yet [the sphere] has no place that is defined [as right] — namely, that if we were to posit for it the place of the right, and likewise the left, by analogy to its other parts, then [the matter would hold]; thus the right [הימין] would be the part that faces toward the inhabited region of the earth [ההלק המיושב מהארץ], and likewise the left [השמאל]. So that, if the inhabited region were in the other part, the right would [then] be the right [only] by analogy to something other than itself [בהקש אל זולתו] — and the right would [in that case] become "left." So, then, if there is in the sphere no defined place of right or left from the side of its own essence [מצד עצמו], its right and left would [be defined] only by analogy to something other than itself [בהקש אל זולתו].

And yet the right is in truth more honorable than the left, in that the right and the left belong to it from the side of its own essence [מצד עצמו], not by analogy to something other than itself [בהקש אל זולתו]. But since [the determination] is by analogy to something other than itself, it would be possible that the same one thing be at one time "right" and at another time "left"; so that the thing that is more honorable [would be] more honorable [only] for a movable being [מדבר] — a matter [only] slightly more honorable in respect of honor [itself] — and this is the reductio ad absurdum [וזה בהכלית הבטול = the conclusion to nullity].

And further: the sphere of the fixed stars [גלגל הכוכבים הקיימים] is what moves by the diurnal motion [התנועה היומית], as the Philosopher [Aristotle] holds, according to what is understood from Ibn Rushd. Here, then, one would have to say that the diurnal motion necessarily existed [proceeding] from the left toward the right — and this is the opposite of what the Philosopher laid down.

This will become clear when it is explained which of the [celestial] poles [מהקטבים] is more fittingly the "above" [מעלה], and which of the poles is more fittingly the "below" [מטה]. For [the Philosopher] is committed [to the view] that whatever has a right and a left has [also] an "above" and a "below," a "front" and a "back," as the Philosopher explained.

Now let us say that it has been explained that there is no contrariety [חלוף] in the sphere from the side of its own essence [מצד עצמו], if not from the side of the stars [מצד הכוכבים] or by analogy to something other than itself [בהקש אל זולתו]; and this [holds] of necessity [in any analogy] to the world of the elements [אל עולם היסודות]. For there is nothing at all outside the heavens [אין חוץ מהשמים דבר], as the Philosopher explained. And were there something there, [the stars] would still have no natures differing by analogy to that thing.

And since the matter is so, it has been explained that what is more honorable on the side of the stars [מצד הכוכבים] is whatever has more stars in it; for the star is the more honorable [feature] among the parts of the sphere [שבחלקי הגלגל]. It will likewise be explained that what is more honorable by analogy to the world of the elements [מעולם היסודות] is the northern region [המקום הצפוני], in which are found all the natural things in the world of the elements. Here, then, it has been explained that the northern side [הצד הצפוני] of the sphere of the constellations [גלגל המזלות] is more honorable, [a point] that these two causes together necessitate. My intention [in saying] this is that the part of the sphere where more stars are found is more honorable than [the part] toward the southern side [בצד הדרומי]. And this is explained by the [great] number that stand upon it — this being [the view] of the astronomers [חכמי התכונה] [?] — and so it is also with the disposition of the heavens [התכונה]; and it is likewise over against the place that would be more honorable in the world of the elements [בעולם היסודות].

And when we reflect on this, my intention [is that] the northern pole [הקטב הצפוני] is more honorable than the southern, and it is explained, from [the doctrine] that [the celestial body] possesses soul [מהבעל נפש], that the "above" [המעלה] [is the side] from which [the motion proceeds]; and we have already taken our stand on [the view] that the right is more honorable. The left of the sphere is more honorable than the "below," as has been explained here — [namely] that what is fitting to be the northern pole [הקטב הצפוני] is the "above" [המעלה]. And if the matter were so, then the motion of the diurnal sphere [גלגל היומי] would be from the left toward the right—

[*Page 326 [p. 326]:*] —and this is the opposite of what the Philosopher laid down. The standing of this point has already been [argued], by way of the analogy [המשל] which Ibn Rushd applied to it. And further: when [Aristotle] determined the matter in this manner, it is difficult to give a cause for why the motion of the rest of the spheres should be in the direction opposite to the diurnal motion. For it would be fitting that this motion, too, be in them from the right toward the left, as Ibn Rushd mentioned.

And since the matter is so, and since it has already been explained that it would be fitting for them that the right and the left be taken in them from [their] analogy to the world of the elements [מן ההקש אל עולם היסודות], it is [thereby] explained that it would not be possible for there to be in them a right and a left whose [meaning] is the reverse of the right and the left in the diurnal sphere [בגלגל היומי]. For these too are taken, in all of them, by analogy to the world of the elements [בהקש אל עולם היסודות], not from the side of their own essences [מצד עצמם].

And further: were we to grant that there is already a right and a left in them, in the direction opposite [that] which is in the diurnal sphere, then it would be difficult to give a cause for why the configurations [מצבי] of these spheres differ [in their motions], unless this manner [be itself] an activity directed [פועלת תכוין] toward the motions' being to contrary sides [לצדדים הפכים], as we said. And since the matter is so, it has been explained that this very cause, which the Philosopher laid down, would here, from [its] great insufficiency [מהספק העצום], yield something whose [proper] order does not in any way proceed from it [the cause].

And likewise let us say: were one to lay it down as the cause that, since the stars [are such] that some of them are swifter in motion and some slower in motion, by reason of their nearness [קורבתם] to and distance [ורחקם] from the diurnal sphere [מהגלגל היומי] — so that whatever among the spheres is nearer to it has its motion the more lagging [מאוחרת], the [point] being that whatever reaches the diurnal sphere is [thereby] struck [מהכה] by the mover that moves it in the contrary [direction]; and it is restrained [וימנעהו], on account of this, from being moved in the contrary direction of that side, so that its motion would [in fact] be in the contrary of that side, [which] is the more lagging [מאוחרת] — [then] this [is] an argument [מאמר] that has no [coherent] aspect [פנים]; it is open to many objections [לסבות רבות].

For among them: if we were to grant this, then the upper sphere [הגלגל העליון] would have to be the mover of the rest of the spheres beneath it, apart from the [proper] mover of the upper [spheres themselves]. For [the supposition] that the rest of the upper spheres move the lower spheres [שבשאר הגלגלים העליונים אל הגלגלים התחתונים] is explained to be a reductio ad absurdum [מבואר הבטול], as we mentioned in the preceding treatise. For [in fact] the rest of the spheres move of themselves [מעצמם], by reason of desire [התשוקה] and choice [והבחירה] in the diurnal motion [בתנועה היומית], along with their being moved of themselves in their proper [individual] motion [בתנועתם המיוחדת]. Here, then, this supposition

[ההנחה] is necessitated to be among the nullities [מהבטולים] [that] we already mentioned in the preceding treatise.

And further: the Philosopher in his own person [שהפלוסוף בעצמו] sees that for each one of the planets [מכוכבי לכת] of the diurnal sphere [גלגל יומי], as will be explained, [there is a cause] in [something] other than [their] nature [שאחר הטבע]. And if the matter were so, [then] this would be [the very cause] — namely that the cause they laid down [is] [itself] a manifest reductio ad absurdum [מבוארת הבטול]. And so too: if the matter were so, here, then, it would be explained that there already was the motion by which the spheres are moved in it [בה], [arising] from the degree of swiftness [מהמהירות] which their nature gave them when they are moved [שיהנועעו], [and which would] not [be such] that this diurnal motion [should] restrain them from it [the motion]. And it would be necessitated [too] that, [arising] from this, [there be] something whose nature [טבעם] gave them what [renders it] swifter [שיגזור] — [namely] that their motion [is] the particular one [המיוחדת], [a thing] necessitated to be the more lagging [המאוחרת] in this manner, [it being] the [side] in which the restraining cause [המונע] is what completes for them what [renders] swifter [שיגזור] their nature in the motion. And this is in the [realm of the] reductio ad absurdum [בתכלית הבטול]: for if the matter were so, here, then, there would be a nature in them by reason of which—

[*Page 327 [p. 327]:*] —this motion [would be] a nullity [לבטלה], inasmuch as it has no instrument [כלי] by which to complete in it what the matter of this motion necessitates [שיגזרהו]. And this is wholly [a thing] that issues from the [valid] syllogism [מן ההקש]; and it is at the degree [in the ranking] in which the prior things [are]: that the motion [does] not [proceed] from what the earth [does], by reason of [the earth's] not referring [שיחסה] to all the celestial aspects [האופקים] together [as] one. The Philosopher has already explained what there is in this matter [המאמר] [as] a reductio ad absurdum [מהבטול].

And in sum, then, this laying-down [הנחת] of a single nature does not issue into actuality at one of the moments-of-"now" [בעת מן העתים]; this is [itself] in the [realm of the] reductio ad absurdum [בהכלית הבטול]. For the thing that issues from nature, were there a nature [for it], would be found [only] a little out of [the totality of] time [מעט מן הזמן]; together with [the fact] that what this supposition [ההנחה] [issues] in, in respect of our laying [it] down concerning the heavenly bodies [לגרמים השמימיים], [is] a perpetually restraining mover [מונע ימנע תמיד] [restraining them] from completing what they portrayed [as] the matter of the motion [מענין התנועה]. For it would be necessitated, [from] what they portrayed

[as] this order [המסדר], [that there be] a foreign thing [דבר זר] [whose order is other than the order] which they portrayed.

This is what is explained from what we laid down beforehand, [namely] that something emanates [שיושפע] from them — [the question being] whether their motions were the swifter, [arising] from the side [whence] their motions are the more lagging [מאוחרת]. And further: it is the case that, if there were laid down for them two desires [שתי תשוקות] equal [in force] together [מקבילות יחד], one wishes to say [רוצה לומר] that [one of them is] to continue the diurnal motion [לתנועה היומית], and they would desire, together with this, to be moved in the contrary of that side—

[*Page 327, lower [p. 327]:*] —and [if] the more lagging one [would] prevent the second desire [התשוקה השנית], as will be seen from what Ibn Rushd said: here, then, all the prior things would be necessitated, [namely] that, there being laid down two desires equal together [שתי תשוקות מקבילות], one of which moves the sphere together with them [יחד], this is [itself] in the [realm of the] reductio ad absurdum [בהכלית הבטול], as we explained — this whole [matter] — in the preceding treatise on this [topic].

And likewise let us say: were one to lay it down as the cause that, since there are in the upper sphere [בגלגל העליון] many stars [כוכבים רבים] — whereas in the rest of the spheres beneath it there is found but one star apiece — [the reasoning being] that, if there were more stars in them, the mover of the upper sphere [משיג הגלגל העליון] would have weariness [לאות] in moving them: this is an argument [מאמר] that has no [coherent] aspect [פנים]. For [if] the sphere and the star are of one [and the same] nature [מטבע אחד], as the Philosopher explained — [then] if the matter were not so, here, then, the star would have to stand still, compelled in its place [עומד מוכרח במקומו], and this is explained [as] a reductio ad absurdum [הבטול]. And it would be necessitated [too] that, if there were weariness [לאות] for the mover of the sphere [משיג הגלגל] in moving the spheres beneath it [were] there many stars in them, that very weariness [הלאות ההוא] [would arise] in their own moving [the spheres] — [namely] that the spheres [in which the stars sit are] void [רקים] of [more] stars, since the nature of the parts of the sphere [טבע חלקי הגלגל], together with their being luminous [מאירים] or non-luminous [בלתי מאירים], is one nature in itself [טבע אחד בעינו]. And further:

[*Page 327, foot [p. 327]:*] —it would already have to be necessitated, from this supposition [מזאת ההנחה], that the mover of the upper sphere [שיניע גלגל העליון] move all the spheres beneath it [כל הגלגלים אשר תחתיו]. This has already been

explained in what preceded, [namely] that whatever the upper sphere reaches [שישיג] is [itself] this supposition [as] a reductio ad absurdum [מהבטול].

And further: when the matter is laid down so, here, then, it would be necessitated that there be a nature in the spheres toward [their] having more stars in them, [if] not [for the fact] that [the mover] is already restrained [נמנע] from them, [such] that the upper sphere [could] move [them]. And it would be [further necessitated] that, if such were the nature [in them] that there should be more stars in them, [this] would be a nullity [לבטלה], inasmuch as it [a thing] issues into actuality at one of the moments-of-"now" [בעת מן העתים]. This is wholly [a thing] that issues from the [valid] syllogism [מן ההקש], together with what would be necessitated by this supposition [as] a reductio ad absurdum [מהבטול]: [namely] that there would not be for the heavenly bodies [לגרמים השמימיים] what would be found for them [arising] from the [supposed] swift nature [טבעם] of [some] of the stars [מהכוכבים]. For, when the matter is laid down so, it would be necessitated that there not be in them an instrument [כלים] toward which there might emanate from them [שיושפע מהם]—

[*Page 328 [p. 328]:*] —[anything] of what they portrayed concerning the matter of the motion [מענין התנועה]; and the order that emanates [השופע] from them would be an order other than the order which they portrayed.

And here it has been explained that what the Philosopher laid down concerning the causes of these matters, [drawn] from the side of the essence of the heavens [מצד עצם השמים], is insufficient [בלתי צודק]. This is [the very point] from which is added that what we have explained is [thereby] revealed and completed: [namely] that all of these matters — [the things] which exist on account of something other than themselves [בעבור זולתם], as it is fitting that they be completed here — and this is something that the Philosopher, too, agrees to, as we mentioned, [are] as if the nature of the truth had compelled him [הכריחתו] to it.

And here it has been explained that everything that is explained of the things found in the heavens is a demonstration [מופת] that the heavens come into being [שהשמים הווים] in three respects [מצד משלשה צדדים]:

The **first** respect — [drawn] from their being directed [מכוון] toward the most complete end possible [לתכלית מה ביותר שלם שאפשר] — and this is impossible by way of the [merely] non-coming-into-being thing existing in this matter of itself [בעצמו], as has been explained in what preceded.

And the **second** respect — [drawn] from there being no nature in the heavens by which this matter could be found, [and yet] this too [it being] impossible [for it] to

be [merely] non-coming-into-being [בלתי הווה], as has been explained in what preceded.

And the **third** respect — [drawn] from their being directed [מכוון] toward the most complete end possible [ביותר שלם שאפשר] on account of something other than the heavens [זולת השמים]; and this too [it being] impossible [for it] to be [merely] non-coming-into-being [בלתי הווה], as has been explained in what preceded. And on this account the number of demonstrations [מספר המופתים] there would be, from the things found in the heavens, [proving] that the heavens come into being [שהשמים הווים], [is] in [proportion to] the number of [those very] things; the established [count] is three.

פרק עשירי (Chapter Ten)

It will be explained in it: what time is, and what kind of existence its existence is. [יתבאר בו מהו הזמן ואיזה מציאות מציאותו.]

After it has been explained to us, from the things found in the heavens, that the heavens come into being [שהשמים הווים] — they being [thereby] recognized [as such] — here, then, it is fitting that we investigate whether time comes into being [אם הזמן הווה] or does not come into being [או בלתי הווה]. This is because [the answer to] this stands [as deciding] whether there was here a world before [another] world [עולם אחר עולם], as some of the ancients believe [כמו שיאמינו קצת הקדמים]. For if there was [such], then it would be necessitated that there were heavens that come into being [שהיו בשמים שהיו הווים], and [also] in a time that was before [it] [ובזמן שיהיה קדום]; here, then, there would of necessity be there a world before [another] world [עולם אחר עולם], and this [would be] without end [אל לא תכלית].

But if it were not necessitated [that there was], in a time that was before [it], [anything] [בזמן שיהיה קדום], here, then, this respect would not necessitate that there were

[*Page 328, lower [p. 328]:*] —worlds, one after another [עולמות אחד אחר אחר], with no end to their number [אין תכלית למספרם]. And if it were impossible [בלתי אפשר], in a time that was before [it] [בזמן שיהיה קדום], here, then, it would be possible that there were here worlds, one after another [עולמות אחד אחר אחר], [yet still] with no end to their number [אין תכלית למספרם].

And further: because the Philosopher brought a demonstration [ראיה] from the nature of time [מטבע הזמן] [to show] that the heavens are not [things that] come into being [בלתי מחודשים] — and this is a doubt [ספק] [raised] about the heavens

[מהשמים] — here, then, it is fitting that we investigate it [שנחקור] in a complete manner [as to] how the matter [stands] in this. And it has [already] been explained, [as among] the things antecedent [שקודם], that an investigation of the matter of time [מענין הזמן] — whether it comes into being [אם הוא הווה] or does not come into being [או בלתי הווה] — here, then, it is fitting that we investigate the very quiddity of time [במהות הזמן]; for [only] this will set us right [יישירנו] to take our stand upon the truth in this.

And let us say what is explained of itself [בנפשו]: that time [הזמן] is something [arising] from the [mathematical] science [מהכמה], in that it has already been said to be [either] equal [שוה] or unequal [בלתי שוה] — these being a property [סגולה] of [that] science [הכמה]. But [as for] which part of [that] science [מאיזה חלק מהכמה]—

it is. And here it is made clear that [time] belongs to the continuous science [i.e., it is a continuous magnitude], for one already speaks of it as "long" and "short." Moreover, the whole of it is measured by way of the part that is continuous [המתדבק], and this is a property of the continuous science. Furthermore, its end [תכליתו] is the *now* [העתה], and the *now* is its beginning, while it is in itself indivisible [בלתי מתחלק]. And if it is a subject [נושא], or if it is separate [נבדל] — this is among the things into which it is proper to inquire concerning it, for time will not escape one of these two [characterizations].

But that it is not a subject is made clear: for if this were so, it would be among the things multiplied by the multiplicity of their subjects [בהתרבות הנושאים], and this is false, since there is not found there [more than] a single time, as has been explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע]. So let us undertake to clarify this through the two well-known premises [שתי הקדמות ידועות].

The first [premise] is that time has a part distinct from another part [יש בו חלק זולת חלק], and this [is so] because uniform time [שוה הזמן] is the past time [הזמן הקודם] together with another, distinct time, the later time [הזמן המתאחר] — for if it were otherwise, [namely] that this [time] is possible apart from that, then the past time would be the future time, and this is patently false [מבואר הבטול]. Furthermore, [if time did] not have a part distinct from another within a single time, then the contraries [ההפכים] would be [found together] in a single subject at one time [בזמן אחד]; for it is on account of the [reciprocal] exclusion of the contraries — that they should be in one subject under [a relation of] one to another at one time — [that] there would be there variable times [זמנים מתחלפים]; and if there were not there variable times, it would necessarily follow that the contraries are found in a single thing at one and the same time [בזמן האחד בעינו].

But the second premise is that time is among the things continuous with the parts [מתדמה מהחלקים] in respect of its being time. [This too can be shown:] for our apprehension of it [as] time consists in the difference between daytime and nighttime [זמן היום לזמן הלילה], or [in] the difference of summer-time from winter-time [זמן הקיץ לזמן הסתו]; only this difference is in time per accidens [במקרה], not in respect of its being time. And when we have reckoned for ourselves these premises, we say that it is not separate [שאיננו נבדל].

And this [follows]: for if it were a subject, it would be necessarily so [classified] because there is in it a part distinct from another, and yet it were not in a subject — [in which case] there would be no part [distinct] from another part within the continuum-with-the-parts [במתדמה החלקים], were it not for the boundary of the subject [מצר הנושא]; but when there was no subject there, then there is in it no part distinct from another part. Yet there is found in time a part distinct from another, as was [just] premised — so [time] is therefore not [a subject], but separate [נבדל].

Furthermore, if time were a subject, one might say that it would be necessary that the part be the whole [שיהיה החלק הוא הכל], for this [would be] in every continuity-of-parts [מתדמה החלקים] [that] the part agrees with the whole in name [בשם] and in definition [ובגדר]; and yet, the part being other than the whole, it is [a part] in respect of the subject [מצד הנושא]; but when there was no subject there, then it is necessary that the part be the whole — and this is utterly false [בתכלית הבטול].

And after this, [if] one wishes to say that [time] is not in a subject [שאיננו בנושא], [that] it is not separate [ואינו נבדל], and [that] there is there no third part [חלק שלישי], [then] it would be necessary that it be in a subject [שיהיה מצד מה בנושא]; and in respect of what is separate [ומצד מה נבדל], it is made clear that the prior authorities laid it down [by] positing it in a particular subject [בנושא מיוחד], or [as] separate absolutely [נבדל במוחלט]. But if we posit it in a non-particular subject [נושא בלתי מיוחד], no consequence among those of the prior [authorities] is entailed [לא יתחייב דבר מהשקרים הקודמים].

Now, which is this subject? It is made clear that it is the motion [התנועה], as is explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע]. And here, time will bear to motion the relation that number [המספר] bears to the things numbered [הספורים] — [so] that the multiplicity does not multiply in respect of [the multiplicity of] number [שלא יתרבה ברבוים, כן לא יתרבה הזמן]...

by the multiplicity of motions [ברבוי התנועות]; and it [time] is in this respect a pure subject for the subject [נקי מנשא], such that it is not in a particular place [במקום מיוחד].

And if there were [a measure] specific to the diurnal motion [לתנועה היומית], this [too] is [understood] by way of positing — not by nature [בהנחה, לא בטבע]; for just as it is measured by some motion that there is [כאשר ישוער באיזו תנועה שתהיה], so it is measured in respect of the prior [בקודם] and in respect of the later [ובמתאחר]; and as it is measured in respect of the prior and in respect of the later, it is measured in time [ישוער בזמן].

And after the matter of what time is has been clarified, it is proper to inquire which existence is the existence of its existences [איזו מציאות מציאות מציאותו] — whether it is found in potentiality [בכח], or in actuality [בפעל], or in a grade intermediate between potentiality and actuality [במדרגה ממוצעת בין הכח והפעל]; and if it were in a grade intermediate between potentiality and actuality, [we must ask] whether there is in this a difference between its past and its future [בין החולף ממנו והעתיד], or not; and if [there is], [whether] this is one [grade] together [אם הוא אחד], or many [או הרבה] — [namely] whether this comes after the cessation of that [זה בא אחר סור זה].

But which existence is its existence [איזה מציאות מציאותו]? It is made clear that it is not found in pure potentiality [בכח גמור], for if this were so, no part of it — neither a past part nor a future part [חלק ממנו חולף וחלק עתיד] — would be found; rather, the whole of it would be future [כלו עתיד], for this is the way of that whose existence is in pure potentiality [בכח גמור]. And so too we say that it is made clear that it is not found in actuality [בפעל], and this [is so] because there is no part of it that would be found together [as] one [נמצא יחד]; for that which is found together [as] one is from the *now* [העתה], and the *now* is not time [והוא איננו זמן]; and so it would not remain [for it] except that its existence is intermediate between potentiality and actuality [ממוצע בין הכח והפעל], as the matter is in motion [כמו הענין בתנועה].

And here it was proper that it be so, since time is an accident attaching to motion [מקרה דבק לתנועה]. For when we inquire whether there is among the parts of time [bound up with] potentiality [הכח] in this matter, until it should be in some of them under the rule [דין] of what is in actuality [שבפועל], and in some of them under the rule of what is in potentiality [שבכח] — as if we should say that the past part [שהחלק החולף] is of the time that would be under the rule of what is in actuality [שבפועל], while the future part [העתיד] is of the time that would be under the rule of what is in potentiality [שבכח] — or that the rule of both of them

is under the rule of what is in potentiality [שניהם דין מה שבכח], because there is there no part of time found in actuality [נמצא בפעל], [whether] neither of the past time nor of the future time [לא מהזמן החולף ולא מהזמן העתיד] — or that there would be of the past time the rule of what is in potentiality [מהזמן החולף דין מה שבכח], and the rule of the future of it [under] the rule of what is in actuality [ודין העתיד ממנו דין מה שבפעל] —

let us say that it is made clear that what is found there [שמה שימצא] is indeed said in relation to the future [ביחס אל העתיד], not in relation to the past [לא ביחס אל החולף]. And in respect of the matter being so, here it is made clear that what is found from time in potentiality is the future time [הזמן העתיד], not the past time [לא הזמן החולף]. And here this matter [stands] in the [same way] as the matter in motion [כמו הענין בתנועה]: this [is so] because motion is a thing intermediate between potentiality and actuality [ממוצע בין הכח והפעל]; and what has [already] passed of it [מה שעבר ממנה] would be under the rule [דין] of what is in actuality [שבפעל].

And [the rest of it would be under the rule of what is in potentiality]; and [it is] only that this difference between motion and time [is] in that the motion [yet] finds within it an impression in actuality [רושם בפועל], in respect of what has [already] passed of it [במתנועע במה שקנה] in the absence of complete perfection [מהשלמות הבלתי גמור], in respect of what has passed of the motion [מצד מה שעבר מן התנועה]; whereas time finds within it no impression in actuality [לא ימצא ממנו רושם בפעל] in respect of what has passed of it in actuality [במה שעבר ממנו], if this were not in it [already] in respect of the motion which this time measures [מצד התנועה אשר ישערה זה הזמן].

It has already been explained, too, that the existence of time has gone out into actuality [יצא לפעל] in respect of its presentness [על נכחותו]; and that which is found in future time [בזמן העתיד] is not in past time [לא בזמן העובר], as has been said. For if time in its entirety [בכללו] were found in potentiality [בכח], then time — which measures the past motion [התנועה החולפת] in respect of the presentness of [its] coming-to-be [על נכחות ההתהוות] — would not have been; for it [time] is found in actuality [נמצאת בפעל] in some respect; and on account of this it is necessary [that there be] a measure that would be its measure in actuality [שיהיה משער אותה בפעל]; and it is impossible that in time…

it measures it, if there were not found in actuality in some respect [בפעל באופן מה]. And this will already be seen [to be] so likewise from what is said, [namely] that if the existence of past time, future time [הזמן החולף והעתיד], were in potentiality [בכח] — for example — then it would be necessary that each one of

the two parts of the possible [שני חלקי האפשר] be [equally] possible in past time [בזמן העובר], just as it is possible in future time [בזמן העתיד]; and this is patently false [מבואר הבטול].

But how it has [already] been explained that, according to this assumption [הנחה], each one of the two parts of the possible would be [equally] possible in past time just as it is possible in future time [בזמן העתיד] — that indeed is very clear [מבואר מאד]. For [if] there were no apprehension of the being of each one of the parts of the possible in past time [בזמן העובר] apart from [its being] possible in some manner [באופן מה], yet the matter is not so in future time [בזמן העתיד], [then] it has [in fact] already gone out into actuality in some respect [יצא כבר אל הפועל באופן מה]; and there will not remain in it the possible [as] possible in future time [בזמן העתיד], since it [the possible] has already gone out into actuality [in respect] of past time [בזמן העובר], for each of the two parts of the possible [each] going out into actuality [יצא כבר אל הפעל כל אחד משני חלקי האפשר].

Moreover, if the existence of past time, future time [הזמן החולף והעתיד], were in pure potentiality [בכח על משל אחד] — for example — it would be in the saying of the speaker [מאמר האומר], by way of example, that after this one day there would be another day, when the sun is at the head of Aries [בראש טלה] — a thing that would not be [yet]. And this [is so] because, when something of past time has elapsed [כשכאשר עבר קצת הזמן], it does not [thereby] draw nearer to the completion of the day [אל שלמות היום]; rather, the whole of that day remains always in potentiality [בכח תמיד], by way of example. Nor could the day go out [into actuality] and reach the completion of that day [שלמות היום ההוא] — and this is patently false [מבואר הבטול].

And it is [in fact] made clear that it [the day] already draws nearer always to the completion of the day [אל שלמות היום] — that which goes out into actuality from that day [מהיום ההוא] — for when its existence is completed [ישלם מציאותו], there would be that the sun is at the head of Aries [בראש טלה], by our example of this; for it has already, then, gone out into the actuality of the existence of that day [לפעל מציאות היום ההוא] in some respect [באופן מה]. And when one reckons all this, it is made clear that time, even if there is in it no part in actuality [חלק בפעל], nevertheless the rule of what has passed of it [מה שעבר ממנו] is the rule of what is in actuality [שבפעל] in some respect, and what is yet [to come] of it [is under] the rule of what is in pure potentiality [שבכח הגמור].

But [as to] whether time is one or many [הזמן אחד או הרבה] — that is, whether [it is] together [as] one [אם יחד], or [whether it comes] this after the cessation of that [בבא זה אחר סור זה] — it is made clear that there are not found of it many [parts]

together [as] one [ממנו הרבה יחד] in the [same] place where they would be multiplied in this respect [שיתרבה בזה האופן], as is explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע]. And so it will be explained that it is not many in number by [its very] essence [הרבה במספר בעצם] — [coming] this after the cessation of that [בבא זה אחר סור זה]; for if this were so, the multiplicity in it would be like the matter among individual human beings [באישי האדם] — in that they are many

by [their very] essence [בעצם], and they [each] come into being, this one after that one [זה אחר זה]. But the truth is [ואולם היותם] that the multiplicity by [their very] essence [הרבה בעצם] is made clear [to be such] that, according as each one of them is one in number [אחד במספר], this [is so] by nature [בטבע], not by positing [לא בהנחה].

And if the matter were so in time, it would be necessary [to ask] whether there would be found these others within it [שימצאו אלו האחרים בו] — those by whose passing the multiplicity would be in [time] by [its very] essence [שבעבורם יהיה הרבוי בעצמות] — in [such] a manner that each one of them be found [as] one together [נמצא יחד], and this is patently false [מבואר הבטול]; for if this were so, here these others, in respect of which this description is [אשר בזה התואר עצמות], would be times — and yet they are not times [והם אינם זמן], nor [are they] a part of time [ולא חלק מזמן] — or [else] these others would not be found in a manner such that each one of them be found [as] one together [נמצא יחד]. As if we should say that these others are days or years [ימים או שנים], it is made clear that, when one posits this matter in this description [בזה התואר], it is necessary that there be to these others ends defined [תכליות נגדרים] and intermediate [ואמצע]; and it is impossible that there be an end [תכלית שיהיה]

and intermediate such that it have an end [תכלית], [for] this [is so] because, when this matter is not laid down in this description [התואר], there would not be here a multiplicity by [their very] essences in the parts of time [בחלקי הזמן]; rather, there would be the multiplicity in it by [way of] positing [בהנחה].

And in respect of the matter being so, it is made clear that it is impossible that there be a multiplicity by [their very] essences in the parts of time [בחלקי הזמן]; for there is no time in [such] a manner that there be in it a multiplicity by [their very] essences which is bounded by nature [מוגבל בטבע] — it being impossible that there be in it [time] an intermediate [אמצע]; for what is similar to it, [namely] its coming-into-being [היותו], is the end [תכלית], [and] there is possible in it [only] its being intermediate [היותו אמצע].

Moreover, the parts of time which are [bound] together with them are continuous [מתדבקים] — some of them with some [קצתם בקצת] — [namely such] that one part of them is the end of the other part in some respect [קצתם בקצת]; so it is necessary that, if that part were one [other] [שאם היה החלק ההוא אחר], the time would be one in its entirety [בכללו אחד]. And here it has been clarified that time is not many by [its very] essence [אינו הרבה בעצם] — neither together [as] one [לא יחד], nor [does] this [come] after the cessation of that [ולא בבא זה אחר סור זה]; rather, the multiplicity in it is by number [במספר] [coming] this after the cessation of that. Indeed, the multiplicity in it by number is by positing [בהנחה], not by nature [לא בטבע]; for the multiplicity in it is by measure alone [בשעור לבד]; therefore it [time] is one, [coming] after another in actuality [בפעל], [in respect of] many [parts] in potentiality [רבים בכח], as the matter is in the measure [בשעור] — only that the measure is found [as] one together [נמצא יחד], whereas time is not found [as] one together, and not [in respect of] motion [ולא התנועה].

Moreover, there is found the difference between time and motion, and [between time] and the measure [השעור], in that the prior and the later [הקודם והמתאחר] are [present] in [time] in respect of magnitude by [way of] positing [בגודל בהנחה] — when the prior is laid down as later than the later [קודם שיהיה מתאחר למתאחר], as when the later end is laid down as prior [התכלית האחר קודם]. And it is impossible [for] this in time and in motion [בזמן ובתנועה], [namely] that there should be among them the later [as] prior in no manner whatever [שיהיה בהם בשום פנים … המתאחר קודם]; rather, [the prior is] prior [in the absolute sense]. And in this [respect] the two sides resemble [one another] in respect of number pure from matter [הצד הזה דומים למספר הנקי מהחמר]; for the prior in it [הקודם בו] is prior by nature [קודם בטבע]; therefore it is impossible, in the number pure from matter [במספר הנקי מהחמר], the addition of something that would be its ends [קצותיו], as is possible [for] this in the measure [בשעור] — this [being so] because there is not, before the [first] one, any thing whatever [אין לפני האחד דבר מה].

פרק אחד עשר [Chapter Eleven]

[Subtitle, in smaller type:] In it will be explained that time is generated [שהזמן מחודש].

And after this matter of time has been clarified for us, it is proper that we inquire whether it is generated absolutely [מחודש במוחלט] or eternal [קדמון].

Let us say that it would already appear that it [time] is necessarily generated in time [מחויב בזמן שיהיה מחודש]. And this [is so] because wisdom [שהחכמה] [bears] upon what a thing is, [namely] how much it is [כמה שהוא] — [that] it is finite [בעל

תכלית]; for it is that whereby one knows the quantity of the "how-much" [כמות הבעל כמה], when we are asked about it the question "how much?" [כשנשאלנו ממנו השאלה בכמה]. And in respect of the matter being so, it is made clear that time [bears] upon what [it is] of wisdom in respect of its being time [מהחכמה במה שהוא זמן], [and] here it is necessary [from] this that time be finite [בעל תכלית].

And here, together with this — its being made clear within its own [account] [בנפשו] that wisdom [bears] upon what [a thing] is, [namely] how much it is [כמה שהוא], [that] it is finite [בעל תכלית] — here one has already testified to the truth of this [point] as well, [namely] that when one inquires into the kinds of wisdom [בסוגי החכמה], one finds them all [to be] finite [בעלי תכלית]. This [is so] because body [שהגשם], and surface [והשטח], and line [והקו], and place [והמקום], are finite of necessity [בעלי תכלית בהכרח]; for it has already been explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע] that body [שהגשם] is finite of necessity [בעל תכלית בהכרח]. And in respect of the matter being so, place too would be finite to body in some manner [המקום תכלית לגשם באופן מה], for it is that which encompasses [...]

to it the body; and it [place] too is exactly equal to the measure of the body it surrounds. It is therefore evident that place [המקום] too is finite, since it [place] is found in a finite body. And likewise it has been explained that the surface [השטח] is finite, since it is found in a finite body. By the same token we may say that number [המספר] is finite, since every number whatever is either even or odd; if it is determinate, that is its finitude. This is what wisdom adds, by way of disclosure and completion [גלוי ושלמות], to what we said — that wisdom is finite in respect of its being a "how-much" [כמה, quantity].

Now perhaps someone will raise a doubt about the demonstration carried out here and say that there will already be found, in some "how-much," a quantity that has no finitude. This is so because what is numbered can be added to, and this [addition] never ceases; and the measure [השעור] can be divided, [in respect of] what can be divided, and this too never ceases. So too it will be shown of the measure, in respect of its being a measure, that it can be added to without ceasing. And this is because there is nothing to prevent a finite measure from being a measure larger than it — larger than the world. But as for what is impossible — in respect of which it would be finite — [it is] in the case where there is no place larger than the world, in respect of the fact that there is no body at all outside the world, according to what the Philosopher held; yet it is not impossible that there be in it [potentially] what would be without finitude. For what is necessitated [as impossible] in this respect is [an actual body] without finitude — and this has been explained by the proofs which the Philosopher set

out concerning this. And when the questioner has weighed [the fact] that there will already be found, in some "how-much," what has no finitude, then it would seem possible that there be a time without finitude. But this is the very opposite of what has been demonstrated by the foregoing proof.

We shall therefore say that it has been shown, with but little examination, that there is in this objection nothing that nullifies the premise we laid down earlier — namely, that whatever is finite in "how-much" must be finite [bound], according as the nature of "how-much" requires this, just as we said earlier. As for the fact that this privation of finitude is found in number and in measure after this manner [i.e., as the open-endedness of an operation], it is rather the privation of finitude in respect of the activity of division and addition [בפעל החלוקה וההוספה]. I mean to say: whatever is divided always retains [a residue], in respect of [its remaining] potentiality for division [literally: for adhering further together]; and whatever is added to always retains [a residue], in respect of [its remaining] potentiality for addition. But whatever is divided, or to which a part is added, always retains the finitude in "how-much." And this is so because number, in respect of its being what it is, has nothing in it [of being non-finite]; it is not in potentiality for being what it is not [i.e., for being non-numbered], but is in potentiality for being a number greater [than it]. With the matter being so, there will be in it no potentiality for being a number without finitude in "how-much," for it has already been explained that every number is finite in "how-much." So too will this be shown of measure: that what is found in it [as residue], in respect of being measure, is no determinate thing without finitude; rather, it is in potentiality for being a larger measure. With the matter being so, every measure will be finite. As the Philosopher explained, it is evident that there is no privation of finitude found in this manner in the measure of the privation of finitude in "how-much"; rather, it is the privation of finitude in [333] respect of the activity of addition.

They [number and measure] always retain the finitude in whatever is added [to them]. And this is shown also: that even were there not in potentiality, in [a thing] of finite measure, points without finitude in their number — for if there were in it points without finitude in their number, then there would be in it, in potentiality, parts without finitude in their number, and that has already been explained to be false.

Now as for what we wished [to argue] when we said that the measure can be divided, into what is divided — [the result] is what divides, [and it] always retains the part, with [the result] that the number of divisions is always finite [shows the

finitude in "how-much"]; the matter here is as in the case of number. I mean to say that the number which can be added to is always more than this [particular number], that it should ever be in potentiality, but rather is [always] finite "how-much." So too it is fitting that the matter be reckoned likewise concerning the addition by which we suppose it possible [to extend] the measure without finitude. I mean to say that we suppose that it is not in potentiality for [an actual infinite] number; for if this were possible, then the finitude would [itself] be the [side of] life [reality] for there being [something] without finitude — and this has already been explained to be false.

And indeed, the privation of finitude will be by the activity of addition, with there being a number of the parts always finite in "how-much"; and if there were what is added, this number would be added to [further]. When the questioner has weighed this, it is shown that there will not be found, in some "how-much," what is non-finite in "how-much"; but there will indeed be found in it, per accidens [במקרה], the privation of finitude — as though one were to speak of the activity of division and the activity of addition. This is a thing that necessarily is found [334] in some "how-much" that is time. I mean to say that it [time] can be divided, which is perpetual; and what is added to, this too is perpetual. But the addition will not be possible in it except on the side of [being] posterior [מצד המתאחר]; for the potentiality [for addition] will indeed be in time [only] on the side of the posterior — as we explained earlier.

Now perhaps someone will still raise a doubt and say: even granting what has been shown from the foregoing demonstration — that it [time] is necessarily finite in "how-much" — yet it has indeed been shown to be possible that time should be finite in extent, while there is a part of time before it that is finite, and before that part another part [finite], since this is a matter not impossible in body. I mean to say that there is not found a body of which it is said that there comes to be a part, and [then] the privation of a part — and this without finitude. With the matter being so, time would be corrupted in respect of its coming-to-be, in respect of its priorities [its earlier portions]. I mean to say that everything that comes to be, a part of it is corrupted [passes away]; so it would not be impossible that it [time] should be finite in extent in this manner — as though one were to say that before this finite time there was [another] time prior to it, finite, and that there is no finitude [reachable] by going thus, one [time] coming after another, this after that.

We shall say that it has already been explained, in what was set down earlier, that time prior in its totality is one continuous thing [דבר אחד מדובק], and there is

not in it multiplicity in essence [רבוי בעצמות], just as is heard concerning body. With the matter being so, it is explained from the consideration of body that it would not be without finitude in "how-much" — in respect of its being one continuous thing — and this is the side in respect of which there is in it [unity of] essence. So it is explained that it is not possible for time to be without finitude in respect of its being one continuous thing.

Moreover, it is among the falsehoods to say that there are parts of time as of essence, and that time would not be, in its totality, of essence; for [if it were] this [latter, time would be] the universal [of which the parts are instances], for that would make time [a precedent] to the parts; and the part would not be agreeing, in everything, in name and in definition [מסכים לכל בשם ובגדר]. And when it has been explained that time is, in its totality, of essence, it is explained — from what was explained earlier — that time is finite by necessity, since this is among the things that wisdom apprehends in respect of its being a "how-much."

Now perhaps someone will [again] raise a doubt and say: in respect of the fact that we find, in body and in measure and in number, what is in them, in potentiality, [something] without finitude — as though one spoke of division and addition — it would be shown that the matter of time should not be found [such that] it would be impossible that there be in it [an actual infinite], as though one spoke of what has no finitude to it. So there is a possible side in respect of which it [time] would be without finitude, since we find what has no finitude to it in respect of its being in potentiality. And this manner [of reasoning] has obligated the Philosopher [to hold] time [to be] without finitude. And so it is — that when it has been explained of it [time] that it is [possible there be] no finitude to it [335], it has been explained that, after [the side of] this, when the matter is explained for him as [there being] no finitude to it [an actual infinite], it is also explained for him, after this, that no infinite is found [in actuality].

Now as for the side in respect of which is removed the [actual] existence of what has no finitude in the proofs of the ancients [the philosophers]: it is the side of [their] being found [in actuality], while the side that is removed [as impossible] is [the actual] existence. And indeed, the side in respect of which [things] are dismissed [from existence] — that [side] in respect of which there is no finitude to it [an actual infinite] in the proofs of the foregoing [philosophers] — is the side of actuality [מצד הפעל]. These are the things which necessitate [our affirming] their existence [only] in respect of their having no finitude to them in time and in measure on the side of potentiality [מצד הכח].

And as for what the Philosopher held here — when he obligated that it [time] be without finitude in "how-much" — it is on account of what he argued for in this, by reason of the nature of the "now" [טבע העתה] and by reason of the nature of generation and corruption [טבע ההויה וההפסד]; for he has already obligated that there should not be a [336]...

beginning [of being], as we recalled, in the recollection of the Philosopher's arguments, [the arguments] by which he was obligated that the world should be primordial [pre-eternal]. And it will be explained, after this, in our investigation into the Philosopher's arguments, that he was not obligated, on account of this, that time should be generated [or rather, not generated] absolutely [מחודש במוחלט]. Yet in this place we must inquire whether he was obligated [to it] — [namely,] because there is found of time [something] of which it would not be found that there is something from it [present] in actuality without finitude — that it [time] should be without finitude.

We shall say that it has been explained that there is nothing necessitating this. And this is so because the privation of finitude found in number and in measure — in respect of [their] being [a continuum] adhering [together] and [their] being added to — is [a thing] of which it is possible [that it be] added to [further], in respect of [its] being [grasped] in potentiality. So it is possible that there be found, in this respect, [something] that time will not have [otherwise] of the nature; I mean to say that the matter [of time] will be found [an infinite only] in potentiality, not in actuality. For we do not concede that there is, of body and of number and of measure, [an infinite] that is in them, in potentiality, on the side of their being found in actuality — as the Philosopher will say. But it has been said, rather, that they are indeed necessitated [as finite] on account of the nature of "how-much"; and the demonstration of this is that number [is finite] in respect of its being finite "how-much," even though it is not found in actuality. This is what has been explained by the demonstration that obligated us, [proceeding] from the Philosopher, [to hold] that number be finite "how-much."

And this is explained to be possible — that there be a number, in respect of which what is added to it would be a "how-much" [only] in potentiality — and from this side it will be said, in a great time and a small one [alike], by reason of the number that would fall in it: there is no doubt that there is no multiplicity in time except in potentiality, as we explained.

So too the number into which the parts are divided, which can be added to, [is] one that is finite in measure; and it has already been explained that an equal number will always be finite in "how-much," of necessity. And it is explained still

further that [the number] should not [be] necessitated, in respect of its being found, [to be] a number in potentiality without finitude in "how-much"; for the straight motion [התנועה הישרה] will not be found of it [as] a thing in actuality, and it [the straight motion] is, by necessity, of finite extent in "how-much" — as the Philosopher explained. And it has already been explained, also, before this, that it is not possible that there be of the Philosopher's analogy [a basis for holding] in his view the possibility of [there] being [something] without finitude in "how-much"; and this [analogy] is [only] what is found in respect of what is [grasped] in potentiality, [namely] the privation of finitude.

for we have already explained that the absence of a limit [העדר התכלית] is predicated of these matters equivocally [בשתוף]. It has likewise already been shown that what is necessitated within time — were time non-created — would itself be without limit; and this is false with respect to the "how much," in that it is a quantity of some magnitude.

We say, further, that it is impossible for there to be in time [בזמן] anything devoid of a limit [בלתי בעל תכלית]. This will already appear upon examination in all the propositions [המאמרות] that have an essence — and even if the predicament [המושג: that which is grasped] is one to which no limit applies, the matter is as we have stated. It has likewise been shown that time pertains to motion [התנועה], for time is bound up with [דבקה] the moved thing, and that which is moved is necessarily a body [גשם]. Each of its attributes is among those that have a limit — for what is grasped of time belongs to the attributes [ממשיגיו] of body, and the absence of a limit accrues to it [only] accidentally [במקרה], just as is the case [with body]. By contrast, [the attributes] that belong to it essentially [ממשיגי העצם] are limited, since time is bound up with motion, and the moved is necessarily a body. Therefore, as we said, time belongs to the attributes of body, and these are essentially bounded by a limit [בעלי תכלית בעצם]. But if its attributes — namely those in respect of which time is a kind of "how much" [כמה] — [were said to lack a limit, that absence is only accidental].

This is so because the things that belong to body, and each of the attributes it possesses, are essentially limited [בעלי תכלית]; and whatever lacks a limit belongs to it only accidentally [במקרה]. Since time is among the attributes of body, it is essentially limited [בעל תכלית בעצם], just as has already been explained — and this is what was to be said.

[That] body is limited [בעל תכלית] follows from the very nature of the "how much" [טבע הכמה], and likewise [it is shown so] in the case of number [במספר]. Indeed, the absence of a limit accrues to it only in respect of the "how much" that admits

joining [המתדבק = the contiguous], and nothing more; whereas in respect of being a [determinate] "how much," it has a limit. And this is shown by the fact that no [actual infinite] is found in a "how much" [שלא ימצא בכמה בלתי בעל תכלית in actuality], though one may be found in it accidentally [במקרה] — that is, not in respect of the [actual] "how much," but in respect of the act of addition and division [פעל ההוספה והחלוקה].

As for that which body receives, [namely] its form [הצורה], this too is limited [בעל תכלית], just as is its nature [הטבע]. For what body receives [from its mover] is necessarily bounded [מוגבל בהכרח], and the form likewise is [bounded]; from it [the form] there are ordered a bounded set of operations [פעולות מוגבלות], as has been explained. And as for what body receives in respect of quality [מהאיכות], this is quality itself [האיכיות]; this too [is limited] in their very essences [בעצמותם].

But that which it [body] receives — this is [the point] that every quality is bounded [מוגבל], just as no heat is found that is without limit [לבלתי תכלית], nor any cold, [nor any other quality reaching] to the most remote limit [תכלית המרחק]. It has already been stated, within the definition of the contraries [בגדר ההפכים], and through this it will be explained that since quality is encompassed [מוקף], it is [bounded], for between any two contraries [שני ההפכים] there is found [a determinate interval]; and the other things that lie between them [are likewise bounded]. This [encompassing] is necessitated by the existence of the [two] extremes [הקצוות] which are encompassed and bounded [מוקף ומוגבל]. As for the kinds [סוגי] of quality which are grasped [המושגים] — granted, then, [the question arises:] what is it that, within the genus of quality [בסוג האיכיות], pertains either to their very essences [בעצמותה האיכיות] or to their number [במספרם]? Now [consider]:

[As for] life with respect to its perfection [חיי על שלמיותה], there is no limit to the number of [its perfections in respect of] enumeration [למספר הספר]. By contrast, in the genus of natural power [הכח הטבעי], [the matter is not so]; for there is found within a species of the speaking beings [מהדברים — i.e. rational beings] [a power that is] bounded [מוגבל], my intention being that the deficiency [היחרון] is not found within it [לא ימצא בו]. Were this so — were it the case in a [given] species, [namely] in one [where some] individuals [אישים] lack [it] — [it would follow that] the natural power [כחם הטבעי] would be without limit [בלתי בעל].

Since the matter stands so, the natural power [in such things] is [bounded], and likewise the matter is so without natural power; and it follows that [the case here is the same]. For it has been explained that the existent [הנמצא] is, in respect of the "how much," [bounded] in its very self [בעצמותו]. This will be explained in

[the treatment of] number, [proceeding] from what has been [shown, namely] that number is limited [בעל תכלית]: it will be explained that every [number] is [either] even [זוג] or odd [נפרד], and in [the treatment of] number it will be explained [further] that those [numbers] found in [things] are bounded by number [במספר].

So too it will be explained — by way of example [דרך משל] — that [number] is limited [בלתי בעל תכלית], in that it is impossible for there to be a [number] without limit to be enumerated [למפרם]. For were the thing so, [the result] would itself be without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית]; and this is a matter that has already been explained in [the treatment of] figure [בתמונה]. For every figure [תמונה] is [bounded by] a line [קו], or a [bounded] solid [קום], or a surface [שטח], or [several] surfaces [שטחים]. [Were a figure] without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית] — and this [would hold] of [each of] its kinds [שסוגי]: it is as though one were saying that what is bounded by a single line [שיקיף בו קו אחד], and [likewise] what is bounded by more than one line [בו קוים יותר מאחד], [had] no limit to their kinds [מינים מתחלפים].

For were it the case that the number of figures of these kinds [מספר מהם מהקוים] were without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית] in a figure [בתמונה] — [it would follow] that the perimeter of that figure [הקף התמונה ההיא] would be without limit [בלתי בעל], that the figure itself would be without limit [התמונה ההיא בלתי בעל תכלית], [and yet] a figure [תמונה] is necessarily one possessing a limit [בעלת תכלית]. [That is,] within that figure [בתמונה ההיא] which would be without limit [שתהיה בלתי בעל תכלית], it has already been explained in [the work of] Euclid [באקלידס] that every figure [שכל תמונה] is bounded by triangles [משולשים], according to the number of the lines that enclose it [כמספר הקוים המקיפים בה].

A point [נקודה] is one in itself [אחת בעינה], being the extremity of the line of the figure [מקצות הקו התמונה]. Were it possible for these kinds [אלו המינים] to be without limit [לאין תכלית], [it would follow that] what is bounded by a single point [בעל תכלית נקודה] would have no limit to its enumeration [אין תכלית למספרם] — neither in potency nor in actuality [לא בכח ולא בפעל], as before [כמו שקדם]. And [the same holds] in respect of quality [מהאיכיות]: it is bounded [מוגבל].

Now [the question:] whither [באנה — i.e. "where"]? The natural places [המקומות הטבעיים] are bounded and encompassed [מוגבלים ומוקפים], and so too [things] are limited [בעלי תכלית], since they belong to body [בגשם], and to body necessarily [לגשם בהכרח].

Likewise it will be explained that the number of places [מספר המקומות] is [bounded], [and] without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית] [it is not] — for were this possible, [namely] that they be encompassed by a number without limit [יקיף בהם מספר אין תכלית לו], it would be necessitated [ויחויב] that [the thing] be without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית]. And in general, since the place of a thing [מקום הדבר] is "where"-possessing [בעל האנה], it is [bounded] and limited [ומוגבל].

As for the "when" [במתי], this is clear [מבואר], for [a determinate answer] has already been [given] to the question, when we have asked of it [נשאלנו ממנו]. I say that it is impossible for there to be there, in the "when" [מן המתי], [an unlimited]; for it [the "when"] is more remote from the present "now" [מעתה העומד] [than] a time possessing [no limit], [and yet a time possessing] limit [זמן בעל תכלית]. [Hence] of the "when" — [taken] from a number [מכפר] that has no limit to it [שאין לו תכלית] — it would be necessitated [הנה יתחייב] that what is more remote from the present "now" [יותר רחוק מהעתה העומד] have no limit in number [אין הכלית להם במספר]; and were this so [ויהיה אם כן], the "when" [הזמן = the "when"] would be without limit in the "how much" [בלתי בעל תכלית בכמה] — and this is false [וזה שקר].

[As for the conjoinings/relations:] the kinds of the primary conjunctions [סוגי ההצטרפות הראשונים] [are such] that there is bounded within them [יקיף בהם] [a determinate number]. [Of] what would be of them [ממה שהיה ממנו], [it is said] in a proposition [במאמר] that they too are encompassed [מוקפים]; and for this reason the kinds of [these conjunctions are bounded]. Insofar as a thing is conjoined [שההצטרף] to one genus [לסוג אחד], it is [bounded].

[the relation] is conjoined to "three" [מצטרף לשלשה], since the number "three" [מספר השלשה] [is conjoined to "two," and so on]; and likewise the matter holds in respect of "one to one" [באחד באחד] of the numbers [מהמספרים] that are after them [אשר הם אחר]. And so it will be explained — [proceeding] from this — by way of [the relation] "greater" and "lesser" [בגדול ובקטן], [that] it [the relation] is nothing but a kind of relation [ממה שיקשה]; and this is so because the side of the conjunction [צד ההצטרפות] was a conjoining of the little to one [היה המצטרף למעט אחד] in number [במספר]. It [a thing] has many conjunctions [מצטרפים רבים] from the side [מצד] of what we have taken to be the conjoined [שלקחנו המצטרף]. But from the side of the conjunction [מצד ההצטרפות], that which belongs to it essentially [אשר לו בעצם] is not [in itself] known [לא יודע] in respect of the more or less of the doubt [יותר הספק], in respect of "greater" and "lesser" in measure [בגדול ובקטן בשעור]. This [side of the] conjunction [הצרוף] is not [in itself] known [לא יודע]; rather it is [known only] when there is one [other] thing in itself [אם דבר

אחד בעצמו], [to which] the conjoined things [המצטרפים] are more [related] than to another single one [יותר מאחד] — that is, when we have taken the conjoined thing [לקחנו המצטרף] and [taken] the conjoined thing [המצטרף] [to be related] to a "greater" or a "lesser" of some measure [לגדול קטן מה].

But all of this is bounded [מוגבל], for the possessions [הקנינים = acquired states] that adhere to a thing [הדבקים לדבר] — such as [the case of] the rind and the leaves belonging to a tree [הקליפה והעלים לאילן], [for these] belong to the recognition of the possessions [בהכרת הקנינים] — were bodies [גשמים] or ensouled dispositions [תכונות נפשיות], for it [the possessor] is something bounded [מוגבל], as before [כמו שקדם].

[As for action and being-acted-upon:] in respect of "acting" and "being-acted-upon" [בפעל וההפעלות], every body acts [יפעל] [by] a bounded and encompassed act [פועל מוגבל ומוקף]; and so it will be explained, [namely] that, when the proximities of the operations [סמיכות ההפעלותי] would be [bounded], it [the operation] is bounded [מוגבל]. In general, since the passions [שההפעלות] are [bounded] in respect of [their] "where" [אם באנה], each of them is bounded and encompassed [מוגבל ומוקף]. This is because the passions [שההפעלות] in respect of [their] very essence [אשר בעצם] [are bounded]:

whether in essence [בעצם], in quality [באיך], in quantity [בכמה], or [in the other categories] — it has been explained that the being-acted-upon [ההפעלות] is bounded [מוגבל], and that the limit [תכליתו] [reaches] the essence [העצם] that arrives at the term of the becoming [המגיע בסוף ההויה]. The being-acted-upon [in respect of] quality [האיכות] is one that is renewed [יתחדש] at the term of [that quality]; and the being-acted-upon [in respect of] "where" [האנה] is one whose limit [תכליתו] [is the place] toward which the path [ידרך] [leads]. The being-acted-upon [in respect of] the "how much" [בכמה] is one whose limit [is] the quantitative limit [הכמה התכליתי] belonging to that growing thing [לצומח ההוא]. [Hence] the acting and the being-acted-upon [שהפועל וההפעליות] are bounded in their very selves [מוגבל בעצמותו].

[And so:] that which is in them [אשר יהיה בהם] — this is so because the [acting] passions [שההפעלות] [are bounded], in that the substances [העצמים] are essentially possessed of a limit [בעלי תכלית] in number [במספר]. So too in respect of the things [לדברים] which are possessed of a limit [בעלי תכלית], [they are bounded] in number; and [the same holds for] the passions [וההפעלות] in respect of [their] "whither" [באנה] — they too are possessed of a limit [בעלי תכלית] in number, for the kinds of the "whither" [מיני האנה] are possessed of a limit [בעלי תכלית]...

[which is the case] in respect of "how much" [בכמה]. So too it holds for the things that are finite in number [בעלי הכליה במספר]: when the quantity [הכמות] of their growings [צמיחותם] is bounded [מוגבל], whether it be bounded in respect of the prior [היהרון] or bounded in respect of the latter [ההכרון] — and this is the difference between the cases — these are bounded. As for "state" [מצב], it has been explained that the thing which is qualified by a state [שהמצב נגדר] is qualified in respect of its being in some particular state [במה שהוא מצב]: for were it possible to be otherwise, it would not be known [נודע], since the notification [ההודעה] within it would be by reason of [its] being so qualified. But a state that is necessarily so [המצב יחוייב שיהיה] is known [נודע]; thus, if it be necessary that the thing be in a given state, [that state] is qualified [נגדר].

And so I say, in respect of the eighth [of the categories], that the states which it is possible for a thing to be in are finite and bounded in number [מוגבלים ובעלי הכליה במספר]. This is because a state is a relation [יחס] of the thing to that which encompasses it [הדבר אל הדבר המקיף בו]; and according as the sides [צדדי] of the thing that encompasses it are bounded in number [יקיף בהם מספר בעל הכליה] necessarily, so the number of states [מספר המצבים] will be finite [בעל הכליה]. But how it will be explained that the sides of the thing that encompasses it are finite in number [בעל הכליה] follows from what we have said: namely, that were it possible for there to be in them a number without limit [שאין הכליה לו], the surface of that thing [שטח הדבר ההוא] — the thing being in [a given] state — would be divisible into parts encompassing a number without limit [אל חלקים יקוף בהם מספר שאין הכליה לו], and this is something whose explanation [shows] it to be false [שהוא שקר]. And when it is explained of the embodied [thing] [ההתבאר שהתגשם], [it follows] that each of its apprehensible attributes [כל אחד ממשיגיו] is finite [בעל תכלית] of necessity — and this is what we set out to demonstrate by this proof [המופה].

And let us say further that it is impossible for time [הזמן] to be without limit in respect of quantity [בלתי בעל תכלית בכמות]; for were this so, the elapsed time [הזמן החולף] would be without limit in quantity, and this would be explained to be false from what we say. This is because it has been explained there [in the *Physics*] that the time [in which] the spheres [הגלגלים] move [מהתנועה] is some number that corresponds to [מה מספר] the movement of the stars [הכוכבים] which move within them [אשר ינוע אותם] — that which lags behind in motion [מאוחר בתנועה] is [measured] in a greater time [בזמן יותר גדול]. And it has likewise been explained that, were it the case that there were no [definite] number for the revolutions of one star [כבובי האחד] in one time, [and] a greater number for the revolutions of the other [מספר כבובי האחר] in [that same] greater time, then there would be no

[definite] swiftness of motion of the one as against the other [מהירה האחד … מהאחר]. And this is explained for us [in the case where] the sphere that is swifter in motion than the other spheres [שבכאן גלגלים יותר ממהרי התנועה מגלגלים אחרים] — as though one were to say that the sphere swifter [in motion] is the daily sphere [הגלגל היומי], [which is] swifter in motion than the sphere of the fixed stars [מגלגל הכוכבים הקיימים].

And it is likewise explained that, were the elapsed time without limit [הזמן החולף בלתי בעל תכלית], the world would be eternal [היה העולם קדום], as would be necessitated for one who holds that time is without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית]; for it cannot be that the motions [התנועות] which are necessary [for time] be a continuous eternal time [זמן מדובק נצחי], as has been explained in the *Physics* [בספר השמע] (Aristotle, *Physics*). For [if so] the number of the revolutions of the stars [מספר הכוכבים] which move within them [in time] would be [such] that each of the spheres [כל אחד מהגלגלים] would have no limit to its number [מספר שאין לו תכלית]. And it is likewise explained that the number which has no limit [שהמספר שאין לו תכלית] is neither greater nor lesser [אינו יותר גדול ולא יותר קטן] than another number that has no limit [במספר אחר שאין לו תכלית] — for [if it] were so, the [given] number would be greater [המספר האחד יותר גדול], and the other would necessarily be lesser [מהאחר יהיה בהכרח] in respect of being finite in some manner [מצד מה בעל הכליה]; and this is explained to be false [מבוארה]. And when one has reckoned all of this through [כאשר התישב זה כלו], behold I say that, were the elapsed time without limit in respect of quantity [בלתי בעל תכלית בכמות], there would be for the spheres no [determinate] swiftness of motion and motion [מהירה תנועה ותנועה מהונית]; for the number of the revolutions [מכפר הסבובים] within which the swiftest sphere [הגלגל מהיר התנועה] moves — [reckoned in] this elapsed time [הזמן החולף] which is set down [as] without limit [הונח בלתי בעל תכלית] of necessity [בהכרח] — [stands so,] and likewise the number of the revolutions [מספר הסבובים]…

And in general, [in respect of] the swift movement [תנועת המהיר] in all the elapsed time [בכל הזמן החולף], [it stands] in a ratio [על נכחותו] to the slower movement [המאוחר מהתנועה] in some [respect]: hence there must be a ratio [יחס] of the number of the revolutions of the swift [one] in the elapsed time to the number of the revolutions of the slower [one] [אל מספר סבובי המאוחר] in the like proportion of the swift to the slow [כיתם המהירות אל האיחור]. And inasmuch as this could not be [were it otherwise] — that is, were it [the case] that the elapsed time were not [bounded] [שלא היה שיהיה … הזמן החולף] — [therefore] each one of these numbers [כל אחד מאלו המספרים] must be finite [בעל תכלית]; the numbers [המספרים] must

be finite of necessity [בעל תכלית בהכרח], and from this it is necessary [ולזה יחוייב] that the elapsed time [הזמן החולף] be finite [בעל תכלית].

And let us say further that it is impossible for the elapsed time to be without limit [לאין תכלית]. For were this possible, it would be necessary that the time within which the moon [הירח] entered into the shadow of the earth [נכנם בו … בצל הארץ] in all this elapsed time be a time without limit [זמן שאין לו תכלית], [whereas] if this time set down were finite [שאם הונח זה הזמן בעל תכלית], it would be necessary that the elapsed time as a whole [הזמן החולף בכללו] be finite [בעל תכלית]. But according as the elapsed time is not [bounded] — [being supposedly] greater than the time within which the moon entered into the shadow of the earth [נכנם בו הירח בצל הארץ], for each of these is [a portion] of the elapsed time which is finite [בעל תכלית] — it could not be that the elapsed time be without limit [שאין לו תכלית], [being] greater than the [putatively] limitless elapsed time [גדול מהזמן החולף שאין לו תכלית]. And this is explained, [given] that there is no time there but one time [אין שם אלא זמן אחד]: it would be necessary that the moon enter always [נכנם בו הירח תמיד], [and be] always eclipsed in this elapsed time [לוקה תמיד בזה הזמן החולף] — and this is in the utmost absurdity [בתכלית הבטול].

And in general, [it follows] that, since the elapsed time has no limit [שהזמן החולף שאין לו תכלית], it is [the same] in itself [בעינו] [as] the elapsed time which has no limit; for there is no [other] time there but one time [כי אם זמן אחד], and the time which has no limit in the elapsed [time] could not have a part [חלק] that has no limit in the elapsed [time]. Hence it is necessary that the moon be eclipsed always [שתהיה הירח לוקה תמיד] in all the elapsed time [בכל זמן החולף]. And by this it is explained that the moon does not enter at all into the shadow of the earth [שלא תכנם כלל בצל הארץ] in the elapsed time; for, were the time within which it does not enter also without limit [גם כן בלתי בעל תכלית], it would necessarily follow from this that the moon always abides [שתשכן … הירח תמיד] in the shadow of the earth [בצל הארץ] and yet does not enter into it [ובלתי נכנסת בו] together [יחד] — and were this so, the two contraries [שני ההפכים] would [hold] of one subject together [בנושא אחד יחד], and this is in the utmost absurdity [בתכלית הבטול].

And by this proof [המופה] it is explained in its very self [בעינו] that the part [החלק] of the moon which is illumined [המאיר] — [namely] in respect of the aspect [מהצד המביט] of it toward the earth [ממנה אל הארץ] — would be always eastward toward the sun and westward [מזרחי אל השמש ומערבי] together [יחד], and this is in the utmost absurdity [בתכלית הבטול]. And this is because, [for] the time within which the moon was eastward toward the sun [היתה הירח מזרחית לשמש] in this elapsed time, it [the moon] is necessarily [so] without limit [בהכרח בלתי בעל

תכלית]; [and] if the elapsed time set down [is] without limit [לאין תכלית], then it is necessary by this that the moon be westward toward the sun [שיהיה הירח מערבי לשמש], [and] eastward and westward toward the sun together in all the elapsed time [ומזרחי לשמש יחד בכל הזמן החולף] — and this is all explained to be void [מבואר הבטול]. And so it is necessary by this that the light of the moon seen here [אור הירח שבכאן] be always increasing and decreasing together [נוסף ונחסר יחד] — and this is in the utmost absurdity [בתכלית הבטול]. And so it is necessary by this that there be…

And let us say further that it is impossible for the elapsed time to be without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית]. This is something that is explained [by considering] which part of the time it would be possible for a "when" [מתי] to be in, on a single illustration [על משל אחד], inasmuch as [a "when"] is prior to [its being among] the parts [מהדמה החלקים] — just as [there is] some part [in space] [שהוא חלק] that is a "where" [במקום] possible for [a thing] to be in [אפשר שיהיה בו], its "whither" [אנה] being [fixed] by the supposition [לפי ההנחה], on a single illustration [על משל אחד]. And according as there is no "when" there having no limit [שאין שם מתי אין תכלית לו], it is explained that there is no part of the elapsed time there [שאין שם חלק מהזמן החולף] which would be more remote [מרחקן] from the present "now" [מהעתה העומד], [for there is such] only if there is a time having a limit [אם זמן שיש לו תכלית]. And were the elapsed time set down without limit [ואם הונח הזמן החולף בלתי בעל תכלית], then there would be a [time-]relation [יחם] within which there would fall no "when"-relation [שלא יפול בו מתי יחם] having no limit [שאין לו תכלית] — and this [holds] of whatever "when" be set down [מתי שיונח]; [for] there would be a time-relation [יחם הזמן] which is before it…

[book p. 343, cont.] …in respect of the time within which the "when" [is reckoned] [אשר לו אל הזמן אשר בו המתי], and [in respect of] the present "now" [והעתה העומד], a relation [יחם] having no limit [שאין לו תכלית]. And it has already been set down [וכבר הונח] that [the "now"] is known in itself [ידוע בעצמו], in respect of that within which there is no doubt [שאין בו ספק] — [namely] that there would be some part of the time within which the "when" would be [reckoned] [שאיזה חלק שיהיה בזמן שיהיה בו מתי …], on a single illustration [על משל אחד]; this is an impossible without-limit [זה חלוף בלתי אפשר]. So it is necessary by this that the elapsed time not be without limit [שיחוייב … שלא יהיה הזמן החולף בלתי בעל תכלית].

And let us say further that it is impossible for the elapsed time to be without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית]. This is because time is continuous [מדובק] in respect of its parts [מחלקיו], and its quiddity [וכמותו] consists in the coming-to-be of the motion [מהתהוות התנועה] in its present actuality [על נכחותה] — just as its parts are

quantities coming-to-be [שכמות חלקיו … מהתהוות] from the coming-to-be of the motion which is reckoned by its present actuality [אשר ישערה על נכחותה], and the quantity of the coming-to-be [המתהוה] in respect of that which comes-to-be [במה שהוא מתהוה] necessarily involves a continual succession [יחוייב שיחוף תמיד] of that which is perpetual in the coming-to-be [מה שהתמידה ההויה]. And this is a matter explained in [the treatment of] the parts of time [בחלקי הזמן], and it is explained that [time] is uniform [שוה יחויב] [taken] in respect of time as a whole [בזמן בכללו], inasmuch as it is one and continuous [שהוא אחד ומדובק], as has been explained before [כמו שהתבאר במה שקדם]. And when one has reckoned this [כאשר התישב זה], behold I say that it is impossible for the elapsed time to be without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית]: for were this possible, there would be no impression [רושם] [made] by the motion in [the act of] addition to the time [מהתנועה בהוספת הזמן]. But it is necessary [אבל יחויב], if it be set down that there is diminished from it [שנחסר ממנו] some [portion] of motion [מהתנועה], [that] the elapsed [time] comes [to be] one after another [החולפה בבא זה אחר זה] [proceeding] from this cause to that [סור … אל זה] without limit [אל לא תכלית], such that its measure [שעורו] would not be smaller than its [own] measure [קטן משעורו] — [namely] if we add within it [אם הוסיפנו בו] from the future motions [מהתנועות העתידות] coming one after another [בבא זה אחר זה], there is no limit to this [זה לאין תכלית]. And were there no impression in the addition of motion and its diminution [רושם בהוספת התנועה והחסרונה] in respect of the quantity of time [בכמות הזמן], then there would be no time coming-to-be from the motion [מהוה מהזמן מהתנועה]; and its existence [מציאותו] would be [merely] as we have imagined it [if] there were no motion there in its [actual] existences [שלא תהיה שם תנועה במציאותו] — [whereas,] if we imagine there to be motion there [שתהיה שם מהתנועה] manifold-fold greater than what was [there] in the elapsed time [כפלים רבים יותר על מה שהיה ממנה בזמן החולף], and this is explained to be void [מבואר הבטול]. For it has already been explained that time is something generated from the motion [שהזמן הוא מתחדש מהתנועה] in respect of its present actuality [על נכחותה], and it reckons it [ומשער אותה] by the side which is in it [in respect of] the one and the continuous [אשר הוא בו אחד ומדובק] — for there are no [actual] parts in time in actuality [כי אין בזמן חלקים בפעל], as has been explained before [כמו שקדם]. And from this it is necessary that the time always be increasing [שיהיה הזמן נוסף תמיד] [by] all that the motion newly generates [כל מה שתחתדש התנועה]…

And when one has reckoned this [כאשר התישב זה], behold it is necessary [that there follow] one of two further matters [אחד משני דברים], if we set it down that the time is generated from the motion [שהזמן נתחדש מהתנועה]: [either] it be an addition in [the act of] generation [נוסף בהתחדשה], as appears from its [own] matter [שיראה מענינה] — and so it will be, if the elapsed time [הזמן החולף] be finite

[בעל תכלית]; or [else] we say that the time is generated from the motion [שהזמן נתחדש מהתנועה] [in such a way that it changes endlessly] until it become without limit [עד שנהיה בלתי בעל תכלית]. And [yet] afterward it would not be [the case] that there were any impression in respect of that which is generated from the motion [רושם במה שהתחדש מהתנועה]. And were the matter so, then it would be necessary [that there be] in the limitless time [בזמן הבלתי בעל תכלית] — at the time of its generation [בעת התחדשותו] of the motion that is generated from it [שתתחדש ממנה] one after another [זה אחר זה] — that it be finite [שיהיה בעל תכלית] prior to its being without limit [קודם היותו בלתי בעל תכלית]; and in this way it would be generated from it [יתחדש ממנה], and in this way it would be always finite from the motion [תמיד בעל תכלית מהתנועה], and this is in the utmost absurdity [וזה מבואר הבטול].

And if the matter be so, then we set down that there is something finite generated from it [שיתחדש ממנו] [that is] finite, [existing] prior to [its being] without limit [קודם היותו בלתי בעל תכלית]: behold, [the time] would be finite [בעל תכלית], and there would be [something] found of it always [הנמצא ממנו תמיד] [that is] finite [בעל תכלית]. And this is because, were it possible to set down [שיעתק] on the side of the addition [על צד ההוספה] of its being finite [מהיותו בעל תכלית] [as turning] into [the] being without limit [אל היותו בלתי בעל תכלית], behold, this would be the time in respect of which it goes [אשר ידרוך], [namely] in respect of its being without limit [להיותו בלתי בעל תכלית] — [and] the intermediate [האמצעי] between the finite and the without-limit [בין הבעל תכלית והבלתי בעל תכלית], [being something of which,] between two things, the negation of both extremes [שלילה עליו שתי הקצוות] is true [יצדק]. But were the matter so, then this intermediate [האמצעי] would be neither finite nor without limit [לא בעל תכלית ולא בלתי בעל תכלית] — and this is explained to be void [מבואר הבטול].

And in general, [it follows] that when we set down that there is generated from it [שיתחדש ממנו] something finite in quantity [בעל תכלית בכמות], and were it the case that it be added to that which is added [שיתוסף אל מה שיתוסף] [endlessly], this is [a] without-limit [זה אל לא תכלית]; and being so, the matter is explained [מבואר], [namely] that [the elapsed time] would already have necessarily been finite [שכבר יחויב מזה שיהיה] from the start-time [לזמן ההתחלה].

And let us say further that it is impossible for the elapsed time to be without limit [לאין תכלית]. This is because time is the measure of the motion [משער התנועה] in actuality [בפעל], in respect of the present actuality of the coming-to-be [על נכחות התהווה]; and from this it is necessary that it be reckoned [שישערה] in general by something one and continuous [במה שהוא אחת ומדובקת]. And the measured thing

[המשער] in respect of which it [time] is the measure [שהוא משער] is necessarily finite [יחויב היותו בעל תכלית]; for the without-limit has no measure nor bound [כי אין לבלתי בעל תכלית שעור ולא הגבלה]. And the matter being so, then it is necessary that the time be [something] in respect of which it [time] is the measure of the motion [בו משער התנועה] in actuality [בפעל], that is, the elapsed time [הזמן החולף]; and from this it is necessary that it be from the start-time [לזמן ההתחלה].

And let us say further that it is impossible for the elapsed time to be without limit [לאין תכלית]. For were this possible, then this would not be [so], in that we have already set down [בשנניח שכבר] that there had been in the elapsed time some [given] time [זמן מה], and after it [another] time [ואחריו זמן] — [yet] this [is supposed to go] without limit [זה אל לא תכלית]; for in this way [time] would always be the generating [תמיד המתחדש] of the quantities of the limitless time [מכמות הזמן בעל תכלית]. But [the case] would be [thus], that we set down that, before this [given] time [לפני זה], there would be another time [שיהיה זמן אחר], and before it [another] time [ולפניו זמן] — [yet] this [is supposed to go] without limit [זה אל לא תכלית]. And were the matter so, behold it would be…

the coming-to-be of the elapsing time [הזמן החולף] from the prior side, and this [too] would be such that it would come to be in time from the later side — not from the prior side. For [on that supposition] the intermediate time [הזמן האמצעי], which would derive from it, would itself be finite [בעל תכלית]. So with respect to the unlimited [הבלתי בעל תכלית] it would hold true that it is something that has no limit, and this is precisely the limit of the void [תכלית הבטול] — for although it is said of the unlimited that it "came to be," this is prior to its conjoining; for it is prior to that which cannot increase by division from anything possessed of a measure [בעל שעור] that always preserves the definition of the measured [גדר הבעל שעור]. So too, what has no limit in respect of its being measured [לשעורו] cannot increase by addition to anything possessed of a measure — for it is impossible for what is possessed of a measure to be measured by the unlimited.

And [further], when it comes to be from it [i.e., from the unlimited] on the side of conjoining, this is just as it is impossible that a point [נקודה] should remain on the line and then a [further] part come to be after [that] part — and this is just as, since the point can produce no [new] thing from itself except [insofar as] every doubling does not issue forth from the definition of the divided [מגדר המחלק], for it is something indivisible. So too the unlimited possessed of measure: every doubling [of it] does not issue forth from the definition of the possessed-of-measure, for it is always conjoined to addition, as has been explained in what preceded.

And again: it is impossible that the elapsing time [הזמן החולף] should be unlimited [לאין תכלית]. This is because, if it were so, it would be fitting that there should be in it no limit in respect of quantity from the prior side — yet it is something complete [בכח גמור], and there is already found something that has no limit in actuality [בפעל]. And in general, then, since it is found that the elapsing time is something that comes to be on the later side, just as preceded, it is clear that it is more fitting [to be unlimited] from the later side than from the prior side — [namely that] the later side be unlimited in quantity, [as measured] backward from whichever [point] we please of the elapsing time, namely the [point] that comes to be; and this is something possessed of a limit. And [further], since being more time than there would be is something in which privation [העדר] is found on the later side, it is impossible that it be unlimited [in this respect], [for it is] impossible that the elapsing time be unlimited.

It is impossible that the elapsing time [הזמן החולף] be unlimited; and this is, because if it were so, there would have to be here an eternal moved thing [מתנועע נצחי] moved [continuously] — for the necessary motions [התנועות הנכרחות] cannot be such that there should be from them a perpetually-conjoined time [זמן מדובק נצחי], as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] explained. It is fitting, then, that it be moved by a circular motion [תנועה סבובית], not by a rectilinear motion [תנועה הישרה]. And if the matter were so, then…

it would be the heavenly body [הגרם השמיימי], for there is here no [other] moved thing moved by this description; and so [too] it is clear. Likewise, then, with respect to the matter of time [הזמן], that it is what numbers the motion of the heaven [סופר תנועת הגלגל], as is explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע, Aristotle's *Physics*] — and indeed, although we picture it [time] by the two measures of the motions [משתי התנועות], this [shows] that it is one and conjoined; it would not be [so] except as when… And as for the heavenly body, it has already been explained that the elapsing time must be possessed of a limit [בעל תכלית].

The elapsing time [הזמן החולף] is something that does not exist [as an actual infinite] — and this is because it is impossible that there be found from it a part to which one could point [חלק רמוז אליו]; for what is nearest to us of the elapsing time is [the present] existence [המציאות] which [belongs to that part to which one can point]. The part that is to be divided off, then, [belongs] to the time that elapses, all of it [in sum]. As for the fact that time [is] among existents, this is clear from the prior and the later; for it cannot be that it be found to belong to that which is absolute privation [העדר מוחלט]. There is no saying that existence

pertains [to it otherwise], for this existence of time is nothing other than this [present] existence [itself].

It is clear, then, that there is already found in it [time] the prior [side, directed] toward that which is absolute privation. And again, since the whole [of time] is either unlimited [בלתי בעל תכלית] or finite, and these descriptions [המאריצים / the predicates] are [predicated of something] possessed of measure — and again, since it has already been said that it [time] cannot but be possessed of measure [בעל שעור] —

It is fitting that there not be hidden from us that which is necessary to the measure [המשוער]: namely whether the properties of number [סגולות המספר] belong to it, so as to be a "counting" [ספירה], and whether the properties of the [continuous] measure [סגולות השעור] belong to its being something conjoined [מתדבק]; and that it be said of it "long" and "short," "great" and "small," from the side of [its being] a counting. And it will be said of it "long" and "short" from the side of its being conjoined — that is, in respect of its necessarily being divisible into that which is divisible, just as it is possible to add to it without limit, just as it is possible that the possible addition [should be made] to it from the later side [מהצד המאוחר]. And here it has been explained that time must necessarily be [such], [and this] is the discussion in this chapter [פרק].

פרק שנים עשר — Chapter Twelve

[Sub-rubric, Rashi script: יתבאר בו שהתנועה מחודשת — "It will be explained therein that motion is created [מחודשת]."]

It is fitting that we investigate likewise the matter of motion [התנועה]: whether it was [always] found, or whether it neither departs [from existence] nor ceases — just as the one who asserts the eternity [קדמות] of the world [העולם] would say.

And let us say: it has already been seen, from the two demonstrations [המופתים] by which we have explained that time is created [מחודש], that motion too must be created [מחודשת]. For just as time is [derived] from intellect [מהכמה / from the rational consideration], and the matter [pertains] to time, so too is motion [it] later than time. But time is later [than], [given] what belongs to time, [namely] that there pertains to it the nature of quantity [מטבע הכמות]...

and time is among the things attained [as predicates] of body [הגשם] by the mediation [of motion], and [so] motion must be created [מחודשת]. For just as motion [is derived] from intellect, and time is [derived] from intellect — so [too], whatever pertains to motion necessarily pertains to it [time]; for it is what is

attained [as a predicate] of body, and this in respect of quantity, just as has been explained in what preceded — [namely, that] it [time] has come to be possessed of a limit in quantity.

And by this it has been explained that the remaining demonstrations [המיפתים / the keys-of-proof] necessarily [show] likewise that the motion that exists [now] [התנועה ההוה] is [created]; for the parable [המשל] has already been stated, since it [the argument] would [otherwise] be in respect of this [present] motion when one transfers the argument concerning them [the demonstrations] to motion. It is impossible that the elapsing motion [התנועה החולפת] be unlimited [בלתי בעלת תכלית]; for if this were possible, [then] the number of the revolutions of the swift sphere [מספר סבובי הגלגל מהיר] [would be unlimited], and likewise the number of the revolutions of the slow sphere [מספר סבובי הגלגל מאוחר] in [its] motion. [But] the number of the revolutions of the swift [sphere] is greater than the number of the revolutions of the slow one — [yet both would be infinite], and there is no greater and lesser between infinities; and this is the [absurdity] already explained as the void [הבטול].

And again, with respect to the compound motion [התנועה המורכבת] of the wandering stars [הכוכבים ההולכים נבוכים / the planets] — up to [the point] at which there happens to them a recurrence [נזורה] in their being, in [a span of] one hundred [years]… — indeed it happens to them that their revolutions are numbered, [and] that those which vary [from each other] differ in [each] period [תקופה], [each] period that there is here. And since it has been explained that their revolutions are numbered, it is clear that every number is possessed of a limit of necessity [בעל תכלית בהכרח]; [so the revolutions of the planets] that go [around] are of necessity possessed of a limit.

And [again], since the quantity of the elapsing motion [כמות התנועה החולפת] [cannot be] without limit, [the argument] requires that the motion which is the [most recent] coming-to-be [ההתחדשה] — [for example,] the motion of the moon in [its passage through] the shadow of the earth [בצל הארץ] — be unlimited; and [this] requires that this too [be examined] just as [in] what passed concerning time. And it requires that this too [be reckoned] like the [previous] demonstration: if the elapsing time [הזמן החולף] be granted as unlimited…

[for example,] the matter of the sphere [גלגל] passed [in] the time that the moon [הירח] [requires]; in the time the moon takes [לוקה / "is eclipsed"], always, in [the manner of] the remaining cases of privation [הבטולים] which we have made obligatory by this demonstration [המופת] — [namely, that there be] a limit. And this [is] of what is not hard to maintain.

And likewise let us say: it is impossible that there be [a motion possessed of no limit] — that is, [the motion] which is explained to be such, [as to] which it is possible that there fall in it a "when" [מתי] from the side of the time [מצד הזמן] which is [after it]. But in accordance with [the principle] that there is [no] "when" in it [which] has no limit [אין תכלית]… [the part] of the elapsing motion [מהתנועה החולפת] would be its remoteness from the motion [that is] without limit. And if [we] grant the elapsing motion [התנועה החולפת] [to be] such that there should not fall in it a "when" [going back] toward the motion that has no limit — and it has already been explained in which…

there falls in it a "when," [as] in [the case of] a single parable [משל אחד]: this [is] an unlimited variation [חלוף בלתי בעל תכלית]; the elapsing motion [התנועה החולפת] [is] possessed of a limit [בעלת תכלית]. And likewise let us say that, with respect to all that issues forth as following from [the principle] of [motion] coming-to-be [מתהווה] in its coming-to-be upon its proper character [על נכוחתה], the being-found of motion [הויית התנועה] is required; but if the motion [in question] had been [already] passed [שעבר], this would be impossible for it, and so it would [follow that]…

And likewise let us say: since all that comes forth as following from the truth of its coming-to-be [נכחות התהוותו], and it has been explained that the measured [המשוער] is possessed of a limit, then it is required that the motion be [created] — and likewise let us say it is impossible that the motion be [unlimited]; this could not be unless one grants that there be, prior to this [motion], another [motion] possessed of a limit [בעלת תכלית] — and this [tends] toward [its] not [being] [actually] unlimited [in] the coming-to-be of motion from the prior side. And this is clear from the later side [מהצד המאוחר], that it [the motion] is possessed of a limit; not from the prior side. The quantity of the intermediate motion [כמות התנועה האמצעי] [lies] between the quantity of the [elapsing] motion [and the unlimited]: [it is] the motion that is unlimited, possessed of a limit; it holds true of it to say that it has already held true of it that it is not possessed of a limit — this being the limit of the void [תכלית הבטול]. For although it is said in the discussion that, with respect to the unlimited possessed-of-measure, in their conjoining [the unlimited part is] prior to this — and this so that there should not come to be by division from the possessed-of-measure something that always preserves the definition of the possessed-of-measure [גדר הבעל שעור] — so too, what has no limit in respect of its being measured [לשעורו] cannot increase by addition from the unlimited possessed-of-measure; and that there come to be from it on the side [of conjoining], just as it is impossible that a point [should remain] on the line, and there come to be [from it] a part after [a] part — this being just as, since the

point [נקודה], all [that comes from] it [arises only] because no thing comes to be from it except [insofar as] every doubling does not issue from the definition of the divided [מגדר המחלק] — for it is something indivisible. So too the unlimited possessed-of-measure, every doubling [of] it does not issue from the definition of the possessed-of-measure, for [it is] without limit, conjoined to addition.

And likewise let us say it is impossible that the elapsing motion [התנועה החולפת] be unlimited in quantity; for if this were possible, then there would be more of it from the later side [מהצד המאוחר] in quantity, since it is something found [as] conjoined and as having addition in number [בהוספה המספר]. And here it is explained that the [elapsing motion] is [necessarily] possessed of a limit in quantity from the later side. And by this it is explained that the elapsing motion [התנועה החולפת] is not unlimited.

And likewise let us say that the elapsing motion [התנועה החולפת] is not unlimited…

this is possible. It would then necessarily follow that there would be here something conjoined [to it], for the necessary motion [התנועה הנכרכות] is not conjoined, as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] explained. And if it were so, then the thing in motion here would be moved by a motion that is conjoined to it, in which there is contact [התדבקות]; whereas the celestial body [הגרם השמיימי] does not anticipate [its mover] — as he explained — so that the elapsing motion [התנועה החולפת] would not be without limit [בלתי בעל תכלית]. For one to say of the elapsing motion that it is something without limit is to say something that has no existence [מציאות]: there is no part of motion that is found in actuality [בפעל], since motion comes about only by reason of the absence of the natural existents that are present by necessity [בהכרח], as the Philosopher explained.

It is therefore all the more fitting that what exists, by reason of its existing from the side of the future [מהצד העתיד] — that is, from the side of the future part of it that is found in pure potentiality [בכח גמור] — and the elapsing side of it [הצד החולף ממנה], namely the completed motion [התנועה שלמות], from the side of what has already passed: this is not actual being [פעל מה], but rather what has already become joined to it. Moreover, the completed motion already extends and varies — in *how* [its parts run], or in *how much*, or in their respect [or "in the agent": בעבורו] — as in the motion of millstones for grinding wheat into flour, or the motion of the celestial bodies [הגרמים]… as found among the existents. So the elapsing motion, from the side of the completion that follows from it — whether in respect of what is in them in actuality, that is, the impression [הרושם] that reaches them from… — the elapsing motion is found to have some existence; and

from it comes the universal existence [המציאות אשר לכללה], as is evident from the explanation given of its own nature in what we have set down here regarding time [זה בזמן].

פרק שלשה עשר

Chapter Thirteen

[Chapter heading, p. 349, Rashi-script rubric beneath the title:] [Rashi script: "In which it will be explained that the earth is created [שהגלות הארץ מחודש]."]

It is fitting that we investigate the manifest part of the earth [החלק הנגלה מהארץ] from…, for it is among the matters whose existences are conjoined [מציאותם מדובק]… this part, and the bounds [ויקוף] of the elemental water-foundation [היסוד המימי] are surpassed [יפסד / "are corrupted"] by the things generated from them [הנולדות מבינם], and it would not be possible for the lowly existents to settle into being [שישובו להוות]; for we find that man would [arise] from the tree [or: from the wine, מאילן החמר] — and this is evident, for if the species of these [things] were corrupted [יפסד], so that no individual of these species were found, [there would be no human generation] …

it would be possible for [these species] to be renewed [שיתחדש] in the natural order [על המנהג הטבעי] from the rest of the species, as is explained for one who has looked into [the matter in] natural science [בחכמה הטבעית]. And when one reflects, the things whose existences are conjoined — namely, that this manifest part of the earth is from the [thing] that has established the kinds [מיני] of compounds [המורכבים] out of the elements [מהיסודות] which they have, so as to be existent — then it is fitting that we investigate whether this manifest part of the earth has a distinguishing property [סגולה מיוחדת] in this respect, or not.

We may say that it already appears that the revelation [שהגלות] of this manifest part — that this manifest part of the earth is higher than the rest of the lowly existents — and that it is a thing that the nature of the elements [טבע היסודות] did not bestow [לא יתנהו], nor did the nature of the celestial bodies [טבע הגרמים השמיימים] bestow it, as will be explained presently. Already it has been found that all the distinguishing properties [הסגולות] of the earth that come-to-be [להגלות הארץ כל הסגולות] revealed — and that this is for the sake of an end [לתכלית], and this is among the things [from which it follows that] the nature of the earthy and watery foundation [היסוד הארצי והמימי] does not bestow it; nor is there a natural property [טבע] that would bestow it for the sake of something other than itself [בעבור זולתו].

Since the matter [הענין] is so, it is necessarily required that the revelation of the earth be for the sake of an end. This is among the things from which it follows that the nature of the earthy and watery foundation does not bestow it, as will be explained after this. And given that the matter is so, all the distinguishing properties found in the existent are [there] inasmuch as it is [that] which the nature did not bestow of itself, nor does the nature of the celestial bodies bestow them — and the matter is likewise [for these]. Thus it is necessarily required that the revelation [הגלות] of the earth be for the sake of an end; this is among the things [proving] that it was not bestowed by these existents, which are by chance [בקרי] and in time [ובהזדמן], for were the matter [a product] of the small part of the earthy [portion] and of a small part of the time [מהזמן]...

[The argument continues:] ... of the earth and the water, it is evident, for it has already [been established] ... the earthy foundation on all its sides. And indeed [the relation] of [the earth] to the stars is evident from what is said: that this manifest part of the earth will not be found revealed [לא ימצא נגלה] ... And this is a matter upon which the masters of [astronomical] computation [חכמי התכונה — here: "those who reckon the lunar phases," מהלקיות הירחיים] have taken their stand ... The greatest of them [המ;רבים] [stood upon it]. And it is explained that from whichever of the stars [you reckon], the [latitude is] revealed sixty... below the earth twenty... from that star, or from the stars among them, in breadth [ברוחב] ... and this is very evident, and all the more so given what [is set down] in this book [הספר].

When all this is considered, it [follows] that the manifest part of the earth is created [מחודש]. And this [is so because] its existence is always from a productive cause [מהסבה הפועלת], and... here is one to whom this is always to be ascribed [ייוחס]; and this is the answer to that.

The second [point] is that it is explained that this manifest part — namely the parts of the earth that the elemental water-foundation surrounds [אשר יקוף בה היסוד המימי] — is higher [גבוה] than the manifest part of the earth which the [water] surrounds, from the side of sense-perception [מצד החוש], [or] from the side of speculation [מצד העיון]; and this [follows from] what has already [been shown:] that the elemental water-foundation [is sent] toward the manifest part [שינר היסוד המימי אל החלק הנגלה] ... the nature of the water, that it would flow [נגרים] toward...

the lowly places, [coming] from the places that are above them. And when one reflects that this manifest part [of the earth] is higher than the rest of the parts of the earth, it is explained that it is already always a productive [thing], for

[otherwise] what is would always be a thing-full [filled] thing rather than a thing toward "no-thing" [אל לא דבר]; and this [is the case] inasmuch as time [הזמן] is bound up with it now [מחובר מעתה], and this is explained as being entirely false. It is therefore explained that there must necessarily be a productive [agent] at the very beginning of [the world's] entry into existence [הכנסו במציאותו], for it is always [acted upon] by the agent [מהפועל אותו], as we have explained. So the existents [established] this place [המקום] in the manner that we recalled earlier [שזכרנו במה שקדם].

[Now consider:] the existence of this place [from] a productive cause [מסבה פועלת], and it is granted [והונחה] that there falls upon this no doubt as to why the earth should not be revealed [נגלה מהארץ] — as is explained in itself [בנפשו].

[New thesis:] [The revelation] of the earth, which must necessarily be created [מחודש] — that is, it is explained that it is created [מחודש] — will be explained with ease [בקלות]: that if we posit the celestial bodies [הגרמים השמיימים] to be existent … there would be a possibility, in this part, that what is revealed [שיגלה] is explained to be false [שהוא שקר]. Together with what [the celestial bodies] attain — namely this [end] — the celestial bodies [have] instruments [כלים] with which to bestow [להשפיע] in this respect … some thing of these existents in a time in which there is no [end / completion, תכלית], for their motion is such as to bestow from it [שיושפע ממנה] what has been explained earlier. And this is a thing [bound up] with the end [בתכלית]: these honored bodies [הגרמים הנכבדים] [moving] to no purpose [לבטלה] in a time in which there is no … so that the world in its entirety [העולם בכללו] would be created [מחודש].

[Counter-position considered:] The Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] has already [treated] a chapter [שער] of this in some manner, and this [bears on] the [order of] existences [המציאות]. He said that the cause [הסבה] in this is heat [חום]: by the way of heat, it overpowers the moist [שינגב הלחות], and it is explained …

[The argument, p. 351 lower:] It is fitting that there not be hidden [שלא יעלם] from us what already [pertains to] the chapter [שער], [namely] the other [point]: that the cause in this is from the side of the nature of the existence of the sun [טבע המציאות … השמש] in this place. For [if] this were the way … so that it would not be possible for it to complete [שישלם] from this its existence; and this is because the sun's heat [שחום השמש] also already overpowers in the northern quarter [בפאה הצפונית], or [more] markedly so, because of the departure [יציאה] of its center [מרכז]. Since [the matter is] so, it is necessarily required — if this were the cause — that it be revealed [נגלה] likewise; and it is necessarily required that the earth be [revealed] toward [both] the sides of north and south [צדרי הצפון והדרום].

But this is false, if [taken] from the side [of speculation], and false from the side of sense-perception [מצד החוש], for the [manifest part] is not found [more than] sixty… ten hours. Indeed it is false, as Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד, Averroes] says, that were the matter so…

[from] the rest of the elements [היסודות]; and it would be fitting, when the [one] foundation overpowers [כשיגבר היסוד], that its corruption [follow]. As is the rule [כמשפט] for every contrary, that it corrupts [שמפסיד] the [thing opposed to it] … Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] [advanced] this cause, which the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] mentioned. They [reasoned] in this from the northern quarter [הפאה הצפונית], where the [land] is … the heat of the sun together with the heat that comes from the mixture [ההמזגה] of the rest [of the elements] in the northern [region]; for it is explained that in the northern quarter [more land] would be found from them than in the southern quarter [בפאה הדרומית]. This is what the sages of [astronomical] computation [חכמי התכונה] explained, and so it is to be said that in this quarter the sun [is present] there for more [time].

We may say that it already is necessarily required, also — as Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] himself says — that the manifest quarter [הפאה הנגלת] be [revealed for] twenty…-four hours, and this is a thing that is not found to be so [בלתי נמצא כן].

[New thesis:] A further doubt arises concerning the cause that… [Ibn Rushd / the Philosopher set down]. It would not suffice [for the explanation] that drawn from heat [מהחום] — that what is bestowed from it [שיושפע] would be by necessity, together with this, that there would be bestowed from it a nature peculiar [טבע מיוחד] … higher than the rest of the parts of the earth. And here [the manifest part] is ascribed to the heat [אל החום]; but rather it is ascribed to the cold [אל הקור], and this [is so] by nature [בטבעיות]. And if one says that here there are stars that bestow from them by means of their radiations [נצוציהם / "rays," זהרם], then [we reply that] it was already required that this manifest part be for twenty-four hours.

And here it is explained to us, regarding that in which there is no doubt … not from the nature of the earthy and watery foundation [טבע היסוד הארצי והמימי], [nor] from the stars by means of their radiations [נצוציהם], that this is created [מחודש] by necessity [בהכרח]. Rather, when the matter is posited [as we have set it down], it is already required that these [things] be in actuality [or: be absolutely so, במוחלט]; and given that the matter is so, here it is not…

[The argument, p. 352 lower, leading on:] …whatever has been given here, and it is explained that not … when the revelation of the earth [הגלות הארץ] was

effected, and this [follows from] what is already always conjoined [מתמיד מדובק] specifically [מיוחד] — this manifest part of the earth. And behold, the being of the earthy foundation [הוית היסוד הארצי] is not ascribed [אינו מיוחס] to the cold [הקור], and this is a thing very evident to one who has looked … here other stars [would] act [from] the side of coldness [הקרירות] … With this, the prior doubt [הספק הקודם] [still] remains as it is [בעינו], [as to] whether this manifest part of the earth is revealed in a length [באורך]…

[New thesis, p. 352 lower:] [A further] doubt: that it is impossible that the revelation of the earth [הגלות הארץ] should be completed [שישלם] [by] the earthy and watery [foundation], nor by reason of what is bestowed upon them [מה שיושפע להם]. And this is explained — that the revelation of the earth is [for the sake of an end] — [when] one posits the matter so, a great doubt [ספק עצום] arises from this: were these things, which are here renewed [מחודשים], [renewed] … without it being investigated how the generated species [המינים הנולדים] would come to be …

The species are renewed [מחודשים] in [an absolute] way in this manner, so that it would be necessarily required [that they have a determining cause]. And this is explained as the void [הבטול] to one who has looked … in what preceded: that it is not fitting that the being [ההוייה] be… For the partial being [ההוייה החלקית] would necessarily require that the whole be [so], and the [being] of this would not be required as the universal being [ההוייה הכוללת].

[And further,] regarding [the celestial bodies — that] this universal being [ההוייה הכללית] is ascribed [מיוחסת] to nature [הטבע] — and this would [be the case] were it possible that [the being] should be in the [celestial] bodies [שיהיו בגרמים] … their being all of them of one [single] nature [מטבע אחד]. And if [this] were [so]… that here there is no thing such that the [celestial] bodies could be exchanged [שיתחלפו] in their being [גרמיהם]…

in their nature — all the more so since it is possible for things like these treated here, where the changing relations could change their causes in nature, that they were composed of mixture and blending [מהערוב והתמזגות]. And here it is further clarified beyond doubt. This too is explained from the consideration that the coming-to-be whose beginning is will and choice [הרצון והבחירה] is prior to the coming-to-be whose beginning is nature. For in these things the Creator placed, at the time of their coming-to-be, the beginning by which there would be in them their like in species, so that their existence might be preserved so far as possible — since it would have been impossible for them to remain as individuals, He

prepared for them in this way the preservation of the species. Praised be the One who fashioned the whole, whose accomplishment and wisdom none can attain.

פרק ארבעה עשר [Chapter Fourteen]

[Subheading, smaller type:] An inquiry into whether it is necessary that this world have come to be, in view of what the precise reasoner [יחני המדקדק] argues on this point, by reason of the absurdity of an infinite force existing in a finite body [כח בלתי בעל תכלית בגשם בעל תכלית].

In keeping with what we have already mentioned — namely, that the precise reasoner thought to clarify the words of the Philosopher to the effect that the world is created — it is fitting that we now examine whether what this precise reasoner argued on the matter is correct or not.

Let us say that the Philosopher already explained that, in his view, there cannot be found an infinite force in a finite body. And since the matter is so, and the heavens are a finite body, then, according to what is explained, it is impossible that there be in them an infinite force. For this reason the precise reasoner held it necessary that the celestial body perish and that its motion cease. Now the sage Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד / Averroes] thought to reject this doubt by saying that the force in the celestial body is not "in it" in the sense of being [contained] within it [as a quantity], and that therefore it is not bound to perish; rather, it is necessary, from the side of its own essence, that its motion be everlasting and eternal — by reason of the mover that moves it, which is something not in a body and is itself infinite [שאינו בגשם שהוא לבלתי תכלית]. This is possible, in Ibn Rushd's account, with respect to motion, for the moved thing, with respect to the mover, is that in which the possibility of motion exists; and so it would be possible that the very [substance] of the moved thing be everlasting

with respect to the mover, even though it [the moved body] is itself, with respect to its own essence, a thing of no permanence — and this matter has no end. This is explained from the consideration that the duration whose mover is the time that elapses [supplies it] with an infinite motion. If we do not grant that the mover supplies its motion to the moved thing in this way, by one body after another body actually touching it, then this is explained as null [מבואר הבטול]. And it is likewise explained that, just as the matter is so, the heavenly bodies' motion has always been from the side of their own [essence], and is necessary from their side, and that therefore their motion is necessarily perpetual and without end. And this consideration is that the motion belongs to the heavenly bodies from the side of their own essence — for that motion would be the end for

which there is to them, with respect to their own essence, the possibility of being moved by it. And so all the motion by which they would be moved would be of necessity and not of compulsion [ההכרח והאונס], since they have, with respect to their own essence, the possibility of being moved by it; and this is the conclusion to be rejected as utterly absurd [בתכלית הבטול], for there is not to be found among natural things anything of this description — all the more so something that could exist perpetually.

Furthermore, this motion belongs to the heavenly bodies with respect to depiction and apprehension [הציור וההשגה], as was said before, and this is explained — that their movers do not move them by way of necessity and compulsion, but by way of choice and desire [הבחירה והתשוקה]. And since the matter is so, their motion does not set their mover [as] always [identical], but rather their motion is always [bound up with] their desire and their choice, according to that depiction which is that [object of depiction]. And when we grant the possibilities that belong to them in the motion that has an end, then it is necessary from this that their motion perish.

This, which we have seen, appears in a manner that includes all the proofs that arise from the forms of the movers from their side — but [it is] from the side of the moved thing. The analogy is that the soul, which is the mover in man, is always engaged with one matter, and it happens to it, from the side of the weakening of its instrument, that its action is impaired; yet this does not happen to it from the side of its own [finitude], for the matter would already be in this manner that there would be the impairment, and the cessation [of action] would cease with this impairment. And since the matter is so, it is explained that the cessation of the motion is on account of the moved thing, not on account of the mover; and so we have not let anything go out of this that the doubt would yield, when we posited the mover as an infinite force not in a body [בלתי כח בגשם].

Now it will be explained to you that, in the Philosopher's view, it is already possible that, in the heavenly bodies, there should already be reached, from what their motion has changed, a number that we apprehend — that with the rotation of the uppermost sphere there would be in it many stars

adhering to the moved thing. And behold, we have explained, in keeping with what was said before, that what was here [stated] is [an instance of] the cessation of the [individual] essences; but indeed we have mentioned this here in order to clarify that the Philosopher did not keep far from holding it impossible that there be in the heavenly bodies a number [apprehended] by this circular motion by which they are moved. And it is already possible that the necessity of this be

explained from the side of his own statement — namely, that just as we were given that, if there were in the sphere of the sun, by way of example, two stars, the uppermost sphere would apprehend a number in moving it: for it cannot be that this number [come about] in a manner in which it would be able [to come about] by its motion in a certain time, or that it come about in a manner in which it would not be able to come about at all by its motion. And if we say that it would be able [to come about] by its motion in a certain time, and that afterward, by reason of the number, its motion ceases from that side, then this is explained from what was said in the book *On Hearing* [ספר השמע / the *Physics*] — that this sphere could move the sphere of the sun, since there was in it but a single star, [over] a longer time than [it can] from the relation of the moved thing to the mover; and from this it would be necessary that the motion by which the uppermost sphere moves the rest of the spheres beneath it would cease.

And if we say that the [number] would come about in a manner in which it would not be able [to be apprehended] by its motion at all, this is explained — that it is already necessary from this that the uppermost sphere not be able to move the sphere of the sun, when we posit that there would be in it but a single star, except in a time shorter than the time in which it was possible for it to move it according to the first supposition. The analogy is that one who is able to carry four loaves in half an hour is able [to carry] more than two loaves than one who is not able to carry four loaves at all; and behold, the relation of time to time [reflects] the relation of force to force. And if we acknowledge that the number, which is for the moved thing, does not cause the motion to cease, [it follows] from what we hear: that its being placed [as] perpetual is on account of the force it has, which has no end. And this is what we sought concerning the uppermost sphere's apprehending a number — that there is no cessation of its motion; and just as its motion does not cease, this is explained — that there is no cessation of its motion.

And here it will be explained to you that there is no doubt that the words of the Philosopher already require, in this place, that the motion of the heavenly bodies has ceased, as the precise reasoner [יחני המדקדק] said. But, just as we have considered this according to the matter in itself, there is not found anything that would be a proof of the world's having come to be. This is what we have already mentioned, that those things which are not bound to be [imply that] there is not found, in a finite body, a force that has no end [for] moving with no end — for had there been a mover from it [whose] nature corresponds to this motion, then whatever continually maintained the relation that holds between mover and moved thing would remain. And this is explained — that there has already been reasoned that the motion of the spheres does not cease, namely, the motion by

which they are moved; for the relation that holds between mover and moved thing, and [between] mover and moved thing, is always one and the same in them, since they have no nature corresponding to this motion, for they have no admixture [מזג], and they have no opposite. And this is what we intended to clarify in this chapter.

פרק חמשה עשר [Chapter Fifteen]

[Subheading, smaller type:] Remember it. We shall add proof, disclosure, and completeness to what we have explained concerning the world's coming-to-be [חדוש העולם].

And what will add disclosure and completeness to what has been explained concerning the matter of the world's coming-to-be is this: that we find that all that has been composed in the sciences is something newly come, [arrived] recently. For we find that the ancients said in [each] science some matter, and afterward it was perfected over the length of time, until in one science the perfection in it was not found [until] reaching the Philosopher; and in another science the perfection in it was not found [until] reaching Galen [גלינוס]; and in another science the perfection in it has not been found [in] any one of the ancients — namely, the science of the stars [astronomy], because that science required a longer time for its perfecting, by reason of what is required for it: that there stand upon it [the apprehension] from the senses, [so that] the perfection in it is found later. This is so because the mathematical sciences, like geometry and arithmetic, are found prior to the rest of the sciences, for the predecessors of Aristotle [ארסטוטלוס] already said in them a perfect statement, according to what appears from what is reported of them; whereas the natural science required [the apprehension] of the senses more, [and so] the perfection in it came later.

And behold, the craft of medicine [מלאכת הרפואה] is the one that requires the senses more — and especially in some of what is known by experience, how much is known by experiment, and how much is known by practice in it; and for this reason the perfection in it came later. But the science of the stars [astronomy] required the senses in a manner that could not be perfected for it except in a very long time; and for this reason its perfection came later.

And according to these sciences, which follow upon the degree of a man's perfection — and it [astronomy] is what they are engaged with by nature — these sciences are newly innovated for them recently in time. For had the matter been so [that they were eternal], it would have been possible here that they not go forth into actuality except in an infinite time — together with the existence there

of many natural instruments [bringing them] from potentiality to a very strong actuality; and this is explained as null. And this will already appear also from the matter of the divine Torah [התורה האלהית], which is found spreading today among the whole of the nations, [showing] that it is newly innovated recently in time. For had the world been ancient [pre-eternal], it would have been fitting that this had come about earlier;

[The text runs on past the foot of the page:] but rather one might say that it was fitting that it be earlier — [in] the time before which there was for us [no prior time], the time to which there is no end. And it is already found likewise comparable to what is found [in] the sciences, namely, that the things current in it that were prior to it were very deficient, until there reached this place the divine matters complete in the most perfect way possible — as has been explained to one who understands our meaning. And behold, we have begun to clarify this in what cannot be doubted. And so it likewise appears from the matter of the languages: that the matters in them are conventional [הסכמיים], not natural; this is so because, had they been natural — as in the way the horse and the donkey [whinny and bray] — one of two things would be required: either that the human species be divided into kinds…

Sefer Milchamot HaShem — Book VI (מאמר ו'), Part One (חלק א')

because of the change of languages, or because the languages differed by reason of the difference of climes. But [consider] that the human species be divided into kinds according to the difference of languages — this too is plainly false. For it would then follow that one speaking the language of one of these kinds could not converse with another, since the language of that other kind would be foreign to him; for he would have by nature some other quality that is found uniquely in his own kind. And this is false, in light of what has been clarified from the senses; for we see that two people [each] speaking a [different] language can come to an understanding with one another, and can settle down to speak the language of that other and abandon their native tongue.

Now [consider] that the languages differed according to the climes — this too is false, for it would then follow that anyone who spoke that language [native] by nature to a given clime would be ascribed to that clime, [namely] all who come to bear that name from among the people [of it]. Moreover, consider the people of [different] climes: it would be required that the swiftness, the [bodily] motion,

and the manner of pronouncing a language varied according to the difference of the nature of the clime — yet there is no trace of these effects in the letters [or sounds] indicated by them. And since the matter is so, it has been clarified that the languages are not natural; and therefore it is necessary that they be conventional [הסכמיים].

And it has [already] been clarified that those who first agreed [upon them] must have preceded the [coming-to-be of the] language in time. And if they had some other language prior [to it], it would follow regarding it too what required us [to posit] that those who first agreed [must have preceded] — namely, that those who agreed must have preceded that conventional language in time. Nor can one say that this would proceed [back] for them, language before language, without end. And this is so because it has already been clarified concerning the matter of the conventional language that it is not possible that a nation as a whole agree together to change its language [all at once]; for it is not possible that there be there any cause that would bring them to this — and it is exceedingly unseemly to say that a nation [as a whole] agreed together upon a thing to no purpose. All the more, then, that this should occur to a nation repeatedly: there is no end [conceivable] to them [if] language after language [is posited].

Furthermore, [consider] that languages have never changed [back and forth] in this long stretch of time whose history has been transmitted to us — meaning, that men have risen up and abolished their language and innovated for themselves another language. All the more so, since there is no reason it should be fitting for a nation to undertake such a falsehood that would do it harm in actuality. And this is so on account of: men of wisdom whose duty it is to perfect [the disciplines]; and a generation [of scholars] who have composed treatises and books in the sciences and the laws [נמוסים], to complete what was lacking for the masters of creation [i.e., human beings] and to set them straight toward success — there is no doubt that they would not, taken all together, agree to abolish the language and to prevent the benefit [residing] in those books that come after them. So, then, it has been clarified that it is not fitting that there be a language prior to these [present] languages, and that they are innovated of necessity, just as those preceding them [were].

But the human species is, as has been clarified, in need of language in order to establish its individuals — and [also] for the sake of its possible duration in time; for since man is political [מדיני] by nature, his own self-establishment is not completed except through many crafts. Therefore it is necessary that the people of the polity [מדינה] have a language, by which they ask one another for whatever

they need to preserve their bodies and to bring them to human perfection as far as possible.

And since the matter is so, it has been clarified that the far-distant time in which the human species has no end [going forward] is the very [same] time that has no end apart from language [going backward]; and therefore it is necessary that language too precede that time in which the [human] species has no end. And [the time] in which language has a beginning [שיש לו הבלית — "that has an end/limit"] is innovated of necessity. Behold, then, if the matter is so, the human species is absolutely innovated.

And see how the Philosopher [Aristotle] perceived something of this. He said, in [his discussion of] those signs of the heavens [i.e., catastrophes], that it is possible the dry land became sea and the sea dry land; and through this the languages, the writing-systems, and the [written] works are altered, and it could be that books once existed yet no one is now found who knows how to read them. And for this very cause, too, it appears to the Philosopher that the sciences have been [repeatedly] innovated, after this [or that] catastrophe befell mankind, [coming around] time after time without their having any end — just as is left over [unexplained] in the clarification of what comes after the nature [i.e., metaphysics], and apart from that place [it appears] in the natural science [physics]. Yet with all this, none of it avails him against what we have brought forward — that this is a proof for the innovation of the world. For [his view] is that [the human race] is destroyed in this manner, a nation together [with its sciences], and it perishes utterly; and also, if it is thus destroyed utterly, no [other] language will be innovated in its place.

But if it is not destroyed utterly, then those who remain [necessarily] spoke their language of necessity — or, if [survivors of] one [group] are revealed among people of another language, behold, those who come after them [merely] speak that [existing] language, and no [new] language is innovated thereby. And it has further been clarified that, according to this assumption — that languages are conventional always — it follows from this necessarily that there cannot remain [a state in which], if [only] one language [existed], the long time would have no end [going back]; and this is false. And so too, then, it follows that the remaining languages [must] have been innovated, and that those who agreed [upon them] preceded them in time; and it follows from this that the human species is absolutely innovated. For it has already been completed, [namely] what the Philosopher said [is] the cause of the perishing of languages, and this is clarified of itself.

And likewise it appears, too, regarding the matter of the sciences. That is to say, our having informed [the reader] that the languages have already perished — behold, it follows regarding the remaining languages that the sciences [too] perished, even though [the time] in which they exist has no end; for, with the languages perishing and their being lost, the sciences which exist [in them] perish in the perishing [of the languages]. And it further follows from the perishing of these the perishing of the sciences which exist [in them]. And this — which we see in the perfect sciences, which are spread among all the nations, as in the matter of the science of Aristotle, and in the science of Galen, and the rest of the sciences in which men have been [reckoned] perfect — as in this matter of the science of Ptolemy concerning the science of the spheres [astronomy], and as the matter is found in our complete [traditions] — [shows] that it cannot be that these [sciences] perished utterly, if the human species did not perish utterly. And indeed it was so, because man's desire by nature is to attain wisdom — for this is his perfection and his success — and they would exert themselves to transmit these sciences to their tongues [i.e., languages], until they spread thereby into all the languages.

And since the matter is so, it has been clarified that there has already been [established] from these matters which we have mentioned in this chapter a strong proof that the world is innovated; and this is the unique property [מסגולת] of truth, that it agrees with itself from every side.

פרק ששה עשר — Chapter Sixteen

[Subheading, smaller type:] It will be clarified in it whether it is possible for the world to be corrupted [יתבאר בו שאי אפשר בעולם שיפסד — "It will be clarified in it that it is not possible for the world to be corrupted"].

Now that all these foregoing matters have been clarified — [namely] that the world is [necessarily] innovated [as it is in] this present world — behold, it is fitting that we investigate whether corruption [ההפסד] is possible for it or not; and, this [done], we investigate first what are the causes of corruption.

We say that the natural corruption that befalls a thing [comes] by reason of the nature of matter, not by reason of the form; for the form is that which strives to preserve the existence of the thing possessing the form, as far as possible — as has been clarified in [the science of] nature [the *Physics*]. And this corruption comes about when the acting powers [הכחות המתפעלות — the passive/affected powers] overcome the active powers; and this, indeed, can be found in a thing that has by itself a contrary, or [in a thing] composed of contraries — for [only]

when there is a path of contrariety [present] is the thing corrupted by its contrary. And since it has been demonstrated [in this work] that there is to the heavenly body no contrary, and it is not composed of contraries, it is clarified that it cannot be corrupted, since there is in the matter no [source of] corruption, nor is there a path of the form being corrupted; but rather it [the form] is the good and the perfection [of the thing], to give to the thing [its form-bestowing perfection] as far as possible. And since the heavenly body cannot be corrupted, it is clarified that it cannot be corrupted in the world [either], for the heavenly bodies emanate here [below] [the powers] by which there is completed in these [things] the coming-to-be [of] what they preserve in existence; and therefore the lower existence too cannot be corrupted.

Now [an objector] might find sufficient ground to say that what is named "the demonstration" [המופת] will be clarified [to mean] that the world is not corruptible by nature — for there is in it no cause of corruption, and that which has in it no cause of corruption, its corruption is impossible. But [we reply that] that whose coming-to-be results [proceeds] by intention and will [בכוונה ורצון] [can also] be corrupted by intention and will, as [is the case with] what comes to be by intention and will: this is what is corrupted by will, even if its nature is not such that it is corrupted at that time. This is like the craftsman who corrupts [destroys] the box [התיבה] when he so wills, and makes from it a chair [כסא].

And we say that the difference between the volitional coming-to-be [ההוייה הרצונית] — which does not [come about] according to nature — requires this of him who finds it [so] in the matter of the stars and the rest of what is in the heavens: that their coming-to-be is impossible except by will. But corruption [in general] does not compel us to lay it down that it [necessarily] be so, unless nature [itself] requires it of him. Furthermore, [we note] that coming-to-be is that whose way it is to be ascribed [related] to actuality; and the matter is not so with corruption, as has been clarified in what preceded.

And further: when we examine the corruption that would be in this manner [i.e., the volitional kind], we find it [to be] of [one of two purposes]: either directed toward the good and perfection, or directed toward corruption and ruin — like this [kind of] falsehood [present] in [the case of] some men, in whom the [good] intention has been corrupted, those who corrupt things by their wisdom in order to take revenge through them on their enemies, or those who rejoice in [working] ruin because of the wickedness of their intention. But that which is directed toward the good and perfection comes about in one of two ways: either he

corrupts the thing in order to make for it a more complete form, or he corrupts it in order to make from it what he needs…

that is more [excellent]. The analogy: the craftsman who has already shaped the cup, when the [first] shaped form was unsuitable for him, makes [reshapes] it into some other, more perfect, form; and it could likewise be that he reshapes it into a vessel more precious than [the first], or [conversely] makes from it a lesser vessel than [the first], because the [intended] usefulness of that vessel is at this [later] time [different]. And since this is so, it has been clarified concerning the matter of corruption that comes about by intention and will, that it [the will to corrupt] would be [directed] toward one of these causes which we mentioned earlier. Behold, then — when it will be clarified that none of these possible causes [applies] to the Name, may He be blessed — it will [thereby] be clarified that it is impossible for the world to be corrupted by [His] intention and will.

And this [follows] from what will be clarified shortly: that there is nothing fitting [for it to be] ascribed to the Name, may He be blessed, [namely] the unseemly act which men of corrupt nature perform when they corrupt [things, directed] toward ruin and corruption; but rather He is found to be the Agent of the good and the perfection, in the most complete way possible. And it is not possible that He grow weary [שיכעס — "be angered"], for there is in Him no cause for this anger. And so too it cannot be that He do this [corruption] in order to take revenge on an enemy — and this is something there is no need to clarify at length in this book.

And so too we say that it is impossible to say that the Name, may He be blessed, would corrupt this world in order to make from it another, more complete world. For if the matter were so, behold, then — [consider] the cause that prevented Him from giving it this [more perfect] form in the [original] bringing-it-into-being-of-it: is there some preventer that prevents Him [from doing so], or [is it] that the [new] notion [only later] became known to Him? Now [the supposition] that there occurred to the Name, may He be blessed, some preventer is impossible, and that it is impossible that there [newly] occur to Him knowledge — for if this were possible, He would be changeable in His own essence; and this is false. And it is also impossible that there be there a preventer that prevents Him, for [the giving of the more perfect form] is within the [scope of] the end of [His] power and the capacity to attain the good and perfection found [in things], as far as possible — and this is clarified for whoever has examined natural things, [namely] in the manner of the end of [their] power and the capacity, by their being-brought-into-

existence, to attain for them of the good and the perfection in the end, as far as possible.

And in sum: behold, if there were there a preventer, this would be either by reason of the matter, or by reason of an external thing. And it is impossible that the difference [come] by reason of the matter, for we find Him ruling over it [the matter] and bringing it to whatever He wills, until He already perfects in it what is possible for it to be of coming-to-be. And it is also impossible that this difference [come] by reason of an external thing; for if the matter were so, behold, then, it could not be [otherwise] than that, when there is a preventer of that dominion [שלטנות] and rule [over Him] on the part of the Name, may He be blessed, [this would] make the world [come to be] in a way that there would not be in it of the perfection [what is] possible — for there is to the Name, may He be blessed, no [external] body that could prevent Him from doing with it [the world] what He wills, in the way that it is possible for one man to prevent another, [say] by binding his hands; and [thus] he would prevent his actions. And if there were dominion and rule [exercised] by one [external being] over Him, behold, it would be impossible that He be [either] a body — or not a body. [If He were] not a body, [it would follow] that the deficient existent rules over the perfect existent! And there is here, then, no possible way for [Him to be] either a body or for a corporeal being to prevent the act of the Separate [Intellect]. And were this required [granted], behold — if this were possible — that preventer would [itself] be a separate intellect [שכל נבדל]. But it cannot be conceived that this act [proceed] from it, on the side of compulsion and necessity…

but [is moved] rather on the side of desire [על צד התשוקה]. For even if we were to say that this intellectual longing, present in the soul of that [separate] intellect, were withheld from it by something within its own nature, this is a thing already shown to be false. For the longing that the heavenly body has toward God is a longing toward that which is more perfect [נכבד] than itself — and God is too exalted to be denied [anything] in His acts. Moreover, it has already been established that this must be the case for these heavenly substances [אלו הנמוסים], since each one of them is an object of thought [מושכל] to God, and God is in actuality [בפעל] far more so; for they are not numerically one, since the things that are united in their cause are not [thereby] one in number — as has been very fully explained.

Furthermore, even if the matter were as the opponent supposes, no thing would here destroy that which impedes it [the world's perishing]; rather, [the cause] would remain forever. For there is here no thing that could destroy the

impediment, and it has also been shown that it is impossible to suppose that God should be compelled to do anything other than what He is doing — for that would be to impose upon Him something more than He requires of Himself. But to complete the act that proceeds from Him, namely [recte: that] God should make this world perish, He would [have to] make it more perfect [shall it perish so that He may make a better one] — and this is a matter already explained [as impossible]: that God should destroy this world in order to make from it another world like this very world. The thing would then be as we said before, and this is shown to be false [מבואר הבטול].

Now [as for] the world that is [eternal] like this world — this point has [already] been clarified, and [the same holds] also for [a world] besides these [hypothetical ones] in this very world. Among the things that necessarily follow from this is the following: in general, if there were motion there [in such a world], then [the same conclusions follow]. And if [the order] were straight [ישרה], it would necessarily have an "up" and a "down," and that which is moved in a circuit — for the renewing-thing [המחדש] is what produces the "up"; it would already be necessary that the elements [היסודות] and the composite be found there. And if there were motion there, [then] motion is among its [the world's] surroundings, which [order] is necessitated by these. And when this is so, it is shown that [it arises] from the side of nature and not from the side of intention and will [מצד הכונה והרצון].

פרק שבעה עשר — Chapter Seventeen

[Subheading, Rashi script:] In which it is explained how the coming-to-be of the world took place [איך היתה הויית העולם].

Now that it has been shown that the world must necessarily be in being [הווה], and that it cannot perish [שהוא בלתי נפסד], and that its coming-to-be did not [arise] from some other world existing prior to it — it is proper that we inquire how its coming-to-be can be conceived. This is the [matter we shall investigate]: this [mode of] coming-to-be [זאת ההויה].

Let us say that there is no obstacle, in [the inquiry into] this [mode of] coming-to-be — and this coming-to-be is itself a disputed matter, [namely] whether [it came to be] from a substrate [יש מיש] or from nothing [יש מאין] — that prevents [our investigating it]. Now if we posit that [it came to be] from a substrate [יש מיש], then this [substrate], from which the world came to be, [must have had] some form [צורה מה]; for it is impossible that the [primordial matter] should be found

only as [bare] matter [רק מצורה — i.e., only matter, devoid of form], with it being a necessity that it have some motions. And the possibility of [there being] such existents in this world [requires this], since [otherwise], if the matter were [as the opponent claims], it would be impossible to suppose for it [a state] like the motions — and this is a thing already shown, for it is impossible to suppose for it motions without end [בלתי בעלות]. To say that the world came to be from privation [מהעדר] [would mean] that the world came to be in privation.

And [seeing] that the matter has been thus supposed, [these things] necessarily follow from it: because there were motions there, [and] each of them would necessarily be found [to require its source]; and whichever of them is found, it would be necessary that those existents be found there which were prior to this world — namely, the elements [היסודות] [and the heavenly body]. When this is so, then it would be necessary that the world be [eternal], as has been shown to be false [מבואר הבטול], as already stated. Or else we should say that it is impossible for the order [הסדר] and the rightness [היושר] to be made complete in it, except when the elements were equalized [כשיונחו היסודות] — the existing elements and the heavenly body — [the rightness] being completed in it by way of [their] separation and rightness, in such a way that there were no stars there preserving the elements in their motions in a mode [partaking] of swiftness and slowness [המהירות והאיחור] and the [lowliness]; or else [we should say] that this came about through the bringing-together [להתקבץ] of these causes.

Nor is there there [in such a world] motion in a mode that would compel God [to act] — [for] if there were found in the heavenly body that which is completed in the elements that are found [there], it would be necessary that they [the elements] be found [as] a mixture of the elements and the [admixture] [מערוב היסודות והמזגם]. And this is the opposite of what [the opponent supposes] the matter to be, as it is [in fact], that there should not be in the heavenly body the rightness [היושר] [found] in these lower existents. Rather, [the claim] that these elements perished, and that there will not be there [a beginning], over the long time that has no end [שאין לו תכלית] — this [too leads to absurdity]. For [it must hold]…

that which preserves the equality, the order, and the rightness in them, [namely] the elements that remain, and [the claim that the heavenly body] destroys them in the manner that governs all of it [as in the foregoing], and that this and that were not found at all [as] existents [in the way] I have [argued]. But [it would be] that one of them alone is found, and [then] this would be the lightest element [היסוד הקל], as it is proper that it must be — as has been shown — that [recte: it

should be that] the light element should be in the place of the lowest [time / lowest place]. Yet it is among the falsehoods that the simple [bodies] would be found [each in turn], because in [whatever] way their existence is [posited], they must be very few; [it is among the falsehoods] that the elements should be found in vain [לבטלה], the existing elements being found because of that which is composite from them. And further, [there would be] motion in the world of the elements, for there was not there [anything]; there would there have been [nothing] except for the existence of the light element and the heavy [element], which was set forth in the Fifth Book of this work [מאמר החמישי מזה הספר]. And this is [the very thing] for which one would have to suppose that one of [the elements] should overpower another, according to the principle that destroys [recte: that destroys] the whole into its opposite — [for] when one of them overpowers, it will overpower [it] entirely within a part of the parts of that endless time [הזמן הבלתי] alone. And [the overpowerer] is the overpowering [element]; and if the overpowerer is [thus], then [recte: this would follow] from the side of the motion that always produces it, [and] the lowest [element], whose time has no end, [and] this is very ugly [מגונה מאד] — that lost substances [עבודות] should be found in vain over a time that has no end, [the lower element being found] little and over little of the time. But we have said [that the elements are not found] in vain, for it has been shown that the elements are [necessary]; and it has further been shown that there could not be there [more than one element] — that there should be there only one element [יסוד אחד], and that motion does not [exist apart from] the light and the heavy [element], as has been shown from our words in the [foregoing] of this work. And this is the opposite of what Plato [אפלטון] supposes…

that the heavenly body moved [and thereby] the world came to be [as] moving things [מתנועעים]. And further, [it has already been shown] that the motion of that heavenly body [exists] in vain [לבטלה], after [it has been shown] that there is no corruption of the elements except for [the corruption] of part of the elements [לקצת היסודות] — [for] this is the greatest of falsehoods, [namely] my view that [the heavenly body] should have an end in quantity [בעלת תכלית בכמות], [yet] for no benefit [לא לשום תועלת] of [this kind]. For that circular motion would necessarily be one [for] which this motion belongs [exclusively] to it, and there is no [other], [and it] emanates that which it emanates to the existent below it [בנמצא השפל]. For this very motion necessitated the heavenly body, and it has been explained, [following] what was set forth, that since that motion would [thus] always be conceivable, [it would be] false to say that there should be here a separate mover [מניע נבדל] that moves [the world] toward this end [התכלית]. And if we [posit] that there were motions in which these existents were perfected…

and so [the position] is shown to be confused [מבולבלה]. We have [already] said that this, too, is explained in the *Physics* [בספר השמע — the *Akroasis / Physica*], [namely] that it is impossible that the matter should be [eternal as the opponent claims, having] an impediment [מניע].

And when it has been shown to be false that [it came to be] in such a manner, then it would seem that [no alternative] remains except that [the world] came to be [either] from a substrate [יש] or from nothing [אין] — as we mentioned regarding what was set forth above. But it has not been shown of [the world] that it could come to be and come-to-be-anew [המתחדש] in that manner: [for] on this manner [of coming-to-be], they are forms [צורות] not like that which [exists] in itself [as bare matter], and this is the [function] of the forms [תהן הצורות]. But how does He give the corporeal forms [הגשמות] — who gives, and [how shall] I know? And in general, if [the world] were in being [either] by nature [בטבע] or by intention and will [בכונה ורצון], [the question stands]; but corporeity itself was not made-anew in [the forms] at all, [nor] anything [that the philosophers] speak of [discursively] [דבר מדבר]. And likewise this is found in [the discussion of] that which is made-anew [שיתחדש] in natural science [בחכמה הטבעית], that it is explained concerning [the soul] in itself.

Now form [הצורה], too, has no [substrate of] coming-to-be in itself [בעצמותה], and the form discourses to it [as to] the possibilities of what it can receive [from form]; this [is the thing] not explained — that this likeness [הדמוי] should be there. And further, when the matter has been thus supposed, then [these things] necessarily follow, namely [from] that which has been explained in natural science: that on this supposition there would be there an emptiness [רקות — a void], as is explained [in the account of] the coming-to-be of the world from the distant [things] in which there is found among them either body [גשם], or there would be in them the necessary, or the impossible [מחויב, או נמנע]. And [as for] the [doctrine] that it would be — if so, that the world is found prior to [its] coming-to-be — [if it came from] the impossible, it would be impossible that it should issue forth into actuality at [a given] time [שיצא לפעל בעת]. There would then be that place [as] a void [רקות], for the definition [גדר]…

[recte note: the antecedent across these lines is the contrast between coming-to-be מיש ("from a substrate") and מאין ("from nothing"), the void/emptiness רקות, and the necessary/possible/impossible modal triad. Several line-end words sit at the extreme left margin and were reconstructed from the grammar and the recurring argument; committed where the sense is secure, flagged where a single word is genuinely uncertain.]

The remaining lines on p. 364 (foot) continue: …of emptiness [the void] is that it is an empty place [מקום פנוי] [devoid] of body [גשם], and it is possible that there be in it body. The void [precedes / would precede] the coming-to-be of the world. And further, because [the philosophers] posit for it possibilities — that there be body in it [more than the body] which is outside the world — [if so] it would be possible that there be in them the corporeal [הגשם], for there is no [difference] between the parts of that void [חלקי הפנוי] [whether] from them, [or] from another; for the whole of it is privation [העדר] [more than] there would be found there a void that has no end [אין תכלית לו], nor [recte:] any [definite thing] — and this is the [argument from] falsehood [הבטול]. And further, [the opponent] has already asked [ישאל]: what is [the cause whereby] God [made] this world — [this is treated] here, in this part [בזה החלק].

— nor would it bring that thing into being at any other point of the void. It is evident, then, that the form does not bring about its effect in a particular place; rather, we find that its action takes effect in whatever place is prepared to receive what comes to be — its action does not attach itself to one specific place. And this is necessarily so, because the form is not in a place at all; its action takes effect in whatever places things capable of receiving it happen to exist. ✻

Given that this is so, and given that the void in its entirety would be capable of receiving the desire of the agent cause in just the same relation throughout — for the agent's desire would govern the whole void alike — it would necessarily follow that a body issue from that agent across the entire void. The result would be a body that is actually infinite [אין תכלית לו בפעל], and that is manifestly an absurdity [מבואר הבטול].

In general, a thing comes to be in a particular place only for one of three reasons: because the matter [החמר] from which it comes to be is in a particular place; because the agent that produces it is in a place; or by the combination of these two causes together. ✻ For example, vapor produces rain in a given place because the matter from which the rain forms is in that place; whereas the house comes to be in a given place because Reuven, the builder who produces it, is in that place. The house does not come to be from Reuven the builder in this place merely because the place is what it is, but rather because the thing from which the house comes to be is in this place; and the form that comes to be does not come to be in this place because of the place itself, but because the recipient [המקבל] of it is in this place. ✻

This is the distinction between a case where the agent that produces a thing is in a particular place and a case where the agent that produces it is not in a

particular place. An agent that is in a particular place cannot produce an effect at any one time except in a single place numerically; whereas an agent that is not in a place can produce an effect at one and the same time in many places, wherever there is something prepared to receive its desire.

Once this has been established, it is clear that when one posits the world as having come to be from nothing [יש מאין], there would be nothing here that necessitates its coming-to-be in a particular place — neither on the side of the agent nor on the side of that in which the world comes to be. Hence it would necessarily follow either that the world come to be throughout the whole of that infinite void in one and the same relation, or that there be there a body, in the place of the world alone, which is the very thing that necessitated this coming-to-be in a particular place. But if the matter stood thus, it would necessarily follow that there be a body there, for whatever is in a place is necessarily a body.

Further: prior to the world's coming-to-be, the world's existence must have been either necessary [מחויב], impossible [נמנע], or possible [אפשר]. But if it had been necessary, it would never have ceased to exist; and if it had been impossible, its existence could never have come about. Therefore its existence must have been possible. Now the possible [האפשרות] is among the things that require a substrate [נושא]. It follows, then, that there must have been a substrate there, in which there was a possibility of receiving the volitional coming-to-be [הוייה הרצונית] whose necessity has been demonstrated. And so it necessarily follows that this coming-to-be was from a substrate [יש מיש] — which is the opposite of what was posited.

Further: the first agent [הפועל הראשון] must have been an agent in potentiality with respect to this coming-to-be prior to the world's origination. And since correlatives [המצטרפים] exist together, it follows that, when the cause was a cause in potentiality, there must have been there a body in potentiality prior to the coming-to-be of the world. ✻ In general, the dictum that the world's existence is necessary — when the agent was a cause in potentiality, what is acted upon must correspondingly have been acted upon in potentiality; and that which is acted upon in potentiality is a body. If so, then there must necessarily have been a body there prior to the coming-to-be of the world. In sum, then, the claim that a body came to be when full [מלא] of some thing is manifestly absurd [מבואר הבטול], for it is impossible —

— for a body to come to be at all insofar as it is a body, all the more so that it come to be from a thing already full [מלא דבר] in the absolute sense. Rather, the

body comes to be not insofar as it is a body, but insofar as it is possessed of forms [בעל צורות] that come to be in it.

It is evident that we cannot escape these difficulties [הספקות], in view of what we set down earlier — namely, that there must necessarily be a distinction between universal coming-to-be [ההוייה הכללית] and particular coming-to-be [ההוייה החלקית]. For all these matters are necessary to that which comes to be insofar as it is something that comes to be — whether its origination be from will or from nature — and not to that which comes to be in part insofar as it comes to be in part. This is self-evident from the nature of these difficulties.

Now suppose someone were to object that we have already escaped these difficulties by means of the premise [הקדמה] that the Rav, the Guide [הרב המורה, Maimonides], mentioned: namely, that the nature of an existent at the time of its coming-to-be is other than its nature after it has come to be and reached completion, and therefore one cannot testify, from how it now exists, to how it was prior to its coming-to-be. ✻ Our reply to him is this: what truly follows by necessity from this premise is that what exists in this present existence by virtue of its being in the condition it is now in is not necessarily something that existed before it came to be in this condition. But whatever necessarily belongs to it by virtue of its existing in any given condition during its coming-to-be — that must necessarily belong to it at the time of its coming-to-be. And it is evident that for many of these matters the foregoing difficulty remains in force even with this premise. [The point is that] the difficulties followed quite apart from any regard to the condition in which this thing exists, and therefore they remain in force along with this premise.

We have already informed you that the Rav, the Guide, did not adopt this view in order to escape the difficulties — rather, [he adopted it] in order to escape the difficulties that would follow for one who posits the world as originated in the manner in which Plato [אפלטון] posited it, as is apparent from what the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] argued against him — not that this follows from the view of the Torah. For the Rav, the Guide, has already stated that if Plato's view were demonstrated by proof such that it ought to be believed, it would not conflict with the principles of the Torah; rather, it would be in agreement with them. And if the view of our Torah were that the world came to be from nothing [יש מאין], this statement would not hold true.

From this it becomes clear to you that the view of our Torah is that the world has come to be — but it does not follow from this that the coming-to-be was from nothing in the absolute sense. On the contrary, by my life, it appears from the

words of the Torah that all of creation, apart from the separate intellects [העולם השכלים], was from a substrate [יש מיש]. This is what is meant where it says of the creation of light, "Let there be light" [Bereishis 1:3]; while the firmament came to be from the waters, as it says, "Let there be a firmament ✻ in the midst of the waters" [Bereishis 1:6]. And of all the other things mentioned in the creation of the world it is evident that their creation was from a substrate: it says, "Let the earth put forth grass" [Bereishis 1:11], "Let the waters swarm" [Bereishis 1:20], "Let the earth bring forth" [Bereishis 1:24], "And the Lord God formed the man of dust from the ground" [Bereishis 2:7]. This will be explained fully, God willing, in what follows.

As for the Rav, the Guide, he said that this view [creation from nothing] is a foundation-stone of our Torah, because he reckoned that in this way we escape the difficulties that the Philosopher raised against anyone who maintains the world's coming-to-be; and that is why he set this premise first, and said that he had already built it as a wall around the Torah, fending off every assailant [כל משליך אבן אליה]. But it is evident that we are reckoned already to have escaped, by means of this premise, all those difficulties we mentioned, once we have inferred from it something that does not truly follow from it.

Furthermore, this premise, when taken in a universal sense, leaves us no avenue of inquiry [עיון] into the coming-to-be of the existent; and therefore the inquiry after its coming-to-be is closed off to us. But if that is so, then there will be no benefit to us in positing the world as originated, for the sake of upholding belief in the miracles [אמונת המופתים] — which is the very reason it was held necessary to believe that the world is originated, as the Rav, the Guide, mentioned. For the miracles occurred after the world had already come into existence; and if, after the world's coming-to-be, nothing is possible except what the nature of existence necessitates — as would seem to follow from this premise — then there will be no path to belief in the miracles.

We have already strayed from our purpose; but we were driven to this lest the reader of our words suspect us of disputing the Torah in disputing this view, and we have recorded the difficulties that befall it from the side of speculation. In general, then, as the Rav, the Guide, said: whatever view is demonstrated by proof to be necessary, it is fitting that we believe it — and even the view of the Philosopher, were it to be demonstrated by proof, it would be fitting that we believe it, and whatever comes in the Torah that appears to conflict with it would be interpreted in a manner that accords with the truth.

Let us now return to our purpose and say: since it has already been necessarily established, by many proofs, concerning this coming-to-be whose necessity has been demonstrated, that it must be either from a substrate [יש מיש] or from nothing [יש מאין]; and since it has already been shown that it cannot be in either of these two ways alone; it therefore remains that it be from nothing in one respect and from a substrate in another. This is the division that escaped the ancients [נעלמת מהקרמונים]. Its being from a substrate consists in its being from a body [מגשם]; its being from nothing consists in its being from a body devoid of every form [מגשם נעדר כל צורה].

It is evident that in this way all the difficulties we raised against these two views are removed. For the difficulty that befalls Plato [the Platonic view], according to what we mentioned, arose because he assigned to this body certain motions; whereas once we have posited it as devoid of form, all those difficulties are removed, since what is of this character can have no motion, for matter does not move itself. And the difficulty that befalls one who posits the coming-to-be of the world from nothing in the absolute sense arose only because he assigned no substrate to this coming-to-be; whereas once we have assigned a substrate to this coming-to-be, all the difficulties are removed.

As for how this coming-to-be is to be conceived: it is according to what I now say. This body, from which the world came to be — God, may He be blessed, made part of it preserve its configuration [שומר תמונתו], and that is the heavenly body [הגשם השמימיי]; and He created in it the stars and the spheres [הככבים והגלגלים], which He set in motion in such a way that there flows from them whatever is needed to perfect what is here below. And He left part of it not preserving its configuration — and that is what lies between the spheres of one star and the spheres of another star. And in part of it He placed a nature whereby it has the possibility of receiving all forms — and that is the lower matter [החמר השפל], by virtue of the elemental forms [הצורות היסודיות] that He created in it, and the power that He gave to the elements of the lower matter to receive all forms. It thus appears that this body was prior —

— to the creation of the world that does not preserve its configuration in certain respects. For the preservation of configuration ranks, in the gradation of form and perfection, [higher than] the absence of preservation of configuration. Thus you find among all ensouled beings [בעלי נפש] that they preserve their configuration; and the more firmly a thing among them cleaves to life, the more truly it preserves its configuration — as is the case with the stars and the spheres. And among them [bodies], we find that there is that which has no form among

bodies — that does not preserve its configuration — and that is the body that does not preserve its configuration, which has been shown to exist between the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים].

Now it was possible for God, may He be blessed, to give to one and the same matter differing forms, or differing dispositions [הכנות], owing to the fact that this coming-to-be is volitional [רצונית]; and in this way it was possible for the stars to differ in their natures with respect to what flows from them by means of their radiance [זהרם], even though their matter is one and the same, as stated above. Here it has been shown that the origin [התחלה] of all the matters is one in number, for a body devoid of every nature cannot have its parts differ one from another. ✻ And it was fitting that it be so: for just as the origin of all forms is a single form in number, so it is fitting that the origin of all matters be a single matter.

It is for this reason that some of the ancients held there to be two divinities here, because they supposed that the material origins [ההתחלות החמריות] are two — namely, the lower matter [החמר השפל] and the heavenly body [הגרם השמימיי].

It should not be supposed against us that, in saying of this body, from which the world came to be, that it does not preserve its configuration, we mean that it has some motion by which the disposition of its parts is thrown into confusion and their arrangement reshuffled, one part out of another in a different way — for that statement would contradict itself. Rather, what we mean is that it is devoid of the nature from which there would follow, for a body, the preservation of configuration.

פרק שמונה עשר [Chapter Eighteen]

In it we resolve many of the difficulties that arise concerning the coming-to-be of the world.

It is fitting that we now investigate the difficulties that follow from this coming-to-be whose necessity has been demonstrated — for through this our true knowledge of it will be made complete, I mean, such that no doubt or rejoinder [ספק ולא דחייה] remains regarding it.

Now the first difficulty is this: with respect to this body, either nothing of it remains over when the world came to be from it, or something of it remains over. And if something of it remained over, then that remainder would be in vain [לבטלה] — and that is false, according to what is supposed. But if we say that nothing of it remained over, then there is no escaping one of two cases: either it

was of itself spherical in configuration [כדורי התמונה], or it was in some other configuration and God, may He be blessed, set its parts in motion and gave it a spherical configuration. And if we say that it was of itself spherical in configuration — how I wonder at how it came about that this body should be spherical in configuration, seeing that it has no nature among natures, as has been shown concerning it! And so it is evident —

— for it has no nature that would require those spherical [forms] of it [הכדוריות]. And it is far-fetched that this perfect configuration should attain to it by chance — quite apart from the further implausibility that the magnitude of this body should happen to agree with the magnitude the world ought to have. For it has already been seen that the magnitude of the world cannot possibly be larger than it is, nor smaller than the measure actually found in it; and this is because the magnitude proper to each one of the natural ensouled beings [הבעלי נפש הטבעיים] is something delimited, as we mentioned earlier. And if it had a [definite] breadth in this measure, this would be due to its individual nature [טבע האישיי], not on account of any apportioner [המניי].

Since the matter stands thus, it is shown — as has already been shown — that if the elements [היסודות] had been larger than they are, or smaller, it would not have been possible for the things found here, which require these magnitudes for the perfecting and preserving of their existence [להם להשלמת מציאותם ולשמירתם], to exist. For if they had been larger than they are, those existing things would, through the predominance of one element among the elements at the seasons [בתקופות] in which that element gains the upper hand over them [יגבירו אותם], receive more than is fitting; and if they had been smaller than they are, they would not receive from them what is fitting. And by this it is shown that it is not fitting for the spheres and the stars to be larger than they are, nor smaller — though this is [all the more] fitting for them, since they have no individual nature [טבע אישיי] suited to make their existences of a fixed magnitude.

And by this it is shown that, since the world came to be here, it was fitting that the world come to be from this body in the measure it has, and in all the matters found in it. For there cannot be — for example, in the spheres of the sun — were there found here more than a single sun, that the individual nature should differ in it; and likewise in the matter of the spheres of the rest of the stars. And so too, then, this shows why it is not possible for there to be more than one world: for if there were found of it more than one, the one would diverge from the other on account of the individual nature, since in the world there is no opposite [לעולם הפך]. It is shown that it is not possible for there to be an existing world other than

the one that exists; rather there is only this world. And this is from the magnitude that is in it, and from the natures found in it.

And further, because it is fitting that the order [נמוס] of the world, its arrangement, and its rectitude be such, this emanates [שופע] from God, may He be blessed, by reason of the fact that the order of existing things, their arrangement and their rectitude, is one. And the order which is in the soul [בנפש] — the name of God, may He be blessed, being one and not many — must of necessity emanate from Him in the world according to one number; and there would not be found emanating from Him orders that differ.

And by this it is shown that it cannot be said of this body — from which the world came to be — that it be such that nothing of it remained over nor less. For it is far-fetched that its having this perfect configuration should be by chance. And if we say that the body was not such that more of it remained over nor less when the world came to be from it, then this was [all the more] required of it; for when God, may He be blessed, gathered it and gave it a spherical configuration, there had to be here a void [רקות]. This too is shown of itself, given that the nullity of this second alternative has already been shown, as we mentioned — namely, that he did not assess how it should come about by chance that the magnitude of this body should be equal to the magnitude fitting for the world. And since the matter is so, here, then, [we see] how great a doubt arises from these alternatives.

The second doubt is this: it has already been shown that, if there were not found of this body the measure fitting for the world to come to be from it, the world would not have come to be here; and so it would be, if God, may He be blessed, were perpetually in such a state that nothing emanated from Him to give being to anything other than Himself — and this is exceedingly disgraceful. In sum, then, it would be necessary that the world's coming-to-be be not on the side of possibility, but rather on the side of falsehood — that there be found of this body the measure by which the world is perfected; and it would then be that the inception of the world's coming-to-be was perfected by chance and by happenstance [מקרי והזדמן]. And this is shown to be null, according to what he supposed.

The third doubt is this: it has already been supposed that, if there were here an eternal thing [דבר קדמון] other than God, may He be blessed, it would be a deity like Him — and this is the utmost disgrace.

The fourth doubt is this: it has already been supposed that this body must, of necessity, prior to the coming-to-be of the world, either be in motion or be at rest.

And if it was in motion, all those nullities which we charged against the view of Plato would be incumbent upon it. And if it was at rest — whether it was at rest by nature or by constraint [בהכרח], and however it may be — it would have to have for it a nature and a form, and this is the opposite of what was supposed. Given that it has already been shown that this body, found prior to the world's coming-to-be, was at rest: and this, because if it was at rest by nature, then [we would need] the recognition of the existing elements [הכרת היסודות הנמצאים], for it would not find here a natural rest, and they would not be necessary [ולא הכרחיית] if the elements were not found of "up" and "down" [המעלה והמטה]; and there would be required, by the recognition, that there be one of the elements at rest beneath the heavy, or upon the light. And were the matter so, here, then there would be here something light and something heavy; and there would be required the existence of "up" and "down" — that the heavenly body [הגרם השמימיי] be found, as has been shown in natural science [בטבעיות]. And there would also be required, then, from this supposition, many of the nullities incumbent upon the view of Plato; and this is exceedingly shown to one who investigates this book.

The fifth doubt is this: matter is found only from a form, in every respect, according to what has been shown of the nature of the lower existence [המציאות השפל] — all the more, then, that a form be found only when there is no time having a limit to it [אין זמן תכלית לו].

The sixth doubt is this: matter, when called "deprived" [חסר] in description, will by its nature be found a little of the time; and it would be, in every case, that the time of its being found in description would be perfectly longer — all the more, then, that there be no limit to the time of its being found in a perfect manner.

The seventh doubt is this: we find every coming-to-be, which exists in every act of becoming, to be from will or from nature, such that it not come from some chance happenstance [דבר הזדמן]. The parable is that the natural craft does not work from water, nor from salt, nor from dust; but rather the one who speaks works that which is fit to be received in actuality [רצוי הפועל], like the burns [המכוות], and what resembles them, from what is fit to be worked from the nature itself. The parable, however, is more shown in nature — for man does not come to be from the seed of the horse. And since the matter is so, here, then, how is it possible that there be from one and the same matter all the natures found in the world — "would that one might give, and would that one might sow" [מי יתן ואי זרע]? And further —

— it has already been asked: what is it that prepared the matter to receive the will of the operative form [רצוי הצורה הפועלת]? And this is all dark and exceedingly doubtful.

The eighth doubt is this: it has already been supposed that the elements and the place [המקום] must of necessity be found prior to the coming-to-be of the world; and this, because its place — "up" and "down" — already resembles that which already existed, I mean to say, the distances [הרחקים] in which there is found "up" and "down" after the coming-to-be of the world. And inasmuch as there was there "up" and "down," then there is there a heavenly body [גרם שמימיי]; and this requires that the elements be found, by nature, in "up" and "down."

The ninth doubt is this: it has already been asked what the matter is that brought the Agent [הפועל], who willed to bring about this coming-to-be at this *now* [העה], not to will it prior to this — whether some knowledge was newly produced in Him that did not exist before this, or whether He came to need it now and not before this, or whether there was some impediment and obstruction [מונע והוסר]. Here, then, all this is shown to be null, as has been explained earlier.

And after we have mentioned the doubts that fall upon this supposition — which requires what is not doubtful — it is fitting that we exert ourselves in resolving them as far as possible. First, however, it is fitting to say something that clears the path of the first investigator and offers help in this inquiry; and this is that it is fitting for everyone who investigates in a science to know which of the items of wisdom can be explained in that science and which cannot. The parable is that the geometer [שהגמטריו] should not give a view on the matter of the medical craft in what is geometry [גמטריא]; and if he did not know which of the newly-investigated items belong to his wisdom and which of them he should not investigate, in what is not in the way of his speculation — so too is the one who is a geometer in what is geometry [גמטריא].

And so it is fitting that he know which of the things found in a subject [בנושא] should be investigated in it — from the side wherein it is geometrical, [such that] the perfecting of knowledge in it can be found — and which of them cannot be in it. The parable is the length of the line of the circle [שאורך קו העגול]: granted that these matters that are explained in some science are explained by the science of geometry [הגמטריא], here, then, it is not possible that knowledge of it [i.e. the circle's circumference] be perfected by the science of geometry [הגמטריאה]; and this is shown that it is not possible that knowledge of this be perfected in any science. And if the geometer did not know this matter — that knowledge of this cannot be perfected in any science — it would befall him that he labor at

attaining it in vain in his investigating it, or err in it, just as it is false for the one who would think to square the circle [לרבע העגול], from the ancients [הקדמונים].

And since the matter is so, here, then, it is fitting that we investigate this matter — whether the apprehension [ההשגה] of it is possible for us, if we will it, [and] whether it is possible for us that knowledge be perfected for us of the configuration of this body from which the world came to be, and the like of it. And we shall say that it is shown that there is no path by which we may attain this knowledge — and this, because, as for this body, which has no operation [פועל], here, then, there is for us no way to investigate its figure and the like of it in such a way that we may say that its configuration was such-and-such on account of this end, and likewise the like of it; for that which has no operation cannot have for it a cause of its perfecting [סבה הכליתיה], if this be of the side wherein there is in it an operation. And since the matter is so, here, then, it is not possible —

— for us to explain whether anything of it remained over when the world came to be from it, or whether nothing of it remained over. But in every case, what is made known to us of this is that there was found of it the measure by which the world could come to be; and this, because if the matter were not so, the world would not have come to be. And it is possible that something of it already remained over — and this, that we are not exact concerning that wherein there is no operation, since [such] an operation would be a thing without benefit; but rather this matter is of the properties of existing things, with respect to that which is not [a thing] of operation that has an operation. And so too it would be required that there be, in the configuration, that which is perfected for the good of the sphere of the world; for if the matter were not so, there would be here, of necessity, a void [רקות]. And so too it would be required that it be finite [בעל הכלית]; for this is required of the body, in that it is a body. Here, then, this is what it is possible for us to know of this body — but we cannot know with certainty whether anything of it remained over, or did not remain over; for perhaps it happened that it was such that something of it was perfected and its configuration became spherical, and if it is far-fetched that this be perfected by chance, then perhaps something of it remained over.

And here it is possible to explain, according to what is in our hands of this from the premises — which is exceedingly little — that it is fitting to believe that something of it already remained over. And this, because it is far-fetched that this body should be perfected by chance in the quantity of the world and in its configuration. And further, it is fitting that there be [a mean] between that which

is, like the heavenly bodies, in the utmost perfection and vitality, and the absolute intermediate privation [ההעדר המוחלט אמצעי] — and this is this body, deprived of form, which is, as it were, intermediate between existence and privation, as we mentioned earlier. And it is shown that these three truths are exceedingly weak; but it is not possible for us to have more than this measure, because the nature of this body requires that knowledge in it not be perfected, by reason of the fact that it has no operation. As for whether there be in it another world, or other worlds — whether the measure perfected of it for this be greater, or not — this is of what we shall investigate in the next chapter, in accordance with what is possible for us.

And it is shown that the first doubt is already resolved in this manner; namely, that it had already been laid down that it would be false if more of this body had remained over than the measure from which the world came to be — for if the matter were not so, the remainder of it would be in vain [לבטלה]. And it is shown that this is not false, in respect of that which is not [a thing] of operation that has an operation; but rather it is of the properties to which there is attributed that which is not [a thing] of operation, as we mentioned earlier.

As for what was said in the second doubt — that, if the matter were so, it would be necessary that the world's coming-to-be should not be on the side of possibility, were it not for the falsehood that there would be found of this body the measure by which the world could be perfected here, and it would then be that the inception of the world's coming-to-be was attributed to chance and to happenstance [הקרי וההזדמן] — together with the necessity of this, that if there had not been of this body the measure by which the world could be perfected from it, that God, may He be blessed, would perpetually be in such a manner that nothing would emanate from Him to give being to anything other than Himself, and this is all shown to be null — here, then —

— when the intellect grasps it, no difficulty is found in it. The reason is that this coming-into-being lies between two extremes: the side of the agent and the side of the patient. As for what concerns the agent, the agent must act in due measure, for the agent acts upon this thing in the measure appropriate to it. But as for what concerns the patient, nothing of the sort is required of it, for the patient has no claim that the actualization fail to reach it from the agent. Rather, what is required of the patient is only that it exist; for if it did not exist, the actualization could not reach it from the agent in actuality. So, just as there would be no recipient to receive the benefit, and just as it would be no deficiency in God, may He be blessed, if He did not create the world while there was as yet no body at all

to receive creation, so too it would be no deficiency in God, may He be blessed, if He did not create the world while there was as yet nothing embodied to receive creation in the requisite measure.

And this follows from what was explained earlier: that God, may He be blessed, had no need that this world come into existence in relation to Him, in keeping with the fact that He is perfect in His own essence and acquires nothing from another. Rather, He acted to bring it about by way of beneficence and favor. Since this is so, it was not impossible that God, may He be blessed, should always exist in such a manner that this beneficence not be conferred — namely, when there is no recipient there to receive it. And here, then, this second difficulty is resolved.

Now the third difficulty is exceedingly weak, and this for the following reason: it does not follow that, when this body is posited as eternal, it would be at the rank of God, may He be blessed, so as to be a deity like Him. For there is no divinity belonging to God, may He be blessed, merely from the side of His existence; nor are the other things [that might be posited as eternal] divine on the side of their being eternal. For if it were possible that all things be eternal, then God, may He be blessed, would still be the deity, in that He bestows upon the rest of the things their order [הנמוס] and the arrangement that is found in them. And in general: God, may He be blessed, is the deity by reason of the magnitude of His rank — for from it there emanates, by reason of the magnitude of His wisdom, that which results in the goodness of order and rectitude among existing things. But in the eternal body there is nothing of this matter, nor of the good in its own essence. And one will already find that the more a thing acquires of the good, the more honorable it is; and for this reason man is more honorable than the plant, and the living thing more honorable than the growing thing.

Since this is so — and it has been explained that this body is at the extreme of deficiency with respect to privation, while God, may He be blessed, is at the extreme of perfection — behold, if so, it is shown that this body has no partnership in divinity at all, for it is more remote than anything from perfection. And here, then, this third difficulty is resolved. Now the good that existing things acquired is from God, may He be blessed, and the evil they acquired is by reason of the privation that belongs to each thing in its own essence by nature — and this comes about by reason of this very coming-into-being, on the side of the privation. This is more evident than what preceded. On this account our Rabbis agreed, may their memory be a blessing, that beneficence comes from above and that the source of evil is the privation: they said, "no evil thing descends from above," for it could not be that evil be ascribed to the Divine in any respect. This

is exceedingly evident, and will be resolved at greater length in its proper explanation.

Now the fourth difficulty is likewise of this kind. The reason is that the body would already have to be in motion, if motion were natural to it — in which case its being at rest would be by compulsion; whereas the body that has no nature to be moved cannot be said to be in motion, since it is at rest, just as, for example, a man cannot be said to be sighted when he is in fact blind — for there is no recognized way in which this body should be moved. This is evident, for this body, being homogeneous, was described neither as in motion nor as at rest. And by this the difficulty is resolved. From this it has been explained, concerning the state that preceded the creation of the world, that there was no time there at all — for there was there neither motion nor rest, and what is neither in motion nor at rest is in no way clothed in time, as has been explained in the *Physics* [ספר השמע].

Now the fifth difficulty — we have already spoken of the difficulties in it in the preceding treatise, in the inquiry concerning the body that has no preservative [keeper], whose like is found among the spheres. And here its resolution is laid down in another manner. The reason is that, although form is found together with matter — as it is found in the hylic forms — yet form is also found separate in itself, as was explained concerning the matter of the separate forms. So there is no requirement here, on account of the nature of these two existents, that they not be found except as one [together]. Rather, it was possible that matter be found without form for all these things that are clothed in the primary qualities — whether they be the forms of the elements — and that it be impossible for them to be utterly stripped of [those qualities], but that they change from contrary to contrary, and acquire of the forms by compulsion a grade corresponding to that, in respect of the qualities and their temperaments. All this is evident to whoever has investigated the *Physics* [בטבעיות]. And this is the nature that God, may He be blessed, gave to the lower matter: to receive all the forms, some of them by means of some of these elemental forms, which He gave to them first, and by the possibility He gave them to change from contrary to contrary in these qualities. This is the possibility belonging to the thing by the nature of the form. For it would be a falsehood that matter — on the side of its being stripped by its nature of every form — should have the possibility to receive all the forms, and that this possibility should belong to the thing by the nature of the form, in such a way that some particular thing would come to be by chance from some particular thing. Rather, it comes to be only from a determinate generator: from the snake there comes to be a snake [recte: this is

the import of "from the snake there comes to be," the printed antecedent being compressed], and the human comes to be from the seed of man — namely, the appropriate form. And here the unity in things is on the side of the form, for matter is shared in common by all of them.

Now as for the claim that it would already be necessary, from this, that this body endure without form for a time having no limit — it has been shown to be a falsehood, against what preceded concerning the coming-to-be of the world; all the more so since there was no time there at all, let alone a time having no limit.

Now the sixth difficulty — behold, this too has been resolved by what was weighed. The reason is that the thing perfect in description in it is more honorable than the thing deficient in description, by reason of the nature belonging to it, which makes it necessary, according to the natural custom, that the more perfect description be found in it — as is the case in the creation of the living thing. For their natures are such that there would come to be from them things produced by chance, departing from [the proper course of] nature, if this were not so; and the way of this body would be roughly equivalent [whether or not such a deficient description obtained]. But this body has no nature obliging it to anything of the sort. This has already been explained in what is here, when the subject is taken as abstracted from nature: that what is obliged to have perfection is not obliged to have it on that account. And one will already find a time which, measured from the time of its existence in the most perfect description, falls short by a long span. The illustration is that matter compounded from it — such as the matter of Reuben — would be found to have a much longer time before there cleaves to it the life proper to human beings. So too, then, it is evident from what preceded that this would not be found prior to the creation of the world; and this is evident, namely that no time would be found there of which it has no limit — for the statement that there be found there a time having no limit is a falsehood, as has been explained.

Now the seventh difficulty is forceful — exceedingly deep — yet with all this the conclusion is not hard to draw. This is because it has already been explained that universal coming-to-be is not such that one should ascribe it to coming-to-be in respect of its being partial; and it is evident that the coming-to-be of man is, in respect of its being partial coming-to-be, on the side of its being coming-to-be, as preceded. And further, since this coming-to-be, as has been explained concerning it, is ascribed to will and not to nature — and because of this it was possible that change occur in it, in the matter, into one of the contrary forms, from putrefaction — as has been explained, its being necessary from what we find

among the heavens and the stars and the difference between them, as preceded. And behold there would be, for the craft, a choicer matter, since what is acted upon in the craft is something outside the speaker, and cannot give the thing acted upon a nature to receive its will; rather, it gives it the picture [figure] when that matter is fit to receive it. But God, may He be blessed — for His works are diffused throughout all the parts of the thing, as is the case that the matter is found in the works of nature, which are caused by Him, having within them a nature to receive [His will] as is fitting.

And we have already grasped the great force of [the argument of] the *Physics* concerning the actualizing of matter by the separate form, from what is found in the creation of the living thing — the wondrous things in the moving of matter, to the point that one breaks off from it what is fit to be made: organ from organ, from the rest of the organs found in it. And behold the rank of God, may He be blessed, in this matter, together with the rest of the agents that emanated from Him, is at the rank of the chief head in the state, as the consideration which Plato spoke of [makes clear]. And this — that he should set in that state certain men who should make one craft by which the matter of the state is perfected, but not give them the power to make another craft, but [rather] prevent them [from it] — since it is not fitting that one master of a craft serve in two crafts, as Plato said, but rather that there overflow upon them this skill to the exclusion of others, from the side of what is preserved [proper] to him of the craft. And in this manner he makes some of them builders and some of them weavers; and so too the matter in each craft, until its matter be perfected by it, [according to] the manner in which every craft requires [the others] for the perfecting of that state. Behold the first head overflowed from himself all these crafts, each craft [being executed] by the men of that craft. And so too God, may He be blessed, overflowed from Himself all existents at first; and afterward there overflowed from Him, may He be blessed, craft from craft — so that there should come to be from them their likenesses, and there be in them a power whereby their likenesses come to be — together with what He prepared, for this coming-to-be, of the agents: that man come to be from man, and horse from horse, by means of what He prepared for this coming-into-being from the agents, [proceeding] from the heavenly bodies and the Active Intellect.

And behold, just as each one of these things receives the form fit for the act in a single way, its act being diffused through all the parts of the lower matter according to what was given to it from the agent — He willing to say that the agent's intellect is what gives to these things their forms — so the matter, in its generalities, receives the form fit for the act, whose act is undistinguished,

[proceeding] to a part of it [rather] than to a part. And behold the nature in this is graded; and this, because the form belonging to it is matter that alone receives its will, in a wondrous manner. And this is the form whose act is distinguished in a single matter, the more fit the form is — its act receiving the will of the agent in a more wondrous manner. The illustration is in what is explained concerning the motions of man, the natural and the volitional; for there would already be found among them, in the manner the *Physics* [ספר השמע] explains the matter [of the soul] for the form, that which is exceedingly wondrous. As when one considers the matter of the loosening of nourishment and the reckoning of it to the very essence of the nourished thing when a part is broken off from that organ. And so too is explained the great force of the *Physics* concerning the form, in the matter of the volitional motions, of which a man partakes: how he directs the air which is in the instruments of the voice for these wondrous motions, which one cannot reckon in the way they came to be anew from these vocal grades — but a man pictures the matter of song, and from that picturing [comes] the wonder. And the form whose act is wondrous is moved by the instruments of the voice in this wondrous manner. And the form whose act is distinguished in a determinate matter — as is the case that all the matter which its act reaches in actuality receives the will of the agent in a more wondrous manner — the lower matter receiving the will of the active intellect in a more wondrous manner the more distinguished the form. But the diffusion of its act in its generalities is more distinguished, in that there is distinguished for it a determinate part from what is found; though the diffusion of its act in its generalities is, as is the case in this matter, by God, may He be blessed. The matter receives, in all the parts of the thing, the will of the form in a more wondrous manner the lower the matter that receives the will of the active intellect. And here this difficulty is resolved.

Now the eighth difficulty is to be set to one side. This is because "above" and "below" would not be in it [the primordial body] from the side of the mathematical distances which are in it, but from the side of the things found in it; for in this manner the light element moves upward and the heavy element downward. And when there was no light or heavy [element] there, there was no "above" and "below." And in sum, "above" and "below" cannot be found unless there is a spherical body revolving in motion, as has been explained in the *Physics* [בטבעיות]. And since this body had no nature of the [recognized] natures, this is evident.

that there was no surrounding region there, and no elements either; and so there was no "above" or "below" there.

As for the ninth difficulty, no objection can be raised on the basis of what we have already established. For if the world's creation by God, may He be blessed, were owing to a change that arose in Him, may He be blessed, this difficulty would indeed be a barrier, on account of the appearances [of inconstancy it would imply]. But because we have explained that there is no change attributable to God, may He be blessed, in His creating it — rather, this came about by way of His goodness and His favor — it follows that this is referred solely to His will. And if someone should say that, because the world's coming-into-being depends on God, may He be blessed, in a single, unvarying manner, the matter must necessarily have been thus by His will, and we have granted that He willed at one moment and did not will at another, then there would of necessity be some change in God, may He be blessed.

We have already said that the lower matter, by its very nature, was at the outset disposed toward existence — disposed toward receiving the good in it from a [definite] beginning in time — since this good, for its part, of necessity has an order arranged for it, as has been explained earlier; and for this reason it was necessary that the world be generated in time. And since this is so, it is clear that the existence of the good is found in this lower matter from this [primordial] beginning; for the lower matter is, of itself, [something] not-yet-existent, found in it [in the lower realm] always. It was the deficiency [of the matter] that lay in this beginning, [the deficiency] which made it necessary that the existence of the good in it be generated; and were it not for this, the good in it would be an [eternally] complete act through its constellation, as has been explained — and that is false, as we have shown.

And since the matter is so, it follows of necessity that the world entered into existence at a [definite] time, and there is no room for the question "Why did God, may He be blessed, not bring it into being prior to this?"; for if its Agent had preceded it, what measure of time would there have been [to mark that priority]? — and this very question collapses. And behold, just as God, may He be blessed, did not [as it were fail] in creating a thing together with the existence of its contrary in it — for the nature of the recipient prevents this — so too God, may He be blessed, was not [unable to act]; rather, the good is found ever-present in a body that comes to be from it [from the lower world], because the deficiency that belongs to the very essence of that body necessitated that the good in it be created. We have already discussed this at greater length in our investigation of the Philosopher's arguments by which he held the world to be eternal.

It is also possible to give an account, by means of what we have explained, of how it is that the forms which God, may He be blessed, here imparted to the celestial bodies came to be newly produced apart from any [prior] motion — namely, that this coming-into-being consisted in their preserving the [their] image, in the absence of any [prior] preservation of an image, and this is [precisely what] the coming-into-being [is]; for because they are wholly filled with existence [and altogether actual], there is in them no motion and no change — for change is the opposite of this [fullness]. We have already explained, moreover, that there was no [prior] motion there before the coming-into-being of the world. Accordingly, if this is so, there was no motion prior to the coming-into-being that was [itself] prior to all the motions.

And it was fitting that it should be so. For since the motions found [in the heavens] are ordered out of [this primal] coming-into-being to which it belongs, it was fitting that they should be prior to its [the world's] motion — yet it does not follow that they too come to be along with their motion; rather, it befell them that the partial portions [of the motions], whose motions are subsequent, [arose] out of the coming-into-being. And indeed it happened to them that the coming-into-being found there [in those portions] is prior to their [own] coming-into-being, of necessity, on account of the coming-into-being…

that has parts in it [i.e., a partial coming-into-being], because by this it is necessary that the whole be found; for in it are found the causes of that first coming-into-being, and this would not be [so] of the whole if it were not in motion, as has been explained to one who has studied the *Physics* [ספר השמע], and from what preceded in this book.

פרק תשעה עשר [Chapter Nineteen]

[Subtitle:] In which we explain that there is only one world.

It is fitting that we now investigate, in light of what we have in hand from the premises [already established], whether it is possible for there to be here more worlds than one — given that it has already been explained that it is not possible for there to be here many worlds, one coming after another, [as we showed when] we refuted that view. We offer at the outset an apology for entering upon this difficult inquiry, [explaining] in what way it is not possible for the investigation of it to be brought to completion by us. This is because the body out of which the world came to be — given that its existence is [now] a completed act — cannot be known to us, whether any of it remains over in such a quantity that there might be from it another world; and this is most clear.

Yet, because of what is here [available to us], it is possible for a demonstration to be drawn from this regarding it, whether on the side of the Agent or on the side of sense. If, on the side of the Agent, it were possible for us to have from it a starting point for a demonstration concerning this, [we should pursue it]. As for the world that we have come to know through what has been explained from the side of sense, [namely] that this body came to be of necessity in a quantity such that the world would come to be from it — behold, it is fitting that we investigate this with the full reach of our understanding. For human felicity does indeed attain to a man's knowing whatever it is possible for him to know.

Now let us say: it cannot but be that the bodies of the [supposed] worlds whose existence has been explained are in one place, or in many places, and the privation [i.e., empty interval] between them is absolute. It would seem that it is not fitting for them to be found in many places, since [if so] the many [intervals] would not be such that there would be there [a continuous extension], as is little [supported] in what is investigated; for that is a void, as has been explained in our discussion of the matter. And again, when the matter is taken thus, it follows of necessity that there would be a void there, and that there would be a measure for the absolute privation, and a division of it, and a relation of its extremity to its extremity [implying continuity] — and this is a thing already shown to be null. But how this is to be explained — behold, [it is] in accordance with what is to be said. For we posit that the one body, [call it] body א [aleph], and the other,

[continues:] body ב [bet], and let it be imagined that there extends from each of them a line, line ג [gimel] from the one and line ד [dalet] from the other; and let these lines be at the [outer] limits of the [two] bodies in such a way that there will be no privation between them. Now it is clear that it is possible for these two lines to be described as being equal in length, and this is clear to anyone who has given a little study to geometry. And if the lines were straight, they could not be known [to be] straight, or crooked; but if they were [in fact] straight and equal, the distance between them would be a little less in all its parts [i.e., uniform]. As for the distance between them, which is an absolute privation — behold, this is a thing already shown to be null, for the equality and the order [of a continuum] could only be of something that exists, not of something non-existent. And if we [are to suppose] that they [the worlds] are non-existent, then…

being non-existent — behold, their distance from one another in one place would be greater than their distance in another place, and the [intervening] portion would be of an absolute privation greater than the other portion of it [in the first case]; and this [too] involves the void. But [in fact] since the privation [is]

absolute, [there can be] no relation between this and that, and so all of this is false [reasoning].

When this is rightly considered, it is clear that it is not fitting that there be such a body except in one place. And since the matter is so, it must be said that there is not fittingly [more than one] place — that is to say, only one world. For [if] the bodies that would be between the [several] worlds could not be known, whether [a body] preserves its image or does not preserve its image — and if it does preserve its image, then the world moves with the motion of the encompassing [sphere] that surrounds it, so that there is movement [communicated] from it [to the others] in this manner.

[As for] these [supposed] worlds, behold, they all move with respect to motion, each one of them; for the central world among the worlds moves in respect of its totality by the motion of each one of them, and through its moving, the world that surrounds it is borne along [too], for it encompasses it and is renewed by it — [and] this for the [other] worlds. With this [picture], a motion is borne that would have to be a void — and this is a thing already shown to be null. To follow out [all] the false consequences for the upholders of this view at length is itself the more illuminating refutation by way of its very exposition.

And so it would have to be, if the matter were so, that [each world] would not preserve its image; as is the case with the matter of [whether] a body lies between the orb of one star and the orb of the second star. But if the matter were so, it would follow, because this body is uniform [and] of a single character [spherical], as we have explained in our discussion, that the stars in the worlds that are on our horizon would of necessity be seen by us — and there would be seen there at times two moons together, or more. And further, there would of necessity be added or subtracted, with respect to the proportion of distance from the sun that is in this world [of ours], some light — for it would already be possible that the light received [from the sun] in the worlds that are in them [those worlds] would likewise be received from the sun. And further, the fixed stars that would be there would of necessity be seen by us at times with a wondrous magnitude, in proportion to their nearness and their distance from us — yet there are not found among the fixed stars [any such] thing of this description.

And further, the fixed stars that would be there would of necessity not be found ever at one [constant] distance from the fixed stars that are in this world [of ours]; and this is the opposite of what has been explained concerning the fixed stars that are perceptible to us, for they are all of them ever at one [constant] distance, one from another, in this long [span of] time…

in which their relations [positions] have reached us — namely, [those of] this celestial body. Moreover, since this would have to follow, those [supposed worlds] would of necessity have raised up among us these stars that appear [to belong] to the worlds; [for] among the worlds that are seen [there would be] in that world a middle [central] one, lying between our heavens and the [fixed] stars.

And if someone should say that the stars in the worlds that are in their [respective] worlds have already become hidden from us, [there being] in those worlds an advantage [or surplus] of their distance from us — we said [in reply]: they would not be of equal worth, not precious to all of them [the worlds]; and further, that what we have doubted about [the appearance of] the moon, in this matter [of] the world, remains as a [standing] doubt against this argument. And, in sum, if we are to enumerate all the false consequences entailed by this supposition, in accordance with [our] mathematical inquiry, our discourse would be drawn out at length, and what we have mentioned about it [already] is enough. And if someone says that a uniform body…

[is] spherical, no false consequence would follow from these false suppositions — we say to him: if it were as our argument has informed us, then there would be this difference between the body that does not preserve its image and the body that does preserve its image found among the orbs; and behold, there would of necessity follow from this no less a doubt than the first doubt, namely, that we [find that] there is in this body no spherical [member] that receives light — and if the matter were so, it would follow of necessity that this body would [have to] receive the light of the sun always in its totality, and there would always be a wondrous light [in it]; and this is shown to be null.

And further, because the worlds would of necessity be such that they agree with this world [of ours] in name and in definition, as has preceded, it follows of necessity that they [must] be [thus] — by way of example, [that] the mover of the orb of the sun in the one of the worlds agrees in kind with the mover of the orb of the sun in the other world; and likewise the matter with the rest of the movers [that are] like them belonging to those other worlds. And behold, the separate forms that agree in kind could not possibly be many in number; for it happened to the hylic forms that they are [multiplied] because of the matter to which [each] is bound, and [so] there would be, if there were such a form, in number a form for [each of] many bodies, in such a way that each one of them has a clinging-to-matter [adhesion] in itself, by which way they are given life, each one of them — and this is shown to be null. But it would [only] be possible for the agent of the

separate form to attain a number greater than one, [if it were] when [the form] does not cling to them in any number, as is the case with the agent in every one of the things that are here [in the sublunar world].

And further, since the [degree of] unity [a thing has] is the more honored the fewer [things] it embraces — and for this reason unity, with respect to things, is on the side of the form, while multiplicity is on the side of matter — and in proportion as the activities of God, may He be blessed, are fitting to be on the side of [what is] the more honored, it is clear that it is not fitting that there be here [more than] one world.

And further, [consider] that we find it fitting that there should be in [each] species [an individual] that is not found except for the sake of the preservation of the existence of the species; and that there would not be found, among the imperishable things, [individuals subject to] the corruptions [that beset] perishable things [as there are] in man. The illustration is that there have already been found many individuals in the human species; for were there not [more than] one individual besides him [a given man], it would have been possible that death should overtake him before he begot [offspring], should some precious corruption befall some portion of the earth that he is upon, or [befall him] from some other cause; and so likewise it would have been possible that [the species] would be uprooted and corrupted in this manner [of] the human species, [a danger] which, with [the providence] that the multiplicity [of individuals] preserves, God, may He be blessed, has formed in the human species — bringing it about that it stands fast through many activities.

And it is for this very reason that there was [a need for] multiplicity in man [i.e., in the human species], in the manner by which the human species spread out across the whole inhabited world; for if there were no multiplicity in this manner, then by reason of [the fact] that man is by his nature one who must gather himself to people with men in their extremities [the ends of the earth], behold, a corruption might befall in any [single] portion that stands [exposed], in a particular region; and were the corruption to befall in that place, the human species [as a whole] would [then] perish. And so it follows of necessity that there be in it [in man] a multiplicity [spread] in all the inhabited world, in order that the human species might survive. And these are the causes [either of] the [need for] multiplicity that there is in [the case of] the rest of the species, in [whatever] way it is in it; or the extremities [the regions] whereby the multiplicity comes to be in the rest of the species. And further, because there were [other] species [existing] for the sake of man — that is, [whether] in respect of nourishment from

them, [or] in respect of making use of them for his work — it followed of necessity that there be of the rest of the species so great a multiplicity that their existence [might] suffice them…

to man. And when this matter is considered, the meaning is that the multiplicity in the individual [member of a species] is found only for the sake of preserving the species, so that it should not perish. And this is clear from what has preceded: that for a being whose corruption in the world is possible, [Gersonides] explains, it is not fitting that there be a multiplicity of individuals belonging to it [if it were imperishable]. And here it has been explained that there is no world more than one — neither in unison [coexisting together] nor coming one after another — by reason of this [argument], according to what is possible for us [to demonstrate].

פרק עשרים (Chapter Twenty)

[Subtitle, secondary type:] נתיר בו הספק שיקרה מפני מה שטען הפלוסוף מפני טבע הזמן — "In which we resolve the difficulty that arises from the argument the Philosopher [Aristotle] urged from the nature of time."

Now that we have explained this matter of universal coming-into-being [ההוייה הכללית], and have settled the difficulties that bear upon it, we shall recall the difficulties that follow from the arguments by which the Philosopher [Aristotle] sought to establish that the world is eternal — difficulties that are all rooted in what has been explained concerning this [whole] matter of coming-into-being. It is right that we should investigate them thoroughly, so that no division or doubt should remain in this understanding [of ours]; for it is by [resolving] this that the perfect knowledge attains its excellence. Now these arguments we have already recalled in what preceded, and we shall return now to examine them one by one in a separate chapter.

We say, then, that the first argument by which the Philosopher [Aristotle] urged [the eternity of the world] is the one drawn from the nature of time. This argument runs thus: he says that time, by its nature, is seen to be something that is without ceasing [unlimited]; for it is impossible that there should ever have been a time that came-to-be and [then] passed away — since [if so] it would have been necessary that there be a [further] time present before [that] time came-to-be in which it [already] was, and a [further] time in which, together with its passing-away, it was passing-away. That is, every passing-away passes away in [a] time. And so the Philosopher said that this inference is one upon which his predecessors had agreed. He further said that whoever holds [this] must hold that

there should be a [further] time prior to the [present] time, since whatever-came-to-be is [something that] comes-to-be after [it] is absent [from existence].

And once a coming-to-be has occurred [in this manner], behold, there would be a time prior to that time; but we said that what is "prior" and what is "later" are [themselves] among the differentiae [the dividing markers] of time. Hence if it be so, time will of necessity exist by necessity, and concerning this it would have to be explained that it is impossible that time should ever be that it neither was nor passed away [i.e., that time should have any non-existence]; for time is continuous and one, in accordance with what we perceive [of] our [own] matter [experience]. And it is impossible that there should be existence of a time without motion. Hence it would have to be that there be there a continuous and eternal motion; for [only] thus would there be in them [in time and motion] a continuous time without ceasing — as [is the case] when there is there a continuous and eternal motion. Hence it would have to be that there be found there [a single] mover, [moving] in one eternal [motion]; for the single [continuous] motion would [indeed] belong to a single mover. And this is what is praiseworthy in the words of the Philosopher concerning this matter of motion, as has been explained [in] what he said in the *Physics* [ספר השמע] (Aristotle, *Physics*) and in the treatise marked with the letter Lamed [the *Metaphysics*, Book Λ], [drawn] from what comes after the [natural] science [from the *Metaphysics*].

And it is right that it not be hidden from us that the Philosopher has already, in the third [book] of this same treatise [the *Physics*], laid down this inference [which states] that it would necessarily follow from it that, were there a present time [a "now"], it [would already] be in [some prior] time — and concerning this his predecessors agreed. And since we have recalled this argument, behold, it is right that we examine the matter thoroughly in a perfect manner, in accordance with the truth in itself.

We say, then, that what is made clear [is this]: that the inquiry concerning the matter of time — [namely,] whether it is possible that it [time] should come-to-be or pass away, or whether this is impossible — is [the same as] the [inquiry whether] it is possible that it [time] should have a beginning [a starting-point of time] or an end. For it is as if one were to say that there is a present [moment] from which time begins, [so that] before it there would be no time; or [that] there is a present [moment] which is the end of time, [so that] after it there would be no time. Whether this is possible, or whether it is impossible, and since it has been explained that this is impossible — it would necessarily follow that time is, of necessity, without ceasing [unbounded] in the past and in the future.

But if the intention here was [to ask] about the coming-to-be of [some] time which [itself] comes-to-be a part of it [of total time] — that is to say, [the question] whether there should be there [a beginning to] some [particular stretch of] time — then this [question] is one that begets no obscurity: this [much] is what the Philosopher [grants] us. But if we are informed that it is impossible that there should be a part of the time that [as a whole] comes-to-be together [all at once], as is explained from its [time's] nature, then this would not entail that there should be no beginning to time; and likewise it would not necessarily follow [either] that there should be no part of the time that passes away [perishes] without [the whole of] time passing away with it. And this accords well with what we have laid down concerning eternal time. For just as we have laid down that time is eternal, so too this would not entail that there should be a time before this part [of time], previous [to it] from the [whole stretch] of time that has come-to-be; for the time present [the "now"] in [its] coming-to-be is in this manner: there is no time before it. As if it were said that this [present] hour, which comes-to-be, comes-to-be in [some] hour that preceded it — rather, it [the "now"] is the [moment of] coming-to-be in [the very] time that is newly produced in the [act of] coming-into-being, [so] that there should be coming-to-be of the [present] hour in one [single] hour, and coming-to-be of half an hour in [yet another] half-hour, and so it would be explained that there is no passing-away of the hour in [its own single] hour, but rather [its] passing-away [occurs] at its [own] proper [present moment].

And since it has been explained that this does not entail that there should be a time prior to the coming-to-be of time, or a [time] in which the passing-away of time should be after [its] passing-away — it is [thereby] made clear that this does not necessarily follow [from] what the Philosopher urged: that, were there [a moment] from which to grasp [both] the coming-to-be of time and its passing-away, [then] a part of time would [have to] come-to-be or pass away [in some other time].

And with this [point], behold, it [the answer] is necessitated [by] what we have informed [you] of: that the part of time that comes-to-be in a [present] time comes-to-be in the very [moment of] its coming-to-be, and that the part of time that passes away in a [present] time passes away in the [very moment of its] passing-away. The doubt that arises concerning the part of time that is newly produced is but slight; for this [the part] which is newly produced from the time is itself the part of time that is newly produced, together with the coming-to-be of this part [of time]. My intention is [to say] that the two times newly produced together [the moment of the part and the moment of its production] — and concerning this it would [likewise] have to be that the [matter] required [should

hold] also for a third time that is newly produced; and concerning this it would also have to be that the [matter] required should be [so] for a fourth time too, [and so on] without ceasing. And were there [then] found times [extending] without end, [each] to be enumerated together [with the next], then it would be false — for [it would mean] that two times are found together, according to what has been explained concerning the matter of time: that it [time] is clean [pure] of matter in some manner [respect]. And concerning this [there would be] no [end to the] increase in the multiplications of the motions; nonetheless [the upshot is] that whoever [holds] this would [have to] hold that times are found without end, [times] that cannot be enumerated together [as a completed totality]. And behold, this [argument] is the doubt the more [serious] when it is said that there is no time present [no "now"] in the time which is found in it…

apart from [save] the present time [the "now"] in every respect — rather, it [the "now"] is a [bounding] limit, and apart from [its being] a limit. For this [is so]: because the present time [the "now"] is [only] little by little [a vanishingly small thing], it was of necessity a matter of [vanishingly] small existence; its parts in [their] totality [are but] little in [their] generality, since they could not [all] be found from it [as] no fewer than every part of this time. And were it the case that the present time [the "now"] is itself the time that is found in it — as if we were to say that its parts are found in [their] totality, as we say that the [number] eight is sown [composed] of seeds [units] found in the acquired measure [i.e., that it adds up] — behold, the matter is so [too here]: that at the [given] hour there is found [an] hour, [and that] all the parts of this hour would be found [as] no fewer than [the whole] hour from it [the present moment]; for it [the "now"] is what it is impossible to find among them [the parts] together [as a totality], and they [the parts] are found one after another by necessity. And if they were [thus] found, one after another, then they would have to be such that their existences are in [an] equal time [evenly] for all the parts; and concerning this it is explained that there could not be here a second time [a separate time] apart from the time that is found in every respect. But it [the "now"] is apart [from being a time] in the manner in which the whole [of time] is apart from its parts.

And since this has been settled, behold, the inquiry is [now the question] whether there was there a present [moment] from which time began — [namely the question] whether it is necessitated that there should have been [a "now"] at that present [moment] in which that time was found, [as a time] preceding [it]. For this [is so]: because the inquiry [about] the equality of this matter is [the very] thing inquired about here, [namely,] that there [should] not be a coming-to-be of a part of [the] time. And so the inquiry [stands] just as this matter [stands] in

itself concerning the passing-away of time. And we say that it has been made clear that it does not necessarily follow that everything which is newly produced should [itself] be newly produced in [some prior] time, [as the Philosopher] hinted at in the *Physics* [ספר השמע]. For this [is the reason]: because there is no [difference] between the change and what we [merely] named "intermediate change," and concerning this it has been explained that there is no [difference] between the change at all and what is [an] intermediate change with respect to it; and this would [hold even] were the change [to occur] without [a prior] time.

And since the matter is so concerning change, behold, time would [merely] be an accident attaching to the change and being newly produced with its [the change's] coming-to-be — as the Philosopher explained. Behold, it has [thus] been made clear from what has already been explained, [namely] that there should be there [a beginning of] coming-to-be without [a prior] time. For were [the coming-to-be] to be [thus] without [a prior] time, then [a part of] time would, by it [along with it], come-to-be; and were a part of time to pass away [in this case], then [the whole of] time too would [have to] pass away without [another] time [in which to do so]. And this [latter] is the opposite of what the Philosopher [Aristotle] urged in this inference.

And our intention here is [to explain] the change of motion — how, or by how much, or in what way [it comes about]. And we shall say, further, that it has [already] been explained from the nature of time, that if there was a coming-to-be [an existence], it [time] would not be prior in time to the change [the thing's becoming], or [be] continuous with the change. And how would it be, then? Behold, by necessity the [act of] becoming-different [the change] must precede, in the coming-to-be of its [the thing's] existence, [the thing] itself — it [the change] being the term [endpoint, תכלית] of that [particular] change. And the time [which is an accident] is that which is [the boundary] between the beginning of the change and its end. And this [whole] premise is clarified in its own self for whoever has applied himself to the [study of] natural things [בטבעיות, the *Physics*].

And the answer for us [to] this premise [is this]: my intention is that, whenever there is a coming-to-be, the becoming-different [the change] precedes the coming-to-be of [the thing's] existence — yet this would [seem to] necessitate the opposite of [what] it [the premise] laid down: that the becoming-different [the change], which is the term [endpoint] of the change, should not [in fact] precede [its] existence in [a prior] time. But [in truth] the time [here] is explained [in such a way] that it does not precede the coming-to-be of [the thing's] existence at the

term [endpoint] of the change; for [the time] is found, by necessity, [only] together with the beginning of the change. And this is so, [namely] that there is found the body that is moved [by] whatever [motion] there should be and [by] whatever motion it moves with.

And since the matter is so, it has been explained that, if there was [a beginning] of the time, it [time] is not [a separate something] apart from the [moment of] time present [the "now"], so that it should not be [the case that] it [time] passes away [perishes] in [some other] time afterward. For this [is the reason]: because it [time] is not [a thing] that passes away — the term [endpoint] of the change preceding [its] passing-away — were the [whole] passing-away of [the] time to be drawn out continuously [stretched out into another] time. And since the matter is so, it has been made clear, in [the case of] that about which there is no doubt, that it is not necessitated: that, if there was [a beginning of] the time, [then] there must have been found a time prior to its [the time's] coming-to-be; or [that], if there was [a thing] passing-away, there must be found a time after its passing-away — but [in fact] the opposite [holds], as we have explained.

But [as for] what the Philosopher urged — that there must be found a time prior to the coming-to-be of [the] coming-to-be of time if a coming-to-be [of time] was supposed, and a time after the passing-away if a passing-away was supposed — [this rests] upon the words [reasonings] that he [Aristotle] used concerning the [nature of] time, and they are [the words] we [ourselves] named "before" and "after." And behold, by their life [I assure you], this argument is [made up of] three parts.

And this [shows] that what we named here [as] "before" and "after" is [itself] said [only] by the equivocation of the name [בשתוף השם] [as said] of the [moments] prior, and of the [moments] later — which are the [very] differentiae [dividing markers] of [the] time. And behold, just as this is the [standing] difficulty about which the Philosopher [Aristotle] left [himself] in doubt: when he explained that the world is finite [bounded] in [its] measure [extent] — that is, [in saying] that there is outside the world neither void [רקות] nor plenum [neither emptiness nor a full body], and concerning this he would say that there is no place there [outside the world]. And it has [thus] been made clear from what we have said: that "place" [מקום] points [signifies] necessarily — just as the figure [the geometrical body] within points upon it [signifies a place], [namely the place] that we said "inside" [תוך] of. And so we have said "[there]" pointing to a place, by necessity, by this inference. And were it [the case] that they [Aristotle's followers] had already used this term [the word "place"] in [a sense] in which it does not

point to a place [at all], [then] this would be [the same] as what we explained [above]: that there is a plenum that points to a place. So too, when we said that there is no plenum [outside the world], it would [still] have to be that "there" [שם] points to a place. And this [is so] because the intention of the [logical] subject [הנשוא] and the predicate [in the proposition] is that there should be one [single] inference necessitated and affirmative. And if not, then there would not be among these inferences [propositional] conditions [for] receiving [a sense] — as has been explained in the *Book of Rhetoric* [ספר המליצה] (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*).

And, in sum, behold, the intention of the [logical] subject and the predicate is not changed by reason of the inference [being] negative or affirmative — and this is [self-]explained in itself.

And since the matter was so, it has been made clear that whoever held the world to have a finite [bounded] measure [extent] would leave [himself] of necessity [resting] upon a treatise [argument] that contradicts itself; for he says that there is outside the world neither void nor plenum, while [yet] he [thereby] says that there is "there" [a place], [which is] explained — [namely] that "there" [שם], or "outside" [חוץ], points to a place — by necessity, as has preceded. And [the upshot is:] when there was [a place] "there," behold, there would [have to] be there a body; and concerning this it would [then] necessarily follow that there be a body outside that [first] body — and so it [the reasoning] would go on [endlessly], to no term [end]. Behold, then, [it follows]: thus has it been made clear that whoever held the world to have a finite [bounded] measure — [namely those whose] words [reasonings] he [Aristotle himself] left [resting] upon a finite [bounded measure], which [reasonings] they used — there is no escape [for him] from the [logical] uses [made] of them [the terms]. And this is [self-]explained, [namely] that those words [terms] they used in these places — apart from the [sense] understood [proper] to them as regards [the matter] of time — that the intention is wholly [meant] to point to an absolute privation [העדר המוחלט]. And this is the same as [what holds] in what they used in [drawing] inferences upon the supposition that time comes-to-be or passes away, or upon the supposition that the world…

are finite [בעל תכלית]. Moreover, since the [three terms of the eternity argument] are conventional [הסכמיים] — as has been explained — the case is the same with them: there would be no objection against us, [even] if the matter were not so. After all, if language did not leave it open [to apply] a term to whatever falls under it, [a term] could not be used, since [its very] existence comes from being applied to that to which it is assigned. And this too is clear in the case of some of

the matters that exist: there is no term [for them], yet the wise have nonetheless used borrowed names for them, by way of [some] resemblance. So even if the matter were as [the objection supposes] — as when it is said "prior" and "posterior," "outside" and "place" [קודם ואחר וחוץ ושם] — there would be no objection against us drawn from these [usages], since we [ourselves] are the ones who are guided in that intent. And here this doubt is resolved: it has been explained that one is not obliged [to hold] from this [argument] that time [הזמן] is everlasting [נצחי], neither in the past nor in the future. This is what we set out to clarify in this chapter.

Chapter Twenty-One [פרק אחד [?] ועשרים]

[Chapter heading sub-line:] The doubt concerning surveying [the world] from the standpoint of "now" [נתיר הספק סיקרה מצד העתה].

The second argument [הטענה השנית] that the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] urges — his words being these: "Now it is plainly apparent from his account that 'now' is the [boundary] between [the past and] the future [העתיד]"; for the dictum "that there be a 'now' such that there is at present nothing prior to it" — this is something a man cannot even conceive of [לא יכילהו דמיון האדם]. For if there were a time, there would be no time prior to it, and this is something impossible by reason of the posterior [מהמאחר]. The "prior" and the "posterior" [הקודם והמאחר] are among the distinguishing marks [המבדיל(ם)] — [the claim being] that there be a time before the coming-to-be of time [קודם הוויית הזמן]; and this is [included] in the second argument, according to what was said earlier.

This [argument] holds because every line proceeds to the point on the line as [its terminus] in actuality [בפעל [?] בקו הכבבי]; this is the point that is the [terminal] limit [התכלית], the [point] found to be such; and it is the point that is the [terminus of] the part of the line, found to be such in potency [בכח], being the beginning and the end together [התחלה והכלית יחד], and a beginning relative to the posterior. And since the matter is so, [the point] is found only in potency [נמצא אלא בכח]; the point [exists] when it [actually] is [a boundary], just as it would be the [terminal] limit of the line, or [marks] the beginning of it in actuality [בפעל].

And [Aristotle] further strengthens this view by saying that "now" is more closely analogous to the [point]; and [his ground for] this is that the point is found, if it is found, [either as] the limit of the line or as its beginning in actuality — that is, [as marking] the part of the line. So the point: when it was [a terminus] together

[התחלה והכלית יחד] — that is, when it was the limit relative to the prior and the beginning relative to the posterior, [it follows] that he is obliged [to hold] that it would be the limit relative to the prior and the beginning relative to the posterior. But it is impossible that [the point] presently be [both]; this is clear, for if it were found in actuality, it would be [divided]. And further, it is impossible that the parts of [a continuum be present together] — for the existence of time [מציאות הזמן] is in potency [בכח], all the more so [in the case of] that whose existence has no way [to be] in actuality, [and] which has no [terminal] limit or beginning. And inasmuch as time is among the [things] that exist in potency [בכח] and not in actuality [בפעל], it is obliged that there not be found [a present "now" in actuality]. — These are his words in this argument.

[Now] we say: as for what the Philosopher [the Philosopher] makes binding at the [present "now"] — that a man cannot conceive [לא יכיל דמיון האדם] that there be a "now" such [that there is nothing prior to it] — this is not necessary [בלתי מחויב]. And this is the manner in which [the Philosopher's reasoning] is the same [as before]: [that "now" be the boundary of] another body outside it [גשם אחר מחוץ ממנו], according to [the supposition] that the resemblance [comes to an end] at a body — as the Philosopher mentioned — namely, that there be a world that is not finite [בלתי בעל תכלית], and this [is the case] which the resemblance of the man rightly [pictures]. And the man does not [err] in [supposing] that it cannot be conceived that there be [a body], [pictured] as not-empty [רקות] and not-full [מלוי]. And what the [man pictures] for us is by reason of our seeing in the bodies [around us] that [each] comes to an end at another body. And from this it happened to us [to picture] the matter in the very same way with time [בזמן], and this does not [appear] from now [on], but rather "now" [encompasses] us at its two extremities [קצותיו], and from this [arises] the division of time [חלוק הזמן].

And here, then, this argument is the argument of the Philosopher [drawn] from the term "prior" and "posterior" [ממלת קודם ואחר], and the [error] happened to us [from] this resemblance, for we [are guided into supposing] "prior" and "posterior," and it was caused by [supposing] that there be there [an] absolute [privation, ההעדר המוחלט], whereas it is [properly] resembled to every "prior" prior [to it], and thus is voided [וכבר נבטל] this argument by what preceded. And as for [the term] "prior" relative to "posterior" [הקודם מהמאחר], by reason of what was explained concerning "prior" and "posterior" — as is apparent from the words [of the Philosopher] — that there would be [in the case of] a uniform [continuum] a "now," or [discrete] "nows," among which the [parts of motion] are divided in the *Physics* [בספר השמע], until, as we [shall] not depict, [the conclusion follows] that "now" would have no [reality] of its own nature and quiddity [מהותו]

but rather is among the things by which we posit motion as countable [להשים התנועה ספירה]. — Here it is said for every "now" "prior" and "posterior." And this [is the case] because time numbers motion correctly [התנועה על נכחונה], except that it [the "now"] is not [itself motion], that is, [it is not] motion that is together [שלא תהיה יחד], nor a part [of motion measured] from the standpoint of what it is together; this [is what is meant by] measuring time from the standpoint of what it is together. And this [arises] from the standpoint of the nature of "prior" and "posterior," which [are such] that there is in it "prior" and "posterior," and this [holds] not in [respect of its being a thing] that is divided and is always found in the division — [for] the part [that is "prior" and the part that is] "posterior." And according to [the fact] that this is the same manner, [Aristotle] held that it would not be measured in "prior" and "posterior" — that is, it would not be measured in time. These are the words of the Philosopher in the *Physics* [בספר השמע], according to what there is no doubt about therein. And inasmuch as the matter is so, [we conclude]: "now" [העתה] — this is the beginning of time [התחלת הזמן].

that it is not [merely] a "prior" relative to "posterior" in motion, [in respect of the fact] that there would be no time there at all [לא היה שם זמן כלל]. But [Aristotle] is obliged [to hold] this, [namely] that time is found [as numbering motion] correctly with respect to the comings-to-be, [whether at] the present "now" — [the supposition being] a deficiency [שיפול] in [the claim] that, after that present "now," the [former "now"] would [number] what the motion [began to be], [so that] motion would come to be in existence [להיות נמצאת].

[As for] time: he is not obliged at the [last "now"] that there be at it [a numbering of] time, and there is already completed a depiction of time at [its] "now." And when this was so, it is clear that the "prior" [already] divides off from the "posterior" [שיתחלק מהמאחר]. Yet he is not obliged [to hold] this [view], which is [drawn from supposing] that the beginning of time, or its end [התחלת הזמן או תכליתו], is obliged in [its being a thing] that depicts a [depiction] in time [שיחן ציור בזמן], and this is [the thing] that brings [him to conclude that it is] finite [בעל תכלית]. And in general, here we see [that there are] aspects [drawn] from existence [צדדים מהמציאות]: the one aspect is [that which] is newly originated [יחודש], and the other [aspect] is the bounding of the [former] aspect of time [הגבלה], [namely] the part [of time] indicated by [a span] like "one day" or "one hour" [יום אחד או שעה אחד], and this [is so] because the "nows" [העתות] that bound it [אשר יגבילהו]; and so too the hour [השעה]. And if there were not a "prior" relative to the posterior in time [שמהמאחר בזמן], it would be — as we said — that all [these] are one thing [in respect of being] one and the same [דבר אחד בעינו], for [the act of] numbering [הספירה] is in each one [of the "nows"] from the standpoint

of the comings-to-be, among which "prior" divides off from posterior [יחלקו הקודם מהמאחר], [being] one of these times [אחד מאלו הזמנים]. But the [beginning] was [that] the parts of these times are divided, and the exchange of these [parts] of time — their extremities [קצתם] being at a remove [במרחק] between the "nows" [שתי העתות] which the "now"s bound [אשר יגבילו], the [span] that is between the two "nows" which the hour bounds [יגבילו השעה].

So that at present there are found for it two aspects [drawn] from existence [שני צדדים מהמציאות]: it is the division of the "prior" relative to the posterior [חלוקה הקודם מהמאחר], either by reason of time [מהזמן] or by reason of motion [מהתנועה] — as if it were said that "the day [היום] would be bounded relative to it from the standpoint [of] two [things]." And if the matter were not [a matter of] a "now" but rather of a division [חלוקה], as we said, [it would be a span of] three days or three hours [שלשה ימים או שלשה שעות], [and] each of these times is one and the same in itself [אחת בעינה] [drawn] from the posterior [מהמאחר]. For they are two "nows" [שתי עתות] in every exchange [התחלפות] of these times. From the standpoint of the exchange [מצד חלוף] of these times — [that is], from the standpoint of what is exchanged among the "nows" [שיתחלפו] — the "nows" [העתות] which they set as bounded [ישימם מוגבלים]; and this [is] that which the day bounds [יגבילו היום]. It is greater than [what is bounded by] the more remote [aspect, drawn] from [a "now"] — and [so too] the hour [השעה]. And inasmuch as the matter is so, it is clear from existence [מהמציאות] [that there are] two [aspects]: the one is that which is newly originated [יחודש] [drawn] from the posterior [מהמאחר], and the other is the bounding of the quantity [הגבלה הכמות] of one [drawn] from time [מהזמן].

And from [these] two aspects there are found a marvel of wisdom that is tightly conjoined [סגולת הכמה המתדבק], and this [is] because we [might] say that [the time] is "a great time" [בזמן רב], or "a little" [ומעט], "long" [וארוך], or "short" [וקצר]; here we said "great" or "little" [drawn] from the posterior [מהמאחר], and we said "long" or "short" [ארוך וקצר] [in respect of what] is between the two "nows" [שתי העתות] which the "now"s bound — namely, that time [הזמן ההוא]. It is from the standpoint of what is divided off [drawn] from the "prior" relative to the [posterior, that is] from the standpoint of the remove [המרחק] which is between the two "nows" [שתי העתות] which [bound]. And here this matter is at present like the matter [described in terms] of a point [בנקודה], and this [is so] because the point is found [as] something whose [property] is to set the line as bounded [מוגבל] from the standpoint [of two aspects], and they set it as a number [ספור], just as the [former] part of the line [is bounded] in the line — and this [is] the matter [now described] in terms of a point [בנקודה].

[The compositor's signature "25*" appears at the foot here, and the page-foot ornament is plain.]

[Continuation, p. 388]

[Recto running header: מלחמות ה' — "Wars of the Lord."]

for [the property] of existence [is that] "now" [העתה] is newly originated from [the point] [מתחדש ממציאות הנקודה] upon the remove [על הרוחק] which [the motion traverses], from the standpoint of the [former] aspect [drawn] from motion [בתנועה], as has been explained in the *Physics* [בספר השמע]. And inasmuch as the matter is so, it is clear that one is not prevented at present, from the standpoint of [the fact] that we set [time] as bounded [שישים הזמן מוגבל] [such] that there be found a time before it [שימצא זולת זמן נמצא לפניו]; but this is a matter whose necessity [חיובו] has already been explained in what preceded.

And likewise, even if we grant that time were [drawn] from the [measure] of motion [משער התנועה] from the standpoint of the "nows" [העתות] which divide off in it [the "prior"] from the posterior [הקודם מהמאחר] — in respect of this very motion that this [motion] is indicated by [these "nows"] [התנועה הרמוזה אליו לבד] — one would not [be obliged to such-and-such a conclusion]. [As for] motion: it is here obliged [to hold] this [view, drawn] from one of two things, [namely] that the measure of motion [ישער התנועה] is what is between the "nows" [מה שבין העתות], even [granting] that there be a [measure] of motion [משער התנועה] such that time [שהזמן] is the number of motion [מספר התנועה] [and that] time [is] the number of the "nows" [מספר העתות]. And here there would not be a time [לא יהיה הזמן] [such] that it [the "now"] is divided, and it [the "now"] is "now" [העתה], and there would not be [time] either — [a time] at present [לעתה]; and this [is so] by reason of the [terminal] limit of voiding [בתכלית הבטול]. — Yet with [this granted] the divisions [המתחלקות] which are divided off [are divided] in number equally [במספר שוה]. By way of example, the time of the motion [זמן התנועה] which is [a span] of three years [בשלש שנים], when each one [of its parts] is divided [נחלקו כל אחד], from this [it follows] too that the time of the one motion [זמן התנועה האחת] [be the same as that] of [the motion] that belongs to another man [שהוא לאיש אחר], when their parts are divided among them [each from the other] — and this [is] the manifest falsehood [מבואר הכוב].

And if [the measure] of motion is what is between these "nows" [מה שבין העתות האלו] which [divide off] motion [התנועה], then he is obliged [to hold] from this that he would not [measure something other] than what is between the first part,

"prior" [החלק הראשון הקודם], [relative to] the [posterior]; and this is void [בטל], because it is clear that time is [the thing of which we are speaking]. And further, it is already obliged from this that there be [a span such] that, when its parts are divided into "nows," there would be what is between them [מה שביניהם] [of] motion that would be [a span] of a thousand years equal [in time] [תהיה באלף שנה בזמן שוה] — when each of its parts is divided into two "nows," among each of them one hour [שעה אחת]. And further, [there is what] is not divided except at one "now" [בעתה אחד] [such] that there be [a span such that] when its "nows" divide off the "prior" relative to the posterior [from this] — and when this was wholly false [כלו שקר], it is clear [in general from the standpoint of the "nows" which are limits, that they divide off in it the "prior" relative to the posterior alone].

And it has [now] been explained, in [the manner] that has been [shown] at present, that the division of the "prior" relative to the posterior [שיחלוק הקודם מהמאחר] is found only in potency [נמצא כי אם בכח], and the "now" which [bounds it]...

in potency [בכח], it is not correct. The reason is this: what makes the division of prior from posterior [הקודם והמאוחר] something other than the "now [העתה]" is that the potency in question is necessarily bounded by a terminus, since the beginning and the terminus are joined together through the act of dividing. Now this potency, which belongs to the "now," is not found in actuality in time [בזמן בפעל], for it is this very thing that gives time its nature: that time exists in actuality whenever there is something hinted at as standing in relation to that "now." And it is manifest that the potency [to divide] and its terminus are equal. But what is required of it [the "now"] is that there not be found together with it [in actuality] that of which it is the beginning — for the beginning is in potency something other than the beginning in actuality. Hence this consideration does not prevent the [opposing] side from holding, as has already been explained, that they [prior and posterior] are something not found in time in actuality.

This is so because it is already possible that what exists now is the very thing whose "now" is the beginning — and this is because that time [in question] would be found together with the "now," which is its [terminus]. But the matter is not so with the "now" that is the beginning [of a new stretch].

[Now to] the Philosopher [הפלוסוף / Aristotle], who says that the terminus of motion [התנועה / Aristotle, *Physics* [ספר השמע]] is found [only in potency] — he says that what is the beginning is in potency [בכח], and so it would necessarily be that at the "now" there would be a division of prior from posterior [only] in

potency, not in actuality. To this we reply: this is the very meaning [we intend] when we say that these are the names of the potencies; it is so called because there is not found together with it that of which it is the beginning. For the point [הנקודה] is at once both the beginning and the terminus of the line — this, indeed, is the flaw in the explanation, as has already been explained — and they [prior and posterior] are a thing that cannot exist [together in actuality].

And it has already been explained to you that the [potency] in it [the line], in uniform circular motion [בתנועה הישרה — recte: read as the regular/uniform motion] and in the other motions, is without terminus, since there is not found in them anything to which the explanation of nullity applies. And if someone should say that this is because of [the nature of the point], then it would necessarily follow, by this motion which is in it, that this motion would be circular [סבובי], renewed at the points which are pictured upon the magnitude. [And if] the nature of the "now" were [identical with] the nature of the point on the circular line, then the matter would be so, and the point — which is in proportion to the magnitude of the circular motion — would be [the terminus]. So [too], if the "now" were thus the beginning and the terminus, this too would have been required of this point, which [stands in proportion to] the magnitude of the circular motion. But time [הזמן] does not proceed in a circle [אינו הולך בסבוב], since the elapsed time does not return as such, in the manner that the return of motion proceeds upon the magnitude of the circular [revolution]. Nor is what is required of it [time] in proportion to the magnitude of the circular [revolution], as has been explained. For it has already been explained that the time of that motion is not infinite [בלתי בעל הכלית — recte: not unbounded]. And so this doubt is resolved in a manner that admits no doubt in it.

פרק שנים ועשרים (Chapter Twenty-Two)

[Subtitle, small type:] The doubt raised from the nature of the now [העתה — recte: שקרה מטבע ה(עתה), "which arises from the nature of the (now)"].

The third argument [הטענה השלישית] which the Philosopher [הפלוסוף / Aristotle] advances, and the root of his words, is this: because of what is in [the heavenly] motions, it would be necessary by demonstration that the terminus [שהתכלית] of motion is itself [motion]; hence it would necessarily follow, if the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים] were in the place to which they ascend [in] their coming-to-be [הוויתם] — and this would necessarily follow [as endless]. For it cannot have a terminus, since it is something without terminus [אין תכלית] in respect of its number. If, then, [the matter] is so in respect of its own being [it is] without

coming-to-be [בלתי הווה]; and if there were there [a terminus], it would necessarily follow that the world [העולם] is eternal [שיהיה קדום].

And we say that this doubt is not of the sort [from which it would follow]. The coming-to-be [ההוויה] is required in part insofar as it is a partial coming-to-be in the [whole]; and it would not necessarily follow that there would be there a partial [eternal coming-to-be], as we explained in the fourth chapter [בפרק הרביעי] of this treatise [מזה המאמר], [namely] the falsehood [שקרם] that there is no motion of transference [תנועת העתק] which is the first [coming-to-be — recte: היא הראשונה, "which is the first," i.e. the primary] coming-to-be.

Moreover, it has already been explained that, with respect to the falsehood of coming-to-be [ההוויה] which proceeds along the path of nature [על דרך הטבע] — yet it is [in fact otherwise] — it is manifest that it is not necessary that it [be eternal]. For their oppositions are alternating [מתחלפות]: it is possible that they were [first] in a state of transference [העתק] toward a first mover [מתנועע ראשון] from the side of the heavenly bodies [גרמים השמימיים הווים], such that there would be there a moved-thing [מתנועע], [and] it would necessarily follow regarding that moved-thing whether it is coming-to-be [הווה] — for it [the heavens] is without [terminus]. It is possible that there were there bodies [גשמים], [and] so too it would necessarily follow that there would be there a moved-thing [from] the side of its own essence [מצד עצמו], without coming-to-be [בלתי הווה].

This, then, is equal to what is sought [in the falsehood], and this is the same matter, namely: coming-to-be in part [בחלק]. But when one posits the world [העולם] in its entirety [בכללו], there is found a part of it to which they ascend [in] their coming-to-be [תעלה אליו הוויתו] — [as we showed] in this treatise [מזה המאמר]. And it has already been explained that the first [matter] is in [the sense of] the first [coming-to-be], but the first [in the strict sense] is the motion [תנועה] of what precedes [it]. So this coming-to-be [ההוויה] is not in the way [we described]; rather it is ascribed to choice and will [אל הבחירה והרצון], which precedes natural coming-to-be [להוויה הטבעית], since the matters [העניינים] were alternating [מתחלפים]. And here this doubt is resolved [נתר].

פרק שלשה ועשרים (Chapter Twenty-Three)

[Subtitle, small type:] The doubt … which arises from the nature of things that come to be [מטבע הדברים המתחדשים].

The fourth argument [הטענה הרביעית] which the Philosopher [הפלוסוף / Aristotle] advanced concerning things that come to be [המתחדשים] is this: in each one of

them, the potency [הכח] precedes the act [הכח קודם אל הפעל], and this is so; for potency and act are correlatives [הם סותרים — recte: opposite/correlative], and this is [established] from one side. And the root of his words is this: [for each thing] whose existence is in potency, [the potency] is prior to its existence in actuality [בכח קודם למציאותו בפעל]; if it is so, then by demonstration the time [הזמן] of [the thing's] coming-to-be [הוויית] precedes [it], so that there would be there a motion [תנועה]. And if there were there a motion, [it would have a prior potency, and so on without end].

If the world [העולם] were coming-to-be [הווה], it would necessarily follow that its existence be in actuality in time [בפעל בזמן], for the whole [matter] of coming-to-be is this consideration. And if there were there a time [זמן], then there would be there a moved-thing [מהנועע]; and if there were there a moved-thing, it would be moved either by nature [בטבע] necessarily, or it [is] moved [by something else]; hence it would have a natural motion [תנועה טבעית], for it is in proportion to the natures [אל הטבעיות]. And it is impossible that the natural motions which exist [should be without end]; [otherwise it] would be a falsehood [שקר].

And this falsehood proceeds by demonstration from [the supposition] that we posited that the world is coming-to-be [שיהיה הווה], and from the premise [ההצעה] from which it follows that he [the Philosopher] says: hence it would necessarily follow that the world is without coming-to-be [בלתי הווה], as will be explained from this premise [ההקדמה] — that the world is eternal [שהעולם קדום] — and not [merely] from the words of the commentators [המפרשים] upon his words.

And we say [in response]: [granting] something of what we say in this argument [הטענה] — that [a thing's] existence is in potency prior to its existence in actuality in time [בכח קודם למציאותו בפעל בזמן] — if it is so, [granting] that the eternity of time [היות הזמן נצחי] would be required, [namely that] the potency which precedes the renewal of [each thing] [הכח הקודם לחדושו], or that this be [required] from the side of [its eternity] — it does not necessarily follow that [the potency] precedes every renewed thing [קודם כל מתחדש]. But if we maintain that time is eternal [נצחי], then this is not at all what is sought [המבוקש], as is explained. For this [supposition] indeed occurs to coming-to-be in part [להוויה בחלק], since the time was already found prior to that coming-to-be [קודם ההוויה ההיא] which is required in it — because the time is renewed [מתחדש] in [the act of] coming-to-be.

But if it [the potency] is required from the side of the nature of the potency [מצד טבע הכח], [it is required only] in the manner that needs explaining [שיצטרך אל באור]. And we say: for the potency [הכח] — and it is its being changeable

[המשתנה] in what we have named [as] motion [התנועה] — is its being changeable in [the respect] in which we have named it; and behold, the potency, in [the respect] in which we have named it, is found together with the existence of motion [מציאות התנועה], so its existence is a time [מציאותה זמן]; for the time is found in the [existence of motion]. But the potency, in [the respect] in which we have named the motion, does not [require a prior time — recte: לא יחויב, "is not required"]; there is no motion there [אין שם תנועה]. And when the matter is so, it [the thing] comes to be a renewed thing [מתחדש] such that it does not necessarily follow that one find a time prior to it [זמן לפניו].

And in sum, this is so: coming-to-be in part [הוויה בחלק], insofar as it is coming-to-be in part, [is required] in respect of that coming-to-be [ההוייה ההיא]; but the universal coming-to-be [ההוייה הכללית] is not renewed by [a prior] coming-to-be [לא חדש בחדושה].

[Now consider] whether the potency precedes the act [הכח הקודם לפועל] or not — for this is [the matter]. The potency is of two kinds [שני מינים]: either the complete potency [הכח הגמור], which we have named the [first kind of] motion; or the incomplete potency [הכח הבלתי גמור], [namely] what we have named [as] motion and what belongs to motion [מה שאליו התנועה]. [As for the second kind —] what we have named [as] motion and what belongs to motion [מה שאליו התנועה] — its motion, it has already been explained, is required from its own existence [ממציאותה]. [As for the first kind —] it follows in [the act of] finding the motion [בהמצא ההנועה] which motion it was [איזו תנועה שהיתה]; the motion does not require from its existence the existence of a time [מציאותו מציאות זמן], for [this is what is] explained: that if we posit there a first change [שנוי ראשון], there is no time [זמן] there before it [לפניו]. And here this doubt is resolved.

And if it be possible that they [potency and act] be found together from one side, then [the act] does not necessarily follow [as something — recte: ולוה יחויב, "and therefore it is required"] to the act [לפעל]. And if the potency were prior to the act [הכח קודם לפעל], then [it would follow that] the prior and the posterior [הקודם והמאוחר] are parts of time [חלקי הזמן]. We have said [that this proceeds] by way of the question [בדרך השאלה], because there is no time there [אין שם זמן]. And when [the act] was [first], we said earlier that it would be prior in time [קודם בזמן]; and if it were prior, [then a man could compare them] — for one man is not comparable [to another in] all [respects — recte: כי לא ידמה האדם כל צורק, "for a man is not comparable in everything fitting"].

פרק ארבעה ועשרים (Chapter Twenty-Four)

[Subtitle, small type:] The doubt … which arises from the nature of motion [מטבע התנועה].

The fifth argument [הטענה החמשית] which the Philosopher [הפלוסוף / Aristotle] advances is this: he says that it is impossible that the [heaven] should have been destroyed [נפסדת]. And when the matter is so, it is manifest [that it is] eternal [נצחי], not departing and not ceasing [לא סר ולא יסור], since the motions [התנועות] are continuous and perpetual [ההתדבקות והתמדיות]. And the manner of its explanation is this: there were here [first] a motion newly come-to-be [תנועה מחחדשת ראשונה], [and] it would necessarily follow that it is either coming-to-be [הוה] or not coming-to-be [בלתי הוה]. And if it is coming-to-be [הוה], it is not first [בלתי ראשונה], since a motion has already preceded it [כבר תקדם לה תנועה]; and that coming-to-be is [thus] the first [ההווייה היא הראשונה]; hence it would necessarily follow in it [that there is a prior motion]. This would necessarily follow either from the side of the act [מצד הפעל] or from the side of the [mover — recte: (תפעל)המ/(ניע)מצד המ]. [And it follows] from the side of the act because it [the act] is said to be [posterior — recte: שהפועל יאמר כאשר, "since the agent is so called when it acts"]: by demonstration there is renewed in it [the act], on account of which the [mover] is roused [התעורר], whether it was so before the first change [השנוי הראשון] or not. And if it [the second change] is required in it, then this [same] consideration applies in the same way [also] to that [first] cause [הסבה בעינה], without terminus [בלי תכלית].

And it is manifest that this is equal to the [necessity] which [follows], [namely] that the first change which we posit [שהונח ראשון] is [itself preceded by] another change [שנוי אחר], whether it is coming-to-be [הווה] or not coming-to-be [בלתי הווה]. But this [necessity is] from the side of [what] the Philosopher saw, [namely] that it would necessarily follow that something precede it [שיקדם לו]; [and so] we posit a first [thing] that is not first [שתהיה בלתי ראשונה]. And if it is the first [הוא הראשון], then it would necessarily follow that it precede [שיהיה קודם] the [second] change [השנוי]. For the potency [הכח] is what precedes the act in every thing [הקודם לפעל בכל הדבר]; the possibility of the [second] change is [either] a change [שנוי], or [the change] is drawn out [נמשך] toward [a — recte: לשנוי, "toward the change"]. The first change is the change which is renewed in it [אשר יחודש בו], [where] it is possible [שיהיה בלתי ראשונה — recte: that it be not first] for this very cause [לזאת הסבה בעינה], such that the change which is the prior [is what] precedes this [second] change [קודם על השנוי].

[Therefore] the moved-thing [המתנועע] is [moved] in the motion newly come-to-be [בתנועה המחודשת] [and] not coming-to-be [בלתי הווה]; and its way is that the moved-thing be moved [שיתנועע] — that is, this matter [מזה הענין] that it be moved [שיתנועע] — and there would necessarily be there a change either in the mover [במניע], or in the moved-thing [במתנועע], or [in both — recte: או בשניהם, "or in both of them"]; the posited first [thing] would be not first [שהונחה ראשונה בלתי ראשונה]. And if [the matter] is so [ואם נאמר — recte: "and if we say"], then it would necessarily follow in it that there be before it a change [שיהיה לפניו שנוי], as [we said] that it be [moved]. And when this was so, it would not necessarily follow that the first moved-thing [המתנועע הראשון] be coming-to-be [הווה] or not [coming-to-be — recte: או בלתי (הווה)].

[Continues into the next chapter.]

There are two senses in which one can say that there is in [these motions] no first motion. The first is from the side of the act [מצד היציאה מהכח אל הפועל], and the second is from the side of the conjoined [requirement] for a newly come-to-be first mover [המתחדש למניע הראשון].

Now, as for what would follow from the side of the act, [namely] the bringing-forth from potency into act: it is manifest [that there would be a regress], for it is the mover [המניע] that brings this about. When [a thing] was a mover in potency, and afterward came to be a mover in actuality [מניע בפעל], it then necessarily follows that there be there a change [שנוי] — since the bringing-forth from potency into act is itself a change, [and so] the act would be either coming-to-be [הווה] or not coming-to-be [בלתי הווה].

And as for what would follow from the side of the conjoined [requirement] of the newly come-to-be first mover: it is manifest that, were there a newly come-to-be motion [התנועה מהודשת], that newly come-to-be [motion] would have a conjoined relation [צרוף] to the first mover [במניע הראשון]. I mean by this the conjoined relation [הצרוף] between the mover and the moved-thing [בין המניע והמתנועע]. And behold, it is impossible that this conjoined newness [ההתחדשות הצרוף] be without a change [שנוי].

Since the matter is so, it necessarily follows that there be there no first newly come-to-be motion [שלא תהיה שם תנועה מחודשת ראשונה]; and this too is equal to [the case in which] the first moved-thing [המתנועע הראשון] was [either] coming-to-be [הווה] or not coming-to-be [בלתי הווה]. And by this it will be explained that there is there no last motion [תנועה אחרונה] either. This is so because, if there were there a last motion, then the moved-thing [המתנועע] would no longer be

moved by it [לא ימנע המתנועע בה] by reason of one of two considerations: either that there be there a motion whose course [terminus] would be that it move toward ceasing [שיהיה דרכו שיתנועע בהפסקו], or that there be no terminus in the course by which it moves [שלא יפסק משיהיה דרכו שיתנועע].

And if it were [a motion] that does not cease together with the [final] ceasing from motion [שלא יפסק עם הפסקו מהתנועה], by [virtue of] the possibility of the existence of motion in it [אפשרות מציאות תנועה] — and when we posit this possibility as found in actuality [נמצא בפעל], that would be a falsehood [היה שקר], namely that there be after the last motion [a further] motion [אחר התנועה האחרונה תנועה]; and the false-supposition, which is impossible, did not make its supposition into a falsehood [לא יקרה מהנחתו שקר] — then, behold, if that be so, there would be there a last motion [תנועה אחרונה] such that there would not remain in it the possibility of motion together with its ceasing from motion [אפשרות תנועה עם הפסקו מהתנועה].

And if we posit that the moved-thing ceases [שהמתנועע פסק] from [both] the two considerations together [משני העניינים יחד], there would be there two changes [שני שנויים]; and the second [change], which is the corruption [ההפסד] of the possibility of newly come-to-be motion [אפשרות התנועה חדוש], would necessarily be a newly come-to-be [thing] required after the corruption of the motion [יחוייב בהכרח שיהיה חדוש אחר הפסד התנועה]. For the [act of] motion and the possibility of motion [התנועה ואפשרות התנועה] are two correlative things [שני דברים מקבילים] that cannot be found together in one thing [לדבר אחד] from one side, but [only] at two differing times [בשני עתים מתחלפים].

Behold, then, if [this be] so [with] the possibility of motion [אפשרות התנועה], it would not be found except after the corruption of the motion [לא ימצא אלא אחר הפסד התנועה]; but [the motion] would not be corrupted except after [the possibility] is corrupted [לא יפסד אלא אחר שימצא]. So, of necessity, their corruptions follow one upon the other [הנה הפסדו בהכרח הוא אחר הפסד התנועה]. Behold, then, if there were after the last motion the possibility of finding [further] motion [אחר התנועה האחרונה אפשרות במציאות תנועה], this too has already been explained to be a falsehood [שהוא שקר].

And likewise, behold, it necessarily follows that there would be a [thing] that corrupts [המפסיד] the last motion after the corruption of the motion [אחר הפסד התנועה] — for if it [the motion] were not corrupted, it would be possible that it corrupt [שיפסיד]. And when we posit that very possibility as found in actuality [נמצא בפעל], we would necessitate from it a falsehood [שקר], namely that there be after the last motion [a further] motion [אחר התנועה האחרונה תנועה].

And when the truth of this whole [matter is grasped], I mean that it is impossible that there be there a first motion [תנועה ראשונה] and no last motion [ולא תנועה אחרונה], it necessarily follows from this [conclusion] that the motion be eternal [שתהיה התנועה נצחית]; and it follows from this that the moved-thing there be eternal [מתנועע נצחי], not departing and not ceasing [לא סר ולא יסור].

Now let us say — and this is explained with a little speculation [מעט עיון] together with what preceded — that it is possible that the first motion [התנועה הראשונה] be newly come-to-be absolutely [מחודשת במוחלט], [namely] that when the first moved-thing was coming-to-be [המתנועע הראשון הווה] in the manner that has been explained, it would [still] be necessary [in it].

This is what the Philosopher [הפלוסוף / Aristotle] argued in order to nullify this supposition [לבטל זאת ההנחה]: [he argued] from [the principle] that the agent, when it acts, acts at a [given] time and does not act [at another] time [שהפועל כאשר יפעל עת ולא יפעל עת]. And behold, there is here of necessity a change [שנוי], by reason of which it is roused [התעורר] now to do this act [לעשות זה הפעל], whereas it was not roused to this previously [לזה קודם]. We have already resolved this doubt in the eighth chapter of this treatise [בפרק השמנה אשר מזה המאמר].

And likewise let us say [in response to the doubt] which necessarily follows from the side of the bringing-forth from potency into act in the mover [מצד היציאה מהכח אל הפועל במניע] — [namely the doubt] that there be there no first change [שלא יהיה שם שנוי ראשון], which is impossible [הוא בלתי מחוייב]. And this is so because every change is a bringing-forth from potency into act [כל שנוי הוא יציאה מהכח אל הפועל], as is explained from its definition in the *Physics* [בספר השמע]. But it is not necessary, by reason of this — [namely] that every change is a bringing-forth from potency into act — that this change be the bringing-forth from potency into act which is in the recipient [במתפעל אשר להתפעל], [and] not the bringing-forth from potency into act which is in the agent toward the doing of its action [בפועל לעשות פעולתו]. And this is explained of itself from what was said in this definition [הגדר].

For it has already been said of motion [בתנועה] that it is the perfection [שלמות] of the moved-thing insofar as it is moved [המתנועע במה שהוא מתנועע]; and in general, change [השנוי] belongs to the moved-thing, not to the mover [הוא במתנועע, לא במניע]. Were it not so, this agent [הפועל] would be a moved-thing [מתנועע] by [virtue of] the craft [מהמלאכה].

Moreover, if the bringing-forth from potency into act [were] in the second act [בפועל שני], then behold, it necessarily follows that every mover be [itself]

changed insofar as it is a mover [כל מניע משתנה מצד מה שהוא מניע]. And this has already been explained in the [Aristotelian] categories [במאמרות]: that the motion [התנועה] is one and the same in subject [היא אחת בנושא], being in [a] respect [בצד] — and this is that, when [a thing] is related to the mover it is called actuation [תקרא הנעה], and when it is related to the moved-thing it is called motion [תקרא התנועעות].

Since the matter is so, it is manifest that when the actuation [ההנעה] was in potency [בכח], and when the motion [התנועה] was in actuality [בפעל], the actuation was in actuality [ההנעה בפעל]. Were it not so, it would necessarily follow that the definition of the actuation [גדר ההנעה] be that it is the perfection of the actuation in respect of what is in potency [שלמות ההנעה אשר בכח מצד מה שהוא בכח], just as the definition of the motion [גדר ההתנועעות] is the perfection of motion [שלמות ההתנועעות] in respect of what is in potency [מצד מה שהוא בכח].

And when the reckoning necessitates the existence of the potency upon this [thing] in [the] actuation [חיוב מציאות הכח על זה האופן בהנעה], it is explained of necessity [מבואר שיחוייב] [that], if the bringing-forth from potency into act were in the second act in the actuation [הפעל שני בהנעה], every mover would be changed insofar as it is a mover [שיהיה כל מניע משתנה במה שהוא מניע]. And this is a thing already explained in natural science [בחכמה הטבעית] to be false [שהוא שקר].

Moreover, it necessarily follows from this that there be there two motions together [שתי תנועות יחד]: the one [being] actuation [מניע], and the other [being] motion in the moved-thing [במתנועע]. And this is the contrary [חלוף] of what the Philosopher already explained in [the place] where there is no doubt about it in the matter of motion [במעניין התנועה], namely in the *Physics* [בספר השמע] — that there are not [two motions] there, but [only] one motion [תנועה אחת], and it is in the moved-thing [במתנועע].

Moreover, what is also explained in [the case of] the movers that are with us [במניעים אשר אצלנו] is that they already actuate at one time and do not actuate at another time [ינעו פעם ולא יניעו פעם] in the absence of [any] change newly arising in them [מזולת שנוי יתחדש בהם]; and this is what is sought [שהשתוק], even though [each] is a body [בעל גשם]. Behold, then, a mover actuates at the time it chooses [מניע בעת שיבחרהו], and it is unchanging in this [בלתי משתנה בזה]; whereas the change [השנוי] is something that adheres to the moved-thing [דבק למתנועע]. And since the matter is so, it is manifest from this that the side [from which one might object] would not prevent that there be there a newly come-to-be motion [שתהיה התנועה מחודשת].

Now, as for what the Philosopher argued from [the side of] the patient [המתפעל], [namely] that when we posit [a thing] coming-to-be [הונח הווה], the [coming-to-be] would not be a newly come-to-be motion [שלא היה התנועה מחודשת] — [for he held] that every coming-to-be necessarily has a change preceding it [מחוייב שיקדם לו שנוי], and if [the supposition is] that that prior change is itself the prior [coming-to-be] [הונח השנוי ההוא הוא הקודם], then it necessarily follows that there precede it [yet another] possibility of change [יחוייב שיקדם לו חדוש אפשרות השנוי], and so on, [yet] this leads to no completion [וכן אל לא תכלית] — [we answer:] behold, none of these [supposed regresses] follow from what we have explained concerning the matter of coming-to-be that is in this treatise [מעניין ההווייה אשר בה במאמר הנה].

For we have already said that the possibility in the change is said in three senses [שלשה פנים]. The first is the possibility that is in the way of nature [על דרך הטבע]; the second is the possibility that is from the side of choice and will [מצד הבחירה והרצון]; and the third is the possibility that is from nature and choice together [מהטבע והבחירה יחד].

Now the possibility that is more in the way of nature [על דרך הטבע יותר] than the other possibilities [is the one] that has no [single] relation to all times with one relation [שאין יחסו אל כל העתים יחס אחד]; rather, its relation to the time at which its bringing-forth into act draws near [יקרב לו עת אשר יציאתו אל הפעל] is stronger [יותר חזק]. The example: the possibility of the earth's coming-to-be into copper [התהווה הארץ בנחשת] — its relation to the time near the coming-to-be is stronger [יחסו אל העת הסמוך לעת ההווייה יותר חזק], because there is brought nearer to it [שיקרב אליו יותר] the more recent coming-to-be agent [הפועל המהווה].

And there is no [fixed] relation in the agent to the changing patients [המתפעלים המתחלפים] with one relation [יחס אחד]; rather, its relation to the patient that is closer to it is stronger [קרוב לו יותר חזק], for that [patient] is more prepared to receive its action [מוכן לקבל פעולותיו]. And likewise there is no [single] relation in the one agent to the changing patients [הפועלים המתחלפים] with one relation [יחס אחד]; rather, its relation to the [patient] that is closer to it is stronger [קרוב לו יותר חזק]. And this is explained of itself from the matter of the possibilities that are by nature [אשר בטבע].

The example: the possibility of the earth's coming-to-be [התהווה הארץ] is stronger at the time of heat [בעת החום] than [at the time] when it is [in] a [time of] cold [בעת הקור]; and likewise, when the fire is in a [given] place [כשהיה האש במקום מה], behold, there is no possibility of the actions of the earth [אפשרות הפעולות הארץ] proceeding from it as in one example [על משל אחד]. But [as for] the parts

[התלקים] that are closer to it [קרובים אליו] — they are more prepared to receive its action [מוכנים לקבל פעולותיו]; or [as for] when the earth was in a [given] place [כשהיתה הארץ במקום] and its surroundings [סביבותיה] are found to be many fires [אשים רבים], behold, there is no possibility of the actions of the earth in them [אפשרות הפעולות הארץ בהם] as in one example [על משל אחד]; but the possibility of the [actions] of [the earth] from the fire [מהאש] is stronger and closer [היותר קרוב יותר חזק].

And likewise it is fitting that you know that the possibility of the act [שאפשרות הפעל] that the changing patients [המתפעלים המתחלפים] have [as] individuals [באיש] — [namely those patients] that are of one species [ממין אחד], [yet] the farther of which is more remote [הרחוקים מרחק אחד] from the agent [מהפועל] by nature [בטבע] — has one relation [הוא על יחס אחד], in [the manner] that they were according to one and the same measure of greatness [על שעור אחד מהגודל]. And likewise, the possibility of the acts [התפעלות] in the patient [במתפעל] from the one agent [מהאחד] to the changing patients [המתחלפים] [as] individuals [באיש], which are of one species [ממין אחד], has one relation [הם על יחס אחד] in [the manner] that they were [related to] the agent in the same measure of greatness [בשעור אחד מהגודל].

Behold, then, the possibility that is from choice [מהבחירה] is by itself more singled out [לבד ייוחד] than the other possibilities [שאר האפשריות], in that its relation is not to all times with one relation [שאין יחסו אל כל העתים הוא יחס אחד], because its bringing-forth [יציאתו] is not drawn out to [any particular] change at all [אל הפעל נמשך לשנוי כלל]; rather, it is drawn out to the will of the agent [נמשך לרצון הפועל]. By reason of this, there is not there a time, together with [other] times, in which is found in it this possibility [אין שם עת מהעתים אשר נמצא בהם זה האפשרות] [such that] the time would be more fitting toward [bringing-forth into] act [עת יהיה יותר ראוי אל הפעל] than [another] time [מעת אחר].

And likewise [is the relation of] the changing patients [המתפעלים המתחלפים] [as] individuals [באיש], which are of one species [ממין אחד] [and have] one relation [יחס אחד]: my will [רצוני] is that it is no more fitting that [the agent] go forth to the closer patient [המתפעל הקרוב יותר] than to the more remote [מהיותר רחוק]. The example: that Reuben [ראובן] the goldsmith [הצורף], when he wishes to make [something] by his craft [כשירצה לעשות], [does so] by his very nature, and not toward any [external] benefit [טבעהבם לא לשום תועלת].

If this were possible, and there were found around the [workpiece] many pieces of gold [חתיכות זהב רבות], behold, the piece closer [to him] would not be more fitting [to him] that he make from it [the article] by its nature than from another

[שיעשה ממנה טבעה מזולתה]. For, since this act is drawn out to the will of the agent [נמשך לרצון הפועל], and whichever [piece] he should choose from them [שיבחר מהם] he would make from it [the article] by its nature [יעשה ממנה הטבעה], my will [רצוני] is [to say] that he has already chosen [שכבר יבחר] — if he wishes to make this from the piece whose nature is more remote from him [מהחתיכה הטבעה היותר רחוקה ממנו] — [and there is] nothing impossible [in this], [for] this is possible in act, by [his] nature [בפועל בטבע].

And likewise will be the relation of the patient [יחם המתפעל] to the changing agents [הפועלים המתחלפים] [as] individuals [באיש], which are of one species [ממין אחד] [and have] one relation [יחם אחד]. The example: that the possibility, in [the case of] this piece of gold [החתיכה מהזהב], of there being a relation of nature [טבעה אין יחסו לצורף] — [namely] that the one agent's [conjoined] relation to the other agent [האחד יחסו אל הצורף האחר], and if it were closer to it [קרוב אליה ממנו], and this were so — [it would be] because there is no proximity of the agent in choice to the patient [קורבת הפועל בבחירה אל המתפעל] [such as] would necessitate that it act upon it [שיחויב שיפעל בו]. But [the agent] would already be found beside the patient over a great time and not acting upon it at all [נמצא הפועל אצל המתפעל זמן רב ולא יפעל בו כלל].

And by reason of this, it is not necessary, in [the case of] the many patients [במתפעלים הרבים], that their being made remote from the agent [שירחקן מהפועל] by choice [make] the more remote one — [further] by [the distance] of the agent — act with [the agent] together as one example [על משל אחד]; nor is it necessary, likewise, in [the case of] the many patients that are far [removed] [בפועלים הרבים הרחוקים], that the more remote one [מרחק אחד] — [further] by [the distance] of the agent acting [מהתפעל אחד מרחק אחד שיפעלו בו] — act together as one example [על משל אחד].

Now, [as for] the possibility that is from nature and choice together [מהטבע והבחירה יחד] — as in the matter of Reuben [ראובן] who builds a house [לבנות בית], when the cold has grown strong [כאשר התחזק הקור], to be a shelter for himself [להיות לו למגן] — it is something intermediate [ממוצע] between these two prior possibilities [שני אלי האפשריות הקודמים]. And this is so because [in such a case] there is no [single] relation toward all times with one relation [שאין יחסו אל כל העתים יחס אחד]; for, by reason that nature sets the time in which it is most fitting that this possibility go forth [שהטבע ישים העת היותר ראוי שיצא בו זה האפשרות], the bringing-forth toward the act is defined [אל הפועל נגדר].

But [as for] the relation of [the agent] to the changing patients [המתפעלים המתחלפים] [as] individuals [באיש], which are of one species [ממין אחד] [and have]

one relation [יחס אחד] — and if some of them were [in] greater proximity, [being] closer to some extent [קרובים מקצת] — my will [רצוני] is [to say] that the one [patient] is not closer [שאין האחד קרוב] [in a way] that would necessitate more from the agent that it be more fitting that it act upon it [שיחויב יותר ממה שיחייב שיהיה יותר ראוי שיתפעל ממנו]. For this [act] is drawn out to the choice of the agent [נמשך לבחירת הפועל].

The example: that Reuben [ראובן], when he wishes to build the house [לבנות הבית], behold, there is in this no possibility [that he must take] the stones that are closer to it [more fitting] [האפשרות יותר באבנים היותר קרובים אליו] — for it is already possible that Reuben build the house from stones [שיבנה ראובן הבית מהאבנים] that are not closer to him [אשר אינם יותר קרובים לו], if it were [the case] that he chose them more [שיבחרם יותר].

And likewise [is] the relation of the patient [יחס המתפעל] to the changing agents [הפועלים המתחלפים] by choice [בבחירה] — [as] individuals [באיש] — which is one and the same relation [הוא יחס אחד] for this [self-same] cause [לזאת הסבה בעינה]. And likewise it is not necessary, in [the case of] the many patients [במתפעלים הרבים], that their being made remote from the agent [שירחקן] [make] the more remote one act with [the agent] together as one example [על משל אחד]; nor is it necessary, also, in [the case of] the many patients that are far [removed] [בפועלים הרבים הרחוקים], that the more remote one [מתפעל אחד מרחק אחד] — [namely] that the more remote act with [the agent] together as one example [שיפעלו בו יחד על משל אחד]. For [in all these cases] their actions in them [פעולותם בהם] would be drawn out to [the agent's] will [נמשכה לרצונם].

And when the reckoning necessitates [grasping] these possibilities [וכאשר התישב זה מאלו האפשריות], behold, let us say that it is not necessary, in every change [בכל שנוי], that there be there a change preceding it [שיהיה שם שנוי קודם לו] — and it is the change [השנוי] which is necessitated from it [as] something newly come-to-be [אשר יחויב ממנו חדוש] [as] a possibility of the change [אפשרות זה השנוי].

And this is so even according to [what] one would reckon necessary [in] the change that is in the way of nature [וזה שזה אמנם יחשב שיחויב בשנוי על דרך הטבע]; for the possibilities that are in the way of nature [שהאפשריות אשר על דרך הטבע] are a thing defined of necessity [נגדר בהכרח]. And by [the principle that] there is [a time] more fitting that it be found in it [ובו עת יותר ראוי שימצא בו], it is also explained [והוא מבואר] that, since there is in it [a time] more fitting that it be found in it [כי היות בו עת מה יותר ראוי שימצא בו], it is a thing drawn out to the change of necessity [הוא דבר נמשך לשנוי בהכרח]; and from its side there would be a relation toward this [time —

[The argument continues past this page.]

more strongly. As for the change which choice originates [השנוי אשר חדשו מהרצון] — such as the coming-into-being of the world [הוויית העולם] — here it is not necessary that any change should precede it at all, and this change is not drawn to act in relation to any change whatsoever; nor was it related to all the [available] times by a single relation. Nor is it impossible that its relation be to all the times by a single relation, such that no [particular] time would be found in which it could fail to come about. For if it were possible that this [coming-to-be] should be at one time rather than at another, this would itself be a clear sign [of natural determination] — since there is no time more fitting than another for it to emerge into act in it. But here this possibility is found always equally prior, and it is not necessary that any change be newly produced in it: such is the change.

The illustration [המשל]: the gold [הזהב] which Reuben [ראובן] has at hand, ready for the goldsmith [הצורף] to work — it would be possible for him to make from it something of a nature other than its own [טבעה מזולתה] by way of choice alone [על דרך הבחירה לבד], without any benefit to himself [לא להועיל לעצמו]. Here it is not necessary that this possibility emerge into act, but in every case the relation of this possibility to act, and its emergence into act, [is one and the same]; on a single pattern [על משל אחד]. And this is so because the possibility which is bounded by time [נגדר הזמן] of necessity is in fact what is bounded [by time]; for those [possibilities] whose relation to all the times is not by a single relation, this is something self-evident. And the matter [is now] clearly explained in itself.

It is therefore necessary, by the very converse of the [Philosopher's] doubt, that the possibility whose relation to all the times is not by a single relation should be one whose [emergence] is not [naturally] necessitated to be in any [particular] time. Since this is so, behold this volitional coming-into-being [ההוייה הרצונית] is found always present, lacking nothing up to the [moment of its] origination [עד ההתחדשה]; for, [in respect] of that which is from the will [מהרצון], no [particular time] is prevented [from being its time], as we said before.

And you ought to know that what we have said in this matter concerning [the role of] place [המקום] is by way of expansion [על דרך ההרחבה]; for there is no time at all prior to the coming-into-being of the world, if its coming-into-being was [a true] coming-to-be. And further, what we have said is not [meant to imply] that there would have to be some change preceding the change — as a path they tread to [showing] that the change must be found prior in time, as the Philosopher says. But it is possible that the change and what they tread as its path should be newly produced together [שיתחדשו יחד], and [in such a case] there is no

necessity [for a prior change]. The illustration [is] that the heavens [should be] found [at] some time prior to their being moved [שיתנועעו]. This is what we say is found, in the same way, in natural things [בדברים הטבעיים]: for the earth, when fire comes to be from it [נתהוה ממנה אש], behold the newly produced fire [is such] that its path is to move upward [שיתנועע למעלה], and the origination of its upward motion comes about together with it [תנועתו למעלה יחד]; and there is nothing here that prevents this — [something] one can say is the case for the possibility [that is involved] in this upward motion [התנועה למעלה], which is found in the earth from which the fire came to be.

For there is no way by which the earth could be moved upward [שיתנועע למעלה], unless one says that the equality of the possibility is found in the earth for it to come to be fire from it by way of [its] truth [על דרך האמת] — [and then] behold, this possibility would be found in fire, [but] not in it [the earth]. And this — that this possibility is found in the earth, because it is found in it by the intermediacy of the possibility by which it is fitted to become fire from it, as Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] says in [this] place, to settle the matter about which Yaḥyā the Grammarian [יחני המדקדק = John Philoponus] cast doubt in this — behold this natural possibility is found [to be] without limit [in] time…

[without] limit and unbounded [ובלתי נגדר]. And the illustration [המשל]: that the potency [הכח] by which seed [זרע] comes to be from Reuben [ראובן] was already found, according to this supposition, in Reuben himself, so that there might come to be from him the seed by the intermediacy of the possibility in which the seed could come to be from him. And this requires that this possibility be found in what comes to be from him — namely the seed — without limit [לאין תכלית]; and this [leads] to nullity [הבטול], and this nullity is the more evidently [false] for one who believes in the eternity of the world [קדמות העולם].

Further — [and] this is among the things made clear from what the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] explained — namely that he held that change must precede the possibility of [a further] change [שיקדם לשנוי אפשרות השנוי], because the potency [הכח] is found to precede act in all newly produced things [בכל הדברים המתחדשים]. For the Philosopher will indeed want, by this [argument], [to establish] the potency of the thing whose path is to be moved by this motion; and he did not explain this matter [by] the definition of motion [גדר התנועה], which is the perfection of the movable [thing] insofar as it is movable [שלמות המתנועע במה שהוא מתנועע]. Behold, this is not so [for] the [given] case of motion — rather, it is so [only] if it is already found prior in nature [in] him whose path is to be moved by it; as is the matter [in the case] of the movable [thing] from which the

[definition] of motion was taken [אשר לוקח בגדר התנועה], not [in the case of] him whose path it is not in [his] nature to be moved by it. As is the matter in the natural potency [בכח הטבעי] which Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד] [discusses] — that it is what is moved upward [שיתנועע למעלה] — for this potency [is] indeed found in the earth on the side [על צד] of that whose path it is not in [its] nature to be moved by this motion. And this is a thing other than the potency which the Philosopher must hold to precede act in newly produced things [בדברים המתחדשים].

And so too, then, because it is said by way of the impression [ברושם] that the light [thing] [הקל] [is] that whose path is to be moved upward [שיתנועע למעלה], and by the definition of the heavy [the thing] whose path is to be moved downward [שיתנועע למטה] — it is [thereby] made clear that it is not possible to say that there is found in the earth a path by which it is moved upward [שיתנועע למעלה], because of [the lack of] the possibility found in it for there to be fire from it [שיהיה ממנה אש]. For it is impossible that there be a path by which it [the earth] is moved both upward and downward together [להתנועע אל המעלה ולהתנועע אל המטה]; and this is made clear [by the fact] that it is not possible to posit the [two] possibilities — the possibility that fire [comes] from it [ממנה יהיה האש], and [the possibility involved in] this being so [namely], that he whose path is to be moved by this motion and [its] motion [are found] together [יחד]; and [further], that the prior [thing] would be in the movable [thing] [קדימה למתנועע] by way of natural motion [על התנועה בטבע], not by way of time [לא בזמן].

And since the matter is so, it is made clear that this argument [הטענה] does not require that there be a first change preceding [a change] that has no first [שיהיה ראשון בלתי ראשון], and that we have already posited that the coming-into-being of the world [הוויית העולם] is the first change — rather, [it is] that which is not [itself a] motion, as we explained before. And though the first motion was the motion of the heavenly bodies [תנועת הגרמים השמימיים], and [though] we have already posited that it is not necessary that the heavenly bodies be prior to it [the motion] in time [קודם לה בזמן]…

as though one were to say: the coming-into-being of the world [הוויית העולם] was [such] that it would be newly produced [either] in time or apart from time [בזמן או בזולת זמן]. Now, if it was apart from time [בזולת זמן], this is clear from its [very] matter, since the newly-produced [thing] [ההתחדש], the change [השנוי], and the conjunction [הצרוף] are coupled together. And if it was in time [בזמן], this too will be explained from what is said. For the conjunction [הצרוף] — from that whose newly-being-produced is [bound up] with the ceasing of the change [בהכלית השנוי]

— is like the matter in something resembling that in which we gave the illustration, and in [the respect in] which its custom differs [במה שינהג מנהגו]; and what comes to be from it is what is newly produced at the beginning of the change [בתחלת השנוי]. And this would be the case when the conjunction [הצרוף] is on the side of the change [מצד השנוי], as is the matter with the conjunction that lies between the substrate [המשנה] and the thing changed [המשתנה]. And it is from this that it is made clear that the newly-produced conjunction [הצרוף המתחדש] [arises] because of this first change [השנוי הראשון] — [the change] from substrate to the thing changed [למשנה עם המשתנה] [coming] newly to be together with the origination [עם ההתחדשות], this [being] the change. And since the matter is so, it is made clear that nothing prevents [the conclusion] that the coming-into-being of the world [הוויית העולם] was the first change.

But as to what the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] held — that there could be no last motion [לא תהיה שם הנועה אחרונה] — this too is [a position] that is not necessitated from that [same] side. And this [is so] for one who would already say that the conjoined-movable [המתנועע] ceases together with the [cessation] of the motion [יפסק המתנועע יחד מהתנועה], and that its path would be to be moved by that [very] motion [שיתנועע בתנועה ההיא]; and the illustration [המשל] [is] that those balanced things which equal one another [שהזון] cease together with the [cessation] of that motion [יפסק יחד מתנועה ההזה], and since its path is [thus], it would be possible from this side that there be a cessation in the first movable [thing] [שיפסק מהתנועע הראשון], if [the position] is now reversed: that there is a cessation of the [bodies] surrounding it [המתנועע הסבוביה], whose path is to be moved by it [שיתנועע בה].

And it has already been explained [in] the premise which we set down before [שההקדמה] — that the Philosopher must hold that the change [השנוי], which is the corruption of the possibility of the motion's origination [הפסד אפשרות חדוש התנועה], must necessarily be newly produced after the corruption of the motion [אחר הפסד התנועה] — [and that this] is incorrect [היא בלתי צודקת]. And this [is so] because the motion [התנועה] and the possibility of the motion [אפשרות התנועה] are things found together — that which keeps the movable [thing] [המתנועע] [enduring so as] to be moved [להיות מתנועע]; and if this were [so], then this [would] differ on [its] sides [מצדדים מתחלפים]. And this [is so] because the motion, in respect of its matter, is compounded of potency and act [מורכבת מהכח והפעל]; rather, in [that] respect [is] that from which it emerges into act, from the motion [מה שיצא לפעל מהתנועה]; and the possibility [האפשרות] is [that] from whose side is said what is said to complete [the passage] from the motion [להשלים מן התנועה]. And since the matter is so, it is made clear that the motion and the possibility of

the motion [התנועה ואפשרות התנועה] are found together [in] that which keeps this motion [enduring] [שהתמידה התנועה]; and according to what is found together, it is made clear that the corruption [of the two] cannot occur together [שלא ימנע הפסדם יחד] — [contrary to] that which was said: that there is no corruption except after a [further] thing is found [לא יפסד אלא אחר שימצא]; and this is well explained.

And here you have already seen, [in] this explanation, a sign [הראות נגלה] that it has already been explained from us [שכבר יתבאר שיתבאר ממנו] in the case of Reuben [ראובן], to whom is hinted that it is possible to posit [שהוא בלתי אפשר שימות], and [yet] this is [shown] evidently null [מבואר הבטול]; and behold, what would emerge from it is a falsehood [שקר הוא שקר], and this requires that there be [it], and this [is] the premise [ההקדמה] which we [laid down] [אשר חייב] [as] incorrect [בלתי צודקת]. But as to how it is possible that there be explained from it that it is impossible to posit in Reuben [ראובן] a positing [שימה], it is [now] explained. And this [is so]: that if there were there a last sensation [הרגש אחרון] [belonging] to this [the] living being [לזה החי], it has [now] been explained — that what they cease from is [a thing] whose path is to sense [שירגיש], it is the cessation [the consequence] of [the position] that its path is to sense [מהיות דרכו שירגיש]; and behold, a corruption [comes] of the necessity of [its] being [moved by] a path that it would [continue to] sense by [שירגיש] after the cessation [of] the sensing [מההרגש]. Behold, if, then, after the last sensation [אחר ההרגש] [there is one] which is [counted as] resting in the existence of the sensation [שהוא מונח במציאות ההרגש], and when [the position] we have laid down is found in act [נמצא בפעל], it requires from it a falsehood [יחייב ממנו שקר]…

and this would be [a thing] resting [in act] after this last sensation, the sensation [ההרגש] [we have spoken of]; but as for the false consequent [הכזב האפשרי], [it] would not [be] necessitated false from it [לא יתחייב ממנו שקר], if [so], then the falsehood would emerge [from it]; we have posited from Reuben [ראובן] that it is possible to posit it. And since the matter is so, it is made clear that it is not possible to posit in Reuben [ראובן] [such] positing, and this [leads] to the nullity and absurdity [הבטול וההגנות].

Now perhaps one will think that this [argument] obliges the nullity [הבטול], from this [same] explanation that the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] made on this point — namely, perhaps it will be said that the Philosopher did not hold that there [must] be a cessation from the motion [פסק מהתנועה] whose path it is to be moved by it alone [יתנועע בה לבד], but he did hold that there [must] be a cessation of every other motion [נפסק מכל תנועה אחרת], and that this [comes] of the possibilities

[האפשרות] said to corrupt after the corruption of the motion [שיפסד אחר הפסד התנועה]. And since the matter is so, behold it will be thought that from this it is not necessitated [שלא יחויב] the nullity [הבטול] which we mentioned [שזכרנוהו]; and this [is so] because Reuben [ראובן], if there were a positing [of it], behold it would not cease from being moved [לא יפסק משיתנועע] by another motion [בתנועה אחרת], except as we [have] explained. Rather, when we consider the matter of the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] on this point, the explanation will [further] explain that he means by the possibility of the motion [באפשרות התנועה] that whose path is to be moved by it, not [by] another motion [לא תנועה אחרת]; and this [is so] if this [other] possibility be in respect of [its relation] to another motion [ביחס אל הנועה אחרת] — it is made clear that what was not made clear [is] that the possibility of the motion [אפשרות התנועה] [comprises] two parallel things [שני דברים מקבילים]; for there would not [otherwise] be here a reception between them [הקבלה ביניהם], unless [it be] from the side that the possibility is in respect of [its relation] to that [same] motion [ביחס אל התנועה ההיא]. And this — one would indeed think it to be so — [is] because the potency and the act are contraries [הכח והפעל הם סותרים].

And the illustration [המשל]: that it should not be possible that there be found in Reuben [ראובן] blackness in act and in possibility together [השחרות בפעל ובאפשרות יחד]; but if we took the possibility in respect of something other than this [namely] blackness [זולת השחרות], this would not prevent [the matter] — and the illustration [is] that it is possible that there be black in act [שחור בפעל], and [yet] it would be possible that it be white together [לבן יחד]; and all the more so [if] it were possible that, together with this, there should be hot or cold [חם או קר], or [some other] of the things whose custom differs [שינהג מנהג הדברים] [namely, things] that are not blackness and do not receive blackness [שאינם שחרות ולא מקבל השחרות], for these things [could] possibly be found together in act [ימצאו יחד בפעל].

And since the matter is so, it is made clear that the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] meant here, by the possibility of the motion [אפשרות התנועה], that very motion by which the movable [thing] is moved [התנועת ההיא אשר הוא מתנועע בה] in [the case of] this last motion [התנועה האחרונה]; and since the matter is so, it is made clear that what we have already necessitated of [its] nullity [שחייבנוהו מהבטול] [holds]. And further, [even] on its [other] aspect [על פי שנודה], by way of illustration [דרך משל], that after the last sensation [שאחר ההרגש האחרון] there remained possibilities in the existence of the sensation [אפשרות במציאות ההרגש], behold it is not necessitated from this that there be found a last sensation [שם הרגש אחרון] in this [the] living being [לזה החי]. And this [is so] because we are not constrained, with our acknowledging on this [point] some [such] positing [שימה], [to grant] that

there be there a last sensation [counted as] resting [in act] of necessity [מונח הוא בהכרח אחרון]. But it is indeed necessary to posit that there is there a last sensation in the absolute [sense] [הרגש אחרון במוחלט]; and this [is so because] it is made clear that whichever sensation [שאיזה הרגש] is posited [as] last [to belong] to this living being [לזה החי] [is such] that there remains after it a being-moved [whose] path is to sense [שירגיש]: behold it is possible that there be in it [yet] another [sensation] [שיהיה בו אחרון], and it is possible that there be no other after it [שלא יהיה בו אחרון]; and this [is so because] if this possibility emerges into act [יצא האפשרות לפעל], then that sensation [ההרגש ההוא] would not be the last [אחרון]; and if it did not emerge into act after that [other] [emerging] — [namely the act] that keeps that [other] living being [enduring] to be living [שהתמיד החי ההוא להיות חי] — behold that sensation [ההרגש ההוא] would be the last [אחרון]. And according to this, since this possibility could already emerge into act [שכבר אפשר שיצא לפעל], and it is already possible that it not emerge into act [שלא יצא לפעל], behold it is possible in that sensation [בהרגש ההוא] [that it be] the resting [last one] [המונח] which would be…

a last one, and that there be none — but rather that there must be one of necessity, since otherwise [the moving thing] would perish by necessity. Now since the matter stands so, this [conclusion] is not avoided; and we concede, together with this, that there is a way for the motion to come to a halt, just as the Philosopher [הפילוסוף; Aristotle] assumed — by which we mean, on the side on which we settled the matter regarding the last sensation [ההרגש האחרון]. That is to say, it is possible that there be a last one for it, and that there remain in it the possibility of being moved by this motion; for [this possibility persists] as long as it has not issued into actuality [יצא לפעל]. If it issued into actuality, there was no last motion; and if it did not issue into actuality, then this is the last one.

In general, when we posit a world in which [a thing] is required to perish at some time, there is nothing to prevent its perishing being found, by necessity, after the cessation of motion — so that one may say that there already was for it a last motion. And [the matter is] such that there is no requirement that there be some motion to which one might point and say "this one is the last," and that there be none after it; for the possibility of this motion — if it issued into actuality, there was no [last motion], and if it did not issue into actuality, then this is the last one.

And it does not follow that [the moving thing] is required to perish at some particular time — that is, that there be one to which one could point as its [absolutely] last [motion]; this is impossible. Rather, [it perishes] at some time, in the manner in which Reuben [ראובן; placeholder name] is required to die at some

time, yet this does not require that he die at this [particular] time, since he was already required to die at some time. And there is no [necessity] that he die at this time, [for the requirement] is not for dying at this time. So too the matter holds in the world, alike: if we posit that [a thing] perishes, all the more so [does it hold] that, if we posit it, it is possible that there be in it a motion whose motions are the last. Now since the matter stands so, it is explained that there is no requirement [of] this last [motion].

As for what the Philosopher answered on the side of the one who corrupts [the argument] — that the perishing thing is the destroyer [המפסיד] — it is explained from what preceded that he corrupted [his own case] here. And it is explained that, by the explanation that the world does not perish, it is nevertheless required of it; [yet] it will not return to being after it [perishes]. And here it has been explained why the Philosopher answered concerning the motion that is not necessary. And it is explained that for us, too, it is possible that [the motion] cease at some time; but we have explained on this point that there is no doubt about it. Indeed, we have explained on this point what the Philosopher explained — that there was no last motion there —

in our reckoning that this has already been explained, [proceeding] from this point, as we have explained. And in general, whoever has explained the truths [האמתות], the soundness of the truths is strengthened in them; but he weakens them. And this is plainly so.

פרק עשרים וחמשה

(Chapter Twenty-Five)

[Rashi-script sub-rubric:] נתיר בו הספק שיקרה מצד החומר הראשון. [Gloss: In which we resolve the doubt that arises on the side of the first matter.]

The sixth argument [הטענה הששית] that the Philosopher argued is on the side of the nature of the first matter [טבע החמר הראשון]. This [is its content]: he would say that whatever is of equal [status with] the [first] matter is neither generated nor perishes in itself [אינו לא הווה ולא נפסד בעצם]. For if it had a subject [נושא] from which it would come to be — for whatever is in a subject does not separate from that in which [it is] — and it is required of it that there be found, before it comes to be, that from which it comes to be; or [that] it be found in actuality [נמצא בפעל] — and this is entirely a falsehood. Now since the matter stands so, and this was along the path of the first matter, it is explained that the world is required to be eternal [שיהיה עולם שיהיה קדום].

And we say that it is explained, together with what preceded, that it is not required, from this side, that the world be eternal. For we say that the new generation in the first matter is [a matter of] nature, by the renewal explained in the eighteenth chapter of this treatise [פרק השמנה עשר מזה המאמר], and on this point this doubt is resolved completely.

פרק עשרים וששה

(Chapter Twenty-Six)

[Rashi-script sub-rubric:] נתיר בו הספק שיקרה מפני טבע הגשם השמיימי. [Gloss: In which we resolve the doubt that arises on account of the nature of the heavenly body.]

The seventh argument [הטענה השביעית] that the Philosopher argued is on the side of the nature of the heavenly body [טבע הגשם השמיימי]. This [is its content]: every generated thing [כל הווה] comes to be by transformation from its opposite [מהפכו] and perishes [into it] — according to the opposite that is contradictory [הפך הסותר] — so that whatever cannot have an opposite into which it transforms is not generated and does not perish. But as for that which comes to be by transformation from its opposite and perishes into the opposite [הפך] — according to [this principle] it is required by this that the heavenly body [הגשם השמיימי] be without coming-to-be [בלתי הווה], and that the world be eternal [שיהיה עולם שיהיה קדום].

And we say that it is explained, together with what preceded, that this doubt is resolved [שהתר זה הספק]. The doubt is not [valid], because the universal coming-to-be [ההוויה הכללית] is not required to be that in which it is a coming-to-be in part [בחלק] — that is, [a coming-to-be] which is from its opposite and into the opposite. Moreover, this universal coming-to-be is itself likewise [the source of] the partial comings-to-be [ההוויות החלקיות], since these comings-to-be are referred to the will [הרצון]; and we find a thing [proceeding] toward a thing, as in the case of the artifact [מלאכה], of which one says that nature makes [it] from what has no opposite — from that which has no opposite. Moreover, [it is so] also in the comings-to-be whose opposite is a renewal from their transformation [אשר יתחדש מהפכו], just as that whose opposite is a full thing, as is the matter with form [כמו הענין בצורה].

in itself, for it is explained that the world is not prevented from being a coming-to-be on account of the [aforesaid principle]. So too in the natural things [הדברים הטבעיים], the majority of what comes to be — and the majority of the things that

are newly generated [הדברים המהחדשים] are forms in a manner that is not perfect except in part, the forms being [merely] the foundations alone [היסודיות לבד], as we have explained in our exposition in the book on the coming-to-be of composite things [הדברים המורכבים], which is not [a transformation]…

in itself, in accordance with the form that comes to be in that coming-to-be, which is conceived [merely] as a change in name, as to how it is. But the disposition of the matter requires, in the coming-to-be in part [בחלק], that the coming-to-be be the opposite [הפך] of that which comes to be, so that the first form perishes so as to take on the second. But [as for] the coming-to-be that is not the perishing of a thing — [namely] that of the heavenly body — in accordance with what has been explained of its character, it is not [the perishing of a thing], but rather [it is] as the matter is at the extremity of the natural matters [בקצה הענינים הטבעיים]: it is the acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה], and this has already been explained in the first treatise [במאמר הראשון]; and this is possible — that the coming-to-be of the heavenly body be something received [קבול לבד], in that it receives the form of the preservation of the image [שמירת התמונה], and through its mediation [it receives the separate form]. And this is explained, that the heavenly body [גרם השמיימי] is not prevented [from coming to be].

And it will be explained, in respect of that in which there is no doubt that it cannot perish, since the transformation would be into a thing into which the perishing thing perishes — [a thing more eminent] than what preceded.

פרק עשרים ושבעה

(Chapter Twenty-Seven)

[Rashi-script sub-rubric:] נתיר בו הספק, שיקרה מצד טבע הנצחי וההווה והנפסד. [Gloss: In which we resolve the doubt that arises on the side of the nature of the eternal, the generated, and the corrupted.]

The eighth argument [הטענה השמינית] that the Philosopher argued is on the side of the nature of the eternal, the generated, and the corrupted [טבע הנצחי וההווה והנפסד]. This [is its content]: he would say that everything generated [כל הווה] perishes, in that it cannot be that it be imperishable [בלתי נפסד]; and it is explained from the matter of the heavenly body that it cannot [perish], since it cannot be generated [בלתי הווה]. Therefore the Philosopher would say that whatever cannot be generated cannot perish — nor [can] the imperishable be generated.

The root of his words is this: if [we consider] one matter and its contrary [שכנגדו], then behold — just as it is fit that there be in the one thing itself a power [כח] over the one matter, so that it be fit that it have the act of the one from the two contraries [שני ההפכים], so [it is with] the contrary power; for the two contrary acts [שני הפעולות המתנגדות], so it would be fit that there be one time [זמן אחד] for the one of the two, and that there be, for each of the two mutually-transforming powers [הכחות המתהפכים], that the powers be bounded [נגדרים]. For [if] the powers were not bounded — that is, if there be not for one of the two powers a time [זמן] [for it], and for the act of the second power [a time], in a [time] not bounded — the mutually-transforming [powers would not be] bounded. Indeed, it would be possible — [but] if the powers were not bounded, the boundedness would not be found in the power; for just as the active power [הכח הפועל] is, indeed, bounded, so too the things acted-upon [המהפעלות] are, indeed, bounded in the great time [בזמן הגדול], at the boundary of the acts and their perfection [תכלית הפעולות ושלמותה]. And this matter is found when we reckon this power in its proper places [במקומי המיחד],

[Gathering signature: 26*]

not in the far-off place [במקום הרחוק] — and this is the case with Reuben, by way of example: he was already absent by accident at a time in which he has no terminus [אין תכלית לו]. Yet the privations [העדרו] that are found in seed and in blood, from which a [thing] comes to be, are a finite time [תכליתי בזמן]. And one says further that it is not possible that they be found in one thing — [namely] that each one of them be without terminus and without bound [שאין לו תכלית ובלתי בעל תכלית] in itself — as, by way of example, the power of existence [כח המציאות] is not without terminus [בלתי בעל תכלית]. And this [would be so] if it were possible, [in these] matters: if we did not posit that one act issues at some time from the two times [שני העתים], this would be a falsehood as regards [the things] mutually opposed in [the power of] existence and privation [המציאות וההעדר]. Or [if] we were to posit it, this too would be a falsehood, for the two opposites [שני ההפכים] cannot [coexist]. Or [if] we were to posit that one act, from the two powers, and the other, is always absent [נעדרת תמיד] — this is the part that…

there is in [the world] a power that is always [present], such that it is found and is absent [תמידי שימצא ושיעדר]: that which is found is always [present], and the act of the power of privation [כח ההעדר] is without [issuing] into actuality at some time. And if the matter were such that it always issues into actuality, its existence and its issuance would not escape [being] either possible or necessary; for the privation in actuality [ההעדר בפעל] would not escape. And if we were to posit a

new coming-to-be [as] the act of this power, it would be prevented [נמנע]; for the preventions [ההמנעות] are the contradiction of the possibilities [סתירת האפשרות] and the contradiction of [the claim that] the power means to say that its act is always absent [פעולתו נעדרת תמיד]. And [if] we were to posit, and this possibility be found in actuality [נמצא בפעל], there would be a heaviness [כובד; absurdity] — the [thing] required of it from it [being] a falsehood — [namely] the mutually-transforming [powers] together [המתהפכות יחד]; he means to say that the thing would be [perpetually existent] and absent [in privation]. And this is what has been explained, that when we posited it…

[that] the matter be so, it is explained that there is not always [the case], in [the thing] perpetually [existent] — that the matter be so, for the thing has powers that mutually oppose [כחות מתנגדים] [it], bounded and possessed of terminus [נגדר ובעל תכלית]; and on this point the Philosopher would say that the always-existent [תמיד המציאות], in respect of what has already perished [שעבר], perishes in the future [נפסד בעתיד]. [As for] the coming-to-be that would be imperishable [בלתי נפסד] — this is what perishes; and the coming-to-be is that which is found after privation [הנמצא אחר ההעדר]; and if [it be] in the future [בעתיד], then there will be found in it a power of privation [כח ההעדר], a time without [terminus], as has been explained earlier in this. And the thing perpetually [existent] [has] the power of privation [for] a time that is not without terminus, [but] possessed of terminus alone [בעל תכלית בלבד]; for the matter required by this is one, and this is what is possible…

[Gathering signature: 26]

[The argument of chapter 27 continues — answering Aristotle's claim that whatever is generated must perish.]

this view rests on a false assumption. Likewise, when we posit a coming-to-be [הוה] for which there is no temporal terminus, then — since what comes-to-be [המתהוה] is bounded [נגדר] in this way too — there are necessarily two bounded limits [שני גדרים], one of which is prior to the other: privation [ההעדר] and the coming-to-be that perishes [וההוה הנפסד]. For the recipient of the coming-to-be [המקבל ההויה] has a priority over the living thing [as a substrate has over what arises in it], on the model of the way coming-to-be precedes the living thing in man. And once this prior limit is distinguished [from the later one], it makes a difference for this argument [whether one or the other is taken first], so let one set up the syllogism and frame the condition, saying: if the perpetually-existent thing [הדבר הנצחי] is one that does not receive coming-to-be [בלתי מקבל ההויה],

then it likewise does not perish; but if it does not receive coming-to-be, then it is also not generated and not corrupted [בלתי הווה ובלתי נפסד] —

— just as was explained earlier; and this is so of necessity. Now the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] has advanced several further arguments on this point, and we shall present those further arguments before recalling the rest of what he set out at length in this place.

We say, then, regarding what the Philosopher held — namely, that a thing whose contraries are necessarily bounded [שיהיו הכחות נגדרים], so that he drew the comparison here to the particular nearby power [בכח הקרוב המיוחד] — that the existence and the corruption [ההויה … ההפסד] are such that the road [the path of the thing's existence] either has no temporal terminus or does have a terminus. For if the matter were thus — that the road to existence had no terminus, while the road to corruption [had a terminus] — that would be the very nullity [הבטול] that he has explained, and this matter would be evident; for everything is [otherwise inconsistent]. And as for the matter we have adduced — that one and the same thing is bounded such that it is not prevented by this from being a world that comes-to-be [היות העולם הווה] — we maintain that its road to coming-to-be is for a time without terminus [זמן … בלתי בעל תכלית], just as we established earlier.

And if we have posited that this very road [to corruption] should be in a bounded time [בזמן בעל תכלית] — that is, the world['s corruption] — we would not be granting it a power for corruption [כח על ההפסד]; for from this argument it would necessarily follow that the world would not [perish]. We have therefore lodged here a power directed toward corruption in the body which comes-to-be from it [the matter] — and this is self-evident.

And in general: had the matter run by way of nature [בדרך הטבע], it would have been impossible for the natural [course] to be its contrary of necessity; but inasmuch as it is the Creator [הבורא] who acts — as has been explained in what preceded — it will not [be bound to perish]. And once it comes-to-be, just as has been explained, this whole

argument [bears upon] the matter. And if the Philosopher says to us that the thing is unbounded with respect to corruption [בעל תכלית … ההפסד] in past and future, as he holds — then this is the nullity over which there is dispute. For if it were possible for [the existence] to be divided

— that is, divided into a part belonging to the unbounded time — and were one to take it that what has no terminus has a part bounded by that very [unbounded]

time, [a contradiction follows]. And it would follow that what is itself unbounded should have a part [yet] greater [than another part] of that which has no terminus, since whatever has no terminus is greater than any [finite] part of it; and this is void [בטל], according to what was said in explaining what came after this matter. Hence it follows necessarily that, regarding what is unbounded, if the matter were not posited thus, [the contradiction stands]. We say to him: but even if we grant that the world should be unbounded with respect to corruption in past and future, as the Philosopher holds, this division [of an infinite time into parts] is itself in dispute — namely, whether what is unbounded admits of being divided. And if it were possible to divide it, [the parts] would be gathered into a sum greater [than the whole], since whatever has no terminus

[is greater than any part of it]. Now this is evident: that it is possible, in unbounded time [בזמן הבלתי בעל תכלית], for there to be a part with respect to the side of the unbounded — that is, a part belonging to unbounded time with respect to the side on which the time is bounded — not [a part] from the side [of being unbounded] itself, as is self-evident. Yet it would indeed be false to hold that it is unbounded from the side on which it is bounded — that is, from the side of addition [ההוספה]. But from the side on which it is bounded, [the time] is such that it receives addition [שיקבל בו ההוספה] when one adds to it a [further] time —

— that is, a bounded time, since the time it is bounded by is bounded. And given that the matter is thus, [the upshot] is the manner in which the time of the world's existence is unbounded, [yet] each of these [bounded] times [composing it] is bounded; and the time [taken altogether] will be such that each part of it is unbounded with respect to the bounded. And the [following] necessarily follows from the fact that there necessarily holds a time for the privation of the world [זמן הֶעְדֵּר העולם] — [which is] one of these unbounded times [in the direction of past or future]; and this [implies] that there would be a world prior [to it] [… שיהיה קדום], if one posited that there were a privation prior to the world's coming-to-be, [yet not] in a bounded time.

We would also be positing, then, that the time of the world's existence is perpetually [תמיד] [unbounded] with respect to addition; and this [tends] toward the unending [אל לא תכלית], just as has been explained — so that the nullity which we maintained [follows], namely that there is nothing greater [than that] which has no terminus, [and thus] of necessity it is not the case that the world is prior [קדום]. And inasmuch as it is evident from what we recalled of the argument of the Philosopher that whatever has unbounded contraries [הכחות הבלתי נגדרים] — each of them taking hold [of the thing] — [yields] that the subject

[הנושא] would be perpetually devoid of [some of] its actions [נעדר תמיד מפעולות], since those actions [are such that] there is no intermediate between them; or [yields] that there would be in it actions at every time [בכל הזמן] — and this too is false; or [yields] that one [action] is in it always and the other is always absent — this too is false. And given that the matter is thus, and that this [is rooted in] the nature of time [טבע הזמן]: when one posits a time in which each of [the contraries] from its own side and being-bounded takes hold, such that it would seize each [in turn] —

— that [precisely] is what the Philosopher held: namely that this is impossible without [the subject's] being perpetually devoid of [one of the contraries], because if one posits the matter thus, [then] one [action] is always devoid and the other [present] together [with it]; and so we say that this is unsound [בלתי צודק]. For of one of the [two] contraries the action is always found in the affirmative [בחיוב] and acts thus; and if one posits the matter thus, then it will not be the case [that there is a time] in which [neither acts]. [The alternatives are:] either a single one of the actions [holds] in the affirmative and [the argument] would be self-contradictory [סותר נפשו]; and the illustration is that [the world's existence] is possible and what perishes is possible — [then] what holds [perpetually] would be the necessary [מחויב], and this is the evident nullity. And if we [grant] that each of [the actions] holds [for] the unbounded time [as] bounded, then it would not befall — that is, that the action which is found always

[in the affirmative] — that one of the contraries should be perpetually found and the other perpetually absent; [from which] it follows of necessity that the time in which it is found is [itself] unbounded, and this is unsound. For [the contradiction] is not avoided [merely] by positing in the affirmative that the action of the other [contrary] is perpetually absent in the affirmative; rather there would [still] be possibility here [אפשרות], and this is the contrary of what [the argument requires], namely [that] the [one] action holds in the affirmative and the other, its correlate, holds in possibility. The illustration is that, if the thing were necessary, what is found would be necessary — [whereas] it is possible that what is found be not found; [so] each of the actions [stands] in possibility in every [respect], [and] therefore this is false. And we propose, for the clarification of this point, that what is posited as found — from whose positing no nullity follows — is that which it is possible for the subject to be. It is not as when [a thing] is posited as found in the manner of Reuben who is standing: for Reuben, while standing, it is possible that he should sit — except that it is not [possible for him to sit while] he is standing, since the two contraries cannot be combined in him; yet it was indeed possible for him to sit once the standing ceases from him, for he is

receptive to sitting. But if Reuben is posited as [already] sitting in him, that being together with the cessation of the standing from him, then [the assumption] is void — for this star is a possible star [כוכב אפשרי]. And even though the [one action] is not found always — since the other is not found always —

— [it follows] in the absence of the division [of contraries] taking hold of it, [so] this would [be the case]: one would be positing the existence of what was not [previously found], [where] it would have been possible for [the other] to be found. It has been explained that, if one posits that one of [the two contraries] acts in the affirmative [בחיוב], and the action which is its correlate [המקבילו] — it would follow from this assumption [that it is] false; for if the action that is its correlate were removed, [the contradiction] would not befall. But if one posits that the absent action is found [נמצא] [together with it] — [as] the Philosopher [does] — then it is fitting that there should be found from it [the subject] that whose finding is impossible. And inasmuch as the matter is [thus], the nullity [follows]: namely, that it would be false [to say] that it is impossible [for it not to be]; for by this assumption is found that which it is possible should be found —

— that is, [should] the world be found always and not absent [נמצא תמיד … נעדר]: then it does not follow from this [that it is] necessary that there be in it an absence together with its being-found; rather it is fitting that there follow from this what it is impossible should be found — and this is permitted [מותר]. And it would be astonishing if this were hidden from the Philosopher; nor is it fitting to ascribe to him concealment [העלם] in a matter like this, [which] he himself has already explained at length. He does not grant the truth [נותן האמת] [on] this [point] in [accordance with] what he said: namely, that after these arguments [קצה אלו הטענות], [there remain other arguments]; [yet] these arguments are not settled [נוחנות] [as] the truth in this [matter], according as [some] thing that comes-to-be does not unavoidably fall under corruption — [for] it would follow [otherwise] that this end [קצה] of those [arguments] is nullified. And if [the whole] were void without [there being] possibility [for] the proposal [הצעה], it would suffice as a notice [הערה] to whoever understands his words — that there is a demonstration [מופת] [bearing] upon what it is impossible should be found here…

[and] it has been explained as null. These arguments which we recalled regarding the Philosopher — most of the argument that will be mentioned after this will be [resolved], [and] the Philosopher will advance still further arguments [to show] that there remains [a thing] perpetually-existent [נצחי], as Plato [אפלטון] held.

[Plato's position, distinguished from Aristotle's:] Between the perpetually-found [הנמצא תמיד] and the perpetually-absent [הנעדר תמיד], [a thing] is always sound [תמיד יצדק]; and it is neither found always nor absent always; between them [is something] found at [some] times [מהעתים] and absent at [other times] [נעדר], such that it comes-to-be and perishes [שיהיה הווה … נפסד] — since the intermediate [האמצעי] is not sound, the merchant [reasoner] is bound to argue against him concerning [this]. As for the intermediate which is sound of it [שיצדק עליו] —

[End of page 408; the chapter's argument continues on the following pages.]

— [it belongs to] the nature of the [thing's] terminus. From this it appears that what comes-to-be and what perishes [ההווה והנפסד] is not perpetually-existent [בלתי תמיד המציאות], just as it appeared earlier that what has no terminus is perpetually-existent and is not perpetually-corrupted [בלתי נפסד]. For if we posit that what comes-to-be and perishes is perpetually-existent and perpetually-imperishable, it would necessarily follow that a thing has no potentiality for existence and for privation [perpetually] — and this is false, in accordance with what has been explained earlier.

Moreover, the intermediate between what comes-to-be and what perishes [האמצעי בין הנמצא והנפסד] is perpetually-existent and is not perpetually-absent [נעדר]; nor is it perpetually-existent and never-perishing. And when this is so, then the intermediate is that which has the potentiality both for existence and for privation [כח המציאות וכח ההעדר]; and so each of these [extremes] is the reverse of the intermediate. For it is fitting that each of them be the reverse of the intermediate as regards this comparison: namely, that what has the potentiality for existence and privation is what comes-to-be. And whatever has the potentiality for existence and privation [together] perishes; so, then, whatever comes-to-be perishes.

And thus it is explained that whatever perishes by its very kind comes-to-be. Now if this is so, then it has been explained that it is impossible for a thing that does not perish [בלתי נפסד] to come-to-be, and [impossible] for a thing that does not come-to-be to perish; and from this it is explained that whatever does not come-to-be is imperishable, and whatever is imperishable does not come-to-be.

There is a further argument, namely this: that everything in which there is a potentiality to act or to be acted upon [שיפעל או שיתפעל] — its potentiality is found within a limit [בתכלית]: [a limit] to that which it is possible for it to act upon or to be acted upon by that thing within that limit, [emanating] from the agent or

from the [things] acted upon by that very thing. And that within which it acts is defined [נגדר], according to what was previously demonstrated; and that within which there is for it [the matter] in question, and the potentiality for generation and corruption — the time within which it receives coming-to-be is defined, and likewise the time within which it receives corruption. From this it followed that the things which receive coming-to-be and corruption have a limit [בעלי תכלית]. And no potentiality is found except where there is one of two things: either a finite potentiality or an infinite potentiality. The finite potentiality, [we say], is bounded [נגבל], because it has a beginning and an end; whereas the infinite [potentiality] is unbounded [בלתי נגבל]. But if one were to say that there exists a thing perpetually-coming-to-be [נצחי הווה], [then] it has a finite, [yet] unbounded potentiality, since [otherwise] one would not find [it] to be greater [than it is], for [only thus] would one find a thing perpetually-coming-to-be.

And [as for] that whose limit is such that it cannot be divided [further] in part, until some of the things would have an inexhaustible potentiality [כח אין תכלה] with respect to the past, and to part of them an inexhaustible potentiality with respect to the future — and to part of them an inexhaustible potentiality in [both of] the two parts together [i.e., past and future] — this necessitates a remote consequence [דבר רחוק]. For there would then be that whose limit is no greater than what has no limit at all; for were the sum of the two potentialities gathered, there would be no limit to that which has no limit. And if one were to say that what is possible should be found in coming-to-be, and [its] potentialities be corrupted, [as] unbounded — [then] the Philosopher would [already] say that this necessitates the falsehood mentioned in the proposal [בהצעה], namely the [supposed] resolution of the possible-false [האפשרי שקר]. From this it appears that the Philosopher [holds it] impossible for what comes-to-be [ever] to be imperishable, and impossible for what is imperishable [ever] to come-to-be.

Now the Philosopher recalled, in confirming this view, a further argument besides these — but we have not seen [it].

— for we shall investigate these arguments first, before we mention the remaining arguments, since it is fitting [to do so] on account of the multitude of his arguments in this inquiry.

Let us say, then, regarding what the Philosopher said: that between the perpetually-existent and the perpetually-absent [הנמצא תמיד והנעדר תמיד] is the intermediate, which is neither found always nor absent always; and that which is found at some times and absent at [other] times — what is fitting [to say] of it is that it comes-to-be and perishes [שיהיה הווה נפסד], since one cannot truly say of it

that it is neither coming-to-be nor perishing, [for] it is not [a] necessary [being] [בלתי מחויב]. For it has already been truly said of [what is] imperishable that it is not found always and is not absent always; and likewise the matter [stands] with the imperishable thing in [respect of] corruption [בנפסד]. And since the matter is so, it is therefore not necessary that there always truly be an intermediate between these two termini, [a thing] that neither comes-to-be nor perishes; rather, it is by necessity that it should come-to-be or perish. And if it were not so, what the Philosopher said would not hold — namely, that from the fact that the unbounded receptive contraries [הכחות המקבלים הבלתי נגדרים], each of which takes hold [of the thing] at every time, as he indicated earlier — [for] if it were so, the imperishable thing would, for example, be found-and-absent perpetually, absolutely, [or] the operation of privation [פעולת ההעדר] would itself perpetually be the operation of [the thing's] being-found.

Rather, [we say,] if this point necessitated [the conclusion the] Philosopher [drew] — [then,] by reason of what he already indicated earlier — there is no necessity in this, [as] has already been explained; for there is in [his words] no [proof] that this is necessary [שאין זה מחויב] in what we said earlier; nor is there any benefit in repeating the matters [doubly] [בכפול הדברים].

Now [here is] how it is explained that "the imperishable that comes-to-be" or "the imperishable that perishes" is truly said of each of them that it is found and absent, or [that] it is not found always and not absent, or that it is found at some times and absent at [other] times — that [thing] being the intermediate between the perpetually-found and the perpetually-absent. This will be explained from what was said. And [moreover] this — that "the found" [הנמצא] — is said of [a thing] more [properly] than what "the absent" [הנעדר] is said of it; for "the found" [is said] of what comes-to-be, that is to say, of the found-which-comes-to-be [הנמצא ההוה], namely of [that] which is the reverse of the absent; and of the perpetually-found imperishable [thing], that is, that which is prior, [it is said] that nothing is prior to its existence. Likewise "the absent" [הנעדר] is said more [properly] than what "the perishable" is said of it — that is, what is said of [a thing] as "perishable" [הנפסד], [the case] in which it is prior that it be deprived-of-existence [קדם להעדרו מציאות]; and of the perpetually-absent-in-passing-away [נעדר תמיד בחלוף] — that of which it is [the case] that no existence is prior to its privation.

And since the matter is so, it is explained that, since already it is truly said of "the imperishable that comes-to-be" [ההוה הבלתי נפסד] that it is found and absent, this is because "the found" is said of it by reason of its being [in] coming-to-be, and

"the found" is said of [it as] coming-to-be, just as earlier. And by this it is explained that, since already it is truly said of "the imperishable that comes-to-be" that it is found and absent, and that there is no need to come [to it further] in the light — [namely] that already it is truly said of each of them that it is not found always and not absent always — one means [thereby] to say of "the imperishable that comes-to-be" [that it is] imperishable, and one does not necessitate that everything imperishable comes-to-be.

And since the matter is so, it is explained that there is no need to truly say of the intermediate between the perpetually-found and the perpetually-absent that it is always coming-to-be-and-perishing, as the Philosopher said. And if the Philosopher made the intermediate between them necessary — that it should be coming-to-be-and-perishing — [it would be] because [its] nature is distinct, differing in nature from [its] terminus, so that it is the reverse of them, as was recalled [earlier].

And [since the matter] necessitates that it should not be combined with them in privation of the limit at all — see, this necessity is exceedingly weak; for [it holds] only in [the] manner in which the nature of the intermediate is distinct in nature from the two termini. Hence there are truly said of it these two descriptions [התוארים] by which the termini are described: namely, that already it is truly said of the intermediate that it is found and absent. And hence it necessarily follows that its nature should be distinct in nature from the two termini, namely, that the intermediate between two things is necessarily of the being of those two things together, or [of] their privation, [in the case] in which it is truly said of it [the description] itself — [a point] the Philosopher already recalled in many places.

But [now consider] what the Philosopher said: that the coming-to-be and the corruption [ההווה וההפסד] are the reverse [of each other], being [things] each of which is the reverse of the other; for they are reversed about the intermediate between the perpetually-found and the perpetually-absent. And see what it is that has the potentiality for existence and for privation [כח על המציאות ועל ההעדר]: it is explained that [a thing] that is non-necessary [בלתי מחויב] — that is, that of which there is [potentiality] for existence and for privation, namely this [thing] of which there is the potentiality for existence and privation, that is, the found-and-absent [הנמצא הנעדר] at the time of [its] passing-away, which is the intermediate between the perpetually-found and the perpetually-absent — is more inclusive [יותר כולל] than [either] coming-to-be or perishing. For "the found" is more inclusive than coming-to-be, since it is truly said of coming-to-be, [yet] this would

[also] be [the case] if [a thing] were [such] that it is possible that it should be found [as] a thing described by this very description.

And likewise it is explained that "the found, which is absent" [הנמצא הנעדר] is more inclusive than "the perishable," for it is truly said of the perishable and of the imperishable.

And since the matter is so, it is explained that one does not necessitate that the coming-to-be be the reverse of the perishing; rather, it is truly said of each [thing] that it comes-to-be-and-perishes [שיצדק שכל הוה נמצא ונעדר], and one does not necessitate that everything which comes-to-be is absent and perishes; and from this it is explained that already it is truly said that not everything which is imperishable comes-to-be. And by this it is explained that it does not necessitate that everything which comes-to-be is absent, and it does not necessitate that everything which is found-and-absent comes-to-be; and so it does not necessitate that everything imperishable comes-to-be.

But the Philosopher made this necessity necessary here according to what he supposed [מה שאחשוב]; for, according to what he already explained, it is impossible that there should be found, in a single thing, two contrary potentialities not [mutually] defined [שני כחות מתנגדים בלתי נגדרים]. Hence it would be necessary that there should be [some] one of which there is the potentiality for existence and the potentiality for privation in coming-to-be — and on account of this he turned to recall this root and to add upon it in the light [further]. And already we have explained in what we said earlier that there is no necessity in this root, and so there is no need to reply to it here.

And [the Philosopher] likewise made it necessary that there should not be found a thing perpetually-coming-to-be [נצחי] in what [pertains to] the future; for the coming-to-be has [only] a [finite] potentiality, since the coming-to-be is necessarily prior [to it], and in all the passing time [בכל הזמן החולף] it has no limit.

There is a further argument, namely this: that if there were found a primordial thing [דבר קדמון] that perishes or comes-to-be perpetually [נצחי], it would necessarily be that the imperishable should be imperishable, and the perpetually-existent should be non-existent [הנמצא בלתי נמצא]. And [the result is] that, if we do not posit a time for the coming-to-be distinct by [its very] nature from the time of the corruption, it would be necessary that there be a possibility of its corruption, [its] coming-into-being [holding] in every possibility [whatever], and it would be necessary that it should be coming-to-be-and-perishing together, or

neither coming-to-be nor perishing together, according to what has been explained earlier; and this is wholly false.

This, indeed, [is what] the Philosopher made necessary, according to what he indicated, and [according to] the root that [holds] that the unbounded contraries cannot be [such] that each of them takes hold [of the thing] at every time. And when [one] joins this to that root which [holds] that it has already been explained that this possibility goes out [to the result] that, when this possibility comes-to-be [as] false, [it is] impossible. He necessitated [therefore] that this [thing] which is non-necessary [מה שהונה] is impossible-of-being [בלתי אפשר].

There is yet a further argument, namely this: that the Philosopher would say that it is of the [class of] false [things] [מן השקר] that there should be a thing that comes-to-be and does not perish, [or] a thing imperishable that does not come-to-be. This is because [as for] "the imperishable that comes-to-be and the imperishable that perishes," it is impossible that its existence should come-to-be by chance [במקרה] and not from their own essence [ולא מפאת עצמם], but [only] from the side of [their] nature [מצד טבעם]; and this, because the alternation of the natures of the existing things [התחלף טבעי הנמצאים] is the cause [הסבה] of [a thing's] receiving part of [its] coming-to-be and corruption, and [its] not receiving part of this. And if this were so, then [there would be] a nature receptive of coming-to-be and corruption — [yet] it would be impossible that there should remain a perpetual thing [נצחי]; and likewise, if there were here a nature receptive of perpetuity [התמידות], it would be impossible that it be made to perish in it. Rather, it would [then] be possible to transfer the necessary nature [טבע ההכרחי] to the nature of the possible [אל טבע האפשרי].

And see, this argument is the strongest of all the arguments by which the Philosopher argued on this matter. And if one were to say that the privation in the perpetually-coming-to-be is, with respect to the past time, [merely] relative [בערך] [to it] — and that it does not necessitate a thing of the [false] propositions mentioned, if one posits the perpetually-coming-to-be in what [pertains to] the future as eternal-from-all-priorities [בכל הקדמות], whether these or those many [priorities] [האלה או ברובם] — see, the Philosopher would reply to this argument and say that it is of the things known in their very selves that we have said that there is in a thing a potentiality by which we mean that it should be relative [בערך] to the future time; and if it were understood from what we said, that there is in a thing a potentiality by which there should be that very potentiality [namely] with respect to the past time, [then] there would be the past time and the future together [as] one [thing] — and this is false.

There is yet a further argument, namely this — and it is [the one] which already appears, upon investigation, among the existing things: that all the imperishable [things] that come-to-be perish, and all that comes-to-be perishes. And this appears in all kinds of the four [types of] change [מיני השנויים הארבעה]; and this investigation reinforces what appears from the imperishable [things that] come-to-be, namely that they are [things] of which there are contraries, and that for the perpetual [נצחי] it is fitting that it should have no reverse [שלא יהיה לו הפך].

And after this, the Philosopher reinforced his view by the agreement of the foregoing nations and the generations passing-away [הקודמות והדורות החולפים] who are in the heavens — [for these are] the place which the Lord, blessed be He, set apart for the perpetuity of their existence, and [for] warding off corruption from them, [as distinct] from the rest of existing things. And this [accords] with what [Aristotle] traced; for the Philosopher devoted a section [שער] [to it] in the [course of] the third [book] of these arguments, all of them. And [in] this he relied on the agreement of those who came before [him in] this view: [namely,] that if this inquiry, as explained by way of speculation, were complete [שלם], there would have been no need for the agreement of those who came before [him].

Let us turn now to what was entailed by the first of these arguments. If it were the case here that the generated thing remained eternal [שישאר נצחי], that would be because it is something generated at every one of the times of the elapsed past [בכל העתות אשר בזמן החולף] without there being any limit to those times — that is, it would be something for which it is possible that it have been generated at every one of the times of the elapsed past. But when we posit this possibility as realized in actuality [בפעל], a falsehood follows, namely that the world be both found and absent at once [נמצא ונעדר יחד]; and this is false. So this disproof [ההר] is evident from what was set out earlier; for if this were not so, then it would be possible, in the very respect in which it is posited, for the thing to be found.

And if someone were to say to us: even granting that this possibility is not realized [שלא יונח זה האפשר נמצא עם מקבילו] — well, a falsehood follows from that too, namely that the imperishable thing [ההווה בלתי הווה] would be something generated which, being generated at every one of the times of the elapsed past without there being any limit to them, would be obliged to be a generated thing that is imperishable; and this is false. We said, accordingly, that the case is not so — that if one posits the thing to have existed there [שיהיה שם] for a time prior to the coming-to-be of the world [קודם הוויית העולם], that has already been shown to be impossible at any of the times for which it is supposed there to be a possibility that it be generated — that is, a time prior to the past for which there is no end

[שאין שעור]. So [the imperishable thing] would have to be found at that time, after privation [אחר ההעדר]; and given that this is so, it has been shown that the consequence does not follow — that this be generated yet imperishable [שיהיה בהווה שהוא בלתי הווה].

Now as for what was entailed by the second argument, we have already explained there that it rests upon the things that are conducted [המתנהגים], when one grasps a thing through them at every time [כל הזמן] — and this is a thing that is not necessary [בלתי מחויב], as was set out earlier. And further: that the possibility already posited in it is found in such a way that it could not have failed to be possible [שלא היה בו אפשר]. And given that this is so, then a falsehood follows from it; for it would not be obliged in [respect of] that wherein it is impossible that it not be, as we explained earlier. And if someone says that what was already posited in it is found in such a way that it [merely] is possible [שהוא נמצא שהוא אפשר] — this is evident, because one of these proofs grasps [the matter] at every time, [namely] that the actual existence of the world [שמציאות העולם] — and [yet] its actual existence is [only] possible at every one of its times [אפשר הוא בכל עת מהזמן]. And if we grant that this possibility is realized in actuality, a falsehood follows from it, namely that the world be both found and absent at once [נמצא ונעדר יחד]; and given that this is so, that of it which is impossible is also not warranted [בלתי צודק] — we said that this is not warranted — and this, indeed, since what was already posited

to be found is something that could not fail to be: that is, something which it was already possible should be found or not be found, [yet] not both found and not-found together [לא שימצא ולא ימצא יחד], for this would be impossible — and this is what has been explained in itself [מבואר בנפשו].

And if someone says: it is not possible that the generated thing here should remain eternal [שישאר נצחי], inasmuch as the recipient of privation [שהמקבל ההעדר] is by nature prior to the generated thing [קודם בטבע על ההווה], as the Philosopher mentioned — given that this is so, then there would be in the world a power directed toward privation [כח על ההעדר]; and what has within it a power directed toward privation is not eternal [אינו נצחי]. But this has already been posited [as] false [וכבר הונח זה שקר]; and there is no [warrant] for saying that there would be in it a power directed toward privation in [respect of] its relation to the elapsed past [ביחס אל הזמן העובר], nor does this nullification [הבטול] follow from it. For that proof is evident in its bearing on what is said in [respect of] its relation to the future time [ביחס אל הזמן העתיד] — as the Philosopher said. We said to him: it is not necessary, in [respect of] what is generated from it, that the

world be a recipient of privation [מקבל ההעדר]; rather, it is a recipient of coming-to-be [מקבל ההוויה] when the Agent wills [it] — not [a recipient] of coming-to-be in itself [בעצמו], from its own beginning [התחלה], and not [a recipient] of the contrary [either], as has already been explained in our discussion. And this possibility, indeed, was found prior to [its] reception of coming-to-be [קודם קבולו ההוויה]; but after the reception of coming-to-be there is no possibility there at all [אין שם אפשרות כלל]. For if there were a possibility there of privation, the possibility would have to belong to it from the side of the Agent [מצד הפועל], since it has within itself no power directed at this; and this has already been explained beyond doubt — that it is impossible for it to have within itself a power directed at this, [a power] from the side of the Agent.

In sum, then, privation was for the corporeal thing [לגשם] that was generated from the world by nature [מטבעו], because its very being is stripped of every nature [משולל מכל הטבעים], and from this there remains in it a deficiency [נשאר בזה החסרון] — until the Name, blessed be He, brings it to acquire [שהקנהו] these natures that are found in it. And given this, it has been explained that the possibility belonging to it was [the possibility] of receiving coming-to-be, not of receiving privation [שהיה לו הוא לקבול ההוויה, לא לקבול ההעדר].

Now as for what the Philosopher said — that the generated thing is by its nature perishable [נפסד הוא מצד טבעו], because it has a contrary [שיש לו הפך], and that for this reason it is necessary that every generated thing perish [שיהיה כל הווה נפסד], since the nature that obliges it to coming-to-be does not in itself oblige it to privation [אינו בעינו יחייב לו ההפסד] — as has been disclosed by these very things that are found here, namely that they are all found to be generated [things] that perish [שנמצאם כלם הווים נפסדים], since they have no nature directed at coming-to-be [טבע על ההוויה], inasmuch as they have a contrary; for [a thing] that has a contrary, behold, there is no nature for it directed at coming-to-be, and for this reason it would be obliged that the world be imperishable [שיהיה בלתי הווה] — to this we reply that it is not necessary, [in respect] of the world, that it be imperishable [שלא יחויב מזה בעולם שיהיה בלתי הווה]. For we ourselves concede that it has no nature directed at coming-to-be, but [we deny] the [conclusion regarding] perishing and coming-to-be [ההפסד וההוויה]: since it has a contrary, this very fact does not prevent its having been generated in the manner already set out.

In sum, this matter has already been explained in chapter twenty-six [בפרק הששה ועשרים], [namely] this proposition — that it is not prevented that the world come-to-be even though it has no contrary [מפני שאין לו הפך]. And if someone says that,

in [the world's] very nature [שהטבע בעינו], coming-to-be is required of it [שחייב לו ההוויה], as though one should say [that this is] the will of the Name, blessed be He [רצון השם יתברך], it would be fitting that perishing also be required of it [ראוי שיחייב לו ההפסד], just as we find in [the case of] the things that are here, where the nature that requires coming-to-be of them requires perishing of them [שחייב להם ההוויה יחייב להם ההפסד] — we reply to him that this requirement [החיוב] is utterly weak [חלוש מאד]. And this [has been] explained already: that it is the way of the Name, blessed be He [שמדרך השם יתברך], that there should come from Him existence and the good [שיבא ממנו המציאות והטוב], not perishing and the bad [לא ההפסד והרע]; whereas the contrary, behold, its [proper] path would be to be an instrument of coming-to-be

and of perishing. And you see that it is so also in things whose [very] beginning, the thing sought [in producing them], is the will [הרצון] — these being the matters [העניינים] that come to be by craft [במלאכה], which have no power directed at perishing in [respect of] the manner in which they come to be by craft. The illustration is the chair fashioned by craft [שהכסא הנעשה במלאכה]: it is not made to perish [לא יחוייב הפסדו] in [respect of] that wherein it was made by craft; rather, perishing befalls it because of the wood of which it is [made], it being a natural corporeal thing compounded of [several] contraries [גשם טבעי מורכב מהפכים].

But as for what the Philosopher argued — from the consensus of the ancients [מצד הסכמת הקודמים] that the heavens should be a place for the Name, blessed be He [מקום לשם יתברך] — this is something one need not reply to. For the truth is not weakened by reason of the consensus of men to the contrary [על חלופו]; even granting [the existence of] something on which they agreed, this too is not unconnected to what has been explained here regarding the matter of the coming-to-be of the world [מענין הוויית העולם]. Indeed, we ourselves may say, by way of expanding the language [על צד הרחבת הלשון], that the Divine is in the heavens [שהאלהים בשמים], inasmuch as the things found there are closer in their rank [קרובות למדרגתו] — there being no limit to the worth of what is found there [אין שעור מהנמצאות] — than what is [found] here.

And here it has been explained that none of the objections by which the Philosopher argued in this matter is necessary — [the claim] that it be impossible for a generated thing to be eternal [בלתי נצחי]. And it is a wonder, on the part of those who expound the Philosopher's words [מהמפרשים דברי הפלוסוף], that they believed these objections to be true demonstrations [מופתים אמתיים], and held it necessary, on account of them, that this should be [the case], namely that the

acquired intellect [השכל הנקנה] should perish — and that [perishes] by way of utter destruction [בהכליה הבטול]. My contention is [rather] that what perishes is that which has causes of perishing [מה שאין לו סבות ההפסד — that what lacks causes of perishing does not perish]. This has already been explained, by a little reflection [במעט עיון]: that what is such that it has no cause of perishing is obliged not to perish [שלא יפסד]; and the acquired intellect [שהשכל הנקנה] has no causes of perishing [אין לו סבות ההפסד], as has been explained in our discussion. It is impossible, in [respect of] that which has no cause of perishing, that it perish; rather, in the first conception [בהמונה הראשונה — at the very outset] the acquired intellect is [a thing] that it is impossible should perish [אי אפשר שיפסד].

פרק עשרים ושמנה

Chapter Twenty-Eight

[Chapter subtitle:] Drawing attention to the doubt arising from what the Philosopher argued — [namely] that it is impossible that all things should fall under coming-to-be [שאי אפשר שיהיו כל הדברים נופלים תחת ההוויה].

The ninth argument by which the Philosopher argued, to establish that it is impossible for the generated world to be eternal [שאי אפשר לעולם שיהיה הווה נצחי], is this: he says that it is impossible that all things should fall under coming-to-be [שאי אפשר שיהיו כל הדברים נופלים תחת ההוויה]. For every generated thing, if it be generated, is [either] a body or [something] in a body [גשם או בגשם]; and if all things were generated, each one after [a state in which] it was not [מחווים אחר שלא היו], it would be necessary that the body itself be [included] in the totality of the generated [שיהיה הגשם בכללו מהווה] absolutely [במוחלט] — meaning [that there would have to be] a full body [מלא גשם] — and it would be necessary that there be prior [שיקדם] to the coming-to-be of the body a void in which it could come to be [רקות שיהיה בו יתהוה]; for the [proper] place [of a body] is what reciprocates the [thing] coming-to-be [מהברת המתהוה]. And likewise, then, the coming-to-be of a full body where there had been no body is an absolute falsehood [שקר], just as [is] the coming-to-be of a body from a body [that is only] potentially a body [גשם מגשם בכח] — meaning, [the coming-to-be] of matter without form [מחומר בלתי צורה]; for matter cannot be stripped of form [אי אפשר בו שיפשיט צורה], since were these stripped of form [אלו הפשיט צורה], it would be [a case of] what does not exist in actuality being [posited as] existent [מה שלא ימצא בפעל נמצא], and this is false. And given this, it would be necessary, [on that view], that the body be imperishable [שיהיה הגשם בלתי הווה].

We say that this is evident from what has already been explained in chapter eighteen [בפרק השמנה עשר] — that this proposition, [namely] that it is impossible that the coming-to-be of the world be from a body devoid of all form [מגשם נעדר כל צורה], was indeed [shown to be]

possible in the lower matter [בחמר השפל] that should be devoid of all form, on account of the elemental forms that are found [הצורות היסודיות הנמצאות] in it. As for that wherein it [the lower matter] could be stripped of these [שיופשט מהם] — well, since these natures are within it, it was not impossible that it be devoid of all form, but [rather] it was [shown to be] necessary [היה מחויב], as was explained earlier. And it is fitting that you know that this possibility — [the possibility] that belongs to the prime matter [לחמר הראשון] for receiving every one of the forms [לקבל כל הצורות] — is precisely on account of these forms we have mentioned; for it is not possible apart from this [אי אפשר זולת זה]. For it is impossible that there be a possibility [belonging] to matter [that is] only matter [לחמר רק מצורה]; for if it had a possibility [of receiving form], its relation [יחסו] to all the forms would be one [single] relation [יחס אחד], and this has been explained [to be] null [הבטול]. And [the conclusion is] that the possibility is [directed] to a particular thing [אל דבר מיוחד]. In sum, then, the possibility is found [as belonging] to a thing [that is the bearer] of a particular form [לדבר בעל צורה מיוחדת] and to a particular form [צורה מיוחדת], as though one should say that the copper [הנחשת] has within it a possibility directed at something's coming to be from it that is derived from it [שיתהוה ממנו הזורדיט [?]]. And in this manner the prime matter [החמר הראשון] was alive with a power [כחיי] for receiving every one of the forms, in part [קצתם] from the side of the natures within which they are changed [שישתנה בהם] into a temperament [אל מזג] — and [thus] a form spreads out and clothes itself [ויפשט צורה וילבש] in a form pertaining to that [particular] temperament [המתיחסת למזג ההוא].

And here this doubt has been resolved and brought to completion [ונשלם], in that the disproof has been resolved [בהתרו] — every one of the doubts that fall under [the question] of what has been explained here concerning the being of the world [מהוויית העולם], on account of the objections of the Philosopher. And we have already set out earlier, likewise, [the answers to] the remaining doubts that one might raise [שיסופק בהם] concerning this [matter of] universal coming-to-be [ההוייה הכללית] in the general manner whose [truth] has been [shown to be] obligatory [שהתחבאר חיובה]. And it has [thus] been explained that the inquiry has already been completed for us in [respect of] the truth, in a complete manner [באופן שלם]; this is what we have set out by way of the many demonstrations [במופתים רבים] that require [the truth of] the world's being generated [חיוב היות

העולם הווה], and we have resolved all the doubts that fall within it, by the very [strength] of what has been explained concerning this matter of [the world's] coming-to-be [מענין זאת ההוויה]. And here the inquiry has been completed concerning these speculative topics [הדרושים העיונים] in which our intention was to investigate, in this [theme], by way of speculative inquiry [בדרך המחקר העיוני].

פרק עשרים ותשעה

Chapter Twenty-Nine

[Chapter subtitle:] In conclusion of all that this book comprises of the speculative matters [מהדברים העיונים], and by way of giving thanks and acknowledgement to the Name, blessed be He, from whom all proceeds [אשר הכל מאתו].

It is fitting that there not be hidden from us anything of what has come to be revealed to us [מה שיקרה לנו] in these deep questions [השאלות העמוקות] which this book comprises. For what is found among them [שנמצא מהם] is, in some [respects], nearly more fitting [than what is found among] our predecessors [לקודמים]; [yet] it is the more fitting that one give ear [שימע] to attaining the truth in them, in the manner in which they set us right toward it [שמיישירונו אליו]. For what is found in the Philosopher concerning the matter of the immortality of the soul [בענין השארות הנפש] is not [stated] in a manner that has been [adequately] explained — whether it be so or not. He did say that it is fitting that this be investigated [שהוא ראוי שיחקר מזה]; this he said in the Book of the Soul [בספר הנפש] and in [the work] which comes after the Physics [ובמה שאחר הטבע, the *Metaphysics*], yet there is found no investigation of it by him at all [ולא נמצא לו שיחקור מזה כלל].

And behold, the moderns [האחרונים] who agreed concerning the matter of immortality [על ענין ההשארות] — they were all of them compelled [הוכרחו כלם] to [the view] that the acquired intellect perishes [שהשכל הנקנה נפסד]. And this [is] what the sage Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד, Averroes] set down in his treatises [באגרותיו], where he explained the matter of the immortality of the soul [ענין השארות הנפש] in such a manner — being [the position] in which the privation has been [held to be] explained [שהוא מבואר ההמנע]. My contention is [rather] that man should return [שישוב האדם] to the rank of the [Active] Intellect in actuality [במדרגת השכל הפועל]; given the necessity [of this] — were the matter so, [then] there would not be [Text continues beyond this page.]

[This continues the close of Chapter Twenty-Nine of Part One, on the immortality of the soul.]

Here the whole [matter of] the felicity of the human soul [הצלחה כלל לנפש האנושיה] would [have to] be at an end, if immortality were [understood] in this manner. And behold, the matter [as treated] in dream, in divination, and in prophecy [בחלום ובקסם ובנבואה] — we have found in [Ibn Rushd] only a little [on it], the sage Ibn Rushd [אבן רשד, Averroes] in the *Book of Sense and the Sensed* [לספר החוש והמוחש]; and behold, there [his treatment] is greatly deficient [חסר מאד], together with what [genuine] strength of argument [מהקשי החזק] there is in this inquiry. And concerning the matter of the knowledge of the Name, blessed be He, of [particular] things [ידיעת השם יתברך הדברים], we have not found among any one of the ancients a true [and] complete account [מאמר אמתי לא חסר ולא שלם] apart from what is found on this [topic] in [the work of] the great Rabbi, the Master [לרב המורה, Maimonides, the *Guide*]; and we have already explained in our discussion that it is not fitting that the Name's knowledge be [conceived] in this manner. So too [is it] with the matter of providence [בהשגחה].

And behold, concerning the matter of the purpose [intended in] the heavenly bodies [הכונה הגרמים השמימיים], we have not found among any one of the ancients a true account at all, as has been explained in our discussion. So too [with] the matter of the causes of the things found in the heavens [סבות הדברים הנמצאים בשמים]: up to the point [where] the ancients said nothing at all about them, and some of them [even] pronounced upon them an unjustified statement [מאמר בלתי צודק], as has been explained in our discussion. So too with the movers of the heavenly bodies [במניעי הגרמים השמימיים], and with the First Cause [ובסבה הראשונה]; and as regards one part to another [וביחס קצת אל קצה], we have not found among our predecessors an order [of explanation] fitting to the natural matter [סדור יאות אל הענין הטבעי], as has been explained in our discussion. So too with [the matter of] the origination of the world [בחדוש העולם]: we have not found among any one of the ancients a true account by way of speculation [מאמר אמתי בדרך העיון] — except for what is found of it [stated] in [Maimonides'] *Guide* [לרב המורה], in the form [it takes] in the way of received tradition [בדרך הקבלה]. And what is found of it [stated] in [the *Guide*] is [there set down] in such a way that [Maimonides] all but shut us off [שסוגרו] from [pursuing] this inquiry, since he posited the origination of the world in a manner whose [import] we have explained, and ruled that it is impossible for a man to attain this inquiry by way of speculation [בדרך העיון].

And inasmuch as the matter is so, it is a great marvel [נפלא מאד] that the inquiry has been completed for us regarding all these deep speculative topics [הדרושים העמוקים], and that all the doubts that fall under them have been resolved [התרת כל הספקות הנפלות בהם]. For this it is fitting that thanksgiving be given to the

Name, blessed be He, who has revealed to us these wondrous deep things [העמוקות הנפלאות].

May He be blessed and exalted forever, and triumphant above every blessing and praise [על כל ברכה ותהלה].

[Colophon, set in smaller centered type:] And behold, this Part [חלק] of this Treatise was completed [נשלמה] at the beginning of [the month of] Shevat [בראש שבט] of the year five thousand and eighty-nine [שנת שמנים ותשע לפרט האלף הששי — see note] of the sixth millennium of the formation of the world [לצירת העולם].

[Smaller-type postscript paragraph:] And it is fitting that it not be hidden from us [שלא יפלא עלינו] — [from] the one who reflects [המעיין] on this book — when one sees [בראותו] this [span of] time in which we completed this Treatise [המאמר], and sees, together with this, what the moderns [האחרונים] report concerning us: that we composed [שחברנו] this book more than eighteen years before this [date] [קודם זה הזמן יותר משמנה עשרה שנים]. And this [is so] because we had already composed this book for ourselves [some] twelve years ago, as it were [כמו שתים עשרה שנה], and there was [as yet] no inquiry in it in the matter of the eternity of the world and its origination [בקדמות העולם וחדושו]; but what came to be in the Torah was [drawn] in a manner congruent with speculation [באופן יאות אל העיון]. Yet that which we were obliged to adduce in it [ולהצטרכנו להביא בו] of [certain] of the speculative matters [הדברים העיונים] which we did not have at that time — there was no way for us to speak of [it] in these matters in a complete manner [לא היה לנו דרך לדבר בו באלו הדברים באופן שלם]. And it was on account of this that this book [lay] in that depth, marvelous [as it is] [בעומק נפלא], up to the point that, by reason [of that depth], it would have been impossible to take it up in [its full force] [שבעמט שהיה בלתי אפשר שיקח בו]; and to whatever extent the time grew longer for us, and we saw that there was for us a way toward the completion that has been clarified [אל השלמה הבאור] in this book, we were roused [התעוררנו] to clarify this book in this manner — for through this [there comes] the marvelous benefit [התועלת הנפלא] to the one who reflects on it, in each one of these precious speculative topics [הדרושים היקרים], together with some [matters] more [that bear] witness to it [עם שקצתם עוד לקצת ומעיר עליו].

[End of Part One of Treatise Six.]

חלק שני

Part Two [of Treatise Six]

It will be explained in [this Part] that that to which speculation has brought us [שהביא אליו העיון] is [identical with] the view of our Torah [דעת תורתנו]. And there it will be explained [the bearing of this on] what is recounted in the Account of Creation [מעשה בראשית]. And after that we shall set forth [נביא] in this Part two questions of [Torah] doctrine [שאלות דתיות], and we shall investigate them according to what speculation and the Torah have given us [לפי מה שיתנהו העיון והתורה]: namely, in what way the [prophetic] signs and the [miraculous] demonstrations [האותות והמופתים] could come to be, and how they came to be, and by whose hand [ועל יד מי יהיו] and who is the agent [ומי הוא הפועל], and in what way the prophet is examined [ובמה יבחן הנביא].

[Table of chapter-contents for Part Two, set in smaller type:]

Chapter One [פרק ראשון] — it will be explained in it that there is no necessity, by reason of what is mentioned in the Torah and in the words of the Prophets, that the world be a thing generated something-from-nothing absolutely [הווה יש מאין במוחלט].

Chapter Two [פרק שני] — it will be explained in it in how many senses the word "*reshit*" [beginning] is used in our language [ראשית יאמר בלשוננו].

Chapter Three [פרק שלישי] — it will be explained in it in how many senses the word "*eretz*" [earth] is used in our language [ארץ יאמר בלשוננו].

Chapter Four [פרק רביעי] — it will be explained in it the [intended] meaning in [the words] *tohu* and *vohu* [בתהו ובהו].

Chapter Five [פרק חמישי] — it will be explained in it in how many senses the words "*or*" [light] and "*choshech*" [darkness] are used [אור וחשך].

Chapter Six [פרק ששי] — it will be explained in it in how many senses the word "*ruach*" [wind/spirit] is used [רוח].

Chapter Seven [פרק שביעי] — it will be explained in it the meaning [intended] in the Torah by [the word] *raqia* [firmament], and by "the lower waters" and "the upper waters" [רקיע ובמים התחתונים ובמים העליונים].

Chapter Eight [פרק שמיני] — it will be explained in it what is recounted in the Torah of the Account of Creation [ממעשה בראשית].

Chapter Nine [פרק תשיעי] — it will be explained in it which of the [stated] things is the agent [מי הוא הפועל], and how this is brought to completion through it [ואיך ישלם זה ממנו].

Chapter Ten [פרק עשירי] — it will be explained in it by what means it is possible that the wonders should come to be [שיתחדשו הנפלאות] at the hand of a sage who is not a prophet [על יד חכם שאינו נביא].

Chapter Eleven [פרק אחד עשר] — it will be explained in it from which of [created] things the wonders can come to be [יתכן מהדברים שיתחדשו הנפלאות], and from which of them not [ובאיזה לא], and how they could come to be in them [ואיך יתכן שיתחדשו בהם].

Chapter Twelve [פרק שנים עשר] — it will be explained in it in what way the prophet is examined [ובמה יבחן הנביא].

Chapter Thirteen [פרק שלשה עשר] — it will be explained in it [the remainder of this entry runs together with the contents-line for ch. 14; see note].

Chapter Fourteen [פרק ארבעה עשר] — we shall leave [for treatment] in it [נתיר בו] [some] precious doubts concerning the matter of prophecy [בענין הנבואה] and the wonders [והנפלאות], on account of some of the narratives [קצת ספורים] that come [up] in them within the words of the Prophets [בדברי הנביאים].

פרק ראשון

Chapter One

[Chapter subtitle:] It will be explained in it that there is no necessity, by reason of what is mentioned in the Torah and in the words of the Prophets, that the world be a thing generated something-from-nothing absolutely [הווה יש מאין במוחלט].

It is plainly evident [מבואר נגלה] that there is no necessity, from the side of the Torah's positions [הפנות התוריות], that the world should be generated something-from-nothing [שיהיה העולם הווה יש מאין]. For we ourselves find, among all the wonders [in Scripture], that they [proceed] something-from-something [שהם יהיו יש מיש] — such as the coming-to-be of blood from water [כהתהוות מהמים דם], and of lice from dust [ומהעפר כנים], and of a serpent from a staff [ומהמטה נחש], and likewise the swallowing-up by Aaron's staff of the remaining staffs [וכן בלוע מטה אהרן שאר המטות], [which] is not a perishing into nothing at all [אינו הפסד אל לא דבר]; and likewise the wonder of the oil that was made [to multiply] by

Elisha [אלישע, the prophet Elisha] — [this] is not [a case] of something's being required to come to be something-from-nothing [שיהיה יש מאין]; and this, in our [view], is like [the case of] the reversal of the staff into a serpent [כההפך המטה לנחש]. And this, [in turn,] is like the reversal whereby the air enters into a vessel during the drawing-off [of liquid] — [the vessel] being [thus] drawn [empty] of [its] oil [כההפך האויר הנכנס בכלי בהריקה אוחה לשמן — see note].

And in sum, behold: the Torah is not a law compelled [to teach] [אינה נמוס מוכרח] that it require us to believe things that are not [philosophically] necessary [להאמין דברים בלתי צורקים], or to do things in which there is no benefit [אין תועלה בהם], as the multitude [ההמון] supposes; rather, it is a perfect law in [respect of] the ultimate perfection [נמוס שלם בתכלית השלמות], as has been explained in our interpretations of the words of the Torah [מפירושינו לדברי התורה] — [namely] that the perfection by which it brings men to long [לחשוק] for governing themselves [אל שיהנהגו] by this perfect law [בזה הנמוס השלם], behold, this is [precisely] the definition of the perfect law [מגדר הנמוס השלם], as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף, Aristotle] has explained. And the matter being so, it is evident [מבואר] that there is in the Torah no thing [no teaching] that would bring us to believe what is false [מה שהוא כוזב]; for what is false does not of itself bring belief in it [לא יביא עצמותו אל ההאמנה בו], nor [does] what follows after it [והנמשך אחריו]. Therefore it is fitting that we posit [that] whatever comes in the Torah comes in a manner congruent with speculation [באופן שיאוה אל העיון]. On account of this the great Rabbi, the Master [הרב המורה, Maimonides], explained everything that comes in the Torah, from what would [otherwise] bring [one] to suppose that the Name, blessed be He, is corporeal [בעל גשם], in such a way that nothing is hidden [שלא יסתר] from what has been explained by way of speculation [מדרך העיון]; and for this same reason — that, had it been so, the eternity of the world [קדמות העולם] would have been [demonstrably] explained by way of speculation — it would necessarily be obligatory [שכבר יוכרח] to interpret what comes in the Torah such that it appears to be at variance [חולק] with this view [the view yielded by speculation] in a manner congruent with speculation [באופן שיאוה אל העיון].

And it is fitting that you know that there has already befallen us, concerning what is mentioned in the Torah on the matter of the origination of the world [מענין חדוש העולם], the reverse of this matter [הפך זה הענין]: my intention being [to say] that we were not obliged [שלא נצטרכנו] to wrestle with ourselves [ללחק עצמנו] to explain what comes in the Torah on this matter in a manner congruent with speculation; rather, what comes in the Torah on this matter [is] precisely such [that] there comes to us the truth in [respect of] the manner [in which it is] by way of speculation [מדרך העיון]. And [as for] what we have already roused

[ourselves] to do — to find the truth in this inquiry [למצא האמת בזאת החקירה] of what has been clarified to us of what comes in [the Torah] on the origination of the world [בחדוש העולם] — [the point is] that what is mentioned in [the Torah] on this matter is the thing that sets [us] most rightly straight [מישיר מאד] in this very inquiry toward finding the truth in it [למצא האמת בה], as is evident from our explications [מביאורנו] of the [Torah] portion [לזאת הפרשה] in which the matter of the origination of the world is mentioned.

And it is fitting that the matter be so in the Torah [ראוי היה שיהיה הענין כן בתורה], and this [is so] because the Torah is a law that conducts man [שהיא נמוס יורדך בו האדם] toward the acquisition of [his] final perfection [קנין שלמותו האחרון], as we have explained in our interpretations of the words of the Torah [בפירושינו לדברי התורה] — [namely] that it is obligatory that man be set straight [מישרת האדם] toward attaining the truth in [these] deep speculative topics [בדרושים העמוקים] which are exceedingly difficult of attainment [אשר יקשה מאד ההגעה אליהם]. And this [is] because these speculative topics, when the truth concerning them has been revealed [כשנגלה האמת בהם] by way of received tradition [על דרך הקבלה], and [when there is] the setting-straight [that goes] with this knowledge [והיישרה עם זה הידיעה] in [respect of] the manner of those things [באופן מה בדברים] by which a man is brought toward the truth of that topic [אשר יבילו האדם לאמתת זה הדרוש] — behold, [thereby] is much of the difficulty in attaining them removed [הנה יסור מאד מהקשי אשר בהגעה אליהם].

And indeed, we [have] purposed to set down at the very outset [להקדים תחלה], before our [main] discourse, [some] words of Torah concerning the origination of the world [דברי תורה בחדוש העולם] — [namely] that there is no obligation, [arising] from the wonders [מהנפלאות], [to suppose] that the world be a thing generated something-from-nothing [שיהיה העולם הווה יש מאין]. [As for] the thing that would compel us [יכריחנו] to believe in the origination of the world [להאמין בחדוש העולם] — [such] that, were there not [present] what compels [one], one would not believe [it] of its own [evidence] [שאם לא היה מחויב שנאמין בנפשו] — it would [then] be easy for us to clarify that what comes in the Torah [is] a world generated [in time] [מחודש העולם] in a manner congruent with the view of the Philosopher [באופן יאות לדעת הפלוסוף]. But [as for] how the wonders could come to be [איך יתכן שיהיו הנפלאות], and who is the agent [ומי הוא הפועל], and from which of [created] things they could be, and to what [kind of] destruction they would [tend] [ולאיזה הכליה יהיו] —

behold, this is [drawn] from what we are inquiring into [שנחקור עליו] after we have completed the clarification of what comes in the Torah on the matter of the origination of the world [מענין חדוש העולם].

פרק שני

Chapter Two

[Chapter subtitle:] It will be explained in it in how many senses the word "*reshit*" [beginning] is used in our language [ראשית יאמר בלשוננו].

It is fitting that we explain first the [several] terms which the Torah used [השתמשה בהם התורה] in [the account of] the origination of the world, before [we explain] what comes [of] the words of the Torah on this [topic]; for the understanding of the simple [literal] term [הבנת הדבור הפשוט] necessarily precedes the understanding of the compound term [הבנת הדבור המורכב].

We say, then, that as for "*reshit*" [beginning], the intended meaning in it, in our language, was [that of] the part [or member] that is prior to the remaining parts [of a thing] [החלק מהדבר אשר הוא קודם לשאר חלקיו] — [in] whichever priority it be among the [several] priorities [איזו קדימה שתהיה מהקדימות]. [It may be] priority of time [קדימת זמן], as in our saying "the beginning of the reign of Jehoiakim" [ראשית ממלכת יהויקים], meaning [the part of] the time that is prior, [the time] in which Jehoiakim reigned [הזמן הקודם אשר מלך בו יהויקים]; and likewise "the first of your dough" [ראשית עריסותיכם], meaning [to say] the part [of the dough] that the [hands] raise [off] first in time [החלק אשר ירימו מהעסה קודם בזמן]; and likewise "the first[fruits] of the shearing of your flock" [ראשית גז צאנך], and there are many like these. And [it may be] priority of order [קדימה בסדר], as in our saying "[he] could not change [it], nor pass over the first of the land [ולא יעביר ראשית הארץ], for [there] He has consecrated [it to Himself] [כי קדש לה]" — [the intent being] to say [it is] the part prior to it in order [רוצה לומר החלק הקודם ממנה בסדר]; and this is one of the wondrous [things] which [the verse] "their first kingdom was Babel [ראשית ממלכתו בבל]" said [echoes], and it is possible that this too be so [referring to priority of order]; and likewise "the first of wisdom is the fear of the Lord [ראשית חכמה], for the fear of the Lord, it is wisdom [כי יראת ה' היא חכמה]," [and] what they said: "behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom [הן יראת ה' היא חכמה]." And this [is what] would be said: that the part prior [in order] is [drawn] from the wisdom by which they are set straight toward the fear of God [אשר יושרו בה ליראת השם] — and this is the [civil] political philosophy [הפילוסופיה המדינית]; and this [is so] because the perfection of [moral] traits [שלמות המדות] is

required to be prior in order to the perfection of the intelligibles [קודם בסדר לשלמות המושכלות]; and this [is] of what need not [further] be clarified for the one reflecting [למעיין] on this book.

And [it may be] priority in worth [or rank] [קדימה במעלה], as in their saying "[Wisdom] consecrated [is] to Him, the first of His produce [קדש לה' ראשית תבואתו]" — meaning [to say] that the part equal [in standing] from the [whole] kind [שזה שוה החלק מן המין] is [the part] more set apart, [drawn] to the worship of the [Divine] Name, [more excellent] than the rest of its kind [נבדל לעבודת השם יותר משאר מינו]; and this is the [sense of] "the prior in worth" [הקודם במעלה]. And [it may be] priority in cause and in nature [קדימה בסבה ובטבע], as they said: "the Lord acquired me [Wisdom] by [His] wisdom, the beginning of His way [ה' בחכמה קנני ראשית דרכו]"; and this [is so] because the intelligized order [הסדור המושכל] [is] prior in cause and in nature to the agent that is newly-brought-forth from it [קודם בסבה ובטבע אל הפועל המתחדש ממנו]. And this last meaning [ומזאת הכונה האחרונה] was [what] they said [in] "In the beginning God created [בראשית ברא אלהים]," as will be explained hereafter [כמו שיתבאר אחר זה].

פרק שלישי

Chapter Three

[Chapter subtitle:] It will be explained in it in how many senses the word "*eretz*" [earth] is used in our language [ארץ יאמר בלשוננו].

The word "*eretz*" [earth] is used equivocally [משתתף — by equivocation]: [sometimes] it is said specifically [בפרט] of the elemental earth [על היסוד הארצי], and this [usage] is found many [times] [וזה ימצא הרבה]; and [sometimes] it is said generally [בכלל] of all the elements [על כל היסודות]. And [it] was so [used] because the elemental earth was the [most] foundational of [the] elements [שהיה יסוד הארץ] in the lower place [במקום השפל], the [other] elements being [situated] in their entirety below the heavens [למטה מהשמים]. As for this [usage], indeed *eretz* will [in it] be the [most] frequent [in occurring] [ברוב] in [respect of] its being [situated] next to the heavens [אצל השמים], as they said: "Who is [the] god in the heavens or in the earth [מי אל בשמים ובארץ] who does according to Your deeds [אשר יעשה כמעשיך]" and so forth; [and as in] "In the beginning God created the heavens [בראשית ברא אלהים את השמים]" and [the earth] [text continues].

[Text continues beyond this page.]

[Conclusion of פרק שלישי — Chapter Three (the senses of "earth"), from the preceding page:]

This sense of "earth" [ארץ] is likewise found frequently. And this is the meaning of "and the earth was tohu va-vohu" [Bereishis 1:2, והארץ היתה תהו ובהו], for this "earth" is the very [earth] that was mentioned in the prior verse.

פרק רביעי — Chapter Four

[Chapter rubric beneath the heading, p. 421:]

Explaining the senses in which the Torah uses *tohu* and *vohu* [תהו ובהו].

Tohu and *vohu* [תהו ובהו], in our language, are said of the remote matter [החמר הרחוק] of a thing and of its final form — that is, the form prior to it in order [of being]. Observe: it is said, and the measuring-line [קו] of *tohu* and the plumb-stones [אבני בהו] were stretched over it [cf. Yeshayahu 34:11]. This refers to the dwelling-place of the living creatures mentioned there, which is in the wasteland [המקום החרב]: the meaning is that they dwelt there until the Divine Presence [שכינה] settled upon that place for them, as if there had been laid down for them the first matter and the final form needed for the construction required of them — that is, for them the elements [יסודות] are the subject of speech and of being beaten down. The parable of this is as follows: when someone wishes to build, he first needs to inscribe upon the lower surface [השטח השפל] a figure [תמונה] — according to the size and shape he wishes, whether square or round — bringing up [marking off] the stones that are the foundations of the walls and their lower courses. So too the form [הצורה] is related to *tohu* and *vohu*: *vohu* corresponds to the matter [החמר] of the building, and these are the stones [האבנים], for the matter was the bearer of the form, as if it were said to be "in it." This sense of the matter [הענין] has already been mentioned [there], in the words of the Nasi Rabbi Avraham bar Ḥiyya in his *Sefer Tzurat ha-Aretz* [ספר צורת הארץ — Form of the Earth]. And behold, the Torah set the matter first, because the matter is prior on account of [its role in] the Torah's [account].

By this approach they said "and the earth was *tohu va-vohu*" [Bereishis 1:2] — meaning the final form and the first matter [החמר הראשון], this [final] form being the form of the elements [הצורות היסודיות] by whose intermediacy the first matter is made ready [מוכן] to receive all the other forms.

And how wonderful is what our Rabbis, of blessed memory, said in clarifying this point! They said: *Tohu* is a green [ירוק] line that encompasses the world [את העולם]; *vohu* — these are the stones [אבנים] [Bereishis Rabbah 1:9; cf. Chagigah

12a]. This means: the forms are that in which there is privation [העדר], and these are the elements [היסודות] — foundations for [the other] things by reason of their being mixed and combined [התמזגותם]; and this is the intermediate thing [הדבר הממוצע]. Here, then, they took it [the intermediate] in the manner of a thing intermediate between the contraries [בין ההפכים], which is green [ירוק]; for they took the intermediate among colors [בצבעים], since it is more clearly an intermediate than the intermediate among the other contraries.

As for what they said — *vohu* [בהו] — its meaning is "such-and-such" [as in the phrase] *mefulamot* [מפולמות, "marked-out things"], that is, "so-and-so and so-and-so" [פלוני ופלוני]; for both terms signify [the qualities] hidden and concealed [ההעלם וההסתר], and from this is composed "so-and-so and such-and-such" [מורכב מפלוני ומאלמוני], these being two names that signify concealment and hiddenness [ההכחה וההעלם]. And you, the inquirer, have already understood what concealment there is in the matter of the first matter [החמר הראשון] and the last [matter], and [the concealment] which lies in [our] conception [ציורו] of them.

פרק חמישי — Chapter Five

[Chapter rubric beneath the heading, p. 421:]

> Explaining the senses in which "light" and "darkness" [אור וחושך] are said.

"Light" and "darkness" [אור וחושך] are names said by equivocation [שמות משותפים]. Thus "light" [האור] is sometimes said of the sensed light [האור המוחש], and "darkness" of the privation of the sensed light [העדר האור המוחש]; and most especially [the light spoken of is] the light of the sun [אור החמה], as in "to give light by day" [Bereishis 1:15]. So too the matter [העניין] in "darkness" [בחשך]: the darkening of the sun at its setting [חשך השמש בצאתו], and in "the day grew dark for them," and this [usage] is frequent. And by way of an extension of this likeness, they said: "darker than blackness is their visage" [Iyov 30:30(?), חשך משחור תארם].

In a further [sense] light [האור] is predicated of perfect [healthy] eyesight, as Solomon said in his wisdom, "the light of my eyes — even that is gone from me" [Tehillim 38:11, אור עיני]; and likewise "darkness" is predicated of eyes that cannot see, that is, [eyes] in which seeing is destroyed [חשכו הרואות]. This [usage holds] because seeing the visible objects is not perfected [in the dark]. And inasmuch as form [הצורה] is similar to light [דומה לאור], "light" came to be predicated of the perfection [שלמות] of a thing that is its form, just as light is the perfection of the celestial body [הגשם הספירי] insofar as it is celestial [ספירייי]; and further, since

[light] is what makes things actually intelligible [מושכלים] — just as it makes things to be on the [intellectual] side things-that-are-intellects, that is, intelligibles only — "form" came to be called "light." And [the matter] reversed: the first matter [החמר הראשון] is likened to darkness [לחושך] and to gloom [ואפל], and "darkness, gloom, and a death-shadow" [אבן אפל וצלמות, Iyov 10:21–22] are said of the first matter by reason of the privation of the forms [העדר הצורות] that adhere to it [the matter], as we explained in our commentary on the Book of Job [ספר איוב].

And the matter [העניין] in "and darkness was upon the face of the deep" [וחשך על פני תהום, Bereishis 1:2] will be [understood] thus: it means to say that the foundation-earth [יסוד הארץ] is, in its destruction [בהבלית], [marked] by the privation of form and good [העדר הצורה והטוב], even though it is the least [הפחות] of all existents. And [scripture establishes] its being [marked] by the destruction of form [בתכלית מהעדר הצורה] through the parable [המשילוה] of the first matter [החמר הראשון], as it is said, "for dust you are" [Bereishis 3:19, כי עפר אתה] — and as for "to dust," "the man shall return to his dust as it was" [האדם ישוב אל עפרו כשהיה]. And [the matter is] of what is said "upon the face of the deep" [על פני תהום] — for the deep [תהום] is the lowest place of the waters [מקום השפל מהמים], and this is clear from our [discussion]; and "the face of the deep" [פני תהום] will be the lowest surface [השטח השפל] of the waters [מהמים], and its explanation will be: "upon the face of the deep" beside the lowest surface of the waters, since the word "upon" [על] is said in this verse in accordance with this intention, as they said "and beside it [is] the tribe of Manasseh" [Bamidbar 2:20, ועליו מטה מנשה]; and [the verse] gives over to the disposition [המערכת] [the work of] building in a pure construction [לבונה זכה], as we explained concerning the disposition, as is set out in [the discussion of] the offerings/configurations [במנחות(?)].

But the Rabbi, the Master [the Guide — Maimonides], said that the intention in the word "darkness" [חשך] is the foundation-fire [יסוד האש], and he brought a proof from what the Torah said: "you heard the sound from the midst of the darkness" [את הקול מתוך החשך, Devarim 5:20]; and in another place it is said "from the midst of the fire" [מתוך האש] — this is a sign that "fire" is called "darkness," and so too "all darkness is hidden away for his treasured ones; a fire not blown shall consume him" [Iyov 20:26, כל חשך טמון לצפוניו לא נופח תאכלהו אש] — this too is a sign that the darkness is the fire. Yet [Maimonides holds that] it is called "the elemental fire" [האש היסודית], inasmuch as the elemental fire does not give light [אינה מאירה], as is explained in natural science [בטבעיות]; whereas light is precious to it [the fire] when it is interwoven among bodies [כאשר הסתבכה בגשמים].

But this matter is not pleasing to us, for [Maimonides] is not obliged [to hold] that in one place [it means] fire and that in another place — namely, in the place after "from the midst of the fire" — the darkness would be the fire, [the place] where the darkness would be that from which fire issued; for the matter [העניין] [is rather] that in this way fire is found to be exceedingly dark [חשוך מאד]. And of this [Scripture] said "these words the Lord spoke to all your assembly at the mountain from the midst of the fire, the cloud and the thick darkness" [דבר ה' אל כל קהלכם בהר מתוך האש הענן והערפל, Devarim 5:19]; it has already been explained to you that "his words" [issue] from the midst of the fire, and that the cloud and the thick darkness — that is, [are] the darkness; and this is clearly so when it said "when you heard the sound from the midst of the darkness" [Devarim 5:20], [whereas on Maimonides' reading] the intention would have to be that it was from the midst of the fire. And likewise they said, "all darkness is hidden for his treasured ones" [Iyov 20:26]: if the intention were that "fire" is what is mentioned by this verse, then it would be [the case] that the fire issues to the cloud and to the [other] destructive things [המפסידים] — and these things are found, for the most part [ברוב העתים], very dark [חשוך מאד].

And further, it would already be difficult for the Rabbi, the Master [the Guide], as to why "fire" should be related to the lower surface [השטח השפל] of the waters — for it would already have been fit to relate it to the face of the wind/air [פני הרוח], not "upon the face of the waters" [על פני המים]; all the more so [is it] unfitting to relate it to the lower surface of the waters, and this is most clear.

And further, the earth [הארץ] is more remote from the luminary [המאור] than the rest of the elements [משאר היסודות], for it is the most darkened body [גוף חשוך מאד]; and so it would have been more obligatory that it be called by the name "darkness" than any other of the elements, since it too is even more deprived of form and good than the rest of the elements — and this is why it would have been fit that it be called "darkness," as we explained.

But "darkness" [חשך] is predicated of the privation of the intelligibles [המושכלות] which are the forms [הצורות], just as "darkness" is predicated of the privation of form, [as it is] said, "and the fool walks in darkness" [Kohelet 2:14, והכסיל בחשך ילך]. And for this reason "light" [האור] came to be predicated of him to whom the intelligibles [המושכלות] are attained, [as] Solomon said in his wisdom; he said "in the name of [God], may He be blessed, and the light dwells with Him" [ונהורא עמיה שריה, Daniel 2:22]. And the meaning of "the light is utterly His," as in Solomon's [usage], is that this light is the separate intellects [השכלים הנפרדים] which are the

movers of the heavenly bodies [מניעי הגרמים השמיימים]. And by this intention will be the saying "let there be light" [יהי אור, Bereishis 1:3].

Our Rabbis, of blessed memory, already alluded to this matter in the Midrash: "and God saw the light, that it was good" [Bereishis 1:4] — said Rabbi Yehuda bar Simon: the Holy One, blessed be He, set apart [הבדיל] the light for Himself [את האור לעצמו]; the parable is of a king who saw a fine portion and said, "this [is] for myself" [Bereishis Rabbah 3:6]. So too when the Holy One, blessed be He, created [it], He said: no creature is able to make use of it [להשתמש בו] but I alone — this is what is written, "and the light is His and dwells with Him" [Daniel 2:22]. Said Rabbi Avin HaLevi: the Holy One, blessed be He, took it and wrapped Himself in it as in a prayer-shawl [נטלו הקב"ה ונתעטף בו כטלית], and made His world shine from His radiance [והבריק את עולמו מזיוו] — this is what is written, "He covers Himself with light as with a garment" [עוטה אור כשלמה, Tehillim 104:2]. And the Rabbis said: He flashed it forth [הבריק], giving it to the righteous for the time to come [לעתיד לבא] — the parable is of a king who saw a fine portion and said, "this [is] for my son" — this is what is written, "light is sown for the righteous" [אור זרוע לצדיק, Tehillim 97:11].

It has already been made clear to you that all of them [the sages] agreed that this "light" [האור] is not a sensed light [אור מוחש], but is, in their view, the light of the intellect [אור השכל]. And how wonderful is their saying in this — for whoever reckons it and understands the manner of the dispute [המחלוקת] among them [will see that] this is [the point]: Rabbi Yehuda bar Simon saw that it is not possible for the human intellect [שכל האנושי] to attain the separate intellects [השכלים הנפרדים] from any side of apprehension [מההשגה]; and [other] sages saw that it is possible for them to be apprehended, in some degree, by what is emanated to them and given to them [מה שישפע לו מאירם ויזיום(?)], by way of the perfecting [שישלם] of the [intellectual] survivals [ההשארות] that come with this apprehension [ההשגה] — and even though it is not possible to perfect their apprehension in a complete way [באופן שלם], as was explained at the beginning of this book. As for the saying of Rabbi Avin HaLevi, [peace be upon him], it [the matter] will be explained at great length [מאד יתבאר בו], for in it the light [האור] was earlier explained to be the cause [סבה] of the rest of the created things [שאר הנבראות]; and this is [the sense] in which the Sage [Solomon] said, "[He through whom] God, may He be blessed, looked into the world of the separate intellects [עולם השכלים הנפרדים] and emanated from them existence [המציאות]."

פרק ששי — Chapter Six

[Chapter rubric beneath the heading, p. 424:]

Explaining the senses in which "ruach" [רוח — wind/spirit] is said.

"Ruach" [רוח] is a name that participates [in several senses]: it is said of the wind that blows [הרוח המנשבה] — "a very strong sea-wind" [רוח ים חזק מאד] — and this is frequent. And by way of an extension this matter is called [by the name] in likeness to the breath [נפש] of the soul [רוח], inasmuch as the natural deep [התהום הטבעי] is the first vessel [הכלי הראשון] of the breath-of-life [לנפש], and they carry [ונשאו] the *ruach* — the being that comes to be [המהוה] in the heart, going out to the limbs by the intermediacy of the pulsing arteries [העורקים הדופקים]. And "ruach" is also said of the elemental air [האויר היסודי], and this is the sense of "and the spirit of God" [ורוח אלהים, Bereishis 1:2]; and behold, they attached it to God [אלהים] in order to indicate its great magnitude — for the *ruach* that blows lessens the quantity [מעטה הכמות]. And so that the *ruach* might be common to the elemental air and to the *ruach* that blows, they linked the two of them in [their] magnitude [גודל], to indicate [the magnitude] of whichever *ruach* is spoken of. This [usage] is already found frequently in our language: I would [add] that [something] is supported by one of the names of God, may He be blessed, when one wishes to magnify [להפליג] it in its greatness [בגדלו] or in its strength [בחזקו] — [as] it is said "like the mountains of God" [כהררי אל, Tehillim 36:7], "a flame of Yah" [שלהבת יה, Shir ha-Shirim 8:6], "a divine half" [חצי שדי, Iyov 6:4], "the voice of Shaddai" [כקול שדי, Yechezkel 1:24]. And behold, they said of this *ruach* that it was "hovering upon the face of the waters" [מרחפת על פני המים, Bereishis 1:2] — meaning it was settled [נוחה] upon the surface of the waters [שטח המים], and so too "as it hovers over its young" [על גוזליו ירחף, Devarim 32:11] [conveys] the [meaning of the] will resting upon it.

And behold, in general, by the name "ruach" [are intended both] the foundation-air [יסוד האויר] and the foundation-fire [ויסוד האש], inasmuch as the Torah already called the foundation-fire [יסוד האש] "fire" [אש] — to indicate the distance [המרחק] between it and the sensed fire [האש המוחש]. And behold, [the foundation-air] is like air [כמו אויר], except that it is dry [שהוא יבש], and it is hotter than the air [יותר חם מהאויר]; and this is why the sages said that the air [האויר] is of two parts [שני חלקים]: the lower part [החלק השפל], in which there is the rain [הגשם] and the mist [המטר] and the other things that are customary there [הדברים הנוהגים], and it is hot and moist [חם ולח]; and the upper part [החלק העליון], and it is hot and dry [חם ויבש].

פרק שביעי — Chapter Seven

[Chapter rubric beneath the heading, p. 424:]

Explaining the meaning intended by the Torah in the term "raqia" [רקיע — firmament], and regarding the lower waters and the upper waters [במים התחתונים ובמים העליונים].

"Raqia" [רקיע — firmament] — its meaning is said of everything that is spread out [נרקע] while preserving its figure [שומר תמונתו], [as] it is said: "and they beat out the sheets of gold" [Shemos 39:3, ויקעו את פחי הזהב], "thin beaten sheets" [רקעי פחים, Bamidbar 17:3], "He who spread out the earth upon the waters" [לרוקע הארץ על המים, Tehillim 136:6] — meaning that there is already a part [חלק] in [the earth], spread out [רקע], which rises higher than the elemental waters [המים היסודיים], and this is the elevated part; that is, the part of the earth that is in the revealed portion [בחלק הנגלה מהארץ], which is a vessel [כלי] not perfected [לא ישלם] except by it [the earth's] being this great, elevated part [החלק ההגדלות], as [the verse implies]. And the matter [העניין] [is that] "raqia" [רקיע] is found [used] uniquely in our language for the celestial body [לגרם השמימיי], [as] it is said "let there be luminaries in the firmament of the heavens" [יהי מאורות ברקיע השמים, Bereishis 1:14], "and He set them in the firmament of the heavens" [ויתן אותם ברקיע השמים, Bereishis 1:17]. The meaning of this is what they said: "upon the face of the firmament of the heavens" [על פני רקיע השמים, Bereishis 1:20] — for the bird flies up from the earth toward the surface of the waters [שטח המים] that surrounds it [שהוא סביבי], yet it does not move by this motion [תנועה] in a straight motion downward or upward [תנועה ישרה למטה או למעלה], as is the matter [העניין] with the parts of the elements [חלקי היסודות]. And this is the matter [העניין] in what they said, "let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters" [יהי רקיע בתוך המים, Bereishis 1:6]. And behold, there were created… …there were created, first, by reason of the cause and the nature of the movers of the heavenly bodies [מניעי הגרמים השמיימים] — for they are the cause, the form, and the perfection of [the heavenly bodies] — and behold, the form is prior in existence [הצורה היא הקודמת במציאות], even if it is later in coming-to-be [מאוחרת בהוייה]. But Scripture said "in the midst of the waters" [בתוך המים, Bereishis 1:6] because the things explained above came to be there as a body [גשם] not preserving its figure [בלתי שומר תמונתו], that is, the upper [waters] and the lower [waters]. And our language has already linked this matter [together], inasmuch as it stood, in a single fixed disposition, to the waters [אל המים], when it said "like the waters that pour forth" [כמים הנגרים, cf. II Shmuel 14:14] [?]; and "and they melted the heart of the people, and it became as water" [וימס לבב העם ויהי למים], for behold, it likened their hearts to waters in respect of their softness [לרכותו] and the ease of their being acted upon [ולקלות התפעלותו]. And in keeping with this, the matter was likened to "waters" for the body that has in it no nature that would preserve its figure [שישמור תמונתו]. This is what David said: "Praise Him, you heavens of heavens,

and you waters that are above the heavens" [הללוהו השמים השמים אשר מעל השמים, Tehillim 148:4] — and [those waters] are the body [הגשם] not preserving its figure [הבלתי שומר תמונתו], which [lies] above the orbs [אשר על הגלגלים], so that not all the motions [כל התנועות] should come to a limit at their endpoint [קצתם לקצה].

And behold, the Master, the Guide [הרב המורה — Maimonides], understood here by the term "raqia" [רקיע — firmament] the cold part of the air [החלק הקר מהאויר], in which the cloud [הענן] and the rain [המטר] come to be; and behold, he brought a proof for this [לזה הביאו], for it would have been strange in his view that there should be water upon the celestial body [על הגרם השמיימי מים]. But you should know that, even though the matter is true in this respect, this [reading] is what we have already explained in accordance with what was demonstrated above as a [genuine] demonstration [במופת], [and] not [merely] as something false [לא במה שקרם] [?]. And behold, [the demonstrated view] is still the consensus of all the sages who preceded us — those who said this in explaining this verse [הפסוק] — as will be made clear to you from their sayings [ממאמריהם].

[Citing the Midrash:] They said in Bereishis Rabbah: at the hour when the Holy One, blessed be He, said "let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters" [יהי רקיע בתוך המים, Bereishis 1:6], the middle drop [טפה האמצעית] of the waters congealed [גלדה], and the lower heavens and the heavens of the upper heavens were made [נעשו שמים ההתחתונים ושמי השמים העליונים]; they were [still] fluid on the first day [להים היו שמים ביום ראשון], and on the second they congealed [וביום ב' קרשו] — that is to say, He gave them standing and permanence [נתן להם עמידה וקיום]. "Let there be a firmament" [יהי רקיע] — let the firmament grow strong [יחזק הרקיע]. Rabbi Yehuda bar Simon said: a [metal] sheet was beaten out of [the matter of] the firmament [יעשה מטליה הרקיע], as one says "and they beat out the sheets of gold" [וירקעו את פחי הזהב, Shemos 39:3]. Rabbi Ḥanina said: a fire went forth from above [אש יצתה מלמעלה] and scorched the surface of the firmament [וליהכה פני רקיע וכו']. Rabbi Pinḥas, in the name of Hoshaya, said: just as there is a void between the firmament and the earth [חלל שבין הרקיע לארץ], so there is between the firmament and the upper waters [בין הרקיע למים העליונים], [as it is said] "let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters" [יהי רקיע בתוך המים] — between [the two] [בינים ובנתים]. Rabbi Tanḥuma said: I shall state the reason [אנא אמירת טעם]; were it said "and God made the firmament and divided between the waters which are upon [על] the firmament," I should have said [the upper waters] lie upon the body of the firmament [על גופו של רקיע] [just like] the lower waters [המים נחונים] [rest on the earth]; rather, since it says "between the waters which are above the firmament" [בין המים אשר מעל לרקיע], behold, the upper waters [המים העליונים] are suspended [תלויים] by [the divine] command [במאמר].

And behold, a proof has been shown to you that what they understood [by the firmament] is this celestial body [הגרם השמיימי]. The first [proof] is their saying "and the lower heavens and the upper heavens of the heavens were made" [נעשו שמים ההתחתונים ושמי השמים העליונים] — and this is something it would not be fitting to say of the cloud [שאין ראוי שיאמר על הענן], nor of the place in which the firmament's coming-to-be occurred [ולא על המקום שנהוה בו]. And the second is their saying "a fire went forth from above and scorched its face" [שאמר אש יצתה מלמעלה וליחכה פני רקיע] — and this it would not be fitting to say of the cloud [אין ראוי שיאמר על הענן], for the cloud's condensation [העבותו] is from cold [קור], and what acts upon that cold part of the air [הפועל לו הוא קור אשר בחלק ההוא מהאויר] — it is cold, not fire [לא האש], that acts [upon it], as was explained in the *Meteorologica* [ספר האותות]. So how could this [scorching] be said of this cold part of the air, in which the cloud comes to be [יחהווה בו הענן]? And how wonderful…

[is the manner in which] they said "a fire from above" [אש של מעלה]; and this is because we are not assured that the preserving [שמירת] of the [body's] figure [התמונה] is [achieved] only by reason of dryness [מצד היובש] — and behold, fire is the most desiccating and drying agent [המייבש והמנגב], [so] they attributed this act to fire [יחס זה הפעל לאש]; and [this is meant] to indicate that there is no [such] nature in [this substance] as the nature [it has] from the elemental fire [מהאש היסודי], [hence] he said "a fire from above" [אש של מעלה]. And in this manner you find them saying in many places that the heavens [השמים] came to be from fire and water [נחהוו מאש ומים] — meaning that there are in [the heavens] two natures [שני טבעים], a nature that preserves its figure and a nature that does not preserve its figure [טבע שומר תמונתו וטבע בלתי שומר תמונתו]. And God forbid that this sage [החכם] should mean that God, blessed be He, made the heavens by means of fire as an instrument [כאמצעות כלי], [or that the heavens are] a fire or some thing attached to fire [מתיחס לאש]; rather, his intention in this is that God, blessed be He, gave them this nature in which their figure is preserved [שיש בו שומר תמונתו].

And the third proof [הראיה השלישית] is what was said about "the void that is between the firmament and the earth" [חלל שיש בין הרקיע לארץ] — just as there is between the firmament and the upper waters [בין הרקיע למים העליונים]; for had the firmament been the place of the cloud [מקום הענן] or the rain, then the upper waters [מים העליונים] too would have been potentially there [בכח], [which is] not so. But when [the matter] is reckoned in accordance with what we have said, this saying is fitting [יאות זה המאמר], for you already find [the sages] saying that the thickness of the firmament [שעביו של רקיע] is of the measure [בשעור] of what is between the earth and the firmament [שבין הארץ לרקיע]; and likewise the

measure between the firmament and the upper waters [בין רקיע למים העליונים]; and there is the body that does not preserve its figure [הגשם הבלתי שומר תמונתו], which the proof has shown to be between them [שהוא בינהם], for this is the falsely[-named water] [השקר] in which there would be a void [שיהיה שם רקות]. And this is what they said in Bereishis Rabbah: from the earth to the firmament [מהארץ עד לרקיע] is a journey of five hundred years [מהלך חמש מאות שנה].

But as for the saying of Rabbi Tanḥuma about the upper waters [המים העליונים] being suspended [התלויים] by the [divine] command [במאמר], it is most wonderful [הוא נפלא מאד]; for it indicates that the nature of these [upper] waters is not [the same] nature [שאין טבעם כטבע] — that is, [the nature] of these lower waters, which are heavy [שהם כבדים], and the earth carries them [והארץ נישאת אותם]; rather, [the upper waters] are suspended [תלויים] by the [divine] command [במאמר], meaning that it would not be fitting to say of them that they have something to carry them, for they are neither light nor heavy [שאין להם דבר ישאם, כי אינם קלים ולא כבדים]. And to this [points] the precise reading [וזה דקדק] [in the verse], for had it been written [שאלו היה כתב] "and [God] divided between the waters [and] said they were heavy" [ואמר שאלו היה כתב] [?] — and [Scripture] divided between the waters which are upon the firmament [ויבדל בין המים אשר על הרקיע] — I should have said [הייתי אומר] [that they lie] upon the body of the firmament [על גופו של רקיע] [as] the lower waters [are] set [down] [המים נתונים], the sense being that they rest upon it and it carries them [רצונו שהם עליו והוא ישאם]; but rather it said that they are above the firmament [שהם מעל לרקיע], and [the firmament] does not carry them upon itself [ולא האר אותם בשהם על הרקיע], their being [supported as if] resting upon themselves [להיותם נסמכים על עצמם]. And this is a most wonderful precision [וזה דקדוק נפלא מאד].

And a teaching has [also] been shown to us about the name "raqia" being applied to heavens [שיאמר בשמים] which are "fire and water" [שהם אש ומים], [used] in the way of likeness [על צד הדמיון], according to which [reading] it would be [understood] thus [שיהיה כן] — as they said in Bereishis Rabbah [בבראשית רבה], that they are not [things] over which the creatures should be amazed [שאינו שהבריות משתוממין עליהם] [?], [namely the saying] that the creatures are astonished concerning them, [thinking] "let us say that they are waters of fire" [לומר של מים הם של אש הם] — they have taught [הורו] by this saying that this is said only by way of likeness and parable [על צד הדמיון והמשל].

And to this Rabbi Akiva pointed [ולזה אמר ר' עקיבא] in the chapter "Ein Dorshin" [בפרק אין דורשין, Chagigah 14b]: when you arrive at the stones of pure marble [לאבני שיש טהור], do not say "water, water" [אל תאמרו מים מים], for it is written,

"he that speaks falsehoods shall not be established before My eyes" [דובר שקרים לא יכון לנגד עיני, Tehillim 101:7]. Behold, this sage called the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמיימים] "stones of pure marble" [אבני שיש טהור], and called them so [וקראם כן] because of their being spherical [ספיריים] and enduring [וקיים], free of any transgression or turbidity [נקיים מכל עבירות ועובי]; and he said this to indicate the name "water" [מים] that is applied to the body which does not preserve its figure [הגשם הבלתי שומר תמונתו] — [a name applied to it] by way of likeness and parable [על צד הדמיון והמשל], [and] not because the nature of these elemental waters [המים היסודיים] would be its [true] nature [לא שיהיה טבעי בטבע אלו].

But as for what Ben Zoma said in the chapter "Ein Dorshin" [בפרק אין דורשין, Chagigah 15a] — that there is between the upper waters and the lower waters [בין המים העליונים למים התחתונים] only two fingerbreadths [שתי אצבעות] [of separation] — it is most wonderful [הוא נפלא מאד]. And this is [so] because the lower heavens [שהמים התחתונים] — which is the lower matter [החמר השפל] — is distinct from the upper waters [נבדל מהמים העליונים] in the elemental forms [בצורות היסודיות] which God, blessed be He, set in it [נתן בו], in which [the lower matter] is, as it were, in potentiality to receive all the forms [כחיי לקבל כל הצורות]. And these elemental forms have in them two active powers [שתי כחות פועלות], namely heat and cold [החום והקור], and by these their endpoint is acted upon at the extreme [יפעלו קצתם בקצה] — and this [active] thing is not found in the upper waters [וזה דבר לא ימצא למים העליונים].

And you already know that "finger" [האצבע] is said in our language of the active power [הכח הפועל]: "the finger of God" [אצבע אלהים, Shemos 8:15] — "the finger of God, engraved upon the tablets" [אצבע אלהים חרות על הלוחות, cf. Shemos 31:18]. And indeed it is so, inasmuch as [the finger] is the wondrous instrument by which everything is done [כלי נפלא לעשות בו כל דבר]; and indeed it is by the intermediacy of the fingers [באמצעות האצבעות] that the created things were created [אשר נבראו בו], and this our meaning is [thus] explained [וזה מענינו מבואר].

And you already find, furthermore, [a saying] of our Rabbis, of blessed memory — a teaching, without doubt, that this firmament [הרקיע] is the celestial body [הגרם השמיימי]. They said in Bereishis Rabbah, in the exposition of "these are the generations of the heavens and the earth" [אלה תולדות השמים והארץ, Bereishis 2:4]: Rabbi Azariah, in the name of Rabbi [...], said "[turn] toward what is above — that is the word [intended]" [כלפי למעלן הדבור אמור] [?], for everything you see [as] the generations of the heavens and the earth [תולדות השמים והארץ] [is] of them [those mentioned above]: on the first [day], it is said "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" [בראשית ברא אלהים את השמים ואת הארץ,

Bereishis 1:1]; on the second they were created from the upper [waters], as it is said "and God said: let there be light" [ויאמר אלהים יהי אור, Bereishis 1:3]; on the third they were created from the lower [waters], as it is said "and God said: let the earth put forth grass" [ויאמר אלהים תדשא הארץ, Bereishis 1:11]; on the fourth they were created from the upper [waters], as it is said "and God said: let there be luminaries in the firmament of the heavens" [ויאמר אלהים יהי מאורות ברקיע השמים, Bereishis 1:14] etc. Behold, it has been explained to you that this sage saw that the firmament that was created on the second day is one of the heavenly bodies [שנברא ביום שני הוא מהגרמים השמיימים].

פרק שמיני — Chapter Eight

[Chapter rubric beneath the heading, p. 427:]

> Explaining what is recalled in the Torah concerning the Account of Creation [מה שנזכר בתורה ממעשה בראשית].

You already know, from what was set forth [previously], that the world's coming-into-existence [שהויית העולם] by God, blessed be He, was not in time [היתה בזולת זמן] — since [its] coming-to-be cannot be [a passage] full [of going] from one thing to another [מפני היותה מלא דבר אל דבר] [?]. And likewise our Rabbis, of blessed memory, agreed that the heavens and the earth were created together [שהשמים והארץ נבראו יחדיו]. They said in the chapter "Ein Dorshin" [בפרק אין דורשין, Chagigah 12a]: and this is "as one" [כאחד נבראו], as it is said "yea, My hand laid the foundation of the earth, and My right hand spanned out the heavens [אף ידי יסדה ארץ וימיני טפחה שמים]; I call to them, they stand up together" [קורא אני אליהם יעמדו יחדיו, Yeshayahu 48:13]. And this is explained [ולזה הוא מבואר], inasmuch as their coming-to-be in this coming-into-existence [שייוחס בהווייה הזאת] was completed in the six [days] [שהיה נשלמה בששת ימים]; [it was] not in such a manner that one was [really] later than the other by [a span of] a single day [שיהיה האחד לשני יום אחד], in the [literal] way of [a temporal] parable [דרך משל], but rather they said this to indicate the priority [על הקדימה] that there is among existing things, of the one extreme over the other [שיש לקצה הנמצאות על קצתם]. And the parable [והמשל] of the eighth [step concerns] the heavenly bodies [שמיני הגרמים השמיימים]: the heavenly [movers] are prior in respect of cause and in respect of nature to the heavenly bodies [הם קודמים בסבה ובטבע לגרמים השמיימים], and the heavenly bodies are prior in cause and in nature to the elements [קודמים בסבה ובטבע ליסודות], and [so too prior] to what comes to be from them [ולמה שיהחדש מהם]. And behold, the elements are prior to what is originated from them [קודמים למה שיהחדש מהם] in priority of matter [קדימה היולאנית]; and the composite [thing] [והמורכב] is likewise [such that] its extreme [member] is prior [קצתו קודם] in [this

same] respect of priority [מהקדימה]; and the parable [והמשל] of what sprouts [שהצטמח] is…

prior to the perfect living thing [קודם לחי השלם]; and in this manner the aquatic living thing [חי המימיי] would be prior to the flyer [קודם למעופף], and the flyer prior to the walking [land] animal, and the walker prior to the speaking [creature, i.e. man] [והמעופף קודם להולך, וההולך למדבר]. And this is because the aquatic living thing makes [produces] an imperfect egg [עושה ביצה בלתי שלמה], the flyer makes a perfect egg [עושה ביצה שלמה], and the walker makes the living thing within its own body [עושה בעל חי בגופו]. And for this reason it is explained in the *Book of Animals* [ספר בעלי חיים — Aristotle, *De Animalibus*] that the flyer is more perfect than the aquatic [שהמעופף הוא יותר שלם מהמימיי], and the walker more perfect than the flyer [וההולך יותר שלם מהמעופף]; and there is no doubt that man [שהאדם] is the most perfect of [all] the [remaining categories of] walking living things [הוא יותר שלם משאר בעלי חיים ההולכים]. And from this side the doubt is removed [ומזה הצד יוסר הספק] — the doubt which some of the early ones among our Rabbis, of blessed memory, voiced [אשר ספק לקצה הקודמים מרבותינו זכרונם לברכה] over the matter [דבר] of on which day the luminaries [were created] [באיזה דבר שוער יום המאורות]: [whether] on the first day, or the second day, or the third day [יום ראשון ויום שני ויום שלישי] — and behold, the luminaries were not found until the fourth day [והנה לא היו המאורות נמצאים עד יום רביעי].

And this is the matter [וזהו ענין] that they, of blessed memory, [meant] in resolving this doubt [בהתר זה הספק]: "here are the luminaries [הן הן מאורות] that were created on the first day, but were not suspended [hung up] until the fourth day [שנבראו ביום ראשון ולא תלאן עד יום רביעי]." [This] means [רוצה לומר] that [Scripture] did not make the luminaries' coming-to-be depend on a time prior to the fourth day [שלא תלה הנהוותם בזמן קודם ליום רביעי], but rather they came to be on the first day [אבל הם היו נמצאים ביום ראשון], for everything was created together by the will of God, blessed be He [כי הכל נברא יחד ברצון השם יתברך]. And there is no doubt that it is impossible that their meaning — [namely], "and He did not suspend [them] until the fourth day" [ולא תלאן עד יום רביעי] — should be other than what we have recalled [זולת מה שזכרנו]; for it would be impossible to say that the stars came to be on the first day [שיהיו הכוכבים נבראים ביום ראשון] and afterwards were suspended on the fourth day in the firmament [ואחר כן תלאן ביום הרביעי ברקיע], for they are not the things [actually] suspended in it [כי הם אינם התלויים בו] — that is, within the depth of the firmament [בעומק הרקיע]; and "and He set them in [the firmament]" [וישימם בו] is likewise plainly the negation [of literal suspension] [הוא גם כן מבואר הבטול]. And this is explained, [namely] that the intention by "[He did not] suspend [them]" [בתלאן] here is [merely] the [act of] relating [them to it]

[ההתיחסות], since the term "suspension" [שם התלייה] is said in many [senses] in our language [יאמר הרבה בלשוננו בזאת הכונה].

And among the things it is fitting that you know [וממה שראוי שתדעהו] is this: everything that could be originated from nature [שאפשר חדושו מהטבע] — in accordance with what God, blessed be He, instilled [in nature] [מה שהטביעו השם יתברך] — its creation is not attributed to God, blessed be He, in this wondrous account [לא יוחסה בריאתו לשם יתברך בזה הספור הנפלא], for it [comes about] by the intermediacy of nature [באמצעות הטבע]. And for this [reason] the coming-to-be of plants [הויית הצמחים] and of the living things that come to be from putrefaction [והבעלי חיים המהוים מהעפוש] and apart from [their] species [ומזולת מינם] was not attributed to God, blessed be He [לא יחס לשם יתברך]; rather, the creation of what does not come to be by the natural course [מה שלא יתהוה על המנהג הטבעי] is attributed to God, blessed be He [יתיחס לשם יתברך], because its creation was by a wondrous way, not according to its [usual] kind [כי בריאתו לא כמינו היתה דרך פלא]. And to this is [also] attributed the coming-to-be of the parts-in-readiness [יחס הויה המתדמה החלקים] to God, blessed be He [לשם יתברך]; for it is enough [כי די] that, by the motions of the heavenly bodies [בתנועות הגרמים השמיימים], together with the power that is in the lower matter [עם הכח אשר בחמר השפל] to receive all the forms [לקבל כל הצורות] by the intermediacy of the elemental forms [באמצעות הצורות היסודיות] which He created in it [אשר ברא בו] —

— so that there should come to be from this lower matter the parts-in-readiness [שיהיה מזה החמר השפל המתדמה החלקים], and these are the species of plants [המינים מהצמח] and the living things born from putrefaction [והבעלי חיים נולדים מהעפוש]; and this is explained to whoever looks into this book [וזה מבואר למעיין בזה הספר]. Behold, this is what we saw fit to set forth before the words [of this passage] are explained — this passage [זאת הפרשה] in which we shall recall the origination of the world [נזכר בה חדוש העולם]; and from here we begin its explanation [ומהנה נתחיל בבאורה].

[Beginning the exegesis of the Creation passage proper:]

[Scripture] said: "In the beginning" [בראשית] of creation [הבריאה], when God, blessed be He, [created] the heavens [השם השמים] and what is beneath them [ומה שהתחתיהם], He created in the lower matter [וברא בחמר השפל] its first dispositions [התחלותיו הראשונות], which are the first matter [אשר הם החמר הראשון] and the first forms [arrayed] within it in order [והצורות הראשונות לו כסדר] — and these are the elemental forms [והם הצורות היסודיות], for in [the matter] there is the readiness [הוכן] to receive all the forms [לקבל כל הצורות], which [forms] these elements [embody] [אשר אלו היסודות]; in the manner that the earthy element settles as the

lowest layer [שהיסיד הארצי הם באופן שהוא בשטח השפל], [then] the foundation of the waters [מיסוד המים], and the fire and the air are upon the surface of the upper waters [ושהאש ושהאויר הם על שטח המים העליון] —

Milchamot HaShem — Book VI (Treatise Six), Part Two, Chapter Eight (continued)

Behold, "In the beginning" — and this is the whole act of creation — what God, may He be blessed, meant is that He brought into being a world of light. This is the world of the angels, the movers of the heavenly bodies; and immediately, as soon as He willed it, this came to be, with no need of any [intervening] action. God, may He be blessed, then distinguished between this and the light: the latter is this honored world [העולם הזה הנכבד]. He likewise distinguished between what He set apart from the level of prime matter [ההיולי] and the heavenly body — which is "the darkness" referred to in the parable [המשל] — even though the two of them are a single thing, since these forms are the perfections [שלמות] belonging to the heavenly bodies. In this way comes "the evening and the morning": these existents were filled from a single level among the grades of existing things [מדרגה אחת ממדרגות הנמצאות], for the form is unified with that of which it is the form, as will be explained later in the matter of the [philosophical] definitions [הגדרים]. And thus He called the light "evening" and the darkness "morning," to deepen this wondrous parable — as has already been explained in the matter of their unification [ההתאחדות] — for from the day and the night there comes to be a single day.

It is also possible to say that what is meant here is that within this light there are distinct gradations [מדרגות חלוקות], one more honored, another less honored, descending by the level of the form by degrees [הולכים מדרגת הצורה לקצת], as we explained in the fifth [chapter] of this book. And this would be the gradation in which their darkness [קצתם] is graded in relation to that which proceeds from them — all of them proceeding in the manner that they all flow from a single ordering principle [נמוס אחד] as one, as has already been explained.

And He made mention, with respect to this act of creation, that it was newly originated [נתחדשה] when God, may He be blessed, said this — to indicate the will [הרצון]; for with God, may He be blessed, there is no "utterance" in the sense of [literal] letters and voice, as the Rav, the Master [Maimonides], explained.

After He completed the account of the manner of the creation of this first grade among existents [המדרגה הראשונה מהנמצאות], He began to recount the manner of the creation of the second grade. He said that God, may He be blessed, said that there would come to be a celestial body [גרם שמיימי], a part of which would be a body that does not retain its figure [הבלתי שומר תמונתו]; and that there would be created [a body] dividing between this part — the body that does not retain its figure — and what is below the firmament [למטה מהרקיע]. This is the nature that divides between them: it is the creation of the elemental forms [הצורות היסודיות] within this lower part. For the body that does not retain its figure is the one disposed [מוכן] to receive all forms; but the upper part — the body that does not retain its figure — is not found in this nature, but rather remains permanently in its [own] condition.

And in this way the lower matter [החמר השפל] came to be — meaning [that this accounts for] what appears to us from the existence of the elemental forms within it; or else what is meant is that He said, "let it be so," in the [verse] portion that first treats the matter of the existence of the elemental forms within it, "and it was so" [ויהי כן]. And so it was that in this way the lower matter came to be, in the manner mentioned in the verse, "and the earth was tohu va-vohu" [Gen 1:2]. The Torah did not wish to return to mentioning this [explicitly], so that it should not be permissible [to err] in [its] understanding. And since "firmament" [רקיע] is a name common [משותף] to every separated thing [נברר], God, may He be blessed, called this firmament — by which He unifies it [in its naming] — "heavens" [שמים]. And here too the "evening and morning" were of [a single] grade among existents, a single thing; and this is because the spheres [הגלגלים] go along the path of the form and of perfection [השלמות], and in this manner they are unified [מתאחדים].

And behold, it was not said concerning what was created on the second [day] "that it was good," because what was created on it [consisted] of spheres [מהגלגלים]

not yet complete, until [the day] on which the creation of those stars [הככבים] is mentioned — and this is the matter [referred to] on the fourth day; and so "that it was good" was not said. And as for what was created on it from the elemental forms [מהצורות היסודיות] for the lower matter [לחמר השפל], this too was not a complete matter, for these forms had already been created in them upon the whole [על כולם]. This is what they said in *Bereishis Rabbah*: "Why is 'good' not written on the second [day]?" Some of them said that it was because Gehinnom was created on it. They meant by this that the power [הכח] within this lower

matter to receive all the elemental forms — created in it as a precious thing — [also gave rise] to the lowly things of corruption and privation [ההפסד וההעדר]. And some of them said it was on account of the division [המחלוקת]; they meant that it was because contraries [ההפכים] were created within the lower matter, [and] it is not fitting that "good" be said of it — since on its account these things cause the corruption of one another to some degree. And some of them said it was because the work [מלאכת] of the upper waters — which are the heavenly bodies — was not completed [on it], nor the work of the lower waters, which are the lower matter, as we have explained.

Now you ought to know that it is possible to say that this division [ההבדל] mentioned in this passage was a division in place [במקום]; for if the matter were so, there would [still] have been in this a permitted matter [היה בזה המאר מותר — [?]]. This is because the body that is in the midst of the waters [באמצע המים] is, without doubt, one that divides between what is above it and what is beneath it. Accordingly it was said, "and let it divide between waters and waters" — for to the waters there is no need [otherwise] — and so this would be permissible. And likewise it would be permissible [to say], "and it divided between the waters which are beneath the firmament and the waters which are above the firmament" [Gen 1:7]. Moreover, since "and let it be" was said according to [this] intent — that it should be so, in the utmost rarity [בתכלית הזרות — [?]] — this is on account of another [point]: that since "let it make" [is said], there is no need to say "that it was so." But indeed He needed [to say] this; otherwise He would not have made mention that God, may He be blessed, made the firmament [הרקיע]. And this is so when [Scripture] says, "And God said, let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters," and "let it divide between waters and waters" [Gen 1:6] — this is well explained. "And it was so" [ויהי כן] is well explained as His having alluded [רמז] by it to the coming-into-being [ההוייה] which God, may He be blessed, created within the lower matter [בחמר השפל], and they are the elemental forms mentioned in the verse, "and the earth was tohu va-vohu" [Gen 1:2].

And behold, the Torah has brought us a great benefit, in that it has made known to us what is present here — the unification [ההאחדות] of the lower matter with the heavenly body [הגרם השמיימי]: that were there not between them this unification, there would have had to be here two gods [שני אלוה], the one watching over [משגיח] the matter of the spheres [הגלגלים] and their movers, and the other watching over the lower matter. And from this [error] arose the place of the error of those who believe in two godheads [שני אלהות].

And after [the Torah] completed the account of this second grade among existents [המדרגה השנית], it [proceeded] to recount [the manner of] another grade beyond it. It said that God, may He be blessed, had already said that the waters which surrounded the earth in their nature [המים אשר היו מקיפה בטבעם] should gather to one place [אל מקום אחד], so that the dry land [היבשה] would appear. This was indeed [a matter] of necessity in that it was created in the earth in this respect: the part [of the earth] that is revealed — a thing that comes forth from its sphericity [מכדוריותו] — rises higher than the watery element [היסוד המימיי] by a certain measure, as has preceded. Accordingly God, may He be blessed, said [that there should be] the firm surface of the earth above the waters [רקע הארץ על המים]; and immediately, as soon as God, may He be blessed, willed it, this matter [was so], the thing being —

so. And behold, God, may He be blessed, called the dry land "earth" [ארץ]; even though "earth" is said in general of all the elements [היסודות] together, as has preceded, "earth" had already been singled out here for this [particular] designation. And as for the gathering of the waters, God, may He be blessed, called it "seas" [ימים]; yet He said "seas" [in the plural] and did not say "sea," because it is the nature of the sea, in its course, to alter the places of the earth over which its waters pass, as is explained in the *Book of Meteorology* [בספר האותות]. This is what they said, of blessed memory, in *Bereishis Rabbah*: "But is not the sea one? What does Scripture teach by calling the gathered waters 'seas'? Rather, the taste of the fish that comes up from Acco [מעכו] is unlike the taste of the fish that comes up from Aspamia [מאספמיא]." And behold, this teaches us that this Torah [recognized] that [the sea] is the watery element [היסוד המימיי]; and the Philosopher [Aristotle] has already explained this in the *Book of Meteorology* [בספר האותות]. Moreover, [Scripture] had already made known that God, may He be blessed, found that this is good, in that it brought the benefit of bringing-into-being [תועלת להוויות] the comings-to-be in the revealed part of the earth; and for the sake of this is the final end [התכלית] of its existence. And after this, God, may He be blessed, said that the earth should bring forth the growths [הצמחים] that come to be from it. And He made mention first of:

the lacking growth [הצמח החסר], which is the grass that yields seed [העשב המזריע זרע]; and after this He made mention of the complete growth [הצמח השלם], which is the tree [האילן] that produces fruit "wherein is its seed, after its kind" [Gen 1:11] — for this is the ordering [הסדור] fitting according to nature; and accordingly the species of tree is more complete than the [lesser] growth, and accordingly its operations [פעולותיו] are more complete. For we always take the sign [נקח ראיה]

from the operations to the [grades of] forms, as the Philosopher mentioned in the *Book of the Soul* [בספר הנפש].

And behold, when God, may He be blessed, said that these growths should come to be from the earth, it was as though [He said] "let it teem" [שרצה] — meaning that He had already brought it about that the earth should put forth grass, the herb yielding seed, [and] the fruit tree producing fruit wherein is its seed, after its kind. And God, may He be blessed, knew that what He had brought forth was good — that this is good — and this coming-into-being [ההוייה] was ascribed to the third day. And behold, the "evening and morning" of this grade among existents [המדרגה] is a single thing; and the parable [המשל] is that the revealing of the earth [הגלות הארץ] is for the sake of these comings-into-being [ההוויות]; and so the lacking growth [הצמח החסר] and the complete [growth] are unified [מתאחדים]. For all the forms which the lower matter [החמר השפל] is fit to receive are [arranged], some of them by degrees, according to the grade of the form and of perfection [השלמות]; and in this way all of them are unified, and there comes to be from them a single coming-into-being [ההוויה], as we mentioned in the first [chapter] of this book.

It is possible to say that what is meant in this is that God, may He be blessed, said there should be in the earth the power to bring forth these growths, and it was so — His will [having] already given to the earth this power and disposition [ההכנה] in a wondrous way; and "it brought forth" [והוציאה] these growths, as though they sprang up from it of themselves [בשצמחו ממנה], as if the sowers had sown [the seed] in the earth. And these are the seeds [הזורעים]; "and these were found together at the time of the creation" [בעת הבריאה], as is the matter with the rest of the things created. And this is the matter of what was said elsewhere [Gen 2:5]: "and every shrub of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew, for [the Lord God] had not [yet] caused it to rain," etc. — for the creation [הבריאה] mentioned here [refers to] the [primal] sprouting [הצמיחה]. This is what they said in *Bereishis Rabbah*: "and the earth brought forth [vatotzei ha-aretz]" — a thing that was "deposited in its hand" [פקוד בידה], meaning that it was as a deposit [פקדון] in its hand. And further they said there: "the generations [תולדות]" —

"of the earth [were brought forth] on the first [day]," according to the words of Beit Hillel [בית הלל], "and they were held in suspense three days — first, second, and third — and it brought forth its three generations [שלש תולדות]: trees, grasses, and the Garden of Eden." And it has already become clear to you that the sprouting [הצמיחה] occurred after God, may He be blessed, placed the power of

this generation [ההולדה] within this earth at a certain time [בארץ הזאת בזמן מה]. And behold, God, may He be blessed, knew that these growths which He brought into being were good things [טובים]; and accordingly the verse did not say [merely], "And God said, let the earth bring forth grass, herb," and so on, as was said of the rest of the [acts of] creation [שאר הבריאות]. This is what He [in those cases] said: "And God made the firmament" [ויעש אלהים את הרקיע]; "And God made the two great luminaries" [ויעש אלהים את שני המאורות]; "And God created the great sea-creatures" [ויברא אלהים את התנינים]; "And God made the beasts of the earth" [ויעש אלהים את חית הארץ]; "And God created man" [ויברא אלהים את האדם]. But [of the growths] He said, "and the earth brought forth" [ותוצא הארץ], to indicate that with respect to what He created, the sprouting was not completed from the [growths] themselves [מהצמח] by God, may He be blessed — as [was] the case with the rest of the things [He] created; for the rest of the things were created in their complete state [שלמי הבריאה] on the day they were created.

Now you ought to know that it was not [arbitrarily] said, concerning what was created on the first day, "And God made the light" [ויעש אלהים את האור]; for the light is a form belonging to the heavenly body [צורה לגשם השמיימי], and there is no [completed] form to this coming-into-being [ההתהוות] in itself, but rather the coming-into-being [consists] in [the heavenly body's] coming to be [as] something complete for it [שהוא לו שלמות]. And it is not fitting to think that the form which is this — [the form] bound up [נקשרת] with the heavenly body [בגשם השמיימי] — [is] other [than a separate form], because it has already been laid down [הונחה] as a separate [form] [נבדלת]. And this is because we have already explained that it is a separate form [נבדלת], in such a way that it does not perform its proper operation [פעולתה המיוחדת] by means of any bodily instrument [בכלי גופיי], as is the matter with the hylic forms [בצורות ההיולאניות — recte: הנבדלות? the argument requires the *separate* forms — [?]].

It is possible to say, further, that the cause [הסבה] of its being said "and it brought forth" [והוציאה] — and [Scripture] did not say, "And God made grass, herb" — is that the species [המין], being of the ensouled kind [מן הבעלי נפש], does not clothe itself in another form in the [full] perfection of its existence [שלמות הוייתו], as is the matter with the ensouled creatures [בבעלי חיים]. For [the vegetative power] is already found in living beings [בבעלי חיים] at first [as] the vegetative power [הכח הצומח], until their being is perfected by what perfects it, and the animate soul [הנפש החיונית] reaches into it; and accordingly it needed another beginning [התחלה אחרת] introduced into it, apart from the beginning [ההתחלה] which is [given] there — namely [by] God, may He be blessed, in [the matter of] the waters and the earth — and this [coming-to-be] He ascribes to the name of God, may He

be blessed, in this act of creation [הבריאה]. But the growth [הצמח] did not require another beginning [התחלה אחרת] apart from the beginning [ההתחלה] which God, may He be blessed, [gave] there, to make these growths sprout in the earth; for to them there is no form added [נוספת] upon their sprouting [הצמיחה].

And after [the Torah] completed the account in this, the third grade among existents [המדרגה השלישית], it began to recount another grade among existents. It said that God, may He be blessed, had already said that there should be bodies illuminating in the firmament of the heavens [גופים מאירים ברקיע השמים] — and they are the sun and the moon and the rest of the stars [השמש והירח ושאר הככבים]. He indeed willed, in [bringing about] their existence [במציאותם], "to divide between the day and the night" [להבדיל בין היום ובין הלילה] — meaning to bring about, by [means of] this lower matter [החמר השפל], things that receive [the alternation of] day and night: the day that comes-into-being from it and the night that comes-into-being from it; and this, because there comes-into-being from this the manner of the seasons [תקופות] alternating [מתחלפות] to some degree. And behold, this day and night which come-into-being from them [come about] from each one of the kinds of revolution [הסבוב] found in them; and there will be a day — the day of the star, when [the star comes] into being [יום הכוכב בהיות]

within their bodies, whether the egg be complete or incomplete; and accordingly they require, in the birth of their kind, an additional divine providence, so that the coming-into-being may be brought to completion and the kinds endure — even more than [is needed] for an animal that walks, for [God], may He be blessed, is the one who fashions living beings within their body. This providence is the one whereby [God], may He be blessed, gave them a complete instrument by which their birth is made whole and brought to completion.

As for man, however, there was no need to bless him with [the blessing of] increasing and multiplying, since his birth was [already] perfect. Indeed, this [blessing] was given by way of a commandment: the intent is to say that [God], may He be blessed, commanded him to be fruitful and multiply, so that his kind should not cease. We have already explained this — in what admits of no doubt — in our exposition of the words of the Torah; and here is not the place for this inquiry.

After [Scripture] has completed this level of the creation, it begins to recount another level beyond it. It says that [God], may He be blessed, had already said that there should be all the kinds of the great living beings that walk and that reproduce their kind. So too He intended to say that [God], may He be blessed, had already made all the kinds of living beings that walk, which are not

[explicitly] mentioned in this manner. And [God], may He be blessed, already knew, regarding what He brought into being from this, that it was good — that is, that what He brought into being was [made] for the [proper] end, which is what was possible to bring to its perfection; for it is in this that His fashioning lies, in the most honored way, in the manner most fitting for that toward which it was directed.

After this, [God], may He be blessed, spoke to the upper beings and to the lower beings, of whom He made man a possessor of intellect; and [God], may He be blessed, said that there should likewise be this [creature], man, in such a manner that his individuals would dominate over all the ensouled beings in the world of generation and corruption. So too He intended to say that [God], may He be blessed, had already created [man] in this manner: this is the human form ascribed to him, and accordingly He created him in the image of the upper beings, for they are possessors of intellect; the intellect of man is ascribed [to them] in the manner in which it stands [in relation] to the intellect of the upper beings. And behold, He created them male and female [Gen 1:27], since without this the [process of] birth would not be brought to completion.

So too it is fitting that you understand what the matter would be in [the things] that [God], may He be blessed, created. And behold, [God], may He be blessed, blessed them with providence over their endurance and their preservation, and said to them, "be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and master it" [Gen 1:28]; for this [reason] I created them — for the preservation of the human kind, its kind. And this is the case, for if the human kind…

[had] the power and the nature [proper] to all the genera of living beings that are upon the earth, which would belong to them — [namely] this fitness for sustenance [drawn] from every green herb [Gen 1:30]: the intent is to say that the plants and the trees, too, were fit to be sustenance for them. And when [God], may He be blessed, willed that this be so, it was so, just as He willed it. Now [Scripture] mentioned here this creation, since by it these kinds would endure and their existence be preserved as far as possible. And behold, [God], may He be blessed, knew that all that He had made was very good — that is, [good] for that toward which it was directed; and this [is] His bringing it into being in the most perfect way possible.

We have already laid down this general principle in [the case of] this saying [regarding] all that He made: that according to that for which He made it, the lower world was directed for the sake of its end; and the good was not brought to completion until the end for which it [exists] was reached — that is, [until] that

which is before the end was reached; so too the perfect good was not brought to completion in its entirety until [a man] reached his perfection and completeness. And behold, "evening and morning" — the intent is to say [the distinction between] the non-rational living thing and the rational living thing, according to their measure as it proceeds along the course of the perfections to its limit. And in this way is explained how the parts of the world are all distinct from one another, and in this [lies] the unity of the world being together — that is, [their being] as a single thing.

And the wondrous account [of Creation] has already informed us, in this matter, [that] one root is established upon which all natural science is built: namely, that among the natural existents there is nothing [made] for nothing. And this is what informs us, regarding all that [God], may He be blessed, made — that these existents are very good.

It is fitting that you should know that [Scripture] already said, regarding man, "let us make man" [Gen 1:26] in the plural form, and did not say so regarding the rest of the [acts of] coming-into-being; rather it said "let the earth bring forth grass" [Gen 1:11], "let the waters swarm" [Gen 1:20], "let the earth bring forth [the living creature]" [Gen 1:24] — because the rest of the [things that came into] being do not have in them a form that is not hylic; and this ascribes their coming-into-being to the elements, with the power given to them, [whereby] there were from them these [acts of] coming-into-being. But man — in order to bring into being in him a form that is not hylic in some respect — did not have his coming-into-being ascribed to the elements separately; rather [it is ascribed] to the elements [insofar as] his coming-into-being [is from] matter, while the coming-into-being of his separate form [is] in the manner in which it stands [in relation] to the upper beings, just as we explained [in the words] "and the spirit returns to God who gave it" [Kohelet 12:7].

And this is what is found [in] what [the Sages] of blessed memory said, in [the words of] their blessing, in many places: that man was created from the upper and from the lower beings. All this [comes] to arouse [us to the awareness] that there is in man [something] whereby he is ascribed, in some manner, to the upper beings.

And because mention is made here, in [Scripture's] brevity regarding the creation of man, [in order] to bring the account of the creation of the world to completion, it then proceeds to recount the secrets of the creation of man, and to complete what was given to him by [God], may He be blessed, to reach his felicity of the soul — just as we explained, in our exposition of the words of the Torah,

regarding the [statement] of the Torah concerning man, and Eve, and the serpent, and the Garden of Eden, and the cherubim, and the flame of the whirling sword [Gen 3:24]. And behold, here is not the place for this inquiry, for the intent in this is to explain what the Torah's account describes regarding the creation of the world.

It is fitting that you should understand what the Torah already mentioned in [its] explanation, in that account: that the acquired intellect is eternal. This is what it had already said: that man became a living soul [Gen 2:7] — the intent is to say that…

[Scripture] would inform [us] of the distinction between his soul and the soul of the rest of the living beings: that the soul of man has in it a power by which there is [for him] life and endurance in itself — which is not the case in the rest of the living beings. And behold, you will find none other than man for whom the soul remains while he is living; and this is why [Scripture] said "let the earth bring forth a living soul after its kind" [Gen 1:24] — for there is in that nothing of the [attribute] of life that is a [special] attribute of the soul; rather there is the name [given] to the genus of [the things] that have life, and these are the living beings; and this is what our meaning has explained.

In general, behold, [the Sages] said regarding man that he is a "living soul" [Gen 2:7] — of necessity, to inform us of the singularity that is in this soul, [setting it apart] from the rest of the souls of the living beings, and to indicate this singularity. So too it said that man was created in the upper image [Gen 1:27]. After this it is explained in what manner it would be that the human soul has endurance in itself; and [Scripture] recounted that man was, in [his] nature, [one] who called names for all living beings [Gen 2:19–20] — the intent is to say that the name indicated their quiddity. And this is what indicates the definition and the will in this [matter], for in man there is a power by which he conceives the quiddity of these things. And [Scripture] said that whatever man would call to it, in this manner, behold, that was its name — a living [creature] [Gen 2:19]; the intent is to say that by his intellect [he grasped] that very quiddity, [which] is the intellect [that is] enduring in itself.

See how the Torah explained that the acquired intellect is eternal, and its testimony [is] together with this — that this felicity would be in conception, not in the verification of what is in actuality; rather this [felicity] would belong to it from the side that it is conception, just as we explained in the first [part] of this book. Indeed, the testimony informs us that, because the calling of names is conception, not truth, this is very well explained.

And behold, the Torah took, in this, the kinds of living beings [as standing] for the rest of the natural things that are [mentioned] here, as if it had said "the element" — and the things that come into being from the parts, and the plants. And behold, the felicity that reaches [a man] in the apprehension of the honored matters is far more honored than [what is described] here, just as was explained in the first [part] of this book.

See how the Torah explained this matter in clear language. And behold, the [thing] hidden in this matter [is hidden] only because of the keys [of interpretation] that have been placed [for it] in [the doctrine of] the immortality of the soul, on account of the view of the philosophers concerning the immortality of the soul. And in this those who say that the Torah did not arouse [us] concerning the matter of the felicity of the soul have gone gravely astray. Indeed, [the truth lies in] the priority [given] in the Torah and its mention [of these matters], for, since this is so, there will be in the matter nothing but that the Torah set right these [matters] for [the sake of] the perfections of the soul; rather, the [thing] whose ceasing is providence alone — but this would be that whose separation [from matter] is utter nullity. And accordingly [a man] is obligated to set before himself the notification of the Torah regarding the matter of the immortality of the soul, for it is the end for whose sake it is fitting that everyone exert himself — that one exert himself in [the matter of] the perfections of the soul.

And here is completed the account of the levels of the creation, [in] the bringing into being of the world. And accordingly, the seventh level, which is ascribed to [God], may He be blessed, in the creation of the world, is His preserving it, always, in the manner that it [exists]; and according to that, the level of the master craft, which is made by the craftsman who loves it, [is such] that this activity [of preserving] does not need any agent beyond the completing [agent]; rather it requires [reference] to the perpetual agent. And this, indeed, would belong to it always [as] a wondrous love, by reason of this honored apprehension that is in providence, and by reason of the wondrous love…

that is found by nature in this honored apprehension. The movers of the heavenly bodies long [yearningly] that there should always emanate from them what emanates upon these existents. For this wondrous love would belong to them from the side of the lacking pattern [of order] that is in their soul; but it would belong to them, of necessity, [from] this wondrous love, from the side of what they attain — namely, that this lacking pattern that is in their soul is a part of the perfect patterns that are with [God], may He be blessed; and they serve

[Him] by reason of this love that is in them, in the pattern by which [God], may He be blessed, set their spheres in motion, always, in the manner whereby there emanates from them what emanates upon these existents. And these [are] the [acts of] fashioning [that come] from this serving [done] for [God], may He be blessed; [were this serving] to cease in this matter for [even] one instant, all these existents would be corrupted, for this serving is the cause whereby the motions of the spheres are always upon the manner that is in them.

And further, since they [are such] that the matters of their own essences already emanated from [God], may He be blessed — [namely] the existence of the spheres and the stars, which cleave to it in this wondrous manner — they long to be likened to [God], may He be blessed, as far as possible. And in this wondrous manner they would long to emanate over that which is more perfect than they, to complete the divine intent in [that] for which He created them, in this wondrous manner. And this is what [Scripture] already recounted and said: that the creation of the heavens and the earth, and all that is in them, was completed [Gen 2:1] from the rest of the existents; and that the seventh level of the creation is what [God], may He be blessed, already longed [for], [namely] the craft of His work — the intent is to say [the bringing about] of the intelligible from the work, [namely] the pattern of the existents — and He ordered them and set them right.

And in this manner [God], may He be blessed, continues existence, and there is no need to do in it as [in the case of] these [other] existents; rather it comes into being in this manner that it [exists] in, in what is found for the movers of the heavenly bodies, [whereby] there always [arises] the longing to [God], may He be blessed, to set their spheres in motion, in this manner whereby these existents are brought to completion in their pattern. And this is the cause [whereby] [God], may He be blessed, blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, when He gave the Torah to Israel, to arouse [them] concerning the matter of the origination of the world; for in this seventh level of the creation [God] rested [Gen 2:2–3] from these activities that He performed at the time of the origination of the world. And it is this [act of] craft that [God], may He be blessed, created — that is, [what is] according to that which is by nature, which [God], may He be blessed, gave to it at the time of the creation — in [the act of] always performing the bringing-into-being of existence, according to that which is by nature, which [God], may He be blessed, gave to it at the time of the creation.

And behold, [as for] our exposition of "and God ceased" [Gen 2:2]: it [pertains] to the matter of love — like "and the whole of David" [?]. And if one were to say that, if the matter were so, [then] there was a lacking of soul — for this activity is

bound always with soul, as they said "[my soul] was bound up [with my soul]" [cf. I Samuel 18:1], and as in the whole [meaning] of our [text concerning] "the soul of David" — we say to him that this [objection does] not [hold]: it would [hold] only when the longing were composite of body and soul, like [in the case of] man, since it is fitting to ascribe this longing to the soul, which is the part of him to which it would be possible that the longing and the desire be ascribed. But [God], may He be blessed, has in Him no part to which the longing alone is ascribed, for He is not composite; and accordingly the longing that is ascribed to Him — [namely] that He longs toward Himself, in His [very] self — is not [ascribed] to a part of Him. And it is possible that what is said, in their saying "and God ceased on the seventh day [from] His work that He had done" [Gen 2:2], is that He completed, in this seventh level, His work that He had made — in [the sense of] that which He made always giving…

their activity in this revealed part of the earth is at the perfection of strength, and at night when it is at the perfection of weakness. To illustrate: just as the sun, when it is upon the horizon by day, has its night when it is beneath the earth, so the sun has its day when it is in the northern constellations [במזלות הצפונים] and its night when it is in the southern constellations [במזלות הדרומיים]. By this means the four seasons of the year [ארבע תקופות בשנה] come to be, differing from one another in some measure.

He further mentioned that the Name, blessed be He, willed [רצה השם ית' ב"ה] them in their existence to a second purpose [להועלה שנית]: namely, that there should arise from them differing activities in which the stars are distinguished [ייוחדו בהם הככבים] from one another to some degree, and that the stars should serve as signs for these distinct effects in which they are distinguished. This is the meaning of "for signs and for appointed times and for days" [Genesis 1:14] — as though one were to say that the appointed time at which a given renewing event will occur corresponds to which planet governed it [שיגזרהו הככב הפלוני], and that the second appointed time corresponds to which other planet governed it. Thus one says that the ruler [המושל] at this hour is Saturn [שבתי], the ruler at the second hour is Jupiter [צדק], the ruler of this day is Saturn, and the ruler of the second day is the sun [השמש].

And so it is with the rest of the appointed times in the years, and with the other "appointed times" [המועדים] — that the greater changes are connected to the dominion the stars hold over them, in accordance with what has been explained from sense-experience [מן החוש] to one who occupies himself with the laws of the stars [משפטי הככבים]. This is clear from what already preceded in the fifth

[treatise] of this book: that both these final causes [שתי הסבות] mentioned in their creation are causes for the perfection of the multiplicity of comings-into-being [רבוי ההוייות] in this lower matter [החמר השפל].

He further mentioned that the Name, blessed be He, already willed them in their existence to a third purpose [להועלה שלישית]: namely, that they should give light upon the earth, for by this is perfected the existence of man and the rest of the living beings that possess the sense of sight [חוש הראות] — and this is very clearly so. For without light a seeing being would not apprehend the things it senses; and behold, we see that the senses are among the greatest of the causes by which a man is brought to the perfection of his intelligibles. Man is, by this means, greatly brought toward the perfection of his intelligibles [אל השלמתו במושכלותיו], since the first principles of his intelligibles are acquired from the senses, and chief among them is the sense of sight — and this is very clearly so.

And since the Name, blessed be He, already willed in the creation of the stars that man should attain through them these benefits [שיגיע בהם … הפעולות], it is clear that this was a cause for His producing them in the most excellent manner possible — in their nearness and their farness [מהקורבה והריחק], their greatness and their smallness [והגודל והקטנות], the variety of their colors in their luminosities [וחלוף הצבעים בנצוציהם], the multitude of their motions and the fewness thereof [ורבוי התנועות ומעוטם], and the rest of the matters found in the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים] — in order that they might attain through them these purposes in the most perfect manner possible.

And behold, "Let the waters swarm with swarms" [ישרצו שרץ — cf. Genesis 1:20] — this came to be by the Name, blessed be He. He returns to recount the manner of this creation [אופן זאת הבריאה]: he says that the Name, blessed be He, already made the two great luminaries [שני המאורות הגדולים], namely the sun and the moon, and produced [them] greater than the rest of the stars [יותר גדולים משאר הככבים], since these beings found in the lower [world] [הנמצאות השפלות] have greater need of the sun and moon than of the rest of the stars. For this reason He was obliged to make them in such a way that they should be of the greatest magnitude [מהגודל], more than the rest of the stars,

as preceded. And for this reason he said that He made the sun for the dominion of the day [לממשלה היום] and the moon for the dominion of the night [לממשלה הלילה], and the stars too, which have a dominion over them, as preceded. He mentioned that He already made them in such a manner that these aforementioned benefits [התועלות הנזכרות] would be perfected through them — meaning that He set them over the earth so that a living being possessing the

sense of sight should derive benefit. He intends to say "by day and by night" [ביום ובלילה], for in this way [בדרך] there were ordered from them these renewing accidents [המקרים המתחדשים] that change in this lower world from time to time, as preceded.

And to divide [ולהבדיל] between the light of the star and the darkness — and this is the *now* [העת] when it is upon the horizon, and that is when it is beneath the horizon. And so the light of the star and its darkness would be ordered [מיוחס] toward the four seasons [התקופות הארבעה] that come to be from every kind of revolution found in it, as preceded. To this he refers when he says here, "and to divide between the light and the darkness" [Genesis 1:18] — in exchange for what he first said, "to divide between the day and the night" [Genesis 1:14] — so as to add to what he gave to understand in this discourse [המאמר]. For from "by day and by night" [Genesis 1:14] it would have been possible to think that he means nothing but the daily revolution [ההקף היומי]; and for this reason he transposed the language here to "the light and the darkness." And by this he said, "the ruler over day and over night" [Genesis 1:18, paraphrased], in exchange for "the signs," and "they were for signs and for appointed times and for days and for years." This is what he meant to add, in the perfection of what is plain in his words here in this discourse — I mean, "they were for signs and for appointed times and for days and for years."

After this he said, "And God saw that what He had produced from the stars was good — that is to say, it was good" [Genesis 1:18, glossed]. This is the [final] end [התכלית] of their creation, for what is false among them is good only per accidens [במקרה]. And behold, "there was evening and there was morning" [Genesis 1:19] in this level of the creation [המדרגה מהבריאה], [as distinct] from the other — and this is that they all share in the manner in which there is poured forth from them an order [נמוס] for these lower beings [הנמצאות השפלות], and He set them in order and made them upright [וסדרם ויושרם].

And behold, "the evening and the morning" are two aspects [שני צדדים] in them. The one is from the side of the star, in regard to which there are renewed from it varying relations [יחסים מתחלפים] toward this part [of the world] revealed from the earth [החלק הנגלה מהארץ]; and the morning is the time at which the effect reaching this revealed part of the earth is strongest in its activity, and the evening at which the weakest of its activity would be — and behold, this matter is one [העניין מתאחד], even though, in respect of what is ordered from it, its activity varies in some manner.

And the second aspect is that the stars differ among themselves at one extreme in honor [בכבוד], and apart from this in honor too, in respect of the relation of the ordered activities [מדרגות הפעולות המסודרות] to one star rather than another — and behold, with this they are all united [מתאחדים כלם], until, from the totality of them, there is perfected this order [הנמוס], the soul [הנפש] that is found in these lower beings [הנמצאות השפלות].

And behold, here there are two weighty doubts [שני ספקות עצומות] that it is fitting one should strive to resolve [שנשתדל בהתרם]. The one [doubt] will already be explained from what we have said: that the Name, blessed be He, already brought into being these things for the sake of these lower beings. And if it be so, the more honorable [thing] would have been brought into being for the sake of the less honorable [בעבור הפחות] — and this is a great falsehood in the eyes of the wise [שקר עצום אצל החכמים]. And the second [doubt] is that it has already become fitting, according to the seventh order [הסדר השביעי], that their coming-into-being [הויה] should be on the third day [ליום השלישי]. For the heavens and the stars precede them in honor and in existence [קודמים בכבוד ובמציאות] — so how could they come into being from them? — And we shall say that this first doubt will find no [difficulty], upon investigation of the inquiry, together with what preceded among the things [we said] in this discourse [המאמר]. For it has already been seen that the more honorable [הנכבד] always perfects the less honorable [… ישלים השפל] in what it emanates to it [במה שישפיע לו], and that the manner in which the Name, blessed be He, emanates to all beings does not require that the one to whom this is emanated be more honorable. But rather it is said that, from the aspect of their being produced [שמציאותו], it is in the manner of perfection [מהשלמות] that the more honorable be able to emanate, in its perfection, to all beings [לכל הנמצאות] in accordance with what it is possible for them to receive from it.

But indeed that which is false [מה שהוא מהשקר] is that the more honorable should acquire its perfection from the less honorable [שיקנה הנכבד שלמותו מהפחות]. And since the matter is so, behold, this doubt is removed by what we said: that the spheres [שהגלגלים] and their movers [ומניעיהם] were brought into being for the sake of their own essences [בעבור עצמותם], and because they are more honorable [יותר נכבד]. For a being possessing a body acts upon what is lower in [its capacity as] a being possessing a body, [whereas] a body that does not act would not act upon them; for these activities are of [the order of] those things that pertain to bodies [לגשמים], and without this they would have been dead bodies [גופים מתים], set in motion to no purpose [הושמו מתנועעים]. And because there would not have been, were it not so, anything fitting that they should act,

He would [then] have been an agent of nullity [פועל הבטלה]. He intends to say that they should not be moved, nor should there be renewed from their motions any benefit [שום תועלת]; and it would be impossible that this benefit [התועלת] should be renewed for their own essences [לעצמותם], since there is in them no power in their own essences [שאין בהם כח בעצמותם]. For this reason, the cause that the motions of the spheres came to be was to perfect through them the rest of the beings [שאר הנמצאות … להשלים בהם] — the spheres, and their numbering [ומספרם], and their luminosities [ונצוצי הכוכבים], and the rest of the matters found in the heavens — in the most perfect manner by which it is possible to perfect these beings.

And this is clear from what already preceded. This doubt cannot be resolved more correctly [לא יתכן שיותר] except upon the supposition of the world's being generated [הנחת העולם מחודש]; and from this there will be explained to us the origination of the world [חדוש העולם], as preceded. — But indeed the second doubt is very hard [קשה מאד], and it is fitting that one resolve it [שנאמר בהתרו] according to its proper measure [לפי קצורנו].

And we shall say that, because the [final] end of the intent [תכלית הכונה] in our perfect Torah [בתורתנו התמימה] is to bring the one who investigates it [המעיין] to walk in its way toward the true felicity [ההצלחה האמתית], as we have explained in our exposition of the words of the Torah, behold, it willed to testify to man, from the aspect of speculation [מצד העיון], in this order [בזה הסדור] found in it — in the account of the form of the world's creation [בספור תואר בריאת העולם] — concerning the secrets of existence [סודות המציאות]. And it intended by this to testify to him, from the aspect of speculation, that the world is necessarily generated [שהוא מחויב שיהיה העולם מחודש]. And behold, this was from it [the Torah] a measured thing [דבר מנה] in its placing before him a matter to take his stand upon [דבר יעמד בו]. And this is because, just as one who walks on a road in which he is confident that there is no stumbling block [שאין בה מכשול] will not stray in his speculation [לא יפליג בעיון] in the way he proceeds along it — until, for the sake of which there would be a cause [סבה] that this manner [שיטה] of perfecting [be] in the manner that would be better, so that it should remain in its place [נשאר במקומו], by his being kept distant in his way always from the place toward which he directed his coming [כיון לבא אליו]. But indeed, when there is in it [the road] a stumbling block [מכשול], he will stumble.

He directs the speculation [העיון] toward it and applies his striving [וישים השתדלותו] to remove the obstacles [להסירם], or to turn away from it toward the road that conducts him [אשר תוליכהו] to the place toward which he directed his

going [כיון ללכת אליו]. And so it is in the matter [the way one proceeds] in the Torah: that were there not in it [a matter for] the one who investigates [המעיין] to take his stand upon, the one who investigates would not be at variance [… לא היה מפליג] in speculation upon it, and this would be a cause of withholding from it its benefit [תועלתה].

And behold, the change of the order of the creation [שנוי סדר הבריאה] in this matter is itself the cause for this very thing [לזאת הסבה בעינה]. And this is [evident in] that, if there had been mentioned the matter of the creation of the stars before [the matter of] the revolution of the earth [קודם … הגלות הארץ], it would have been possible to think a [certain] view, and to suppose that the revolution of the earth would be related to the stars [שיהיה הגלות הארץ מיוחס אל הככבים], as the Philosopher [הפלוסוף] and those who agree with him

after him supposed. And for this reason he mentioned, in the Torah, first the matter of the revolution of the earth, before the mention of the creation of the stars [קודם זכר בריאת הככבים]. And because the mention of the revolution of the earth — our matter [in it] — was not directed [toward the stars] for their own sake [בלתי מכוון בעבור עצמותו], but rather it [the Torah] directed [it] for the sake of the coming-into-being of the beings in it [בעבור הויית ההוים בו], it was necessary that it mention with it the coming-into-being of the growing things [הויית הצמחים]. For this had already been necessitated by [the need] also to make known the matter of the evening and the morning in this coming-into-being [עניין הערב והבקר בזאת ההויה], and that they are united [שהם מתאחדים].

And further: that if he had mentioned the creation of the stars after the creation of the celestial body [בריאת הגרם השמימיי], it would have been possible for the investigator [למעיין] to err and to suppose that the stars were [created] in the spheres for the sake of their own essences [בעבור עצמותם], and that the benefit reaching from them to these beings [שהתועלת המגיע מהם … אלו הנמצאות] is from them per the second intent [על הכונה השנית]. For this reason there is the separating between them [the topics] in [the order of] the creation of the revolution of the earth; and they themselves [the lower beings] are connected [to it], so that the creation of the spheres should be made known to us as having been perfected without the stars [נשלמה בזולת ככבים], in respect of what would require their own essences [שיצטרך אל עצמותם]. And indeed the stars were [created] in them [the spheres], in [the order of] these benefits mentioned; and the Torah serves us in this toward that which we draw from it [מה שנקח ממנו] as a demonstration of the origination of the world [מופת על חדוש העולם].

And further: why did he mention, together with the creation of the spheres [בריאת הגלגלים] in their creation, the lower matter [החמר השפל] of the elemental forms [הצורות היסודיות], in which there was a potency [כח] to receive all the forms [לקבל כל הצורות]? Behold, it would not have been fitting that the discourse [המאמר] interrupt in this [the matter of] the lower matter, prior [to mentioning] that the lower [matter] would change from the perfections it has potentially [כחיי] toward some thing — and for this reason it was necessary to mention with it the coming-into-being of the growing things [הויית הצמחים]. And because of this it was obligated to mention with it the creation of the revolution of the earth [בריאת הגלות הארץ], for it [the revolution] is the cause, in the manner of what is found among these comings-into-being here. And after he perfected the account of the creation of what there was to it to perfect [from] the creation of the spheres — namely, the stars —

after he completed the account in this level of the creation [בזאת המדרגה מהבריאה], he began to recount another level of the creation [מדרגה אחרת מהבריאה] in this lower matter [החמר השפל]. And he said that the Name, blessed be He, already said, "Let the waters swarm with swarms of living souls, and let birds fly above the earth across the face of the firmament of the heavens" [Genesis 1:20]. And so he meant to say that the Name, blessed be He, already created in this manner all the kinds of fish that generate their like [המולידים מינם] found in the waters, and all the kinds of birds [העוף] that generate their like.

And the Name, blessed be He, knew that what He produced there was very good, toward the end for which it was created [לתכלית אשר בעבורו נברא]; and they were already, indeed, seen [to be] thus, in the most perfect manner possible in their creation — until they reached there what He had given them, from the good and the favor [מהטוב והחנינה], that the Producer [המציא] [granted] in their creation. And if this be very great [רב מאד], as is explained in natural science [בחכמה הטבעית] in regard to the memory [זכרון] found in the limbs of the living being [אצל איברי הבעל חיים …], behold, this is little in regard to that which is found of the good and the favor [מהטוב והחנינה] in their formation [ביצירתם]. And behold, the Name, blessed be He, gave in them a power [נתן בהם … כח] over their generating their like [על שיולידו מינם], and blessed them in their being fruitful and multiplying — "and let the birds multiply on the earth" [Genesis 1:22] — and they were fruitful and multiplied [יפרה וירבה] on the earth. And behold, "there was evening and there was morning" in this level of the creation, [proceeding] from the one [creature] to the other; and the evening is the living being more deficient than they [החי היותר חסר], as though one were to say "the fish according to their levels" [מדרגותיהם], and the morning is the living being more perfect than they

[החי היותר שלם] — and they are the birds [העופות], according to their levels [מדרגותיהם].

And behold, these two kinds among living beings [שני הסוגים מהבעל חיים] needed the blessing [הברכה] for their being fruitful and multiplying, whereas the perfect living being [החי השלם] did not need it, since the begetting [התולדת] of these kinds is deficient [חסרה], for they are those that produce...

would be something in which no doubt remained, as the Philosopher mentions in the *Metaphysics* [literally, "in what comes after the natural science" — Aristotle, *Metaphysics*].

Let us now say that each of these alternatives already admits of one of the explanations indicated above. The first is that it would already seem necessary for the wondrous existence ascribed to God, blessed be He, to come about, since the kind of existence these wonders possess is the willed existence attributed to Him in the creation of the world — and this has been explained in connection with the subject of existence itself. Furthermore, since it is from Him, blessed be He, that this order of nature found in all existing things derives, it is clearly not fitting that any one of them should be able to alter that nature and that arrangement; only the One from whom that order itself derives can do so. This matter is like that of a great king who sets up laws for his ministers, by which they conduct themselves and govern those beneath them: it is clear that no one of them can alter that law, but the one who has authority over this is the king who established the law. As to the extent to which this comparison applies, it is already evident that all the wonders mentioned in the Torah and in the words of the prophets are attributed to God, blessed be He — and this has been explained in its place. And our Rabbis of blessed memory, too, may already be seen to have grasped that what acts in the wonders is God, blessed be He, and concerning this they said, regarding the matter of the plague of the firstborn, "And I passed through the land of Egypt — I and not an angel," and so on [Pesachim 7b; cf. the Passover Haggadah, on Shemos 12:12].

And this same explanation may also already be found from another of the alternatives raised above: namely, that what acts in these wonders is the Active Intellect. This is because the prophetic apprehension in prophecy is a contact reaching the Active Intellect, as was explained in the second treatise of this book [Treatise II]. It has thus been explained that the Active Intellect knows the novelty of these wonders, and by this means it makes them known to a prophet. Granting this, it has been explained that the Active Intellect is what acts in the wonders. For if this novelty of these wonders were ascribed to God, blessed be He, by way

of will alone, it would not have been possible for the knowledge of them to reach the Active Intellect — since there is no law and order to novelties of that kind such that any knowledge of them could be had. And in general, since the agent that is separate [from matter] acts upon that which is acted upon according to the law belonging to that which is acted upon, and since this holds with respect to the Active Intellect, knowledge of the wonders is what is fitting that the agent should have of them.

But we have already said that there must be a definite law for the wonders, since apart from this it would not be possible for the knowledge of them to occur — for knowledge is of things that are bounded and ordered, in accordance with the respect in which they are bounded and ordered, as was explained in the second treatise of this book. Moreover, since it is impossible for the separate intellect to have knowledge of a thing insofar as it is particular — and it has been explained that there is, in apprehending the wonders, a universal law — and since the knowledge of these wonders reaches the prophet by way of a wonder according to the manner explained in the second treatise of this book, the result being the apprehension by the particular of the particular thing from the Active Intellect: and furthermore, since these acts are all found in these things in the way described here — and this you will not find, for instance, in what is renewed after the creation of the world,

such as a heavenly body's coming to be in the celestial sphere in some wondrous way; but rather you will find that whatever is renewed among the wonders, whether substances or accidents, all belong to these lower existing things — and since this is so, it has been explained that what acts in them is the Active Intellect. Furthermore, since the novelty of the wonders is for the sake of providence and benefaction toward these things here, and since the Active Intellect is what watches over them with respect to the end for the sake of which they exist, it is fitting that this providence be ascribed to it. And if this providence were ascribed to the separate intellect by another route, this would be because providence proceeds by the manner of the perfection by which the Active Intellect watches over these things. It thus follows from this that the Active Intellect knew the law according to which this providence is ordered with respect to these things — for it is impossible that it should know what completes the thing if it did not know what its perfection is, as has been explained in connection with itself. And if this is so, then it would necessarily follow that the Active Intellect is what watches over these things here — since it has knowledge, in respect of the perfection of these things, of the law that grounds their existence, and since the path by which

they are reached is from it through this act upon these things. For this reason it has been explained that the Active Intellect is what acts in these wonders.

And there may already be found in like manner a way in which, in the case of a human being, it is he who acts in the wonders. This is because, since the will that wills this is the beginning of the novelty of the renewed wonder, and since it is impossible for a will to come to be anew in God, blessed be He, nor in the Active Intellect, while it is possible for a renewed will to come to be in a human being, it is fitting that the human being should be the agent. Indeed, this would be possible when he knows, in the law of these existing things, a great deal, and grasps the degree to which the Active Intellect — on the side of the intelligible law conceived in his soul — acts; there would then occur to him an action belonging to the things attributed to the separate action, and there would occur to him the novelty of the will by way of strong attachment. This matter has already been illustrated by the readiness with which matter is moved to its special form [הצורה המיוחדת], as was explained: for one already finds that the elements [literally, "the earthy things," הארמיות] come to be at their beginning with a wondrous readiness, on account of the actions of the soul that move them.

And in general: behold, matter's hearing of the special form, so as to take on the special form, is exceedingly wondrous, as our Rabbis mentioned in what went before; and in this manner it is possible to picture that there occurred to a human being, when his form took on, in some way, something of these lower things [?], that there already came to be for them all a degree of matter readying it for the special form. This comparison too will help, with respect to what is pictured of the conditions of the wonders, [namely] that there was in them an entryway [מבוא] for a prophet — for the human being who is a prophet is the one who knows these existing things more than the rest of mankind. And this would be when his perfection were complete, and when the parts of his soul that are conjoined toward the perfection and strength of his use [of them] in their action — which is apprehension — were ordered. Moreover, it has been found that whenever the prophet's degree was higher, the wonders performed by his hand would be more wondrous; and the Torah testifies to this,

for there is a wondrous difference between the wonders performed by the hand of Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, and the wonders performed by the hand of others — and this is something that indicates that the more a prophet apprehends, the more he acts in the wonders. And it would seem that the sage Rabbi Avraham ibn Ezra, of blessed memory, already inclined toward this view; for he held that Moses needed to strike the rock several times in order to bring

forth the water [Bamidbar 20:11], because at the first instance there was no separation in his general providence, on account of the anger [הכעס] that had hold of him. And concerning this it was said that he had "a portion of a portion," meaning that, because the prophet did not make use of his providence, his form would not be taken in the special matter according to what this sage held [cf. Bamidbar 20:10–12; Ibn Ezra ad loc.].

These, then, are the ways of the alternatives by which the parts of the question hidden in this inquiry may be resolved. And there may already be found, too, that which annuls some part of them: namely, it would seem that it is not fitting that God, blessed be He, should be the proximate agent in these wonders. For if the matter were so, then the act of the Active Intellect — which is the lower agent — in this would be more venerable than the act of God, blessed be He, when something is acted upon. And this is because the act [of the Active Intellect] is always good in itself, whereas this [other] act is not good except by accident — that is to say, the act of the Active Intellect in these things, willed and accomplished, would be more venerable than the act of God, blessed be He, performed upon them. The illustration is: the serpent's becoming a staff [Shemos 4:3] is not good in respect of itself, even though there was in it some good when those who saw the wonder acquired a true belief from it. So too, when the staff came to be by the hand of the prophet, it is not good in respect of itself — rather it is evil in respect of itself — even though it was good by accident, in a chance way, in bringing the people who saw it to acquire a true belief.

Furthermore, since God, blessed be He, would be the agent in this, the act of the Active Intellect in these things would be more venerable, because its actions are bounded in them at every time by attachment; whereas the act of God, blessed be He, in them would be in but a small part of time, and the agent ascribed to Him would, when annulled, stand idle for most of the time — and this is the utmost in disgrace. And again, if the matter were so, it would be impossible that this providential information [ההודעה] should reach a prophet in prophecy; for the agent in this information is the Active Intellect, as was explained before, and it would not be possible for it to belong to the Active Intellect to have this information if God, blessed be He, were the agent in the wonders, as our Rabbis mentioned before — if [the wonder] were a deed of God, blessed be He, performing the act of wonder.

[?: this last clause — כמו שבאנו במה שקדם, אם הנה השם יתברך פעל הנפלאות — is syntactically compressed; rendered as best read.]

And again: since we hold that God, blessed be He, is the agent of the wonders, it would be obligatory — if there came to be in Him will and knowledge when He willed to renew the wonder He renewed, and if this renewed wonder were to come to be at that time — that it be bounded and ordered by His prior will. But the assertion that there comes to be in Him will and knowledge anew is the utmost in annulment. And if we are to say that the wonder which is renewed is renewed at this time, in a manner bounded and ordered by His prior will, as our Rabbis of blessed memory mentioned in connection with the matter of the wonders — for they said that these were among "the conditions which the Holy One, Blessed be He, made with the works of Creation" [Bereishis Rabbah 5:5], and thus they also said that these wonders were created "at twilight" [bein hashemashos — Avos 5:6, the things created on the eve of the first Shabbos],

meaning to say that they had already been created, after the coming-to-be of the world in the six days, before the entry of the Shabbos day — behold, many absurdities are entailed by this from which there is no escape. For one: if the matter were so, the renewed wonder would not have needed a prophet, since what was renewed had already come to be at that time apart from a prophet; and this is the manifest contrary [of what we observe]. And for another: if the matter were so, behold, the question is not removed by this division. For if God set an order, in accordance with His prior will, that this renewed wonder should be at this time and not at a time other than that for which it was found to exist — but it happened that there reached it from Him this good end — behold, the difficulty remains as before, [the matter] being one of explained annulment and disgrace [?: הטוב here read as "the good end"]. And again, [there is the difficulty] of how it could be possible that the wonders reach by accident in this — behold, the wondrous benefit reaching from them.

And if we say that God, blessed be He, ordered, in accordance with His prior will, that the wonders which would be renewed at this time should be renewed in it — to the end for the sake of which they were found — behold, it would be obligatory that there be an annulment of the natural-possible. The illustration is: the splitting of the Sea of Suf [the Red Sea], were it foreknown to God, blessed be He, beforehand, that it would be renewed at the time when the nature [of the sea] would be renewed in order to make the Egyptians perish and to bring Israel to a complete faith in God, blessed be He — behold, it would have to be that the Egyptians would be pursuing Israel at this time into the sea, and that Israel would then be of perfect faith in God, blessed be He. For if this were not so, it would not have been obligatory; and if it were not obligatory, then it is possible that this wonder should be renewed at the time which God, blessed be He, set for it, and

yet no benefit be renewed from it — and this is because the Egyptians' going there at that time was possible, not necessary, by reason of their being agents through their free choice; and likewise it was possible for Israel that they should be of perfect faith in God, blessed be He, prior to this time. And when this was so, it has been explained that the natural-possible is already annulled, and this is the utmost in annulment. So this contention too falls away — that the Active Intellect should be what acts in these wonders.

Furthermore, since God, blessed be He, is the law of existing things and orders them and sets them aright, and in this manner it is possible that He be the agent in the things that exist — and since this is so — it has been explained that the novelty of the wonders is a thing that departs from the bound of the law of existing things, inasmuch as there is no bound to this existence. But it may be possible that they be things very many in number, as we said, that the novelty of the serpent and the staff [Shemos 4:3] could be in this manner, in some way among these things; so too the matter in the case of one of the things [discussed] here. Behold, it has been explained that it is impossible that the Active Intellect should be the agent in this existence belonging to that existence of God, blessed be He, since it is impossible that this order be comprised within the arrangement of the law of existing things that is in the soul which derives from God, blessed be He. So this contention too falls away — that the Active Intellect should be what acts in these wonders.

And it will already be explained, too, that it is impossible that a human being should be the one who acts in these wonders. For if the matter were so, the providential information would not reach him in prophecy; but...

for since it has been established that the movers of the heavenly bodies surpass him in the rank of their existence, this is the reason why the movers of the heavenly bodies are perpetually parceled out to him, and they move because of this through their spheres, in the manner whereby the law of these existing things is brought to completion. The matter would thus admit of one interpretation among these explanations; yet the last interpretation set out is the more fitting one, in keeping with our considered view. And behold, this seventh rank is the one we cherish — the rank that has neither ceasing nor cessation, as we explained earlier in connection with the question of the world's being something incapable of corruption.

This, then, is the measure of what is not in place here from the Account of Creation [מעשה בראשית], which is the very thing that brought us to the inquiry into the matter of the world's origination [חידוש העולם]. And it was fitting that this

be so, for it is impossible that the Torah should have founded for us a lying view, and for this reason it was obligatory that our view accord with the Torah as to what was explained, its obligation [demonstrated] by demonstration.

Now let the inquirer see how marvelously we have succeeded in clarifying this passage [of Scripture] — more than anyone who preceded us — in a manner that the inquirer cannot in any way fail to grasp, apart from what we have already mentioned. And this is because this passage attests to us, whether from the side of the language or from the side of its order, that this is its meaning beyond doubt. We have not wished to draw out the discourse in refuting whoever preceded us in its explanation, since we see that this would be superfluous — the passage itself, by its plain sense, gives notice beyond doubt of what its meaning is; and where there is direct instruction, there is no need of witnesses to litigate the matter.

It is therefore fitting that we give abundant thanks to God, blessed be He, for our having found this marvel — the marvel that has been disclosed to us and that has roused our eyes [to see]. May it be His will that there be found in this nation, through this marvelous inquiry into the wonders that are in it, the [end] for which all this exists, as has been explained from our words.

פרק תשיעי [Chapter Nine]

In which will be explained the manner along which the foundational principles concerning the matter of the wonders [הנפלאות] proceed.

Now that it has already been explained, in a way that admits no doubt, that there is in the world a [class of] coming-to-be other than what was [previously] found — and that the wonders whose existence is publicized from the words of the Torah and the narratives of the words of the prophets are a coming-to-be that is renewed, necessarily of a kind of coming-into-being distinct from this one in some way: for there will not be in it a coming-to-be that is bounded, as is the matter with natural coming-into-being — it is therefore fitting that we inquire here into what end these things have, and in what way they came to be and in what way they did not, and who is the agent in this coming-into-being. For when we have inquired into this matter of the wonders, we shall have come to know what is required of their notification [ההודעה] concerning their meaning.

And it has [already] been explained that it is fitting that we publicize here what the narrative of the Torah and the narratives of the words of the prophets make plain regarding the wonders — taking from them direct evidence [ראיה] for that

into which we wished to inquire. For we have applied ourselves to the speculative matters in such a way that they were [first] perceived through sense as matters within which there would be inquiry, so as to make from them the beginning of a demonstration

upon what has been given us through their notification. And this is so because some of these matters can stand for a man on the basis of sense, [the matters] that he senses in themselves, for the ease of apprehending the [object of] sense that he needs in completing that inquiry — though some of them cannot do so. But some of them require that a man take their measure on the basis of what is apprehended by sense from others than himself, those whom it is fitting to rely upon, as the Philosopher did in the kinds of animals [Aristotle, *De Animalibus*], and as Ptolemy did with the observations [מבטי] of the stars [the *Almagest*], where he took much from those who preceded him, on account of the difficulty of attaining by sense what was needed for the completing of these speculations — if a man were not aided in this by what was [already] apprehended by those who came before. And it is explained that the matter of the wonders is of this same kind: that we are not aided from them by anything within sense from which we could make, of ourselves, the beginning of a demonstration in this inquiry. And for this it is fitting that we take from those who preceded that which they recounted to us as the truth: namely, the prophets, taken as a whole, and the people who lived in their times, to whom this matter was publicized in a way that leaves no doubt of it.

Let us say, then, that when we inquired into the matter of the wonders, we found some of them [pertaining] to substances themselves [בעצמים] and some of them [pertaining] to accidents [במקרים]. An illustration of those that are in substances themselves is the turning of the staff downward into a serpent [Shemos 4:3], and [the turning of] water into blood, and what underwent change in its custom [מנהג]; and an illustration of those that are in accidents is the turning of the hand of the lord of the prophets [Moses] leprous in an instant, apart from any prior cause that would necessarily require this from the course of nature, by his own hand [Shemos 4:6]; and the drying-up of the hand of Jeroboam in this manner [I Melachim 13:4]; and likewise, when the prophet [at Beth-El] took the measure concerning the matter of the altar — that there would be one to serve upon it in idolatrous worship [I Melachim 13:2].

And likewise it has been explained that some of the wonders had a notification [הודעה] reach the prophet through them before they came to be, and some of them did not have a notification reach the prophet before they came to be. This is

of two kinds: the one kind, which will be explained, is that the prophet was praying to God, blessed be He, that He perform this wonder; and the second kind, which will be explained, is not so — rather the prophet was reminded by a decree that this wonder should be renewed, and it came to be renewed by his decree. An illustration of what had a notification reach the prophet, by way of prophecy, [is] the plagues, in their entirety, which God, blessed be He, renewed in Egypt, and whatever resembles this from the rest of the wonders. And an illustration of what did not have a notification reach the prophet, but rather it was already recounted that he had prayed to God, blessed be He, that He bring this wonder about, is what Elisha prayed to God, blessed be He — that the youths who were coming against him be smitten with blindness — and that Elijah prayed to God, blessed be He, to revive the son of the widow [I Melachim 17:21]; and whatever resembles this from the rest of the wonders. And an illustration of what did not have a notification reach the prophet, but rather it was recounted that the prophet decreed that this wonder should be renewed, and it came to be renewed by his decree, is what Elijah said: "If I am a man of God, let fire come down from heaven and consume you and your fifty" [II Melachim 1:10], and the wonder that Elisha performed with the oil [II Melachim 4:1–7], and whatever resembles this from the rest of the wonders.

So too, behold, when we inquired into the matter of the wonders, we found that in all of them it is possible that there be a prophet ascribed to them. And one will already be aided concerning this inquiry by what is mentioned in the Torah concerning Moses — when he would seek direct evidence [ראיה] that would be confirmed regarding Israel, that God, blessed be He, had indeed appeared to him: [namely,] the matter of the wonders that

he was commanded to perform before them, so that it be confirmed for them that he was a prophet; and were it possible to perform the wonders without a prophet, this matter would not have been direct evidence for Israel that Moses was a prophet. And let it not be hard for you that a wonder was performed for us [Israel] when the camp [of Assyria] was smitten — when the angel of God smote it in the camp [II Melachim 19:35] — even though there was there [the prophet] Isaiah, who [served] as witness in strengthening this matter. And likewise, what God, blessed be He, made the camp of Aram hear — the sound of chariotry and the sound of horses, so that they fled because of this and abandoned their tents [II Melachim 7:6–7] — behold, there was already there Elisha, and he [served] as witness to this matter, in keeping with what was said: that there would already be in the gate of Samaria on that day "a seah of fine flour at a shekel and two seahs of barley at a shekel" [II Melachim 7:1]. And likewise, what God, blessed be

He, took the measure of — in closing every womb of the house of Avimelech [Bereishis 20:18], and the plaguing of Pharaoh with great plagues on account of Sarah [Bereishis 12:17] — behold, there was there [the prophet] Avraham, who was a prophet.

And in general, when one inquires into all the wonders that those who recounted recounted in the Torah and in the words of the prophets that were performed through them, [one finds that] they were performed either by the hand of a prophet or for the sake of a prophet — to the point that not one of them is found in which the renewal would not have an entry-point involving [מבוא] a prophet.

And likewise, when we inquired here into all the wonders, we found them all on the side of beneficence [ההטבה], and of favor [החנינה], and of providence [ההשגחה]: whether for the acquiring of a good belief, or for the acquiring of a bodily good, or for delivering from a bodily evil, or for delivering from a psychic evil. An illustration of [a wonder] that was for the acquiring of a good belief is the wonders that Moses performed for Israel, so that they would believe that he was [a prophet] and that they would believe in the name of God, blessed be He; and the wonder that he [Elijah] performed so that Israel might believe that "the Lord, He is God" [I Melachim 18:39], [which stands among] the wonders that change the custom [of nature]. And an illustration of what was for the acquiring of a bodily good is the manna, which was performed by the hand of Moses our master, peace be upon him, and the wonder of the jar of flour and the cruse of oil that was performed by his [Elijah's] hand [I Melachim 17:14], and the rest of the wonders that change the custom. And an illustration of what was for delivering from a bodily evil is the splitting of the Sea of Suf, and the smiting of the angel of God in the camp of Aram, and the rest of the wonders that follow the [same] custom. And let it not be hard for you [to reckon among these] the wonder concerning the swallowing-up of the earth — [the matter of] Korah and his congregation [Bamidbar 16:32] — and the rest of the wonders that follow the [same] custom; for this too was on the side of beneficence and providence over Israel, so that they all might be brought to obey the words of God, blessed be He — the word that He spoke by the hand of Moses His servant. And so too you will find with the rest of the wonders, when one inquires

into them — that they are all measured toward a good outcome. And it was fitting that this be so, since the wonders are necessarily ordered intelligibly; for substances have already been renewed in them, as I mentioned, and the form has [thereby] been given a separate form [צורה נבדלת], as will be explained from these matters that are at work [in them]; and behold, there is no way for the form

to reach from it [anything] but the good, whereas evil does indeed reach from the side of matter, as will be explained in what is to come.

פרק עשירי [Chapter Ten]

In which will be explained who is the agent of the wonders, and how this is brought to completion.

Now that we have contended over this matter of the wonders, it is fitting that we inquire who is the agent of the wonders — for it is impossible that they should be without an agent. And this is because it has already been found that they are all measured toward a good outcome; and this was [a feature] of what is proper to that which is the work of an agent, from the side [of the fact] that it is the work of an agent, as was explained in what preceded. Behold, it is explained that it was already obligatory that the wonders be the work of an agent. And further, [a wonder] will already be found among the wonders that is renewed in [things] in which there is a living being — as in the renewing of the serpent from the staff — and this is, in its end, the nullifying of the living being that is said to be renewed per accidens [בקרי], or from the side of its soul, together with what would come to be from its formation among the marvelous completions. And further, [the wonders] will already have a notification reach the prophet [concerning them], and this would not be possible if it [the wonder] came to be per accidens [בקרי] and by chance [ובהזדמן]; and this is very well explained from what we set down in the second discourse [מאמר] of this book.

This being the matter, it is explained that the wonders are, in their being-renewed, of the kind of [actions that are] the works [of an agent]. As to the inquiry into the rest of the things whose renewing comprehends here the law of existing things, and their order and their setting-aright — and this [pertains to the matter] of the [skilled] arts [האומנות]: by way of illustration, that there would be in the renewing of the serpent from the staff [something] not brought to completion except by a knowledge of the law of the serpent's existence and its order and its setting-aright, just as the one who made it would not bring his making to completion from its kind apart from this knowledge [?: the analogy to a craftsman's making is read as printed]. And this being the matter, behold, it is explained that the agent of the wonders has a knowledge in the manner [of knowing] what is in the law of these existing things, and their natures, and their forces, and their setting-aright.

And this being the matter, behold, it appears that the matter will not escape from this division [into possibilities]: either the agent be God, blessed be He, since

there would be found with Him a knowledge of the law of existing things, as preceded; or the agent be the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל], since there would likewise be found with it a knowledge of what is in the law of these lower existing things; or the agent be the prophet — for with him too there is found a knowledge of what is in the law of these lower existing things. And it is explained that there is here no agent other [than these] to whom this action could be ascribed; and this is because it is impossible that there be a second agent in this [drawn] from one of the movers of the heavenly bodies, since we have found these actions [to be] of the kind of actions whose renewing they all share, and it is impossible to ascribe their renewing to any other than these, as will be explained from what we say in what is to follow regarding this.

Now, since the foundational principles that are needful for us in this inquiry are few — and we cannot [reach our end] except with great difficulty, all the more so since there will gather for us difficulties in [the] existence such that we have not found a thing [established] for us by any one of those who preceded — it is therefore fitting that we set down first all the foundational principles that are to be found among our reflections that establish the parts of the hidden [dialectical] division of this inquiry and their nullification; for by this there can be [established] for us many foundational principles, and there will [thereby] be made easy for us the clarification of the true [view] from the not-true, as the Philosopher mentioned in the *Sefer ha-Nitzuach* [the *Book of Disputation* — Aristotle's *Topics*]. With this there is set straight, by this means, the right path for our reaching the truth in that inquiry in a manner that admits no doubt. For the [opposing] reflections that stand opposite us in one [given] inquiry are among those that give us doubt in that inquiry; and if the truth be clarified in this inquiry, and the reflections opposing it be not nullified, behold, we are left perplexed in this inquiry, and there will not be for us in this inquiry [any settled] knowledge. For this is the complete knowledge…

this matter would be referred to His will [רצונו]. It is also possible that the human being is the agent in this — that is, that a human being should have complete knowledge of the custom [נמוס] of these existing things, in the manner [required] of an agent. But it has already been explained in Book One of this work that for the living beings [בעלי חיים] such [knowledge] cannot be attained in its fullness. And [even] supposing that he could be such an agent — who can give and who knows [מי יתן ויידע]?

Moreover, why should the human being be the agent of these things? For these things are the objects of his intellection, and this is because, [working] from these

things, he would be acting upon them from the side of [one of] the parts of the soul through perception [מצד חלקי הנפש בהשגה]. And from this it would follow that working a wonder would be possible through a renewal of the will — namely, that he should be the one who lays down the premise [המניח], which he has placed [as a foundation] for the human intellect [לשכל האנושי]. By means of this premise [the wonder] would be produced from this side — and this is quite clear — to the point that, if the matter were so, it would be possible for [the wonder to occur] through a human being in vain [לבטלה].

This will become clear from what [Aristotle] says, namely [in the proposition] that these things change from their natural custom [ממנהגם הטבעי] so as to take on a form, as it were [כמו צורה]. It has already been explained that they change in their existence [במציאותם], as if to say that they are made [into something] — when there is a form belonging to the designated matter [לחמר המיוחד]. This is what Aristotle [הוא אשר הוא בו ה"א — i.e., the Philosopher] said in [the saying] "a statement returns upon itself [מאמר סותר נפשו]," for the thing from which this comes is itself [a thing] that has a form, since it bestows [upon something] that which itself has a form. In sum, [given] all that follows from positing the human being as the agent of the wonders, let us cut short [the discussion] and stand upon what is explained in [the following].

After it has been explained that there are several ways [in which] the wonders [may have an agent], and what is [the place] in each one of them in which one of the incorrect premises [מהבלתי צודק] is nullified — let us say what is explained, that [should] the human being be the agent of the wonders, [this] is correct…

by [the strength of] the arguments we have recalled. But as for what holds firm [מה שקיים] — by virtue of his knowing in what way [is] the custom [נמוס] of these existing things — the [following] statement [is to be made] concerning the refuted arguments [בטענות המבטלות]: that the human being [who has] what holds firm [the position] that the human being be the agent, [this is] because [he is one] in whom there is from a side [the standing] that he should be a prophet [נביא]. And every [argument] that was [advanced]… it is possible that the wonder be still more wondrous — and this is a great [matter] — [namely] that the prophet [הנביא] be the agent of the wonders. But what holds firm…

— for it is clear that he [the prophet] is one who lacks [the capacity] for working the wonders, [a wonder] which is something that goes outside the bounds [מגדר] of the custom of these existing things [נמוס הנמצאות]; for [the reason is] that the human being — if he were an agent like this — [acting] from the side of what his intellect [שכלו] has set apart [מתבודד] from the rest [of things], would have been a

thing that is not within matter [בלתי דבר בחמר]. It is explained that he [who is] a cause of the renewal of the wonder [סבה לחדוש המופת] — according to this, [it would follow] that human beings, by reason of their being bound to matter [דבק בחמר] — for he is [bound to it] — as has been explained at length in its [proper] place [is impossible].

It is [further] possible [to suppose] that a human being could change his own essence [שתשנה עצמותו], and this [comes about] in the most complete way [בתכלית]. [Aristotle] says, and this is because, [given] that the human being is the ruler [מושל] over the natural [forces] according to this premise [ההנחה], by reason of his being already [thus], he would be obligated [to the consequence] that there be a still greater ruler [מושל], such that he [could] make of himself a serpent [נחש] — for this is all the more [absurd]. And here, [the same goes for] the statement [made] regarding the form [בצורה] that would change the essence [המהות] of his soul. For the form [הצורה] is what is set apart [שיבודר], and to this end [לזה] it is not possible that he be depicted [שתצוייר] in the form [בצורה] [of a serpent] in general. And here, were we to recall all the nullifications [הבטולים] of the wonders, we would be compelled to a lengthy statement [למאמר ארוך]; and to this end [I have here only] explained how this premise [זאת ההנחה] is nullified.

[Now] let me explain in what ways [מאופני] it is proper to divide the [matter into a] division [לחלק חלק] of these [possibilities], each one of them. Behold, it is fitting that the correct [position] [הצודק] be clarified [שנברר], [the one] of which it is explained that it is nullified by these arguments… and [whether] it is correct without doubt [בלי ספק]. And this is explained from what we have said: that what holds firm — namely, that the human being be the agent [of] these existing things — its nullification [בטולו] has already been explained, [namely the nullification] of [the position] that the human being is the agent of the wonders. And likewise [as to] the agent, [it is so] by reason of what is found among the conditions of the wonders [מתנאי המופתים]: that, [the wonder] being [a matter] of the rank of the prophet [מדרגת הנביא], the higher [the prophet] is, [the greater the wonder]. It is also explained that [the prophet] is not obligated [to be the agent] by this; but what he is obligated [to] is that there be for the prophet [לנביא] a recorded mark [רושם]…

[book p. 450] …[that there be] something belonging to him [as a mark] in the renewal of the wonders [בחדוש הנפלאות] — and this is [the case], since not every [agent] is one who… [the prophet] is the agent of it [the wonder], as is found in the case of the soul [שימצא לנפש]; and it does not act upon it, but rather it [the soul] is the recipient [מקבלת]. [So too with the wonder:] the [faculty of] sensation

in the living beings that belongs to it in this [respect] — yet it is not [itself] a living being [בעלי חיים]. And since this is so, behold, [it follows] that there is for the human being an entry-point [מבוא] in this from the side of the agent other than this [מזולת זה], as will be explained [further on].

— And likewise it is said: God, may He be blessed [השם יתברך], is the agent in [the case of] these existing things [is so] either with respect to all of them or with respect to most of them; and this is explained from the very essence of the argument [מעצם הטענה] [contained] in [the position] that God, may He be blessed, is the agent. [As for the proposition] that the world ascribed to God, may He be blessed [העולם המיוחס לשם יתברך], would not [be ascribed] to God, may He be blessed, [as] the proximate agent [הפועל הקרוב] — this is because that very generation [ההויה], being [a thing] that is found in relation to a [pre]existent [אל נמצא], is like the matter [discussed] regarding the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל]; whereas the generation of the world ascribed [to God], it is [a thing] that is not found in relation to a [pre]existent [אינה מנמצא אל נמצא — i.e., it is creation from nothing].

And likewise [as to] what [makes God] the agent of the wonders [is] by reason of [the wonder's] being an order [סדר], this [being] the [very] generation [ההויה], [the proposition] that one of them [the existing things] is [arranged] according to its ordering [על סדורו] by [an agent] other than God, may He be blessed — [namely] that God, may He be blessed, be the agent — this [too is so]. And this is from the very essence of the custom [מעצם הנמוס], which is the order [סדר] which God, may He be blessed… [the order] by means of which the announcement [ההודעה] [comes] to the prophet in prophecy [בנבואה], as [it comes] in matters [that are] bounded and ordered [המוגבלים ומסודרים] from the side… as has been explained in Book Two of this [work].

[As to] the refuted [position] that God should be the agent of the wonders: since the renewal [of the wonders] goes outside the bounds [מגדר] of the custom of the existing things [נמוס הנמצאות] — [the position] that the agent of the wonders is God, may He be blessed — [this] is not [tenable]; for [creation] God, may He be blessed, is the proximate agent. This is [the position] that has already been ascribed [in] what Scripture [הכתוב] ascribes to God, may He be blessed; and even the matters [העניינים]… as when they said "for the Lord has cursed David [כי ה' קלל את דוד]" [Shmuel II 16:10], indeed [the meaning is] that [God is] the beginning of all the things that are renewed [המתחדשים], according to [the principle that they trace back to] the proximate agent that is near to them [הפועל הקרוב להם].

— And likewise it is said: the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] is the agent in [the case of] these existing things, [and this] is a truth in which there is no doubt; and this is explained from [the foregoing]. But as for [the position] that it has been nullified that the Active Intellect [be the agent] of the wonders — [things] that go outside the bounds [מגדר] of the custom of the existing things, in what we have set down [במה שקדם] — this is explained, that they [the wonders]…

[book p. 451] …it is possible that there reach to them an announcement [הודעה] to the prophet from them [מהם]; [and that] the agent of the wonders [is the Active Intellect] is [so] because [the existing things] already pertain to a [single domain]… of [its] will, or [there is] a nullification of the nature of the possible [טבע האפשר]. Behold, it is fitting [to ask whether] there is also nullified [the position] that God, may He be blessed, be [the agent] other than God, may He be blessed, or the Active Intellect [be the agent], [an agent] for the human being, as we have explained. And it is not possible that this very intellect — [the intellect] of the human being other than God, may He be blessed — [be the agent], because [the position] that this intellect [שכל] is the very Active Intellect [השכל הפועל בעינו] [is untenable]: for when one ascribes [נייחס] this action [הפעל] to whatever intellect we [are speaking] of [in our own sense — בעינינו]…

Behold, it is explained that it is impossible [שאי אפשר] [for] the argument [הטענה] [to be] a thing [that is] incorrect [בלתי צודק], or [for it to be the case] that the work explains that it is impossible for the human being to be [the agent — this is] included within this argument. And this is the thing which is incorrect [בלתי צודק]; [the matter] is what has been explained in Book Two of this [work] — namely, how [the wonder] would be a particular [thing] [פרטית] or a particular act [פעל פרטי]. And this, indeed, would be [a matter] of providence [בהשגחה] — for the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] is the one who watches over [המשגיח] [men]; and from this it is obligated that its providence [השגחתו] [extends] over the ranks of men [מדרגות האנשים] in [their] nearness and farness [בקורבה ורוחק] from [its] rank [ממדרגתו]. [Indeed] this providence [ההשגחה], which there is for it [the Active Intellect] over the men who [stand within] a custom and order [נמוס וסדר], extends in this [proportion] from the measure of [the man's] providence [מן ההשגחה]; this [holds] for the man [himself]. But in [the matter] of [the measure] by which there is some [nearness] of his nearness [קורבה] to the Active Intellect [לשכל הפועל] — and when this was so, that [a man] is on the side of [this] providence [על צד ההשגחה], it is explained, [as comes] from the intellect, [that] the Active Intellect [המשכל הפועל], [working] by [an agency] other than itself [מזולתו], is renewed for him [שתתחדש לו] by means [of it]…

[the matter being one] that it is possible there reach to him an announcement [הודעה] to the prophet from them [מהם]. But as for [the position] that it has been nullified that the intellect be… already obligated to it in this, [namely] whether there is in this a renewal of knowledge [חדוש ידיעה] and a renewal [of will] — behold, it is fitting to consider it [שנעיין בו]. And this is the [very] argument [that] God, may He be blessed, is the agent. And [given] that here is an agent in them… of the agent — for it is impossible that they [the wonders] be ascribed [שייוחם] [to anything] in this [respect]; the act [הפעל] is also possible [to be] ascribed [שייוחם] thus to one intellect, [an intellect] set apart [נבדל] from [anything] other than God, may He be blessed, because, when one posits the matter so [הונח הענין כן], behold, [the matter] will be [as follows]: the agent in its [proper] sense [בעינו], as we have explained in what we set down [במה שקדם], to the point [that…] this [intellect] is a separate intellect [שכל נבדל]. Behold, it is obligated [that] this is the nullification [הבטול]: that it is possible that there be [an agent] other than [this intellect, an agent] included in this. And [given that] the human being is the agent — behold, it is explained that he is already obligated [to a consequence], that there should be…

[that] the agent be a thing [that is] incorrect [בלתי צודק]. And since the matter is so [ובהיות הענין כן], behold, [as for] what is incorrect in it [צודק בה], who will give and [who] knows [מי יתן וידע]?

And let me say that the work has already explained how it is possible that there reach [a result] from the agent [that is] separate [הנבדל], [an effect] also reaching from the side of the recipient [מצד המקבל]; and the explanation is, in [the discussion] of the statement [המאמר], that [the separate agent] is the one who watches over [המשגיח] [men] still more, in proportion to [the degree to which] one is brought nearer to its rank [שיקרב יותר למדרגתו]. [Now] its providence over the individuals of humankind [באישי האדם] varies [מתחלפת] in accordance with [their] distance [מרחק] from the rank of the Active Intellect [ממדרגת השכל הפועל]. And this is explained: that men, from the side of their nearness [קורבתם] to it, also have for them, in this same way, [a share] of the providence [מן ההשגחה] [that belongs] to this man [לזה האיש] — not insofar as he is [merely a man]…

[but] insofar as he is some particular man [איזה איש] who chanced [הזדמן] to be at this rank [בזאת המדרגה]. [And as for one] who was so [שר היה זה כן], behold, it is explained that the matter of the wonders [ענין הנפלאות]… it is explained that in the same way the matter of the wonders is brought to completion [ישלם ענין הנפלאות] [in one] who has [appropriate] knowledge and will [ידיעה ורצון].

And behold, there is no renewal [אין חדוש], either [in the agent's knowledge or will]… in [the case where it is] the human choice [הבחירה האנושית] [that has been the cause], [as] this is the custom [הנמוס]. Just as the matters [come] from the Active Intellect [מהשכל הפועל] and from the heavenly bodies [ומהגרמים השמימיים] — [as explained in] Books Three and Four of this work — so too there [in the soul] this order [הסדור] in the soul of the [rational] intellect [בנפש השכל]… to complete what is lacking from the good [מן הטוב] from the side of the order [מצד הסדור]. And here is loosed [הותר] [the difficulty raised] by the doubt [הספק] in that argument [בטענה ההיא], and this…

And behold, this was [so] from the necessity of the existence [מהכרח מציאות]… [namely] the nearness [הקורבה] which [belongs] to the human being [in proportion] to the rank of the [Active] Intellect [למדרגת השכל]…

[book p. 452] …this measure of providence [זה השעור מן ההשגחה]. [And] if it had not been so [אם לא היה ש…]… it is possible that he be a prophet [נביא]; and to this end [ולזה] it would be possible that his rank be that of an exceedingly mighty prophet [מדרגת הנביא יותר עצומה]. And in whatever way [ובאיזה צד] there should be for a human being an entry-point [מבוא] into them, [it follows that…].

And this is explained [as] what our Rabbis, of blessed memory [רבותינו זכרונם לברכה], said : "Ten things were created on the eve of Shabbos at twilight [התנה בין השמשות … הקדוש ברוך הוא]" [Avot 5:6]. This [statement] agrees [מסכים] with what we [have shown]: that there is here [a basis] for the renewal of the wonders [לחדוש הנפלאות], [a renewal that is] ordered by necessity [מסודר כהכרח] in the [original] coming-to-be of the world [בהתחדש העולם]. And the matters [הענינים] which "were created at twilight [נבראו בין השמשות]," and [as for] the days [הימים] [during] which a place was assigned [נתיחסה] to them at the creation of the [world], they are [things] that [partake] of generation [מן ההויה].

On the seventh day [ביום השביעי] the generation was [completed] at twilight [בין השמשות] — the intermediate time [הזמן הממוצע] between the two [periods], one of them [being day and the other night]. And in this they said here, that [the things created at] that generation [שהויה] [are] the willed generation [ההויה הרצונית] which was renewed from [the side of] the world [העולם], [a generation] in which is the existence of the world after [its] coming-to-be [מציאות העולם אחר ההתחדשו]. And this [is so] in [some] way [בה] which resembles the natural generation [להויה הטבעית]: a renewal [of] a bounded speaking-being [מתחדש מדבר מוגבל], as this [thing] is found [כמו שימצא זה] to belong to the willed generation [להויה הרצונית].

Moreover, since this [same] generation [is so], the motion of the heavenly bodies [תנועת הגרמים השמימיים] and the act [והפעל] which… is found [שימצא] [in] this matter [is found] in the natural generation [בהויה הטבעית] — behold, [it is] something renewed in the world [נתחדש בה בעולם]; for the renewal [התחדש] [of these things] did [not] [come from] the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים]. And for this reason [ולזאת הסבה] they said that the wonder [המופת] would be [a thing] other than the intermediary [בזולת אמצעי], [that is,] that this act [is] not by means of an intermediary; rather, it is ordered from the [supernal] intellect that flows forth [מהשכל השופע ממ…].

And the Rabbis, of blessed memory [רבותינו זכרונם לברכה], in saying these things, explained that the generation [שההויה] which came to be in the six [days] of the creation of the world [בששת… בריאת העולם] was a willed [generation] [רצונית]; and what was drawn forth [ומה שנמשך] [from it] is a natural generation [הויה טבעית]. And you already know that what they called [שהם יקראו] "between the two [periods of] the days [בין שני הימים]," [that] which would be in it some part [בו חלק מה] — from all [of which it appears] that the wondrous generation [שהויה הנפלאות] is, as it were, intermediate [ממוצעת] between the generation that comes [forth] from the world [העולם] and the natural generation [ההויה הטבעית] which was drawn [forth from it].

And this [is so] because there is for it [the natural generation] a custom and order [נמוס וסדר], [the order] of the natural [generation] [הטבעית]; and because there was not [the case that] the thing renewed in it [המתחדש בה] would be found [in] the natural generation [בהויה הטבעית] — behold, [the wondrous generation] is what resembles [הוא הדומה] [an intermediate]. This generation [is] because it was not [a thing] that [merely] came to be [שלא תהיה] by an intermediary [באמצעות], by an agent [על ידי פועל] which is renewed here at the borders of the stars [הכוכבים], as [in] the natural [generation]. Behold, [this wondrous generation] is what resembles [הדומה] the willed generation [להויה הרצונית], the [generation] renewed by means of the stars [באמצעות הכוכבים] and the motion [ותנועה]. [And for] this reason [הסבה] our Rabbis, of blessed memory [רבותינו זכרונם לברכה], said that this renewal [שחדוש]… and that this act [is] not ordered from [the side of] the heavenly bodies [מהגרמים השמימיים], [an act that] flows forth [שופע] from the movers of the heavenly bodies [ממניעי הגרמים השמימיים]. And this is…

the [matter] of [the verse] "I, and not an angel, and not a deputy [אני ולא מלאך ולא שליח]" [Haggadah / Mechilta on Shemos 12:12], to teach [להורות] concerning [the working] by way of a wonder [על דרך מופת], [that] it was not ordered [ולא היתה מסודרת] from the heavenly bodies [מהגרמים השמימיים]. Our Rabbis, of blessed

memory [רבותינו זכרונם לברכה], [said this] in [explaining] these [matters], how these things [אלו הדברים]...

[the providence is] over the side of the individual providence [ההשגחה האישית], by which [the supernal] keys [המפתחות] [are unlocked]; [as] [the Rabbis] said: "Three keys [שלשה מפתחות] were not entrusted to a deputy [לא נמסרו]... the key of childbirth [מפתח של חיה], the key of rain [מפתח של גשמים]..." [Taanit 2a]. And here is what they intended [רצו] by this: that what is from the Lord is from the keys of the womb [מהפתחי רחם] — [that is,] the individual [providence] [האישית]; and what is renewed [ומה שיתחדש] by the rains [מהגשמים] is by reason of [the matter of] the revival of the dead [תחיית המתים], to bring it [the announcement] [להיותה] of the wonders [מהנפלאות], the more [so]: [that] its renewal [חדושו] is by reason of the individual providence [ההשגחה האישית], as it were [כאלו]...

[The text continues into the next discussion.]

—that He intended thereby to bring all the people of that generation to a complete faith [אמונה שלמה] in the Lord, may He be blessed. This is just as the renewal of the wonders through Moses brought Israel to a complete faith in the Lord, may He be blessed, as they said to Pharaoh: "For I have hardened his heart" [Shemos 10:1], and so on; and at the close of the account it says: "and they shall know that I am the Lord" [Shemos 14:18]. So too this wonder will be performed at that time in order to bring all people to a complete faith—just as [Tzefaniah] foretold when he said: "For then I will turn to the peoples a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one accord" [Tzefaniah 3:9].

Now, our intention here is not to investigate the matter of the revival of the dead [תחיית המתים], for that is something it would be more fitting to investigate in our exposition of the words of the prophets and the words of the sages who have instructed us; rather, the order of the topics has brought us to mention it here.

And the sages have already agreed to this very point: that whatever the Lord, may He be blessed, renews here by means of an intermediary [על יד אמצעי] is not what is performed by Him as the proximate agent [הפועל הקרוב]. They said: "The Holy One, blessed be He, does no thing except that He first takes counsel with His heavenly court [פמליא של מעלה]" [cf. Sanhedrin 38b]. And you should note that what they say of it [refers] to what the Lord, may He be blessed, made [happen] after the creation of the world, not to what He made in the creation of the world itself; for this is something whose attribution to the intermediary cannot be

conceived—[that is,] to one who would [merely] partake in the creation of the world. And this is plain.

פרק אחד עשר [Chapter Eleven]

In which it is explained that it is possible for the wonders to be renewed through one who is a sage but not a prophet [על יד חכם שאינו נביא].

Now, as to by whose hand it might be conceivable that the renewal of the wonders should come about—this is plain from what was said before: that the one fit to be a prophet [נביא] should be the agent. For were the matter not so, there would be no wonder [done] for Israel through one who was already a prophet—since the Lord, may He be blessed, manifestly performed [the wonders] for Moses on account of what Moses did before them through the wonders [i.e., by virtue of his prophetic rank]. And it was fitting that this be so; for, since the doing of the wonders [שהעשה הנפלאות] is [from] the side of the higher providence that is possible [for a person to attain], and since this [higher] providence [comes] from the side of the great nearness of the man's rank to the rank of the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל]—

—it is therefore fitting that this providence should belong to one who has reached, in his final perfection, the utmost nearness to the Active Intellect that is possible, and to its rank. But, in line with what we have agreed concerning this matter, a difficulty arises from what the sages have recounted in many places: that wonders were renewed through certain sages of the generations who were not prophets.

We may say that we already know that it is possible for the wonder to be renewed through one who is not a prophet but a sage, when his rank in wisdom was a mighty one. Yet the wonder that would belong, in this respect, to a prophet by virtue of his prophecy [is the more exalted]—as appears from this Aggadah [הגדה]: that these wonders had been renewed [i.e., set in readiness] before they came to be. And this [accords with] what has already been said: that the diviner [הקוסם] knows much of the things that are to come into being [המתחדשים], which are ordered from the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים], as has been explained in the second [book] of this work. By this [it is shown] that in every respect [the case is] as one who tells in advance what will come to be—namely, the prophet. The wonders, however, since it is not possible that they be ordered from the heavenly bodies— as [said] before, behold, the one who foretells them, if they come [to pass] necessarily, is a prophet; and in this way [too] there was a wonder for Israel, since Moses was already a prophet, when he informed them of these

wonders before they came to be. And, indeed, what appears in the narratives of the words of the prophets [is] that in everything renewed of these wonders there was an entry-point for a prophet [מבוא לנביא]; so that it cannot be that the renewal [should come] through a sage who is not a prophet. And note that the matter is not brought into this [discussion through] the narrative concerning the words of the prophets in order to set far [from us the conclusion] that one who is not a prophet but a sage of a rank short of [full] perfection would [partake] in this providence; rather, [it is brought] because prophets were already present then, and what was renewed through them sufficed—[granting] that it is possible this happened, also, in their times, except that this is not mentioned among the words of the prophets, for what is mentioned among their [recorded] words of the wonders that were done through the prophets is enough. And according to this providence—which would be obliged to be the stronger in coming-to-be the stronger the rank of the apprehender providentially watched over [is]—the wonders renewed through the prophet whose rank is the more exalted would be the more exalted, as we have mentioned before.

פרק שנים עשר [Chapter Twelve]

In which it is explained in respect of which sort of things it is possible that the wonders be renewed, and in respect of which not; and how it is that they may be renewed in them.

It is fitting that we investigate in respect of which sort of things it is possible that the wonders be renewed, and in respect of which sort this is not possible.

We say, first, that it is plain that it is not possible for a thing to be renewed [by way of] the wonders such that its existence be drawn out [as] continuing perpetually—as if one were to say that the nature of one of the existing things should be changed by a wondrous change that would not cease. For if this were possible, this would [hold] of necessity, because there is nothing in what is ordered from the heavenly bodies [that is] good in itself; for were [a thing] good in itself, it would not be possible that it be changed from [the state of] its [perpetual] beneficence; and this is already false—

—as to that whose change of order is possible at a given time. For it is already possible that what is good in itself be the better by accident at the time when the order in it is changed; but it is not possible that there be in it [a thing] perpetually [good] by accident more [than] when the order in it is changed; for it cannot be that what is good by accident be perpetual upon this manner. But in any case, if it were [so], it would be for [only] a little of the time and by way of accident.

And it is plain that, if we grant that there will not be [a thing] that is good [as] ordered from this matter of the heavenly bodies, then there is a satisfaction [a "resting," נייחא] for the Lord, may He be blessed: [namely, that] this lack [חסרון] [exists] in such a manner that the [continued] drawing-out from it would be a perpetual lack. And this is plain: [that] He is obliged, in [working] the wonders, not to draw out the continuance of their existence perpetually. By this [a thing] becomes precious in the eyes [of the beholder], and this is something whose change is already possible [from what] it is at a given time, to be the better at that [particular] time—as the sacrifice that Elijah offered up on Mount Carmel [בהר הכרמל] at a time when [sacrifice] upon the high places [הבמות] was forbidden, and what resembles this; but it is not possible that there be changed a thing [whose nature is] of perpetual change.

For what is found in it of perfection and goodness in itself, it is not possible that its change be the better perpetually—but if it were [so], this would be for [only] a little of the time and by way of accident. And from this side is found a great difference between the wonders renewed through the one prophet and the wonders renewed through the prophet who is beneath him in rank; for, in [accordance with] all that the rank of the prophet was the more exalted, the wonder renewed through him would be the more comprehensive and the more drawn-out in its existence and the more [lasting] in time—as if one were to say that he draws near [it] the more to the nature of the natural thing [הדבר הטבעי], so that the accidental good in it [be] the more attributed to the substance [העצם].

And in this way there is found a wondrous difference between the wonders of Moses our master, peace be upon him, and the wonders of those other than him among the prophets; for the wonders of Moses are found to be the most comprehensive [by far]. This is plain from the blow by which the whole matter of the Egyptians [was overturned]; and there are found among them, too, those whose existence was drawn out for a long time—such as the wonder of the manna [המן], and the pillar of fire [עמוד האש], and the standing of the cloud [עמוד הענן], whose existence was drawn out some forty years. And such a thing is not found other than with Moses our master, peace be upon him. And so [too] with what was done for Elijah from the jar of meal and the cruse of oil [the widow's vessels, Melachim I 17], whose existence was drawn out [only] some time, [a thing that] was [done] for but one woman; and the measure of that time was not so long as the duration of the existence of the manna and the pillar of fire and the standing of the cloud.

And this very matter held [also] in [the case of] Moses; for by reason of the application [of his soul-faculties, התבודדות], his intellect was perpetually [conjoined], such that his providence was possible to him perpetually from the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל]—[that is,] this agent. And from this side [comes] his providence, by [its] great nearness to the rank of the Active Intellect, [a providence] more [present] than that found in any other than he; [hence] the wonder done through him was the more comprehensive and the more wondrous; and, because of his perpetual conjunction with the Active Intellect, his wonders were the more enduring for a long time. And this is what the Torah hinted at, [as to] the difference between the wonders done through Moses our master, peace be upon him, and the wonders done through one other than he.

We say, further, that it is not possible for the wonders to be renewed in things whose conception [הציור], in their being [thus], is self-contradictory [סותר נפשו]—as if one were to say that the black be conceived as turning into the white [while] it is [still] black, by way of a [contradiction] in which the correlatives [המקבילים] are gathered together at once [in] one and the same respect [מצד אחד]. For [in such a case] there would be found a thing [conceived] in [contradictory] description; and behold, this very supposition is self-contradictory, since [we say] that it is [both] white [and] not white; and it would be, if so, that the one thing be [at once] black and not-black—and this is utter nullity [בתכלית הבטול].

And on account of this, it is plain that the wonders cannot be renewed in the mathematical matters [העניינים הלמודיים] in respect of what is demonstrative in them. As an example: it is not possible to renew that a rectilinear triangle [משולש ישר הקוים] should have its angles [together] less than two right angles [שתי זויות נצבות]—were this possible. For behold, the angles of this triangle [would] be [both] equal to two right angles and not equal—and this is false; for the contradictories cannot be gathered together at once in one and the same subject [נושא]. And for this very reason it is explained that the wonders cannot be renewed in things [that are] changing in respect of the things that change [them]—as if one were to say that on a [given] day, on which no rain came down there in Jerusalem—

—there should yet be renewed afterwards, by way of the wonder, that rain already came down on that [same] day, [while] it is [also the case that] it did not come down there in Jerusalem. For this is because [the thing] has already gone forth into the act of that day, and it has been [both] that no rain came down in it [and the supposed contrary]. Now, behold, if [one were to] sit [and reflect] afterwards [in] another way—[namely,] by way of a wonder—that rain already

came down in it, [then] the [two] correlatives are gathered together at the time when [we say] both that rain came down in it and that no rain came down in it in another place [or respect] there.

Further, [it cannot be] that what is renewed, in [the very respect] in which it is being renewed, be [renewed] in the future time, not in the past [elapsed] time. And this is very plain, [too plain] to require lengthening in its exposition further on.

We say, further, that it is not possible for a wonder to be renewed among the heavenly bodies [הגרמים השמימיים]. For it has already been explained that the Active Intellect [השכל הפועל] is the agent of these wonders, as [said] before, and it is not possible that the Active Intellect be an agent among the heavenly bodies, for it is [an effect] caused by them [i.e., it is below them, deriving from them]. Further, because the existence of the wonders was [established] on the side of beneficence and favor [ההטבה והחנינה], as has been explained, and it would [follow] from what was said before that, in [their] being changed [thus], the order of the matters of the heavenly bodies would be changed—[and then] there would be renewed a corruption [הפסד] that would mar these lower things in their entirety. Behold, [then,] it is of [the realm of] the false that there be changed a thing among the heavenly bodies by way of a wonder.

And let no man trouble us [by citing] the standing of the sun [מעמידת השמש] for Joshua [Yehoshua 10:12–13]; for there is no intention in it that the motion of the sun was [truly] arrested [שתחתבל תנועת השמש]. The testimony to this is what they [Scripture] said of it: "and [the sun] hasted not to go down [for] about a whole day" [Yehoshua 10:13]—that is to say, it hasted not to go [down], [but] not that it was prevented from coming [to its setting]. As for [the sun's] not moving—it cannot be said of it that it did not move at all; but [rather] this is said of [its] not moving in [its usual] swiftness [במהירות]. And this is plain: that there is no intention in their saying "the sun stood still in Gibeon" [Yehoshua 10:12] that its motion was [wholly] arrested. The intention in this is rather that the sun should not depart [so as no longer] to be [in position] over against Gibeon [כנגד גבעון], and the moon should not depart [so as no longer] to be over against the valley of Aijalon [עמק אילון], until the nation should be avenged of its enemies—as in this small measure [of time] in which they were seen, the sun over against Gibeon and the moon over against the valley of Aijalon. And it is plain that the sun and the moon, [even] while [both] of them were moving in their accustomed motion [תנועתם הנהוגה], would be found over against one place [for] a wide [span] of time

—as in the matter of [their being] over against Gibeon and over against the valley of Aijalon.

And this is what is said: "Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou, Moon, in the valley of Aijalon" [Yehoshua 10:12]—meaning that the sun was already [positioned] over against Gibeon and the moon already stood over against the valley of Aijalon, until the vengeance upon the nation of its enemies was completed [עד שנשלמה נקמת גוי אויביו], as Joshua asked. And, indeed, the verse abridged in this the narrative, as is its custom. But as to what is said—that the sun already stood in the midst of the heavens [בחצי השמים], and "hasted not to go down [for] about a whole day" [Yehoshua 10:13]—the intention in it is what [it] says. [For] it has already been explained in the science of the stars [חכמת הכוכבים] [as] plain, that the sun, or any [given] star, when it is at the mid-heaven [בחצי השמים], is not felt [to have] in it a rising or a setting [for] about a half-hour, as the sense apprehends [as] plain; but its elevation [גבהו] would be near to being [the same], after [the passing of] about a half-hour, [holding] from about a half-hour before mid-day until about a half-hour after mid-day—and this is plain, as is plain to one who has elevated [the matter] by means of one of the instruments made for this, such as the astrolabe [האצטרולב] and what resembles it. And it is plain that the mid-day [חצי היום] is [the time] called "the day," which is the [time of] the sun; and behold, until mid-day the act of the sun and its light grows ever stronger, and then is the day perfect and whole.

Book VI, Part 2 — Chapter 12 (continued)

and after that its light wanes little by little, until it fades away as the sun completes its course and this passes into [its setting like a] star. For this reason it is clear that the sealing-off [of its strength] occurs at midday, when the sun stands at the midpoint of the sky; for up until that moment the daylight, its perfection, and its action have all been on the increase toward addition and completion, and only afterward does it bend toward decline. This is why Scripture says, "at evening time" — for "the day is far spent" [Judges 19:9], which is among the things that indicate that the day rises and increases up to midday, and that the waters [of its strength] are at the full at midday.

Now the miracle of Joshua was this: he said that he would complete his vengeance upon his enemies within that brief span of time during which no descent of the sun would be felt while it stood at the midpoint of the sky. This is the meaning of his words, "Sun, stand still… and the moon, until the nation took vengeance on its enemies" [cf. Joshua 10:12–13]: "Is this not written in the Book of Yashar? And the sun stayed in the midst of the sky, and did not hasten to set for

about a whole day" [Joshua 10:13]. "And there was no day like that one before it or after it, that the Lord hearkened to the voice of a man, for the Lord fought for Israel" [Joshua 10:14]. He means by this that the sun was not perceived to move out of [the midpoint of the sky], and that the vengeance over the nation of his enemies was accomplished within that short time.

Afterward [Scripture] explained the cause for which the sun's motion was suspended, and stated that the cause that it did not hasten to set was — as one finds [in the text] — its [light] and perfection, so that the sun would not then hasten to descend. This took place "before it and after it, that [the Lord] hearkened to the voice of a man": within that small measure of time. The vengeance was indeed accomplished within that small span of time, "for the Lord fought [for Israel]."

As for the cause: how could it be feasible that the standing-still over the Valley of Aijalon was — according to what I consider most likely — that the moon there [lingered] for some perceptible time? And whatever adds to this matter is what is recorded in the Torah concerning the distinction of one miracle from another, and whether [this] miracle [was a miracle other than itself] ...

in his prophecy at that time, and we do not find that [the sun] returned to the Lord on account of this miracle; nor [is there an indication] that this miracle was, as it were, a sign He told them concerning His worship — that He is the Master over all existent things, [so] that at the Blessed Name's [command] the sun's motion [was arrested], if this miracle were [of that kind]. Given that the matter is so — that this miracle was a renewal worked upon the heavenly bodies, [so] that Israel's enemies might be defeated within that small span of time, which redounded to Israel's benefit — the matter is more fully explained from the standing-still of the sun, that is, at the place where the [motion] was suspended.

Our Sages of blessed memory, in mentioning the miracle of the sun's standing-still, said that we should bestir ourselves [to consider] how one nation among the other nations [might claim] a miracle, and not [permit] that any prophet among them be made upright by it — that is, that [such a one] would tell them to believe in the name of the Blessed One, and that the existent things would submit [before them]; and the miracle of this had already been nullified. For if the matter had been so, this matter would have been mentioned [in Scripture]. Since it was not so, it is clear that it was impossible for it to be said [that the suspension was wrought] upon the heavenly bodies; rather, the miracle was the small [span], as we have explained.

And here the benefit is very clear. And here it has been explained that there was no [arbitrary] will [behind it], and that its motion was suspended. So too our Sages said concerning the sun's standing-still — this condition, namely, that it was at the midpoint [of the sky]. They said: "Even though He made the sun stand still [in the sky]" — Rabbi Akiva [taught]: Heaven forbid! For the Holy One, blessed be He, does not [grant] peace to those who serve their own will [recte: עובדי כוכבים, "idolaters"]. And were it [the case that] its intent [had been] in the standing-still of the sun [as a true cessation], then the standing-still of the sky would [require] a sanction — for the miracle [lay] in the standing-still [itself], which is one and the same. But they said that [its standing] in the midst [of the sky] was a sanction, and only because the sun was at the midpoint of the sky [could it be said to stand]. It would be feasible that the sun stood for some span of time, [an interval of] not inconsiderable breadth, as before; and they [the Sages] wished by this [to convey] that it could not be feasible for one through whom [such a thing might] pass [to claim] to the Blessed Name's [command] over its voice — if [a person could] bound some span [of time so] that it be accomplished, as Joshua [did]. And from what [Scripture] testifies as the true — entirely it said, "and it hastened not to go down" — behold, [it retained] some of its motion's velocity in relation to perception. And it was obligatory [to say] that it lost some of its motion's velocity in relation to perception. And if there had been no motion at all, it would have been obligatory that it lose its motion entirely, and this is well explained.

Now if there is doubt with us, [a doubt] of doubt, the miracle of the shadow that was wrought for Hezekiah — which could not [have come about] save through a change in the ordering of the sun's motion — [is the case in point], for it would be impossible that it [come] to be according to what one might suppose [of] the sun. We say of it that this miracle was not [as supposed of] the sun; for had the matter been so, this motion would not have been attributed to the shadow, since it is the sun's motion. And further, if the matter had been so, [the shadow] would not [have inclined] back ten degrees — for it could not [be] that the sun [moved] in the velocity of [its] motion, just as it could not [be] that the miracle [lay] in the two matters as one and the same. And behold, what the recipient [of the miracle] has is some portion [from outside] — that is, that the star itself appears [changed] in it; and this is the cause ...

by the deity [the LORD], and shamed, as is explained in the Book [of Isaiah], in that the sun was marked upon it [the dial]. And if [this change] were [wrought] by the sun's moving together with it, [so that] the sun's beam moved and one saw it by means of something other [than its true place] — [which came] first, that this joy was marked by it [the gnomon] — the sun's beam being seen [elsewhere than

at] its proper place is something that has the appearance of falsehood [an optical illusion], like that which is reflected in running water, as is seen [in such cases]; because the velocity of the motion makes the waters that are [reflected] disordered, [so] that this image upon them is a marvel if [it is] not [examined] otherwise. And since Hezekiah had already seen the form of the cloud [shadow] incline easily toward the shadow, ten degrees, in the direction of that motion — yet it would be a wonder if the shadow [should return] back by the motion of the cloud. And behold, the miracle was ...

as is explained in the Book of Signs [Isaiah]. Now behold, when the cloud was beneath [the sun], if this [cloud] was moving in its course quickly, it would happen [that the shadow appeared] precious, [appearing] at a place other than its own; for it would already be moving by the measure [of the cloud's own speed], and in this manner [the shadow] would be seen on account of the cloud — that is, [the appearance arises] because of the haste of the motion. And this is the cause [why] a person sees its image doubled in them — the image that is marked upon it, and not another — and [it is] not [the case] that another is seen in a portion other than the waters [i.e., other than where the thing actually is]. And toward which side the cloud's [motion bends], he said it is [such that, on account] of the velocity of the cloud's motion the shadow [returns] ten degrees backward, in the reverse direction; then, by the cloud's reversing its motion to the rear ...

that the prophet was [empowered to set the] limit. And here it has been explained that [these are] not eternal [matters].

Now you should know that the view of the later [scholars] is what is explained as our position in this chapter; and this is what [they hold concerning] "And if the Lord creates a creation" — if a mouth was created [in the earth] when the Lord created it [Numbers 16:30]. He means to say that the opening of the [earth's] mouth, the smoke, and the swallowing-down within the belly of the earth that [Korach and his company] sank into — [all] occurred at that place [where] this took place [for] the duration of that time [as long as this matter] required, [these being the] signs; "and fire came forth" from the place where the mouth opened [Numbers 16:35]. The [earth] in our tongue [refers to this], as has been explained concerning the matter of "the Valley of the Son of [Hinnom]" — and [yet] it is written, "there is nothing new" [Ecclesiastes 1:9]. They raised the difficulty (and it is written, "there is nothing new") — meaning [whether God can] alter nature from its [established] custom. And they resolved that this [signs-case is to be brought] near ...

a miracle. And here it has been explained with regard to which of the matters it [is feasible that a miracle could occur], and with regard to which it could not be feasible. And it has been explained, together with this, that the miracle-bearing things are all in [the realm] of what is to come for them, since by this the [particular] side [of possibility] would be [present] in them.

פרק שלשה עשר — Chapter Thirteen

[Body rubric (p. 460): פרק שלשה עשר — "Chapter Thirteen"; sub-caption: יתבאר בו במה יבחן הנביא — "In which it is explained by what the prophet is tested"]

It is fitting that we inquire by what the prophet is tested — for in this [matter] there is little doubt — as in [the case of] what gave rise to [the dispute] of Jeremiah with Hananiah son of Azzur.

We have already said, with what was explained earlier without any doubt, by what [the prophet is tested]: namely, that the prophet is tested without doubt by his foretelling the renewal of wonders before they come; for one who does not have foreknowledge of [a thing] is not a prophet. And so it will appear from what was explained earlier in the second [part] of this book: that complete and perfect knowledge [of the future] belongs only to a prophet. And by this [criterion] the prophet is tested — whether all his words, which he foretells in prophecy, turn out [to be] truthful.

[And this was the case with] Samuel, who was a prophet — and this is what Scripture relates: "[The LORD was with him,] and let none of his words fall to the ground" [1 Samuel 3:19]. "And all Israel from Dan [even] to Beersheba knew that Samuel was established to be a prophet to the LORD" [1 Samuel 3:20]. The cause of [Scripture's saying] "Samuel [was] established as a prophet to the LORD," by their [coming to] know it, was that his words [all came true upon] the earth [i.e., were all fulfilled].

Behold, the distinction between these two [tests] is this: in the foretelling of the renewal of wonders, one knows by it [the prophet] through the telling. But [as for] this second criterion — that all his words be doubled [in fulfillment], and that all that he foretells turn out [to be] a wondrous marvel — this is the cause [by which] Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, brought [proof of his being] a worker of wonders, since by it much of [his being] a worker of wonders …

But here is the place of consideration: namely, what one might say [as to why] He tests by good tidings and does not test by evil tidings; and [as to whether] He does test by evil tidings — for "the LORD is gracious" [cf. Joel 2:13] and relents of [the

evil], in the manner that the divine providence cleaves to it [the recipient], so that it is said [a test lies] in the good tidings: is it feasible that this would be necessarily [binding] upon a person? Behold, much would be nullified [thereby], for much of the good that is found would not [necessarily come about] — that is, the good that He is not obligated [to bring]. As [in] "Behold, I am with you, and will keep you in all places where you go" [Genesis 28:15] [said] to Jacob our father — and were this [a binding test], Jacob would have feared on account of Esau's deeds toward him; and were the good [bound to come about], it would not have been fitting for Jacob to have any remnant [of fear].

And [Scripture] says that, when the evil was sent against him, the prophet [who] foretold it to him — that the foretelling reaches him. Since the matter is so, this is the cause of the diligence with which the recipient [of prophecy] takes ...

what one might say: that Jeremiah the prophet is tested by good tidings and is not tested by evil tidings; and this is [the case], for if we said that the prophet [foretold an evil that] "[the LORD] does not relent of," [then] when the recipient's matter is reversed in him, and [the evil] is removed from him — behold, the matter is so: it would be feasible that the arrival of that good [which was foretold might not occur]; much of [what is within] the nature of the possible would be nullified. And further, [consider] that we [find] this [as] what the Blessed Name already promised [Jacob]: "and I will keep you in all places where you go" [Genesis 28:15]. And along with all this, were this [a binding test], it would be obligatory that the foretold thing [come] to pass [for him]. And we have said, with what was explained earlier, [that none of his word would fall] to the earth — that it [should] not come [unfulfilled]. And by this [comes] the conclusion: if the matter is so, behold it would already be feasible that this [evil] would not turn out true; rather, [it lies] in [the prophet's] taking counsel [so] that this [evil] not befall — this being the [outcome of the] matter ...

upon him, or has conferred good upon him in the manner by which divine providence cleaves to him, then he is delivered. As for the good that was ordained to come to a person, behold, it is not feasible that it should not arrive. The reason is that human choice was placed in a person so that he might set right what his own iniquity has corrupted — [the iniquity] that comes from the side of the heavenly bodies — and not so that he might spoil what was ordained for him for the good. So you will not find a person whose choice brings about, in the natural course, the removal from him of the good that the prophet foretold would reach him. Yet it may indeed lie within his nature [to do this] of his own will [literally, "by his bow"]. Hence it would be a remote thing that a good ordained for a person

should fail to reach him. And by this consideration the prophet is tested through what does not arrive [i.e., this is precisely why a prediction of good that fails would discredit him] — namely, that if this good came from the side of the heavenly bodies, it was a remote thing that it should fail to arrive.

But if that good did fail to arrive, this would not prove that the one who foretold it was no prophet, for it would be feasible that he had completed this [prediction] by divination or in a dream. And this is made plain from the words of Jeremiah, where he set down this very consideration in this manner that we have already mentioned. He means that if the good in question does not arrive, this would be made plain to Israel only [as proof] that Hananiah was no prophet.

Now you should know that this good, which we said it is a remote thing should fail [to arrive], is the good ordained from the side of the heavenly bodies. But as for the good ordained by individual providence — behold, a condition may be found in it, and so it would not necessarily arrive. The illustration that the Torah has already provided us with respect to the many benefits, [showing] that we shall obtain them if we walk in His ways through individual providence — and this is made plain, [in] that when we shall not walk in His ways, these very goods will be removed [from us], as the Torah has said, "But if you will not obey Me," and so forth [Leviticus 26:14, 27]. And in this manner did the prophet again foretell good to Israel, as it is said, "and they shall add no more to oppress them" [cf. 2 Samuel 7:10] — for this was foretold to them by reason of necessity, since it would not be feasible that this good should be completed always from the side of the order from the heavenly bodies. This is made plain to those who make a little use of the science of the [astrological] judgments of the stars: that this [individual-providence good] is a thing which it is not impossible should befall those who, at some moment, are doing some evil. And behold, individual providence is found to have a condition in it by necessity. For this would not be [unconditional]; rather it would belong to whoever cleaves, in the action by which one cleaves, to this very providence.

And so too with Jacob: it was by necessity from the side of individual providence — for it would not be completed for him that the keeping [promised to him] in everything he should do, going forth from the side of the order from the heavenly bodies, [be unconditional]. Were this not so, Jacob would not have feared, lest perhaps he should bring about sin and so this very individual providence be removed from him. Now there is no place to raise the difficulty from what is said —

— that it is not fitting to say [this], namely, that our Rabbis, of blessed memory, [taught] that every good thing that goes forth from the mouth of HaKadosh Baruch Hu for good — even though it be conditional — He does not retract. For this saying [applies] only [to the case] where there is no condition stated [explicitly] — that is, [where] the condition is not the condition [made explicit] in itself.

But there was, without doubt, a sin on Moses' part, [as in] "And My anger shall be kindled against them, and I will consume them, and I will make of you a great nation" [Exodus 32:10]; this [shows] that there is no [such absolute rule], for it would have been fitting that he pray on their behalf. As it is said [of Samuel]: "Moreover as for me, far be it from me that I should sin against the LORD in ceasing to pray for you" [1 Samuel 12:23]. And being so, the intention of that saying [of the Rabbis] is only that one should make every effort that the deliverance not be removed, and that there be no failure such that the seed of Israel be brought to an end — for "I will make of you a great nation" had already gone forth from Him. Hence this [good] was not removed from Him by reason of the good foretold on account of [Moses'] prayer on behalf of Israel.

Now behold, the Master, the Guide [Maimonides], resolved this very difficulty that we mentioned — concerning the testing of the prophet through a good that, when it fails to arrive, [might be thought to show] that the foretelling of the good is not retracted [i.e., why a true prophet's predicted good could yet fail]. And he has already shown the fear that Jacob felt at the deeds of his brother Esau — [the fear] that the foretelling of the good might be retracted — where it is said in his opening to the commentary on the Mishnah that the foretelling of the prophet is not retracted [cf. the Guide II:42, on Genesis 32:8]. He means: the foretelling [of good] that the Blessed Name has ordained for a prophet concerning himself is not retracted; but [as for] the foretelling of good that He ordains for him to convey to another, it is feasible that it should be retracted.

And this is made plain, [namely] that this is not [the only] cause here. For the question would still stand: why should the foretelling of good that is said to the prophet concerning himself be such that it is not retracted, whereas the foretelling of good that He ordains for him to convey to another should be such that it is retracted? Furthermore, we find that the prophet's foretelling of good to convey to another was [indeed] not fulfilled, [as in] "and the children of wickedness shall add no more to oppress them" [2 Samuel 7:10] — and yet in the end [they were brought] to make an end of them. And here it shall be explained by what the prophet is tested, and how he is tested. [End of Chapter 13.]

פרק ארבעה עשר — Chapter Fourteen

[Body rubric (p. 462): פרק ארבעה עשר — "Chapter Fourteen"; sub-caption: יתיר בו קצה ספקות יקר בענין הנבואה והנפלאות מפני קצת נפלאות באו בהם בדברי הנביאים — "In which is resolved the edge of a precious doubt concerning the matter of prophecy and of wonders, on account of certain wonders that have come down in them in the words of the prophets"]

It is fitting that we inquire here, so as to resolve a strong and precious doubt concerning the matter of prophecy and the matter of wonders, with respect to what is related of this in the words of the prophets. Now this doubt concerning prophecy lies in what is related of Samuel — that he conveyed [a message] after his death in [a session of] prophecy to Saul [1 Samuel 28]. And this doubt [is one] that has already been explained in two [respects] from this. The book has already shown that the particular thing [conveyed] in prophecy [comes] not from the side of the Active Intellect, but rather from the side of the prophet — by reason that his thought is spread out over those particulars. And being so, how could it be feasible that there should reach a prophet a notification of a particular thing after his death? Behold, there is then no thought of his spread out over the particulars of the world, since the hylic soul has already perished from him; and with this [arises] the additional impossibility, that there should emanate from him, after [his] death, this notification to a man other than himself — and this is most plainly [absurd].

And just as this doubt is precious in the matter of prophecy, so it is precious in the matter of wonders: namely, what is told of Elisha — that he restored [a dead man to] life after his [own] death, when [the man] was buried in his grave [2 Kings 13:21]. For this wonder ought to have been newly wrought by the hand of a prophet, and we do not find there a man to whom it would be feasible to attribute this mighty wonder other than Elisha. And behold, the saying [implies] that when this wonder was wrought —

— by his hand, it would seem to imply the strange [conclusion]: for it is not feasible that there should cleave in [a dead body] the perfection of the Active Intellect's action after death, since it would not need this — for there had already reached him what it is feasible should reach him of good and of perfection [in his lifetime].

Now let us say that the first doubt has no resolution to it whatever. This [is so in that] we do not know what it was that Saul heard, [namely] that a word reached him from Samuel in prophecy. Rather, this notification [given to Saul] by inquiry

was by way of divination; for the divination [carried out] by means of the actions in which the application of the imaginative faculty is completed is [a faculty] by which the supernal power is received. And behold, the necromantic medium [ha-ov — the *ov*, 1 Samuel 28] is one of those who believe in [the practice of] inquiring of the dead by divination. And so too this is the cause [why] his voice was very low, as they said, "and your speech shall be low out of the dust" [Isaiah 29:4] — and this, too, is the cause [why] none heard his voice except the inquirer concerning him, as our Rabbis, of blessed memory, have already related concerning this matter. And were this thing true [i.e., a real raising], this raising [up] would have been heard by all who stood there; it would not have been [the case] that Saul alone inquired of him — this is plainly [so]. And this is what Saul meant when he said to the woman, "Divine for me, I pray you, by the necromantic medium" [1 Samuel 28:8] — for, according to this, the matter is a kind of this divination. The raising [up] [is to be understood] in the measure [in which] the imaginative faculty is set down [as operative], [a faculty] that is debased below the [other] powers of the soul, in the manner [in which] the application of the soul-faculties is completed for the imaginative faculty [as distinguished] from the rest of the powers of the soul.

But the resolution of the second doubt is in what one might raise as a difficulty — and it seems that what is said in resolving it [is] that, just as things were found by [individual] providence ordained from the side of the heavenly bodies [to be of] two kinds — the one kind being the keeping of the [individual] man, and the other kind being the keeping of the universal [order] — so things were found [ordained] by [individual] providence, from the side of conjunction, in the whole action [in] two kinds: the one kind being the keeping of that [particular] man, and the other kind being the keeping of the universal [order] that is renewed [in] our affairs after death. And by this manner has the Blessed Name already foretold to a person the matter of divine providence which is found at the time of [his] seed [/ posterity], [as in] what is said, "and also that nation, whom they shall serve, will I judge" [Genesis 15:14] — behold, here He made known the matter of the wonders that smite the Egyptians on the side of divine providence, by reason of the conjunction of the [fore]father by [/ to] choice. And in this manner it may be feasible that there should cleave to Elisha, from [individual] providence, what was ordained from it — this being the wonder [wrought] after his death, for the honor of Elisha. For there is no more in this than that providence undertook the keeping of his possessions [/ his interests]. Or it is feasible that there was there someone to whom it would be fitting that this wonder be [wrought] by his hand, even if [Scripture] did not relate it.

Behold, this is what appears to us in resolving these doubts that are found.

And here is completed what we intended to investigate in this book. Its completion was on the seventh day of the month of Shevat of the year [5]089 [89 = 9 + 80 = שמנים ותשע] of the particular count of the sixth millennium [האלף הששי] of the creation of the world [= 5089 AM; 5089 − 3760 = 1329 CE, Shevat (Jan/Feb) 1329].

Blessed and exalted be the Fashioner of all, who has helped us in the abundance of His mercies and His kindnesses upon all — a blessing and a praise. Amen.

[Imprint, Latin/German]: "Fr. Nies'sche Buchdruckerei (Carl B. [L]orck) in Leipzig." [— "Fr. Nies's Printing House (Carl B. Lorck) in Leipzig"]

[Below the imprint, a further faint show-through block bleeds through from the verso; the recto face itself carries no printed Hebrew body text. Not transcribed as content — it is reversed bleed-through, not a page of the work.]

[Library date-due stamp]

[Library stamp, English: "...LIBRAR[Y] / [UNIVERS]ITY OF TORONTO / AU[G] 23 1983"]

[Cover photograph]

[Library barcode label, English: "UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO" / barcode "3 1761 0112 4337 5"]

[End of the scanned volume. No residual text of the *Milchamot HaShem* appears on these leaves; the work proper concluded with its colophon and the Leipzig printer's imprint on the preceding leaf.]