

*Quaestio de strigibus, una
cum tractatu De praeeminentia
sacrae theologiae, et
quadruplici apologia De
lamiis contra Ponzinibium*

[An Inquiry Concerning Witches]

(1523)

by Bartolomeo Spina (Bartholomaeus Spineus, c. 1474–1546),
Dominican theologian, Master of the Sacred Palace

Translation by Scott Weisman



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Translator Version 2

Upright reason dictates that the recipients of the good, of whatever type and level of beneficence it may be, must show gratitude and blessing to the beneficent person in every way possible, commensurate with the value of the beneficence. And one who has benefited all the people of the world — for example, one who invented a new instrument for the good of the world, or a good book — it is fitting for every discerning person, out of the obligation of love of fellow beings, to at least purchase it, so that the man will profit and his heart will be encouraged thereby to invent yet more good instruments in the world. And similarly, all other wise-hearted people will likewise strive and exert themselves to invent good things and instruments needed for the repair of the world and its perfection.

And therefore, whoever says: "What do I need this new instrument for?" — he does not act well towards the world. For if not for the man who invented it, where would you be? And what would your city do? And more than this, if the man did not exert himself, what would the world do?

— R. Pinchas Eliyahu Hurwitz, *Sefer HaBris HaShalem* (1797)

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A NOTE ON THE WORK

The Dominican answer to the sceptics, written by the man who would become Master of the Sacred Palace. Spina holds that the *strigae* are real: that they travel bodily to their gatherings, copulate with demons, murder infants, and are therefore heretics and apostates whom the secular arm must burn. He argues from Aquinas and the canonists, but his most striking pages are the depositions — cases from Ferrara, Bergamo and the Val Camonica that he had heard of at first or second hand and sets down as evidence. The volume also carries his four *Apologiae* against the jurist Gianfrancesco Ponzinibio, who had argued that the witches' flight was a dream and that the Inquisition had no jurisdiction over it; Spina's reply is one of the fiercest exchanges of the Italian witch debate.

The source is the Rome, 1576 collected edition (*in aedibus Populi Romani*), Bayerische Staatsbibliothek copy 4 Phys.m. 85 m, in full: the *Quaestio de strigibus* as first printed at Venice in 1523, the *Tractatus de praeeminentia sacrae theologiae*, and the four *Apologiae de lamiis contra Ponzinibium*. The three tracts share one continuous pagination of 180 printed pages — the *Quaestio* at pp. 1–90, the *De praeeminentia* (in two tractates) at pp. 91–132, and the *Apologiae* at pp. 133–180, closing with the register and the Rome imprint — preceded by unnumbered front matter: the title page, a dedication, the author's preface and the index of chapters. The source PDF has 203 pages, including the binding and blank flyleaves; pagination in the translation follows the printed page numbers. No digitization of the 1523 Venice first edition was located. The Internet Archive holds a lower-quality Google scan of the same 1576 edition, which was consulted on a few difficult words.

A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION PROCESS

This translation was produced with the translation-pipeline. See the linked repository for details on the process.

This edition has been checked at citation grade. A stratified sample of it was independently re-transcribed from the original page by readers given no sight of the translation, and the two readings were then reconciled letter by letter. Every disagreement in the layer a citing reader depends on — figures, names, headings, and whether a passage is present at all — was settled against the page before publication, and none was left open.

What that does and does not mean. It is a claim about a sample, not about every line. A passage the sample did not reach is neither confirmed nor denied, and silence in an independent reading is not agreement. Where the page itself will not settle a reading, this edition withdraws rather than guesses: a bracketed pair marks a genuine ambiguity the original cannot decide, and a question mark a character that could not be read. Those marks are deliberate refusals, and they are worth more than the confident readings they replace.

A note on the references. A scriptural or bibliographic reference given in brackets or parentheses is, in most cases, an **editorial identification of an allusion rather than a citation printed in the source**. Books of this kind

quote and weave scripture constantly without naming it, and the identification is supplied here as a convenience to the reader. Where the source does print a reference of its own, it is given as printed. **An identified allusion is not evidence that the author cited that passage** — look at the original before resting an argument on one.

This text is the product of a highly refined automated translation process. It has undergone only cursory human review and should not be treated as an authoritative or scholarly rendering. It is offered solely as a reference and reading aid — a way to make an otherwise inaccessible work approachable — and any passage of real consequence should be checked against the original source.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The source images are from the Münchener Digitalisierungszentrum of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich (shelfmark 4 Phys.m. 85 m), made freely available for scholarly use.

Translated with the assistance of Claude. The translator thanks the Anthropic team for making this work possible.

Notation and abbreviations

A few conventions have been applied uniformly throughout this translation, so that one quantity is always written one way. They change how a value is *written*, never what it is; where the printed source and this translation differ in notation, the source's own form is recorded in the editorial apparatus.

Numerals are Arabic, even where the source sets Roman ones. Roman numerals are kept only in headings, running headers and signatures, which are transcribed as printed.

Dates are given as year, month, day — *1572 November 11*. Dates are Julian, as the source gives them, and have not been converted to the Gregorian calendar.

Times are written with raised unit letters: 7^h 36^m 12^s for seven hours, thirty-six minutes and twelve seconds. An interval longer than a day carries a raised d — 3^d 7^h. The degree and minute signs below are never used for time.

Where a table in the source spreads one quantity across separate columns for degrees, minutes and seconds, those columns have been joined into a single column and the value written whole. Where a value runs to thirds and beyond, the columns are kept, since there the columns are the notation.

[Front board: the outer face of the upper cover, dark brown grained covering with a lighter spine strip at the left edge. No title, lettering, label or tooling is visible. No text.]

[Inside of the front board (pastedown). Library matter only; no printed text of the book.]

[Handwritten shelfmark, upper left, in ink: "Phys. m." on one line and "85^m" below it, with a short stroke under the superscript.] — the library's shelfmark. A small oval mark, a "o" or "o" [?], stands at the extreme upper-left corner before "Phys." Below the shelfmark are two faint pencil ovals, apparently erased or offset.

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"Rescued from fire and water in the great burning of the Bavarian State Library in March of the war year 1943."

[Artist's signature at the lower right of the bookplate's frame, in very small capitals: "F. STAEGE" [?].]

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[Flyleaf, blank. No text on this side. Browned edge along the left side of the leaf, with a strip of a further leaf visible beyond it at the far left; a pale scalloped patch at the lower-left corner. No ink or writing.]

[Flyleaf (recto of the leaf facing the title page). No printed text on this side. Near the top, a line of handwriting in brown ink has been heavily struck through with dense cross-hatched strokes, so that none of its letters can be made out: [Illegible: a single handwritten line, deliberately cancelled]. The printed title page shows through the leaf from behind, reversed and faint (title lines, woodcut, imprint); none of it is this side's ink. Lower right, in a later hand in brown ink: *Emptus Romae* ("Bought at Rome") — written *Emptg Romæ*, with the *-us* suspension.]

[Verso of the same flyleaf, blank. No text on this side. The cancelled inscription and the *Emptus Romae* note from the other side show through reversed (brown cross-hatched band near the top; mirrored "Emptg Romæ" at

lower left); neither is this side's ink. Scattered foxing, a crease across the lower half, and a pale stain at the lower-left corner.]

[Title page]

REVERENDI PATRIS F. BARTHOLOMAEI SPINEI PISANI ORD. PRAED. THEOLOGIAE PROF. SACRIQ. PALATII APOSTOLICI MAGISTRI DIGNISSIMI, QVAESTIO DE STRIGIBVS, VNA CVM TRACTATV DE PRAEeminentia Sacrae Theologiae, & quadruplici Apologia de Lamiis contra Ponzinibium.

The Inquiry concerning the *Striges* [Quaestio de strigibus]

by the Reverend Father Fra Bartholomaeus Spineus [Bartolomeo Spina] of Pisa, of the Order of Preachers, Professor of Theology and most worthy Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace;

together with a Treatise on the Pre-eminence of Sacred Theology, and a Fourfold Apology on the *Lamiae* against Ponzinibius [Gianfrancesco Ponzinibio].

With the privilege and licence of the superiors.

Diagram. Rectangular title-page woodcut within a single ruled frame. Two standing, haloed, bearded figures in robes flank a crowned oval shield: the figure on the left holds a long sword upright in his right hand and a closed book; the figure on the right holds keys raised in his right hand and a book.¹ Behind them are clouds and a range of hills. The shield bears a diagonal band from upper left to lower right, lettered on the band; a crown stands on the shield and a mask-like ornament at its foot.

- Shield band (centre): "S·P·Q·R" (the Senate and People of Rome)

ROMAE, In Aedibus Populi Romani, M D LXXVI.

Rome, at the press of the Roman People [In Aedibus Populi Romani], 1576.

[Library stamp, upper centre, overlying the show-through: an oval ink stamp reading "BIBLIOTHECA / REGIA / MONACE[?]S" — between "MONACE" and a final "S" (probable) three or four letters are lost among the reversed title-page show-through.]²

That the *striges* are carried bodily to the devil's game [ludus diabolicus] — as is also commonly said — is determined in a very full inquiry. Once that inquiry is complete, and so that the truth, now determined, may the more easily be both strengthened and defended by a fourfold Apology against a certain adversary, a twofold treatise — written to safeguard the pre-eminence of sacred theology over all the other sciences, and directed against that same adversary — is fittingly placed before it.

To the Most Reverend Father and Lord, Lord Marino Grimano [Marino Grimani], Cardinal Priest of the Holy Roman Church of the title of San Vitale, and Patriarch of Aquileia,

¹by these attributes the pair is conventionally Paul (sword) and Peter (keys); the woodcut itself carries no names.

²the standard form of this stamp is *Bibliotheca Regia Monacensis*; an identification, not a reading of the stamp.

Fra Bartholomaeus Spineus [Bartolomeo Spina] of Pisa, a regular of the Order of Preachers, undeserving Doctor of Sacred Theology, [wishes] happiness.

No one of sound mind will deny that to God, Best and Greatest — the first Principle of all things, of the whole universe, I say, and likewise their last end — a universal worship is owed, and that very worship at its most devoted; nor that he alone is to be served with the supreme service, with every power (so to speak) and with chosen works, and with whatever virtue and endowment a man possesses above all others. In imitation of this most elegant bond, and by the gentle disposition of divine providence, the more universal a governor and director of human life a man is among men, the more ample the service he claims and requires from men as his right. For this reason, by that same right, all peoples render to their princes the outward homage of the service owed them; and the higher that power and majesty is raised, the more numerous and the more exacting the worship that is prescribed as its due. So it comes about that the whole Church is, as it should be and most deservedly, subject to the Supreme Pontiff, raised to the highest seat of spiritual power — after God himself, whose universal vicegerent he is on earth — and he is hedged about on every side with honours and homage and, as it were, most abundantly fenced in.

And just as the Most Reverend Lords Cardinals stand nearest in dignity to that first Vicar of Christ, and are his chief assessors in the government of the universal Church, and his co-workers with tireless zeal, counsel and help and with every service they can give, so it is surely right that they should receive from all worshippers of Christ the honour due to them — and, beneath the chief Prelate, a worship the more illustrious and the ampler, the more splendid the endowments of virtue and wisdom that adorn them. This has been the principle of my long-standing and most heartfelt service both towards all who have been promoted to this rank, which shines with the most celebrated gifts of grace, and above all towards a man to be celebrated in perpetual memory, the Most Reverend Lord Dominicus Grimanus [Domenico Grimani], your late uncle, most distinguished Prelate. Hence it has so won me over and bound me to you — who now so rival your most honoured uncle's glory in every gift of endowment and virtue that report already pronounces you not inferior to him — that with unwearied spirit I long, if I can offer any gifts, if I can show my most wise Lord any proof of a most rare affection, not to delay it. Nor would my most ready heart be satisfied by temporal services towards him, since sacred religion would not even permit me to present these things in person. Rather, I would wish to honour him with a lasting gift as a token of my service, however modest, just as his most august endowments are also lasting. Had not his humility — which set off all his other qualities — held them back, those endowments, if recounted more carefully (as would have been fitting), could have turned the whole Church to the most ardent love of him, and indeed to the most profound admiration.

THE AUTHOR TO THE READER

Now I had prepared whatever ripened fruits I had gathered from the small and not very well tended orchard of my modest talent — fruits whose power was to repel those poisons or diseases by which Christian piety is the more infected the less it is on its guard; poisons which, indeed (and this is still more to be lamented), are extolled by the ignorant as though they were wholesome medicines, and are everywhere pressed upon the minds of the innocent and given them to drink. But by the will of God I am held back for a time. The judgements of God are not to be probed by me further than is fitting; I know that God is to be feared more than man. I know that the most holy Doctors of the Church, whose teaching and honour I defend, are to be revered more than anyone living on earth. But it seems to the householder [patri fa.] that all the tares that have sprung up are not yet to be rooted out. I would hope, however, that by the providence of God a fitting time will come, when the things gathered long ago, and already set in order in bundles of questions and treatises, have [effetuerint: ?] more; and when the fullest freedom is also granted to tear up, as I would wish, the remaining [tares] that infect the purest wheat not only of sacred scholastic theology but also of the sacred Scriptures — then the threshing-floor of heaven will be purged more freely and more abundantly by the fire of truth.

Meanwhile, may Your Most Reverend Lordship [R. D. T.] take a first taste of this one sweet little gift of mine from the same orchard, and be pleased that, dedicated to your most renowned name, it is shared for the common good. For the more the hidden plague of the *Strigiatius* heresy [Strigiatius haeresis] — which, through the same devil's most unbridled malice, shamefully separates and turns away souls redeemed by Christ the Redeemer (alas!) and once more subdued by the enemy devil — has invaded the world with greater force in our time, the more fully it can be avoided by this very sweet fruit, and the more freely and favourably, now laid bare, it can be utterly enfeebled under your protection. May God, Best and Greatest, having pity on his sheep, deign in his goodness to grant this, and at the same time to preserve Your Most Reverend Lordship in happiness until he prepares your passage from temporal to eternal happiness. To you I commend, again and again, your most faithful servant.

THE AUTHOR TO THE READER

A final trial had been concluded at Ferrara against a *maga* or *lamia* — or rather, and better, one called by the common people a *strix* [Strigem], because, like those birds that delight in the shadows of night, such women *maleficae* especially are carried, as it were flying, to the devil's course [cursus diabolicus], as they say. The Lord Doctors of Both Laws, who had been summoned to give counsel as custom requires and to whom the whole proceeding [processus] had been made known, were greatly astonished at the novelty of the matter. They earnestly asked me to commit to writing what I knew of this rare subject, so that the popular opinion — that these things happen in dreams, through the devil's

various delusions — might be abolished; for from the proceeding they had learned that this opinion was false beyond all doubt.

I agreed to their request, although I was burdened with a double lectureship [lectura], each of the heaviest kind — in natural philosophy, I mean, and in sacred theology — and at the same time with the charge of the Inquisition in place of another. And because they pressed me the more insistently, I completed the work with the more insistent care, and in haste. I have brought in only those examples or relevant experiences which it fell to me to learn there from authentic sources. For had I wished to commit to writing everything related everywhere, even by trustworthy people, the work to be published would have grown to an immense size.

A doctor, however, tried to snatch it from my hands before it had yet been fully ripened — one to whom it was not fitting that I refuse anything, a man of a most outstanding mind among others and relying on a very sharp intellect. While he read the writing eagerly, running his eyes over it, he chose to reinforce it in part with the wisdom in which he excels, adorning it according to his own profession. Out of reverence for the man — though his name is suppressed, by his own wish — I did not refuse this. Rather, I judged that it should even be admitted (though I myself would never have done it on my own account, as something not in keeping with my profession), so that the Lord Doctors of both laws, who are called to give counsel and to whom the judicial proceedings in this case are laid open by mandate of the Church, may see at first glance that what we write does not stray too far from their own wisdom. I do not, however, approve all of it. So when you see here and there what belongs to them, set down in the manner of postils [postillae], do not be surprised, but rather be glad, I beg you, most candid Reader. Farewell, and be happy.

INDEX CAP. QVAESTIONIS AMPLISS. DE STRIGIBVS.

Index of the chapters of the very full Inquiry concerning the Striges

The question is put forward, and four arguments are brought in which seem to prove, in general terms, that one side of the question is false: that is, that everything told of the *striges* happens not in reality or in the body, but through fantastic visions or in dreams, by the illusion of the diabolical spirit. — Cap.1.Pag.1

Two arguments are produced to the same effect, which seem to prove specifically that the *striges* are not carried to the devil's game [ludus diabolicus] by an unguent or by any other act of *maleficium*. Then a single argument is appended for the true side of the question, by which the whole question is rendered doubtful. — Cap.2.p.4

It is shown that very many kinds of *maleficia* are subject to the office and judgement of the Inquisition; it is made plain, however, that to discuss these is not the principal intention of this work. And the Brief [Breve] of Pope Adrian VI against the *striges* and the very heresy of *strigiatus*. — cap.3.p.7

What the specific intention of this work is, and how many points are to be set out specifically in it. — c.4.15

That men can be carried by demons across distant tracts of the earth; and likewise that the circumstances attending this fact do not contradict Holy Scripture, but rather agree with it. — cap.5.p.16

That demons can appear to men in human form, and also in the form of beasts, and can offer themselves to them as incubi and succubi. — Cap.6.p.19

That demons, by their natural power, can recover any things that have been lost or destroyed — not the same in number, but in species — not only in appearance but in reality. — Cap.7.p.22

That men and women are not truly changed into any species of beast by the power of demons, but only by delusion. — Cap.8.p.24

That God, Best and Greatest, permits the very many evils that come about through the *striges* only by his most wise disposition, and draws many goods out of them. — Cap.9.p.27

That the things commonly reported of the *striges* cannot happen only in dreams. — C.10.p.29

It is shown by many examples that the same things reported of the *striges* can happen in reality just as common report has it. — Cap.11.p.31

That it is to be firmly believed, and in no way doubted, that all the aforementioned things happen in the way the Inquisitors affirm — a reason drawn from the judgements of those same Inquisitors. — Cap.12.p.35 [?]

To the same effect, a second reason drawn from the faithful assertion of many witnesses [textium], above all exception; and the refutation of one reply. — Cap.13. p.36

The refutation of one evasion of the reason just stated [praedictam rationem]. — Cap.14 p 39

Further deductions brought in to shut off that same evasion. — Cap.15.p.42

The same second reason is confirmed in three ways from the same foundation. — Cap.16.p.45

To the same effect, a third reason brought in from manifold experience through persons of noble rank. — Cap.17.p.48

Experiences of the bodily course [cursus] and transportation of the *striges* to distant places, brought in through persons of the common people. — Cap.18.p.50

Experience of the apparent transformation of the *striges* into cats. — Cap.19.p 52

Why God permits demons to organise and amass so often such large and crowded gatherings [conventus] of the *striges*, with men and women taken from different regions. — Cap 20.p.55

For the solution of the first argument, it is first shown that the chapter *Episcopi* [capitulum Episcopi], alleged to the contrary, is suspect in many ways as to its authority and truth. — Cap.21.p.59

That the chapter *Episcopi* does not effectively establish what it proposes, and is for this reason suspect of falsity and of lesser authority. — Cap.22.p.62

That one need not necessarily abide by the statements of that chapter *Episcopi* if it issued from a synodal and particular council. Indeed, even if it had come from a general council, appeal must be made to the Pontiff, that by his declaration he may exclude the erroneous senses which the adversaries find in it. — Cap.23.p.64

That, even granting that the council *Acquirense* [concilium Acquirense] was general and duly convened, and supposing also everything that is said in it, the *striges* do not escape the hands of the Inquisitors; and on the various modes and kinds of the devil's illusions. — C.24 p.68³

A summary explanation of the chapter *Episcopi*, adduced so far as the purpose of this question requires;

and how the things narrated there differ from those that are said to happen to the *striges*. — Cap 25 p.70

On what matters, chiefly of belief or of action, those persons of whom the said chapter *Episcopi* speaks were deluded. — C.26.p.73

The second argument is resolved; in this resolution it is shown in several ways what one should think of the case mentioned in the legend of Saint Germanus [in legē la sācti Germani], which resembles the deeds of the *striges*. — Cap.28.p.76

All the knots are untied in which the third and fourth arguments seemed to entangle their readers. — Cap.29.p.78

In the solution of the fifth argument it is shown that there is no power in the most abominable ointment with which the *striges* anoint themselves — although sometimes the devil is drawn to the wishes of the *striges* by that anointing, as by a sign, and sometimes he is prevented; and how this comes about. — Cap.30.p.80

That the devil sometimes presents what looks like the image of the person lying motionless in sleep, so that it may be believed that this person was carried to the game [ludus] not really, but rather delusively and only in an imaginary vision. — Cap.31 p.83

The matters touched on by the sixth argument are made most clearly plain: namely, how the *striges* are said to be unable not to be subject to the devil; how they are also apparently turned into cats; and how they are also freed from that same delusion. — C.32 p.87

On that obligation by which the *striges* promise the devil to kill children; and why God permits the death — unjust, as it appears — of so many innocents. — Cap.33.p.88

Chapters of the First Tract On the Pre-eminence of Sacred Theology over All Other Sciences [Capita primi tractatus de Praeeminentia Sacrae Theologiae super omnes alias scientias]

³*Acquirense* is the printed form; the council meant is the one to which the canon *Episcopi* was traditionally ascribed — an identification supplied here, not printed.

The question in doubt is set out through opposing arguments, and the principal conclusion that the author proposes is proved from two foundations.

— Cap.1.p.93

A very full exposition of the proof brought forward. — Cap.2. p.94

That Sacred Theology is more excellent than all the other sciences. — Cap.3.p.95

That the powers of a lower science are not sufficient to decide the questions of a higher one, although they nonetheless serve it. — Cap.4.p.99

That the civil laws, or even the canon laws, cannot of themselves decide theological questions, such as this one about the *striges* is. — Cap.5.p.103

The two arguments recited for the principal conclusion are strengthened. — Cap.6.p.105

It is shown that the third argument brought forward by the Adversary is quite weak, and that his solution of it is also useless; at the same time it is shown in what way skill in the laws can rightly be called a science [scientia]. — Cap.7.p.107

That the science of the laws is practical, and in no way properly speculative. — Cap.8 p.110

That the science of the laws rightly glorifies its practitioners, but Theology glorifies its own more. — C.9.p.112

It is explained that the lawyers' [legistarum] manner of proceeding is not to be despised. — Cap 10.p.113

The fourth argument, in which the mutability of the laws is discussed [disseritur], is not to be disapproved. — Cap.11 p.115

Chapters of the Second Tract On the Pre-eminence of Sacred Theology over All Other Sciences [Capita secundi Tractatus de Praeeminentia Sacrae Theologiae super omnes alias scientias]

That because we advance to the knowledge of truth through the laws, it does not follow that they are pre-eminent in deciding theological questions. — Cap.1.p.117

That from the fact that the Pope makes use of the laws, [the laws] are not preferred to Theology. — Cap.2.p.118

That from the fact that the canons can do something, it does not follow universally that the civil laws can do the same. — Cap.3.p.119

That because the laws sometimes concern themselves with the Catholic faith, Ponzinibio does not make his case. — Cap.4 p.120

The fifth argument to the same effect, a defective one, taken from the fact that the law is promulgated from the mouth of God, is resolved. — Cap.5. p.122

The sixth argument to the same effect, taken from the fact that the law binds in conscience, is resolved. — Cap 6.p.123

The seventh argument to the same effect, too, taken from the fact that civil law has always been held in the highest honour, is resolved together with its confirmation. — C.7.p.125

The eighth argument to the same effect, drawn from the fact that the law commands all, is resolved. — C.8.p.127

The ninth argument, taken from the fact that the end of the laws is to make men virtuous, is resolved. — C.9.p.129

Finally, the tenth argument, taken from the fact that the science of law is called wisdom [sapientia], is overthrown together with its confirmations. — Cap.10.p.130

Chapters on the First Apology On the *Lamiae*, against Ponzinibio
[Capita super Apologia prima de Lamiis contra Ponzinibium]

Preface [Prooemium]. — pag.133

The first and likewise the second arguments — taken from the claims that what is said of the *striges* is neither proved nor favourable to souls — are shown to be weak against the truth. — Cap.1.p.133

The third argument, which proceeds from the lesser likelihood of the things narrated about the *striges*, is rejected. — Cap.2.p.135

The fourth argument, taken from the fact that the things narrated about the *striges* are said to be carried out by the work of the devil, is resolved. — Cap.3.p.137

The fifth argument, taken from the claim that the deeds narrated of the *striges* happen in the spirit and not in the body, is overthrown. — Cap.4 p.139

From the authority of the Apostle adduced in the said chapter *Episcopi* [d.c.Episcopi], it is established that bodily transportation [delatio corporalis] to distant regions inaccessible to human power is supernaturally possible. — C.5.p.140

The chapter *Episcopi* betrays that four things, taken singly, are false. — Cap.6.p.140

The other things reported in the same chapter are judged to be false indeed, but not impossible for demons. — Cap.7.p.143

That something comes to be known in the spirit in several ways. — Cap.8.p.144

Application of the foregoing to the present consideration of the *striges*. — Cap.9.p.146

That something also comes to happen in the spirit in two other ways. — Cap.10.p.148

It is not determined in the said chapter *Episcopi* that it is impossible for the things that sometimes happen in dreams to be done bodily. — C.11.p.150

That the sixth argument, assumed from a presupposition of law, and the seventh as well — because these things proceed from an evil spirit — in no way prevail. — Cap.12.p.152

Chapters on the Second Apology On the *Lamiae*, against Ponzinibio
[Capita super Apologia secunda de Lamiis contra Ponzinibium]

Preface. — pag.154

Ponzinibio's solution to the argument taken from the common confession of the *striges* is overthrown. — Cap.1. p.154

Ponzinibio's solution to the argument taken from experience is rejected. — Cap.2 p.156

Ponzinibio's solution is rejected to the argument proving that the real transportation of bodies [corporum delationem] on the course [in cursu] is possible, from the real transportation by which Christ was carried onto a high mountain and onto the pinnacle of the temple. — Cap.3.p.157

That the bodily transportation of persons by spirits is impossible is not proved in the said chapter *Episcopi*. — Cap.4 p.159

To say that the devil is held bound in hell in such a way that he cannot come to tempt us smacks of heresy. — Cap.5.p 161

It is said without reason that God does not permit the *striges* to be deceived by the devil. — Cap.6.p 162

Ponzinibio's solution to the argument taken from the appetite by which the devil desires to be worshipped is weak, as is the argument itself. — Cap.7.p.163

Ponzinibio's response to the argument taken from the divine permission with respect to the evils done by the *striges* fails, just as the argument itself does. — Cap 8. p.164

Four other weak arguments are reviewed, together with Ponzinibio's solutions, which fail even more. — C.9.p.166

The tenth argument, which takes its foundation from the said chapter *Episcopi*, is badly resolved by the Adversary. — C.10.p.168

Chapters on the Third Apology On the *Lamiae*, against Ponzinibio
[Capita super Apologia tertia de Lamiis contra Ponzinibium]

Three conclusions are rejected, in which Ponzinibio denies that the *striges* misuse the sacraments, lie in wait for children and also kill them, and further denies that the devil is an incubus and a succubus. — Cap.1.pag.170

The position that Ponzinibio embraces in two conclusions is rejected: that *striges* are not to be admitted as witnesses against *striges*, and that for this reason the proceedings of the Inquisitors that admit them are weak. — Cap.2.p.173

Where the Adversary himself chiefly deserves to be judged, he holds, driven by a spirit of rashness, that others are to be judged. — Cap.3.p.175

What Ponzinibio tries to urge in his seventh conclusion — that jurists must be called in to draw up and complete the proceedings of the Inquisitors — is rejected. — Cap.4.p.176

In the fourth Apology a single doctrine of Oltradus [Oldrado da Ponte] concerning the *lamiae* is rejected, and that alone. — p.177

FINIS.

QVAESTIO DE STRIGIBVS

A Question Concerning the *Striges*, by the eminent Professor of Sacred Letters, Fra Bartolomeo Spina [F. Bartholomaeum Spineum], of the Order of Preachers, Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace [PER EXIMIVM SACRARVM LITTERARVM PROFESSOREM F. BARTHOLOMAEVM SPINEVM ORD. PRAED. Sacri Palatij Apostolici Magistrum]

The question is set out, and four arguments are brought forward which seem to prove, in general terms, the false side of the question: namely, that all the things narrated of the striges happen not in truth, nor in the body, but through phantastic visions [phantasticas visiones], or in dreams, by the illusion of the diabolical spirit. Cap. I.

It is asked whether those *maleficae* persons [maleficae illae personae] who are commonly called *striges* truly and bodily do, and undergo, the things they confess that they do and undergo; or whether it should rather be believed that, through the illusions of the devil, they are so far out of their minds that they think things happen to them while awake which in fact happen in dreams. And it seems that, as has been stated, they are deceived by the devil.

[Margin: Primum argumentum pro parte falsa. — The first argument for the false side.]

This is proved, first, by the authority of the council *Acquirense* [concilii Acquirensis], in which — as it is registered in the Decretum [in Decretis], 26.q.5.cap. Episcopi. — it is decreed as follows: "It must not be passed over that certain wicked women, who have turned back to follow Satan and been seduced by the illusions and phantasms of demons, believe and profess that in the hours of night they ride upon certain beasts with Diana, the goddess of the pagans, or with Herodias, or with a countless multitude of women; that in the silence of the dead of night they traverse the spaces of many lands; and that they obey her commands as those of a mistress, etc." Here it is plain that the council determines that these things are illusions of the devil and are brought about only in the imagination [phantasia].

This appears still more plainly from what is found in the same place a little later, in these words: "Priests, throughout the churches entrusted to them, must preach to the people of God with all insistence that they should know these things to be entirely false; and we judge that such phantasms are imposed on the minds of the faithful not by the divine spirit but by the evil one. For Satan himself, who transforms himself into an angel of light, once he has taken hold of the mind of some woman and subjugated her to himself through unbelief, at once transforms himself into the appearances and likenesses of various persons. Deluding in dreams the mind he holds captive, and showing it

now joyful things, now sad ones, now known persons, now unknown, he leads it through every kind of byway. And although the spirit alone undergoes this, the unbeliever supposes that it happens not in the mind but in the body. For who is not led out of himself in dreams and nocturnal visions, and sees many things while sleeping that he had never seen while awake? And who would be so foolish and dull as to think that all these things, which happen in the spirit alone, also happen in the body? — since the prophet Ezekiel saw and heard the visions of the Lord in the spirit, not in the body, as he himself says at once: 'I was in the spirit.' And Paul does not dare to say that he was caught up in the body. It must therefore be publicly proclaimed to all that whoever believes such things, and things like them, loses the faith." And further on: "Whoever, therefore, believes that any creature can be changed for the better or for the worse, or transformed into another species or into another likeness, except by the Creator himself, who made all things and through whom all things were made, is without doubt an unbeliever and worse than a pagan." So much there.

From the words just quoted, therefore, it is made plain not only that it is false that such persons are carried bodily to that diabolical game [*ludum illum diabolicum*] to do what they are commonly said to do, but also that anyone who believes that such things happen, or even can happen, bodily by the power of a demon is a heretic; and it is asserted that all these things and things like them happen in the spirit alone, and only in dreams. Now to contradict the assertion and determination of the holy councils, or even not to acquiesce in it, is heretical, even if they are particular councils: *extra de haeret. c. Ad abolendam*. Therefore, etc.

[Margin: *Secundum argumentum ad idem*. — The second argument to the same effect.]

Second, the same is proved from the things that such persons relate are done in that state of their phantastic course [*cursus*]. For they say that they enter the houses of nobles and rich men, and there eat and drink; and that at times their multitude is so great that they say they have emptied great casks [*vegetes*] of precious wine, consumed great "forms" of cheese [*casei formas*], as they call them, slaughtered very fat oxen, and eaten them roasted; and that they have done a great many things of this kind. These are found to be false on two counts. First, because (as is confirmed also by their own testimony) when they return from the course they almost always find themselves exhausted, and famished no differently than on those nights on which they are not carried off to the course — which, however, would be contrary to nature. Second, because in the houses of those nobles in which they claim to have consumed the things just mentioned, no shortage of food or wine has ever been found, nor has any ox or any other animal whatever been missing. Therefore all these things are proved to be illusions of demons, or dreams. They are not unlike what we read in the life of Saint Germanus [*in historia sancti Germani*]. When that holy man was lodging in a certain place and saw the table being laid again after supper, he asked in surprise for whom they were preparing it afresh. They

told him that they were preparing it for "those good women who go about by night" [bonis illis mulieribus, quae de nocte incedunt], and so that night Saint Germanus resolved to keep watch. And behold, he saw a multitude of demons coming to the table in the form of men and women. Ordering them not to leave, he woke the whole household and asked whether they recognized those persons. When they all said that these were their neighbours, men and women, he sent to each one's house, ordering the demons not to leave; and behold, all those who seemed to be eating there were found in their own beds. Adjured, therefore, the ones who were present said that they were demons, who deluded people in this way. From this the proposition is made perfectly plain.

[Margin: Tertium argumentū ad idem. — The third argument to the same effect.]

Third, the same thing is proved from other things that these same wicked persons relate, which it is heretical, or foolish, to believe have happened or even can happen. They say that the mistress of the course [domina cursus] — whom the *striges* of Ferrara [Ferariae, as printed] call "the wise Sibyl" [sapientem sybillam], and who evidently presides over that multitude, as Herodias or Diana does according to the chapter *Episcopi* mentioned above — longs to touch the water of the river Jordan, at which place, they say, they gather. And although she strives very hard to do so, she never succeeds in touching it; rather, the river itself dries up. She becomes so angry at this that the whole multitude must flee from her presence at once; otherwise they would all be killed by her on the spot. The reason they give why she so greatly longs to touch that water is this: if she could manage to touch the water, they say, she would then become mistress of the whole world. And they say this happens every night on which they meet in the course in this way — that is, twice a week. How much vanity, and of what kind, all this savours of, let the wise judge.

[Margin: Quartum argumentū ad idem. — The fourth argument to the same effect.]

Fourth, the same is also confirmed from their own account of things that seem to carry even an open impossibility with them, and which for that reason must be judged nothing but delusions. They say that after they have eaten some fat ox, as related above, or emptied a cask [uegetem] of wine or a chest or basket of bread, and devoured and consumed it all, that mistress strikes those vessels or places with a golden rod that she carries in her hand, and at once they are full of wine or bread as before, as if nothing had been taken from them. Likewise she orders all the bones of the dead ox to be heaped together on its outspread hide, and, wrapping the hide over the bones by its four parts, and striking it with the rod, she restores the ox alive as before, and orders it to be led back to its place. Since, then, these appear to be miraculous works, which can be done only by God alone, or by divine power, as the sacred theologians unanimously determine, to attribute such things to the devil seems to imply heresy; or else, certainly, all these things happen by way of delusion — which is the proposition.

Two arguments are brought forward to the same effect, which seem to prove specifically that the striges are not carried to the devil's game [ludum diaboli] by means of an unction or some other act of maleficium [maleficio]. Then a single argument for the true side of the question is appended, with the result that the whole question is rendered doubtful. Cap. II.

[Margin: Quintum argumētum ad idem. — The fifth argument to the same effect.]

Fifth, certain experiences show specifically that it is false that the *striges* are carried by the devil to the game, or to distant places, after performing some unction or by any other means whatever. And first we must bring forward what happened to the Illustrious Prince N., within the lifetime of people who are still alive. A certain *strix* was being held in the prison of a certain Conventual inquisitor [Inquisitoris cuiusdam conuentualis], and she confessed that she had many times been carried to the course. On hearing this, the Prince wished to test whether these things were true or rather dreams. Summoning the lord Inquisitor, he finally induced him to allow the woman to be brought in and to anoint herself, in their presence and before a crowd of nobles gathered there for the same purpose, with the unguent she used to use, so that they might see whether she was really carried through the air to the course by the devil, appearing visibly or invisibly. The Inquisitor granted this (though wrongly), and she declared before them that she would go — or be carried by the devil — if she were anointed as above. Yet, though anointed again and again, she stood motionless, and nothing out of the ordinary could ever happen to her. Many nobles who were eyewitnesses of this survive to this very day. From this event it is plain that it is false that the *striges* are carried to the course at will; rather, that it sometimes seems to them that they are carried off in this way comes about through the devil's delusion.

It is fitting now to add several other testimonies and examples of this, which are also reported to have happened in our own times. Master Augusti[nus] de Turre of Bergamo [Dominus Augusti. de Turre, Bergomensis]⁴, the most celebrated physician of his day, told me some years ago in his house at Bergamo that when he was studying at Padua as a young man, he was returning home one night about the sixth hour with his companions. He knocked, and since no one answered or opened, he finally climbed a ladder and entered the house through a window. Looking for the maidservant, he found her lying in her chamber on the ground, on her back, naked, as if dead, and completely insensible, so that he could not rouse her by any means. When morning came, and she had returned to her senses, he asked her what had happened to her that night.

At last she confessed that she had been carried to the course. From this it is manifestly plain that these women are deluded not bodily but in the spirit or in dreams, so that they think they are carried far away while they remain motionless at home.

⁴probably the Bergamo physician Agostino Torre (della Torre); the identification is supplied, not printed

Something similar was told me some years ago at Saluzzo [Salutijs] by Master Petrus Cella [D. Petrus Cella], formerly vicar of the Marquisate of Saluzzo, who is still living: a maidservant of his own had also undergone similar things, and he likewise caught her being deluded.

Moreover, it is commonly reported among our brethren [apud nostros] that when the office of the Inquisition was being exercised by our brethren in the diocese of Como [in dioecesi Cumana], it happened in the town [castro] called Lugano [Luganum] that the wife of the notary of the Inquisition was judicially accused of being a *strix* and a *malefica*. Her husband was astonishingly disturbed, because he believed her to be a holy woman. By the Lord's disposition, however, on the morning of Good Friday [diei Veneris sancti], not finding his wife, he went into the pigsty, and there, in a corner, he found her naked, exposing her private parts, completely insensible and spattered with the pigs' filth. Now almost certain of what he had not been able to believe, he seized a sword in sudden anger and meant to kill her. But coming to himself, he held back a little to see how it would end. And behold, after a short time she returned to her senses; seeing her husband threatening her with death, she prostrated herself before him, begged forgiveness, and promised to reveal the whole truth to him. And she confessed that she had gone to the course that night, etc. On hearing this her husband left at once and accused her before the Inquisitor, so that she might be handed over to the flames. When she was sought out immediately, she was nowhere to be found. It is thought that she threw herself into the lake on whose shore that place stands.

It is also reported that certain women, when they anointed themselves in the same way in order to be carried to the game, were seen by some who were watching in secret to fall to the ground at once, as though overcome by sleep, and to remain there motionless for several hours; yet afterwards, having come to themselves, these same women declared that they had then been carried to the course, as they wished.

It seems, moreover, that this happens to these *striges* through such an unction. Something similar is related by Saint Augustine (*De civitate Dei* 18, c. 28 [Aug. 18. de ci. Dei. c.28.]) as having happened to a man named Praestantius. Praestantius's son told the holy Doctor that on one occasion his father had taken a certain poison by eating a cheese prepared with evil arts, and at once lay in bed as if asleep, yet could not be roused by any means. After some days, however, he said that he had woken as it were, and he related, as though they were dreams, what he had undergone: namely, that he had been made into a packhorse [caballum], and together with other beasts of burden had carried for the soldiers the provisions called *retica*, because he had carried them to the Retiae [ad retias]. And it was found that this had happened just as he told it. Just as it was possible, then, for this Praestantius through the bewitched cheese [caseum maleficum], so it is possible for the *striges* through the diabolical unguent already mentioned, to have had — or to have now — a very deep sleep fall upon them, and to dream that they are carried to distant places, turned into

cats, or that they do or suffer whatever else, which afterwards they think they have really done or suffered. Nor should this be judged altogether contrary to nature, since physicians too sometimes induce a very deep sleep naturally by certain unctions — by anointing the temples of a sick man who until then could not get any sleep at all, as once happened in our own time. From all these and countless other experiences it is perfectly plain either that something of this kind can sometimes happen naturally, or that such things are illusions of demons; and that whatever these persons relate is done or seen by them contrary to nature is done and seen not in the body but in dreams and in the spirit.

[Margin: Sextum argumentū ad idem. — The sixth argument to the same effect.]

Sixth, it is proved that the *striges* are not inescapably bound to the devil, are not turned into cats, and do not kill children — all of which these faithless women nevertheless assert happens, or that they themselves do it, while they say they are carried off in this way by the devil. For they affirm that those who have once bound themselves to the mistress of the course mentioned above can never afterwards withdraw from that obligation. This plainly detracts from free will, and is consequently heretical — indeed, contrary to nature. Again, they say that every so often — say every fortnight or every month — they promise to prey upon [strigare] at least one boy or girl, and that they keep this promise very faithfully. They say, too, that they go through the houses of the infants they mean to attack, entering and leaping in the form of cats through windows and chimneys; and climbing onto the children's bed, they suck their blood from the fingers of their hands and feet, from the pit of the stomach, from the fontanelles, and from the other delicate parts of those little bodies; and the children, for this reason, waste away and die after a few days. They also say that on returning home they take up a certain *calamita* [calamitam]⁵ from beneath the threshold of the door of their house. They leave this *calamita* there for this purpose when they go off to the course, so that on their return, taking it up, they may at once return to their own form as women (as it seems to them), from the form in which they seemed to themselves to be cats. In this business there is either the heresy condemned in the chapter *Episcopi* already cited — namely, that one species of creature is transformed into another — or else, certainly, a very great delusion of the demons, if these things happen only in the spirit, or in dreams. Nor is it likely that they suck so much blood from children that death necessarily follows, without the children feeling it, or even without their parents noticing, since the parents are present, especially at night, when these things are said to happen.^a

[Margin: ^a Vnde sequitur speciē falsitatis habere, iuxta ea quæ habentur, i c. quia uerisimile. de præsump. — Hence it follows that it has an appearance of falsity, according to what is held in c. *Quia verisimile*, de praesump.]

⁵the word may mean a lodestone (Italian *calamita*) or a small reed-frog (Latin *calamites*); the passage does not decide

Otherwise it would follow that a countless multitude of children would perish in this way, whereas in fact those who appear to die such a death are very rare. For they say that the multitude of those who practise as *striges* [strigantium], of both sexes [promiscui], is innumerable [innumerata];

and that each of them is bound, every fortnight [qualibet quindena] or at least every month, to work *maleficium* on one child [vnum maleficiare puerum], as was set out above. Countless children, then, would die even in a single month — which is plainly not the case. Nor is it any answer to say that these children are afterwards cured by the same women who practise as *striges* [strigantibus], or by other *striges*. First, because the *striges* themselves commonly confess that they would not want the children to be cured by anyone, and that they intend, as far as lies in their power, to kill them. Second, because a certain woman, who said that she cured both the children she herself had preyed upon [strigabat] and those preyed upon by others, admits, for another reason, in the same trial [processu] that I conducted against her, that those who practise this [quae strigant] would not want anyone to be cured. From this contradiction in what she said (for she wanted to cure them for the sake of gain) it is manifestly plain that this position rests on no truth at all. Nor does it seem consonant with the divine clemency that God should permit so many innocent children to be killed by these accursed persons at their pleasure. From all these considerations, then, the proposition is as plain as can be.

[Margin: Argumentum pro parte quæstionis vera. — An argument for the true side of the question.]

On the contrary side stand the almost countless trials [processus] of the Inquisitors, and the justice they have executed against such persons on the ground that they truly and bodily go to the course, and there deny the faith and baptism, trample the cross, and heap insults, reproaches and horrible abuse on the sacred Body of Christ. If all these things happened not in reality but in dreams, the Inquisitors would be most unjust judges, and would not be administering justice when they condemn such persons to the extreme penalty. And since the Church knows this and tolerates it, or even favours them, and the Inquisitors are induced and encouraged by princes and peoples to carry it out, it is plain that these things are not mere dreams: these accursed persons commit the horrible crimes described above bodily and while awake. This is all the more so because the Inquisitors are, as a rule, endowed with wisdom and natural prudence — churchmen of the greatest gravity, and men religious in the uprightness of their lives.^b

[Margin: ^b Vnde pro eorū actibus præsumitur, iuxta text. not. & lib. Abb. ī c. nisi essent. de preben. & gl. in l. Titio fundus. ff. de cō. & de. & in religiosis est text. aureus in c. ij. ibi. quod non fecissent cū gl. de no. oper. nun. c. et per glo. in c. de præsentium. 16. q. 1. & Fely. in c. super his col. pe. in fi. de Accusatio. — Hence a presumption stands in favour of their acts, according to the text noted, and Abb. in c. *Nisi essent*, de preben., and the gloss on l. *Titio fundus*, ff. de cō. & de.; and concerning religious there is a golden text in c. ij,

at the words "quod non fecissent," with the gloss, de no. oper. nun.; and by the gloss on c. *De praesentium*, 16. q. 1.; and Fely. on c. *Super his*, penultimate column, at the end, de Accusatio.]

Many kinds of maleficium are shown to be subject to the office and judgement of the Inquisition; it is nevertheless made clear that to discuss them is not the principal intention of this work. Cap, III.

To determine this question, it must first be stated that we do not intend here to discuss the whole genus of superstition — whether the things that seem to be done in it beyond the capacity of human nature really happen, or rather happen by delusion or in the imagination [delusorie phantasticeue]. For I consider it thoroughly established, for anyone even moderately educated — indeed for any unlettered person, unless he is wholly out of his senses — that almost the whole world is befouled with these crimes, since daily experience itself demonstrates it; and also because both divine and human laws rage against such persons. For the Lord cries out against *malefici* in Exodus 22 [Exodi. 22.]: "You shall not suffer *malefici* to live" [Maleficos non patieris viuere]. Likewise, against the same, and also against *magi* and soothsayers [ariolos], enchanterers [incantatores], pythons [pythones] and those who have a spirit of divination, Holy Scripture pronounces the extreme sentence. For in Deuteronomy 18 [Deut. 18.] it is said: "Let there not be found among you anyone who consults soothsayers, or observes dreams and omens; nor let there be a *maleficus*, nor an enchanter, nor anyone who consults pythons or diviners, or seeks the truth from the dead." Leviticus 19 [Leuit. quoque. 19.] likewise says: "The soul that turns aside to *magi* and diviners, and commits fornication with them" — that is, shares in their crimes, implores their help through these means, and makes use of their most wicked arts — "I will set my face against it, and destroy it from the midst of my people." And in the same book, chapter 20 [in eodē lib. c. 20.], it is said from the mouth of the Lord: "A man or woman in whom there is a pythonic spirit or a spirit of divination, let them die: they shall stone them."

The sacred canons, the holy Doctors of the Church and the sacred theologians, treating most abundantly of this genus of superstitions and divinations, likewise define all such things as the most unspeakable crimes, deserving the extreme penalty. This is plain above all from 26. q. 5. throughout [26. q. 5. per totum]; from Saint Augustine in the book *De doctrina christiana* [per diuum Aug. in lib. de doct. christiana], which is registered in the same *causa*, q. 2., c. *Illud*; and in the book *De natura daemonum*, as is found in the same place, q. 4., c. *Igitur* and c. *Sciendum*. It is plain too in several books of the *De civitate Dei* of the same holy Doctor, namely book 7, last chapter; book 8, c. 29; book 10, c. 9; book 18, c. 17 and 18; and book 21, c. 6 [lib. 7. c. ultimo, lib. 8. c. 29. lib. 10. c. 9. lib. 18. c. 17. & 18. & lib. 21. c. 6.]. Saint Thomas, too, declares in many places of his teaching that these most unspeakable works are really done by these most wicked people — especially in 2. 2. q. 93. & 92., in the third book *Contra Gentiles*, c. 104 and 105 [Tertio cōtra Genti. c. 104. & 105.], on the second book of the *Sentences*, dist. 7 [Secundo sententiarum. di. 7.], in *De*

potentia q. 6, art. 6 [Pot. q. 6. ar. 6.], and in *De malo* q. 16, art. 9, 10 and 11 [Ma. q. 16. ar. 9. 10. & 11.]. With him all the sacred theologians agree in the same distinction 7 of the second book of the *Sentences*.^c

[Margin: ^c De hoc, si lubet, vide late in decisio. capellæ Tholosanæ. q. 380. incip. Quidā ata- tus [?]. per totū. — On this, if you please, see at length the *Decisiones capellæ Tholosanæ*, q. 380, beginning "Quidam ata...tus [?]", throughout.]

For this reason, too, the Church lays down *maleficium* as a special impediment to marriage — one brought about only by these arts, through the intervention of diabolical power. Saint Thomas treats of this at length on the fourth book of the *Sentences*, dist. 34 [in. 4. d. 34.], together with the other theologians there. The canon laws likewise, as has been partly shown, condemn such works as most unspeakable: they promulgate or threaten the sentence of excommunication and various other penalties against those who commit them, as is plain above all from 26. q. throughout [26. q. per totum], and wherever divinations and sorceries [sortilegijs] are specifically treated. The civil laws also rage in many ways against *malefici* and *mathematici* [mathe.], as is plain above all from the title C. de malefi. & mathe., which promulgates the gravest penalties against them. If these most unspeakable works were not really done, but only by delusion, the laws against them would have been promulgated in vain; and on the authors of those laws — indeed on God himself — this vanity would be turned back — which is the extreme of blasphemy. Moreover, the effects themselves, which we see and suffer day by day, demonstrate that the *maleficia* performed in our own times by diabolical persons of both sexes [promiscui sexus] — who are often the more powerful in these crimes the baser their station — do not happen in dreams or in the imagination. And this most grievous plague grows with such a flood [illuione] that the Church has been in a manner compelled to establish new laws against such persons. Hence Innocent VIII [Inno. viij.], writing to the Inquisitors of Germany [Alemaniae], and also Julius II [Iulius. ij.], writing to the Inquisitor of Bergamo [Bergomensi], decreed as the following words of the same Innocent declare:

"It has come to our hearing that very many persons of both sexes, unmindful of their own salvation and straying from the Catholic faith, abuse themselves with demons, *incubi* and *succubi*; and by their incantations, spells and conjurations, and other unspeakable superstitions, sorceries [sortilegijs], excesses, crimes and offences, cause and procure that the offspring of women, the young of animals, the fruits of the earth, the grapes of the vines and the fruit of the trees — and also men, women, beasts of burden, flocks, herds and other animals of various kinds, as well as vineyards, orchards, meadows, pastures, standing corn, grain and the other produce of the earth — perish, are choked and are destroyed. They afflict and torment these same men, women, beasts of burden, flocks and herds with dire pains and torments, both inward and outward; they hinder the same men from begetting and the women from conceiving, and husbands from rendering the conjugal act to their wives and wives to their

husbands. Moreover, with sacrilegious mouth they deny the very faith they received in the reception of holy baptism, and at the instigation of the enemy of the human race they do not fear to commit and perpetrate a great many other unspeakable acts, excesses and crimes, to the peril of their own souls, the offence of the divine majesty, and the pernicious example and scandal of very many.”

And a little later: “We therefore, wishing to remove from the midst any impediments whatever by which the execution of the office of these Inquisitors might in any way be delayed, and to provide by timely remedies, as our office requires, lest the stain of heretical depravity [*haereticæ prauitatis*] and of other such excesses spread its poisons to the ruin of other innocent people — the zeal of faith most especially impelling us to this — so that it may not happen on this account that the provinces, cities, dioceses, lands and places named above in those parts of Upper Germany [*Alamaniae superioris*] are deprived of the due office of the Inquisition — that it is lawful for the same Inquisitors to exercise this office of inquisition in them, and that they must be admitted to the correction, imprisonment and punishment of the same persons for the excesses named above and crimes, in all things and through all things exactly as if the provinces, cities, dioceses, lands and places, and the persons and excesses of this kind, had been expressly named, one by one and specifically, in the letters — this, by apostolic authority, by the tenor of these presents, we decree [*statuimus*], etc.”

From all these things the proposition is plain: these things are not done by these most wicked persons by way of delusion, nor do they befall them in dreams; otherwise these laws would be laughable. It is also plain from the apostolic determination already cited that it belongs to the office of the Inquisition to proceed against such persons. For although the letter is addressed to the Inquisitors of Germany, it extends to the others no less than the decretals set in the body of law [*in corpore iuris*] — some of which are addressed to individual persons, and yet whatever is commanded, forbidden or in any way ordained in them is observed as law by all (di. 19. *Si Romanorum* [di. 19. *Si Romanorū*]). The same is plain from the provision concerning the authority of the office of the Inquisition promulgated in c. *Ut officium*, de haereti. in vj. [in c. *Vt officium*. de hæreti. in vj.], which extends to all Inquisitors without qualification, even though that letter was addressed only to the Inquisitors of one determinate province. That this province was named beforehand in the same apostolic letter is indicated by the words of §. j., where it says: “We command that everywhere in the province named above,” etc.

ADDITIO. But note that one might answer this as follows: the provision of the said c. *Ut officium* must be observed as law by all Inquisitors precisely because it is found set down in the volume of law [*in uolumine iuris redacta*]. So the gloss expressly says on l. ij., where Bar. and the doctors follow it, C. de legi.. The case seems otherwise with this constitution, which is found outside the body of law. The notes of Paul. de Cas. on l. j., ff. de consti. princ. [per

Paul. de Cas. in l. j. ff. de consti. princ.] bear this out: he holds that a prince's letter has the force of general law only when it is enclosed in the body of law. Decius follows this on the rubric, Extra de rescri., col. ij. [in rubri. extra de rescri. col. ij.]; and it is the mind of Bart. on §. fi., in j., consti. cod., and on the said l. j. [in §. fi. in j. consti. cod. & in d. l. j.], where Albe. also agrees. Hostien. says the same in a similar case on the Authentica *Cum super*, de sepul. [in aut. cum super. de sepul.], whom Fely. and Dec. follow on c. j., col. iiij., de consti. [in c. j. col. iiij. de consti.]. And in this way one must interpret the saying of Angel. on l. *Item veniunt*, §. *Caeterum*, de peti. haere. [in l. item ueniunt. §. caeterum. de peti. haere.], where he holds that a letter of a prince who has the power of making law must be observed as law in similar cases; Barb. follows this on c. j., col. ij., de proba. [in c. j. col. ij. de proba.], where Fely., col. v., also agrees — for it holds when the letter has been set down in the body of law — although Ias. has doubts about this on l. *Civitas*, col. iiij., ff. si cer. pet. [in l. ciuitas. col. iiij. ff. si cer. pet.].

I think, nevertheless, that on the strength of these arguments one should not depart from the opinion of this Reverend Father. For it must be considered that before this constitution of Innocent VIII the Inquisitors of heretical depravity already had power over *malefici* and superstitious persons of this kind, because such things manifestly savour of heresy — as the gloss notes on c. *Accusatus*, §. *Sane*, de haereti. in vj. [in c. accusatus. §. sane, de haereti. in vj.] — and of apostasy, which is a species of heresy, as Inn. notes on c. j., de aposta. [in c. j. de aposta.]. And this is why Innocent VIII himself presupposes that the Inquisitors have this power, as the Reverend Father already mentioned elegantly proves immediately below. Hence it follows that this constitution is a declaration of the ancient law, and does not introduce any new law. This is also plain from the fact that it was issued in response to a consultation from the Inquisitors of Germany — in which case the

Pope is not held to make new law, but to declare the ancient law [Papa nouum ius condere, sed antiquum declarare] — as the gloss notes on c. *Consultationi*, de tempo. ord. [glo. no. in c. Consultationi. de tempo. ord.], and on c. *Ex tua*, de fil. presby. [in c. Ex tua. de fil. presby.]. Abb. follows it on c. fi., col. ij., de re iud. [in c. fi. col. ij. de re iud.], with similar passages [cum si.], as consti. [?] teaches in his *Singularia*, at the word *consultatio* [ut consti. tradit in sing. suis in uer. consultatio.]; and so does Fely. on the said c. j., col. iiij. [in d. c. j. col. iiij.]. It follows, therefore, that a declaration of the common law of this kind makes general law, even though the words are addressed to the Inquisitors of Germany [Alemaniae], as Fel. and Decius expressly teach on the said c. j., col. iiij., de consti. [in d. c. j. col. iiij. de consti.].

Nor does the word *Statuimus* ("we decree"), placed in the said constitution, stand in the way — although it is of its nature to introduce new law (cle. fi., with the gloss, de rescri. [cle. fi. cum gl. de rescri.], and Bar. teaches the same on c. ij., col. ij., de re iudi. [in c. ij. col. ij. de re iudi.]) — because it must be taken according to the subject matter, as Abb. and Mod. teach on the said c. ij.

[ut Abb. & Mod. tradunt in d. c. ij.]. The foregoing is confirmed as follows. When the Pope is consulted about a case or question pending at the time, then even if he answers in other words that indicate new law, he is nevertheless held to declare the ancient law, not to make new law; for it is of the nature of new law that it refers to future cases (c. fin., de consti. [c. fin. de consti.]). Decius expressly declares this on c. *Pastoralis*, col. ij., de excep. [in c. *pastoralis* col. ij. de excep.], and in support of it I cite the good gloss on c. fi., at the word *respondemus*, de verb. sig. in vj. [in c. fi. in uer. respondemus. de uerb. sig. in vj.].

Beyond this, a second argument might perhaps be attempted [secundo forte attentari posset]: granted that that constitution of Inno. viij. did contain new law, it would still have to be extended to the other Inquisitors. For its immediate cause was not a particular affection for those Inquisitors of Germany, but zeal for the faith and for the office of the Inquisition, as is expressly stated in it; and that cause certainly holds good for the other Inquisitors too, as no one will deny. Hence the provision must also be extended to the others, by what is noted on l. *Non solum*, ff. de integ. rest. [per no. in l. non solum. ff. de integ. rest.], by way of declaration, as Bar. holds on l. j., col. j., de consti. prin. [ut per Bar. in l. j. col. j. de consti. prin.], and Decius on *In omnibus causis id*, col. ij., de reg. iur. [in oībus causis id. col. ij. de reg. iur.]. The first answer, however, is the safer.

But in particular, the same letter of Innocent shows that those Inquisitors to whom he addresses the letter by name — or at whose instance and on whose account he issued it — could proceed against such persons even by virtue of their own office; and consequently that this is common to all Inquisitors on whom the same authority is conferred. For he rebukes the clergy of those cities in which those fathers were Inquisitors, because, wishing to be wiser than they ought, they sought to put obstacles in the way of the Inquisitors, so that they could not make inquisition against the above-mentioned *maleficae* persons [personas maleficas]. For after the words we quoted above — some others, however, intervening — the Pontiff says there: "Nevertheless certain clerics and laymen of those parts, seeking to be wiser than they ought — that because in the letters of deputation these provinces, cities, dioceses, lands and other places named above, and their persons and excesses of this kind, were not expressly named one by one and specifically, those things are not at all contained under the same parts; and that therefore the said Inquisitors may not exercise this office of inquisition in the provinces, cities, dioceses, lands and places named above, and must not be admitted to the punishment, imprisonment and correction of those persons for the excesses and crimes mentioned above — all this they stubbornly are not ashamed to assert [asserere non erubescunt]." "On this account, in the provinces, cities, dioceses, lands and places named above, excesses and crimes of this kind remain unpunished, not without the evident loss of those souls and the forfeiting of their eternal salvation. We therefore, etc."

See how sharply the Pontiff rebukes those who were putting obstacles in the Inquisitors' way to keep them from proceeding against such persons. The supreme Pontiff would certainly not have done this unless such people were blameworthy.^e Nor would these obstructors [impeditores] have deserved that rebuke at all, unless the Inquisitors had been able to exercise their office against such persons by the apostolic authority conferred in common on the office of the Inquisition.

[Margin: ^e Quia culpa non cadit in his quæ nō possunt, vel non debēt fieri, vt patet ex no. p Bar. ī l. quod nerua. ff. de posi. & Salyc. in l. si nullā. C. de pig. act. p doct. in c. culpa caret. de reg. iur. — For there is no fault in things that cannot or ought not to be done, as is plain from what Bar. notes on l. *Quod Nerva*, ff. de posi., and Salyc. on l. *Si nullam*, C. de pig. act., and from the doctors on c. *Culpa caret*, de reg. iur.]

This is also confirmed by other things contained in the same letter. For after the passage quoted and some others, it says this: "And for greater caution," and further on: "...and that they may be able to correct, imprison, punish and fine those persons whom they find guilty in the foregoing, according to their deserts; and also to set forth and preach the word of God to the faithful people in each of the parish churches of such provinces, as often as it is expedient and seems good to them; and to do and likewise to carry out, freely and lawfully, each and every other thing necessary and opportune in the foregoing and concerning it — We grant them anew [de nouo]^f, by the same authority, full and free faculty." Thus far the letter [hæc ibi]. For in the matter at hand, note what is said: *anew*. So even before this, by their own ordinary jurisdiction, the Inquisitors already had this same faculty against such persons [Iam enim igitur ex sua ordinaria iurisdictione prius eandem facultatem Inquisitores habebant cōtra tales personas].

[Margin: ^f Huiusmodi enim dictio, de nouo, nil aliud ibi videtur importare, quā denuo, vt patet cuilibet diligenter cōsiderāti verba Pōtificis, cum his quæ proxime dicta sunt. — For the expression *de novo* seems to import nothing else there than "once again" [denuo], as is plain to anyone who carefully considers the Pontiff's words together with what has just been said.]

And what removes every scruple on this point is that the said letter to the Inquisitors of Germany was, for the greater part of its tenor, confirmed and addressed by Julius II of happy memory [per felicis Recor. Iulium. ij.] to Master Georgius de Casali [Giorgio da Casale] of good memory, formerly Inquisitor of Cremona; and in the end the same provisions are extended to all the Inquisitors of the Congregation of Lombardy of the Order of Preachers [congregationis Lombardiæ ord. prædicatorum] by an apostolic letter of Adrian VI of happy memory [Adriani. vj.]. Its tenor is as follows.

Adrianus Papa. VI.

Beloved son, greeting and apostolic benediction. Some time ago, as you have caused to be set forth to us, Julius [Iulium Papā. iii.], our predecessor of happy memory, learned — not without great displeasure of mind at the

time — that through a certain Georgius de Casali, a professed member of the Order of Friars Preachers, deputed Inquisitor of heretical depravity in the city of Cremona, there had been found in several parts of Lombardy, and especially in the places for which the said Georgius had been deputed Inquisitor, a great many persons of both sexes, unmindful of their own salvation and straying from the Catholic faith, who, forming a certain sect, were denying the faith they had received in the reception of holy baptism, trampling the holy cross underfoot and committing outrages upon it, abusing the sacraments of the Church and especially the Eucharist, taking the devil as their lord and patron and showing him obedience and reverence; who by their incantations, spells [carminibus], sorceries [sortilegiis] and other unspeakable superstitions were harming men, animals and the fruits of the earth in many ways; and who, at the instigation of the same devil, were committing and perpetrating a great many other unspeakable acts, excesses and crimes, to the peril of their souls, the offence of the divine majesty, and the pernicious example and scandal of very many. When (as the said Georgius then asserted) he had proceeded against them in the said places deputed to his inquisition, as his office required, certain persons of those parts, clerics as well as laymen, seeking to be wiser than they ought, rashly presumed to assert that the above-mentioned offences did not pertain to the office of the said Georgius's inquisition. They had sown errors and scandals among the people, and had thus tried to make the same Georgius hateful to the people and to hinder the said Georgius's office, as they were then also hindering it; so that, on account of the foregoing, the above-mentioned persons who perpetrated offences of this kind were remaining unpunished, and others were being led daily by their example to perpetrate the like, to the no small reproach of the faith, the peril of souls, and the scandal of very many.

The said predecessor, therefore, wishing to provide that the execution of the office of the Inquisition should not be delayed in any way, and that the stain of heretical depravity should not spread its poisons further, committed and commanded to the said Georgius, by a certain letter of his in the form of a brief, that in the places deputed to the said Georgius's inquisition he should and might take cognizance of excesses of this kind; exercise and carry out the office of the Inquisition against any persons whatever, of whatever condition and pre-eminence they might be; and correct and punish those persons whom he found guilty in the foregoing — together with the vicars of the local ordinaries, in so far as they wished to be present — according to the deserts of the said persons, in the manner laid down by law and the sacred canons against other heretics, restraining any who opposed him by ecclesiastical censures and the other remedies of law. Those, moreover, who gave counsel, aid or favour in the foregoing, the said predecessor decreed should use and enjoy the same indulgences which those signed with the cross against other heretics [cruce signati contra alios hæreticos] then enjoyed and used by an apostolic indult granted to them, as is said to be contained more fully in the said letter.

And, as the same exposition went on to add, offences and crimes of this kind against the Catholic faith and the Christian religion are committed and perpetrated not only under the jurisdiction of the Inquisitor of Cremona, but are perpetrated and committed daily in all the other places and dioceses under the jurisdiction of the other Inquisitors of the said Order of the Congregation of Lombardy. And since the offences are the same, provision must surely be made against them by the same provision and chastisement, according to the tenor of the same letter.

Accordingly you, who, as you assert, are deputed Inquisitor of the said depravity in the city of Como [in ciuitate Comensi], have humbly petitioned us — in your own name and in the names of all the other Inquisitors of heretical depravity of the said Order and Congregation, wherever they reside and are deputed — that we would deign to extend and enlarge the above-mentioned letter to you, and otherwise to make suitable provision in the matter. We therefore, inclined to these petitions, by apostolic authority and by the tenor of these presents extend the above-mentioned letter, with all the clauses contained in it, in all things and through all things, as is contained in the same letter, to you and to the other Inquisitors of such Order and Congregation, both those deputed at present and those to be deputed in the future for all time to come, as if it were addressed and had been addressed to you and to each of the said Inquisitors; and we grant the same letter to you and to them, as stated above, by the same authority and tenor — notwithstanding all those things which the same Julius our predecessor willed should not stand in the way in the said letter, and anything else to the contrary whatever.

And since it would be difficult to carry the present letter to each of the places where proof of it might perhaps need to be given, we will and decree by apostolic authority that transcripts of it [transumptis], subscribed by the hand of any notary public and fortified with the seal of some ecclesiastical court or of a person constituted in ecclesiastical dignity, shall be given exactly the same credence in court and elsewhere, wherever needed, as would be given to these presents themselves if they were exhibited or shown. Given at Rome at Saint Peter's under the Fisherman's ring, 1523 July 20 [Die. 20. Iulii. 1523.], in the first year of our pontificate. Evangelista [Euangelista].

On the back, moreover [Atergo vero]:

To our beloved son Modesto Vicentino [Modesto da Vicenza], of the Order of Preachers.

There is, in addition, an apostolic brief addressed to the Lord Governor of Bon. [Domino Gubernatori Bon.]⁶, the Lord Altobello, Bishop of Pola [Episcopo Polensi], obtained by the Reverend Father in Christ Fra Hieronymus Faventinus [Girolamo da Faenza] of the Order of Preachers, Inquisitor of Parma, in the year of the Lord 1524, January 18 [anno Domini. 1524. 18. Ian.], from the present Supreme Pontiff Clement VII [Clemente. vii.]. In it he makes

⁶presumably Bologna (Bononia); the page abbreviates

mention of the heresy of *strigatus* [de hæresi strigatus], instructing the said Lord Governor to give the said Inquisitor every favour against certain persons infected [in-fectos] with the said heresy. The brief begins: "Accepimus non sine animi," etc. [Accepimus non sine animi &c.]

Now our most holy Lord would not have related this, nor ordered such things, if such persons — namely the *striges* who are judged heretics — were not truly heretics; or if the things done through them, on account of which they are judged heretics, were merely illusions of the devil. All these measures, indeed, were established and the matter committed to the judgement of the Inquisitors of heretical depravity for no other reason than this: that such malignant persons, through these works that exceed the capacity of human power, show that they have an express pact with the devil [pactum expressum ... cum diabolo], and consequently have apostatized from the Catholic faith. So says the divine Augustine (26. q. 7. c. Non obseruetis [26. q.7.c. Non obseruetis.]); so too the divine Thomas on the second book of the *Sentences*, dist. 7, last article [2.sententiarum.di.7.art. vlt.], and all the theological doctors follow him on that distinction. On Isaiah, chapter 3 [super Isa.c.3.], the divine Thomas repeats the same point, adducing the divine Augustine as well, as he does elsewhere too, where he teaches this very thing.

Now from this express pact made with the demon — a pact that savours of apostasy from the faith, which is reduced to heresy, as is plain from Saint Thomas (2. 2. q. 12. ar. 2, in the argument made to the contrary [S.Tho.2.2.q.12.ar.2.in argu.facto in contrarium]) — such sorcerous and divinatory works [sortilega & diuinatoria opera] of *malefici* [maleficorum] are said manifestly to savour of heresy. And the Inquisitors are to proceed against such perpetrators of these works, as is plain in the chapter *Accusatus, de haereticis*, in the Sext [c. Accusatus. de hæret. in vj.], and from the gloss and the doctors there, at the word *saperent*.

This very point, then — namely that the Inquisitors of heretical depravity can and ought to proceed against the *malefici* already mentioned [maleficos] — I have no intention of proving in any other way. I leave it as manifest, both from what has now been said and from many other things that can readily occur to anyone of even moderate learning.

What the principal intention of this work is, and how many things are to be specially set out in it. Cap. IIII.

Our principal intention in this question, however, is to show that the things said to be done by the *striges* [strigibus] are for the most part true; and that for the rest they are to be judged true only in the way the condition of things permits, as will be set out more fully below. And so what the Inquisitors do against such most impious persons proceeds fittingly and according to the laws. Nevertheless, the opinion of the common people, and even of some learned men — who are shown, however, to be without experience in sacred theology, and for that reason flatly deny everything described above that pertains chiefly to the impiety of the *striges* [strigum] — although it is empty and irrational in many respects, still rests on the truth in some. For of the things said to be

done, or seen, bodily by the *striges*, some are not true in the way the *striges* themselves suppose, as we shall show below. But since the principal intention of this labour we have taken up is to show how these things, being true or false, accord with the Catholic faith or depart from it — and so whether such things do or do not belong to the judgement of the Inquisitors — we shall prove three things principally in this question. First, that the things these persons assert are not contrary to sacred Scripture, but are rather possible according to it; indeed, some things like them are shown in the sacred writings to have happened. Second, we shall also deduce from the sacred writings that all these things, in the manner related, cannot occur merely in dreams. Third, we shall prove that all must believe, and in no way doubt, that these things have happened in the manner the Inquisitors assert. At the end of the question we shall resolve the arguments brought forward earlier for the opposite side, showing in the solution of the first how the determination of the question given above is not opposed to the determination of the council *Acquirense* [concilii Acquirensis], nor to the chapter *Episcopi* already mentioned [cap. Episcopi.] — rather, it agrees with them.

As to the first thing we intend to prove, it must be understood that there are three marvellous things which the *striges* [strigibus] principally assert are done through them, and which some disbelieve, as being either impossible to the power of demons or not done, nor to be done, because divine prohibition forbids it. And there are three other, accessory things, likewise not believed by the persons just mentioned.

The first principal thing is bodily transport [delatio corporalis] by a demon — whether the demon is invisibly present, or transfigured into the form of some beast or of a man [homine] — even across long distances, as is asserted. Accessory to this is to eat, to drink, to dance [corrizare], and to enjoy pleasures of every kind; truly and bodily to serve or attend upon the demon appearing in the form of a great prince; and to show contempt in manifold ways, in his presence, for the Catholic faith and for sacred things. The second principal thing is the appearance of demons in human or even in bestial form, and the performance of the venereal act with them in different ways according to the apparent difference of sex. Accessory to it is everything else said to be accomplished by the demons when present in such a form: for example, the restoring of foods or drinks that have been consumed, and the apparent raising to life of some animal that has been killed and eaten. The third principal thing is the apparent conversion of men and women into cats [catos]. Accessory to it is the preying upon children [strigatio puerorum].

Yet all these things, and others like them (though some of them must be understood in a sound sense), are either contained expressly in the sacred writings, or are deduced from them most plainly, or at the very least are not opposed to them.

That men can be carried by demons to distant regions of the earth, and likewise that the things accessory to this act do not contradict the sacred writings, but rather agree with them. Cap. V.

To make the first principal thing manifest, together with its accessory, two points must be presupposed from the teaching of all the theologians [Theologorum om-] [nium.] The first is that, as regards local motion, the matter of corporeal things obeys the angels, the evil as well as the good, at their bidding [ad nutum]. Augustine lays this down first, virtually, in *De Trinitate* 3 [ab Augu. in 3. de Trin. virtualiter]. If you perhaps want a full proof of this truth, see the holy Doctor: 1. q. 110. ar. 2 & 3; *De potentia* q. 6. ar. 3 [Poten. q. 6. ar. 3.]; *De malo* q. 16. ar. 10 [Ma. q. 16. ar. 10.]; *Quodlibet* 9. art. 5 [Quodlibet 9. art. 5.].

The second is that in the demons their natural endowments [naturalia] have remained most splendid, and in their first perfection. The prince of the theologians, Dionysius, teaches this in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names* [Dion. 4. ca. de diui. no.]. On this point see the divine Thomas, 1. q. 64. ar. 1; 2. d. 7. quæstio. 2. ar. 1; and at length in the *Questions on Demons* [in quæstionibus de dæmonibus].

From these two points it is manifestly concluded that angels, good and evil alike, can carry men bodily from place to place without any difficulty. This is confirmed also by what we know through philosophy about the motion of the heavens. For those who can move the heavens — as in fact the angels do move them, even according to the philosophers, and still more according to the sacred theologians — will be able to transfer a man from one place at pleasure to any distant place whatever. The malign spirits, it is true, cannot move the heavens; not, however, from any defect of natural power, but through their own fault, as Saint Thomas says (*De malo* q. 16. ar. 10 [Ma. q. 16. ar. 10.]). According to the sacred theologians, moreover, any angel could cast even the greatest mountains into the ocean, if God permitted it. Why then will the demons — who are equal to the good angels in natural endowments, and many of whom are superior to many of the angels — not be able to transfer even mountains, and much more men, from place to place with all ease?

That this has in fact happened at times, both with good and with evil angels, has example and testimony in the sacred writings. An example concerning the good angels we have in Dan. 15 [Dan. 15.], of the angel who took the prophet Habakkuk [Abachuc] by the hair of his head, carried him from Judaea into Babylon in a short space of time, and likewise brought him back from there. As regards the evil angels, we have Matth. 4, of the devil, who took up the Lord Jesus [D. Iesum] and set him on the pinnacle of the temple, and from there took him up again and brought him onto a high mountain — the Lord himself permitting it for the devil's greater confusion, since he went away defeated in everything. We also have testimony from the sacred writings concerning the power of the devil, in Job. 41, where the Lord says that there is no power on earth that can be compared with him. How great that power is appeared above all in what he did against the holy man Job himself in an almost imperceptible

time. There is thus no reason why all the demons could not, with equal power, do what is less — namely carry human bodies from place to place, even to a distant one.⁹ Hence, if dromedaries [Dromedarij] can carry men swiftly, as is commonly said, much more can the demons [dæmo-]

[Margin: ⁹ Ad hec faciunt quæ habentur in regu. cui licet. quod est minus de re. iu. in 6. vbi late p moder. ff. eo. ti. — Relevant to these points is what is found in the rule *Cui licet ... quod est minus* [cui licet. quod est minus]⁷, *de regulis iuris* in the Sext [in 6.], where the moderns treat it at length; Digest, same title [ff. eo. ti.].]

do so: the least of them could accomplish such a thing more swiftly and more strongly than a thousand thousand dromedaries together [mille millia Dromedarij simul]. For what is not a body suffers no weariness or fatigue.

That the good angels are of no lesser power, reason persuades; and the histories of the overthrow of the five cities in the valley of the Dead Sea (Gen. 19) and of the slaughter of Sennacherib's army (Isa. 37) show it most plainly. The same thing can be confirmed from the authentic history of Saint James the Apostle [sancti Iacobi Apostoli], celebrated by the whole Church, in which, at that Apostle's command, a demon brought the magician Hermogenes [Hermogenem magum], bound, from his own house through the air [per aerea] to the house of blessed James. We also read of Saint Ambrose that he was carried by a demon from Milan to Rome in the space of three hours, at the bidding of the holy man himself, and was brought back to Milan by the same demon, so that the power of the saints over the demons might thereby be made manifest.

Concerning the carrying of men through the air by demons by the power of the magic art, the true history of Saint Peter the Apostle also offers the best testimony, together with what is read in the *Itinerary* of Saint Clement [in *Itinerario sancti Clementis*]: of that most wicked man Simon Magus [Simone mago], who had himself carried visibly by demons through the air, as if he were ascending into heaven. Paul by his prayers, and Peter by a command given to the demons, dashed him to the ground, and he died with his whole body broken.

The uniform testimony of the necromancers [nicromantum] confirms the same, together with Avicenna in his book *On Necromancy* [Auic. in lib. de Nicromantia], as Agostino Nifo [Augu. Nyphus] relates in his commentary on the third disputation, doubt 18 [in Comen. suo super tertia dispu. dubij. 18.]. I pass over the very many things of this kind that are narrated in the *Malleus maleficarum* [in malleo maleficarum]; for it is enough that through these the point proposed has been made manifestly known.

To say, moreover, that God does not permit these things in the case of the *striges* [strigibus] is to speak without reason, since God has permitted far greater evils when the malice of those who do not fear him so required — such as the irreparable fall of the angels, and the deadly ruin of our first parents, indeed of

⁷the page abbreviates the incipit; the rule of law in full is *Cui licet quod est plus, licet utique quod est minus*

the whole human race. For the judgements of God are inscrutable; and we must confess that God permits whatever is proved to happen by faithful testimony — above all that of the holy Scriptures,^h of wise men, and of a multitude of sworn witnesses not lacking in their senses.

Once the principal point stands, the accessory is already evident of itself. For men so carried can enter houses, the doors or windows having been opened beforehand by the demon; they can take the food prepared by him and enjoy delights just as others do who are awake; and the same must be said of the acts that follow. By the work of the demons, too, sleep can be deepened in those who belong to such a house while they sleep — through a dissolution caused in them of the vapours rising to the brain, or through any other bodily disposition — so that meanwhile they do not hear the sounds or noises arising from the motions described above.⁸ They can also [Possunt etiam obsta-]

[Margin: ^h Quandoquidē ab huiusmodi exemplis sacrae scripturae argumentū sumi posse nemo ibit inficias. Vt patet ex no. per glo. & Gem. in ca. fi. 20 dist. Et abb. in c. Afferte. in 1. no. de praesump. — Since no one will deny that an argument can be drawn from examples of this kind in sacred Scripture. As is plain from what is noted by the gloss and Gem.⁹ on c. fi. (20 dist.), and by the Abbot [abb.] on c. *Afferte*, at the first notabile, *de praesumptionibus* [in 1. no. de praesump.].]

place some obstacle [obsta-culum aliquod apponere] before the eyes and ears of those who are awake, which is nevertheless not perceived by those standing by. That the demons can bring about these things, and very many like them, is clear to those practised in sacred Scripture and theology; and they are easily deduced from the second presupposition.

Now since such persons are diabolical — having, that is, pacts of faithless friendship with the demons, according to the divine Augustine in *De doctrina Christiana* 2 [in 2. de doct. Christiana], which is also recorded by the lord Gratian (26. q. 2. Illud [26.q.2.Illud.]) — and are consequently apostates from the faith, as the same Augustine says (ca. 3 [ca. 3.]) and as the theologians confirm, as was brought forward above, it is no wonder that, being thus awake and in the company of demons who also appear there in human shape, they deny the faith and their baptism, and trample the cross with their feet or even with their buttocks. They heap abuse of various kinds on the most holy body of our Lord Jesus Christ in the sacrament of the altar, which they have carried there themselves; they do homage to the devil with their soul and body, and sometimes with those of their children; they promise to prey upon children [strigare pueros], and strive with all desire and zeal to accomplish it. All these things stand to the premises as effect to cause, by probable consequence; so if they are proved true by the testimony of very many, they are not to be denied. And there are innumerable trials [processus] of the Inquisitors conducted against

⁸the page closes this sentence with a question mark, "...ex praedictis motibus?"

⁹presumably the canonist Geminianus, Domenico da San Gimignano; the page abbreviates

such persons, who confessed under oath that they had perpetrated such things bodily many times. It is plain, therefore, that they are beyond all doubt to be believed.

That demons can appear to men in human form, and also in the form of a brute animal; and that they offer themselves to them as incubi and succubi. Cap. 6

The second principal thing concerning the first part of the question — namely that demons can appear in human or even in bestial form — also has examples and testimonies from sacred Scripture. To set this out, however, one thing must be presupposed. It follows easily from the second presupposition made above for the first principal thing, and we have already used it earlier: namely, that whatever is said to be possible for the good angels with respect to natural power is possible naturally for the evil ones too. For their natural endowments [naturalia] remained most splendid in them after their fault, according to Dionysius [Diony.], as was brought forward above.

[Margin: Cap. 5. — see Chapter 5]

[Margin: Cap. 5. — see Chapter 5]

Now it is plain from sacred Scripture that the good angels can assume aerial bodies and condense them so that they appear human. This is plain in Judges 13 [Iudicum 13.], of the angel who appeared to Manoah [Manuæ] in the form of a young man, speaking and foretelling the birth of Samson, judge of Israel. For from what is said there — "There appeared to him a man exceedingly terrible" [Apparuit ei vir terribilis nimis] — and from the fact that he spoke with them, and that Manoah himself offered him food, it is plain expressly that he appeared to him in human form. The same is shown still more evidently in the angel Raphael, of whom it is said in Tobit, chapter 5 [Tobiæ cap. 5]: "Tobias went out and found a splendid young man standing girded, and as it were ready to walk; and not knowing that he was an angel of God, he greeted him," etc. And in chapter 9 of the same book it is said: "Tobias called the angel, whom indeed he thought to be a man," etc. Nor was it surprising that he thought so, since the angel not only presented a human shape but also seemed to perform all human actions, as is plain in that story; and the angel himself testifies to it in the same place, chapter 12 [ibid. c. 12.], saying: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible food," etc.

From all these passages it is plain that the angels appeared to the holy fathers in the shape of a human body, and that the things which looked like human bodies were nevertheless aerial. This is made manifest by the fact that they suddenly vanished from the eyes of the bystanders and were dissolved into the pre-existing matter — which could not have happened had they been compacted out of any other element, or even out of several. The same is confirmed in the appearance of the two angels whom Lot received as guests (Gen. 19), and of those who appeared to Abraham [Abraam] (Gen. 18); and the same is plain in the other books of sacred Scripture, and most often of all in the New Testament.

We do not read, however, that the good angels assumed bodies in the likeness of beasts — nor was it fitting. We do read that they moved the bodies of beasts to perform things above their nature, as is plain from Balaam's ass (Num. 22), whose tongue a good angel moved to speak, as the more eminent doctors explain and Saint Thomas confirms (2. d. 8. ar. 3 [2.d.8.ar.3.]). But no one has grounds to deny [habet nullus negare] that the evil angels can form out of air, in the likeness of beasts, bodies which they may assume. If, as has been shown, they can form such bodies as bear the likeness of a man, just as the good angels can — which is believed to have been done by the demon who tempted Christ our Lord.¹⁰ For the greater difficulty lies in this act, so far as concerns the thing produced, since a human body requires more organs and more dispositions for its operations than any bestial body, as is plain to the senses; the very dignity of man above the other animals demands this. Moreover, on the testimony of the Apostle (2 Cor. 11), he transfigures himself into an angel of light; how much more, then, can he transform himself into the appearance of the vilest animals. The histories of the saints — of Anthony [Antonii], Margaret [Margaritæ], Catherine of Siena [Catherinæ Senensis], and very many others — confirm this expressly, so that to deny it would now be a mark of great impudence.

That demons have also for a time bodily inhabited real animals, sacred Scripture discloses: both in the serpent (Gen. 3), in which the demon also performed the works of life proper to men, such as speaking, and in the herd of swine (Matth. 8). That they also inhabit and seize [arripant] men, sacred Scripture likewise teaches us, since we read many times in the Gospel that our Lord freed men from demons. Through the mouths of such possessed persons [arreptitiorum] the demons even confessed the Lord Jesus to be the Christ; and he, rebuking them, did not allow them — the demons, that is — to speak. Daily experience with the multitude of the possessed proves the very same thing. For their deliverance, and for the expulsion of the demons themselves from men's bodies, holy mother Church has established a determinate order of clerics, the exorcists, as is plain from 21. dist. c. Cleros and 25. dist. c. Perlectis [21.dist.c.Cleros. & 25.dist.c.Perlectis], so that no room now remains for denying it.

These things, however, are less to the purpose of the question. They have been said only so that the power of the demon may be known from them — namely in transfiguring himself, without difficulty, into a human as well as a bestial shape, since matter obeys him at his bidding [ad nutum] as regards local motion, as has been said; and in this, that he can even move all of a man's limbs at will against that man's will and freedom.

[Margin: Cap. 5. — see Chapter 5]

That demons are also incubi, or succubi — which is likewise contained in this second principal thing — although no example of it is found in sacred Scripture, nor any express authority, all the doctors of theology nevertheless

¹⁰the Latin sentence stops here without an expressed main clause.

assert that such [beings] exist, or are to be found [tales esse dariue asserunt]. They do so above all when, expounding the text of Gen. 6, "The sons of God, seeing the daughters of men," etc., they reject the opinion of those who say that the sons of God by whom the giants were begotten were incubus demons. For Augustine says, on *Genesis ad litteram* and in *De civitate Dei* 15, c. 23 [super Gen. ad litterā, & 15. de ciui. Dei. c. 23.], that these were not demons. For demons cannot be called sons of God, since they are his enemies; nor is that passage of Scripture understood of incubus demons, although a certain gloss there affirms it, together with Josephus [Iosepho]. It is understood rather of the sons of Seth, as Saint Thomas says (2. d. 5. ar. 4. ad 2 [2.d,5.ar.4.ad 2.]). Nor does he¹¹ approve Josephus's opinion there; but on the strength both of that opinion and of the sayings of very many others, he approves only that incubus demons exist.

What is said about the sons of Seth is confirmed by Saint Thomas (*De potentia* q. 6. ar. 8. ad 2. in contrarium [Pot. q. 6. ar. 8. ad 2. in contrarium]). And Augustine, in the c. 23 already mentioned, asserts that incubus demons exist, as we shall bring forward below. Gregory [Greg.] also interprets of them the text of Isa. 34, "And the hairy one cried out one to another" [Et pilosus clamabat alter ad alterum], as is plain in the ordinary gloss [glo. ordi.]. Saint Thomas interprets the same words of them there, and also in c. 13, where, near the end of the chapter, those hairy men are likewise introduced. He speaks of them too on Job 40 [super Iob. 40.], in 1. q. 115, and in 2. d. 8, as we said, and in *Quodlibet* 8. ar. 10 [quodlibet 8. ar. 10.]; and so does Isidore, bk. 8, last chapter [li. 8. c. vltimo].

And if incubi are granted, there is nothing unfitting in granting succubi as well. This, moreover, is permitted by the just judgement of God, so that through the greater malice of both — of the man, I mean, and of the demon — they may incur an even greater punishment. Nor is it unfitting that God should permit this in nature, most abominable though it is. For the most seemly order of divine wisdom does not allow free nature always to be prevented by God from obtaining even the object of its own depraved desire — that is, when most impious men have come to such a depth of wretchedness that they have nothing by which to call down upon themselves the mercy of God, who recalls them from evil. For some fall into such madness of carnal concupiscence, and are borne along so insanelly by unbridled lust, that they desire and strive to accomplish such an act even with beasts, indeed sometimes with insensible things. And — what is most abominable even to think — I myself once heard in confession a man lustful beyond anything that could be said, who had said that he would do such things with God (for shame! [prò pudor]) if he could. Weighed down, then, by this insuperable concupiscence, such people deserve by the just judgement of God not to shrink in horror from the most foul encounters of demons, since the demons themselves transfigure themselves into

¹¹the Latin names no subject here; the nearest named is Saint Thomas

the most beautiful forms of men and women in order to capture wretched souls in these snares.

That demons, by their natural power, can recover whatever has been lost or destroyed — not the same in number but the same in species — and not only in appearance but truly. Cap. VII.

The first thing accessory to this principal thing, as regards its first part — namely that demons appearing in human form recover the things that have been eaten, or otherwise consumed, at that diabolical assembly [diabolico illo conuentu] — is plainly not false in every respect, nor impossible. For they can recover them the same in species, though not in number, which is something that lies even within human power. Demons, however, can accomplish this more marvellously than men can. This is inferred from the same presupposition we have always relied on: namely, that corporeal matter obeys the demons at will as regards local motion. In a short interval of time, therefore, demons can carry similar loaves in the basket [in cophino], and similar wine — or even better or worse — into the cask [in vegetem]. The same must be said of other things to eat: they take each item from different places, and only a little from each, so that the shortfall in each is less apparent, while all of it taken together suffices to replace what was consumed.

The other accessory, which is brought in next, must be thought to occur only in a sound sense. For a demon cannot raise an ox, or any other dead thing, to life. That can be done only by divine power, since it is above, indeed contrary to, the course of nature; and that order or course of nature is subject solely to the author of nature, from whose wisdom it both flowed and was established.¹²

The power of a demon, however, is subject to that order, so it cannot alter it. For this reason the theologians say that although corporeal matter obeys the demons at will as regards local motion, it does not obey them as regards the immediate production of a form, or even its eduction from the potency of matter. That would be to overturn the order of nature, by which a thing comes to formed being through various dispositions. On this, see if you please Saint Thomas in the *Questions De malo* (q. 16. ar. 9. [Ma. q. 16. ar. 9.]).

Nor does matter obey them even as regards local motion against the order of nature. So, although as far as their natural strength goes a demon could carry the whole mass of the earth from place to place, notwithstanding its weight, it cannot do so, because the order of nature would thereby be overturned. In that case, lest there be a vacuum in nature, another element would have to enter the earth's place and become the centre of the world, which is contrary to the natural order in the position of the elements. A demon therefore cannot move the whole earth from place to place, as Saint Thomas also says in the place cited above (art. 10. ad 8 [art. 10. ad octauū]) — even though a spiritual creature can move what is greater, namely the heaven, and demons could do the same by

¹²a small raised mark follows "firmatus est" on the page; no side-note answering to it stands on this page.

nature, especially those who fell from the higher orders, although this is now made impossible for them through their guilt, as was brought forward above.

[Margin: Cap. 5.]

Since, then, demons cannot raise an ox, or any animal that is truly dead, or work any other miracles whatever, and yet the *striges* commonly assert that these things are done by the lady or the lord of that most wicked course [cursus] and assembly, it must be that illusions are found in such things. This can come about in many ways.

First, by deceiving the eyes of the onlookers [præstigiando oculos intuentium], through the intervention of some humour, or its descent, or some other impression or stirring of the spirits produced by the imagination upon the sensitive principle — that is, upon the common sense — and upon the organs of the exterior senses as well. The impressions and species left behind by sensible motions, which are preserved in the sensible spirits, descend there together, as is commonly said, and they move the apprehensive principle, so that certain things appear just as if the sensitive principle were at that moment being altered by the external things themselves. This is how dreams occur naturally in those who are asleep, according to the Philosopher in *De somno et vigilia* [in de som. & vig.]. And the same can happen through the work of the devil to the waking as well as to the sleeping, as Saint Thomas says in the place cited above (ar. II [ar. xi.]); and it is plain from the argument often brought forward about the obedience of matter to separate substances as regards local motion. When this delusion occurs, such people seem to see what is not there in truth — say, a thing living or dead, a man or an ox, and so on.

Second, demons can carry off elsewhere the dead ox, or its hides and bones, and put another like it, alive, in its place in the shortest time, in such a way that the bystanders do not notice the change, because certain bodies are interposed between the eyes of the bystanders and the place from which the body of the dead ox itself was taken and to which the other was carried.

Third — and this is certainly possible — the devil deludes those lost persons in the way that a certain *strigonus* [Strigonus] also confessed: namely, when the lady or the lord of that accursed course [cursus illius maledici] (for in different places and regions the devil who appears as its prince presents himself in a different sex) strikes with a rod the hide in which the bones picked out from the eaten flesh have been gathered, at once a demon enters that hide and so raises it and lifts it up in the form of an ox that it appears to the bystanders to have been brought back to life.¹³

Fourth, demons can form a body out of air in the likeness of an ox and, assuming it, display it to the eyes of the bystanders as though it were alive again after being dead.

Fifth, the devil can mass together an aerial body from within, in the form and likeness of flesh, keep it under the hides for as long as he wishes, and afterwards

¹³the page prints *maledici*; rendered "accursed".

withdraw from it and leave it as though dead. This is why the *striges* commonly assert that such oxen, once brought back to life (as it seems to them) and led back to their owners' stalls at the command of the lady or the lord of the course, die within three days, as though they were drying up entirely from wasting hour by hour; and that what seemed to be flesh, once it has been buried, soon dissolves into its underlying matter.

It must not be denied, then, that men who are truly and bodily led to the course are deluded about these things in these ways, or in one of them. Indeed, granting what the *striges* commonly assert, it is thoroughly in accord with reason. The devil, in his supreme pride, rejoices and exults to display his power in this way at such an assembly as though he were God, since he longs to be thought God and so to be worshipped by all. In this deed in particular he desires to put on a likeness of what Saint Germanus did miraculously. We read of Germanus that a poor host had cooked a calf and given it freely as food to him and his household, and that after supper Germanus brought it back to life in this way: he ordered the hide to be spread on the ground and all the bones of the ox [bouis ossa], already taken out, to be laid back upon it. Then, when he had struck the hide with his staff, he at once raised up alive the calf that had been eaten before. The enemy of souls, therefore, wishes to pretend that by his own power he can bring about what that saint truly did by divine power. These things, then, are not to be denied as impossible; rather, if they are believed to have happened commonly, it is without doubt to be believed that they were done in these ways, and permitted by the just judgement of God.

That men and women are not truly changed into the species of any brute animals whatever by the power of demons, but only by delusion. Cap. VIII.

As regards the third principal point — namely, that men may appear in the species of brute animals, into which, however, they are not truly converted — this point likewise takes an example of its truth from Holy Scripture, and from what was said above it is plain that it must be judged not impossible, indeed easy for demons.

To see this, one must know that phantasy [phantasia] is a power of the soul bound to a bodily organ, in which the phantasms are received. The devil can therefore move that organ locally at will, just as he moves other bodily things — above all as regards the humours, and as regards the spirits that serve it, in which the phantasms immediately reside, as was brought forward above.

[Margin: Cap. 7.]

So, although demons cannot immediately imprint new phantasms in it, or new species and likenesses of things, as is plain from Saint Thomas (*De malo* q. 16. ar. 9 [Ma. q. xvi. ar. ix.]), they can nevertheless vary the old ones in many ways — by composing, by dividing, and so by disturbing them — so that it sometimes seems to a person that he bears the shape of a brute animal, and it works, even while awake. And since the affections follow the apprehension, it follows that the things that suit such a brute nature appear to such people to be fitting or useful.

Holy Scripture shows that this actually happened to the great king Nabuchodonosor [Nebuchadnezzar] (Dan. 4 [Dan. 4.]). Cast out from among men, he ate grass like an ox; living a brute's life in the open air in the woods for seven years, his body was drenched with the dew of heaven, since he had lost his human sense and was confused by a brute sense through the disturbance of his phantasy. For it is said in the same place that after the end of the days — the days, that is, in which he had eaten grass like an ox, and so on — his sense was restored to him, and he blessed the Most High, and so on. This correction and punishment of his was inflicted upon him by divine justice through the ministry of an angel, so that he who had been raised above men like a god by the gravest pride of heart should be punished by the vilest abasement, beneath man.

God does not, however, bring about all these things immediately by himself, since he governs all lower things through higher ones [interiora omnia per superiora] [recte: inferiora], as Augustine says in the third book *De Trinitate* [tertio de Tri.], and as Dionysius teaches in the book *De caelesti hierarchia* [in lib. de caele. hier.]; and he governs these weak bodies through the heavenly ones. Effects that befall us here beyond nature, however, come about either immediately through him alone, who alone is the author of universal nature, or through those spirits that exceed our nature, whether they are good or evil. And if what befell the king just mentioned is said to have been brought about by good spirits, it must not be denied that the very same thing, and things like it, can be done by evil spirits as well — if we are to hold that good spirits differ from evil ones only in guilt, and not in natural power, as is plain from what was said above.

[Margin: Cap. 3.]

From this it follows that it is no wonder if, when the phantasy of women has been disturbed by the work of demons, it sometimes seems to them that they bear the nature, species and shape of cats, and their affections and works besides; and that their companions think this very thing of them, and they of their companions, as an innumerable multitude of them confesses. For in that way, and by that capacity, it must be admitted that such things are possible for demons, by which it was also proved above that they can delude the senses of men by illusion [per praestigium].

This delusion can also come about in a particular way if the demon deceives these women by means of an aerial body formed in the likeness of a cat and brought in among them, so that, by interposing an obstacle between their eyes and the true human bodies, he lets them see only that phantastical body.

No one of sound mind, moreover, ought to deny that demons can suck the blood of children through the *striges*, and so prey upon them [strigare] and finally kill them. Yet I do not doubt that delusions often come into these things too, especially as regards the manner in which they are done. For deceived by an illusory or imaginary disturbance and delusion, just as the *striges* think that they are truly cats, so they sometimes judge that they are sucking the blood of

children: the taste, the liquid and the colour of blood present themselves falsely to their taste and sight in just the same way as the brute species itself presents itself to the judgement of the mind. For a demon can insinuate himself through every avenue of the senses, as Saint Thomas also brings forward (*De malo* q. 16. ar. 11, in the first argument made to the contrary [Ma. q. 16. ar. 11. in arg. primo facto in contrarium]).

The demon also sometimes works invisibly in the bodies of children. He causes wasting sicknesses by introducing poisonous or otherwise deadly things, or else by drawing pestilent humours that lie hidden in the veins to the heart, so that the children are at once afflicted with wasting sicknesses that scarcely admit of a cure, while the *striges* think that they have preyed upon them [*strigasse*] by drawing off their blood.

Fascination [*fascinatio*] can also befall children naturally. Through the vehement affection of envy, anger or hatred in these old women and *striges*, their vital spirits are infected, since their imagination and intention are fixed upon this. This infection reaches as far as the eyes, and from them the surrounding air is infected; from that air the body of an infant who is present receives some infection because of its tenderness, in the same way as a new mirror is infected at the gaze of a menstruating woman, as is said in the book *De somno et vigilia* [in lib. de so. & vig.]. So the gloss on the passage in Gal. 3, "Who has bewitched you" [Quis vos fascinavit], and so on, says that some people have burning eyes, so that they infect others by their gaze alone, and children most of all.

It is also possible that, by God's permission or by some hidden fate, the malignity of the demons with whom the old women who are *sortilegae* [vetulæ sortilegæ] have entered into some pact cooperates to this end, as Saint Thomas says (1. q. 67. ar. 4. ad 2 [1. quæstio. 67. ar. 4. ad secundū]). This is also why the malignant old women invoke the great devil for this purpose with the most disordered words, and kiss children in his name in order to destroy them, as we have learned from their lawful confessions. For this reason parents ought to take every care to prevent old women of ill fame or under suspicion from coming near their children, or kissing them, or offering or handing them anything. For the *maleficae* greatly desire this, so that they may infect them and thereby do the demons' bidding.

That it is nevertheless possible, and often in truth, cannot be denied: that the *striges* suck the blood of children, either by themselves with the help of a needle or a fingernail, or through the work of the demon, by opening the veins and making small incisions in vital and tender places. By sucking from these the blood necessary for life, the children gradually dry up and perish. This is affirmed by trustworthy testimony, and above all it is confirmed when, after the apparent cats have gone, drops of blood are found near the children, who from then on are wailing. Nor is it necessary that the incisions made should be visible unless they are searched for rather carefully, since they are very small and can at once be closed up again by the work of the demons.

That *striges* dance through bedrooms, or run about in flight, and do other things of that kind in the manner of cats — as a great many people often relate from what they have seen, and as the *striges* themselves everywhere confess — is not impossible through the work of the devil. It is clear from what has been said above that he also serves them, carrying them faster than a human being's own nature would allow.

That God, best and greatest, permits the very many evils that come about through the striges only by a most wise disposition, and draws many goods out of them. Cap. VIII.

God himself does not prohibit all the things described above — nor even what seems less fitting, the death of innocent children — but permits them by his just judgement. He does so either because of the sins of those who suffer: actual sins if they are adults, original sin if they are infants. Or else (and this happens more often) because of the sins of the parents: for God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children, as regards the evil of punishment, to the third and fourth generation (Exod. 20 [Exo. 20.]). Or else the very great malice of these *maleficae* itself demands this, to heap up their punishments. For it is justly granted to them as a punishment that they should do evil, and carry out [expelant] [recte: expleant] the things they most wickedly desire and which they have promised the demon they would do. In this way no injury seems to be done to the freedom of choice of either the demon or the human being; rather, each thing is disposed by God, whether acting or permitting, according to its own particular nature — and from this, as has been said, they are punished all the more.

By divine judgement, too, these things often happen so that a city or community in which so many and such great crimes reign may be punished in its members. For princes, officials and peoples sometimes take no care to root out such *maleficae*; rather, a great many of them defend these women, and pursue the officials of the faith with words and with deeds. And these evils befall more particularly those who, in whatever way — by themselves or through others, they themselves or their forebears — have had recourse to such diabolical protections, or have pre-sented a slippery path to others by their words.

This too happens, just as those who have devoted their efforts to performing *maleficia*, or to procuring them in any way whatever, incur sorcery-caused illnesses [maleficiales infirmitates] in themselves, or in those who belong to them by any connection or relation whatever. For this surely happens by the just judgement of God, so that by the things through which a person sins, by these he is also tormented, as is said in Wisdom, chapter two [Sapientiae secundo].

God also draws a great many goods out of those evils.

First, because through them the justice of God shines out most of all, both in this world, as is clear from what has just been said, and in the world to come, as the sacred faith teaches.

Second, because the divine wisdom gleams forth from them. For, as we have said, God disposes all things in a most fitting order: he permits nature, which is free, to govern itself by its own choice, and permits both man and demon to obtain their wish even for malice — although he permits them to do harm even less than they would wish.

Third, because the divine goodness is proved most of all in things of this kind. For from the very quarter in which the faith seems, on one side, to be darkened by the vilest reproaches, and the purity of the most holy sacraments to be defiled, from that same quarter the faith itself is made more solid in the minds of the faithful and more strongly reinforced. From these things we know by familiar experience three things which we previously knew by faith alone, although they fall under question among those who wish to measure everything by their own wit.

The first of these is that certain intellectual creatures are to be observed in our regions, surpassing all men beyond comparison in knowledge and power, whom we call demons. The second, which we know because of these malign works, is that these same demons are malign. For by the things we have described we as it were touch with our hands, little by little, that they lead men into innumerable crimes by tricks and frauds. The third is that they pursue the Lord Jesus Christ with the most savage hatred, and afflict good Christians and the innocent above all others with various harms; that they persecute the faith of Christ; and that they contrive, with every contempt, mockery and reproach they can, that the sacraments of the Church may be dishonoured.

From this it becomes manifest to everyone — what is in itself most clear — that the Catholic faith, I say, flourishes in all truth and perfection and leads its worshippers to beatitude, since these spirits, which are malign, attack it with all their strength (as is plain from what has been said and what is still to be said). For demons do not pursue, to the utmost of their power, anything except what is opposed to their own malice and iniquity. So in all things, good as well as evil, that come about by divine disposition or permission, we may find reason to bless and praise God, best and greatest.

That the things commonly reported about the striges cannot happen only in dreams.
Cap. X.

The second principal point that we undertook to establish in this inquiry — namely, that the things reported about the *striges* by common report cannot by any means happen only in dreams — has clear evidence from the sacred Scriptures. For one thing seems to be demonstrated through the sacred Scriptures that is also universally confirmed by familiar experience. It is this, I say: when something appears in dreams, or when certain things are revealed to certain people in an imaginary vision, they are said to see or know such things in such a way that afterwards, when they are fully awake and sound in body, they discern perfectly well that this very thing became known to them not in waking but in dreams, or was revealed in an imaginary vision, and was not received through the exterior senses nor came about under their cognition. In

short, everyone weighs and knows perfectly well the distinction between his own state when he is sound and awake and acts with his bodily senses free, and the state in which he is not awake and does not use his senses, because they are bound by sleep or at any rate impeded by a higher attention. Nor do I think there is anyone who would admit to having experienced the opposite.

So Saint Peter, who was accustomed to imaginary vision and ecstatic contemplation, saw the angel in the prison while he was awake and in clear light, and obeyed him in everything as he gave commands, right up to his free exit from the prison. Although in that state he did not fully discern between waking and the abstraction that imaginary vision requires, nevertheless, once he no longer saw the angel and was restored to natural cognition alone, he knew fully that before, too, he had perceived and done all these things not by imaginary cognition only, but truly and really, through the exterior senses and in deed. So when the angel departed from him he said: "Now I know truly that the Lord has sent his angel, and has delivered me out of the hand of Herod," and so on (Acts 12 [Act. 12.]). In the same book, chapter 10 [c. 10.], he acknowledges that at another time he underwent an ecstasy and that certain things appeared to him which, though they were not true as they appeared, nevertheless truly foretold to him things to come.

The same is plain in the vision of Isaiah, in which he saw the Lord sitting, and so on (Isa. 6 [Isa. 6.]). For it must not be thought that such a prophet was so deceived as to think that he truly and really saw God, or had seen him, sitting on a throne. For God is a spirit (John 4 [Ioan. 4.]), and sitting is a condition of a body. It therefore happened only in this imagination of his, as the holy Doctors commonly expound that passage.

And, to conclude everything in a word: in every passage of sacred Scripture where something is said about dreams and visions, it is always given to be understood that all those to whom such things happened discerned perfectly well the difference between the state of one dreaming, or in any other way abstracted from the senses, and the state of waking itself, as Saint Thomas also testifies (*De potentia* q. 6 ar. 7 [Pot. q. 6 ar. 7.]) — whether they were holy men, like those of whom we have just spoken, and many others, or pagans, like Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar [Nabuchodonosor].

What happened to Paul, too, favours our proposition, not the opposite. For although he did not know whether his soul was separated from his body in his rapture, or at any rate joined to the body but not using the bodily senses, he nevertheless knew that he had not seen the things he related having seen in his rapture in the way that he was using his bodily senses at the time when he was narrating them, and was acting bodily — not dreaming or undergoing an ecstasy. Ezekiel likewise, when he said that he had been in the spirit, or in a vision of God, in Jerusalem [Hierusalem], knew perfectly well the difference between such a state and vision and the state in which he ordinarily, and while awake, performed bodily works with his senses unimpeded. And this is also clear from the very manner of speaking of sacred Scripture. For he would not

have said, "I was in a vision of God and in the spirit," unless he intended to declare that he had not been bodily in Jerusalem in the same way in which he was then there where he was saying these things — and consequently unless he had known the difference between such states.

For if the difference already mentioned were not known by people when awake, it would follow that nothing could ever be seen to be done in the body rather than in the spirit. Rather, it would always be open to anyone to answer someone who asserted that he was doing something bodily: "It is not as you think; you are dreaming." And he in turn could say: "No — it is you who are dreaming now and are deceived, in thinking that I am dreaming." And all the absurdities that commonly befall the delirious could befall everyone.

Since, therefore, an innumerable multitude of men and women who are detected being carried to the diabolical course [cursus] in different places and at various times unanimously confess and affirm that they go or are carried bodily to that game [ludus], and that they bodily commit there whatever crimes they confess, it is plain that it is not contrary to the sacred Scriptures — rather, it is to be believed in accordance with them — that these things are done bodily, and not only in dreams. For according to the Scriptures every word stands in the mouth of two or three witnesses (Deut. 7, and John, chapter eight [Deut. 7. & Io. octauo]),ⁱ and above all if it is confirmed by oath, as they commonly affirm the things already mentioned before the Inquisitors.

[Margin: i Et in c. Nouit. de Iudi. — "And in the chapter *Novit*, on judgements [de Iudi.]"]

It must not be denied, however, that such things can appear in this way in dreams alone, so that while they are dreaming like this they nevertheless think that these things are truly happening, and so are deluded for the time being. But afterwards this does not remain hidden from those persons when they come back to themselves. And even if the devil were to work in their minds in such a way that even when awake they thought that such things had truly and bodily happened to them, such a person nevertheless finally detects, when he is fully released in his senses and dismissed by the devil, that they were only dreams. This can also easily happen when they are converted to God and confess their sins, just as the delirious, too, once they are fully healed, recognize as a delusion what they believed to be the truth while they were ill. But the *strigones* always affirm the same thing, even when they have been converted to God and are no longer held captive by the devil. Experience and other signs also show the same, as will be said below.

That the things reported of the striges can truly happen just as common rumour has it is shown by many trustworthy examples. Cap. XI.

The firmness of the principal thesis of this chapter also appears from what the divine Augustine brings forward in *De civitate Dei* 18, c. 18 [18. de ciui. Dei. c. 18.]. There he introduces Praestantius, whom we named above near the beginning of the work, as so deeply sunk in sleep by *maleficia* that he could not be woken for several days. Nevertheless, in that state it seemed to him that

he had been turned into a horse and had carried rations [annonā] to soldiers in the manner of horses. And although some horse, of the kind he had dreamt himself to be, really did carry rations to those soldiers, it was not he himself, nor his phantasm in bodily form [phantasticum eius incorporatum], as certain people seem to say and as Augustine relates in the course of his discussion in the same place. And even if Augustine himself were to assert this — were to say, that is, that it was his phantasm in bodily form — it is still not to be understood as though the demon clothed the man's very phantastic power, or even a species preserved in him, with some body. It is rather that the demon himself, who forms the man's species and imagination, either presents another, similar species bodily and externally to the senses of others, or produces a similar species inwardly in their senses — as Saint Thomas lays it down in expounding Augustine's saying, in the *Quaestiones de malo*, q. 16, art. 11, reply to the seventh [q. 16. artic. 11. ad septimum].

Nor, again, can demons carry the power of the phantasy, or its organ, or the spirit that is its subject along with it, elsewhere in bodily form. And even if they could and did so, the person to whom these belonged would then see nothing through them. For no one acts who is not actually informed by a form, which is the principle of operation. Yet the story supposes, as we said, that this man saw these very things in his sleep. From this it can be concluded — indeed it must be — that all these things were done by the operation of an evil spirit, which assumed a body in the form of a horse, unseen both before and after, and carried out the things that are narrated; while the man merely dreamt that he had done such things as a horse, and recognized that the state of full waking was distinct from the state of the dream he had had.

Nor should we think any differently of what the same Augustine narrates in the same chapter, saying: "Another man also related (that is, the one who had related the foregoing) that at his house, by night, before he went to rest, he saw a certain philosopher well known to him come to him and explain to him certain Platonic matters which, when asked earlier, he had refused to explain. And when that same philosopher was afterwards asked why he had done in the other's house what he had refused to do in his own house at his request, he said: 'I did not do it, but I dreamt that I did it.'" So much for that passage. From this it is plain that one must say that some spirit, having assumed a figure in an aerial body, did this — a deed which the malign spirit knew the philosopher was dreaming at that moment, or even brought about.

If the two men brought forward as examples had not asserted, once awake, that they had dreamt such things while they knew themselves to have been asleep — and if, on the contrary, they had affirmed that they had seen these things not in dreams but awake, and that they had carried them out bodily — then it would have to be judged, beyond doubt, that it was not they but rather demons that had lain there, as if asleep, in the figure of their assumed body.

In connection with this it should also be noted that some people perform the works of life in their sleep so genuinely that they seem to be awake. I myself

have known a man who walked and talked while dreaming — and, what is more, recognized the people who met him, talked with them, turned aside from them when they came his way, and sometimes struck them. Yet everyone knew that he was asleep at the time, and this was established by experience. Moreover, he himself afterwards confessed, when awake, that he had indeed dreamt he did such things. Indeed, a certain cousin of mine on my father's side [patruelis], a fellow member of my order [comprofessor], while he was applying himself to preaching as a young man, used to get up at night in his sleep out of excessive anxiety of heart; and climbing up onto a certain portico where he was due to preach, he would preach in perfect order as if to the people, waking everyone and throwing them into confusion with loud shouting. I have known another man who dreamt at night and in that dream really went from his bed to his study, and there wrote many lines correctly without a light; and in the morning he found actually done what he had thought he had only dreamt.

Nevertheless, what we said is also true: that one devil brings about the things that some other person dreams he is doing. Conversely, too, someone may truly and soundly act while awake, having been carried off somewhere by an evil spirit or by a good one, while in his place a spirit, having assumed a similar body, seems to be asleep elsewhere. For something similar to this is believed to have been done through holy angels, according to what is read in authentic histories. It is read of blessed Ambrose that when he happened to be celebrating Mass at Milan [Mediolani] at the hour of the funeral of Saint Martin, who had died at Tours [Turonis], he bowed his head over the altar and was seen to sleep for the space of three hours. Afterwards, when he was woken, as it seemed, by the clergy, who complained of the people's weariness in waiting for the blessing and the end of the Mass, he said that he had performed the funeral office of his brother Martin at Tours. In that place, too, as the story goes, he left behind his glove as proof of so great a thing, so that, both from his own assertion and from the sign just mentioned, it must be believed with complete truth that he was present there bodily; and that in his place an angel, in an assumed body resembling his, stood at the altar in Milan. For it involves a contradiction for the same body to be found in several places at the same time [Implicat enim idem corpus in pluribus locis simul tempore inveniri], as the theologians commonly teach.

Something not unlike this happened to blessed Clement, the successor of Peter. While he was celebrating Mass at Rome, he was seen to fall asleep at once; and after three hours, having come back to himself, as it seemed, he offered the people an excuse: that by order of blessed Peter it had been necessary for him, in that space of time, to consecrate the church of Pisa, which had been dedicated to the divine Peter. As undoubted proof of this, he had left three drops of his own blood on a marble stone in that church at Pisa [Pisis], which are held in the highest veneration to this day in the cathedral church of that city. From this it is plain that an angel in the figure of Saint Clement was at

Rome for the time during which the saint himself was bodily at Pisa, having been carried there by an angel, and is believed to have been brought back to Rome in the same way. The judgement about both men would have been otherwise if they had said that they had dreamt it.

In the same way, then, the *striges* are to be believed when they affirm that they go bodily to the course [cursus]. And if in the meantime they seem to be asleep somewhere, it must be judged that the devil is there in their form or figure. Sometimes, however, they also bring it about by their magic arts that they learn only by an imaginary vision what is really done by their other companions in the course — and they do this to avoid toil and dangers. Such persons are to be presumed to do this sometimes when they are bodily ill. You can see, if you wish, in the *Malleus maleficarum* [malleo maleficarum] what method certain *maleficae* observe to achieve what we have described.

But to say that it always happens this way — indeed, that the things the *striges* recount cannot really happen — seems to conflict both with the histories and with the sacred writings, as has been shown, and to speak so much against the most common experience that it displays stupidity rather than obstinacy without knowledge. For this obstinacy is, for the most part, mixed with the dullness of those who say such things, or who deny that the things we have described truly happen. So much for the second principal point.

That it must be firmly believed, and in no way doubted, that all the foregoing things happen in the way in which they are affirmed by the Inquisitors — an argument drawn from the judgements of those same Inquisitors. Cap. XII.

It must be believed, beyond all doubt, that these things happen in this way, just as is commonly affirmed by the lord Inquisitors: which is the third thing to be treated. And it is established by three arguments that only the insolent or the ignorant can deny that such things happen in the way recorded in the Inquisitors' trials [processus].

The first of these is as follows. Everyone who is skilled and experienced in his own art is to be believed.^k For the experienced man is certain — and more so than one who knows without experience, as is had from the proem of the *Metaphysics* [ex prooemio Metaphy.]. Nor is one to adhere any less to the opinions of the experienced and the elders without demonstration than to demonstrations themselves, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6 [6. Ethic.]. The man who is at once wise and experienced will therefore be the most certain, and consequently the greatest trust is to be placed in him. For trust is placed in someone only because of the certainty of a deed or a saying that he is thought to possess.^l

Now the Fathers Inquisitors are, for the most part, men highly skilled both in law and in sacred theology. And it belongs to theologians and canonists to determine whether the foregoing things are impossible or possible, to be believed or not to be believed. They are also judges over the depositions and testimonies given about such persons, and over their confessions: whether these are impossible, and whether plausible, or indeed laughable; whether they

were made by fools or by people in possession of their minds; in what manner, with what assertion they were uttered, and how effectively they were proved. Consequently, in judging such matters they are experienced above all others.

Since, therefore, these unhappy persons are condemned by the Inquisitors, juridically and by a most grave judgement, on account of these very things they confess, no one ought to be so rash as to condemn their judgements in this way — to think them so deserving of mockery and execration, indeed so utterly iniquitous, that the Inquisitors would afflict innocent people with the harshest torments merely for dreams, or for things that happen in dreams, and would at last hand them over to be put to death most cruelly. For according to the holy Doctors, no one can sin on account of what he desires, or even does, in his sleep, unless something else intervenes.^m See on this, if you please, Saint Thomas, 4, dist. 9, art. 4, quaestiuncula 1 [4. di. 9. articu. 4. quæstiuncula. 1.]. And even if someone incidentally commits some crime in his sleep as well, it is judged more lightly precisely because it is accomplished in sleep, since in that state a man does not have full and free judgement in his actions. It must therefore be held, and firmly believed by all, that these things truly happen and are carried out in the body, just as the Inquisitors judge that they are done.

This argument is further confirmed on three grounds. First, because the Inquisitors are for the most part men of religion, of the best reputation and of the most upright life. Because they are religious and dedicated to God, they incline more to clemency and mercy than to severity, following in this the footsteps of their Saviour, who is rich in mercy. And because they join to the perfect state of religion works of their own holiness and a most innocent life, with the odour of the best reputation — which

[Margin: k L. semel. C. de re mili. lib. 12. et l. j. ī prin. ff. de vē. inspic. & vtrobiq; per Bart. & no. in c. propo-suisti. de probatione. — "Law *Semel*, Code, *De re militari*, book 12; and law 1, at the beginning [ī prin.], Digest, *De ventre inspiciendo*; and on both, Bartolus [Bartolo da Sassoferrato]; and noted in the chapter *Proposuisti*, *De probatione*."]]

[Margin: l Et hinc prouenit, quod recte factum præsimitur, quod facit iudex. ff. de acquir. pos. l. iuste. — "And from this it follows that what a judge does is presumed to be rightly done. Digest, *De acquirenda possessione*, law *Iuste*."]]

[Margin: m Prout tradi consuevit in c. maiores. §. verum. de bapt. per illū tex. et in cle. j. de pa. Et p Albe. de Ros. in l. diuus. ad fin. ff. de off. præs. las. in l. vt vim. col. vj. ī prī. ff. de iusti. & iur. — "As is customarily taught in the chapter *Maiores*, § *Verum*, *De baptismo*, by that text; and in Clementines 1, *De pa.* [?]; and by Albericus de Rosate [Alberico da Rosciate] on law *Divus*, near the end, Digest, *De officio praesidis*; and by Iason [Giasone del Maino] on law *Ut vim*, column 6, at the beginning [ī prī.], Digest, *De iustitia et iure*."]]

rather than lose, it would be better for them, according to the Apostle, to dieⁿ — they must necessarily abhor every injustice, and above all where a man's life is at stake: to destroy it without reason is the height of all injustices. Since, then, in these trials they appear to be, and indeed are, rather most severe, and

do not yield to anyone's prayers or tears, this gives the clearest indication that they do so only for a supremely reasonable cause, and only where mercy would be judged the height of cruelty before God and before all men who savour the things that are of God. That would not be the case if the things that are narrated, and for which the *striges* are burned, were illusions or dreams.^o

That first argument is confirmed, secondly, as follows. Things judged true on the counsel of experts are not to be reckoned false by others.^p But the Inquisitors do not proceed against such accursed persons except on the counsel of men expert both in law and in sacred theology; and as a rule not except with the counsel and consent of the lord Bishop of the city where this trial is held, or of his Vicar, who for the most part are expert at least in canon law. Therefore what they determine to be true or just ought not to be so readily condemned, above all by the inexpert. Nor would those who are truly wise, and who excel in natural elegance and nobility of mind, set themselves in this matter against the counsel of experts, or contradict it headlong, as many of the inexpert do. Rather, first weighing everything with mature reflection, if such an opinion pleased them less, or if the reasons adduced did not seem to them effective or inescapably conclusive, they would courteously put their own opinion forward — by way of disputation rather than by pronouncing a sentence. And that would be most welcome to the Inquisitors, so that the truth might shine out the more through learned discussion [*literali discussione*].^q

Wherever the office is exercised — and it is exercised in the individual cities of Christians throughout Europe by Inquisitors instituted by apostolic delegation, and by the Vicars they appoint — the doctors called to counsel against the *striges* all agree on this one point, or at least the greater part of them do: that the things described happen really and in the body. And on this there exist innumerable trial records [*processus*] and counsels [*consilia*]. Therefore, by the topic from authority [*per locum ab autoritate*] — the authority of the most expert and wise, who are without number, since these things have happened throughout all Christendom, both in our own age and in the age past — all ought to be persuaded, and no room for doubt ought to remain, that the things described happen bodily, as stated above.

The premised argument is confirmed, thirdly, as follows. What the Church tolerates, even where the gravest prejudice to some third party is at issue — in external goods, in reputation, and also in the goods of the body, up to the most cruel deprivation of life — is not to be judged false or iniquitous, if it is done in the ordinary course and judicially by

[Margin: n Tu adde tex. in l. isti quidē. ad fi. ff. quod metus causa, & late Barba. in c. in praesentia. col. 69. de proba. vbi meminit de dicto Apostoli hic allē. facit id quod idem Barba. tradit in cōsil. 55. col. 14. primo volumine. — "You may add the text in law *Isti quidem*, near the end, Digest, *Quod metus causa*; and, at length, Barba. on the chapter *In praesentia*, col. 69, *De probationibus*, where he mentions the saying of the Apostle cited here. To the same point is what the same Barba. lays down in *consilium* 55, col. 14, in the first volume."]

[Margin: o Argu. d. c. 2. de no. ope. nun. cū aliis supra alleg. — "Argument from the said chapter 2, *De novi operis nuntiatione*, with the others cited above."]

[Margin: p Vt patet ex not. per Abb. & Mod. in c. proposuisti. de probat. supra etiam alleg. — "As appears from what is noted by Abb. and Mod. on the chapter *Proposuisti*, *De probationibus*, also cited above."]

[Margin: q Veritas enim hinc ĩde exagitata magis resplendescit in lucē, vt dicit text. in cap. graue 35. q. vlt. & gl. in eo. cum Ioā. eremita. de fid. inst. — "For truth, when it is debated on both sides, shines out the more into the light, as the text says in the chapter *Grave*, 35, q. ult., and the gloss on it; *Cum Ioannes eremita*, *De fide instrumentorum*."]

[Margin: Bene facit tex. in §. illud quæsitū. cum ibi not. per Christopho. insti. de rerum di. — "Very much to the point is the text in § *Illud quæsitum*, with what is noted there by Christopho., Institutes, *De rerum divisione*."]

officials instituted through the apostolic see. For it would be the height of negligence to disparage the Roman Church — indeed, to make it reprehensible for the height of cruelty and injustice, and to slander it — since the Inquisitors do these things only as delegates of the supreme Pontiff, on whom principally depends whatever is done through them, justly or unjustly, especially when he knows of it. For this reason, if iniquity were found in this judicial process, it would principally be imputed to him if he kept silent or did not forbid it. Since that is nothing short of rash, no one can deny that these things happen in this way, as the Inquisitors establish them to happen, unless he is ignorant or very presumptuous.[†]

The second argument to the same effect, taken from the faithful assertion of many witnesses [textium] [recte: testium] beyond all exception; and the refutation of one reply. Cap. XIII.

What we have assumed is also proved by another principal argument, which is as follows. What is asserted by a countless multitude of persons of both sexes, and is always affirmed — everywhere and at various times, uniformly, as if all spoke with one mouth — is to be believed beyond all doubt and denied without any hesitation. This holds above all where the testimony of such persons is admitted in law in a cause of faith; where they declare these very things duly before a judge, against themselves as much as against others; and where even those who have despaired of being granted their lives do so — as happens to those who have relapsed into heresy — so that no one can suspect them of making such things public out of fear of the death they would incur unless they confessed.

All these conditions concur in this trial. Indeed, others often declare the very same thing even when they know their lives have already been granted them, so that no one can judge that they confess it from fear of imminent punishment. Moreover, a great many boys and girls concur in this, and innocent and simple people of that sort, who would easily be caught out if they were inventing a lie — which is why the testimony of children is said to be most certain. Many, too,

who after their conversion are of the most upright life and splendid reputation — and many other conditions concur by which witnesses are rendered worthy of belief and beyond all exception. This is so above all in a cause of faith, where all who are not mortal enemies are admitted as witnesses, however disgraceful they may otherwise be, as appears in the chapter *In favorem* and the chapter *Accusatus*, *De haereticis*, in the Sext [in cap. In fauorem. &c. Accusatus. de hæreti. in sexto].

For if no credence were to be given to such and so great a multitude concerning such matters, as though concerning things not seen, then by the same reasoning no one would ever be believed when he reported things that the hearer had not come to know for himself. And so the consolation of human intercourse would perish, and no end would be given to disputes. That the multitude of those who confess that these things happen bodily is of such a kind and so great

[Margin: r Vt patet ex his quæ habētur in l. quæ dotis. ff. sol. ma. per Bar. & doc. & per not. in c. j. de off. dele. cum multis similibus quæ allegari possent. — "As appears from what is held on law *Quæ dotis*, Digest, *Solutio matrimonio*, by Bar. and the doctors, and from what is noted on chapter 1, *De officio delegati*, with many similar texts that could be cited."]

can already be thoroughly established for the whole world from the multitude of those who, on account of these things, fall under the judgement of the Inquisitors in every region of Christians. So great is it that the number of such persons often exceeds a thousand [millenarium ... numerū] who, in the course of a single year, in the diocese of Como alone [in sola Comensi dioecesi], are investigated and examined by the Inquisitor for the time being and by his Vicars — who are always eight or ten or more — and in almost every year more than a hundred are burned to ashes [incinerantur].

But suppose someone opposes this argument by saying that even so great a multitude is not to be believed, on the ground that it is deluded by the devil — which, he says, can be made plain from the fact that they recount certain incredible things, things that seem to exceed the capacity of our thought or condition, and indeed run contrary to what happens naturally and has been proved. Consequently, he says, denying these things does not seem to bring any disturbance to human intercourse, which is concerned with things naturally possible and contingent.

Those who object in this way must certainly be asked how they know that the things reported are not true but delusions of the devil — for everyone believes that the things confirmed by so great a multitude happen, either truly or delusively. For suppose it is to be believed, on the ground of natural possibility or contingency, that one of these two — the delusion of the demons, I mean, or the actual occurrence of the things narrated — truly happens, because one of them is more possible to occur than the other. Then that one will certainly be more possible, or equally possible, or worthy of belief, which is more or equally in agreement with [consentat eū] [recte: consentaneū] and close to

our nature. For the power of the demon appears less where the deed, or the manner of doing it, comes closer to our natural power. The more an effect exceeds our nature, the greater the power of the cause it displays.

It seems difficult, however, to be able to judge which of these more exceeds the natural capacity of the demon: to carry a man, I mean, bodily through the air to distant places, to prepare and offer foods and the material of every pleasure, and to make himself familiar in human form and compliant to their wishes (for this is the sum of what these lost people recount as marvels); or else to work so subtly in men's imagination [phantasia] — on forming, composing and separating species, and also on the motions of the spirits — that all these things they narrate seem to happen bodily, though they happen, as the objectors themselves maintain, only in the imagination [phantastice]. Indeed, if anyone considers it carefully, he will find that the second without doubt exceeds natural power more than the first, and consequently ought, on their own account, to be less credible. This can indeed be easily weighed, and subtly assessed, by comparison with our own power. For whatever more exceeds the capacity of our natural strength and power is also more supernatural in itself, and absolutely requires a greater power. Since the possible corresponds to a power as that power's object, and is proportioned to it on that account, there will be a corresponding excess in strength among the proportioned powers according to the excess of possible things in being. Now it is less feasible for a man to arrange phantasms, species, spirits and motions in the powers of the soul so artfully that imaginary things seem true, and that whatever things people wish to have represented through these ordered species appear at once as desired, than to bring about bodily such things as are narrated by the *striges*. Indeed, I do not think there is any physician or astrologer — and I have never learned by report or by reading that there has been one — who could bring such things about, or has even attempted it. For a man cannot by art cause even particular dreams, which by nature have a lesser determination, and draw a man out of himself less than does rapture, or such an alienation from the senses as these persons must undergo if they are deluded.

For everyone knows after a dream that he has dreamt, as was proved above, and as experience shows.[Margin: Cap. 10.] Nor does anyone, once he has woken, cling to his dreams as if they were realities, as those who deny that the things narrated happen bodily suppose the *striges* do. This is so, first, because those species and imaginary motions can in no way fall under an external sense, and consequently no craftsman applies himself to such things — no one, that is, whose practical knowledge or skill deals only with the sensible things by which it was itself caused, as man is. And secondly, because it is the common opinion of men, pronounced by all without any hesitation as something found out by a natural light, that these things are done not by human power but by some higher power. These common conceptions of the mind are shown to be natural [naturales conuincantur] by the very fact that they present themselves

to all, or at least to most; and if they rested on a falsehood, they would certainly turn the falsehood back upon the author of nature.

It must therefore be concluded that a man can by no means, by natural power, bring it about that someone is so deluded and so out of his wits that he thinks something truly and bodily happens which he beholds only in an imaginary vision. The things, however, that these most wicked people narrate as happening in the course [in cursu] are in many respects subject even to human capacity, being things that a man can do, by strength or by ingenuity, perfectly, or at least imperfectly, or something partly similar. As to the preparation of foods and the fulfilment of pleasures, no one doubts that a man can be their author — not merely such as are narrated by those people, but even greater ones than the demons procure; not, however, greater than they know how to procure;

or at least such as they can procure, since the proportion of flavours and qualities that brings pleasure is better known to them than to any man whatever, and they are able to stir people towards it more quickly and more easily. As to the bodily carrying of human beings across such great stretches of land in a brief span of time, this is, admittedly, naturally impossible for a man. Yet something similar to it — at least in the kind of work involved — can be procured and done by human ingenuity. This is plain from the almost instantaneous hurling of a great stone, or of a mass of any other mineral body, across many thousands of paces by the ingenuity of engines of war or bombards [tormentorum seu bombardarum]. Therefore whatever marvel is produced beyond nature in the imagination departs further from the possible, and consequently requires greater strength and power, than what is likewise done beyond nature but externally and bodily. And so for the demon the former will be no less impossible, and no more feasible, than the latter; hence no one ought to believe the one to be done by him any less than the other.

As for the appearance of demons in assumed bodies of condensed air, shaped into human form, this argues no greater power in the demon than composing, in the manner described above, species in the imagination [phantasia] which present all sorts of bodies as if real. For a phantasmal species is of greater spirituality than air, and above all than condensed air. Hence the species (if we consider the corporeal nature of each) is less able than air to represent dense bodies. As for the local motion involved in bringing these things about, those species are less capable of it than air is, since the species is moved only accidentally, whereas air is moved of itself as well. For air is a body, while those species are nothing but corporeal accidents. And even if they admitted local motion equally, by reason of their subject as well, that motion would still argue no lesser power in the angel moving it than the motion involved in forming that aerial body; for all corporeal things alike obey angelic power at its nod, so far as local motion is concerned. From all this, then, it is plain that the things these utterly abandoned persons narrate as happening bodily are no less credible — since they are no less possible to the demon — than that the same

things happen only in fantasy, with so great a delusion that things false and empty are believed for certain to be true, as the common people suppose.

The refutation of one evasion of the foregoing argument. Cap. XIII.

Perhaps someone will again set himself against the foregoing argument and try to render it invalid, on the ground that the chapter *Episcopi*, 26. q. 5., says that persons of this or a similar sect are deluded by the devil, and consequently cannot truly know that the evils narrated are done;

nor that such persons are *maleficae*. And even if it did happen bodily that some persons were carried in this way and did the evils they confess, then although a person testifying against herself, or accusing herself, could be believed, she could not be believed when accusing others. For such persons do not know whether those who appear to be present there are truly there, since the devil can put forward their person or figure while they themselves stay at home. Hence the testimony of such persons seems in no way to be accepted to the prejudice of a third party.

To explode this evasion, however — even supposing that credence must be given to that chapter, which will be examined below — a very broad road has already been prepared above. For it is most plainly recognised, even through things proved beyond all doubt by the sacred Scriptures, and things that familiar experience cannot deny, that everyone can easily discern the difference between the state of one who is awake and one who is asleep, and above all in himself. Nor can the devil, by any power or malignant effort whatever, put people out of their minds in such a way that, once restored to wakefulness and health, they do not recognise that everything they seemed to see, when the devil is supposed to have deluded them, they had known by a vision other than bodily vision, and in a way other than by using the external senses. Therefore, since such persons persevere in their confessions against themselves while they are of sound mind, and even after they have renounced the devil and been converted to Christ; and since they always assert that these things happened to them while awake and in full use of their senses — it is not the part of a prudent man to wish to deny without reason what such persons most constantly assert that they experience by the experience of the senses, than which no knowledge we have is clearer or more effective.

And just as we must suppose that what they narrate as done in their own regard truly happens, it is no less likely that the same thing happens really and truly in regard to their companions and the other persons whom they see to be present — above all since it often, indeed always, happens that several go or are carried together by prior agreement, and return together, as is evident from the trial records [*ex processibus*]. Nor is there any greater reason why the devil should delude one of them rather than another in this respect. For he especially desires that the things he procures to be done through them in contempt of Christ and of the faith should be carried out while they are awake rather than in dreams or in any other alienation of the mind, since they incur a greater sin when awake; and it is as easy for the devil to bring about the one as the other

— or even easier for him to carry them while awake than to delude them while asleep, as was shown in the preceding chapter.

But if credence is to be given in court to such persons when they testify against themselves (notwithstanding any delusion of the devil), as has been deduced, it follows inescapably that witnesses against a third party are to be believed as well, if one attends to what is proved always to happen to the lords Inquisitors and judges of the faith. For their daily experience puts this into practice: that those accused by their accomplices in crime, although almost always at the beginning of the trial they deny, nevertheless confess everything in the course of the proceedings; and the opposite happens very rarely. Whoever wantonly denied this would also have to assert that the trial records of all the Inquisitors are false — which among people who are not mad is plainly reckoned execrable. And if it sometimes happens that such persons do not confess, the reason is that the judges either will not, or, willing, cannot, pursue the trial as would be fitting; for the obstacle sometimes comes from those who ought to have supported the Inquisitors. For the Inquisitors cannot do everything by themselves, etc.

But what happens regularly ought not to be set aside on account of what happens very rarely. Likewise, although in other trials too it sometimes happens that innocent people are condemned and harassed by false witnesses and accusers, judgment against the guilty is not on that account put in abeyance [non interponitur iudicium contra reos], nor is less credence given to other witnesses or accusers.

If, on the other hand, someone should adduce that those wicked women of whom the said chapter *Episcopi* [d. c. *Episcopi*.] speaks asserted, while they were awake, that they were really carried across many stretches of land in the silence of the dead of night, and that nevertheless it is determined there that they had been deluded by the devil — the answer is that those women were held captive by the devil through unbelief not only in sleep but also while awake, as is said there. Hence he could easily delude them while awake, and so work upon their minds and imagination that they persuaded themselves and others that what had befallen them in dreams had truly happened to them. In the same way, to the delirious [freneticis] in the grip of their illness, even when they are awake, things seem true that are not true; but once afterwards freed from the illness, they recognise the difference between the state of health and the state of sickness, and that the things which seemed true to them while they were ill had been false.

The persons, however, who accuse themselves, or even their companions, in this sect are no longer in the devil's power. For they always do this while they are sound in mind and body [sanni sunt mente & corpore] [recte: sani], and after they have renounced the devil and confessed their sin — not only judicially but also sacramentally, through the provident care of the lords Inquisitors, who desire their conversion and salvation. For at the end of the trial they ratify and

confirm whatever they had previously confessed, as much against themselves as against others. And so it is plain that this second objection has no force.

Further, against that first evasion it must be said that, just as — by the prevenient mercy of God — the devil cannot delude any except those whose minds he has first subjugated to himself through unbelief, as is said in the said chapter *Episcopi* [d. c. *Episcopi.*], so it must be believed that he can put forward the figure of no person, so as to have her accused of so great a crime, except one whom he knows to be already overcome by him through similar crimes, and who has many times really met with others to commit them. And therefore the Inquisitors ought not to refrain from proceeding against persons so accused, since from the very fact that they are so accused, even if at some time they have not truly and bodily done the things of which they are accused, they are nevertheless vehemently suspected of belonging to so utterly shameful a sect — above all if several witnesses agree on the same point against someone, and at various times, and if the person is also otherwise of evil life or repute. For a most merciful God would not long permit the innocent to be accused of so great a crime. And the same reasoning would then hold for everyone: that the devil puts forward the figures of all persons at various times. That is plainly false, because not only are such innocent people believed to be few in comparison with the others against whom the Inquisitors proceed in any city or territory, but none such has yet been found by the Inquisitors to have been deluded — although it is sometimes said, on the report of others, that something of the kind has happened. I refrain from bringing against this same evasion the very plain signs of real transportation which occur in full wakefulness both before and after the transportation; a great many of them are set out in this little work, as will be especially evident below.

Other unanswerable deductions for closing off the same evasion. Cap. XV.

To shut out that same first evasion, I bring another deduction, which draws its strength both from the said chapter and from other determinations of the supreme Pontiffs. For that chapter lays down a twofold way in which the devil can delude or deceive people. One is by showing, in dreams or in the spirit or in a vision, what is not. The other is, while people are awake, by putting forward the form of someone, as happens in diabolical apparitions — for example, when the devil, assuming an aerial body, shapes it into the likeness of a man, or a woman, or beasts, as we often read in the histories of the saints. The said chapter [d. c.] proves that he can delude in the first way through the second [per secundum] [?]. It proves the second way through the Apostle, 1. Cor. 9.¹⁴, who says that the devil transforms himself into an angel of light — that is, he sometimes appears in the form of a good angel, and all the more can he appear in the form of a man or a beast. He can therefore so order people's phantasms that they seem to themselves to see what they do not see, and that what is not, is — which happens above all in dreams. He can also delude in

¹⁴the words quoted are those of 2 Corinthians 11:14

another way, by sleight [per praestigium], as all who cultivate both theology and canon law acknowledge.

Nor does that chapter deny that the devil can carry people from place to place. To deny this would be heretical, since Job says that there is no power upon earth that can be compared with him. Indeed, it would also be contrary to true philosophy, which ranks the power of a separate substance above every body. That chapter only adduces and asserts that the women are not, at that time, carried off to follow some true goddess and to serve her — the very things on account of which it seemed to those wicked women that they were really carried. From that chapter, then, taken together with faith and philosophy, it is held to be possible that the devil carries these evil-tongued persons [maledicas personas], and also that he deludes them in the second way described above, through the apparitions of various things. Now once something possible is posited as actual, no absurdity follows — above all if it does not conflict with Holy Scripture or with the determinations of the Church.

Let us suppose, then, as a possible case, that a multitude of persons happens to be gathered by the devil in this way and induced to renounce the faith, to despise holy things, and to do the other things that are told of the *striges* — for which they rightly come to be punished by the Inquisitors and the judges of the faith. With such a case posited, we must ask how the judge will be able to come to know of them, if the accomplices and associates in these crimes who have been caught and have confessed in court are not to be believed. For no other person can know these things. Those who are supposed to belong to such a society bind themselves by terrible oaths [sacramentis] not to accuse one another in any way and not to divulge the deed — except perhaps for the sake of seducing someone. And if it happens that someone does not keep this pledged faith, he is horribly beaten by his associates or by the demon, unless perhaps they are in the custody [in fortiis] of the Inquisitors; though even so they sometimes cannot escape.

How, then, will such fierce enemies of the faith be removed from the earth, as holy Mother Church intends? And who, presumptuous or a smatterer, would dare to say that although this mode of delusion is possible to the devil, he nevertheless does not use it, nor does God permit it? Ought anyone to think otherwise about God's permission than holy Mother Church requires and than the outcome of events shows? Where can anyone find the Church teaching that God does not permit these things? On the contrary, it is clear that she holds the opposite, from the fact that she grants authority and every support to the Inquisitors against such utterly wicked persons. The outcome of events, too, and very frequent and open signs teach the same thing. All the judges of the faith and innumerable counsellors judge that it is so; countless witnesses affirm the same. How, then, can any wise man maintain that this is impossible, or even that it does not in fact happen? Let everyone judge in this matter whether they are moved by reason, or by will, or by some other perverse cause or intention.

And let each person set a case before his own eyes: suppose he himself is judge or governor in some city of the Church, or of any prince whatever, and someone appears before him who says he heard a man say that two citizens, among those gathering at the course, had plotted, while they were there, to hand over the city to the enemies of the Church or of the prince; and suppose that, having summoned that man, the judge learns from him that it is so, as from an eyewitness [a teste de visu]. Then what he would believe or do in such a case if he were the judge — or at any rate what he would advise be done if he were a counsellor or an assessor of the judge — let him, I beg, do the same; or let him believe no less, or give his support to the Inquisitors who have learned, by the means described above, that similar things are done or plotted against Christ in such a course — if he is truly a Christian.

Moreover, the Church believes that these things are possible, and indeed that they actually happen. She does so not only indirectly — by giving the Inquisitors authority in general against such persons as against heretics, and by not merely refraining from condemning their judgments but rather approving them — but also directly: she specifically pursues this sect, and by special privileges commands the Inquisitors to pursue these most pestilential people relentlessly, to their final destruction and extermination. Hence what Innocent first commanded to the Inquisitors of Germany, as reported above, and Julius afterwards to the Inquisitor of Cremona, was lastly confirmed by Pope Adrian VI [Adrianus sextus] to all the Inquisitors of the Lombard congregation of the Order of Preachers. He commands them to exercise the office of the Inquisition against the sect already mentioned of persons who are found to be straying from the Catholic faith; denying the very faith¹⁵ which they received in the reception of holy baptism; trampling the holy cross underfoot and committing outrages upon it; abusing the Church's sacraments, and especially the Eucharist; taking the devil as their lord and patron and showing him obedience and reverence; harming people, animals and the fruits of the earth in many ways by their incantations, spells [carminibus], sorceries [sortilegiis] and other abominable superstitions; and committing a great many other abominations, excesses and crimes at the instigation of that same devil. And he commands that they punish them according to the manner laid down by law and by the sacred canons against other heretics.

From this it is plain that, since this sect is nothing other than the sect of the *striges*, and since they commit these abominations for the most part only in the course — because it is there, and nowhere else, that they form their sect and assembly, and not at any other time that they do all these things — it follows that the Pontiff presupposes and determines that these things are done and perpetrated in the course not illusorily but truly and really.

Clement VII [Clemens. vij.], too, in a brief addressed to the Most Reverend Bishop of Pola [Episcopo Polensi], Governor of Bologna, commanding him

¹⁵no verb is printed for "quam"; "which they received" is supplied

to give every support to the Lord Inquisitor of Parma against certain people of Mirandola [Mirandulanos] of that same sect — it begins *Accepimus non sine animi* — expressly calls this sect "the heresy of *strigiatius*" [haeresim strigiatius].

Since, therefore, it is concluded from the foregoing that the crimes already mentioned are committed by these people not illusorily but truly, it must be that they do not go, or are not carried, to the course in dreams, but truly and really; and consequently that credence must be given to eyewitnesses [testibus de visu] against such persons. Otherwise every mode of proceeding against them would perish, or they could be detected only with the greatest difficulty — above all because, as we have learned from their confessions, they bind themselves by great oaths (as we said) not to reveal one another.

It must also be noted that if witnesses are not believed against others on account of the alleged delusion, then neither should those be believed who accuse themselves, or who confess in due legal form, that such things have happened to them. For they would equally have to be judged deluded; they would deserve compassion, and no sentence should be passed against them if they said that they had never done any such thing outside the course, had never perpetrated such things from the heart, and had never held any opinion against the faith. No one of sound mind would grant this, and the practice of all the Inquisitors is to the contrary.

Furthermore, it is drawn from the same words of the Pontiffs that the Inquisitors must observe against this sect the same mode of inquiring and proceeding that they observe according to law against other heretics. Now the mode, as regards the intention of the Inquisitor himself and his efficacy, both inward and outward, is that they proceed fearlessly and relentlessly, setting aside all human fear and all love of any advantage or gain, as is plain from a certain privilege of the Inquisition, which begins¹⁶. As regards the order of proceeding and of execution, it is that they proceed simply and summarily [simpliciter & de plano], etc., c. Statuta, de Haeret. lib. 6. Likewise, that excommunicates and partners or associates in the crime are admitted to give testimony: eod. tit. In fidei fauorem. It is in this last way, therefore, that one must proceed against this sect. The Inquisitors are therefore bound to believe all who are willing to bear testimony against this sect, even if they say that they are associates in the crimes. It cannot be objected, then, that those who call themselves associates are not to be heard because they are deluded by sleight [per praestigium] or in any other way whatever. For then the mode of proceeding against them by which one must proceed against other heretics would be taken away, and that is contrary to the will and command of the Church in the privilege of Adrian already mentioned. Hence it is plain that that evasion is worthless: it is an irrational and dangerous flight.

The same second argument confirmed in three ways from the same foundation. Cap. XVI.

¹⁶no incipit is printed after "quod incipit."; a blank follows

With the evasion already mentioned to the second principal argument thus shut off, that second principal argument is itself confirmed in three ways. First, thus. If two witnesses are believed, even to the prejudice of a third party, both in court and out of court, about possible things having happened,^[7] then all the more must a multitude be believed, above all when it asserts such a thing in agreement,

[Margin, right, beside the chapter opening: ^s L. ubi numē. ff. de test. et c. nouit. de indi. [?] etiā in criminalib⁹. c. in omni, de test. & per Ant. de But. & Fely. in c. cū dilectus. de calum.]

since, by the topical rule, what belongs where it seems less likely to belong belongs also where it seems more likely to belong [de quo minus videtur inesse & inest, & de quo magis].^a [?] And the multitude of those who tell such things is very great, as was shown above. Moreover, it was also proved above, in the first principal argument, and from Holy Scripture as well, that the things told are themselves possible. These things are therefore not to be denied so easily and so indiscriminately, as some do.

The same second argument is confirmed, secondly, thus. A report that everyone spreads does not wholly perish, and it is impossible that what is commonly reported should be entirely false, according to the Philosopher in the book *De somno & vigilia* and in *Ethics* 7.^u This holds above all if the account rests on the certainty of the senses. For the external senses cannot be deceived about their proper sensibles, as is said in the second book *De anima*. Now all these people tell of things that are seen and done by them beyond nature, and they testify, as eyewitnesses and through several senses, that these things are true. And it is a public and universal report that they all agree on this: that the things they say they perceived are done bodily. These things, therefore, are not to be judged wholly false, nor is it to be thought that such persons are universally deceived or deceiving — although delusions may perhaps often intervene, as was explained above.

The same argument is confirmed, thirdly, thus. Suppose something is more incredible than the matter under discussion, or at least equally incredible, and is nevertheless believed by the holy Doctors, and asserted as certain, for this reason alone: that it is recounted and confirmed by a multitude of men and women — both those who have experienced it and those who have learned and come to know it from those who experienced it. Then all the more must everyone believe what is more credible, or at least equally credible, and equally widespread and affirmed by those who have experienced it, or who have learned it by a sure report from those who have. For since believing quickly and without reason is a sign of levity — according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus 19: *He who believes quickly is light of heart* — this ought to be further from the most holy and weighty Doctors of the holy Church, who are endowed, both naturally and supernaturally, with gifts of intellect beyond all others, than from anyone else whatever.

Now all the things that the *striges* tell of being done in that diabolical course are more credible — apart from this one thing which they also affirm happens to them, namely that demons are incubi or succubi to them — than that very excepted thing, that this should be accomplished by demons there or anywhere else. And yet Augustine, Thomas and the other theologians hold this as certain on the assertion of the multitude alone. All the more, therefore, ought we not to deny the things under discussion. That this is more incredible, and seems further from the possible, is evident from the fact that demons, being spiritual creatures, admit bodily pleasures or delights no more than stones do, and can no more be delighted by them with sensitive delight than stones can.

[Margin, left: ^a [?] De qua habetur ī auth. multo magis C. de sac. san. eccle.]

[Margin, left: ^u Et satis patet ex notatis per Bar. in l. de minore. §. plurimū. ff. de quastio.]

For just as stones lack senses, so do angels, and those delights are objects of the senses; consequently such delights seem foreign to the will of these same spirits as well. Admittedly, in assumed bodies [*corpora assumpta*] they can perform such works and movements, as though vital ones, and take pleasure in them intellectually but not sensually, for the ruin of souls — the souls, I mean, of those who have such a most foul commerce with them. Yet, as we have said, these works — most vile, displaying a vileness of mind, as being subject to the passions of the most shameful concupiscence — seem further removed from the refined nature of these spirits than works carried out in the bodily sphere, which nevertheless display their power and might in advance. Of this latter kind are the things told as happening to such people in that diabolical course. The former, therefore, would be less credible than the latter.

That the holy Doctors are moved to believe the less credible things by no reason or revelation, and proclaim them as true to all Christians solely on the faith of those who tell them, is plain above all from the divine Augustine. He was the first among Catholics to set these very things down in writing — not merely as possible but as having actually occurred — in book 15 of *De civitate Dei*, chapter 23, where he says: *It is a very widespread report, and many confirm that they have either experienced it themselves or heard it from those who had experienced it, men whose good faith is not to be doubted, that silvani and fauns, whom the common people call incubi, have been wicked toward women and have sought and achieved intercourse with them; and that certain demons, whom the Gauls call dusii, constantly attempt and accomplish this uncleanness — so that to deny it would seem impudent.* So Augustine. The holy Doctor also holds this very thing, and only on account of Augustine's induction just cited. Nor can the other holy doctors — namely Gregory and Isidore, who affirm that such demons exist as incubi and succubi, as was adduced above — be moved to it by any reason other than the one already stated, since this is not found in Holy Scripture, nor in any revelation to the ancients, nor through the natural course of events.

Since, then, the report of what the *striges* assert is more common, and the assertion more certain, in that it has everywhere been confirmed by judicial oath, it follows *a maiori* [from the greater] that undoubted faith must be given to them. For if these things are denied, and reckoned as if introduced by people who are raving, then those who related the things that are less credible would have to be thought no less raving. Yet the holy Doctors believe those things, as we said, as learned from the account of people who were not raving.

Moreover — and this strengthens and confirms the proposition still further — the very thing the *striges* assert about their transformation, their at least apparent transformation, I mean, into cats, Augustine holds to be most true, although he does not speak of this particular species. And he holds it only on the account of those who affirmed that they had heard such things on the most certain authority, or affirmed that they had even experienced them. For in book 18 of *De civitate Dei*, chapter 17, after relating what the Gentiles tell of the companions of Ulysses changed into beasts by Circe the sorceress [maga], and of the Arcadians who, by swimming across a pool, were turned into wolves — and again of Arcadians turned into wolves after drinking a certain sacrificial liquor offered to their god Lycaeus — after some further remarks he adds, and proves, that these things are to be believed, because such things were reported to happen in his own times too. So he says: *For if we should say that these things are not to be believed* (namely, the things related above), *there are even now people who affirm that they have heard certain things of this kind on the most certain authority, or have even experienced them. For when we too were in Italy, we used to hear such things about a certain region of those parts, where, they said, women who kept inns, steeped in these evil arts, used to give travellers — whichever ones they wished or could — something in cheese, by which they were at once turned into beasts of burden and carried whatever was needed; and after the work was done they returned to themselves again. Yet their mind did not become bestial, but remained rational and human.* So Augustine.

From this it is plain that he believed such things to be done by magic art only on the assertion of many witnesses. Not unlike them are the things the Inquisitors declare to happen to *striges*, and this on the account of those who have experienced them — as with the transformation of *striges* into cats: not, however, a true change of their natural species, but an apparent one. The same reasoning holds for every other marvellous event related by such people concerning the incidents of the diabolical course and confirmed by a countless multitude of witnesses. Since, then, it has been proved above that all such things are possible and do not conflict with Holy Scripture, they are beyond doubt to be believed by everyone — unless someone would be wiser than Augustine and the other holy doctors, who imitate that same Augustine in this belief.

The third argument to the same point, drawn from manifold experience and adduced through persons of rank. Cap. XVII.

[Margin, left: ^x Ca. Quam sit. de elect. in 6.]

Thirdly, it is proved that these things are to be believed, just as the Inquisitors declare them true, by an argument taken from experience, which is called the mistress of things.^x The argument runs thus. What is proved by manifold experience is not to be denied, for nothing is more certain than what is made known by the senses — which belongs to experience. But the things related by the *striges* have also been proved in various places, as to the substance of the fact, through the experience of people other than the *striges*. This is shown first as regards bodily transport. I pass over the things recorded by the ancient authors — Vincent, I mean, the author of the *Historiale*, and Peter

Damian — on which see, if you like, the *Malleus maleficarum*, part 2, chapter 3; this will also be set out briefly in the replies to the arguments. For now I bring forward only the things related in our own times by those who knew them for certain. Concerning the truth of the said diabolical course, then, I pass over the countless things they tell of as having happened long ago, which are also proved true by the witness of Scripture, and I wish to bring forward a twofold argument of the most recent date.

A certain Venerable Father, Brother Paulus de Caspano, of our Order, assured me this present year that a certain priest named Io. Antonius de Palauisinis, a man of good repute, has lived for a long time, and still lives, in the Valtellina, in the village [castrum] of Caspano. The priest told him that when he rose from bed in the morning before dawn, as was his custom, to say the divine office or for some other reason, it happened many times that he saw a great crowd of men and women on the nearby plain, running this way and that with various lights, in the manner of people at play. The priest said he knew for certain that these were *strigones* and *striges* who are carried off to the course so as to enjoy carnal pleasures of every kind.

In addition, a distinguished physician of Ferrara, who practises publicly in this same city in the care of the sick and is called Master Sozinus Bentius, recently related to me, on the most trustworthy testimony, the following. About three years ago he was in the country to inspect his own estates, and he happened to fall into conversation about *striges* with his steward. When the physician said that what is told of *striges* is ravings — and above all the claim that they are carried bodily to the imagined course — the steward at once asserted the contrary. (He is still living, and is called Thomasinus Pollastros; he is from the territory of Mirandola, but now lives in those border parts, in a place called Clauica Malaguzzi.) He said that another peasant lived nearby who tells that he saw men and women dancing together at night in a very great multitude and giving themselves over to pleasures. Astonished at this, the physician asked his steward to summon that peasant to him. Summoned and questioned about these matters, the peasant replied as follows:

"One night I had got up three hours before dawn to come with my oxen and cart and help this steward of yours in some business. When I reached this plain" (he pointed to it with his hand, since it was nearby) "I saw — from a distance, however — a great deal of fire in various places, like great lights. Among them

I also caught sight of a multitude of men and women, as if contending with one another, or even dancing together. Coming closer, I saw more than six thousand people by the clear light the fires made, and tables laid, and some of them eating and drinking, a great many dancing, and games of different kinds being played there; and several also behaving more wantonly than it would be right to put into words. Among them I saw some men and women known to me, and I even spoke with a few of them then. But after an hour, at a certain signal, they all fled from there at a very swift run (so it seemed), and, as if carried off by a cloud, they appeared nowhere." When the physician had received this testimony, he changed his opinion: he now believed that what he had previously thought ravings is not merely possible but actually happens.

Experiences of the bodily course and of the transport of striges to distant places, adduced through common people. Cap. XVIII.

I judge that this same thing should also be proved by the testimony of common people living in Ferrara, so that anyone who wishes can be assured of it without going far.

First, a certain Andreas Magnanus of Bergamo, who lives in Ferrara, told me this winter that he had learned from a kinsman of his living in Venice what happened some years ago: namely, that a certain girl, who lived with her mother in Bergamo, was found at night in Venice in the bedchamber of that kinsman. She was discovered naked in the morning and recognized, since she was his cousin. When they asked her how she had come there, or was there, and why, she wept, and after they had clothed her she related what I set down below, saying:

"Tonight, while I lay awake in bed, I saw my mother, who thought I was asleep, get up from bed, take off her shift, and anoint her body with a certain ointment, which she took from a small vessel drawn out from under the bricks [de sub lateribus]. At once she mounted a staff prepared there, in the manner of someone riding, and was carried out through the window, and from then on I did not see her there at all. I too got up from bed, anointed my body as my mother had done, and was drawn out through the window and at once carried to this place, where I saw my mother lying in wait for this boy as he lay in bed. Terrified at this, and having seen that my mother too was disturbed by my arrival and threatening, I called on the name of the Lord Jesus and the Blessed Virgin. From then on I did not see my mother, and I remained here naked and alone."

When he had heard this from the girl, that kinsman of the narrator wrote all of it to the Father Inquisitor of Bergamo. The woman was seized by him and put to torture, and confessed everything. She added that she had been carried there by the demon more than fifty times in order to kill that boy, the son of the kinsman already mentioned; but she had never succeeded, because she always found him well protected by his parents with the sign of the cross and holy prayers

A certain Antonius Leo, a charcoal-burner [carbonarius] from the Valtellina [de Valle Tellina] who lives in Ferrara, also told me this year that in his native district he had come to know the man to whom the following things happened. That man suspected his wife, on the report of many people, of going to the course while he slept at night. So one night he pretended to be sound asleep. When his wife noticed this, she got up from bed, anointed herself with an ointment from a small vessel she had hidden beforehand, and at once was nowhere to be seen. Her husband, astonished and led by a certain curiosity, got up from bed and did what his wife had done. At once he was carried through the chimney (so it seemed to him) — the same chimney up which he had seen his wife ascend — and was brought into the wine cellar of a certain noble count, where he also found his wife together with many others. But as soon as the wife saw him, she and the others made a certain sign and left at once, leaving her husband behind in that place. In the morning he was found by the servants of the house, seized with shouting as though he were a thief, and set before the count; given the chance to speak, he related with a blush what had happened. As a result his wife was accused before the Inquisitor, finally confessed, and paid a penalty fitting her crimes.

To want to believe only what one happens to see with one's own eyes (let me turn my words for a moment to the obstinate) is a sign of stupidity or of great wickedness: whatever sort of person someone happens to be, he supposes everyone else to be the same — liars, I mean, and deceivers.

From the cases related above, however, it must by no means be supposed that some natural power resides in that ointment, as though all who anointed themselves with it would have to be carried off in this way, or could be. For then they would be carried to one place only, or at least to one kind of place [ad vnam duntaxat differentiam loci], since nature is determined to one effect only, as is said in the second book of the *Physics*. Nor is the devil subject to the natural powers of bodily things as regards causing local motion, since he is nobler than they and free of all matter; for such powers terminate only in material things themselves. Rather, just as an animal is drawn by food, so a spirit is drawn by signs, as Augustine says in book 21 of *De civitate Dei*, chapter 6. For there is a pact, tacit or express, made with the evil spirits by these persons, or by others who first introduced these practices: namely, that they deny the faith and baptism, trample on the cross, never utter any holy name, and incur other most abominable crimes of this kind. Once some deed is then performed as a sign — such an anointing, for example — the devil is at once present of his own will. And so, of his own choice, he either takes on whatever shape he pleases, even that of beasts, or attends invisibly, and carries the wretched persons to the appointed places — according to their will or even to his own — and brings them back from there. A demon of a lower order could also be compelled to this by a higher demon who presides over him — the one, that is, to whose power the lower is subject. For there is precedence and subjection

among spiritual creatures, good as well as evil, as is plain from Saint Thomas, I. q. 109. art. 2.

For these reasons, then, it happens that even if some people sometimes smear themselves with such an ointment intending to be transported, they by no means get their wish, whether they have a pact with the demons or not. Others, by contrast, anointed at some time with such a pernicious unction, have been transported even though they did not intend to be. This comes about from the freedom of the demons, the malice of men sometimes demanding it, so that to their own ruin they obtain what is contrary to their salvation. And through the goodness of God certain people are sometimes guarded from such an evil, even against their own will. Sometimes, too, the demons are prevented from succeeding in obtaining what they want — either by the good angels, or by evil ones set over them. It is from this protection of the good angels that, as a rule, the demons cannot harm the officials of the faith, nor snatch a heretic from their prisons, even if he anointed his whole body with that execrable ointment. And sometimes the demons' freedom in this matter is displayed in such cases as follows: if a person even anointed in this way breaks some pact confirmed with the demon — by uttering some holy name during the course, for example — she is at once set down or abandoned by the demon, and finds herself in places far removed from her own home, from which she had set out; quite often she has even been flogged by these same demons, and sometimes she is unharmed.

The experience of the apparent transformation of striges into cats. Cap. XIX.

What was assumed in the argument already given — concerning the appearance of *striges* in the form of brute animals, and above all of cats, as the *striges* themselves also confess — is further proved by most trustworthy eyewitnesses, so far as can be judged by human reason. For the Antonius Leo named above and his wife, deposing under oath, told me this year that it is now going on three years since, one night, in their bedchamber, which was very securely bolted [seris optime clauso], two large cats appeared, lying in wait for one of their children. The parents, being asleep, did not notice them until the child let out a cry and a wail. For the cats had already bewitched [strigauerant] the infant by the time the parents were woken, and as a result of this sorcery [maleficium] the boy withered away and died within a few days. Getting up from their bed as quickly as possible, then, they saw the two cats and meant to catch and kill them. The husband struck one of them very hard (so it seemed to him) with an iron shovel, and caught the other in a net; nevertheless they slipped away and shortly afterwards both escaped, and, letting themselves down outside the window, did not appear again that night.

They suffered something similar two years later — that is, a year ago — over a little girl who had been born very recently. She was attacked by two large cats, one of a grey [beretini] colour, the other coloured partly white and partly black on the rest of its body, while everyone was asleep at night, and she woke her parents with her crying. When they saw the cats leaping off the bed, they got up to catch them; but neither time did they succeed, for, as before, the cats

escaped their hands with the greatest ease and fled, letting themselves down through the window of the house. The girl withered away within two days and died. At night, too, they quite often heard the noise of many cats lying in wait for their other children, and also in the place where an ointment was kept that a certain *strix* had given them so that the children might be treated by being anointed with it (for they too had already been bewitched [strigati], though not fatally) — although, as they themselves say, they keep only one small cat in the house. Moreover, the *strix* who was burned a few days ago told them, when they questioned her about these things, that the cats they had seen in the bedchamber had been two women, *striges*, in the form of cats, who had also killed their other children earlier in the way described; she declared that she knew them, and indeed disclosed them — by signs, though, not by name.

Of this same apparent transformation of *striges* into cats, another witness in this same city of Ferrara, named Philippus, a cobbler [cerdo] by trade, assured me this year under judicial oath of the following. Three months ago a certain *strix* had charged him not to forbid any fawning and playful cats he might see to come near a boy whom she had undertaken to cure (having perhaps bewitched [strigatum] him herself). On the same day, then, after she had left, he and his wife saw, an hour later, a large cat never seen by them before, approaching the boy at a rapid pace. The parents, out of fear, drove it off again and again, and at last, as it kept coming back to torment them, their patience gave out. The man shut the door and for a long while beat the cat very hard with a spear as it fled this way and that, and finally forced it to throw itself from a high window, so that the cat seemed to be crushed in its whole body. From then on that old *strix* lay in bed for a great many days, her whole body broken. As a result, the slight suspicion they had held before — that she was a *striga* and had herself bewitched [strigasset] their boy, who was suffering most grievously from this illness, being bewitched [strigiatus] — turned into a strong suspicion, indeed an overwhelming one. For the blows and wounds inflicted on the cat were found on that old woman, corresponding limb for limb.

Countless examples could be brought forward to show this matter plainly. But let these most evident testimonies suffice for now; public instruments have been drawn up concerning them, and they can be confirmed before everyone by the same witnesses, who are still living.

The very thing we undertook to prove in this third argument can be shown in another way as well: namely, through what the *striges* begin before the course and complete during it, or show to have been done there once they have returned from it. From these it will be made plain that such things do not happen by delusion, but truly, really, and in the body.

For before they go to the course they obtain a most sacred host, and when they have afterwards been carried to the appointed place, they offer it to the devil as a gift; and, for the devil's pleasure and at his demand, they leave it there subjected to outrages, and afterwards they by no means find it in their possession. That would not happen if they merely dreamed that they were

doing such things. The other gifts offered in the same way prove the same point — children's umbilical cords, for example, cocks, hens, and other things of this kind, which the demons commonly require in their sacrilegious sacrifices. That this is how matters stand, and that these dedication-gifts [encaenia] of the demons do not appear again after the offering, is attested as proved a thousand times over by the countless trials [processus] of the Father Inquisitors.

From the account of these same *striges* we have likewise learned that when they are first carried to the course, and, having denied the faith of Christ and Baptism before the mistress of the course, do homage to the demon, they receive a handful of earth, handed to them by that same demon. They carry it away with them, and it is really found and kept in their possession; and throughout their whole lives these most wicked persons use it to work sorcery [ad maleficiandum] not only on children but also on men and women of every age, by casting a little of that earth on the persons they wish to destroy. But if all this happened in dreams, or by delusion, they would by no means find such things in their possession afterwards when awake.

I offer another sign of this truth as well. The *striges* assert that twice every week they are unwell — on the morning, namely, of Friday and of Monday — because, from the very swift carrying-back by which, on the nights before, they are returned from the course to their own homes, they suffer something like vertigo once they have been set down; and for this reason they lie in bed and rest for almost that whole morning. By this effect too, as by a most open and clear sign, their acquaintances hold them most strongly suspect of being *striges*, above all where they otherwise devote themselves to illusory works [praestigiosis operibus].

Moreover, the woman who was burned a few days ago confirmed what we have just said, and in addition gave this further indication that her course was true and real. Once, when she was being carried back from the course and had been set down through the chimney into her own room, this could not escape the notice of the members of her household who slept in that same room. And although, to hide what had happened, she offered some other excuse for the sound they had heard, she could not satisfy them so far as to keep them from strongly suspecting that she had then returned from the course — as was in fact the truth of the matter. The mutual agreement, too, in words and deeds while they sit in that devilish assembly is a sign of the most evident truth that these things are not done in dreams: they have recognised one another and kept one another company; they have done and said things together while they are at the course, and afterwards they report them in agreement — just as people who are awake agree, in reporting them, about what they did or said together while awake. For if one of them were dreaming or were deluded, or even both of them, they would by no means agree with one another in this way. We do not find it to happen — indeed it is judged impossible and against nature — that two persons should see the same things in dreams, or think that they had done or said this or that, without any difference at all, as is proved

to happen to such women. For very often several of them agree to go and return together, so that there is now no reason, nor even any appearance of a reason, for denying that these things happen bodily and in the waking state. And if these things sometimes also appear in dreams, or happen by the work of the demon, this is not, for the most part, hidden from those who undergo such things, as was also said above from what is handed down in the *Malleus maleficarum*. Nevertheless, to those who are really carried to the course, as has been said, many things happen in part by delusion [delusorie], both in that motion and at the end-point of the motion; so that the wretches judge that certain things are done and exist there really and bodily which are in fact produced in the imagination [phantastice] by the work of the devil, as will become more fully known in the replies to the arguments.

Why demons so [?] often marshal and heap together large and crowded gatherings of striges, with men and women brought from different regions. Cap. XX.

Someone, however, while granting everything set out above, might still doubt the truth of this concourse of people into one place, repeated so often. Grant that the devil can carry people a long way from place to place, and can also gather many people into one place: even so, it does not seem credible that this happens except very rarely. Very few are read of who were carried through the air by a demon; and more rarely still — indeed never — do we read, whether in the writings of the pagans or in those of churchmen, that even once a gathering of people was made by demons as crowded as a single one, even the smallest, of those which the *striges* are said to hold twice a week in various parts of Christendom. And if it is said that the demons do this in order to deceive people and to lie in wait more savagely for their ruin, it seems that they ought to have done these things from the beginning, since from the beginning they have sought the perdition of mankind with the utmost zeal and insatiable malice. Hence, since no one otherwise knows of this deed — indeed, it is denied by all — by the same token someone will deny that God, best and greatest, ever permits these things.

But since, with so many assertions and such manifest indications, these things are proved to happen in this unhappy age of ours, we shall take care to remove the persuasive scruple raised above by this single consideration: that, as God permits it on account of the graver and ever-growing demerits of mankind, the devil pursues these same people more heavily, and day by day undertakes more pernicious ways of doing harm, aiming at the extinction of the Christian name. Once it has first been made plain that this one disease is the gravest of all, contagious beyond measure, and more hostile than any other to the universal salvation of mankind, we shall then easily show that it is not without reason that these things are becoming more frequent in our times.

The first point is shown by the multitude, together with the gravity, of the crimes, and by the deadly ruin of souls through which the devil strives, by every art he can and with every malice, to conquer the world. For those wretched and unhappy persons, once placed in fellowship, draw one another further

into malice and foster one another in malice, and so their guilt is continually aggravated.

They draw one another further into malice, first by leading others on with words. For any diabolical person who knew or believed herself to be alone — so bound to the demon, so estranged from Christ, and his enemy — would be afraid, I say, to reveal this to another and to lead others into a like crime. But now, knowing themselves to be numbered in so solemn and delightful a society, they lead their relatives, friends and companions on with words outside the course, as though boasting of it and meaning to do them a kindness. They do this, first, by telling of the good things that those who meet at the course enjoy. Second, by removing fear, both of the demons and of the judgements of God: for they say that they have the demons not as enemies, as is preached, but as friends who serve them familiarly at their wish; and they heretically affirm that God does not care about such things, or at any rate cannot punish them — as though he had not the strength to set himself against the demon's power and to avenge the injuries done to him. Third, by removing the apparent impossibility of travelling so far, and indeed by offering the means of doing it through the invocation of demons, and by making those same demons compliant for this very purpose through the execrable anointing which the *striges* perform in their accursed name. Fourth, by creating and strengthening confidence through their own company.

Afterwards, once they are gathered together, those persons foster in malice the others whom they have drawn in. First, by presenting them to the great mistress who presides over so large a multitude, so that, because of the excellence, power, benevolence and graciousness she displays, they may be afraid not to obey her wishes and commands, however execrable; may be afraid not to keep their promises to her; and may not hate her, but rather love her as the author of such great goods, who meets them in everything according to their wish. Second, they are fostered in malice by imitating the multitude. For many persons, even after they have been brought there, would refuse to commit sacrileges against Christ and the faith; yet by imitating their companions they commit the most wicked deeds with greater confidence. From the larger multitude, too, follows greater pleasure in the many delights they enjoy. For if the possession of any good is less pleasant without fellowship, as Boethius [Boethius] says, then from the very fact that they come together in a very great multitude they also abound in more amusements — in dancing, singing, playing music and many curiosities, and above all in the sight of the most beautiful persons who appear there, etc. — so that the desire of these most worthless people is kindled more and more to want to repeat these things more often. From all this the malice of those who sin is continually aggravated. For from frequently repeated evil acts there is generated in them the worst of habits: of unbelief, of apostasy from the faith, and finally of vices of every kind, and chiefly of lust, gluttony, envy and anger; and this habit advances in malice, and their heart is hardened day by day with the greatest obstinacy through the

custom of sinning. A sign of this is that such persons are very rarely converted to God, and that those who are converted are proved to relapse so easily. For the women who are converted commonly say that this conversion is most difficult for them and perseverance hard: partly because of the memory of the delights, and partly because the demons, in various forms, flatter them a great deal — or, if they do not prevail in this way, afterwards really and severely terrify and beat them.

Moreover, their malice is aggravated by the multitude, in that they all conspire, as it were, in a single crime, so that each is held liable to the guilt not only of their own sins but also of those of the whole multitude, to which they consent and in which they take delight. For just as good works are more pleasing to God if they are done by many with one mind — as the Lord's words in Matth. 18 indicate: *Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them* — so too, as regards the malice and gravity of offences, the judgement must be the same. So too in natural things, the power of different agents is the stronger, and spreads the further, the more it is united: burning coals glow more fiercely when they are gathered into one heap.

This most wicked net, therefore, is what the cunning enemy uses, in order to drag after him to the Tartarean Styx a copious multitude of the most unhappy people. The devil did not, however, use this art from the beginning or in ancient times, because what the wicked one chiefly intends by these things is to tear out of the human heart faith in the true God. In ancient times, however, he had bound almost the whole world to his servitude through ignorance of the truth and through unbelief, except for a very few of the Jews; and knowing that this people too was prone to idolatry, he did not judge it necessary to draw them into unbelief by these elaborate arts, but easily brought them to lapse into it. After the coming of the Lord and Saviour, however, the Christian people in the primitive Church, living among unbelievers, had led a most perfect life and held most firmly to the faith, since amid persecutions it shone and burned continually, just as gold too is tried by fire; and at that time the devil's sole, or chief, concern was to protect his kingdom, lest all the unbelievers be converted to Christ. But when peace had been granted, in later times, the worshippers of Christ began to act sluggishly and to cool from the fervour of faith they had conceived. Attacking them accordingly, the devil began through his ministers, the heretics, to seduce countless people, and so to gain his wish through the inner assault made by himself and the outer one made by the heretics themselves — but not yet to lie in wait more grievously for men's salvation through visible apparition.

At last, however, when the heretics had been removed from the scene, or at any rate driven far from the borders of the Christians, the devil began to seduce simpler persons easily, to delude them in many ways, and by various illusions to incline them to unbelief and to the worship of Diana, as is related in c. Episcopi. xxvi. q. v. But when the Christians discovered, through the teaching of the priests, that the one who appeared to those persons as their mistress was no

true god or goddess, the devil — lest he be cheated of his most wicked desire — began to present himself openly to Christians alone as obliging them in everything, and to prepare delights of every kind for them very frequently, provided only that he could banish the faith of Christ from their hearts. So that he might obtain this easily and firmly, he devised the snares already mentioned, and the most wicked wiles of the accursed course and of the assemblies of these most unhappy persons.

At the beginning, indeed, because there were not many who would consent to such malice of his, he used to bring people taken from different places of Christendom, though of one language, through the air to a single place only for each kingdom or each province — around the region of the Jordan, for example, or around the walnut tree of Benevento [nucem Beneuenti], and so on. But at present they have grown so strong, in so great a multitude, that they gather in many places and hold large assemblies, of a great multitude of both sexes and of various conditions, in virtually every diocese: as in the Barco of Ferrara [in barcho Ferrarien.], on the plain of Mirandola, on Monte Paterno near Bologna, and in many other places named by these accursed persons. As a result they are no longer always carried through the air by the demons, but often go on foot and run the faster, because the place is very often near at hand — although in this very thing too they are supported in many ways by the demons. May God, best and greatest, deign at last to root out this accursed sect.

Let this suffice on the third principal point, both for the determination of the whole question and for the explanation of the matter. It now remains to refute the arguments made at the beginning for the false opinion.

For the solution of the first argument, it is first shown that the c. Episcopi, which is alleged to the contrary, is suspect in several ways as to its authority and its truth. Cap. XXI.

Now that the truth concerning the question proposed has been determined, it remains to answer the reasons brought at the beginning for the false side. [Margin: Ad primum — "To the first."] On the first argument, then, which is founded on what is said in c. Episcopi, 26.q.5., a good deal must be said, because those who deny that this diabolical course [cursus] takes place bodily rely and depend solely on the words and the authority of this chapter.

First, then, it must be said, according to some, that this chapter — or rather the council itself — is suspect of falsity, and is to be counted among the *paleae* [inter paleas] no less than the councils of Gabillon. or Biloen. [Gabislon. vel Biloen.] are reckoned to be (d.18.c.Placuit, and c. Annis), and likewise with similar texts. These are rejected, and must be held to be counted among apocryphal writings, for no other reason than that it is not known at what time, under which pontiff, or by whose authority some such council was convoked or confirmed. For very many councils have often been held by heretics and schismatics. In them, it is true, a great many decrees are found that seem to contribute to progress in holy living, and some true things drawn from the wisdom of the holy Doctors are inserted; nevertheless they are not accepted by

the Church — indeed they are condemned — because many false and wrongly ordered things are mixed in with them, and also because it has been found that they were not duly assembled, but rather against the will of the supreme Pontiff, or without his knowledge and good pleasure, to whom alone it belongs to convoke and confirm universal councils (dist. 17. per totum). This is plain in the case of the council of Rimini [concilio Arrimi.], condemned at dist. 15. c. Sancta., and, in most recent times, of the council of Basel, condemned by Eugenius IV [Eug. 4.], and so with several other schismatic councils. And anyone who held that a council can be convoked, assembled or held under any other head than the supreme Pontiff at Rome, who presides over the universal Church in the place of Peter — except perhaps in the case where the Pontiff should fall into heresy — would be a heretic, attacking the primacy of the holy mother Roman Church which she received from Christ (d. 22. c. Omnes. and d. 40. c. Si Papa.). Since, therefore, both the date and the author of this alleged council *Acquirense* [concilij Acquiren.] are unknown, it is with good reason that we are not considered bound to adhere to it, and its sayings or decrees appear to have no authority, unless something else is shown.

Second, such a council is strongly suspected of not having been catholic or approved by the Church, because it puts forward some things that are obscure and not fully consonant with Sacred Scripture — and indeed, in the sense that the adversaries of the Inquisitor fathers give it, false and suspect of heresy. Moreover, in proving its own principal proposition according to the said sense, it proceeds defectively and inefficaciously, and against the truth that is manifest in Sacred Scripture — namely, by implying that the devil cannot do things which Sacred Scripture nevertheless declares to be possible to him. For among other things they draw from the said chapter [d. c.] that people cannot really be carried by the devil from place to place, and that he cannot put on the figure of a man, or of a woman as though made a goddess — which is contrary to Sacred Scripture and to the knowledge and teaching of all the theologians who expound Sacred Scripture.

For that the devil carried Christ from place to place is expressly stated in the Gospel, Matth. 4. Much more, then, can he carry others, and he is reported to have done so in the authentic histories of the saints, and especially of the blessed Apostle James [diui Iac. Apost.]. Moreover, natural power is no less in a bad angel than in a good one; and a good angel carried Habakkuk [Abacuc] across long stretches of land in the briefest time (Dan. 4.). Since the devil can even transform himself into an angel of light, as is said in 1. Cor. 9., and as is stated in the same c. Episcopi, much more will he be able to transform himself into some bodily goddess, such as the pagans themselves believed Diana to be.

That chapter also puts forward things contrary to Sacred Scripture (unless the good gloss interprets them), when it says that whoever believes that any creature can be made, or changed for the better or the worse, or transformed into another species or into another likeness, except by the Creator himself, who made all things and through whom all things were made, is an unbeliever

and worse than a pagan. The contrary of this, as regards another species, is expressly stated in Exo. 7. and 8., where we read that Pharaoh's magi turned their rods into serpents, and also turned the waters into real blood, and produced real frogs. Nor can it be said, in accordance with the faith, that these things happened by way of delusion [delusorie]. For, as the blessed Augustine proves well in the gloss on that place [in gl. ibi.], Scripture names with the same word both the rods of the magi and the rod of Moses, which it is certain was truly turned into a serpent. This interpretation of Augustine's on that passage of Sacred Scripture is also followed and explained by the blessed Thomas (Pot. quaestio. sexta. art. 5. ad 8.), together with other theologians and expositors.

The same point is drawn from the same Scripture by another reasoning as well. If those things had happened by way of delusion, then — since the magi could do such things only by the power of the devil, and since it would be as easy for the devil to make gnats [cyniphes] appear by sleight [praestigiose] as frogs and serpents — the magi could equally easily, by his power, have brought forth the gnats themselves delusively and in appearance only, just as they did the frogs. Yet Sacred Scripture says that the magi could not do this. This is not, indeed, to be understood as though the natural power of the devil did not extend even to the production of those creatures, but because God did not then permit them to produce such animals, as the said Saint Augustine says (3. Tri.), and as the Master recites (7. d. 2.). Anyone who even denied that the devil can convert a creature into another likeness by sleight [per praestigium] would be denying sleight itself, which is a species of divination, and would consequently contradict all the theologians and cap. Nec mirum. 26.q.5.; and he would set himself against all the histories that relate such things as have happened by sleight at various times and places. In what way, however, it is to be understood that the devil can or cannot change one creature into another will be explained below.

¶ Third, the said chapter is suspect of falsity in so far as it puts forward a different sense in Sacred Scripture from the one the holy Doctors hold on that saying of the Apostle, "Whether in the body or out of the body I do not know," etc. Indeed, it prefers the sense that Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas reject, and which the blessed Jerome, in his prologue to Daniel, says was the sense of a certain Jew, who likewise denied what the universal Church confesses — namely, that Habakkuk was carried by an angel to Babylon in a short space of time. Hence, both because the exposition comes from the religion [ex cultu] [?] of the Jew who put it forward, and also because Jerome reported it in order to show that in his translations he suffered many calumnies, above all from the Jews — calumnies he regarded as unjust — it is tacitly implied that he equally detests and condemns the grounds of those calumnies, one of which was the exposition just mentioned, which that Jew was introducing. Since, therefore, the said chapter brings forward that exposition, according to the adversaries' interpretation, it is plain from this very fact that it is suspect of lesser truth.

According to the adversaries, the sense of the Apostle's words — where he says he does not know whether he was caught up to the third heaven in the body or out of the body — the sense introduced by the Jew already mentioned and inserted into the c. Episcopi, is this: that the Apostle did not know whether he had been carried bodily into paradise, or into the third heaven, so that his body together with his soul was transported there, or whether he was certainly caught up out of the body, and saw and heard only in the spirit the things he came to know there. Augustine, however, recites this sense and refutes it (12. super Gen. ad litteram) by the following reasoning. It is certain, he says, from the Apostle's words that he knew he had been caught up to the third heaven. It is certain, therefore, that the heaven into which he was caught up was a true heaven, and not some likeness of heaven. For if he had meant this when he says he was caught up into heaven — that is, to see a likeness of heaven in the imagination — he could in the same way have affirmed that he was caught up in the body, that is, into the likeness of this body. And so it would not have been necessary to distinguish what he knew and what he did not know, since he would have known both equally: namely, both that he was in heaven and that he was caught up in the body according to a likeness, as happens in dreams. But if he knew that it was the true third heaven, then he knew either that it was something spiritual and incorporeal — and so his body could not be caught up there — or that it was something corporeal, and so his soul could not be caught up there without the body unless it were separated from the body. And so, after a long discussion, Augustine concludes the true sense of the Apostle's words, saying: "It remains, then, perhaps, that we should understand him to have been ignorant of this very thing: whether, when he was caught up into heaven, he was in the body in the way the soul is in the body when the body is said to be alive — whether of one awake, or of one sleeping, or of one estranged from the bodily senses in ecstasy — or whether he went out of the body altogether, so that the body lay dead until, when that showing was completed, the soul was restored to the dead limbs; and he did not wake up as one sleeping, or return to his senses as one estranged in ecstasy, but, having been wholly dead, came back to life." So he. Saint Thomas cites and follows him (S.Th. 22. q. 175. ar. 6., and Veri. q. 13. art. 6.).

This is also proved by reason. If the Apostle had not then been on earth in his body — where he had been brought by his companions and fellow travellers, and received as a guest by Judas [a Iuda] — they would have found out this very fact most clearly, and it would have become known to all as a remarkable miracle. If, on the other hand, he had been on earth in the body and not in heaven, his refusal to believe his companions when they affirmed this would be put down to impudence — no less than in someone who is willing to believe only what he perceives with the outward sense. But when a man's body remains motionless, not everyone can tell whether it is utterly dead or is rather in ecstasy. Hence, whatever people told Paul — that he had remained motionless in body — he was not bound to adhere to their opinion, if anyone asserted to him that

he had been dead, or not dead. Since, then, even if this reasoning did not support it, the authority of the saints alone would give warrant to the truth, it is plain that the text of that chapter, in putting forward the contrary sense of the Apostle's words, is rendered suspect as to its truth.

That the chapter Episcopi draws its conclusion inefficaciously, and is on this account suspect of falsity and of lesser authority. Cap. XXII.

The said chapter [d.cap.] is also found to be suspect of falsity and of lesser authority from this: that in proving what it intends it proceeds obscurely, ineptly and altogether inefficaciously — if it has the sense which the adversaries attribute to it when they bring it forward against the truth defined above. For, wishing to prove (according to them) that those women did not really and in the body carry out, or see, the things they related, but were rather deluded by the devil in dreams, or in the spirit alone, it brings forward those two authorities of Sacred Scripture from which, according to these men's interpretation, it would follow that Paul and Ezekiel were not present in the body and according to the bodily senses — the one, I say, in heaven, the other in Jerusalem. And yet from those authorities, as the chapter brings them in to support these men's sense, it does not follow, first, that such a thing cannot happen in the body at all — unless they take the authorities to mean that neither Paul into heaven nor Ezekiel into Jerusalem could in any way have been carried bodily, except perhaps by good angels. But this, in the first place, is false as regards the carrying of Ezekiel [E echielis]. For the devil can carry far heavier bodies, and over longer distances, as was shown above. Secondly, the opposite follows from the very thing they say, since, according to Dionysius [Dion.], the natural gifts remained in the demons most splendid. Whatever, then, the good angels can do by natural power, the evil ones can do as well — and all the more those who are of a more excellent nature. That exposition is also shown to be false by this: if Paul had meant it so, he would certainly have been lying. For he had learned better and more surely than the authors of the said chapter what the good angels, and the evil ones too, are able to do. He would not, then, have said, "I do not know; God knows."

If, on the other hand, they take those authorities in the other sense rather — namely that Paul and Ezekiel were not in fact carried bodily to those places, although they could have been carried there — then they do not get from them the point they are aiming at: I mean, that the *striges* cannot be carried bodily by the devil across long stretches of land. For from "not being" to "not being able" there is no argument. It does not follow: "Peter is not Pope; therefore he cannot be Pope." And yet from those authorities, which state that such transportations were not made in the body, the adversaries want to infer that similar things cannot happen in the body. Nor does it follow, either, that what happened to Ezekiel and to Paul always happens in the same way, and to everyone, with respect to any body whatever and any local distance whatever: for from a particular to a universal the argument is not valid, whether as regards time or as regards the individuals [supposita]. These are the best-known first

principles among learned logicians, plain even to children and the unlettered. For who would infer, "At some time Peter existed; therefore Peter always existed"? Likewise, who would reckon this a good inference: "Some man is good; therefore every man is good"? And yet, according to the adversaries, deductions of just this kind are made in that chapter, in this way: "Paul and Ezekiel were not carried to those places in the body; therefore no one can ever be carried in the body in such a way." Moreover, from a particular — and much more from one singular to another singular — the consequence, or argument, is not valid, whether it is made affirmatively or negatively. Thus it does not follow: "Some man, or even Socrates [Sortes], runs; therefore Peter runs"; or, "Some man, or even Socrates, is not good; therefore Peter is not good." And yet, according to those who hold the contrary opinion in the article of the present question, the said chapter *Episcopi* [d.c.Episcopi.] means to argue thus: "Paul and Ezekiel were not carried in the body; therefore neither are those women carried in the body." Hence it is plain that, since these consequences are laughable in the judgement of the learned, the whole chapter too — in the sense that these men who oppose the Inquisitors find in it — is of no authority whatsoever. It is proved not to have proceeded from the Holy Spirit, nor to have come from a good, true and duly convened council; it is rather to be counted among the *paleae* [inter paleas].

Let those who expound the said chapter [d.c.] in this way also consider what proof it offers, according to them. It is this, I say: "In sleep and in visions of the night a man is led out of himself, and while sleeping sees many things he had never seen while awake; therefore the same thing happened to those women with regard to the things they related as done or seen." Likewise, this proof is worthless: "He is foolish and dull who thinks that what happens in the spirit alone happens in the body as well; therefore they are foolish and dull who believe that those women truly and bodily did, or saw, what they related." Do not these proofs assume that those women merely dreamed such things — which is precisely what had to be proved? If, then, the said chapter had the sense these men take from it, it proceeded most inefficaciously. If, however, it is interpreted otherwise, so that its truth and authority can be saved — as we shall try to do below — the adversaries will not get their point from it, as will also be shown there. But for now certain other matters must first be touched on.

That one is not necessarily bound to stand by the statements of that chapter Episcopi if it issued from a synodal council; and that even if it had come from a general council, appeal must be made to the Pontiff, so that by his declaration he may exclude the erroneous senses the adversaries find in it. Cap. XXIII.

Supposing, however, that this chapter issued from a duly convened council, it is still said, secondly, that the argument founded on it does not go through, for two reasons. The first is that it is not yet known whether such a council was synodal or indeed general — and only a general council binds everyone. There is a probable argument that this council was not general, namely that among

the general councils enumerated by Gratian (d. 15. or 17.) no council *Acquirense* is found. And no one ought to doubt in the least that Gratian enumerated all the councils adequately, especially since in d. 15. he promises that he means to assign the origin of the ecclesiastical constitutions, which have commonly arisen from the sacred councils. So if this constitution and mandate had been authentic, he would also have set out its origin first, counting this council *Acquirense* among the general and duly convened councils; otherwise he would not have believed that he had adequately handed down the series of all the councils. This council, then, was not general — or at any rate it carried no authority with him, perhaps because it was not duly convened. A sign of this is that it earned no glossator among the ancients, perhaps because they did not have it inserted in the book of the Decrees [*decretorum libro*]. And if some of the moderns, such as Juan de Torquemada [*Io. de Turrecremata*], have expounded it, they have said that only four things belong to its principal intention — so that the truth contained in it might be saved, all the falsity it puts forward being excluded. What those four principally intended points are will be set out below.

If it is said that many other general councils not previously enumerated are brought in in the book of the Decrees [*libro Decretorum*], the answer is, first, that to adduce awkward consequences is not to solve the question. Secondly, if the date and author of those councils are also unknown, and they contain irrational or false things — such as we shall show this chapter contains — then they too need not necessarily be adhered to; and if anyone wishes to defer to them, they are to be interpreted charitably, as we shall do below with this one as well.

¶ But perhaps someone will still try, with some probability, to argue that such a council was general, and that it was held under the presidency or by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, since it gives orders to bishops without distinction — which, it seems, only the Pope can do, because he alone is their ordinary superior. For this is one of the signs brought forward by the Gloss (*Glo. in c. ut circa. in verb. Perpetuo. de elec. lib. 6.*) for distinguishing general councils from particular ones. The chapter itself also orders that it be publicly announced to all that whoever believes such things and things like them loses the faith. But only one who presides over all can order that a mandate, or any determination of faith whatever, be announced to all. And such is the Pope alone, or else a general council by his authority.

The answer, then, is this. If the chapter gave its order to all bishops absolutely, it would certainly follow from this that the council had been general (provided it was otherwise duly convened), since, as is argued, the Pope alone is set over all bishops and has full authority over all. But that is not what is found in that chapter: it speaks indefinitely, saying "bishops" in the plural. And although an indefinite proposition is sometimes equivalent to a universal one, it is not always so, nor formally so. A Metropolitan, moreover — whether he be Primate or Patriarch, or simply Archbishop — can convene a provincial council, to

which all the bishops of that province, when summoned, are bound to come; otherwise they are excommunicated (d. 18. c. si episcopus. c. si quis. c. Decernimus.). And the council can order them whatever it judges should be ordered, and they are bound to observe what has been ordained in it (d. 92. c. si quis episcopus primo, secundo, tertio.). Similarly, where it is said in the chapter *Episcopi* [c.Epi.] that it is to be announced to all, etc., one could interpret this to mean that it does not speak absolutely of all, but only of all its subjects. Or that it gives this warning not by way of command, but as it were by way of teaching — that this is to be preached to all, as if to say: "This doctrine is to be announced to all, as being true and bearing on the salvation of all." In this way even one who is not a prelate, and who has no jurisdiction but only the office of teaching, can give warning. Much more, then, can a particular council warn everyone in this way. But it cannot command everyone — only its own subjects.

Moreover, to dissent from any particular council whatever — when it commands erroneous or ill-judged things; or in those determinations which reason, or the authority of the holy doctors or of the most eminent theologians, contradicts; or at least in those matters which, according to the glosses and the doctors, do not belong to the principal intention of the council, or which admit of no exposition except an absurd sense — as happens in the case before us concerning the article of the present question, so far as the adversaries' exposition of the said chapter goes — is not erroneous or rash, but salutary, praiseworthy and ^y meritorious.

[Margin: y Vt patet ex 7. d. per totum, praesertim in c. fin. Et si tu opponas de nota. per gl. et per doc. in c. cū dilectus. de ele. ubi dicitur, quod inferior Papa tenetur obedire cōciliis. de quo etiā habetur per Fel. in c. non nulli. col. 4. de resc. praesertim quando de fide in conciliis agitur, quo casu etiam Papa nō potest contra eam disponere, secundum gl. in c. in istis. 4. dist. et ī c. sicut. 15. dis. cum similib. ut Fel. tradit in c. 1. col. 8 in princ. de cōst. Responderi potest, quod illa procedunt in cōciliis vniuersalibus congregatis a Papa, vel collegio Cardinaliū iux. not. per Bal. ī trac. schismatis col. 15 posito sub rub. C. si quis aliq. testam. — "As is plain from 7. d. throughout, especially in the last chapter. And if you object with what is noted by the gloss and by the doctors on c. *Cum dilectus*, *De electione*, where it is said that one inferior to the Pope is bound to obey councils — on which see also Fel. on c. *Non nulli*, col. 4, *De rescriptis* — especially when matters of faith are being treated in councils, in which case even the Pope cannot dispose against it, according to the gloss on c. *In istis*, 4. dist., and on c. *Sicut*, 15. dis., with similar texts, as Fel. teaches on c. 1, col. 8, at the beginning, *De constitutionibus*: the reply can be that those points hold for universal councils convened by the Pope or by the college of Cardinals, according to what is noted by Bal. in the tract on schism, col. 15, placed under the rubric *C. si quis aliq. testam.*"]

For just as those who expound the sacred scriptures, exploding a wrong understanding of them and so bringing them to light, are commended, and

eternal life is promised them — according to that verse of Ecclesiasticus 24 [Ecclesiastici. 24.]: "They that explain me shall have life everlasting" — so too an author is rendered worthy of praise by explaining any truth (since, according to Ambrose [Ambr.], truth comes only from the Holy Spirit) and by refuting any falsehood contrary to it. The teaching of the holy Fathers, too, above all in matters touching faith or good morals, is to be received and venerated only according to their principal intention and sound understanding — excluding, I say, everything that could produce a false and erroneous sense.

The particular councils themselves, moreover, of which c. *Ad abolendam, de heretic.*, speaks — as is touched on in the argument — have no competence to examine or judge a matter of heresy except when the fact is clear. For if it were doubtful, the question must then be referred to the Pope alone, by whose sole authority causes of faith are determined (d. 18. c. multis. 24. q. j. c. Quotiens. & extra de Bapti. c. Maiores.). So the gloss determines on the said c. *Quotiens*, and the lord Abbot [D. Abbas] on the said c. *Ad abolendam*. Of the things brought forward and condemned in the said chapter *Episcopi*, some are clearly heretical: for instance, that anything of divinity [aliquid numinis] is to be found besides the one God; that some people are led or carried off to serve one of the gods or goddesses other than the one true God; that the one who shows and urges such things is a good spirit; that the devil can suddenly and without the ministry or power of nature [naturae ministerio vel virtute], transform one creature into another species or shape. As for the other things that, going by the surface [corticem] of the words, seem to be condemned — namely, that people cannot be carried by demons in a very short time across long stretches of land, and cannot bodily see and do the things these women relate, apart from the truth of their divinities [praeter numinum veritatem] — it is not clear that they are heretical. On the contrary, among the wise the opposite is clear; among others it is either believed or doubtful. Hence, if such a particular council had determined that these things were heretical, one ought not to adhere to it, and no one becomes a heretic by reasonably departing from it. But if the wise were in doubt about such matters, the Pope would have to be consulted, as in other doubts of faith.

[Margin: prohi. [?] Et per eundē Bal. ī c. olim. de re scr. & Dec. in c. significasti de ele. Secus uidetur in concilijs particularibus, uel etiam generalibus: ab his tamē cōgregatis, qui non habent potestatē cōgregandi generale concilium, vt patet ex no. per Fely. in d. c. 1. col. vij. de cōsti. & tale videtur concilium de quo habetur in d. c. Epi. Et ex his si diligenter consideraueris, tollūtur quæ no. glo. in c. vt circa in iure perpetuo, de elect. lib. vi. vltra quod conciliū non obligat quod nō est moribus vrentiū approbatū. iuxta no. per gl. in cap. 1. de treu. & pac. vt etiam ibi Fely. tradit col 4 vsq; ī fi. illius cap. — "...prohi[buerit] [?]. And by the same Bal. on c. *Olim*, *De rescriptis*, and Dec. on c. *Significasti*, *De electione*. It seems otherwise in particular councils, or even in general ones when convened by those who have no power to convene a general council, as is plain from what Fely. notes on the said c. 1, col. 7, *De constitutionibus*; and

such seems to be the council treated in the said c. *Episcopi*. And from these points, if you consider them carefully, what the gloss notes on c. *Ut circa*, in *iure perpetuo*, *De electione*, Book 6 [of the Decretals], is removed; beyond which, a council does not bind in what is not approved by the customs of those who use it, according to what the gloss notes on cap. 1, *De treuga et pace*, as Fely. also teaches there, col. 4, up to the end of that chapter.”]

^z [?] Yet there is no need for this to be done now concerning the article of the present question. For since the Pope has several times granted favour and privileges to the fathers Inquisitors in this matter, as was brought forward above, it is plain that he approves their proceeding lawfully against such persons as against heretics. This being so, one must either take that chapter in another sense or depart from it altogether.

Nor has that chapter gained any authority from being placed in the body of law [corpus iuris]. For this was done not by the authority or will of the Supreme Pontiff, but only by that of Gratian. For even without this, had it been a general council, it would carry authority, just as the decretal letters of the Apostolic See themselves have irrefragable authority (d. 19. c. si Romanorum.). And even if the said council was general — as Saint Thomas [s. Tho.] seems to concede (*Spiritu*. art. 2, ad 14), where he also expounds its statements and calls it the council of Aquileia [concilium Aquilegiense] — we are not bound to adhere to it in such a way that we must grant absurd and irrational things for its sake; rather, we must expound it piously. And that prohibition would be exceedingly irrational and absurd if it were its intention to say that whoever believes that some people are carried bodily to the game [ludus] is a heretic and an infidel, on the ground that in that chapter those who believe those women are also condemned. For it would then follow that those who believe the — so to speak — countless processes of the Inquisitors, which assert that *striges* are really and bodily carried to the devil's game [ludus diabolicus], are entangled in the error of the pagans; that they believe there is something of divinity [aliquid numinis] besides God, and that these things are done by a good spirit; and the other such things that are asserted as heretical in that chapter. This is utterly false, for neither the *striges* nor the others who assert that the sect of the *striges* is carried bodily to the course [cursus] believe any of these things to be true. It is therefore not to be believed that the said chapter [d. c.] intends these very things.

Nor would a council bind if it were shown to determine something formally or virtually contrary to the sacred scriptures as regards the literal sense that the holy Doctors commonly held in them. Rather, one would have to appeal against such a council to the Supreme Ponti- ff. Just so, Jerome [Hierony.] rightly opposed a council that determined that a woman who had been abducted could not marry her abductor, showing that this conflicts with the sacred scriptures (Exod. 22 and Deutero. 22). For this reason the council revoked its sentence, as the gloss attests [vt textatur glo.] [recte: testatur] on c. *De libellis*, d. 20, and as is drawn from 36 q. 2. c. tria., c. si autem., and c. Placuit. Hence in the

present case, too, one could appeal to the Pontiff against the council, even had it been general, so that he might clarify, and bring back to the truth, whatever in the said chapter [d. c.] seemed to conflict with the sacred scriptures.

[Margin: *prædictorū vide quæ tradit Fel. in c. Ne initaris, de cōsti. quia hoc est altū pelagus longiori indigēs discussione. — "...see what Fel. teaches on c. Ne innitaris [recte: innitaris], De constitutionibus; for this is a deep sea and needs longer discussion."*]

That, supposing the council Acquirense was general and duly convened, and supposing too everything that is said in it, the Striges do not escape the hands of the Inquisitors. And on the various modes and kinds of illusion. Cap. XXIII.

But even if it were laid down as certain — which has been proved to be doubtful — that the council, I mean, was general and duly convened, the said chapter [ex. d. c.] still yields the very conclusion that many people cite the said chapter against the Inquisitors in order to escape. That conclusion is this: such accursed and wicked persons do not escape the hands, or the judgement, of those same Inquisitors if these *striges* are said, like those wicked women (of whom the said chapter speaks), to be deluded by the devil in dreams or in the spirit, as certain people try to prove from that chapter. Not only do they fail to escape through such a chapter; through it they actually fall back into the hands of those same Inquisitors. For by that very chapter those wicked women are caught out and judged heretics, infidels, and apostates from the faith.

Their apostasy is marked in the very first words, where it is said that "certain wicked women, turned back after Satan," etc. For to apostatize from the faith is nothing other than to turn back from God after Satan, whom one had renounced in Baptism with one's conversion to our Lord Jesus Christ. That the words just quoted do not mean some other turning back than the one that comes about through infidelity — so that they imply apostasy from the faith, according to c. Non obseruetis. 26. q. 7. — is plain from the words brought in a little later in the same chapter, where it is said: "But would that these women alone had perished in their faithlessness, and had not drawn many with them into the ruin of infidelity. For a countless multitude too, deceived by this opinion, believe these things to be true, and by believing them stray from the right faith and are entangled in the error of the pagans, since they judge that there is something of divinity or godhead [*aliquid diuinitatis aut numinis*] besides the one God," etc. This same point is made manifest by the words that follow, where it is said of Satan that he subjugates the minds of such persons through infidelity; and a little later, that he makes such an infidel suppose that what happens in the mind alone happens in the body. And at the end it says that whoever believes such things loses the faith, is an infidel, and is worse than a pagan. Since, then, according to the adversaries, the *striges* are deluded by demons in the same way, it follows that they must be investigated and judged by the Inquisitors as infidels and apostates from the faith. For all infidelity and apostasy after baptism is reduced to heresy, or is contained under heresy taken

in a broad sense, and the fathers Inquisitors have universal jurisdiction to judge it.

This argument would convince more forcefully those who held that the sect of the *striges* [sectam strigum] is the same as the one the said chapter *Episcopi* speaks of, or is wholly comprehended under it. Yet, as we have shown, it also convinces the others, who hold that the two are different and nevertheless argue that just as those women are deluded, so are these. For if they want this argument of theirs to be valid — that the *striges* are not really carried to the game [ludus] but are deluded in dreams, because those wicked women were deluded — they would consequently also have to argue that just as those women are taken captive by the Devil through infidelity and apostasy before the delusion, so are these.

That argument, however, is not valid. Nor does the chapter mean to affirm that no women whatever can be carried by the devil. Rather, it means that those women were not truly carried to serve some goddess, since no such goddess can exist, but were deluded by the devil, who in deluding them can present now a known person, now an unknown one. And this happens in several ways.

In one way he can delude by sleight [per praestigium]. In this case the alteration takes place not on the side of the thing seen but on the side of the one who sees: the devil dazzles the eyes of the viewer, and there are brought to them, from the imagination, the species of things that appear in this way, or species composed out of those, so that the thing seems present in reality in the way it is shown by the imagination alone, and not in the way it is truly placed before the gaze of the eyes. So it was, as was said above, with that woman who in the time of the blessed Macarius [Macharii] appeared to others to be a mare, while the blessed Macarius saw her truly as she was, a woman, because the devil could not delude him by sleight as he did the others.

In another way delusion comes about through the appearance of a thing newly formed by the devil in the likeness of someone. In that case, although the viewer is deluded in supposing that some person is there who is not truly present, the cause of the delusion lies not on the side of the viewer but on the side of the thing seen. It is in this way that the devil is said to be able to transform himself into an angel of light; and this can happen even in waking, by his forming a body out of condensed air in the likeness and shape of a man or an angel — just as the holy angels, too, used to appear to the ancient fathers and sometimes to dwell with them in human form.

In a third way delusion can come about in the interior imagination alone, when a person is drawn toward the likeness of a thing, which the imagination offers as if it were the thing itself. This happens in dreams and in the various alienations of the senses that are caused either by illness, as in the delirious [freneticis], or by natural rapture, or by the working of demons; and in all these modes of alienation deception is always mixed in. In a holy rapture, by contrast, caused by God through the ministry of angels, what is found is not deception but instruction, as is evident from the rapture of Paul and of other saints — just

as people are sometimes instructed by God in dreams too, according to that text of Job. 33: "Through a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falls upon men and they sleep in their bed, then he opens the ears of men, and teaching them, instructs them in discipline," etc.

These three modes in which the devil can appear to people to delude them are touched on virtually in the said chapter *Episcopi*, if it is not to have an inept sense and so suffer from this the argument that it has lesser authority. For seeing and being deluded by sleight, and likewise being drawn through the imagination toward a likeness in place of the thing, is comprehended in the chapter where it declares that some things are sometimes seen in the spirit and that people are deceived by this. The seeing of phantasmal bodies [corpora phantastica] formed by the devil's power as if they were real is made manifest by the authority of the Apostle. And the chapter means that in some such way those women could be driven out of their minds by the snares of the devil, so that afterwards, even when their senses were restored [solutis sensibus], they thought they had been carried off to the service of the goddess — a delusion they would have noticed while awake, had their mind not been held captive by the devil.

A summary explanation of the chapter Episcopi, adduced as far as the purpose of this question requires; and how the things narrated there differ from those that are said to happen to the Striges. Cap. XXV.

So that the principal intention of the said chapter — according to the Catholic sense it can bear — may be better understood, and so that it may be seen how, rightly understood, it furnishes no argument and does not fight against the truth already determined, I propose to explain it briefly. It must be understood, then, that the said chapter presupposes one thing that we hold for certain by faith as well as by natural reason: namely, that there is one sole true God, and nothing whatever of divinity [numinis] besides him. The Gentiles and pagans nevertheless thought the contrary, introducing and worshipping a multitude of gods. And the women mentioned in the said chapter asserted that Diana — one, I mean, of the goddesses of the Gentiles — and Herodias, turned as it were into a goddess of equal rank, who was the worst of women, were to be found [inueniri]; that they venerated them as goddesses; and that they obeyed and served them as divinities. Not only did these women themselves thus stray from the right faith, entangled in the pagans' errors; they also drew countless others into the same faithlessness [perfidiam] by these assertions and persuasions of theirs. The council set itself against this ruin of souls, teaching that all these things are false; that no credence whatever is to be given to those who assert them, because they could not truly have come to know them, since they are false; and that it was by diabolical illusion alone that such things seemed to them true and known as if by familiar experience.

Intending also to make plain how, I mean, this delusion could come about, the chapter first sets out a twofold cause of the delusion: the first on the side of the devil who deludes, the second on the side of those deluded. Next it discloses

the various mode of the delusion. Lastly it shows about what things they were deluded.

First, then, it proves that these wicked persons are deluded by the devil, because this is easy for the devil, since he transforms himself into an angel of light. It argues, as it were, like this: if he does what is greater, by transforming himself into an angel of light, he can also do what is less, by transforming himself into men or into beasts, or at any rate into the forms of persons who, according to the opinion of the Gentiles, were turned into gods. On the side of the deluded, however, it assigns their infidelity as the cause of their delusion. For by reason of this, through God's just permission, the devil receives the power to practise this delusion against them, so that "he that is filthy, let him be filthy still." From this assigned cause we are given to understand that once the infidelity ceases, that diabolical delusion consequently ceases as well. And so those persons, once converted to the faith or freed in any other way from the devil's captivity, would recognize that they had been deluded — just as the delirious [phrenetici], once afterwards brought back to health, recognize the difference between the two states and only then first notice that in the state of delirium [phrenesis] they were being deluded.

The said chapter indicates the mode of this delusion when it says that they saw these things in dreams and in the spirit — that is, in the imagination alone. This commonly happens in dreams, because in that state the attention and operation of the imagination are less impeded and remain free, while the bodily senses rest from their operations through the binding of sleep. Hence the devil can delude people more easily, by forming and more strongly fixing images toward which a person is borne as though toward the things themselves. And it is proved beyond doubt to be an illusion when such things, so imagined, cannot be true. This is what happened to those women: the things they affirmed they saw with their bodily eyes could not be as they judged. For they could not see with bodily eyes some goddess called Diana, since no such being is found in the whole universe. Nor, by the same reasoning, could they see Herodias; for that accursed woman, as to her body, has been dissolved into dust, and as to her soul has been sent down into hell, where she suffers the harshest punishments. Nor can she go out from there by her own power, still less form a body to assume and appear in. For souls are naturally determined to their own body, so that they cannot move or act anything bodily except through it, as through their own connatural instrument, as Saint Thomas teaches (S. Tho. prima q. 117. ar. 4.). And if at some time, with a supernatural power cooperating, souls go out of the place of hell for a time and appear to people, this happens rarely, and such a going-out or appearance is ordained, or permitted, by God for another end — not so that they may make sport of the living, or strive as it were to rule over them, or be venerated by them in any way whatever.

It must therefore be said that such things appeared to those women only in dreams or in the spirit. The said chapter argues that just as we experience in dreams that many things appear to us by a natural power which in truth do not

exist in themselves but only in the imagination, much more can these things be seen when a superinduced power of a higher and stronger nature cooperates — namely, that of a demon — which prevails so far in deluding persons that afterwards, even when awake, they suppose they were not deluded. For since a natural affliction of sickness and madness can cause this, as happens to those who suffer from delirium [phrenesis], a higher power, such as the diabolical one is, will be able much more to derange people in this way, so long as they are subject to it through sin, so that they do not notice the delusion even when awake.

So although the devil could have deluded those women by all the modes brought forward above, the said chapter (d.c.) reasonably concludes that they were deluded only in dreams and in the spirit — that is, in the imagination alone — because this vision alone sufficed to draw them into this infidelity or to confirm them in it. For the same reason it was not necessary for the devil to gather them together in one place, as he now does with the *striges*, although those women too supposed that this was happening to them. For diabolical fraud keeps this order in its attempts, with God's permission: that it first assails people inwardly. And if it does not prevail against people already enlightened concerning faith in the one God, it then tries to overthrow the established faith by deluding them outwardly in many ways. Against those women, however, the devil was prevailing, and by the inward delusion already described he had led them into the error of a plurality of gods. So there was no need for him to present himself to them outwardly.

But after it had afterwards been made plain to all that there is one sole God, and had been shown more clearly through the vigilance of the Fathers that all the gods of the Gentiles are demons, the devil no longer prevails by inward suggestion alone to draw people into that infidelity. Hence, the veil of his pride unfolded, he no longer seeks to be adored in the likeness of gods, but as the devil and prince of all evil spirits. Every Christian, however, would shudder to adore the devil once recognized, and to enter into a pact with him, and to despise and profane baptism, the faith, and the sacraments, on the strength of his inward suggestion alone. But if along with these things they hoped to carry off advantages and to enjoy pleasures — pleasures toward which many are borne without restraint by a most intense desire, and above all the most abject persons, who are commonly deprived of them — and if they were also promised that they could avenge themselves and turn back upon their enemies injuries they have no power to repel in any other way, then a great many would easily be drawn into the horrifying crimes already described.

This is what the Devil now contrives by this new art of doing harm. To those who conspire in this one crime of this accursed sect he ministers various pleasures, as the women themselves relate that they experience when they come together in one place; and he confers the power of doing harm as they wish. And he leads them apart in the night-time so that, without fear of the

punishments due to such great crimes, they may dare to commit things which, before others and awake, they would for the opposite reason scarcely dare at all.

Nor is it an objection that what happens before a large multitude is hard to conceal. For they do not think they incur any danger of accusation, since all these persons are bound by terrible oaths, under the heaviest penalties, to reveal the deed to no one, except when they wish to seduce someone. Yet quite often the outcome turns out the contrary, because quite often, with the Lord's permission, these crimes are uncovered together with their authors. They also commit those abominations more easily and more boldly when many companions seduce them by both word and the worst example than if they stayed at home alone. The *striges*, therefore, are proved to be deluded in another way than those women were deluded of whom the said chapter *Episcopi* (d. c. *Episcopi*) makes mention, as will also be explained more fully below.

About what things, principally to be believed or to be done, those persons of whom the said chapter Episcopi speaks were deluded. Cap. XXVI.

The said chapter *Episcopi* (d.c. *Episcopi*) further explains the things concerning which those diabolical women were deluded by the Devil. These are principally two; and from holding them as opinions, they were then convicted as heretics on four points, which the said chapter (d.c.) principally intends to condemn.

First, then, they were deluded in this: they thought they saw with their bodily eyes the true goddess Diana, and the true Herodias, together with a true multitude of persons; and yet they saw nothing but likenesses and phantasms [phantasmata] of those just named. Wishing, then, to show how it is possible for them to be deluded in this way, the author of the said chapter (d.c. conditor) says that Satan, deluding in dreams the mind he holds captive, leads it through all sorts of byways — now joyful things, now sad ones, now known persons, now unknown. He proves that this was delusory, given the condition of dreaming [supposita somnij passione], by what we experience in the same way in dreams, saying: "For who is not led outside himself in dreams and nocturnal visions, and sees many things while sleeping that he had never seen while waking?" From this it infers that just as a person would be foolish and dull who supposed that the things that seem to happen in dreams also happen in the body, so a person is shown to be foolish and dull who supposes that the things which happen in the manner already described, in the spirit alone, also truly happen in the body.

Second, they were deluded in this: they thought they were carried bodily to distant parts and carried back, though they did not leave their own houses. The said chapter expresses this delusion, first relating that those wicked women profess this very thing, and then adding that "when the spirit alone suffers this, the unbeliever supposes that it happens not in the mind but in the body." It does not, however, call such a person an unbeliever on account of this opinion. Rather, it means that he who is an unbeliever because of the things it had stated before — namely, because he believes there is something of divinity

[aliquid numinis] besides the one true God — also supposes this to be true, and is deluded by it. To make plain that they were deluded in this way, it brings in the example of Ezekiel's vision and of Paul's rapture.

Finally, the said chapter (d.c.) concludes that whoever believes such things, and things like them, loses the faith. What it calls "such things" it refers to the points in which it had earlier said those women were entangled in the error of the pagans — so that they believe there is something of divinity besides the one true God — and to the things that, according to those women's narration, are necessarily connected with this infidelity. These are four, as the Lord Juan de Torquemada (D. Io. de turre Crema.), Cardinal, a most excellent doctor of sacred Theology and of both laws, of the Order of Preachers, draws them out of the words of that chapter.

The first: it is heretical, and was an ancient error of the pagans, to hold that there is some true goddess called Diana, or Herodias.

The second is that some person is carried to serve some such goddess. On the contrary, since there is no such goddess, no person is carried on real beasts to serve her either, as those wicked women, deluded in dreams, supposed.

The third, that this delusion was caused by a good spirit. On the contrary, it was caused by him who transforms himself into an angel of light in order to deceive. For a good spirit cannot be the author or minister of delusion or of any deception whatever.

The fourth is that someone can be changed by anyone other than God alone into another species or likeness — for the better, say into gods, or for the worse, say into beasts. In fact, the first is absolutely impossible, since God is ingenerable and in no way whatever capable of being made; and the second can be done only by the power of God, which, however, he has never done and never will do — even though a finite power too can generate or produce one nature from another, when the natural powers of things concur and are applied.

In this fourth error those women were held together with the ancient pagans, who supposed not only men but also certain animals had been deified, as Aristotle reports (vt. 12. Metaphy.), and Saint Thomas explains it there (& hoc ibi s. Tho. declarat). They supposed, too, that a greater power dwelt in such deified animals than dwells in earthly ones. One must admit that those women also held this opinion, since they professed that they were carried on beasts across many stretches of land in the silence of the dead of night — which natural beasts could not do, above all in so brief a space of time. Indeed, the Gentiles once held that men too were changed into beasts — into wolves, I mean, or birds, and other such animals — as Augustine relates (in. 18. lib. de ciui. Dei.), and as was explained above; and this is to be changed for the worse. Those who suppose that *striges* are truly changed into cats, and from there return to human form by diabolical power, labour under this heresy even now — just as the pagans supposed that such things were done by the power of gods, for example of the god Licius [?] (dei Licij), or of some other.

Since, however, this last error — by which some things are supposed able to be changed for the better, that is into gods, or for the worse, that is into beasts, by the power of gods — includes both the plurality of gods and the worship owed them, and the claim that this conversion is brought about by a good spirit, all the things already mentioned are judged to be condemned by consequence once this last error alone is condemned. For this reason the said chapter (d. c.) brings in the condemnation of this error alone, as the conclusion, so to speak, of its whole intention, saying: "Whoever, therefore, believes that any creature can be made, or changed for the better or for the worse, or transformed into another species or into another likeness, except by the Creator himself, who made all things and through whom all things were made, is beyond doubt an unbeliever and worse than a pagan" — if, that is (f.), he was previously a Christian. And this for no other reason than the one brought in above in that chapter (in eo. c.): namely, that such a person judges there to be something of divinity outside the one true God, into which men or beasts might have been changed, and by which such a conversion might have been made, and not by the true God, who made all things in the beginning.

The other things condemned in the same chapter, and their opposites, are in no way deduced from the reason just stated — which alone is brought in to convict the error — except reasonably and as matters of fact, not as matters of possibility: for example, that those women were deluded in dreams, that one was not carried bodily from place to place as they supposed, and the like. So, granted that credence is to be given to that chapter, these things will have to be believed to have been true; yet it remains possible for their opposite to happen, even by created power. For from the truth already stated, by which we confess that there is nothing of divinity outside the one true God, it does not necessarily follow that no persons can be carried by the devil from place to place: the opposite of this is possibly consistent with that truth. Nor does it necessarily follow from that reason that those women were deluded in dreams, or even that they could not see bodily most of the things they narrated — provided, however, that it was in the forms of apparent women that they saw the deities they had supposed. For they could have been deluded in another way — for example, by sleight [*per præstigium*], or by the apparition itself being produced while they were awake — notwithstanding the reason already stated. But those things are certainly deduced from that reason reasonably, given the other circumstances present at the time, and given the malign order of diabolical temptation, as was explained above.

[Margin: &. L. cū pater. §. dulcissimis. ff. de leg. 2. & l. cū mulier ff. sol. matr. Ideo dicitur anima legis fecundū Dy. in c. certum est de re. iur. in vi. & late congerit Fel. in c. tua nos. col. 2. de iureiur. — "(L. cum pater, § dulcissimis, ff. de leg. 2, and l. cum mulier, ff. sol. matr.) It is therefore called the soul of the law, according to Dy. (in c. certum est, de re. iur. in vi.); and Fel. gathers this at length (in c. tua nos, col. 2, de iureiur.)."]

Since, then, the reason of a law contains the intention of the lawgiver, and since from the reason brought in by the said chapter nothing is deduced to be contrary to the faith except the four points already stated, as has been shown, it is plain that the chapter meant only those to be understood when it said that whoever believes such things, or things like them, loses the faith, etc. The sect of the *striges*, however, teaches none of these four points as doctrine. Nor does it hold, as its chief and principal error, that men are changed into gods and that there is something of divinity besides the one true God. On the contrary, they confess that the prince who appears to them is a demon, an evil spirit, and not a good God. For although they show him the worship proper to God — denying, as they do, the true God, and doing homage to that demon with body and soul together — they do not, in their hearts, think that he is truly God. They show him all this in order to carry away from him the advantages they long for, as is plain from their confessions. Those women, by contrast, professed that the one they worshipped was a goddess, as is plain in the said chapter *Episcopi*.

Hence it is manifest that these two sects differ in what is principal — all the more since these renounce the faith and baptism, profane sacred things, inflict many acts of *maleficium* and a great many harms on people in their persons, in their beasts and in their crops, and enter into a great many most wicked pacts with the devil, none of which those women are read to have committed. Since, therefore, these sects disagree in their more principal deeds and opinions, let no one wonder if they differ in the accessory ones as well. It cannot, then, be rightly inferred from that chapter that, if those women were deluded and were not truly carried, etc., these are deluded in the same way. For diabolical malice and pride, by which the devil longs to be adored as God, would not be satisfied if this adoration were performed delusively and in dreams — or even by people awake, but in corners. Nor would his hatred be satisfied, with which he most savagely pursues Christ and holy things, if Christ's body and sacred things were profaned only in dreams. His hatred requires that these things be done while awake and bodily. And on this all the doctors of theology commonly agree, and the lords canonists who side with the fathers Inquisitors.

The second argument is resolved; in this resolution it is shown in several ways what one should think of the case mentioned in the legend of Saint Germanus, which resembles the deeds of the striges. Cap. XXVIII.

The second argument, too, brought forward for the false side and contrary to our determination, does not proceed. Neither universally nor always are those two things false that the *striges* are said to report. For they are not always hungry when they return from the course [de cursu]; nor is it always false that chests of bread, or casks full of wine, are emptied by them — although afterwards, by the devil's work, these can be filled again with bread and wine taken from elsewhere. Nor do all of them say that, returning from the course, they always find themselves exhausted or greatly afflicted, or wasting away from hunger — although, on account of the labour of dancing [in corrizando],

and on account of the giddiness, they often return somewhat afflicted because of the distance and speed of their conveyance; for which reason they have to lie longer in bed that morning, as was said above. Quite often, too, they are beaten by the devil when they do not obey him at his nod. It is not to be denied, however, that such persons are also very often deluded, so that they think they are taking real food while they are taking phantasmal food, as was also declared above.

As for the legend of Saint Germanus that is brought in, it does not stand against our thesis, but rather favours it, on many heads. First: from the statement that the host prepared food in the evening, and that it was devoured by a crowd of neighbours coming in (as it seemed to the host and his household), it is not inferred that the delusion lay on the side of the food — as though it were not real food, as some say the *striges* are mocked. For it was manifest there that real provisions were being consumed and were running short in that host's house. Second: if those persons came as it seemed, and truly ate and drank, our thesis is established. But if they were demons, the host himself was deluded together with his whole household, so that while awake they saw — or at some time had seen — demons in human form, though they supposed them to be men: no differently from the way, according to those opponents, the *striges* are deluded in a similar vision. Just as that is granted from such a narrative, therefore, so this too is not to be denied: that the same thing happens to the *striges*, which is confirmed by such manifold testimony.

Third: the narrative no more proves that the deception lay on the side of those at table — that it was demons who seemed to be men reclining at table — than on the side of those who were represented, the men, I mean, asleep in their houses: that perhaps these, too, were demons in human form or figure. The only exception is insofar as the holiness and reverence of Saint Germanus would seem to be opposed to such a delusion (if, however, that story holds up as true) — for he, enlightened by the divine spirit, took care out of charity to free others from diabolical delusions.

Fourth: in the same example it must be considered that what is adduced as similar is not similar. For those men and neighbours did not suppose that they were then going to the game [ad ludum], as though dreaming; or that they ate and drank through the houses, or in the house of that host, and did other such things really and bodily — so far as can be gathered from that legend. It is said only that the persons represented were found at that time sleeping in their beds. Hence that example or incident is not brought to bear on the thesis of this question except very remotely.

Fifth, it is said that there is nothing unfitting in demons having at some time deluded people in that way, in order to establish in the world this opinion: that such things happen only delusively. In that way they could the more freely seduce people, and afterwards the more freely and easily gather them together in reality to commit the most unspeakable works — since prelates and officials of the faith would then rage no more against them than against dreamers.

Sixth, it is said that the legend is suspect as far as this case is concerned, because it seems hard — indeed altogether foreign to people's common notions — that the host should be willing to prepare so much food, and often, for nothing; and, if they were neighbours and known to him, that he should not ask them for the price of the food. To say, moreover, that those neighbours gave or had given him the price, if they were being deluded and did not find themselves fed, is laughable enough. And if it is said that the demons themselves paid the price in the place and in the likeness of those persons: it would be remarkable, if those persons dreamed that they were doing such things, that they did not soon notice the delusion, if their money was not really running short. But if they did not even dream that they were doing such things, it would be no less remarkable if those neighbours of his did not often talk about these things with the host and his household — and so, hearing from the report of the host and household things told of themselves which they knew had not happened to them, did not easily free both themselves and that host and all the others from such delusions. Nor is it any less incredible that they should prepare for so many women and yet be unwilling to wait for their arrival: pleasure, or at any rate invincible curiosity, stands against such a thing. Whatever may be the case about this, however — true, I say, or false — it is enough that it does not conflict with what has been determined concerning the *striges*. And so the reply to the second argument is plain.

All the knots are untied by which the third and fourth arguments seemed to entangle their readers. Cap. XXIX.

To the third argument it must be said that, since everything the *striges* are said to do in the course [in cursu] has its beginning, progress and end only through the work of the devil, who is the father of all lies, no one ought to wonder if many things are said to happen there that are false and irrational, and that strike fear into the wretched while they believe them true. And the argument means these things. Yet the devil does not contrive these things without cause, for people's ruin. For first, in keeping with the most wicked condition of his evil will, at the beginning of his assistance — diabolical as it is — he is accustomed to bring joy; at the end, fear and sadness. For at first he wants to draw people into his service through a foolish gaiety, so that he may do harm the more easily at the end to those he has deceived. It is no wonder, therefore, if he draws these wretched persons with various pleasures and sensual delights, getting himself adored by them on that account, so that his pride may in this way be sated for its part — with manifold insult offered to Christ as well — and if at the end he casts them away from himself struck with fear, and compels them to go back, or be brought back, to their own homes. Otherwise those persons would not readily turn aside, nor be willing to put an end to their pleasures, and so they would fall into exhaustion or death — which God does not always permit. Yet the demon makes bad use even of this preservation by God, since he often draws the same persons into similar crimes without hindrance.

A second cause of this deed can also be assigned, on the side of the demon's malice, according to the mystical sense. The water of the Jordan bears the figure of the sacrament of baptism, because the Lord Jesus too was baptized in it for our sake. That the devil wants to touch or violate that water by his power (as he pretends in the vision) therefore signifies that he strives with all his strength to take baptism away from the earth, and utterly to abolish from the hearts of the faithful the faith in the most holy Trinity divinely infused in it. If he could succeed in doing this, he would become prince of the whole world, as he had been before Christ's coming — of which our Saviour himself says: "The prince of this world shall be cast out." For he held princely rule in the world when the world did not know God, and even his own — the Jewish people, I mean — did not receive him. Because, then, the devil does not now succeed in obtaining this, he is tormented out of pride in a wonderful way; and he shows a most grievous agitation and anger over it at the time when, in figure (as we said), he tries before that multitude to obtain this very thing and does not succeed. For the Lord Jesus prayed, and obtained, that the faith of Peter should never fail (Luc. 22).

This is not always done, however, by the mistress of the course [*domina cursus*], nor everywhere, but only before that multitude whom, deluding them, she pretends to lead down into the plain of the river Jordan. And I think this never truly happens, because of the distance of the place. For the conveyance itself would take up much time, as would the return. The speed of a motion that does not harm our bodies is limited, and is measured by a long span of time if the distance of the place is great, as it is in the present case. For that river is more than two thousand miles distant from these regions of ours even in a straight line, as I myself learned clearly, having been granted to visit the holy places of Jerusalem out of devotion. God, however, draws this good out of that evil when it happens: that those wretched persons can recognize from it that that mistress of theirs, to whom they have bound themselves, is not only no goddess or god, but is in fact a most wicked demon. They can recognize this too: that she cannot do everything even in the lowest things, since at that moment she seems unable to do even what is possible for the very beasts, such as touching the water of a river. And if the matter is referred to her ministry [*ad ministerium*], she does not have the power she would have (as they say) if she could succeed in touching that water. Consequently she is not only no goddess or god, but is so ignoble a creature, and so evil, that God must of necessity hinder and rein her in from doing those evil things, and so resist her pride and evil will as well. The purpose is that, once they know this, those wretched persons — unless their own malice and obstinacy stand in the way — may readily judge that one must not depart from the almighty God for the sake of that prince who is subject to the true God; and that their minds ought to be roused by this all the more strongly to contempt for that most wicked prince of theirs, and to return to their Creator. And this is enough for the third argument.

To the fourth, it must be said that if the things the argument narrates as happening are held to be accomplished by the devil in such a way that he restores what was corrupted as numerically the same [*idem numero*], brings the dead back to life, and does other such things that are repugnant to nature, then those who hold such a power of the demon are beyond doubt heretics. In most cases the *striges* are entangled in this heresy, believing and proclaiming that the very things reported are true, even after they have returned from that diabolical course. But it does not happen as they think. Rather, by the natural power of the demons, similar provisions are carried there from various places, as was said at length above. Or else the demons, deluding those persons, form aerial bodies into various likenesses of food, with similar qualities, by which not only sight but also touch and taste are deceived — just as they likewise form aerial bodies into the likeness of human beings and move them as though living, so that they seem to be the very men whose appearance [*species*] they bear, and to perform the works of life proper to human beings, such as walking, talking, laughing and other such things. Likewise, how an ox or any other animal that is truly dead may seem, delusively, to be raised up by a demon, and in how many ways this can come about by the demon's natural power, has been fully explained above in the chapter cited, so that repeating it would be superfluous.

In the solution of the fifth argument it is shown that there is no power in the ointment with which the striges anoint themselves, although the devil is sometimes drawn to the wishes of the striges by that anointing as by a sign, and sometimes is hindered; and how this comes about. Cap. XXX.

Now, turning to the experiences brought forward in the fifth argument — which we do not wish to deny — we must show that they are in no way repugnant to our pro- position. First, what was said in the third reason of the third principal [*in tertia ratione tertij principalis*] is presupposed. Since the devil is a spiritual creature, and consequently, on his own side, is free from every bodily obligation both in being and in operating, he cannot be moved by any body to the exercise of an operation, nor be compelled or necessarily induced to do anything by any bodily power of words, herbs or stones — as Saint Thomas also determines (*sanctus Tho. 2. dif. 7. q. 2. art. 2. ad tertium*). Rather, he operates upon bodies by the freedom of his will, and chooses those that can serve his malice; and when people use them at his command, the devil himself sometimes comes to them at their wish. In this way people are deceived, supposing that there is some power implanted in such bodies, or even in words, by which they draw the demons and compel them to do something, or even to stay somewhere as if they were bound, or drive them out of a body or out of a place as they wish.

It is not so. Rather, the demons are drawn voluntarily by these bodies, words or ceremonies, as by certain signs of a pact entered into with human beings — the devil judging that to do this at the time suits his malice, and desiring it with an appetite that is not natural or animal, but free. "For as an animal is drawn by food, so the devil by signs," says Augustine (*dicit Augu.*) — not, indeed, by

a drawing or appetite of the same kind, but because both are without coercion. On this principle, then, the devil is inclined by fumigations [profumationibus], sacrifices and various superstitious works to comply with those who do such things, in virtue of the pact of malicious friendship contracted with them — as by signs of their subjection, and of the dominion over them that he has gained, in which he delights in a wonderful way, so as to satisfy in some measure his pride and envy.

For this reason, then, it happens that when the women anoint themselves with a certain execrable ointment — in the making of which many crimes are committed in his name, with outrage to the faith and to the name of Christ and with abuse of the sacraments — he attends them at their wish and carries them to various places. This happens even though the person carried in this way has sometimes not made that pernicious ointment, or has had no express pact with the devil concerning it. For he comes on account of the pacts already entered into with some earlier maker or inventor of it, to the ruin of the one who uses it, and so as to create from this the opinion that in that ointment, ring or crystal, or in any other things or words whatever, there is a power by which people draw him to carry out the purpose for which they anoint themselves or do whatever else they do; and so he often deludes all the vain. But when the devil has recognized that something more pernicious to people's salvation can follow from his ceasing to bring about such an effect, he sends them away with their wishes frustrated, even supposing that he has entered into pacts and has often kept them.

It must be noted, second, that although the devil is free from bodily coercion and free in operating, as has been said, he is nevertheless sometimes hindered from being able to achieve what he desires. This comes about through the superior power of God, or of an angel, whether good or evil. If it is done by God immediately, or through the mediation of a good angel, what happens is ordered only to the salvation of human beings. But if it is done by a superior evil angel — God nonetheless permitting it by his providence — then whatever comes of it is led directly to an evil outcome only, so far as the demon's intention goes; although out of the superabundant divine goodness the evil is often turned into good, or it produces indirectly, and beyond the demon's intention, something better than the good of which one was deprived through the evil that came of it.

With these two points presupposed, to the first experience brought forward to the contrary — concerning what happened to the Prince, who was more curious than was fitting — it is said that this could have come about as much from the malice of the demons as from divine prohibition. The demon could indeed have reckoned that from this it would be easy to fix for ever, in the heart both of that prince and of the nobles to whom it became known, the belief that such things do not truly happen but are all fables. From that could follow impunity for the most grievous crimes the *striges* commit; and there follows too a multiplication of such most wicked persons, to the common ruin

of both the inner and the outer man [utriusque hominis]. For the Inquisitors cannot succeed in prosecuting them, as their office requires of them, unless they obtain favour and help from the princes. The princes withdraw this if they think such things are delusory and do not truly happen; indeed they become a hindrance to them. Likewise the nobles and the rest, not believing such things, do not cease to disparage the honour of the Inquisitors, as though they were occupied only in inquiring into old wives or fools. And so at last, overcome by weariness and exhausted in the extreme, the Inquisitors give up their office; and this plague rages [craffatur] and grows strong — which is what the devil longs for.

For that is a greater evil, and more pernicious to the human race, than bringing one woman to the game [ad ludum] on one occasion, even if every kind of crime had then happened to be committed through her. A common evil, after all (other things being equal), takes precedence over any particular one and is graver. For this reason, then, the devil — who, as far as he can, aims at and works for our perdition and ruin, of body as well as soul — foresaw that the prince and the nobles would easily be led into the false opinion that the sect of the *striges* rests on the delusion of demons and not on truth, if he did not then carry that woman to the game; and so he chose not to carry her to the course at that time at all.

It could also have come about because it was not then the proper hour for conveyance to the course. For, as we have learned from the confession of the *striges*, before they anoint themselves they hear at night a sound, manifold, of that mistress of theirs going before them with a dancing multitude; and they are accustomed to anoint themselves only then, so that, once carried through the air, they may follow her until they all come to the place fixed by the will of the mistress of the course. On the side of divine justice, however — of which the Inquisitors are ministers — God justly forbade the woman to be carried off for another reason: namely, to exalt that justice itself. By it, it always comes about that *maleficae* brought under the jurisdiction of an Inquisitor do not enjoy the devil's protection. For at the time when they are subject to the Inquisitor's actual judgement they have no power to harm anyone, or to escape from prison, or to be freed in any other way by the devil's help, or to be carried off elsewhere. Indirectly, too, God drew good out of this evil. As regards those nobles, a temptation was taken away from them: by it they might perhaps have wished, and busied themselves, to experience in their own body the things they sought, out of harmful curiosity, to learn about in someone else's. As regards that Inquisitor, he deservedly carried away reproach and confusion for that undue concession of his. He did so among religious and God-fearing people, who from this understood very well, and condemned, that he had put the fear of God second to the fear of men; and he did so also with that same prince, together with the nobles and the others to whom the affair became known, so that from this they judged (wrongly, as we have said) that he extended the

powers of his office only against foolish women. And so it came about that both the person and the office of the Inquisition lost their standing with them.

That the devil sometimes presents something like the image of a person sleeping motionless, so that it may not be believed that the person was truly carried to the game, but rather only delusively and in an imaginary vision. Cap. XXXI.

Next, to the experiences brought forward in the argument — namely, that women were found lying motionless, taken out of themselves, who nevertheless asserted that they had been carried bodily to the course — the first reply is this. According to some, it is not unfitting that they should sometimes see, not bodily but only in dreams, and think themselves to do, the things they afterwards suppose and report in waking that they did; and so they are deluded by the devil. The Summistæ [Summistæ], together with certain Doctors, commonly let the matter pass with this reply. In this way the experiences brought forward would be very well answered, and it would nonetheless stand that they are very often carried off bodily, as is likewise confirmed by various experiences. To me, however, it seems very difficult, and contrary to what we commonly experience, that anyone could be so taken out of himself in dreams that afterwards in waking (if he is sound in body) he does not realize that he dreamed, or saw visions in that way, so that he truly thinks he was not carried anywhere in the body, since he had seen it through a dream or an imaginary vision — as was also determined in the body of the question. It is true that we read of a certain boy who dreamed that he was being called by his Master, who was sleeping in another bedchamber, and who at once woke and ran to the Master's bed, saying: "Here I am, for you called me." Nevertheless he accepted the Master's explanation, when the Master told him that he had dreamed — just as the Master himself, in his sleep, seemed to be calling that same boy at the same time. And in the end, fully awake, the boy recognized the deception that the Master had recognized before him; or else the Master really did utter the words of the call aloud, as in fact it is found that many people talk while they are dreaming. Nor is it to be denied that some dreams are so clear that it seems to the dreamer that he is truly awake, and so for a short time afterwards, in waking, he may suppose that he was awake even when he was sleeping most deeply. But in the end everyone notices the difference between the state of one who is awake and one who is asleep, as was shown above in the body of the question.

The *striges*, by contrast, always obstinately affirm that they are awake while they are being carried to the course by the demon, and likewise while they are doing the things they report having done in the course. And if any of them wish to go in dreams, and to see only in imagination what happens in the course, they contrive to achieve this by art, as was explained above [Margin: Cap. 10.]. Such persons, when they are afterwards fully awake, know very well that it was not in waking but in dreams that they saw whatever was done in the course, even by other persons who were bodily transported there.

In accordance with what has already been said, therefore, it must be said to the first three experiences after the one to which we replied first, and to all

others like them that could be brought forward, that the devil lies there in the form of the woman, as though she were asleep, so as to deceive people in this way and to breed in them this false opinion: that the *striges* are not carried bodily to the course. As a consequence grave crimes remain unpunished, and through this the sect of the apostate *striges* is multiplied and strengthened. But just as the devil sometimes deceives people in this way with the Lord's permission, so also, with the Lord's cooperation, it is sometimes made manifest by experience that the *striges* are carried bodily to the course. This happens so that people may be freed from that error through God's mercy (as was shown above, c. 14, and the same has been shown in many ways), and so that the Inquisitors may carry out their office fearlessly, and the princes, together with the peoples, may favour them for the defence of the faith and for the common welfare of the people, and give them timely help.

As for the other experience brought forward, concerning those women who fall down immediately after that anointing and sleep most deeply: it must be known that that most filthy ointment is said to be made, with abuses of the sacraments, from materials of a kind that, in the judgement of physicians, do not naturally have the power to induce sleep. It has also been proved by other experiences that in fact a number of people anointed with such an ointment were neither carried off by the demon nor overcome by sleep — as can also be made manifest from the first experience brought forward to the contrary in this argument. And certain others, having seen two old women secretly anointing themselves, who were at once carried out through the window of the house, anointed themselves several times so as to be carried off in the same way; it did them no good. For they did not leave that place, nor did they even fall asleep.

From all this it is made manifest that even if some are seized by sleep after the execrable anointing, this comes about freely, only through the demon's malice. His aim is sometimes to deceive those who see or hear such things, since through this they suppose that nobody is truly carried to the game even if anointed in this way, and think that all are deluded. For just as the devil can carry such persons through the air by the free choice of his own will, so he can cause the deepest sleep in them, at once or within a short time. He knows all the natural powers that contribute to this, such as those of herbs and of parts of animals, and he can apply something of the kind at his nod so as to induce sleep. Those who sleep in this way, however, will not say afterwards, in waking, that they went or were carried bodily to the course. They will say rather that they dreamed they underwent or accomplished such things — even though what they dreamed was also done, or took place, in the way it seemed to them in their sleep to be done by them. This, however, is believed to be accomplished by the devil, taking on the figure of the dreamers themselves, or the figure the dreamers thought they had while they were dreaming.

So it is with what was said above about that Praestantius brought forward by Augustine [ab Augu.]; that incident indeed favours our purpose more than it hinders it [Margin: Cap. 10.], since it is expressly said there that on

waking he related, as if they were dreams, the things he had undergone — or rather, that it had seemed to him that he had undergone them. For this reason Augustine also says there that the burdens the dreamer seemed perhaps to be carrying in this way were not carried by the dreamer himself, or by his phantasm [phantasia eius]; but if they were true bodies, or are now, they are carried by demons in order to delude people. The manner, however, which Augustine sets down by way of reporting rather than asserting — how such a dreamer could be there, or do those things, where he dreams he is, or which he dreams he does, namely through his embodied phantasm [phantasticum suum incorporatum] — is unutterable, as Augustine himself also says. And he means that it is unutterable because of its unintelligibility, and consequently its impossibility. For everything that happens in connection with bodies can be understood and expressed by us.

As for those who affirm that they were carried bodily: if they had been seen beforehand as though sleeping in the body, or lying motionless, it is rather to be thought that the devil appears lying there in their likeness than that they themselves are truly or bodily sleeping or present there. For, as was said a little above, by a sleight-working delusion the devil can deceive the bystanders, so that the persons who had anointed themselves appear to them to be sleeping, when in fact they are not there; rather, the devil, through assumed aerial bodies, puts forward their appearance [speciem] and figure. This, indeed, does not belong to sleight [praestigium], as Saint Thomas says (s. Tho. 2. dist. 8. ar. 2.). Or if it sometimes does not happen in this way, it could come about thus: that some other body present there appears to be the body of the *striga*, which nevertheless is not there. And this belongs properly to sleight, in the way that was also explained above [Margin: Cap. 7.]. So it also happened to a certain nobleman named Sisinius [Sisinio], as we read in the history of Saint Clement. He ordered his servants to bind and drag Saint Clement; they bound and dragged a column, thinking, together with Sisinius [Sisino], that they had bound and were dragging Saint Clement. This is believed to have been done by angelic power, so that the holy bishop [Antistes] might be set free — although the demon too can do such things, since his natural power is equal to an angel's, as has often been said [Margin: Cap. 5. [?]].

As for the claim that physicians can induce sleep by anointings, we do not deny it. But what is done by the physicians' art is accomplished only by the natural power of the things applied. And the same effect befalls all to whom the same cause is applied, provided they are equally disposed. The anointing with which a physician induces sleep in one sick person would induce it in all people who were anointed with it, unless perhaps by accident some contrary disposition were found in someone that might lessen or prevent the sleep — which would happen only rarely. With this execrable anointing of the *striges*, however, no one attains what he intends — conveyance, I mean, or sleep — except by the work of the devil, at his own will. Hence he complies with the wishes of few, and only of those in league with him [suis foederatis], or of some

who are in mortal sin, to their ruin. Or if at some time an innocent person is carried off in the same way, it is believed to have been done mercifully by divine permission, so that from such an event the possibility of the thing may be argued, and so the truth of the very thing done may be proved by witnesses. And for this reason it must be believed that God permitted what we read in Vincent, the author of the *Historiale* [Vincentium historiale], in the *Speculum historiale*, book 26, c. 43 — drawn from the account left in writing by Peter Damian, an ancient Doctor [Petri Damiani antiqui Doctoris] — about a certain boy monk who was carried bodily through the air at night to a great banquet, was ordered to eat, and when the banquet was over was carried back, and let down from above into a closed mill-house [pistrino]. Many similar things that the *Malleus maleficarum* reports confirm the same; to it I refer the reader. From everything already said, both the principal proposition about the truth of bodily conveyance is plain, and so is the untying of all the knots that the fifth argument, brought forward at the beginning, entangled.

The points raised by the sixth argument — how, I mean, the striges are said to be unable not to be subject to the devil, how they are also apparently turned into cats, and how they are freed from that same delusion — are set out with complete clarity. Cap. XXXII.

Finally, we must answer what was brought forward in the last argument. First of all, none of the things it infers as though they were absurdities is impossible. On the contrary, once the rite of that diabolical course [cursus] is assumed, they are likely, and consequently easy to believe. To begin with the first thing alleged: it is easy to believe that someone who has once done homage [homagium] to the devil cannot afterwards draw back from that purpose. For this is justly owed, by way of punishment and with God reprobating it, to these pestilent people who, holding in contempt the maker of the heavens and of the whole earth, apostatize and cleave to the apostate devil, and subject themselves to his perpetual servitude. Yet this does not take away their freedom of choice [arbitrii libertas], nor do they lack the common help of God, by which he continually draws all people to himself. So if these wretched persons did what lies in them to escape the devil's servitude, they would without doubt be freed from his hand by God's clemency. And in fact many are converted to God through his mercy, which moves and draws them, and through the skill and teaching of the Inquisitors and of the servants of God. For the most part, however, these converts are bodily scourged by the demons and afflicted in many ways before they can be wholly freed, divine justice itself demanding some measure of punishment for so great a crime. And this is the impossibility the *striges* mean when they say that they cannot draw back from that promise: because otherwise, they say, they would be most cruelly beaten by the demons or by their companions [sodalibus].

How the *striges* are turned into cats, or are deluded in this by sleight [praestigium]; how they can also run or leap through bedchambers in the manner of cats and suck the blood of children, and do the other things of this kind that

were brought forward in the argument, has been explained above in many ways. [Margin: Cap. 8.] These things are also most plainly confirmed by what we read to have happened similarly in authentic histories. For we read in the *Lives of the Holy Fathers* [vitis patrum sanctorum] of the blessed Macarius [Machario] that certain people brought a woman to him who nevertheless seemed to them to be not a woman but a mare. They said that, although she was a woman, she had been turned into a mare by some *maleficium* worked against her (as they supposed), and so they begged the holy man to turn her back by the power of God into the woman she had been before. To the holy man, however, she appeared not as a mare but as the woman she truly was; for the demon had no power to delude the holy man as he deluded those people by sleight. This the holy Macarius at once removed from them by his prayers. Many things of this sort are reported in the *Malleus maleficarum*, as appears above all in the case of that young merchant on the island of Cyprus who, after a *maleficium* had been worked against him by a sorceress [maga], was seen by everyone as an ass. That sorceress was at length, by the will of God, caught in this act and burned to ashes, and the young man was freed when the *maleficium* was undone. This incident was like the one Apuleius tells about himself in the book he published to relate this very deed and called *De asino aureo* [The Golden Ass]. He relates that he was turned into an ass — as it appeared to himself and to others — being bound by the *maleficium* of a certain sorceress; and that when he was released from it after a long space of time, he seemed to return to his former appearance [speciem]. Thus this case, together with the other things said to have happened in a similar way and things like it, may furnish an argument of the truth.

Yet these things in no way support what the divine Augustine, in *De civitate Dei* 18, c. 17 [in 18. de ciui. Dei c. 17.], condemns and rejects — namely, that the things related in the books of the gentiles were truly done by sorceresses. Such was what we read of Circe, that most wicked sorceress, who turned the companions of Ulysses [Vlysis] into beasts; and also what we read of the Arcadians [Archades], that they used to offer to their god Lycaeus [Lyceo] a sacrifice of such a kind that whoever partook of it was at once turned into the forms of beasts, as was also related above. For all these things, like the others already mentioned, were feigned by magical sleights rather than accomplished in the truth of the thing, as Augustine also says in the same place; and they are cited by Gratian, 26. q. 5. c. *Nec mirum*. Likewise, what Augustine reports in the same book, c. 16 [Augu. in eodem lib. c. 16.], that the gentiles affirmed of the companions of Diomedes — that they were turned into birds — was done by the mockery [ludificatione] of demons, who appeared in the forms of birds; or else, in place of those companions, birds were secretly brought by the demons to those places from other places where that kind of bird is found, as the same Augustine says in the following chapter, c. 18 of the same book [in seq. c. 18. eiusdem libri]. It is therefore not impossible for women to be turned by sleight into cats and any beasts whatever, or for such animals to appear, through the concurrent malice of demons.

On that obligation by which the striges promise the devil to kill children, and why God permits the unjust (as it appears) death of so many innocents. Cap. XXXIII.

That the devil should require of the *striges* that every so often [omni tanto tempore] they prey upon [strigent] one boy or girl, and that they should carry this out according to his wish, is lamentable, yet not unbelievable. It is so, first, on the part of the demon, who persecutes the name of Christ with the greatest hatred. This shines out above all in its effect in baptized children, so that he persecutes them as though he were persecuting Christ. He also hinders baptism as far as he can, and this out of the envy with which he always lies in wait for human salvation. It is so, next, on the part of the *striges*, who have been accustomed to feed, as on the greatest delicacies, on the flesh of these same infants whom they have first killed and afterwards dug up; and from these same bodies, partly boiled down in water until consumed and turned into liquid, they make that most abominable ointment spoken of above, mixing in the matter of the sacraments to the reproach of the faith — in which the demons take great delight. It is so, finally, on the part of divine justice, by which it is fitting that the crimes of parents be punished to the third and fourth generation. For some, by begetting children unlawfully, and some, by cursing the children they have begotten and calling down evils on them in various ways, offend God and provoke him to a wrath that may blaze out against the children through the ministry of demons and of *striges*. Sometimes, too, the negligence of those same parents deserves this very thing, when they do not fortify their little ones morning and evening with the sign of the Cross and devout prayers, so that by this they might be freed from the snares of demons; instead, as I have said, through this negligence of theirs they fall into those snares. Moreover, the *maleficae striges* sometimes receive this power over those children whose parents have consulted demons to cure them or others, and have sought to obtain bodily health for them through sorceresses [magas] and enchantresses [incantatrices] — so that by the very things by which a person sins, by those too he may most justly be tormented.

As for what is alleged about the *calamita*, it involves no impossibility. It is not that any power to produce such an effect is found in that *calamita*, however much it has been consecrated — or rather execrated — to the demon by diabolical arts. Rather, by the pact made with the devil, as soon as the *calamita* is received the devil ceases to disturb their imagination [phantasiam], the disturbance by which it seemed to them that they were cats; and in this way they are said to be brought back to their proper senses.

The argument also puts forward, as plainly false, the death of countless numbers — countless, I say — of such children, if everything reported about the *striges* were true. But this is neither to be judged impossible nor wholly false. For manifest experience teaches that a great multitude of children die of this plague, even if it is not known to everyone — at least in those parts where this most foul and no less most cruel sect is gaining strength, as it is found above all in the diocese of Como [Cumana dioecesi] and throughout all the borderlands

between Italy and Germany. So much so that the people are compelled in crowds to summon the Inquisitors, to seek them out, and to bring them to their own lands. There neighbours accuse their neighbours and kinswomen, brothers their sisters, sons their mothers, husbands their wives, and conversely men joined to them by any bond, natural or accidental; and they accuse and hand over into the hands of the Inquisitors all the other persons whom they hold under suspicion of being *striges*. For day by day they discover a multitude of children being killed, so that these accursed persons spare not even those of their own household, but even the children of their own sons, and the other grandchildren — indeed, sometimes even their own children (a thing horrible even to say) — they prey upon [strigent] and kill, as is thoroughly established from the countless trials [processibus] of the Inquisitors. The greatest part of illegitimate children in the hospitals, too, dies of this plague. And that a multitude of preyed-upon [strigiatorum] children is found, and perishes, in every city, fortress [castra], village and territory needs no proof. It is true that very many such children are also cured, whether by other *striges* — for some of the *strigae*, taught magical arts by the devil, know how to cure those who have been preyed upon [strigatos], while others do not know how — or by some natural remedy as well, where the children have not been completely preyed upon [strigati]; or certainly by divine help obtained through the prayers and vows of the parents or of the servants of God. For if those involved in such *maleficia*, and in curing other ills, observed what the chapter *Si per sortiarias*, 23. q. 1. teaches, the child would easily be cured by God's mercy.

As for what is said in the argument, that the *striges* do not want the children they infect to be cured: this is indeed true. But it does not contradict what was said a little earlier — that some *striges*, I say, cure children, etc. For although the women who ravage children would not, simply speaking, want those they have preyed upon to be cured, they often nevertheless cure — sometimes those whom they themselves had ravaged, and sometimes any others — either for fear of a greater evil, namely when suspicion arises against them that they have preyed upon someone, or in hope of a greater good, namely when they hope for a reward for the cure, or for the friendship and goodwill of some great person. So did that most notorious *striga* [striges] who was burned at Ferrara a few days ago. More readily, however, if they are asked, they cure those who were infected not by themselves but by other *striges*. And in these the devil gladly cooperates, because by this he leads very many down to hell. For all who seek the cure of children through the arts and incantations of *striges* and harmful superstitions, or who cooperate to this end with help or counsel, sin mortally. And so, through the ministry of these accursed persons, the devil gains great strength on every side against the salvation of Christians, bodily as well as spiritual.

That God, best and greatest [opt. max.], does no injustice in permitting the death of innocents is recognized by anyone who considers that all the most grievous crimes already mentioned gravely provoke his wrath and vengeance

against those who are not liable even by their own guilt, but who not unjustly pay the penalties for the sins either of their first parents or of their nearest ones, as was declared above. [Margin: Cap. 10.] Anyone, too, who considers that God has permitted the greatest evils and the gravest spiritual losses — as, above all others, were the falls of the angels and of the first man — so as not to seem to do violence to anyone's free choice [libero arbitrio], will not wonder if he permits the death of children innocent in themselves: namely, so that he may not, as it were, forcibly prohibit the malice of the *striges* and of the demons; and above all since, from the other side, the justice of him who is God, blessed for ever and ever, demands this very thing. Amen.

End of the Question on the Striges, published by Brother Bartolomeo da Spina of Pisa [Bartholomæo de Spina Pisano], of the Order of Preachers, of the regular observance [vitæ regularis].

Published in the Year of the Lord 1523.

Treatise on the Pre-eminence of Sacred Theology over All the Other Sciences, and above All over That of Human Laws

Published by the Reverend Father Brother Bartolomeo da Spina of Pisa [Bartholomaeum de Spina Pisanum], of the Order of Preachers.

Prooemium

Once my work on the *striges* was finished, and its printing had been delayed for several years beyond the hopes of those who were asking for it, I happened to run a rapid eye [volantibus luminibus] over the distinguished edition, on the same subject, of the question by the most illustrious Giovanni Francesco, Count of Mirandola [Ioan. Francisci Comit̃s Mirandulę; Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola]. When I found that it agreed with ours as to the principal conclusion, I let each enjoy its own matter: I neither embellished ours from his nor found fault with his in the smallest point, since I judged that it too had attained the truth.

Next I came upon the work which I had learned that my most renowned teacher, the Master of the Sacred Palace, had published some time ago. It treats this subject more fully and, together with it, covers a great many other matters that I had deliberately passed over in my own work as not pertaining to my purpose. Rejoicing, however, to imitate the perfection of his teaching in every respect, I chose not to take even the smallest word from his work, so that inviolable faith may be given more fully by all to a truth confirmed by three witnesses — even though in a number of places we adduce matching, indeed identical, authorities, arguments and examples. This will give the truth firmer credit with everyone, when it is known that neither of us received from the other what he published.

After this I ran through another treatise, on the *lamiae* [de lamijs], published by a certain jurist [Legista] named Io. Franc. Ponzi. [Gianfrancesco Ponzinibio], which is contrary and opposed to our conclusion in every respect. In defence of the truth I thought it right to refute it, in so far as it contains falsehoods. For a mere jurist to want to discuss theological matter in such a way as to set himself against the most eminent sages — philosophers and canonists alike, and the most profound theologians, such as the lords Inquisitors

of heretical depravity [haereticae pravitatis] commonly are — seems at first sight to smack of extreme presumption. Indeed it provokes and invites the derision and sneers [ronchum] of the wise. Joining evil to evil, and linking ignorance to blindness, he sends ahead another treatise immediately, in which he strives with all his might to prove that the civil laws themselves surpass all the other sciences in such sublimity that through them the jurists [Legistae] are able — indeed obliged — not only to adorn theological questions with some explanations, touching them in some fashion at least *a posteriori* (which is granted to every science, and to sense as well), but also to decide and determine them, even against the common wisdom and the most profound foundations of the theologians and the holy Doctors. He dares, moreover, to set his own prudence above the sanctions and the prudence of the Apostolic See. Where the See decrees that jurists are to be called to give counsel to the Inquisitor only once — when the trial [processu], I mean, has been completed — this man asserts that they must be called beforehand, and that their presence is necessary at every examination and interrogation [quaestiones] of the accused.

I was astonished at such insolence in this man, and I shuddered. I do not want his allegations — which, when well examined and compared with one another, do not in fact favour his purpose — to leave anyone groping blindly in broad daylight, and so making himself a nuisance to the lords Inquisitors, or rather justly suffering trouble and confusion from those same Inquisitors as an obstructor of their office. Nor do I want the clear truth to be clouded in any way by these little puffs of smoke. I have therefore decided to blow them away in a few words with the fan of that same truth, in the following order.

In the first of the two treatises which I now publish, I shall prove that the conclusion of that man's first treatise is erroneous. I shall show not only that the laws are not to be preferred to theology, and not only that the jurists ought not and cannot settle or decide theological questions, but also that, as men utterly foreign to all theological speculation, they are in no way to be admitted to utter a single word on such matters, any more than mere pleaders [causidici] are — unless perhaps they are at the same time canonists of no common sort. Second, I shall reject the conclusion of his second treatise as erroneous in the Church, confirming the opposite and demolishing the petty sophisms [captiunculas] he has brought forward.

On the first of the points I have proposed, I shall proceed in the manner of those who philosophize. First, I shall set out one argument for each of the opinions, by which the whole question is made doubtful. Second, by the clearest and most effective arguments I shall establish our own true opinion, which is opposed to his, while likewise shutting off his evasions. Last, I shall overturn the remaining fictions which are brought forward as seeming to support his opinion.

But, as Saint Thomas says in the treatise against those who hold a man back from entering religious life [in tractatu contra retrahentes hominem ab ingressu religionis], it seems incongruous and laughable for professors of sacred doctrine

to bring in the little glosses of the jurists as authority. I shall therefore refrain from such aids and allegations, especially from the civil law — all the more so because the profession of religious does not ordinarily allow them to discuss such matters. On the contrary, just as those trained in the noblest science are approved as such, so too, from what is properly their own, they are appointed judges of whether others speak truly or falsely: rightly rejecting everything that conflicts with their wisdom, which is founded on the sacred writings, and accepting only what agrees with it. I too shall observe this, proving and accepting theologically whatever is true and Catholic concerning the present questions, and putting falsehood to flight.

The doubtful question is set out through opposing arguments, and the principal conclusion which the author proposes is proved from two foundations. Cap. I.

As to the first point, then, it seems possible to prove that the science of laws is more excellent than theology, so that it can even determine theological questions. For a science that embraces the divine and the human together, and directs men in all their operations to their end, proximate as well as ultimate — as the science of the civil laws appears to do, as will be shown below — seems to be pre-eminent over a science that deals only with divine things, as theology does. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary is what is found at d. 10. c. *Leges*, where it is said that theology is the superior and more worthy science; and at ea. d. c. *Certum*. and c. *Suscipitis*. it is said that the imperial law is not above the law of God but beneath it. Since, then, an inferior science has no business examining its superiors, and consequently cannot decide their questions either, it follows that the civil law neither ought to nor can determine theological questions.

To resolve this doubtful proposition, it must be understood first that one science may meddle in the questions of another in two ways. In one way, as ordered to the other's end: and this is proper to the inferior and subservient science. In another way, as ordering the other's principles: and this is proper to the superior science (Proœ. Metaphysi.). It must be understood second that whoever has the proper office of establishing a truth also has the proper office of refuting the opposite falsehood. Now the superior science establishes the truth of the inferior by ordering and stabilizing its principles, from which the truth of its conclusions arises and is inferred. It is therefore necessary that it also reject the opposite falsehood — something the inferior science cannot attempt with regard to the superior, in matters that properly belong to the superior itself. These points are well known to philosophers, and they are drawn from the teaching of Aristotle [Aristo.] in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics* [primo Posteriorum], and in the first and fourth books of the *Metaphysics* as well.

With these premises laid down, the conclusion is stated in which the position and opinion against the first treatise of the Adversary consists. It is as follows: The science of laws cannot meddle in deciding the questions proper to theology,

[Margin (right, beside the last two lines): Conclusio principalis. — Principal conclusion.]

and above all so as to set itself against the theologians themselves. This conclusion is proved most irrefutably, as follows, by the argument adduced above, which is to be explained more fully here. An inferior science cannot decide the questions of a superior one. But the science of the civil laws is inferior to the science of sacred theology. Therefore the jurists cannot, by means of the civil laws, meddle in deciding theological questions.

[Margin (left, beside "probatur. Scientia inferior"): Probatur. — It is proved.]
A very full explanation of the proof adduced. Cap. II.

[Margin (left, beside the opening lines of the chapter): No. primo. — Note, first.]

To explain the proof just stated, and the first proposition assumed in it, it must be noted first that among beings the higher and nobler are commonly the causes of the less noble, and consequently have the office of ordering them and of leading them to their proper ends.

This is manifest first among spiritual beings: the higher spirits purge and illuminate the lower, according to Dionysius [Diony.], *De caelesti hierarchia*, ch. 8 [8. ca. cæl. Hier.]. The lower separated spirits, such as those of the lowest order of angels, instruct and direct to their ends the conjoined spirits — our souls, I mean — which they surpass in nature and in power. For this reason, too, the divine clemency has granted that every man should have, for his guardianship from the very beginning of his birth, an angel specially delegated to him, as Saint Jerome [Diuus Hier.] says on the text of Matth. 18, "Their angels," etc. And this is principally for the sake of the soul's salvation.

All spirits, moreover, since they surpass every body in excellence of nature, are the causes of those same bodies. They are so either as regards motion — as the intelligences which move the heavens, and which through that motion also cause and preserve being in the lower bodily fabric, as the Philosopher teaches in *Physics* 8 and *Metaphysics* book 12 — or as regards the very being of the body, as its immediate principle: such are our souls, which give life to the body and preserve it.

Likewise, the highest bodies have been established by God as causes of the lower — the heaven, for example, of the elements — and among these the nobler are causes of the less noble, in the way that a natural place preserves what is located in it, according to the Philosopher in books 4 and 8 of the *Physics* [quarto & octauo Physicorum lib.].

We see this very thing that we are maintaining most clearly in political affairs as well. Cities are governed very well by those who are nobler in birth and who excel in character and in learning alike; the contrary order would be perverse, laying waste the universal good of the kingdom. It is no different, then, with the sciences in their own order: the superior orders the inferior and directs it to its proper ends. For this reason too the Philosopher, in the proem of the *Metaphysics* [procemio Meta.], proves that metaphysics itself is

wisdom, from the fact that it is the noblest of all the sciences; from which it follows that it orders all the others, and is in no way proper to it to be ordered by another. The same order and rule shines out even in the humbler arts and crafts. Civil science orders the military art, which is subject to it; the military art orders horsemanship. Horsemanship in turn orders the art subject to it — the bridle-maker's, for example — commanding it to make a bridle of such a form out of such a material. Likewise the art of navigation orders and commands the art of shipbuilding; shipbuilding in the same way presides over carpentry, and carpentry over the cutting of timber. So too architecture directs the art of house-building, and house-building directs brick-making or some other subservient art.

[Margin (right, beside "Secundo prænotandū"): No. secundo. — Note, second.]

It must be noted, second, that to decide or determine a question in any science belongs to the one who has to judge of the conclusion of that question, and of the middle terms to be brought for or against that conclusion — that is, how they lead to what is intended, or else stray from it. Such a judge is either the proper science, to which it belongs by its own proper nature to treat of the matter of that conclusion and of the arguments produced for deciding that question; or else a superior science, which (as has been said) directs the inferior and leads it to the end it has shown in advance. Deciding theological questions belongs to theology as to the proper and adequate science for them, no differently from the way it is proper to the science of the civil laws to settle civil questions, and to the science of the canons to settle canonical ones. Moreover, theology itself is subject to no science, but surpasses them all by its loftiness, as will shortly be shown more fully. It can therefore be doubtful to no one any longer that theology, the orderer of all the others and subject to the order of no other, alone judges and resolves its own proper questions.

That sacred theology is more excellent than all the other sciences. Cap. III.

It would be superfluous in the presence of the wise to demonstrate with any great care that sacred theology is nobler than all the sciences, since this is evident of itself. Yet because of Ponzinibio's ill-polished words, someone whom the people reckon wise might happen to fall into the folly of asserting, or even supposing, that sacred theology is subject to the civil laws, or in some way inferior to them, and that the theologians themselves are likewise subject to legal learning [legum peritiæ] — rather than the laws themselves being subservient to theology, as all the other sciences are. I am therefore pleased to make this very point, which is in itself most clear, still clearer in the eyes of all, the wise and the unwise alike, by unanswerable arguments. For the firmer development of these arguments, however, one must know that science is a habit [habitus] acquired through demonstration, as is plain from Aristotle in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics* [primo Posteriorū]; and that each thing obtains its nobility from that from which it also obtains its being;

the nobility of a science must therefore be sought from the source from which we know its proper being to arise. Now the habit of science [*habitus scientificus*] has a twofold being: one, I mean, of actual existence, the other specific. The first it has from the intellect, in which it is sustained as in a subject; for every accident exists in act by inhering in a subject. Science, since it is a habit, is a kind of accident, and the intellect itself is its proper and immediate subject and principle. From this, then, science itself is nobler than any bodily quality, since material substance — which alone is the subject of bodily quality — falls short in nobility of spiritual substance, of which kind every intellectual substance is. It follows, too, that a science inhering in a nobler intellect is necessarily nobler (so far as this consideration goes) than one residing in an inferior intellect of lesser nobility. For this reason the knowledge of God is clearer than the knowledge of the angels, even if, per impossibile, all else were equal; and likewise the knowledge of the angels is rightly preferred, for the same cause, to the knowledge of men.

In one and the same intellect, however, one science is not nobler than another on the side of the subject, except in so far as one is more firmly rooted in it than another, or the same science more firmly at one time than at another; and this arises from repeated acts. Or else it concerns different objects of knowledge [*scibilia*], one of which nevertheless depends for its being known on knowledge of the other: thus one who has a subalternating science [*scientia subalternans*] easily acquires the subalternated science through it. Or else it concerns the same object of knowledge, in so far as one may know many things about the same thing: thus one who has knowledge of a single conclusion confirms it through knowledge of the prior truth from which it is inferred. In all these cases, too, the more frequent the meditation, the more perfect the science and the stronger it will grow. This arises from a certain light of the agent intellect residing in the soul, applied more frequently to the possible intellect. By it the intellective power is strengthened, so that it perceives more clearly what is presented to it through the intelligible species. By a greater excess of this light, science shines out clearer and more perfect in one intellect rather than in another, both as to the act of exercising it and as to the efficacy of operating, which follows upon perfection of being. Hence the natural knowledge of the angels, even about the same kind of object of knowledge, is clearer and more efficacious than the knowledge of men; for the light of the angelic intellect naturally surpasses the human. And the knowledge of God is infinitely clearer and more excellent than the knowledge of all creatures, and extends to more things, in the measure that his intellective power, too, is raised infinitely above all others.

As for specific being, every science has its nobility from that from which it also has its species. Every science is specified, and likewise receives its specific distinction, from its formal object [*obiectum formale*].

Thus medicine is distinguished in species, or even in genus, from the science of civil law. For the formal object with which the whole consideration of

medicine is concerned — the curable body, I mean, and the human body first of all — is other than the object of legal science, which I take to be the universal preservation, according to right reason, of external peace and quiet in a multitude of men living together. Therefore, the nobler the proper object of one science is than the object of another, the more excellent in species the one science will be than the other.

Now one object is nobler than another in so far as it is more knowable. For that is the formal object of a science, but first under the aspect of being [sub ratione entis]: each thing is knowable in so far as it is being (*Metaphysics* 9 [nono Meta.]). Nor can there be science of non-beings as such (*Posterior Analytics* 1 [primo Posteriorum]). What is known must be being in act, or at least in potency, or must in some way have a relation to being in act. What is more fully being, then, is necessarily also a nobler object, since it is also more knowable.

But immobility and necessity also belong to the nature of the knowable [de ratione scibilis], since science is only of things that cannot be otherwise (*Posterior Analytics* 1). Therefore, the more necessary something is (for that is what cannot be otherwise), the nobler an object of science it will be, since by this very fact it is also more knowable. From this it arises that certitude [certitudo] belongs to the nature of science — a certitude that cannot be had about contingent things as such. That science, therefore, will be more perfect whose proper object is more necessary and less variable, or rather more invariable. Other things being equal, this is the object that is simpler. Fewer things are required for its being or its nature, so that, fewer things being by nature capable of being taken away from it, less variation also follows. Hence what is supremely simple is also supremely invariable. The science that is about the simpler object, therefore, will be the nobler, for this reason too: that it is consequently about what is more knowable. That is why the Philosopher, in the proem of the *Metaphysics* [in Proœ. Metaphy.], affirms that the science which proceeds from fewer principles is the more certain.

Taking both together, then, and speaking universally: the more the object of a science is both being and simple, the more perfectly knowable it is, and consequently the more perfect is the science of it. The Philosopher himself embraced these two points at the beginning of the first book of *On the Soul* [in primo de Anima in principio], where he teaches that one science is nobler than another either from the nobility of its object or from its greater certitude in itself; so that the noblest science is, consequently, the one that excels in both. The condition of certitude, however, which lies on the side of the knower — that by which the intellect is more fully and more clearly determined in its knowledge of the object — does not give greater nobility to the science simply, unless the two conditions already stated come first, the unity of the same light also remaining constant. For about lowly things one could have more certain knowledge, either from their greater affinity with sensible things, which in this state of the wayfarer [pro isto viæ statu] are well enough proportioned to

our intellect, or from more frequent exercise of the work, or for some other similar reason. Yet such knowledge will not be nobler in itself and simply than knowledge of sublime things, even though that knowledge is less certain to us, while being in itself most certain. Natural appetite shows this. Since appetite is only for perfection and the good (*Ethics* I [primo Ethicorum]), it imitates and follows the measure of perfection itself, so that it is more vehement toward what is absolutely more perfect. We desire that science which is about nobler things, and things more certain in themselves, even if it is granted us to possess it only slightly and thinly, more than we are inclined toward the science (though it is more certain to us) that treats of lower things, as Aristotle teaches in the 11th [?] book *On Animals* [in. II. de animalibus libro]. It is plain, therefore, that the science which shows us loftier things is absolutely more perfect.

If, however, the sciences are not weighed in an equal clarity of light — if the lower thing happens to become known to us by a higher light, I mean by revelation from above, while the nobler things are known only by natural light — then beyond all doubt the more certain science is the one illuminated by that loftier light.

From all this our proposition is made most clear, and it is manifest to all philosophers that the science which is concerned with a nobler and simpler object, and which makes all who possess it more distinguished and more illustrious, is simply nobler than the science which of itself regards lower and less noble things. For the same reason, within the whole common compass by which philosophy extends itself both to rational and to real science, we prefer real science to rational science, because real science is first of all about real things — things, that is, which have in themselves a firm and settled being in nature — whereas rational science treats only of certain devised intentions [excogitatae intentiones], which have their being only in the apprehension of the soul.

Among the real philosophies, moreover, those which are speculative by their object excel those which extend their object to action. For an object operable by us is, by that very fact, lower than a non-operable object, with which speculative science alone is concerned. Speculative science also includes fewer things and is not for the sake of anything else; hence it rightly claims for itself dominion and excellence over the other. Of the speculative sciences, the noblest is the one that contemplates the highest objects of speculation [suprema speculabilia]. Among the natural sciences, this office belongs to metaphysics alone, and deservedly so, because it surveys with its lofty gaze, first and of itself, the first principles of things, and likewise the first causes — the separate substances, I mean, and among them the supreme one, God, best and greatest. The mathematical sciences hold the second seat of dignity: not, indeed, by reason of the nobility of their object (for on this count the science called physics is nobler), but by reason of simplicity. For the object of mathematics, which abstracts from matter according to reason, encloses fewer things within itself than physics considers of itself in its own object. Sacred theology, then, contemplates things that are

nobler simply, and beings more certain and simpler in themselves — God, that is, and divine things — through the most elevated and most hidden reasons and considerations; and it does so under a nobler light as well, the divine light, I mean, the light of divine revelation. In all this it surpasses every other science, whether speculative or practical, and even metaphysics itself, which surveys the loftiest things by natural light alone. The science of the civil laws, by contrast, belongs only to the practical natural sciences — to politics, I mean, which is one part of moral science acquired by natural light (for moral science divides of itself into ethics, economics and politics). It is therefore clear, and follows most plainly, that sacred theology is simply, and without any exception or doubt whatever, nobler than any knowledge proper to the civil laws. Indeed, it follows further that theology is raised higher even above all the sciences that are nobler than the science of laws, as the holy Doctor [sanctus Doctor] teaches excellently in the first part, q. 1, art. 6 [prima parte. q. 1. art. 6.].

This, too, especially as it concerns legal expertise itself, I had never until now found denied by any learned man of any kind whatever. Only this man, I have found from this tract of his, has run into darkness in the most open light. For at the beginning, arguing for the side that in his own judgment is false — the side whose contrary he afterwards asserts that he holds and strives to prove — he concludes, through the said chapter *Leges, Certum, Suscipitis* [per dictū capitulū Leges. Certum. Suscipitis.], that theology is superior and more worthy; so that by this manner of proceeding he makes it plain that he holds the opposite of this truth. It is evident, then, that both by the reason already given and by the authority of all the learned he deserves contempt on this point. Nor would I think that among the lord jurists [domini legistae] a single one could be found so dull of mind or sense, and so estranged from all reason, as to follow this man in so patent a lapse — and, as a consequence, to presume to attempt the determination of theological questions, as this man has done with rash daring and without any reason. No wonder, then, if he has failed on every side.

That the powers of a lower science do not suffice to decide the questions of a higher science, although they supply it with help. Cap. IIII.

For still greater clarity on this matter, however, we must inquire more seriously whether some lower science can, notwithstanding its very inferiority, intrude itself into deciding the questions of a higher science, and consequently theological questions — so that it may be better seen whether it can be granted to legal expertise — or must rather be denied it — that it intrude itself into the article of the question concerning *striges* [de frigidibus].

At first it might seem to someone that a lower science can treat of matters belonging to a higher one. For metaphysics is superior to physics itself; yet physics determines demonstratively that separate substances exist, and that God is immobile, immaterial and of infinite power. And yet these conclusions are metaphysical, and concern the objects of metaphysics of themselves [per se]; therefore, etc. On the contrary side, however, stands the very clear line of reasoning brought forward above.

To clarify this doubt, then, it must be understood first that one science can be called superior to another in three ways. In the first way, by extension: because it extends to more things than the other does. In this way metaphysics is superior to mathematics; but metaphysics is not superior in this way to dialectic — they are of equal compass, as the Philosopher proves in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*. In the second way, one science is superior to another by perfection: because it concerns more perfect things, even if the other perhaps concerns more things. So the science of the soul is superior to the science of minerals, and the science of the heavens is nobler than the science of generation and corruption [de gen. & corrup.] or the science of meteorology [scientia metheororum]. In the third way, one science is superior to another by unlimitedness [illimitatione], or simplicity: because its object is less limited and simpler.

This in fact happens in two ways. In one way, because the subject of one science is limited, relative to the subject of another, by a material difference that is accidental to the formal one. Thus being seen is accidental to a line; and number, too, and every numerical proportion, is contracted by the motions of the celestial bodies, or by sounds, which are accidental to number itself and to its proportions as such. In this way perspective [Perspectiua], which concerns the visual line, is inferior to geometry, which concerns the line in itself. Likewise astrology [Astrologia], which concerns the number of the heavens and of their motions and proportions, is inferior to arithmetic, which concerns number and its proportions in themselves; and music, which concerns sounding number and its properties [pafionibus], is likewise inferior to arithmetic, for the same reason. On account of this inferiority the former are called subalternated [subalternatæ] and the latter subalternating [subalternantes], as if these very words intimated that the former are placed under the latter, as lower under higher.

In the other way, it happens that one science is superior to another by unlimitedness and simplicity because, whether its subject is the same as the other's or different from it, one science extends and orders this subject of its own to a work that falls under choice, while the other does not, but stops at the nature of the subject and at the properties and principles of its nature alone. In this way a practical science is inferior to the speculative science set apart from it [condistincta eidem]: so the theory of medicine [Theorica medicinæ] is superior to its practice, and the science of the soul to moral science.

In all the ways already mentioned, however, theology is superior to all the sciences. It extends to more things: more things have been revealed to us than we could know by natural light. Moreover, the light of divine revelation leads to a firmer knowledge of things known naturally. Again, about things known to us even by natural light we have more considerations through revelation than through the inborn light itself. Thus about God, about the angels, about our soul, about the celestial bodies, and simply about all creatures, we have received certain most lofty considerations to which natural light can by no means lead. That it is prior and superior in perfection as well has been proved more seriously above. In unlimitedness and simplicity likewise it alone excels

all the rest, because it concerns the most unlimited and simplest object — God, I mean, according to the most unlimited reasons, surveyed by natural as well as by supernatural light. In speculation, too, it is superior to the others, because it concerns the highest object of speculation [summo speculari], which cannot be ordered to a work except perhaps objectively — and this takes nothing away from its loftiness, but rather adds to it. And if, secondarily, it also concerns things to be done [operabilibus], in so far as it is practical, it holds eminence over all such sciences, since it directs to the last end of all good works, and of all works that lead to that end both naturally and supernaturally — which is granted to no other science whatever.

It must be understood, secondly, that for one science to intrude itself into speculating about the things which, by their proper reason and adequately, belong to another is simply impossible, because the sciences are formally distinguished by the formal objects they treat of and by the distinct first principles of those objects, as is plain from the first book of the *Posterior Analytics* [primo Posteriorum]. One science can nevertheless determine matters belonging to another in three ways.

In the first way, as judging, or also as directing, ordering, or in any manner confirming what belongs to the consideration of the other. In this way metaphysics [Methaphysica], the most common of all the sciences, orders all the other natural sciences, since it is the first natural wisdom; from this it has the power to establish, confirm and also defend the principles of all the other natural sciences. Likewise the science that is called subaltern [subalterna] proves the principles of the science subalternated to it. For no lower science proves its own proper principles; it refers them to the higher. So physics, too, proves many things which moral science assumes as principles.

In the second way, as it were serving and ministering. For our higher sciences presuppose many truths, and use many in their own reasonings, which the lower sciences properly determine. Metaphysics, for example, presupposes the proof which the physicist brings forward from his own principles, by which he proves from the motion of the heavens that separate substances exist; and afterwards metaphysics takes that proof into its own service, so as to teach from it the things concerning those substances that savour of pure abstraction in being — their number, I mean, their supreme immobility, and matters of that kind. The physicist, however, attempts what we have described in the capacity of one lower and serving, in the way that the interior sense also ministers to the intellect and the exterior senses serve the interior ones.

In the third way, one science can treat of things that belong to another as concurring with it. This happens in two ways. In one way, so that one science considers something that does not belong to the other's subject except remotely — as its remote principle, for instance, or likewise its remote end. In this way every science can say something about God, since he is the first principle and last end of all the other things that the sciences properly speculate about. In this way, too, moral science can say something about the substance of the soul and about

its powers and conditions. In the other way, about something that belongs even proximately to the consideration of another science, but under a different reason. It happens, for instance, that astrology and physics together reach the same conclusion, but through different principles or middle terms [media] fitted to each. Both prove and demonstrate that the Earth is round. Physics does so through a natural middle term: namely, that its parts, being heavy, tend by nature from every side toward the center as far as they can. Astrology does so through a mathematical, or even an astronomical, middle term: because, for example, some celestial phenomena [pafsionum aliquæ cēlestes] appear earlier to those in the east than to those in the west. Some stars, moreover, are perpetually in view of those in the south and some are always hidden from them, while for those in the north the reverse holds with other stars. No other cause of these things can be assigned than the swelling of the Earth, which is natural to it on every side. The Earth's shadow, too, in whatever region of the sky an eclipse of the Moon takes place, is round — and for no other cause than that the body of the Earth itself, which is placed at the center, is round.

Among the ways of superiority among the sciences already mentioned, then — the ways in which one science may in some manner declare things that belong to another — only the one assigned in the first place carries dignity. In this way theology, too, intrudes itself into matters belonging to all the sciences, as the judge and queen of them all: not, indeed, so as to prove all the principles of the others, but so as to confirm more strongly by a higher light, and to deduce more effectively with all falsehood exposed, a great many things about God, the angels, the soul, the celestial bodies, and the very great fabric and most wise order of the whole world, which the other sciences also treat of. The second way, however, carries imperfection; in this way all the other sciences rightly serve sacred theology.

For just as grace presupposes the nature that it perfects, so theology also presupposes all natural science, which it illuminates with the divine light infused into it as its own, that light removing the defect of our natural light. In this way sacred theology makes use of the other sciences, and takes a great many natural demonstrations into its own service, concerning speculative matters as well as moral ones — but, as we have said, as their judge and mistress. By the right of its primacy it may remove whatever it finds false in them, confirm whatever is true, and illuminate whatever is uncertain and obscure, making it passable by a higher light.

The third way, as to its first grade, gives a science greater or at any rate lesser nobility from its own proper object, but not from any remote being considered apart from itself; for the very highest things can be considered even by the lowest sciences. As to the second grade, however, it implies no greater and no lesser perfection in one science than in another. In this way sciences are compared as agreeing in one object, but only materially; and in that way a science does not have nobility from its object of itself [per se]. If, however, they are compared with each other as to their principles, then the nobler of them

is the one that proceeds from simpler and higher principles concerning the same thing that both intend to prove. So, regarding the conclusion introduced above — that the Earth is round — the astrologer has a nobler science of it than the natural philosopher has.

That the civil or even the canon laws cannot of themselves decide theological questions, such as this one about the striges also is. Cap. V.

Since, then, the science of laws is inferior to sacred theology in all the ways already mentioned — and these sciences are also distinguished formally by more than genus, as was set out at length above — and since it proceeds by another formal reason, and a less noble one at that (by natural light, I mean, or by the authority of men), whereas theology confirms everything by divine light and by the authority of God who reveals it, it follows plainly from what has been said that no legal expertise of any kind can meddle in questions belonging to sacred theology, except perhaps as a handmaid serving her mistress. In that manner not the law alone but all the other sciences minister to theology. For it is said of divine wisdom, which is sacred theology, in Proverbs 8 [Prouerbiorum. 8.], that she sent her handmaids — that is, the other sciences — to call men, namely, and to bring them into the citadel: that is, to the summit, strength and perfection of wisdom. On that summit wisdom alone resides, as though dwelling in the citadel itself, set on the highest place. Now everyone of even moderate prudence knows very well how unworthy it would be, and how great a punishment a hand- maid would deserve if she chose to set herself against her mistress — if she dared to censure her in matters that belong to the mistress and to her dominion. The handmaid cannot even know whether those matters are rightly done or not unless the mistress teaches her; nor do they pertain to the handmaid in any way at all, except in so far as she obeys her mistress. It is no less unworthy, and utterly detestable, for a mere jurist to thrust himself into matters belonging to sacred theology in such a way as to strive to hold or defend the opposite of what the sacred theologians determine from the fountain of the sacred writings and of the most lucid teaching of the holy Doctors. And this, certainly, the wise jurists admit.

Granted, then, that both sometimes happen to discuss [disserere] the same matters, still, in what is proper to theology, the civil and even the canon laws ought to defer to it, and to acquiesce in all things — more so than theology, notwithstanding its superiority, ought (as some of the jurists might suppose) to defer to the laws in what is proper to them. That is not true in every respect. On the contrary, even in such matters sacred theology can set itself up as judge and censor, to inquire and judge from its own principles whether the laws are true or good and rightly enacted. If it finds anything in them in harmony with truth and akin to justice, it approves and confirms it; but if anything opposed and contrary to these comes up, it rejects and condemns it. So, rightly, it condemns usury, which human laws nevertheless permit, without treating it as liable to restitution.

Since, therefore, this article concerning the sect of the striges — whether, I mean, it exists in fact, or whether it is possible; whether the things related of such a sect smack manifestly of heresy or do not — belongs to theology alone (for these things cannot be known unless theology itself teaches them, nor are such matters treated in law in any way, except in so far as, having been taken from theology's fountain, they rightly serve that same theology), it follows that it was exceedingly presumptuous of any jurist to take up a contest against the lords Inquisitors on this article. For they are, as a rule, most profound theologians, and whatever they determine on this matter they deduce invincibly from the sacred writings and the teaching of the saints. From this most firmly founded reason, therefore, it is as clear as can be that the Adversary, who presumed to attempt this, deserves sharp rebuke, seeing that he has gone badly astray here through both natural and moral imprudence.

Our preceding deduction proceeded from the nature of science and from the formal distinction of the sciences; and a thing's excellence, both in itself and by comparison with others, arises in the first place from its nature and quiddity, or is made known from a prior principle. For that reason it requires no confirmation through posterior things — signs, say, or effects — nor even through human authorities. But if the Adversary perhaps judges that easier reasons ought to be brought forward, and reasons confirmed through authorities as well — on the ground that the preceding reason seems to proceed from terms and propositions unknown to many jurists, or to himself — then, I think, he is to be satisfied in this way: I remind him that, since the deduction we have made proceeds from the reasons, properties and objects of the sciences and from their formal distinction, and since without knowing these one can never know how one science is compared with another, he should weigh his own presumption from this. For he dares to discuss that question and to meddle in it against the theologians, when he in no way understands its terms and propositions, which are necessary for determining it.

Nevertheless, so that everyone may be satisfied, we shall bring forward the very things he asks for. We shall do so not only when we refute the inept proofs he has made for the opposite side, but also now, first, by introducing the reasons that he himself adduces for our conclusion. This is not because we set great store by them, in so far as they depend on what he has alleged; it is so that everyone may recognise that the solutions he applies to them have no strength or weight at all. The first reason, then, that he puts forward for our conclusion — which afterwards, like the others, he tries to answer — is as follows.

The two reasons recited for the principal conclusion are confirmed. Cap. VI.

[Margin: Responsio prima.] Theologians are properly the expositors [tractatores] of the divine Scriptures, and in expounding them they are placed ahead of the Pontiffs (distin. 20. c. 1.). Now no one ought to meddle in what pertains to another (l. Consulta diuallia. C. de testa. & in l. culpa. ff. de re. iudi.). Nor ought the Pope to meddle in secular affairs; that belongs to the secular prince — nor the other way round, etc. (10. distin. cap. quoniam.), and the gloss there

says that laws are not to be alleged where there is a canon. And there is a good text for this in the Authentic *Quomodo oportet episco.*, at the beginning, with the gloss there on the word *conferens*, etc.

[Margin: *Solutio mala.*] To this reason, however, he replies that it is one thing to ask whether the Emperor can meddle in spiritual cases, which those laws forbid, and another whether laws can be alleged in theological questions — which, he says, has been proved to be useful and not vain, and which the preachers also observe, and rightly.

[Margin: *Reprobatio. Solutio.*] Against this: if the civil laws, which issued from the emperors, cannot be alleged in spiritual cases, or meddle in them, as has been proved by the laws already cited, then, since the crime of heresy itself is counted among spiritual matters, the laws will not be able to meddle with it. Therefore, in this question — whether the sect of the striges is heretical or not, and whether it exists or can exist through the malice of the devil with God's permission — he cannot make a determination by means of the laws against the theologians. He ought rather to acquiesce in the determinations of the theologians. Moreover, practical theological questions are spiritual cases. Therefore, if the laws may not meddle in spiritual cases, as was proved by those texts, they will not be able to meddle in these either — and much less, therefore, in speculative questions, of which kind are the questions already mentioned. It was nevertheless proved above that sacred theology, as mistress of the other sciences, can take even the laws into its service. It is in this way that the preachers use them, just as they make every other science serve them, so as to win all men for Christ. So the Apostle brings in even the sayings of the heathen poets to confirm the truth he preached. This does not weaken but proves the point: that legal expertise is inferior to sacred theology, and consequently that a law cannot be alleged to decide theological questions — above all against the theologians themselves, where they are treating divine matters and matters proper to themselves, and interpreting the sacred writings for their own purpose.

[Margin: *Secunda ratio.*] The second reason favouring the truth is as follows. Theology is more worthy and superior (*dist. 10. c. leges. c. certum. cap. suscipitis.*). Indeed, the science of laws is subject to ethics, as is clear from the gloss in the proem to the Decretum [*gl. in proemio decreti*]. Ethics, however, is far inferior to theology; indeed, the study of laws is even forbidden to religious (*c. non magno. c. super specula. extra ne cle. vel mona.*). Therefore, etc.

[Margin: *Solutio mala.*] The Adversary, however, replies that since theological matters can be explained through the other sciences, much more can they be explained through the laws. He adds that Christ used sensible things in his examples to explain divine things, and that the Philosopher says in the first book of the *Physics* that the way innate to us is from the less perfect, etc. Nor, he says, is the study of laws forbidden to religious except so that they are not hindered from the study of theology.

[Margin: *Reprobatio solutionis.*] Against this: from all these points our proposition is obtained — namely, that the science of laws is inferior and less perfect, and that it can be taken into the service of sacred theology only as an inferior and a handmaid, just as sensible examples can for explaining divine things. Will the jurists, then, be able to decide theological questions from their own principles? That cannot be inferred from the premises, any more than that country folk or children can, whose own concern is with sensible things. And if the laws are a hindrance to a more sublime study — since that study properly belongs to a more sublime and more perfect state, such as the state of religious is — how will the jurists dare to wish to penetrate the secrets of that study, or even to overturn them, as the Adversary has striven to do by means of the laws?

That the third reason brought in by the Adversary is quite weak, and that his solution of it is also useless, is made plain; and at the same time it is shown how legal expertise can deservedly be called a science. Cap. VII.

[Margin: *Tertia ratio.*] The third reason is this. Legal expertise [*peritia legum*] is not a science, since it is not produced by demonstration, because the Legists [*legistae*] do not have the method of argument; they rely only on the authorities of the laws, or of the canons, or of the doctors, and they do not proceed through the cause or through reason. But to know scientifically [*scire*] is to know a thing through its cause (first book of the *Posterior Analytics*). The laws themselves, moreover, refuse subtleties and proceed simply and plainly (c. *dilecti filij. extra de iudi.*).

[Margin: *Solutio mala.*] The Adversary replies, however, that on the contrary it is a science, and he proves it on the ground that in several texts (which he also cites) it is called a science. He also labours to prove — but in vain — that it is a cognition [*cognitio*], and that it is not a productive habit [*habitus factivus*]. From this he further infers that it is scientific and acquired through demonstration, because it distinguishes the just from the unjust. He says also that the laws have reasons and causes, both in doubting, through reason that is not right, and in deciding, through right reason; and for these points he cites many things, etc. He adds that it is not only a practical science but also a speculative one, because, he says, it can only by subtle investigation and speculation untie the knots, questions and controversies that have never yet arisen, as it must do; and it proceeds through reasons and relies on them. He adds further that because the science of law is at once practical and speculative, it is not, even though it has the character of being for use, less worthy than those sciences which are not for use, of which Aristotle speaks in the proem to the *Metaphysics*; for Aristotle, he says, means those that are *only* for use. Otherwise theology and medicine, which theologians and physicians extol to the highest degree, would not be nobler, since they too are for use, as is evident. It also proceeds through new reasons and through devised similitudes, and from this it is evident that it is speculative.

He says also that it is the most certain science, because it has an end which the others, he says, do not have (as in the proem to the *Digest*, col. pen.), and it

is therefore nobler, according to the Philosopher in the proem to the *De anima*. This is evident, too, from its effect: it makes men noble, as is found in l. 2. §. fin. ff. de excusatio. tuto., etc. In many respects, moreover, they are privileged, as is proved, etc. For this reason, too, not all who are expert in law can be made doctors of law, etc. — the Jews, for example. The doctors of law are also magnificent men, because they are occupied with divine things, that is, with the common good of the city; and this is what the Philosopher calls such men in the fourth book of the *Ethics*, as does the text in the first constitution of the *Codex* and in the proem to the *Institutes*. Hence their science too can be called divine. And they are the best ministers of the commonwealth for preserving and protecting the universal good, etc. That is why they are employed at the courts of princes as assessors. And some of them have been received by the Supreme Pontiffs to the kiss of the mouth, while others are received to the kiss of the feet. The laws themselves are also admirable and divine, because nothing superfluous or duplicated is found in them, nothing diminished, etc. He says and multiplies many other things to no purpose; a great many of them, too, will be touched on below among the arguments to be brought forward for his opinion and answered.

He adds, moreover, that although the Legists and Canonists do not have the dialecticians' method of arguing, they nevertheless have one of their own, which is also good. For each science has its own manner of speaking (38. dist. c. loquutio.), and this according to its subject matter — and therefore rightly, according to the Philosopher in the first book of the *Ethics*. Nor is it fitting that the canons should be constrained by logical rules, since laws are imposed not on words but on things (l. 2. C. com. de leg.). Nor is it unfitting to proceed by authorities, above all those of the laws, because a law contains reason no less than the sayings of the philosophers, on hearing which those who philosophize are content. This is done also for the sake of brevity, because the Moderns delight in brevity, etc. And the claim that the laws do not love subtleties is not true absolutely, since they treat subtly of the interpretation of rights, or of the unravelling of questions so as to draw out the truth; but it is true that they do not love subtleties in so far as these tend to deceive.

[Margin: Reprobatio solutionis.] But this solution is of little use. And first, it must be said that the sacred theologians would not take up that reason against the lords Legists. For it does not become the gravest fathers to wish to belittle the glory of others with words, but rather to enlarge it, provided the truth is somehow kept safe. We concede, therefore, that legal expertise is a science, and the most noble in the genus of the moral sciences; indeed, that in that genus it is even wisdom [sapientia], and very useful and necessary to the commonwealth, and even to the whole world — so much so that without it the peace and tranquillity of human life would perish. We know, too, that subtle matters are determined by the laws and are penetrated and elucidated by the lords Legists, even though in judgments they very often deliberately avoid superfluous and

deceptive subtleties. Nor do we deny that it befits each science to have its own difficulties and subtleties, its own terms and its own manners of speaking.

But the Adversary brought in this argument to prove his principal proposition: namely, that from the nobility of the laws, as introduced by this solution of his, he might covertly argue that the laws can also decide theological questions, and especially against the theologians. We shall therefore examine his statements one by one, to show that what he intends cannot be obtained from them. And first: when he proves that legal expertise is a science by the sayings of the laws themselves — even granting that what he intends to prove is true in some sense, as we also granted freely above — this proof of his is nevertheless not a good one. For whoever denied that it is a science would consequently say the contrary: that the authors of the laws, or their followers the Legists, do not speak on this point or affirm it as men who know, but as men who hold an opinion. So he would obtain what he intends only by way of opinion; indeed, he would be assuming what he has to prove — a method of proof that the dialecticians deride, and rightly. His task, rather, was to demonstrate from the very nature [ratio] of science, if he could or knew how, that the knowledge of the laws is a science, and not to do so through the sayings of the laws or of the Legists.

But to come down to the matter itself, we say that the name "science" is taken in two ways. In one way, broadly, for any knowledge [notitia] of knowable things; and in this sense the expertise of all the laws can be called a science. In another way, for certain knowledge acquired demonstratively, whether from the terms themselves, or from the cause, or from some necessary effect. In this sense, although the knowledge of many laws is a science, the knowledge of all of them is not, because the knowledge of those laws that depend on mere human will is not. For the things determined by laws in this way are contingent and subject to variation; just as they were enacted, so they can also be changed, and their contraries sanctioned by law. As for moral rules or conclusions, which proceed from the nature of the virtues or the vices, it is in itself a noble science — but not in the understanding of many men of the present day, who know no cause of what is said scientifically or demonstratively, but rely on the authority of their elders alone, as is clear from their manner of disputing [disserendi]. That method of proof, as is evident according to Boethius [Boetium], generates nothing but opinion — and the weakest of all — and in no way science.

It does not follow, however: "it is a cognition, therefore a science"; "it is a habit that is not productive, therefore a science"; "it distinguishes the just from the unjust, therefore it is a science, therefore through the cause, therefore demonstratively." These proofs provoke laughter among the wise and a sneer [ronchum] at their authority; in me, however, they provoke compassion as well, because while he strives to prove that the Legists are knowers, he proves only that he himself does not know. For those proofs have as much force as these, or others like them: "a man lives, therefore he is an eagle"; "he runs, therefore he is a horse." For an affirmative proof from the more common to

the less common is fallacious and null, as Logic, the lamp of all the sciences, teaches.

When he says, too, that the laws have their own reasons and causes, this is true of many moral matters, as has been said, but not of all. For in very many cases the will of the legislator, moved by a probable reason, suffices in place of a reason — a reason that is sometimes not effective or good either — and for this reason the law can easily be changed. But it belongs to the nature of science that there be immutability both on the side of the knowable conclusions and on the side of the reasons.

But very many of these reasons, too, do not compel the intellect and mind of everyone, because some do not grasp their force more fully — and the world is full of such people. Arguments for the opposite side are also quite often found in contingent matters, because contingent things can turn out well or badly in many ways, according to accidents. Hence of such things there are no demonstrations in the proper sense, as the Analytics speak of demonstration — although there are demonstrations in the sense of probable and persuasive showings [ostensiones].

Yet the laws do not principally treat of contingent things, but of necessary rules founded on the immovable rectitude of reason. They also deduce necessary universal conclusions, even though these are directed to the regulation of singulars, in the more principal matters, which are suited to regulating the life of men; and they proceed not only by way of opinion but also by necessary reasons, as far as the nature of things allows. It is not, therefore, to be denied absolutely that legal expertise is also, in itself, properly a science. With all that has been said, however, in whatever way legal expertise may be a science, it does not follow that it is more excellent than sacred theology, or that it can reach so far as to decide theology's questions.

The science of laws is practical, and in no way properly speculative. Cap. VIII.

In trying to prove, moreover, that the science of laws is speculative because it unties knots through speculation, etc., he displays great ignorance of what the name "speculative science" means. A science is not called speculative because it speculates — that is common to all sciences, and then all would be speculative — but because its proper end is to speculate the truth in such a way that, by its own nature, it does not direct that speculation to a work falling under choice [opus sub electione cadens], as is clear from the Philosopher in the third book of the *De anima* and the first of the *Metaphysics*. Since, then, the laws by their own nature are ordered to regulating the works of men, it is clear that their science is not speculative but only practical.

It is foolish, moreover, to say that one science acquired by the natural light is at once practical and speculative absolutely; and this follows from the ignorance, already noted, of what the name "speculative science" means. For it is proper to our sacred theology to be at once practical in one respect and speculative in another, although it is principally speculative. And if it is conceded that medicine is at once practical and speculative, it must also be conceded that it

divides into two sciences. But it is better to say that it is one and the same science, practical absolutely, because its end is a work. Yet because in some part of itself it proceeds in a speculative way about an operable object, it can for that part be called speculative, or theoretical, but not absolutely, since they direct even this speculation ultimately to a work, and extend it to one.

That this man should make himself a commentator on and expositor of Aristotle's sayings we would indeed welcome — if he did not speak against Aristotle's intention and against all his expositors, and (what is more to be pitied) if he did not speak foolishly. I now see not only a crow wishing to cover itself with peacocks' feathers, but one wishing to adorn peacocks with a crow's. Aristotle would laugh if he heard anyone declare that there is some science which is at once practical and speculative absolutely, or even partly the one and partly the other, since he pronounces these modes of knowing to be distinct generically, and not merely in number or species. The same habit, however, which is practical by its object and end, can be named theoretical, from the fact that it does not actually order its consideration of the causes of its object to a work — although by its nature, and virtually, it always keeps that ordering.

Again, to proceed by new reasons and devised similitudes does not show that the procedure is speculative, since this can be found — and occurs more often — in practical and operable matters. And if from this double gift of nobility he also wishes to infer that this science is nobler than those sciences which are shown to be only speculative, then in his view it will turn out more excellent than first philosophy. For the Philosopher himself proves quite carefully, in the proem to the *Metaphysics* [Procē. Metaph.], that first philosophy is solely speculative. Medicine too, according to him, will be nobler than metaphysics — which even physicians themselves know and admit to be laughable.

He says also that it is the most certain and the noblest science, because it has the most certain causes and demonstrations, and because it has an end which the others do not have. This would perhaps have some force if he proved that end, or at any rate those causes, to be nobler than the ends and causes of the others — and, to the point at issue, nobler than the proper and proximate end of sacred theology, namely the vision of God through his essence, which men are to attain. But I believe that shame will keep him from attempting to prove this. Nor is it true that legal expertise [peritia iuris] is universally about certain things, and consequently that it is most certain with respect to everything it considers; and if it is so with respect to some things, it is still not more certain than the purely speculative sciences, as was proved above. How much less, then, will it be more certain than sacred theology, which comprehends both habits under the most certain light of divine revelation? For divine authority is more efficacious not only than all human authorities but also than all human reasons and demonstrations. And to theology's proper end — eternal beatitude, I mean — inasmuch as theology is practical, the proximate end of everything is finally ordered as to the noblest of all ends: the proximate end not only of all the laws, but also of all the other sciences. Hence it is clear that the authority of

the Philosopher brought in from the first book of the *De anima* militates against the very man who brought it in.

The science of laws deservedly glorifies its cultivators, but theology glorifies its own the more. Cap. IX.

That legal expertise makes its cultivators noble and magnificent we by no means deny. We know and approve that they are deservedly privileged in many things. But this has flowed not so much from the dignity of that science as from its common utility and necessity, joined with the right will of princes. As for the intrinsic excellence of this science, however — inasmuch as science itself is a certain perfection of our soul — the speculative sciences are far more excellent, and above all sacred theology. By them the soul is the more perfected in this, that through them it is, in intelligible being [in esse intelligibili], things other than itself, even the noblest, as is had from the third book of the *De anima*.

Yet philosophers do not lack extrinsic dignities and excellences, and theologians much less, as well as a multitude of privileges, on account of which they are specially called sacred and illustrious. And whoever, through his own fault or defect, is not worthy of the insignia [infula] of the doctorate in law is much less worthy of it in theology — though the converse does not hold.

He adds, again, that the lords Jurists [Iuristas] are employed in the courts of princes. We grant that this is done not without reason, and deservedly, for the determining of judgments and the settling of lawsuits. But few of them become great in the presence of princes. On the contrary, those who are caught cavilling in defence of even unjust causes for gain, or in attacking just ones, grow rather vile in princes' eyes; and with no small supply of such men the world is disfigured and the peace of men weakened. No less, however, do theologians become — or ought they to become — great according to spiritual dignities: because of the illumination with which they enlighten the world concerning God and divine things, and because of the spiritual matters and the judgments of God, which are to be laid open to the peoples and also exercised upon them, so that spiritual and inward peace, tranquillity of soul, and union with God may be preserved in the world. Hence pontiffs, and those who assist them, ought to be good theologians.

That some legist was received by some supreme pontiff to the kiss of the mouth does not prove any excellence over the theologians. For this did not happen to a legist inasmuch as he is a legist — otherwise that honour would be owed to all legists — but on account of other, contingent reasons and causes of greater goodwill, which theologians too happen not to lack, together with the same result. Indeed my own teacher, the most profound theologian Master Sylvester Prierias [Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio], was received to the kiss of the mouth by Leo X [Leone Decimo]. And other fathers have at times (though rarely) been received by other pontiffs even to their private table [ad singularem mensam].

For these reasons, then, just as legal expertise is not to be despised but revered, so too it is not to be preferred to theological science. That the laws themselves

contribute to the common good of the people and of the whole commonwealth — to the temporal quiet and peace of all, I mean — we have already affirmed often, and long before this. But theology contributes to the greater utility of the same people: as practical, it leads them first to the spiritual peace of the soul, while inasmuch as it is speculative, it raises them to the contemplation of God and to the knowledge of all divine things. The laws look upon the divine good from afar; theology brings it forth from its own hidden stores. The laws settle civil lawsuits; theology settles graver ones, exposed to greater peril — spiritual suits, I mean, and those of conscience — and brings about reconciliation between God and men. For the sacred theologians take up, defend and advance the causes of the soul, of the faith, of the Church and of Christ.

Because the science of laws has emanated from God as from its first principle, and leads back to God ultimately and remotely, it is not on that account to be judged or named divine any more than any other science, since God is the ultimate end and the first principle of all the sciences. Theology, however, taken under either aspect, regards God proximately and immediately. Theology is also more admirable: it admits no falsity and permits no evil, not even the least, since it teaches that nothing undefiled [recte: defiled — the page prints *incoinquinatum*, "undefiled", where the sense requires *coinquinatum*] can enter the heavenly homeland, and that men will render an account even of every idle word. It leaves no crime once committed, even the slightest, unpunished, at least in the forum of conscience — one's own, I mean, or another's. The laws are not so disposed toward the evils they permit (permitting them not as evils), such as usury, in the way already described.

The legists' manner of proceeding is declared not to be despised. Cap. X.

To his further claim that the legists have a good method of arguing and disputing even if they do not proceed according to the rules of logic, the reply is that they can certainly speak reasonably. For they are men, and commonly ingenious, and therefore rational; and as such they proceed even logically when they dispute, according to natural logic. But since the light of our reason is by nature quite defective, it was necessary that we be directed in the acts of reason and in discursive reasoning [discursus] through the art of logic, by those who were of sharper wit. Those trained in that art frame their arguments so that they cannot be overcome, and avoid all deceptions with the greatest ease. Those who lack such an art, on the other hand, are thrown down with a light hand and deceived, arguing as ineffectually as they reply feebly — so that their ignorance lies open to the eye, and even legal expertise itself suffers dishonour.

For there is one science alone which perfectly teaches the method of arguing in all the others. Natural reason also dictates that method, but imperfectly and without art; and whoever departs from it always proves his intended point ineffectually. Now the lords Legists — speaking always with due reverence and forbearance [supportatione], and saying what is true and admitted by the wiser among them — are for the most part without this perfect method, and in

their disputations proceed only from the defective dictate of reason, without the mode or rule assigned by the logicians. Very many of them therefore sin in arguing: they do not rightly prove what they intend to prove, nor do they answer objections effectively. This is especially plain in this twofold treatise of this man, who — had I not pitied him — would quite often have led me into contemptuous words, on account of his phylacteries [philaterias], which often serve to infer his proposition about as well as an ass serves for the lyre. For this reason too I have passed over very many of them with contempt.

Each science certainly has its own reasons and disputations — not all of them with respect to the perfect mode, but with respect to the things and truths they treat of. For there is only one general mode of arguing and disputing, by which logic alone directs the acts of reason in all the other sciences; and for this reason, too, it is called by Augustine [Augu.] the art of arts and the science of sciences. And it comes from the sloth of certain legists that they do not seek skill in this method. For those who are logicians as well easily overcome and entangle everyone, even those more expert than themselves in law; and in every disputation they almost always carry off the highest glory, because they clearly lay bare the emptiness of other men's manner of arguing or replying, so that those men are hampered in their proceeding, as though they did not know where to direct their path or where to set their foot. Experience teaches this — though very rarely, because very rare too are the Jurists who take delight in first devoting effort to the study of logic.

The Adversary, however, is deceived in thinking that the logical method of arguing means nothing other than using logical terms and words — saying, for example, "I deny" or "I grant the major," or "the minor," "the antecedent," "the consequence," or "the argument," and the like — or else using deceptive methods while disputing. But he is mistaken, as I said. On the contrary, the gravest doctors of theology, such as Saint Thomas, Albertus Magnus and very many others — like the ancient philosophers, Aristotle, Plato and a great many others — abstain from these words in their discourse. These terms were invented for introducing juniors and little novices [tyrunculis]; and not only the laws but the other sciences too are rightly not subject to these words — and sacred theology still less. Nor is it true that logic changes the nature of words through sophistries; nor does it teach how to form deceptions, except so that afterwards, when they occur, they may be recognized and avoided — lest by a clever arguer anyone be easily deceived and confounded. Suppose, for instance, someone argued thus: "Wisdom is the noblest of the sciences, as is plain from the Philosopher in the proem to the *Metaphysics* [prooemio Metaph.]. Legal expertise [legum peritia] is wisdom, since it is the teaching of all the wise (ff. de legi. l. 2.). Therefore legal expertise is the noblest of the sciences." Perhaps one of the legists will applaud this argument as though it were unanswerable. Yet it is extremely weak. It errs in form — because the first proposition is particular in the first figure of the modes of arguing — and in matter as well. For in the sense in which the first proposition is true (speaking,

I mean, of wisdom absolutely, or simply), the second is false; and conversely, when one speaks of wisdom within the genus of the moral natural sciences [in genere moralium scientiarum naturalium]. It also shuts in the opposite of what it concludes, since in its proof it supposes that other wise men are found too, and consequently other wisdoms.

He also defends himself against another charge with which a great many modern legists are branded — namely, that they proceed not by cause and reason but by authority alone — and says that on the contrary they proceed through laws, which contain reason and cause. In this he does indeed defend the laws in themselves well, since all laws not condemned by the Church are founded on moral reasons. But what is objected is nonetheless true of the understanding of most moderns. In interpreting the laws themselves they often follow the multitude of Doctors, and not the truth better examined by a few. As a result it is evident — daily experience in lawsuits teaches it — that either they defend unjust causes against their conscience and attack just ones, or they have nothing but authority in place of reason, even where they happen to decide according to the true understanding of the law. Not so the philosophers. They adhere to the one sole prince of philosophers, Aristotle, precisely because his reasons are penetrated as drawn from necessary things and concerning necessary things, and as formal. For this reason they rightly convince every intellect that has knowledge of the terms themselves.

The fourth argument, in which the mutability of the laws, which is not to be disapproved, is discussed. Cap. XI.

The fourth argument, brought forward by the Adversary as though it were liable to falsehood, runs as follows. Laws are mutable, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as is plain from the Philosopher in the first book of the *De caelo et mundo*. For in them the will suffices in place of a reason (glo. Insti. de vsu cap.). For what has pleased the Prince has the force of law (Insti. de iure natu. gen. vel ciuil.); nor can a reason be given for all the things established by our ancestors (l. non omnium. ff. de leg.). And for this reason even the imperial laws are not observed everywhere, as is plain in the case of the French and the Venetians; and a great many statutes of cities are found that are contrary to the common laws. Therefore, etc.

[Margin: Solutio. — "Solution."] The Opinant [Opinans], who also enlarges on this argument at great length, replies as follows. First, that law is not voluntary — and so he implicitly denies the Philosopher whom he has adduced. Second, that it is not the Prince's will alone that makes law; rather, that will must be ruled by reason, otherwise his laws are to be quashed and he himself removed. Third, that although the reason of a law cannot be demonstrated, the law can nevertheless be called reasonable because it is not found prohibited — like custom, too, which does not run counter to the canonical institutions.

[Margin: Reprobatio. — "Refutation."] But since the first of these statements deserves contempt, being contrary to the Philosopher, the objection is pressed against the second. Granted that the Prince's will ought to be reasonable, the

Prince can nevertheless, concerning indifferent matters, promulgate laws that are opposite at different times. Nor, when laws are varied, is the science of law varied as to its foundation — which is indeed reason — but as to what is deduced by reason. This variation, although it is not blameworthy but useful according to place and time, nevertheless testifies to the lesser dignity [indignitati] of the science. For the more immutable any science is, the more perfect it is. Hence the other sciences are immutable not only as to their principles but also as to all conclusions necessarily deduced from them. Most legal conclusions, however, are not deduced from reason so necessarily that the opposite could not also be deduced. And as for his addition that a law is reasonable because it is not found prohibited: since its opposite is likewise not found prohibited anywhere, that opposite could equally be held for law. He says certain other things about speculative and practical science, which have already been disposed of by what was said above.

Thus it is plain that, notwithstanding the true praises and commendations of the civil laws, the Adversary's solutions to the arguments brought for our opinion are empty and of no weight. So from all this the truth principally intended remains unimpaired: namely, that theological questions ought not to be determined by the laws.

The argument brought at the beginning of this treatise for the rejected opinion is now plainly seen not to hold, because the laws neither treat of all divine matters, as theology does, nor treat of them as ruling, but rather as serving and acting as handmaids — as has been said, and will be explained more fully below.

Here ends the First Tract on the Pre-eminence of Theology over all the other sciences.

Next, the arguments are to be set out and answered by which the Adversary, in that same first treatise of his, strives to prove that the science of laws is to be preferred to sacred theology, or at least is noble enough to be able to decide theological questions. Let this be the second principal part of the present work.

That we advance through the laws toward knowledge of the truth does not entail their pre-eminence in deciding theological questions. Cap. I.

The first defective argument brought by Ponzinibio to establish the pre-eminence of the laws over theology is this. Common learning, and the liberal studies too, absorbed in boyhood, contribute to the assertion of true doctrine (dist. 37. c. Relatum). And secular letters serve for overturning the errors of the gentiles and for turning what they said well to the use of sacred Scripture (ea. dist. c. Turbat). Therefore much more do the laws.

[Margin: *Solutio prima.* — "First solution."] First solution. If from this argument some superiority of civil law over theology could be inferred,^a then all the studies just mentioned would have to be preferred to sacred theology. And so even a boy, if he were a mere grammarian, or a rhetorician or a poet, would have to be preferred to the sacred theologians. Let only boys say that.

[Margin: ^a Posset profecto mirandū est de isto doc. qui ausus fuerit hoc asseuerare, cū omnes scribentes cōtrariū indifferenter dicāt, theologū præferri legistæ, immo et canonistæ, vt not. Abb. & oēs in c. clerici. de iudic. & Mod. in l. cū quid. & in l. 1. ff. si cert. pet. Car. in cle. 1. in princ. col. 1. de magi. Fely. in rub. de maior. & obed. col. 2. — *Could*. It is truly to be wondered at that this doctor dared to assert this, since all who write say the contrary without distinction: that the theologian is preferred to the legist, and indeed to the canonist too — as Abb. and all the others note on c. *Clerici*, de iudic.; and Mod. on l. *Cum quid* and on l. 1, ff. si cert. pet.; Car. on cle. 1, in princ., col. 1, de magi.; Fely. on the rubric de maior. et obed., col. 2.]

[Margin: Secunda. — "Second."] Second. Nothing else is concluded than what was determined in the preceding treatise: namely, that these kinds of learning, no differently from the laws, can in some respect serve the learning of sacred theology as handmaids.^b For sacred theology, as mistress, takes this as its own — indeed, because these things are its own, as is held in the said chapter *Turbat*. Opposing errors are also exposed and refuted, because what one of the gentiles taught falsely is quite often refuted by another, or even by his own teaching, as is held in the same distinction, c. *Si quid*. But this confirmation of the sacred Scriptures by the heathen and the gentiles is as far removed from the confirmation by which they are made firm in themselves by divine revelation as, in the matter of Christ's coming, the preaching of the angels is removed from the confession of the demons, as is said in the said chapter *Si quid*.

[Margin: ^b Ancilla. Et ita expresse dicit And. de Iser. In prologo feu. col. penul. — *Handmaid*. And so And. de Iser. expressly says, in the prologue to the *Feuda*, the next-to-last column.]

[Margin: Tertia. — "Third."] Third. Nor does it follow from this that anyone learned in any other sciences whatever may so prefer himself to the sacred theologians that it would be fitting for him, or that he would have the faculty, to teach the sacred letters according to his own sense and not according to the tradition of the Fathers who expounded them — which is proper to theologians. On the contrary, such men are sharply rebuked in the said c. *Relatum*; yet the arguer did not blush to do this in his question on the *lamiae* [in quaestione de lamiis]. Hence it is plain that what he intends follows in no respect; rather, he has even weakened his own proposition by his own argument, as though stabbing himself with his own dagger.

That the Pope makes use of laws does not mean they are preferred to theology. Cap. II.

A second argument to the same effect is put forward, as follows. The Pope, to whom alone it belongs to decide doubts concerning the faith, cites and follows laws in making determinations, as is plain in c. *Cum a nobis*, de testi. Therefore, etc.

Solution. It belongs indeed to the Pope alone to decide doubts of faith, and to councils only by his authority,^a since the Lord said to Peter alone: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church." Now the foundation of

the Church is faith in Christ Jesus, according to the Apostle's saying (1 Cor. 3): "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus" — who, as is said in Ephesians 3, dwells in our hearts by faith. The Pope can also cite the civil laws, and decide many ambiguous matters according to them. But it does not follow from this that, in deciding doubts of faith, he takes up the civil laws as an authority or foundation. Rather, as we learn from logic — which teaches how to avoid fallacies, just as it teaches how to construct them, when they are brought in by the less wise, or even by those greedy for empty glory who are commonly called sophists — there is here, I will not say a hidden, but an open fallacy of composition and division. It is no different than if someone argued: "This one is mine" (pointing to his own son), "and this one is a father" (supposing that that son has another son); "therefore this one is my father." The Pope therefore decides doubts of faith, but not through the authorities of the laws;^b rather through the authorities of sacred Scripture, as anyone can observe wherever such doubts are decided in canon law.^c He does cite laws, and determines according to them, where he makes determinations about judicial proceedings and the order of law;^d and this too he does by his own jurisdiction, not as subject to the laws themselves.^e On the contrary, he could abolish^f or abrogate all laws and enact contrary ones, provided this did not conflict with the sacred letters^g or with good morals. He therefore uses laws, even in deciding ecclesiastical cases, as things serving him — as handmaids.^h From this it is further inferred that not only sacred theology, but canon law as well, has the civil law subject to it.^a

[Margin: ^a Concilia. vt patet in ca. 1. & per to. 17. dist. et no. Abb. & Mod. in c. significasti. de elect. — *Councils*. As is plain in c. 1 and throughout dist. 17; and Abb. and Mod. note it on c. *Significasti*, de elect.]

[Margin: ^b Legū. hoc patet quia causæ ecclesiasticæ non debent decidi per leges, sed per canones, vt est tex. et ibi no. Ab. et Mod. in c. 1. de cōsti. ergo multo minus dubia fidei. — *Of the laws*. This is plain because ecclesiastical cases ought not to be decided by the laws but by the canons, as is the text, and as Ab. and Mod. note there, on c. 1, de consti.; much less, therefore, doubts of faith.]

[Margin: ^c Deciduntur. ut in c. 2 [?]. de sum. tri. & in cle. 4. eo. ti. cum similibus. — *Are decided*. As in c. 2 [?], de sum. tri., and in cle. 4 under the same title, with similar passages.]

[Margin: ^d Determinat. vt probatur ex no. per Fel. in c. ecclesia sanctæ Mariæ. col. 3. de constit. ubi plura iura allegat, in quibus Papa in his quæ spectant ad forum secularem decedit secundum ll. & ita etiam loquitur c. a nobis, hic alleg. — *Determines*. As is proved from what Fel. notes on c. *Ecclesia sanctæ Mariæ*, col. 3, de constit., where he cites many laws in which the Pope, in matters belonging to the secular forum, decides according to the laws; and c. *A nobis*, cited here, also speaks in this way.]

[Margin: ^e Subiectus. hoc patet ex late traditis per Fely. in c. 1. col. 8. de consti. ubi etiam Mod. col. 6. — *Subject*. This is plain from what Fely. sets out at length on c. 1, col. 8, de consti.; and Mod. there too, col. 6.]

[Margin: ^f Tollere. hoc patet ex no. per Mod. in c. qua in ecclesiarum. col. 14. de consti. est tamen intelligendum, vt per gl. & Pet. de Anch. in c. possessor. de reg. iur. in. 6. & per Bar. in l. priuilegia. C. de sac. san. eccle. cum regularibus, vt tradit Fely. in d. c. 1. col. 9. de consti. — *Abolish*. This is plain from what Mod. notes on c. *Quae in ecclesiarum*, col. 14, de consti. It is, however, to be understood as the gloss and Pet. de Anch. explain on c. *Possessor*, de reg. iur. in 6, and Bar. on l. *Privilegia*, C. de sac. san. eccle., with the rules [cum regularibus], as Fely. sets out on the said c. 1, col. 9, de consti.]

[Margin: ^g Litteris. hoc enim casu Papa praesumeretur errare, vt est tex. no. in c. sunt quidam. 25. q. 1. Declarari tamen debet ille tex. vt per Fel. in c. 2. col. pen. de rescript. ex quibus dictis tollitur quod. d. Pau. de Ca. in l. 1. ff. si cer. pet. & Mod. in c. ne initaris, de constitu. vbi videtur contrarium dicere. — *Letters*. For in this case the Pope would be presumed to err, as is the noted text in c. *Sunt quidam*, 25 q. 1. That text, however, must be explained as Fel. does on c. 2, next-to-last column, de rescript. By these statements is removed what Pau. de Ca. says on l. 1, ff. si cer. pet., and Mod. on c. *Ne initaris*, de constitu., where he seems to say the contrary.]

[Margin: ^h Ancillis. hoc expresse probatur in c. super specula. de priuil. ubi dicitur, quod sancta ecclesia legum secularium non respuit famulatum. — *Handmaids*. This is expressly proved in c. *Super specula*, de priuil., where it is said that holy Church does not reject the service of the secular laws.]

[Margin: ^a Subijcitur. vt patet ex. d. c. super specula proxime alleg. & fatentur omnes in c. clerici. de iudi. & in l. cū quid. si cert. pet. & patet ex no. in c. ecclesia sanctae Mariae sup. alleg. — *Is subject*. As is plain from the said c. *Super specula*, cited just above; and all concede it on c. *Clerici*, de iudi., and on l. *Cum quid*, si cert. pet.; and it is plain from what is noted on c. *Ecclesia sanctae Mariae*, cited above.]

That canons have some power does not mean that civil laws universally have the same power. Cap. III.

[Margin: Rō tertia. — "Third argument."] The third argument to the same effect is this. The canons have this power (dist. 20, c. *De libellis*, and the following chapter). Therefore the laws have it too, since they have a mutual connection and imitation of each other (auth. de trien. et semis., in princ.); for things that are connected are judged alike (c. *Translato*, extra de constitu.).

Solution. A canon means a rule;^b and in the present matter there are two kinds of rule. One is the rule of faith: by it the articles of faith, and the determinations of councils or of the supreme Pontiffs concerning what is to be believed or what pertains to good morals and the theological virtues, are called rules of faith. The other is the rule of law: in this sense every precept or instruction laid down by the Pope or the Church to direct the settling and pacifying of ecclesiastical cases and suits among men — so that the faithful may live peaceably according to the rite of the Church of God, with a view to divine worship and the advancement of the faithful toward God — is taken as a rule. By canons taken in the first sense theological questions can be determined;

indeed, in the last resort they are decided only by them.^c But the science of such canons is sacred theology itself, which holds such rules as its principles, whether as first principles or as conclusions immediately deduced from the first. Nor do they belong properly to the canonists, insofar as canonists take their name from "canon" in the second sense — except remotely, as to men who borrow these things from the sacred theologians. And in such matters the civil laws are not connected with the canonical ones, nor do they imitate each other; rather, the civil laws themselves imitate the canons in this respect, or rather are subject to them and serve them, as has often been said. By canons taken in the second sense, however, theological questions cannot be decided, but only ecclesiastical questions between men.^d And the chapters cited from dist. 20 are concerned with these alone, as is plain there. In this faculty we grant that canon law is preferred to theology (the same distinction, c. 1) — not as to knowledge, but as to power, as is stated in the same place. This question, however, is concerned with questions of knowledge, not with judicial questions. Nor does canon law even have the faculty of deciding questions between the soul and God, or about divine things in themselves: that belongs to theology alone. And if canons judge of these things in any way, they do so only insofar as they put on the habit of theology. Therefore what is assumed in the argument, as regards the comparison of civil laws and canons, holds true only of canons in the first sense — yet in such a way that these ecclesiastical canons too, and canon law itself, stand above the civil law, insofar as the

[Margin: ^b Regulæ. ca. canon. 3. distin. — *Rule*. The chapter *Canon*, dist. 3.]

[Margin: ^c Deciduntur. vt probatur in cle. 1. § pone. et ibi Car. hoc no. de sum. tri. — *Are decided*. As is proved in cle. 1, § *Pone*, and Car. notes this there, de sum. tri.]

[Margin: ^d Homines. et hoc de plano fatentur doc. omnes: qui volūt q quando agitur de cognitione uera fidei standum esse Theologis, quorum sciētia circa hoc versatur. quando vero agitur de interpretatione iuris diuini, in talibus pertinentibus ad moralem philosophiā, stari debet Canonistis, vt no. de dona. Pet. de Anc. — *Men*. And all the doctors readily concede this: they hold that when the matter is knowledge of the true faith, one must abide by the theologians, whose science is concerned with it; but when the matter is the interpretation of divine law, in such things as pertain to moral philosophy, one must abide by the canonists, as is noted in de dona.; Pet. de Anc.]

maker of the canons surpasses the maker of the laws, and the end of the canons surpasses the end of the civil laws — as all wise men readily grant.^a It follows that the inference drawn does not hold either, namely that if the canonical laws could decide theological questions, the civil laws could do the same.^b For something can belong to a superior that does not belong to an inferior, even one connected with the superior. Things of this kind must be judged alike insofar as they are connected, but not insofar as one surpasses the other. Nevertheless, in the present matter we deny to both of them the faculty

of deciding theological questions, although both may contribute, or be able to contribute, something as handmaids, as was said above.

[Margin: (continuation of note ^d from the previous page) in dispn. antiqua, & mod. tēporibus, quē refert & sequitur Alex. cōsil. 1. circa prin. col. 4. 2 vol. & Mod. in c. ne initaris. in fi. de cōst. ex quo fit vt nō parū mirer de isto doc. cuius argumētis hic respondet Reueren. pater, q̄ præsumpserit contra famigeratas maiorū suorū decisiones dicere. — ... in dispn. antiqua and in modern times [?], whom Alex. cites and follows, cons. 1, near the beginning, col. 4, vol. 2; and Mod. on c. *Ne initaris*, at the end, de const. From this it comes about that I wonder not a little at this doctor, to whose arguments the Reverend Father here replies, that he presumed to speak against the celebrated decisions of his own predecessors.]

[Margin: ^a Conceditur. vt per doct. omnes. in d. c. clerici. de indic. [?] col. cum alijs sup. alleg. & probatur in c. super specula. de priuil. — *Is granted.* As all the doctors hold on the said c. *Clerici*, de indic. [?], col., with the others cited above; and it is proved in c. *Super specula*, de priuil.]

[Margin: ^b Ciuiles. alias sequeretur, q̄ sicut canones possunt de Ecclesiasticis personis disponere, ita & leges contra tex. & ibi not. & omnes in d. c. ecclesia sanctæ Mariæ. — *The civil laws.* Otherwise it would follow that, just as the canons can make dispositions concerning ecclesiastical persons, so could the laws — contrary to the text, and to what is noted there and by all on the said c. *Ecclesia sanctæ Mariæ*.]

That the laws sometimes concern themselves with the Catholic faith does not establish Ponzinibio's thesis. Cap. III.

The fourth argument to the same effect is put forward as follows. The laws are concerned not only with morals but also with faith, since they are subordinate not merely to ethics but to theology as well: they treat of the soul and of faith, and they contain many titles that direct us toward God and tend toward faith. Hence the gloss on l. *Iustitia*, ff. de iusti. et iur., in princ., says that we have no need to read theology, because everything pertaining to faith and to the science of divine law is found in the body of the law. This is especially plain in l. *Cunctos populos*, C. de summa Trin. et fi. catho., and in the Authentic *Quomodo oportet episc.*, § *Nos igitur*, and in many other laws.

[Margin: Solutio. — "Solution."] The first reply is that the civil laws are not concerned with setting out morals scientifically, so that their students would know or teach in what the nature of virtue consists, how one virtue is distinguished from another according to the different species of the virtues, and many other things that belong properly to moral science — and far more eminently to sacred theology, as Saint Thomas [S. Tho.] discussed these matters excellently, beyond human powers, in the second part of his *Summa*, in two volumes. All these things the laws presuppose. They aim only at directing men so that they may lead a peaceable life in accordance with those virtues,^c adding penalties for offenders,^d laying down the manner and the order, and conferring on men the power by which all these things can be put into execution.^e Legists,

therefore, have no business meddling in moral questions — knowing how to discuss, for example, how justice is related to prudence and other such

[Margin: ^c *Pacificā. hoc probatur in proœ. decreta. §. Ideoque. & patet ex gl. no. in c. cum contingat. de iureiur. — Peaceable.* This is proved in the proem, *Decreta*, § *Ideoque*; and it is plain from the noted gloss on c. *Cum contingat*, de iureiur.]

[Margin: ^d *Pœnas. hoc patet in l. 1. de iusti. & iur. — Penalties.* This is plain in l. 1, de iusti. et iur.]

[Margin: ^e *Mandari. quia parum est iura esse. & c. l. 2. §. post originem. de origi. iur. c. 1 & quia, de sta. regu. in 6. — Be put into execution.* Because it is of little use for laws to exist, etc. (l. 2, § *Post originem*, de origi. iur.); c. 1 & quia [?], de sta. regu. in 6.]

matters. They say only that everyone must live justly with others and carry out prudently the tasks entrusted to him; and the laws apply coercion so that human life may proceed virtuously in this way.^a Much less do the laws have any business meddling in matters of faith — that is, in how those matters are to be understood or expounded. Rather, as true Christians, they will declare that these things stand above them, and will confess in their titles that they are wholly to be believed, while nonetheless adding penalties for those who attempt the contrary.^b Hence it does not follow from these points that the laws can decide theological questions. Rather the opposite follows: that they should leave such matters to be discussed and treated by their mistress, since they have no knowledge of them,^c but only faith in general; for they believe whatever holy mother Church believes. And if the first authors of the laws explain anything about such matters, they bring it forward not as pure legists but, in this respect, as theologians — or else they borrowed it from the theologians.

As for the proof that the laws are concerned with such things because they are subordinate to ethics and theology, it is worthless. Grammar too is subordinate to these, and yet no one would infer from this that it can define theological questions. On the contrary, this very subordination no more implies that the laws may meddle in theological matters than that a handmaid may take upon herself the governing of the household, which belongs properly to her mistress; or that commoners should wish to rule cities, which befits the nobles; or that soldiers should lead the battle line, which is proper to the general. Does a subaltern science make determinations about what belongs to the subalternating science, and not rather presuppose it? Does a partial science discourse on what belongs to the general one? How much less, then, will any natural science be able to penetrate the depth of divine things, and of what pertains to them, so as to settle the most difficult questions and untie the most hidden knots?

Turning now to the gloss that was brought in: in the first place, its words are to be disregarded by theologians on account of their author, according to Saint Thomas, opusc. 17, c. 13, ad 11; but still more on account of the words themselves — unless indeed they are so understood that they do not yield the

thesis of the man who cites them, but rather its opposite. For if they mean that everything pertaining to faith and to the science of divine law is found in the civil laws absolutely and without qualification, that is so false and so laughable that it does not even deserve refutation, since those laws cannot even grasp the terms proper to theology, but presuppose what they signify. If, however, the gloss means that everything pertaining to faith, etc., is contained in the laws not without qualification but so far as legal expertise itself^d requires it for a Christian — and even then only as presupposed and borrowed from the theologians, not as examined by the laws — that is certainly true. But from this follows the opposite of what the arguer intends, namely that the law cannot decide theology's questions, as was said above. Nor is it useful for le-

[Margin: ^a Vita. facit c. ad fidē 3. q. 5. — *Life*. The chapter *Ad fidem*, 3 q. 5 [?], bears on this.]

[Margin: ^b Attentatibus. ut patet in d. l. 1. C. de sum. Trin. ubi poena infamiae apponitur. — *Those who attempt*. As is plain in the said l. 1, C. de sum. Trin., where the penalty of infamy is imposed.]

[Margin: ^c Notitiam. nec ob. l. 2. de ll. ubi dicitur q lex est diuinarū & humanarū rerum notitia. quia respōde vt per And. Alcia. lib. 2. dispu. c. 14. — *Knowledge*. Nor does l. 2, de ll., stand in the way, where it is said that law is the knowledge of divine and human things; for reply as And. Alcia. [Andrea Alciato] does, *Dispunctiones* [dispu.] book 2, c. 14.]

[Margin: ^d Peritia. et hēc mens gl. patet, quia dicit nō esse necesse Theo- — *Expertise*. And this is plainly the gloss's meaning, since it says that it is not necessary to examine [?] theo- (the note continues on the next page)] gists to examine anything pertaining to theology, or to discuss it otherwise than by accepting positively what is set before them. They would waste their oil and wear away their time in vain — time which, as legists, they ought to spend on absorbing, teaching, or even practising the laws. Just so, it is of little use to the theologians themselves; and for this reason, if they are religious, they are even forbidden to devote themselves to the study of the civil laws.^a

[Margin: (continuation of note ^d from the previous page) logiā discu[?]re [?], vt quis iure consul. efficiatur. — ... logy in order for someone to become a jurisconsult.]

[Margin: ^a Intendāt. c. super specula. ne cler. vel mon. cū similibus. — *Devote themselves*. c. *Super specula*, ne cler. vel mon., with similar passages.]

That law is promulgated by God does not make it pre-eminent over sacred theology. Cap. V.

The fifth argument, a defective one, runs as follows. The laws were promulgated by God through the mouth of the jurists and the Emperors, for law began from God in paradise (l. 1, ff. de legibus). Hence, just as canon law is subordinate partly to ethics and partly to theology, so too are the civil laws, although with respect to their first efficient cause they are said to be divinely promulgated, according to Panor., etc.

Solution. All knowledge — indeed "every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights" (James 1). "For all wisdom is from the Lord God, and has been with him always, and is before all ages" (Ecclesiasticus 1). For this reason the same apostle exhorts everyone, saying: "If any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly and does not reproach." In the same way philosophy too flowed from God through the mouth of the wise and the philosophers, together with a great knowledge of divine things, of which the Apostle speaks in Romans 1, saying: "What is known of God is manifest to them, for God has revealed it to them." Just as it does not follow from this that philosophy, or any other science, has the right to decide theological questions, so neither do the laws. And it is not true that civil law began in the heavenly paradise.^b In the heavenly paradise, indeed, certain theological commandments and laws were laid down from the beginning: for example, that the angels were bound to turn to God as the author of their supernatural beatitude; that a reward was prepared for those who obeyed this precept, and everlasting punishment for those who did not; and that each angel should carry out the task God had entrusted to him concerning the advancement of others toward God. This they do excellently, according to the Apostle's saying (Hebrews 1): "They are all ministering spirits, sent to serve for the sake of those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation." And in the earthly paradise, whatever law also began there, given by God to our first parents, belongs purely to the theologians, since such things were made known by God directly to them alone, and through them to others. Hence no pre-eminence by which the laws could decide theological questions can be granted to them on this account; rather, what follows is that they cannot do so, and that this does not belong to them. The Emperor, then, commended the so-called civil laws by reference to their genus, on the ground that some law also, immediately from God, pro-

[Margin: ^b Ciuilibus. hoc clare patet ex l. 2. de ori. iur. — *Civil*. This is clearly plain from l. 2, de ori. iur.]

—ceeded — but not from the species of civil law.^a Therefore no pre-eminence and no faculty can be conferred on the civil law by this in relation to theology. Still less can this be inferred from the law's subordination to ethics and theology — indeed, the whole opposite follows, as was shown in the solution of the preceding argument. Nor can a ground for the nobility of one thing over another be drawn from the first and most universal efficient cause, which is God, since all things proceed equally from God together with all their perfections. If the civil laws contain any defect, imperfection, obscurity or falsehood, in those respects they do not proceed from God, but from the ignorance or malice of their makers, and first of all from the devil himself, who oversows the tares.

[Margin: ^a Ciuilis. bene facit, quia quandoque iniqua est et dura. l. prospexit, qui et a quibus cū similib⁹, quo casu non dicitur diuinitus promulgata, ut tradunt Mod. in c. Eccle-sia S. Mar. col. 12. de consti. immo talis lex dicitur pestis c. ad materiā. ubi omnes. de probatio. & ideo in foro conscientiae nō ligat, ut not.

mod. in c. 1 colū. 8. in prin. de de [sic, "de" printed twice across the line end] consti. — *Civil*. This is well to the point, because the civil law is sometimes unjust and harsh (l. *Prospexit*, qui et a quibus, with similar passages); in which case it is not said to be divinely promulgated, as the Moderns (Mod.) teach on c. *Ecclesia S. Mariae*, col. 12, de consti. Indeed, such a law is called a plague (c. *Ad materiam*, de probatio., where all the commentators agree); and therefore it does not bind in the court of conscience, as the Moderns note on c. 1, col. 8, at the beginning, de consti.]

That law binds in conscience does not mean that it predominates over sacred theology. Cap. VI.

The sixth argument to the same effect is put forward as follows. Law binds in conscience, even according to Saint Thomas (Prima secundae, q. 96, a. 4). Hence Fed. de Senis, in consilium 21, proves by many arguments that a man is more bound to follow the disposition of the law than his own conscience. And Panor., on c. *Omnis anima*, de censibus, says that no one is so good and perfect as not to be subject to the law. Therefore, etc. This is confirmed by the fact that it is for no other reason than this that c. *Ut commissi*, near the end, de haeret. in 6, orders that men learned in the law be called in by the Inquisitors to assist in their proceedings. And this was rightly done, because the legists are the ones who handle cases of *maleficia*, and the laws too deal with *maleficia*, as in C. de malef. et mathe. throughout, C. de pag. et eorum temp. et sacrifici., C. de thesau. l. 1, lib. 10, and often elsewhere.

Solution. That laws bind in conscience is not because legislators have the right to judge of conscience or of interior things. It comes from the divine ordinance by which every soul is bound to be subject to the higher powers,^b to God (Romans 13), to render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's (Luke 20), and by which servants are bound to be subject to their masters and to obey them, even the harsh ones (1 Peter 2). But by divine ordinance a law does not bind against divine law, which the theologians consider primarily; it binds beneath it, as was proved from the words of the canon in the solution of the third argument. "For we ought to obey God rather than men" (Acts 5). If, therefore, a conscience is founded on divine or canon law, one must abide by conscience rather than by the civil law. And this is how all the proofs are to be understood from which it is inferred that one ought to abide by the law rather than by conscience: that is true where conscience has no foundation in a superior law, and those who assert otherwise speak as ignorant men. Hence it does not follow that on this account the legists can

[Margin: ^b Subdita Deo. & ita expresse d. Bar. in l. cū lex. col. 2. & in l. si quis per eo. col. 3. de fideiuf. & fatentur omnes, qui de hac materia loquuntur. de quibus habetur per Fel. in c. 1. col. 13. de consti. — *Subject to God*. And so the said Bar. expressly holds on l. *Cum lex*, col. 2, and on l. *Si quis per eo.*, col. 3, de fideius.; and all who speak of this matter concede it. On them see Fel. on c. 1, col. 13, de consti.]

discuss theological matters; rather, the opposite follows. That men learned in the law are called in by the Inquisitors implies nothing more than that they may take part as counsellors^a in certain matters pertaining to the Inquisitors' judgment: the manner of proceeding and of judging, the penalty to be inflicted, and the like. It does not extend to deciding matters of faith, as though mere legists could determine whether someone is a heretic by reason of some word or deed, or not — as if such a man knew what heresy is, or which position or opinion savours of heresy and which does not. Nor are they called for this purpose, to give counsel about these things, but only about the matters just mentioned.

There are two very clear signs of this, beyond the reasons already touched on. The first is that they must be called to that council only once, as is plain from the Extravagante of the lord Benedict XI, *Ex eo*, and only at the end of the proceedings, as is plain in the same place. It is plain also from c. *Statuta*, de haeret. in 6, where the Inquisitor must set out the whole proceedings before the lord ordinary — which he could not do if the proceedings were not complete. Therefore it is left to his judgment alone to determine whether the case on which he is proceeding is one of heresy or not. And in this the Church abides by his judgment, since she grants him the power to exercise the office of judge against the accused, gives him coercive power, and allows him, with the consent of the ordinary, to proceed to interrogation under torture [ad quaestiones] — which he cannot do except in a case of heresy. So the arguer's assumption, that the doctors must be called in by the Inquisitors to assist in the proceedings, is plainly false. The text does not say this. It says that they are to be called to give counsel on proceedings already completed, as is plain from the said chapter *Statuta*. Nor should mere legists be called — rather canonists, and theologians first of all. It is also in the Inquisitor's power to call whom he will, and to reject or even dismiss those he sees to be suspect or ignorant, and likewise the proud. It is plain, then, that the chapter *Ut commissi* does not give the doctors of the laws the faculty of deciding, or even of advising, whether a case pertains to heresy or not, since this is already presupposed as decided by the Inquisitor's judgment.

The second sign is this. Although the Inquisitor is bound to summon doctors to give counsel, he is not bound to follow^b their counsel in acquitting or condemning the accused; it still lies in his power to judge as seems best to him. This would not be so if the doctors were to be called in to give counsel in such a way that they themselves could decide theological questions, as determining the truth against the Inquisitor's opinion and judgment. For the Church would then incur reproach or calumny for granting the Inquisitors such power that they could judge against the counsel of the doctors. It is not principally for this, then, that the doctors are called to counsel, whether legists,

[Margin: ^a Consiliarij. bene facit quia actus spectans ad aliquem, cū consilio alterius non dicitur communiter ad ambos spectare, secundū no. ī ti. de rescr. decisio. 73. in antiquis Abb. in c. nō potest. in fi. de re iudica. vbi etiam Fely.

colum. fi. in fi. et idē Fely. in c. ex parte in fi. de constit. immo etiam si actus deberet fieri ab uno cum cōsensu a[?]rius, non dicitur ad ambos spectare. secundū Fel. in c. eam te. col. 15. de rescript. & rō sumitur ex regula, Aliud est vendere. de reg. iur. cū similibus, vt tradunt Mod. ibi, et in c. 1. col. 1. de iud. — *Counsellors*. This is to the point, because an act that belongs to one person, done with the counsel of another, is not commonly said to belong to both, according to what is noted in the title de rescr., decision 73 among the old ones; Abb. on c. *Non potest*, at the end, de re iudica., where see also Fely., last column, at the end; and the same Fely. on c. *Ex parte*, at the end, de constit. Indeed, even if an act had to be done by one person with the consent of another, it is not said to belong to both, according to Fel. on c. *Eam te*, col. 15, de rescript. The reason is taken from the rule *Aliud est vendere*, de reg. iur., with similar passages, as the Moderns (Mod.) teach there and on c. 1, col. 1, de iud.]

or canonists, by the Inquisitor. It is only so that, having heard many opinions, he may judge by his own wisdom what is to be chosen, and so that he may conform to the laws in the manner of proceeding to a sentence of condemnation or acquittal, as has often been said; and in this they serve as inferiors. Yet even the manner of proceeding is not what pertains principally to the Inquisitors' office. What pertains to it principally is the judgment and discernment of whether opinions, or those who hold them, are entangled in heresy. And the manner of judging, too, is easily practised and understood by the Inquisitors, since their tribunals do not require as many formalities as secular tribunals, or even other ecclesiastical ones: they proceed simply and summarily [de plano], etc., as in the said c. *Statuta*, at the beginning.

As for what the argument proves — that the examination of the Inquisitors' proceedings seems to belong principally to the doctors, because it belongs to them to determine cases of *maleficia* — the reply is this. It is not the Inquisitors' business to judge *maleficia* inflicted by men on anyone, even by the power of a demon, but to judge the cause, namely apostasy, which is always involved. For the devil serves no one in the things already mentioned unless that person has first made with him tacit or express pacts of faithless friendship, and these pertain to apostasy according to Augustine (Augu.), as was shown in the little work *De strigibus*. Hence what follows from this is the opposite of the proposition rather than the proposition itself.

[Margin: ^b (continued from the previous page) olim. de arb[?] & per Io. And. in c. nullus ex cōsil. col. fi. de reg. iuris. in mercurialibus, & Bar. in l. 1. § si plures. ff. de exercit. col. 3. Fel. et Moder. in c. ex parte. de consti. & in c. si per debilitatem, de offic. delega. — ... olim, de arb[?]; and by Io. And. [Giovanni d'Andrea] on c. *Nullus ex consilio*, last column, de reg. iuris, in the *Mercuriales*; and Bar. on l. 1, § *Si plures*, ff. de exercit., col. 3; Fel. and the Moderns on c. *Ex parte*, de consti.; and on c. *Si per debilitatem*, de offic. delega.]

That civil law has always, and deservedly, been held in the highest honour does not mean that it predominates over theology. Cap. VII.

The seventh argument to the same effect, a weak one, is this. According to Cicero, in the first book of *De officiis*, civil law has always been held in the highest honour; therefore it is of the highest dignity. This is confirmed by the fact that it makes a man noble. Hence the legists are called "lords" [domini], whereas the theologians are not, but are called "masters" [magistri] — a title that seems the less worthy because it is shared even by base craftsmen.

Solution. Orators, like poets, when they take on the task of praising or blaming, strain every nerve of their power; the result is that they pay no attention to the propriety of their words, so long as the words serve their end. Hence the same Cicero, in a certain speech against Servius Sulpicius on behalf of Lucius Murena, attacks the legists with such words that he puts them on a level even with the lowest functionaries. Since I think that there too he spoke with exaggeration toward the bad, in the manner of storytellers, I will not repeat his words, out of respect for the legists, whom I hold in great esteem. Let it suffice the legists, for the sake of their honour, to acknowledge from this that what I said is true: orators very often refuse to subject words to things. Orators also do not wish a word to be taken in its exact meaning, but rather according to the subject matter being treated. If the legists were worthy of the highest honour absolutely, they would thereby be rendered as honourable as emperors and kings — indeed as the supreme pontiffs and all the saints, and as God himself, for nothing is above the highest. The legists, then, are not judged worthy of the highest honour absolutely, but only within the class of those skilled in the practical sciences acquired by human means. For Cicero did not know that theology took its origin from the revelation of God; nor could he compare philosophy, especially speculative philosophy, with the other sciences, since he had no expertise in it. What he meant to express, then, was that the lords legists are worthy of great honour — which I myself also affirm — just as they also bring great benefit to the human race.^a Indeed, since by the very nature of their wisdom they deserve to be appointed judges of others; indeed, since princes themselves ought all to be versed in the knowledge of the laws, and ought also to keep doctors of law as their familiars^b by whose counsels they may be supported in the upholding of justice; rightly, they say [dicunt], are they revered by the people, and even feared, as fathers and governors of the whole commonwealth.

But the dignity and excellence of sacred theology are not to be lowered on this account; rather, they are to be exalted all the more. For theology treats weightier and worthier matters; it appoints judges of souls; and it renders most glorious and most famous throughout the whole world those who are princes in governing the commonwealth of the spiritual order, by which every other commonwealth is also directed and to which it is subject. Such are the holy doctors of the Church, the fathers of the whole earth, the most brilliant lights of the world.

As to the confirmation,^c it is said that the name of lordship [dominium] arose from sin, since in the beginning nature brought forth men free, but the law of nations put them under the yoke of servitude (12, q. 2, c. *Cum redemptor*). Hence it is also condemned by Christ as belonging to the customs of the gentiles, according to Matthew 20: "The princes of the gentiles lord it over them, etc.; but it shall not be so among you, etc." Nevertheless, if it designates pre-eminence of power exercised not despotically or tyrannically, the name is fitting, since it expresses at the same time that one who rules in this way is to be feared. This pertains to temporal or secular lordship; and since the laws regulate that lordship, as was said above, the legists are fittingly called "lords", as having already obtained^d a kind of share in lordship through their knowledge of the laws. The name of master and the name of father, on the other hand, are rather names of love, because by their meaning they convey the notion of a supreme benefactor, to whom no equivalent return can be made. And these are the names of the theologians. As much, therefore, as love surpasses fear, so much more worthy is the title of the theologians than

[Margin: ^a Vtilitatē. de hoc habēt p Bal in l. lege 12. tab. p illū tex. C. de leg. hæred. vt tradit Barb. in c. clerici col. 5. & seq. de iudic. [?] — *Benefit*. On this there is Bal., on l. *Lege XII tab.*, by that text, C. de leg. hæred., as Barb. teaches on c. *Clerici*, col. 5 and following, de iudic. [?]]

[Margin: ^b Habere. bene facit l. fi. C. de of. diuer. iudi. & ideo ex hoc dicitur, princeps omnia iura in scrinio pectoris sui habet. secundū Pau. de Ca. Alex. & Mod. in l. omnib⁹. C. de testa. — *Keep*. The last [?] l., C. de of. diuer. iudi., is well to the point; and hence it is said that the prince has all laws in the shrine of his breast, according to Pau. de Ca., Alex., and the Moderns on l. *Omnibus*, C. de testa.]

[Margin: ^c Confirmationem. adde vltra elegāter hæc dicta: q in hoc fundamentū fieri nō meruit: per ea quæ habentur in l. quibus præcipua, de verbo. sign. & glo. in cle. 2. de magis. p̄ sertim quia iureconsul. etiam magistri appellātur, in l. dicere. in ver. Cassius, de arbi. & in auth. habita, ad fi. C. ne filius propa. quicquid ibi glos. dicat, & no. Cardi. in d. cle. 2. col. 2. & Fely. in c. 1. col. 2. eo. ti. de magist. — *Confirmation*. Add, beyond these elegant remarks, that no foundation ought to have been laid on this, by what is contained in l. *Quibus præcipua*, de verbo. sign., and the gloss on cle. 2, de magis.; especially since jurisconsults too are called masters, in l. *Dicere*, at the word *Cassius*, de arbi., and in auth. *Habita*, near the end, C. ne filius propa. — whatever the gloss says there; and see what Cardi. notes on the said cle. 2, col. 2, and Fely. on c. 1, col. 2, same title, de magist.]

[Margin: ^d Adepta. per hoc vide text. & quæ ibi not. Areti. in fi. in § fi. in procem. insti. — *Obtained*. On this see the text, and what Areti. notes there at the end, on the last §, in the proem of the Institutes.]

the title of the legists. And this is recognised all the more if one considers that these two names are so proper to God that the Lord forbade anyone to be called by them without qualification, saying (Matth. 23): "Call no one on earth your

father; for one is your Father, who is in heaven. And be not called Rabbi, that is, masters; for one is your Master." Such a designation is permitted, however, with an addition — for instance "carnal father", "spiritual father", "Master in Theology", and so on. The name of lord, by contrast, was not forbidden by the Lord on the ground that it is proper to God, but because it seems to carry heathen vanity and pride, as is clear from what was said above — although it too belongs first to God, once every imperfection in its signification is set aside. Yet the sacred theologians are not without lordship, since they have power over the soul, and therefore a greater power than those who have power only over exterior things, and only for this life. For the sacred theologians are fitted by their very theology to be rectors of souls with regard to supernatural salvation, and to bind and loose not only for this life but also for the life to come, so that they hold the keys with which to bring the obedient into the eternal kingdom and to shut out the rebellious. One of those keys is the knowledge of sacred theology. And if even a natural son is the servant of his carnal father, as is clear from the fifth book of the *Ethics*, it follows that such a father can also fittingly be called lord — and how much more a spiritual father. So pastors and prelates too are rightly called lords.^a From this it is clear that by their very designation as well the theologians are shown to be worthier than the canonists, and consequently that theology itself surpasses the laws.

[Margin: ^a Nominantur. ut in c. grauem. de exces. praelat. & in c. cum clerici. de uerb. sign. cū similibus. — *Are called.* As in c. *Grauem*, de exces. praelat., and in c. *Cum clerici*, de verb. sign., with similar passages.]

It is not because commanding belongs to the laws that law is to be set above theology.
Cap. VIII.

The eighth argument to the same effect is put forward as follows. A science that commands all the others is nobler than they are, as a ruling science [*Archimantica*, as printed] is. Politics is such a science, since it belongs to politics to establish laws, as is clear from the Philosopher in the proem of the first book of the *Ethics*; for it gives commands even about the speculative sciences themselves — how far they are to be read in the city, and so on.

Solution. A science can be considered in two ways: in one way in itself, in another according to its use. And in this respect, too, there are two ways: in one way with respect to the intrinsic act of the soul — that is, the actual consideration itself; in another way with respect to the extrinsic act, by which the science is communicated to others by speech or in writing. Likewise "to command" is taken in two ways. In one way improperly, as meaning the same as "to judge", and so it is an act of the intellect. In another way properly, as it is an act of the will. If, then, the sciences are compared in themselves, as regards their essence and the species they have from their object, and if in this respect one were to command another — command taken improperly, that is, judging of the other and of the other's principles — then the commanding science is certainly nobler than the one commanded. But the other sciences do not stand in this relation to politics; rather the reverse. Politics, being a practical science,

is judged as to its principles by a speculative science — at least by metaphysics, whose office is to prove and defend the principles of all the sciences, as is found in the first and fourth books of the *Metaphysics*.

A science taken in itself, in the sense just described, does not admit command taken properly — not even a science that is practical. Since such a command is an act of the will, it can fall only on what follows the act of the will itself; and the habit of a science, taken in itself, is not of that kind, for it belongs to the intellect insofar as the intellect is prior to the will. Just as the intellect itself, as a power, is prior to the power of the will, so the first act of the intellect — which is, as it were, its substantial perfection, by which it is first brought into act — is prior to the first act of the will, if the will has one, and much more to the will's second act, of which kind commanding itself is. Likewise the second act of the intellect, considered in its order to its object, from which it has its species and nobility, does not fall under the command of the will. For the will cannot command that contemplating God should not be a metaphysical or theological act, nobler than contemplating the nature of a stone, which is a physical act; nor can it command what is to be held or concluded about God, or about the angels, or about any other objects of speculation. Such things depend on the reasons of the objects of speculation themselves. Yet because our knowledge is subject to time by reason of the phantasms, such an act can be subjected to the will incidentally [per accidens] — for instance, in that a time is chosen for contemplating and for not contemplating. But since no one judges of interior acts except the one who performs them, to command about these acts in the manner described does not pertain to politics, which as the directive science of the community of men is concerned with others; it pertains rather to ethics, by which each person regulates himself in his own acts, interior as well as exterior. Politics can nevertheless command such acts too, but through another incidental cause:^a inasmuch as it can command that something be done at some time by which the one doing it is prevented, for that time, from contemplating other things. If, then, politics in some way commands all the other sciences of itself, this is only as regards exterior acts — namely, that their exterior use take place at such and such a time, in such a manner or order. But this does not argue any nobility of politics over the other sciences; otherwise it would also argue a nobility of politics over itself, since politics itself

[Margin: ^a Accidēs. quo casuquā do quis per accidens imperat, alij, non ex hoc ipso maior — *Incidental*. In which case, when someone commands another incidentally, he is not by that very fact greater] determines about itself, or about the laws themselves, when and to whom they are to be read or expounded, in what manner or order, by what person, for what reward, and so on. Hence it is clear that the argument just stated is quite frivolous. Even if it proved anything, it would infer only that politics itself is nobler. But the science of the laws is not political science; it is its effect. And it does not necessarily follow that, if a cause is nobler than some thing, its effect is nobler than that same thing. It is also inferred that the lawgivers possessed the science of politics —

but not that all jurists do. The Philosopher, too, in the passage cited, meant to infer that politics is the more excellent among the moral sciences: since it is not inferior in its object, it has this further advantage over the others, that it gives commands about their acts, while they give none about its acts. But he did not mean on that account that it is nobler than all the others without qualification. Indeed, in the sixth book of the *Ethics* he himself places wisdom — which, that is, is of divine things — in the genus of the most honourable things. And that applies better to supernatural wisdom, which is theology itself, than to natural wisdom, which is metaphysics — though it was metaphysics that the Philosopher himself had in mind.

[Margin, continued from the previous page: esset, ut patet ex not. p Io. And. & Gemi. in c. fi. de off. leg. in 6. & Fel. in c. de maio. et obed. col. 6 — would be, as is clear from what is noted by Io. And. and Gemi. on the last c., de off. leg. in 6, and by Fel. on c. de maio. et obed., col. 6.]

[Margin: Solutio. — *Solution.*]

Although law makes men virtuous, law is nevertheless subject to sacred theology. Cap. IX.

[Margin: Ratio nona. — *The ninth argument.*]

The ninth argument to the same effect is put forward as follows. A science whose end is better is nobler. But the end of the laws is to make men virtuous, while the end of theology and of every other speculative science is to know. Since, then, other things being equal, a virtuous man is better than a knowing one — for the former is called a good man without qualification, and the latter is not, but only with respect to the intellect — it follows that the science of the laws is nobler than theology. This is confirmed as follows: to know and to act is something nobler than merely to know, as is self-evident. Since the first is the end of a practical science and the second that of a speculative one, practical science will be nobler than speculative science by reason of its end.

[Margin: Solutio. — *Solution.*]

Solution. If the argument were conclusive, it would follow that moral science is absolutely nobler than speculative science — which no wise man would concede. For the Philosopher, in the proem of the *Metaphysics*, proves by an argument from a sign as well that speculative science is the nobler, in that men admire those who show a more penetrating genius and a subtler intellect in the arts, even if they bring no other benefit, and judge them more worthy of honour than those who make useful things but show no great genius in making them. To the argument, then, the reply is that the nobility of a science is twofold. One kind is essential: a science has this from its object, and according to it the speculative is simply nobler than the practical, as was proved above. The other kind is accidental: a science has this from its end, insofar as the notion of end is distinguished from the notion of object. The nobility that a science acquires from its order to its end is called accidental — not because the end does not have of itself the character of a good, by which someone is also formally called good, but because such an end is accidental to the science

as it exists in a subject, and it is the subject that can be called good without qualification. For a person can have moral science without having the virtues or being good; and conversely a person can be good without having moral science, as is self-evident. Now an accident is what can be present or absent without the corruption of its subject, according to the Philosopher in the first book of the *Topics* and Porphyrius in the *Predicables*. It is therefore clear that the nobility a science has from its end, which can be separated from it, is accidental; whereas the nobility a science has from its object cannot be separated from it, any more than the object itself can be separated from the science or the science from the object — and so that nobility is essential. Since, then, speculative science is nobler than practical science by reason of its object, as was shown above, it is clear that speculative science — and above all theology, the highest and chief among the speculative sciences — is essentially, and consequently simply and absolutely, nobler than the science of the laws.

[Margin: Ad secundā. — *To the second.*]

To the confirmation the answer is clear on the same ground. If good action were necessarily joined to practical knowing, moral science would be simply better than speculative science by reason of its end. But since good action is joined to it only incidentally, moral science has nobility from that end only accidentally;^a and consequently speculative science remains of itself absolutely nobler than practical science. Yet even if the argument were granted with all these points, it would not follow that the science of the laws, or any moral science whatever, is nobler than theology — rather the whole opposite. For theology itself is also a practical science, and the noblest of all the practical sciences. Its end, insofar as it is practical, is to make a man virtuous not only according to the natural moral virtues but according to the infused and gratuitous ones; and not only so that he may live together in peace in the earthly city, but also in the heavenly kingdom. Hence the emptiness of the argument is plain, and that of the man who puts it forward as conclusive.

[Margin: ^a Nobilitatem. & ideo non debet attendi. arg. eorum quæ no. in l. fi. C. de his qui ve. æta. impet. in l. 2. §. exactis. in l. 1. de origi. iur. in l. si eadem, de offic. assesso. & in l. 1. §. bestias. de postula. & ubique per glo. & Alb. — *Nobility*. And therefore it ought not to be taken into account: an argument from what is noted on the last l., C. de his qui ve. æta. impet.; on l. 2, § *Exactis*; on l. 1, de origi. iur.; on l. *Si eadem*, de offic. assesso.; and on l. 1, § *Bestias*, de postula.; and everywhere by the gloss and Alb.]

Although the science of the laws is most holy, and is rightly called wisdom in a certain respect, it nevertheless in no respect surpasses sacred theology. Cap. X.

[Margin: Rō decima. — *The tenth argument.*]

The tenth argument to the same effect is this. The science that is most holy is nobler than the others; and wisdom is the supreme among the sciences (first book of the *Metaphysics*). But in l. 1, § *Proinde*, ff. de variis et extraord. cog., it is said that civil wisdom is a most holy thing. Therefore, etc. And this is confirmed first, that it is wisdom. For the knowledge of divine things

is wisdom, and in this it is distinguished from science [scientia], which is of human things only, as is plain from St. Thomas, 2 2, q. 1, ar. 2. But the science of the laws orders divine and human things well and drives out all iniquity (C. de vet. iur. enucle., l. 1). Therefore, etc. It is confirmed, secondly, because, as the Philosopher says in *De regimine principum*, to rule oneself is the highest wisdom. But the science of law teaches not only how to rule oneself well, but also all others and the whole world, as is said in the auth. *Ut omnes obe. iud. prouin.* Therefore, etc.

[Margin: Solutio. — Solution.]

Solution. "Most holy" is taken in two ways. In one way, absolutely and simply, and in this way God alone is most holy. In another way, within a genus: in the genus of the sciences, for example, some science is most holy. This too is taken in two ways. In one way, simply and universally for such a genus; and so sacred theology is simply most holy, while metaphysics is most holy within the genus of the natural sciences. They have this from their object, which is purer and more inviolable — or more immovable and firmer — than any other object: God, that is, revealed to us by supernatural light, or else known by natural light. For "holy" [sanctum] signifies two things, namely pure and firm; it draws the first meaning from the Greek idiom and the second from the Latin. In the other way, it is taken within the genus of the natural practical sciences. And in this way what the law adduced says is true, namely that civil wisdom is most holy: it is an effect of politics, which among the practical sciences is the more scientific in that, by its exercise, it leads more people to a virtuous life than ethics or economics does. For the more common a good is (as Diony. says), the more divine it is, and consequently the holier. It is plain, then, that the arguer does not make his case from this — namely, that expertise in the laws is nobler than theology itself — but rather the contrary.

As for what he touches on concerning wisdom, it must be understood that wisdom too is taken in two ways. In one way, simply; and so theology is wisdom absolutely, as St. Thomas proves, 1, q. 1, ar. 5, and among the natural sciences metaphysics alone is, as is proved in the proem of the *Metaphysics*. Such sciences are therefore called wisdom not necessarily with some qualification, but simply. In the other way, within a genus; and so, within the genus of the practical sciences, political science can be called wisdom, because it considers the highest and universal causes in such a genus. That is why it extends itself universally to all things, directing them all to the universal end — just as, within the genus of the virtues, prudence itself is called wisdom (Prouer. 10: "Wisdom is prudence to a man"), though it is agreed among the philosophers that prudence is not wisdom simply. In this way the word of the law adduced is verified, and it also bears out what I have just said. For that text does not call expertise in the laws simply and absolutely wisdom, but only with a qualification, when it says that it is civil wisdom. Wisdom simply, according to the Philosopher in the proem of the *Metaphysics*, is the supreme among the sciences — not wisdom within a genus, although this too is supreme among the sciences of the same genus.

To the first confirmation the answer is that a thing may be called divine in two ways. In one way, because it is God himself, or is proximately joined to God and ordered to him by a supernatural order. In another way, because it is ordered to God naturally and remotely, yet with a certain inviolability and immutability. That is why the heavenly bodies too, because they are incorruptible and keep uniformity in their passions, are called divine by Aristotle in the third book of the *Physics*, on the authority of all the philosophers. Since, then, laws must be inviolable^a and concern things that ought in no way to be changed, and since they also order the multitude of men to the universal good of the community, which is finally ordered to God as to its ultimate end, laws are said for that reason to contain knowledge of divine things — not because they themselves hand down knowledge of God or the angels, of beatitude, charity or grace, and the like. All these the theologian considers in the highest way, leading immediately to God all men who love light more than darkness. Therefore theology itself is simply and absolutely the highest wisdom.

[Margin: ^a Inviolabiles. iuxta ea quæ habent in c. fi. de cō-sti. et l. leges sacratissimorum. C. de legibus. — *Inviolable*: according to what is contained in c. fi., de consti., and l. *Leges sacratissimorum*, C. de legibus.]

To the second confirmation the answer is that if the argument held, it would follow that ethics was the supreme or highest wisdom. For it is proper to ethics to arrange how each person is to rule himself well; and yet among the moral sciences it is politics that is called wisdom, not the science called ethics — which ought properly to be called *monastica* — as was said above. The Philosopher is therefore speaking there to princes as an orator, whose business it often is to speak in superlatives and, in praising the things he discusses, to strain every nerve. Nothing further is concluded, however, except that politics is the highest wisdom in the genus of the moral sciences, which we have also declared above to be true. It does not follow from this that it is worthier than theology, which also teaches men to rule themselves and the whole world well, by a supernatural governance, through supernatural means, and toward a supernatural end, who is God, blessed. Amen.

The end of the second tract on the pre-eminence of sacred theology, against the first tract of the Adversary.

The Reverend Father Brother Bartolomeo Spina against Ponzinibio: The First Apology on the Lamiae

Prooemium

Having completed the tract in which he strives to prove that laws can be brought in to decide theological questions — a licence, as it were, taken on his own presumption — the Adversary at once sets himself against the theologians on the theological question of the *lamiae*. By arguments propped up with authorities of law, he tries to persuade everyone that it is not to be believed that such persons are carried bodily to the notorious game [*ludus*] and the devil's assembly; rather, he holds, they are all deluded by diabolical arts, so that they believe they do while awake what (as he thinks) they only see in dreams. After this he also answers the arguments brought to prove that they are really carried there by the devil, or even go there bodily by themselves.

Since I have discussed this matter more fully, to the measure of my small ability, in the preceding work entitled *De strigibus*, nothing remains for me but three tasks. First, to answer the arguments he brings to the contrary, as recited in this treatise of his. Second, to defend against his attacks the good arguments he brings forward for our true conclusion, showing that his answers have no strength or force. Third, to refute certain conclusions of his deduced from the foregoing. First, then, he proposes seven arguments to prove that the things already mentioned do not really happen as is reported, but are mere diabolical illusions. The first of them is this.

The first argument, and likewise the second — taken from the claims that what is said of the striges is neither proved nor favourable to souls — are shown to be weak against the truth. Cap. I.

[Margin: Prima ratio — *The first argument.*]

Facts are not presupposed unless they are proved¹⁷ (l. *In bello*, § *Captae*, ff. de cap. post lim. reuer., etc.). But the things that are reported are not established and are not proved, as I shall say below. Therefore, etc.

[Margin: Solutio — *Solution.*]

Solution. On the contrary, they are proved by every kind of proof: by sacred letters and by pagan ones alike; by revealed science and by natural; by laws and

¹⁷the page prints *reprobentur*, "disproved"; the argument that follows — that these things "are not established and are not proved" — requires "proved"

canons, and by the principles of philosophy, and by experience, as is manifest in our preceding work.

And to your statements, which are set out below, we shall likewise reply below.

[Margin: *Secunda rō talis est. — The second argument is this.*]

In doubtful matters the side that favours souls ought to be embraced, even if it is the harder one (glo. in cap. *Iuuenis*, de sponsa.). But denying that such things are true favours souls more than affirming them, lest men perhaps fall into the evil desire of wanting to experience such things, etc. Therefore, etc.

[Margin: *Solutio. — Solution.*]

Solution. On the contrary, the affirmative, preached with due execration of the deed, favours souls: once they have discovered the snares of the devil by these means, they may more easily avoid them; and once it is known with how much hatred the evil spirits persecute the faith of Christ, the faithful may be more firmly confirmed in it, for the devil persecutes nothing but truth and goodness. It favours the faith in a further way. Through this knowledge those infected with this stain are cured by the Inquisitors sent to deal with them — unless they refuse to accept the cure, like the obstinate, who, when they are found to be, or are presumed by law to be, enemies of the faith, are condemned and punished with due chastisement so that they may not infect others: the impenitent, I mean, and the relapsed. The community too is preserved from the many evils that this pestilent kind of people usually causes with the help of demons, whether to bodies, and above all those of children, or to crops and other temporal goods.

That the danger of evil desire follows from affirming this truth is incidental, and happens in the fewer cases. Truth is not to be left unsaid because of evils that arise from its being preached only rarely and incidentally. Otherwise one ought not to preach what, according to the rule of divine providence announced to the peoples through the prophet Jeremiah (Hier. 12), holds true: that the wicked prosper in this life while the good are always in straits — since it could incidentally happen that someone, out of desire to gain prosperity and to escape poverty or some other strait, would want to become wicked and impious. Such truths, however, are never affirmed without preaching at the same time both the evils that threaten wicked men for their wicked deeds and the goods promised to the pious and just for their patience and innocence. So Jeremiah, in the same place shortly after, adds concerning the punishments of the impious: "Gather them together like sheep for the sacrifice, and sanctify them in the day of slaughter. How long will the land mourn, and the grass of every region wither, because of the wickedness of those who dwell in it?" And below, in the same chapter, the Lord says through the prophet against the wicked: "Behold, I will pluck them up out of their land," etc.

To return, then, to the point. Once the malice of the demons is known, and the many delusions that come into play; once the end of such deeds is kept before one's eyes; and once the most severe justice usually exercised against

such people is seen, even those who had been most inclined to evil are turned away from it. If these things were not uncovered and most sharply punished, this accursed sect would grow strong to an astonishing degree. And oil is poured on this slippery ground by those who try to prove that these things are not true, and for this reason set themselves against the Inquisitors. But if the Inquisitors do their duty fearlessly, they will bring even such people — who in this way are indirectly abettors [*fautores*] of heretics — to their senses, so that from then on they will be content with their own studies.

The third argument, proceeding from the lesser likelihood of what is narrated, is refuted. Cap. II.

[Margin: 3. Ratio. — *The third argument.*]

Such things are not likely; therefore they are to be reckoned false. For according to Auer. [Averroes] the proofs [experimenta] of true statements must agree with things perceived by the senses [*res sensatae*]. Nor is credence given to witnesses who depose things that are not likely; on the contrary, they are suspected of falsehood, as is noted in c. *Quia verisimile non est, de praesump.*

[Margin: Solutio. — *Solution.*]

Solution. On the contrary, these things are in the highest degree likely, both to the intellect and to the senses, so that the opposite could be maintained only by the ignorant and the perverse. For once the intellect has grasped how great the power of the demons is and how great their malice; how savage their hatred against Christ and against Christians; and that the justice and wisdom of God are infinite, by which he permits many great things to happen in the world so as to draw from them, by his providence, more and greater goods — then every person will recognise by the intellect that these things are not only possible to be done, but that, when they are affirmed by those who affirm that they have experienced them, they are highly likely. That such things do not happen in nature, or through the works of men alone, nor even things like them in every respect, takes nothing away from the likelihood of their truth; on the contrary, it increases it. For just as the devil is far superior to man and more powerful than he, both by nature and by art, so his works also surpass the natural capacity of men. To want to measure what can happen to men solely by the yardstick of the natural power of men themselves, or of natural agents, is surely the mark of a stupid man — one ignorant both of the eminence of the higher causes and of their contingent connection with the lower ones. And if this argument had any likelihood at all, it would already accuse of falsehood the miracles that are narrated as done by Christ and the saints. Such are the aids, such the favours, that the ignorant bring to the holy faith of Christ when they set themselves against the officers of the faith with these laughable little quibbles and tales of theirs.

The Commentator Averroes, moreover, is speaking of demonstrations of natural things, which indeed have no firmness in the intellect unless they agree with things perceived by the senses and are finally resolved into them. He is not speaking of the things that can occur above the course of nature. And he

too, being an unbeliever, was ignorant of what we know by faith concerning the essence

, power and malice of the demons, and so he could not have full knowledge of such effects. He was therefore not to be brought in on this point against the truth. And yet the things already mentioned do agree well enough with things perceived by the senses. For example, when several people, awake, assert in agreement that they have done this or that, or that they heard, or saw for themselves, things done by others on the course [cursus], no wise man would say that these things were done in dreams or illusions — unless one has recourse to a special power of the demon working in the phantasy [phantasia] beyond the common mode. That, on the side of the thing itself, is something greater, and agrees less with things perceived by the senses, than that a man should be carried bodily by a demon. Hence, if this is not likely, that is less so.

Nor would the demon fully obtain what he desires — the fall of men, I mean, as grave as he can make it, through sin — if these evils were perpetrated only by way of delusion, since no one can incur sin in dreams of himself, but only incidentally. This, however, is not likely among true believers, unless they are deprived of the natural light of the mind and fail to consider the malice and the most grievous hatred with which the demon rages against men.

Most manifest outcomes, too, display not merely the likelihood of these things but their certainty: when, for example, men carried off by a demon find themselves, after a short space of time, far away from the place where they had previously been sitting. Only a power superior to the power of man can do this. And of this matter countless testimonies are reported, even of a person's own deed. Indeed, there is at present a certain man condemned to perpetual prison by the Father Inquisitor of Brixien. [Brescia], who confesses that, as soon as he had dedicated himself, in despair, to the devil in respect of both his outer and his inner man [quo ad utrumque hominem] (for this is what the demons first demand of these unhappy persons), he was carried far from his place, a journey of several days; and that there, after keeping company for a time in carnal pleasures with a great multitude of men and women, he was afterwards obliged to travel for many days to get back to his own place. For the demons are not always at their service as they wish, especially at the beginning of their apostasy. This man is not a fool or a simpleton, such that no credence should be given him in this; I could easily prove it from his name and rank, were it not that making him more particularly known would also bring shame on others. He is, however, now well disposed in the faith.

Another unhappy man of the sect of the *striges*, too, who was handed over to the secular arm last year and burned at Bononiae [Bologna], confessed among other things at his trial that once, while he was being carried to the course with his mother-in-law, it happened that on the way, struck with fear, he called upon the most holy name of Jesus; and at once he found himself set down in the middle of the mud, in a place three days' journey distant from the city — in which city, however, he had been an hour before. Countless attestations of

these things are held in the trial records of the Inquisitors. Thus, from all this, it is perfectly plain that the Adversary's argument set out above collapses on every side.

The fourth argument, taken from the fact that what is narrated of the striges is said to be done by the work of the devil, is answered. Cap. III.

What is done by the magic art, or the necromantic, or the hydromantic [ydromantica], or by any other diabolical art whatever, is called phantasmal [phantastica] and not true (26. q. 5. c. *Nec mirum*). And all the more so since these things happen to persons who can easily be deceived, such as women, peasants and people of low condition; and likewise to persons corrupt in faith and morals, who desire what is not to be desired — as are also those who practise those arts. Now laws that speak of certain persons apply also to persons not expressly named in whom the same reason holds, as is held by Panor. in c. *Nihil*, de electio. Therefore, etc.

Solution. Certainly the things recited in that chapter, and things that happen in a similar way, are phantasmal; and many things happen similarly in this sect, as was said in our work *De strigibus*. Bodily transport, however, is not so, since necromancers too undergo it willingly at the hands of the demons, and procure that it be done to others through the same demons. This is especially plain from the legend of the blessed Apostle James [Iacobus], and from what is specifically reported of the deeds of Petrus de Abano [Pietro d'Abano] and Cecchus Exculanus [Cecco d'Ascoli], most wicked necromancers, in the time not long before our own. Nor do the effects of those arts always happen in a phantasmal way, as is best attested [*textātur*] [recte: *testātur*] by acts of maleficium [maleficia]: illnesses caused, for the most part incurable; the speech of demons who appear; the very frequent discovery of thefts, according to what has been learned through hydromancy; and very many other things of this kind. These things happen truly and really, and not in a phantasmal way, even though the deceiver fabricates deceptions in many matters, as was explained in the work already mentioned.

That the devil attacks chiefly simple people, peasants and women proceeds from his malice: so that through them, easily deceived and won over because of their ignorance, he may the more easily draw in the astute as well. For these would not so easily believe the devil or give in to him unless they first learned thoroughly, from those who experience such things, that they enjoy many delights at will. But — alas! — in these times men who are commonly reputed prudent in other respects are found to be mad about such things: citizens, I mean, and nobles of various kinds, as could be shown, if need be, from the trial records of the Inquisitors. Indeed, what is worst of all, some who are religious in holy orders as well, both secular clergy and regulars (although in name and habit only). And that this plague grows so strong, the chief cause is the persecution by certain doctors of law, whom princes with no experience of theology readily believe, as though they were wise men. Yet in matters of this kind they are rather uncouth, being ignorant of God's providence, of the

power and malice of demons, and of most of the other theological matters to which the present article is reduced. And they fill pages with a mass of citations of laws, which in most cases are not to the purpose, because human laws have to regulate purely human acts; they cannot properly take cognisance of acts bound up with diabolical ones. They can determine fitting penalties for such acts only on the presupposition of the knowledge of a higher science — sacred theology, I mean. They also cite doctors of law who labour under a similar ignorance, since the knowledge of such matters does not belong to their profession.

That those who belong to this sect are also corrupt in faith and morals, and desire what is not to be desired, as necromancers do, is true. For this reason they deserve to pay the due penalties under the judgement of the Father Inquisitors; and those who put obstacles in the way are abettors of heretics. It does not follow, however, that if delusions and deceptions befall necromancers, they befall these people too in the same way, or universally. For they do not desire similar things, nor are they similarly corrupt, and so they are not similarly deceived either. Necromancers do not deny the faith and baptism, etc., as expressly as these do. Necromancers commonly labour to find treasures, or to bend women to their wishes; these people are not afraid to commit such crimes for no other reason than to enjoy pleasures more licentiously and more abundantly. And this is one of the reasons why persons of low condition multiply in this sect more than nobles, and why women deprived of the company of husbands who travel about the world, and of merchants, do so more than other women. For such women seek out in this way the pleasures they are deprived of elsewhere, more than those who have them in abundance at home.

We do not deny, however, that these people too are likewise deceived in many things, as has been said elsewhere. Yet their testimony ought not on that account to be rejected in court. Nor, indeed, would their testimony be rejected because of the deceptions already mentioned, which occur from time to time, if they were deposing on a crime of human lèse-majesty [*crimen laesae maiestatis humanae*] committed even at the time of the course: if, for example, some citizens, while they were actually on the course, or in that diabolical game [*ludus diabolicus*], had agreed together to kill the Prince or to betray the city to the enemy. In that case, I believe, the doctors who are lawyers [*legistae*], our Adversary among them as their leader, would advise that they all be tortured, and, if they confessed the crime, punished with a cruel death. But of the crime of divine lèse-majesty, committed again and again — which is the gravest of all (c. *Vergentis*, de haereti.) — some of them perhaps would care little, and the Adversary, it seems, not at all.

The fifth argument, taken from the claim that the things narrated as done by the striges are done in the spirit and not in the body, is overthrown. Cap. IIII.

In the fourth place [*Quarto loco*] the Adversary argues as follows. All these things happen in the spirit, and not in the body — both as regards the passage across wide stretches of land and as regards the multitude of people who are

said to come together (26. q. 5. cap. *Episcopi*); therefore, etc. And if it is said that this is not the sect of which that chapter speaks, at least it is like it, and the things said to happen in this sect are like those that were believed to happen through that one. Moreover, that chapter condemns all who believe not only the things it narrates to happen in the body, but also things like them. And it is not denied that these are of that kind, at least as regards the passage already mentioned, riding even upon apparent beasts; as regards the appearance of a single prince; and as regards the assembly of a multitude, etc. Yet it is not permitted to depart from the disposition of this text by sophistical arguments (16. q. 1. cap. *Institutiones*), because whoever understands sacred Scripture otherwise than the sense of the Holy Spirit, by whom it was written, demands, may be called a heretic even though he has not left the Church (24 q. 3. cap. *Quidam*, at the end).

[Margin: Quarta rō. — *The fourth argument.*]

Solution [So.]. This chapter, misunderstood by the jurists insofar as it deals with matters that belong to theology, is the cause of their ruin. Because it has been set down in the body of canon law [*corpus iuris canonici*], they think they may put forward their own sense of it, even to the point of opposing the common sense of the theologians. But it does not belong to the jurists to take cognisance of anything in it, except this: that if any persons are found doing or undergoing the things that are there principally condemned, or believing that they are done or happen, they must be reputed unbelievers and punished with the penalty of heretics. But how heresy is found or not found in such things as are narrated, and in which of them, the jurists cannot judge unless they are theologians as well. For it belongs to theologians to discourse on faith, and consequently on its contrary, namely unbelief, and on all its species: apostasy from the faith, heresy, and simple unbelief — since opposites fall under one and the same discipline. Now the sacred theologians determine that it is not heretical to hold that the things narrated of the *striges* are true, as the Inquisitors themselves judge. And with all this they save the said chapter, harmonising its intention with its words. So any pure jurist who sets himself against the judgement of the theologians on this point is exceedingly presumptuous — no less than if a minister of justice were to set himself against a judge, asserting that those whom the judge has determined to be guilty of death were not justly condemned, when the judge, who has heard the case, knows it to deserve death, and the minister does not. And although in our work already mentioned this objection has been more fully answered, drawing everything from the teaching of the theologians — as it has been also by my most illustrious teacher, both in his *Summa* and in his work *De strigilamijs*, and by the authors of the book entitled *Malleus maleficarum* — nevertheless, for a fuller answer to this present objection that has been raised, I shall here too bring forward what is apt [opportuna] against this man in his expounding of that chapter.

By the authority of the Apostle cited in the said chapter Episcopi, it is established that bodily conveyance to distant regions, inaccessible to human power, is supernaturally possible. Cap. V.

First, then, it must be said that, for exploding the sense this man gives that chapter, what is found in the same chapter is of great weight. This, I say: that to claim such things cannot happen in the body, as regards bodily conveyance from place to place, contradicts that chapter and the authority of the Apostle cited in it — taken in the sense the Adversary gives it (a sense the Apostle nevertheless did not intend, as has been said elsewhere and will be repeated below). For that authority presupposes (as the Adversary thinks) that Paul could have been carried bodily even up to the third heaven. Otherwise, on his view, the Apostle would not have said, "Whether in the body or out of the body I know not," etc., but would rather have said, "I know that it was not in the body, but out of the body," etc., since in the body it is impossible — unless perhaps the Adversary boasts that he knows things revealed about such matters which he thinks the Apostle did not know. And if the Adversary should say that it is not established in that chapter, or through that authority, that demons can carry men bodily from place to place, etc. — if he knew the natural power of demons, and considered the things they have done by the witness of Scripture, and were unwilling to measure the infinite wisdom of God with his own small intellect and to pry into His majesty, so as rashly to judge that God ought not, or (what is more wicked) cannot, permit such evils — he would surely be silent. What the chapter meant to teach by the examples it cites concerning Paul and Ezekiel is that something can appear not in the body but in the spirit, and in dreams, so that on this supposition it might determine that the things narrated there, insofar as they touch the faith, are utterly false.

That the Council means to declare four things principally false in the said chapter Episcopi. Cap. VI.

[Margin: 5. Ratio. — *The fifth argument.*]

Second, it must be said that there are two false and heretical things principally narrated in that chapter. The first is that there was a true goddess who appeared in the form of Diana. For in that way, following the errors of the gentiles, something of divinity would be supposed to exist apart from the one God, and consequently a plurality of gods would be asserted. The second is that human beings were turned into gods: for everyone believed that both Herodias and Diana had once been women and had afterwards been turned into goddesses. With these two, moreover, two other false and heretical things were connected. The first is that they thought these things were done by a good spirit. For the gentiles themselves thought the gods were good spirits; and this is heretical, because those who were reputed gods worked many deceptions and were caught out in many things as liars and malicious. This cannot befit God and the holy spirits. The second is that they believed they were called to serve and obey those divinities. The rest of the chapter is brought in only so that the account of what was said about the women should be complete — not so that those things

should be judged or declared impossible, except insofar as they were joined to the things already mentioned, which truly are impossible, and to believe which makes a man an unbeliever. That is why the chapter, when it concludes at the end and pronounces the sentence of condemnation, does not take up again everything it had narrated. It anathematizes only what it principally intended, saying, as if determining definitively: "Whoever, therefore, believes that any creature can be made, either for the better or for the worse, or transformed into another species or into another likeness, except by the Creator himself, who made all things and through whom all things were made, is an unbeliever, and worse than an unbeliever" — so the chapter. This determination contains the point that human beings cannot be turned into gods; and consequently, once this is removed, there does not follow the plurality of gods which, earlier in the same chapter, it had shown to be inferred from the account of those silly women. And it was only on account of this supposed plurality of gods that it had declared them to stray from the right faith and to be caught up in the error of the pagans — not on account of the other things it had narrated before. For it gave that as the sole reason why, I say, it said they were caught up in the error of the pagans, adding: "since something of divinity," etc. Likewise, when near the end it says that whoever believes such things and things like them loses the faith, etc., it adds, lest anyone should think this is to be understood of everything it had set out before: "Whoever, therefore," etc. — as if to say: whoever believes this, and what is included in it as explained above, is an unbeliever, and worse than a pagan. He is called worse than a pagan because he was earlier enlightened by faith, which the pagan never had. For it is impossible, even by the power of God, that human beings should be turned into the true God. And to His power alone belongs the making of human beings into gods — gods so called only by denomination and likeness, that is, by transforming them into the supernal intelligences, which appear to have charge, even universal charge, of these lower things. For the name of deity is taken from the universal providence over things, according to Diony. 12. cap. *de diuinis nominibus*¹⁸ Yet most of the pagans did not think that all the gods were incorporeal; they supposed many of them to be bodily, in the likeness of men, and to differ only in power — as the account in this chapter also shows.

Now it is understood that one creature cannot be transformed into another except by the power of God, as regards a substantial transformation with no accompanying corruption; for only this is properly called conversion. That one creature should be changed into another through its own corruption and a new generation, provided they share in matter, is not impossible in nature. The same matter that was earlier under the form of an ass can afterwards be under the form of an ox, and the ass would be said (though improperly) to have been changed into an ox. In this way, however, nothing can be changed into heaven and the heavenly creatures, still less into God, because these are

¹⁸Pseudo-Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*.

not generable or corruptible. But that one species — say, one man — should be changed into another, so as to be converted into it — say, into a cat — without an intervening generation: that is possible to God alone, as has been said. It is these transformations and conversions, in which one whole created substance is converted into another whole, either better or worse, that the chapter has in view. And in this the pagans erred, thinking that human beings were changed into beasts: so they reckoned that of the companions of Diomedes some had been turned into birds and others into wolves, and so had undergone a transformation for the worse. And they thought some human beings had been changed for the better — into gods, for instance — as has been said.

The chapter, however, does not speak of accidental change, such as from healthy to sick, or from hot to cold, etc. For no one doubts that not only God but creatures too can cause such changes. So, to exclude these, the chapter says "into another species," that is, into another specific nature — although perhaps it may also be understood not of a thing other in species, but only of one other in individual within the same species: if, for instance, one man were converted into another man, which God alone could do. What it says, "another species," can also be interpreted as another shape; for shape, being the proper sign of the species, is itself also called species. For we see that all things that differ in species among bodies also differ in shape. That is why it then adds, "or into another likeness" — the likeness, that is, that arises from a difference of shape. For a demon cannot even bring it about that a creature of one species should have the shape of another — that a man, say, should have the shape of an ass — so that thereby either is an ass or like an ass. It can, however, bring it about that a man appears to be an ass or some other beast — not through a change made in that man, but through a change made in the eyes of those looking on, as has often been said in our work *De strigibus* already mentioned.

The other things reported in that chapter are judged false indeed, but many of them not impossible even for a demon. Cap. VII.

THIRDLY, it must be said that the other things narrated in that chapter — the bodily conveyance on beasts, for instance (that is, on demons transfiguring themselves into the shapes of beasts) across great stretches of the earth; the sight of a multitude of people, and of those Ladies [Dominae] too, of whom mention is made there; and the services rendered to them — are indeed said to be false and not to have really happened, but to have happened in dreams and in the spirit, at that time and to those women. But it is not said there, nor is it true, that these things are impossible for a demon, or that whoever believes they can be done by a demon is an unbeliever. For the chapter does not repeat them when it draws its conclusion, saying "Quisquis ergo," etc.; they are not included in the conclusion so drawn, nor even in the reason for which those women, and all who believe them, are condemned — namely, that they had strayed from the right faith and were entangled in the error of the pagans — as is plain from the words of the chapter.

In our work, moreover, it has been shown from sacred Scripture and the holy Doctors that many such things can be done by the power of demons. It follows that if that chapter were understood as these men think and expound it, it would be dangerous to the faith — just as these men themselves speak dangerously when they say that such things cannot happen bodily. And one would then have to appeal against such a council, even had it been a general one, to the Pontiff, on whose judgement, since he is the head of the Church and of the council, the determination of every cause touching the faith depends: so that it might be well examined and well expounded, and the intention of the Holy Spirit in it declared, and not that of men who think wrongly. So too these men must be restrained by the Inquisitors, so that they may speak on this matter better than the Adversary does.

The intention of the Holy Spirit contained in that chapter must, then, be expounded in conformity with the sacred writings, and not against them. It must also be observed that nothing in the authorities of sacred Scripture adduced in the chapter implies that the things already mentioned cannot be done by demons. What that chapter determines, through the divinely inspired holy Fathers, is that such things as those women reported as having really happened were in fact false at that time. And it shows how they were deluded: they supposed, it says, that what they saw in dreams or in the spirit alone was happening in the body. It shows the possibility of such a delusion from daily experience, by which many things are seen in dreams that have never been seen in waking. So it may easily be inferred that if these things can be caused by nature, through the dissolution of vapours rising to the brain, which stirs up the images [species] of the imagination, much more can they be caused by the power of demons, to whose nod all lower bodily things are subject as regards local motion. For a demon can fix the images in the imagination even better and more firmly, so that it represents this or that more determinately, as he wishes, and so that it appears to the one seeing or imagining that the things are true, more than happens in dreams; or, in another way to be explained below, he can delude people spiritually in such a way that they fully suppose things to have happened just as they appeared.

The said chapter proves this by examples from sacred Scripture, in Paul as well as in Ezekiel: that there can be another vision besides the one exercised through the bodily eyes — whether through the imagination, as in Ezekiel, or through the intellect, as in Paul. The Apostle's words are not, however, to be understood to mean that he did not know whether he saw in the body — that is, through the bodily eyes — what he saw in his rapture, or that he did not know that he had not been caught up bodily into paradise. That false and erroneous sense was held by a certain Jew, as Saint Jerome reports in the prologue to Daniel, and Saint Augustine rejects it in *De Genesi ad litteram* [super Gen. ad litteram]. Rather, as Augustine expounds it there, Paul did not know whether his soul was at that time in the body or else separated from it, as Saint Thomas also approves (S. Tho. verit. q. 13. art. 5. & 22. q. 175. art. 6.). For Paul could

have been caught up in either state, as the holy Doctors determine; but how it was done is not known. The common opinion of the Doctors, however, is that his soul was in the body by its essence, and his body in the house of Judas, where Ananias found him, as is said in Acts 9 [Act. 9].

But both those who dream and those who see imaginatively or intellectually in the manner already described recognize afterwards, when they have come back to themselves, that they were not previously seeing such things with the bodily senses, and that their state in waking is one thing, and their state while in such an abstraction or rapture another. They recognize, too, that what they see while awake is true, whereas what they see asleep or in rapture is either false, like things seen in dreams; or likenesses of false things, as happens in most cases, as in an imaginative vision caused and stirred up by an evil spirit; or likenesses of true things, as in an imaginative vision caused by a good spirit; or else even true, but intellectual — like the things seen supernaturally through the intellect in a vision caused by God.

Something comes to be known in the spirit in several ways. Cap. VIII.

BUT since those wicked women afterwards maintained, when awake, that the things they narrated had really happened to them, they could not have seen such things in the spirit in the ways already described. And therefore it must be understood, fourthly, that something can be said to be known in the spirit in two ways. In one way, on the side of the subject: namely, because the one who sees does so by a power that is either simply or in some manner spiritual, and not through the bodily eyes. This happens in the two ways already mentioned, namely through intellectual vision and through imaginative vision. For the intellect is a power of the soul that is simply spiritual; the imaginative power is less so, since it needs a bodily organ for its operations — operations which nevertheless terminate first in an image [species] without natural matter, representing bodily things, and not in bodies themselves or bodily things as they are in themselves, as the exterior senses together with the common sense do.

In the other way, something is said to be known in the spirit on the side of the object: namely, because what is known is either simply or in some manner a spiritual thing. Consequently this too happens in two ways. In one way, because what is seen is in itself something spiritual, but appears to the bodily eyes as bodily — in the way that demons and separated souls sometimes appear in the likeness of men, both in dreams or in abstraction of the senses and also in waking. In abstraction of the senses this comes about through a special fitting of the images in the phantasy [phantasia], by the working of the separated substance itself. In waking, however, it comes about by the power of that same spiritual creature condensing air into bodily and visible forms — sometimes even at night, with a light produced by some luminous body likewise brought there by supernatural power. That luminous body does not always appear, however, but only its light, the same power of the spiritual nature working

thus at will. And it was in this way that those most wicked women saw in the spirit the devil in the form of Diana, or of Herodias, or of other persons as well.

In the other way, because what is seen is in itself something bodily, and is seen as bodily, but not of the shape or form it has in itself — rather of another. So it comes about that not the thing that is there, but another, is seen. This commonly happens not through good spirits but by the work of demons, since such visions are commonly deceptive. Yet such things can also be done by a good spirit, with a good intention and a right end, according to God's will. So the blessed Pope Clement too obtained by his prayers that in the eyes of Sisinius and his servants a column should seem to be the person of the Pontiff, which they bound and¹⁹ dragged. There is no doubt that this was done by the ministry of good angels. These things, then, are done in the eyes of the onlookers, by dazzling and so altering those eyes that the thing appears otherwise than it is in itself. And for this reason such a vision is called a sleight [praestigium]. In this way too, in the time of the blessed Macarius [Macharij], demons cast a sleight over the eyes of those who looked on at a certain woman, so that she seemed to them to be a mare and not a woman. But they could not cast a sleight over the eyes of the blessed Macarius: to him she always appeared to be a woman, not a mare — although the woman's kinsmen presented her to him to be cured as a mare. And the man of God, by his prayers, freed those same kinsmen from that delusion.

In this way, then, the women of whom the said chapter *Episcopi* [d.c. *Episcopi*.] speaks, having already become the devil's captives, were deluded by him, so that it seemed to them, even while awake, that they saw many things which were not as they appeared to them. So it is no wonder if they sometimes thought they were in a place where they were not, and even that they were carried to various parts and regions, when perhaps they were sitting at home, motionless. For just as a demon can, by sleight, bring it about that what is coloured with one colour seems coloured with another, and what is of one shape seems to be of another — as is plain in the example given above of the woman who seemed to be a mare — so by sleight he can bring it about that someone seems to himself to be moved or carried off who is nevertheless at rest. For just as colour is the proper object of sight, so shape, motion and rest are common objects [communia], as the Philosopher teaches in the second book of the *De anima*.

The said chapter *Episcopi*, then, wishing to show that those women were deceived when they supposed that they were seeing naturally, through the bodily eyes, what they were not really seeing, makes plain that there are several modes of seeing by which they could be driven out of their minds through the devil's delusion. For it happens that something is seen otherwise than it is: in dreams, as we experience; in sight — that is, interior sight, through imaginative or even intellectual forms; and also in the spirit, in the two extreme ways already

¹⁹the page prints "&" twice across the line turn — "ligarent, & / & traherent".

mentioned. Of these, the one that concerns a thing wholly spiritual in itself the chapter expressed through the authority of the Apostle, where he says that an angel of Satan transfigures himself into an angel of light. The modes that are accomplished through the imagination, as we said, or through the intellect, it made plain by the examples it adduced of Ezekiel and Paul.

Application of the foregoing to the present consideration of the striges. Cap. IX.

BUT if anyone should argue from what has been said that, in the same way and in conformity with that chapter, it can be concluded that those who belong to the sect of the *striges* are deceived by the devil — supposing that they are carried to distant parts, and see the multitude of persons they claim to gather with the mistress of the game [*domina ludi*], and eat, drink, indulge their lust and do the other things they are said to do, when all this happens to them only by sleight or by an apparition of demons — the answer is that it is not to be denied that the devil can deceive these women in the same way as he deluded those women then.

But that they are not so deluded as regards many of the things they recount is weighed from two considerations. The first is the outcome, as regards bodily conveyance to distant parts: many persons are reported, on the clearest and most numerous testimony, to have been carried a long way off and left behind in a distant place. Many times, too, a multitude playing in this way has been seen by others who were not of that company, and words have been exchanged with them, as we showed in our work already mentioned, with examples of people still living. And in the territory of Brescia [*in agro Brix.*], too, it happened in our own day (so it is reported) that a certain man, stationed at night in a higher place, saw by a confused light a multitude going very swiftly along the road below; in it he recognized several persons, and was recognized by them. But from fear of that unaccustomed and preternatural encounter he said nothing to them. The next day, however, one of those women who had been running said to him: "Last night you were in great danger, when you saw us running in that place. Take care not to be found there at such an hour again." Now this could not be accounted for as having happened as it is reported — namely, that they remembered it and agreed in their knowledge of such a thing — unless both parties had truly been there. Unless perhaps it be said that all people are deluded and dream alike, and that the devil is always intent on transforming people's phantasms so that they agree in their imaginations of things they suppose they experience together. To assert that belongs only to a man who is raving.

The second consideration is the different design, or cause, the crafty enemy has in deceiving. For the women of whom the said chapter *Episcopi* [d.c. *Episcopi*.] speaks, he wished only to bring to this: that they should believe Diana, or even Herodias, to be goddesses, and so entangle them in the unbelief and errors of the pagans — for to believe that there is anything of true divinity besides the one true God would be exactly that. And this he could do, and do better, by deceiving them through sleight [*praestigium*] and diabolical apparitions — since, knowing themselves to be awake, they would be all the

less likely to notice that they were being deceived — than through imaginary visions, or in dreams, and even than through real conveyance. It was enough for him to present places as if distant, in which a multitude and a great company would be seen, with the devil appearing and putting on the figure of persons, as was said above. In this way each of the women would more easily persuade herself that this was a true goddess, since so many persons served her as a goddess, and would honour her with divine worship.

The persons now under discussion, however, the devil labours to incline in such a way that through bodily pleasures he may bind them to himself by love, so that they do not fear or scruple to deny the faith of Christ and baptism, lest they be deprived of so many delights; and in the end they subject many people to penalties inflicted on them, as was set out at length above in our work. So he supplies real delights, not ones produced by sleight, both with demons — who nevertheless appear in human form — and with men carried off together to the game [*ludum*] — something he could not do so easily or so readily unless he gathered the women bodily in one place. And because they could not by themselves assemble in such numbers, from such a distance, or so quickly, he carries them. To obtain this conveyance the women perform sacrilegious services of ointments and of other signs, which belong to the pacts of the wicked covenant between them and the demons, so that the devil may hold their souls ensnared on every side. It is plain, therefore, that the reasoning is not the same in the two cases. And so no one ought to wonder if an argument cannot be drawn from the one to the other as from like cases.

For once the malice of the demons in that first delusion had been exposed through the vigilance of holy bishops and priests, the devil set his hand to stronger measures: openly showing himself the enemy of Christ, he tries to turn the faithful themselves away from Christ by offering and procuring pleasures. And this plague has now grown so strong that the devil, appearing in the form of a Prince, said in a certain assembly (as some who had been present, and were apprehended by the Inquisitor, reported): "Be of good heart, all of you. Not many years will slip by before you outnumber the faithful of Christ." And the devil achieves this very well with the support of the Adversary and of those like him, who set themselves against the fathers Inquisitors, saying that these things are ravings; in this way they favour these wicked apostates and indirectly confirm them in their heresies. For if the fathers Inquisitors were not hindered by the obstruction of these men — swayed by whose persuasions, as though they were the counsels of the wise, princes often deny the Inquisition's office the help owed to it — this sect would already have been wholly wiped out by the zeal of those same fervent Inquisitors, or at least driven far beyond the bounds of Christendom. So it was with all the other heretics, with whom the whole western region of Christendom had been filled: they were expelled from the bounds of Italy through the labour of Christ's most strenuous soldiers, the fathers Inquisitors. These followed in the footsteps of the bravest princes and leaders — above all the Patriarch Saint Dominic [*Dominicus*], who first

discharged this most holy office in the region of Toulouse and among the Albigensians, and the most victorious champion Peter Martyr [Petrus Martyr], the first Inquisitor in Italy. Afterwards the light of the most brilliant and profound teaching of the angelic doctor, Saint Thomas Aquinas [S. Tho. de Aquino], was poured over all this beyond all others, and by it every assault and all the darkness of the heretics were wholly done away with.

Again, something can happen in the spirit alone in two ways, of which the said chapter Episcopi pursues only one. Cap. X.

IT MUST be known, fifthly — for a still clearer explanation of the said chapter — that "something can happen in the spirit alone" can be understood in two ways. In one way, that things in no way happen in the body while one is awake, like those that occur only in dreams, and those that seem to happen through imagination alone or in ecstasy. In another way, that although they happen in some fashion while one is awake, they do not happen merely naturally, in full wakefulness; rather, something contrived by the devil's work always intervenes, in the modes explained above — that is, either through sleight or through the apparition of demons in assumed bodies. The word of the said chapter, then, where it says that the things it narrated there are to be understood as done in the spirit alone or in dreams, means this second way, not the first.

This is proved, first, because in the first way the devil could not have deluded the women so that, awake afterwards, they supposed they had done with their senses free what had happened only in dreams or in ecstasy, or in rapture through vision — that is, imaginative vision. For people naturally know, while awake, the difference between the state of waking and that of dreaming, and between ecstatic and bodily vision. As for the difference between waking and sleep, there is no one who does not find by experience that he knows it. Reason too supports this knowledge. For the sense of sleep and of waking is the same, according to the Philosopher in the book *De somno et vigilia* [de somno & vigilia], just as universally the knowledge of all contraries is one and the same; and no knowledge we have is more certain than that of the exterior sense about its proper sensibles, as is held in the second book of the *De anima* [secundo de Anima] — which is why the sense does not err about these either. It follows that anyone, provided he is sound in body, knows with the greatest certainty the difference between the state in which he uses his bodily senses and every state in which he does not use them, whether he is asleep or taken out of himself in whatever way. Nor is there any doubt that, for the same reason, those who undergo such things also know the difference of state between undergoing ecstasy and not undergoing it. So Ezekiel too knew the difference between the state in which, as he said, he had been in Jerusalem in a vision, or in the spirit, and the state of full wakefulness in which he was when he reported it. And when he had been in the spirit in this way, we must not think that he believed he was then in Jerusalem in the body; for he would have been deceived, and that is in no way to be granted in the prophecy of the Lord.

Those women, however, supposed that they were transported bodily, and that they did, while awake, whatever they recounted; and afterwards, when they were in full wakefulness, they declared that this very thing had truly been done. From this it is readily plain that these things did not happen to them simply in dreams or in rapture.

Secondly, the same is proved as follows. If the chapter meant that those women were deluded both in dreams and in the spirit at once, this would be impossible, except in the manner in which the angel appeared to Joseph in dreams, or to Peter when he underwent ecstasy; and then those women would have known perfectly well that the vision had been only imaginative, just as those men knew it. If, however, the chapter meant that this had happened either in dreams only or in the spirit only, then the chapter would be stating something false, since according to these men's opinion it asserts that both modes of delusion occurred. And if it meant that some women were deluded in the spirit, or in rapture, and others only in dreams, then each of them, once finally set in waking, would have known the difference of state by herself, as has been said. So it must be expounded that the said chapter [d. cap.], through these two modes better known in Scripture, meant only to suggest the mode in general by which something seems to certain people truly to happen that does not truly happen. Under this general mode, it is only in these two special modes — namely through sleight, or through the apparition of spirits in assumed bodies — that people can be deluded in such a way that, when set in full wakefulness, they suppose things were just as they seemed to them while they were being deluded. And this is how the sense of the Holy Spirit in that chapter is obtained: for this sense alone is true, as has been shown, and the Holy Spirit is the author of truth, not of falsehood.

Moreover, not even the determination of a general council carries so exact a necessity of faith, or so exact an authority, that its words — where they are obscure and seem false rather than true — may not receive an exposition by which they are drawn to a true sense, since even sacred Scripture, which is of greater authority, can be interpreted. Since, therefore, the possibility of people being bodily conveyed by a demon is held from sacred Scripture rather than its opposite — indeed it is known by natural light, as has more than once been shown above — then even if some council states that such a thing did not happen at some particular time, or to some particular persons, we must not on that account think it has been determined that it is impossible to be done.

It is not determined in the said chapter Episcopi that the things which sometimes happen in dreams cannot happen bodily. Cap. XI.

IT MUST be known, lastly, for explaining that chapter [pro eo. cap. declarando], that it does not determine that it is impossible for all such things to happen bodily, as the Adversary ignorantly supposes. For what it says ("When he has seized the mind of any woman and subjugated her to himself through unbelief, he immediately transforms himself into the various forms and likenesses of persons," etc.) is not to be taken as though the conjunction "when"

[cum] had the force of inferring necessity from the antecedent of this statement to its consequent. It carries contingency, or possibility, only. For the chapter means that it is possible for a demon to delude such women in that way. So if they assert that they are truly, and in the body, carried off to serve Diana as one of the goddesses, it is not on that account to be believed that

Diana is a goddess, or that she or Herodias is truly served by anyone as a mistress. For since these things are false, as the faith teaches, it must of necessity be said that women who believe they experience such things are deluded by the devil, the first sower of all falsehoods. But if what is asserted is not something against the faith, and for that reason impossible to be or to happen, but rather things that can easily occur — for instance, that many things are done in contempt [in opprobrium] of the faith while that same faith and baptism are renounced, and that the women are carried to this by the devil so that these things may be done more easily, and without fear, in a remote place by a multitude — then this is not to be denied on the strength of that chapter's intention. Indeed, if reason joined to experience proves that the devil satisfies his malice better in this way, it is not against that chapter to believe that it is done, or happens, like this.

Therefore, if such things are denounced and confirmed by eyewitnesses [de visu], and above all by those who assert that they have themselves experienced all these things, or things like them, the judges of the faith must believe them no less than the holy Doctors — moved only by similar indications — believed things less credible, for instance that there are demons that are incubi and succubi, as was set out in our book. And all the more so because it belongs properly to the theologians — not to the canonists, and still less to the jurists — to declare how the determinations of councils concerning the faith ought to be understood. So if the fathers Inquisitors, who are commonly the most profound theologians, judge that such things do not contradict the said chapter, the jurists cannot oppose them without the mark of rashness. For everyone ought to be content with his own rank and not exceed the measure of his powers.

I pass over what we said in our first work: that it is uncertain, I say, whether that council was particular or general, whether it was duly assembled, or even whether its decrees were confirmed by the apostolic see; who its author was, and at what time — especially since it is not counted among the general councils (dist. 16. cap. primo). So if a book without a certain author is for that very reason counted among the apocrypha, much more is a council uncertain in the conditions just mentioned. Nor does Gratian's authority suffice to require that undoubted faith be given to it, since many other things he reports are counted among the *paleae* [inter paleas]. And even if it was a general council, duly assembled and confirmed, everyone keeps the faculty of recourse to the apostolic see, as was proved above, so that its words that are obscure, and that can be an occasion of errors, may be better declared and expounded according to their due sense.

Moreover, several Pontiffs have declared that such things are found in this way and happen bodily, just as the fathers Inquisitors judge. Indeed, they have confirmed the Inquisitors' proceedings and judgements, and have lent their favour to the sentences against such most wicked persons, and to having them carried out. So too, recently, Clement VII ordered the lord Governor of Bologna [Gubernatori Bon.] to give every favour to the father Inquisitor of Parma against certain people infected with the heresy of *strigatus*; the brief begins *Accepimus non sine animi* etc. And the fathers Inquisitors say that these people commit very many most abominable things in the course [cursus] in contempt of the faith, and on account of these they are judged heretics. It cannot be said, therefore, that such things happen only in the spirit, or in dreams, according to the intention and understanding of the Adversary. Otherwise a person would incur heresy in dreams, which is utterly false, since not even the least sin can of itself be committed in dreams. Indeed, it would follow that the Pope — who, as I said, lends favour to the Inquisitors against these people, and does so by nothing less than apostolic authority — would then be erring, and indeed favouring those who err, if the fathers Inquisitors held a view contrary to the council's determination. No determination of any council whatever, therefore, can be opposed to the said judgements of the Inquisitors. Rather, those who oppose them most manifestly favour heretics and enemies of the catholic faith, as is most clearly established from what has gone before.

And when the Adversary adds, finally, that one must not depart from the disposition of that text through sophistical subtleties and arguments, that is true. But it is to be understood of the true and well-understood disposition of the text — which he does not possess in his understanding, as has been shown at sufficient length. The authority he also adduces, from c. *Quidam*, 24. q. 3. [ex. c. *quidam*. 24. q. 3.], is not to the point, for it speaks only of the sacred writings of the New and Old Testament, among which the determinations of councils are not numbered, nor do they reach their authority, as was shown above. Even so, we still say that the Holy Spirit requires of us the sense we have given, as we proved at length above — not the sense the Adversary gave. Indeed, his sense is contrary to the Holy Spirit, since it is false and leads to heresy, as we shall also touch on below.

That the sixth argument, taken from a presumption of law, and the seventh too, that these things proceed from the malign spirit, do not prevail at all. Cap. XII.

[Margin: Ratio 6. — Argument 6.]

THE SIXTH argument of the Adversary is this. This has a presumption of law [praesumptionem iuris]; indeed, it is proved by law through the said chapter *Episcopi* [per. d. c. *Episcopi*]. Therefore it does not admit proof to the contrary, as is noted in the Authentic *Sed iam necesse*, C. *de dona. ante nup.* [vt no. in auth. *sed iam necesse*. C. *de dona. ante nup.*].

[Margin: Sol. — Solution.]

Solution. On the contrary, it has such a presumption only among those who do not understand the laws as they ought to be understood; and so proof

is admitted against such people. And even if, in law, proof is not admitted against things that have a presumption of law, it is nevertheless admitted in the higher science, whose office it is to judge and examine whether such a thing is rightly laid down or not, and whether the pre- sumption is duly held through the text, or ignorantly, as happens in the present case. For neither law nor a duly accepted presumption of law is found against the determination of the theologians concerning the article of the present question, as was shown in what precedes.

[Margin: Ratio 7. — Argument 7.]

The seventh argument runs thus. These things proceed from the malign spirit, who is false, lying and a deceiver, and who has many ways of doing harm. Therefore they ought rather to be called false than true. And this is how the chapter *Episcopi* proceeded.

[Margin: Solutio. — Solution.]

Solution. From the fact that the devil is the principal author of all these things, it does not follow that they are all delusory and false. What does follow is that he does them all with the intention of doing harm, whether they are true or false. This argument is thoroughly sophistical, leading to manifest heresies and the most open falsehoods. For if the devil, because he is false, a liar and a deceiver, says and does nothing but false and delusory things, it follows that everything the Gospel reports as said by demons about the Lord Jesus was false. And so it would be false that he is the Christ and the Son of God, since this was said by the devil — which is heretical. Likewise, all the works that are proved to be done or said through them, by *malefici* [maleficos] or by the possessed [arrepicios], will be false or delusory; and so the torments, and the innumerable acts of *maleficium* [maleficia] of which they are the cause, would be delusory. All the sayings of the demons would be false when they answer exorcists against their will. Since all these things are most manifestly against the judgement of all wise men, and against what we experience daily, it is plain what weight this argument has, from whose assumed principles these falsehoods follow.

The devil, therefore, often speaks the truth; often he does not deceive, nor delude. But he does all this so that in the end he may deceive the more powerfully, while the wicked put their trust in him because of these things. That would not happen if he always spoke falsehood, if he always deceived or deluded those who question or invoke him; rather, he would be shunned and avoided by everyone, even the worst of men. And because he does not speak even the truth except in order to deceive, the Lord did not allow the demons to speak even what was true, as is found in Luke, chapter 4. And let this suffice for the arguments of the Adversary which he brings forward, to suit his own fantasy — which contains falsehood — in that first treatise of his on the *lamiae* [de Lamijs].

FINIS.

Here ends the first Tract against Ponzinibio on the lamiae. The second begins.

HAVING SEEN, then, the first thing I had proposed — namely, how the Adversary's arguments against the truth do not hold — we must now look at what I promised in the second place to declare: namely, how he solves, not well but erroneously, the arguments he himself set out for the opinion we defend. Other arguments to the same effect I produced at greater length in my earlier work. The first argument for our opinion, then, as the Adversary brings it forward in order to solve it, is as follows.

The solution of Ponzinibio to the argument taken from the common confession of the striges is overthrown. Cap. I.

[Margin: Ratio prima bona. — The first argument, a good one.]

Those who belong to the sect of *strigiatūs* confess in court [iuridice] that they go to the course [cursus], deny the faith, do homage to the devil, and the other things that are related. Therefore these things must be believed to be true, and one must proceed against such people as against other heretics.

[Margin: So. Ponzini. — Ponzinibio's solution.]

He solves it by saying that the confession of such people in court is erroneous and not to be admitted, since they are deluded persons. Nor does this confession contain what is true or possible; and since law and nature reject these things, the confession stands apart from the act. So it is not valid to say: "They confess it is so; therefore it is so." And whatever is against nature fails in its principles; therefore it is naturally impossible. Again, in criminal cases the confession of the accused [Rei] is not, as a rule, relied upon except in a case of mental heresy, because that cannot be proved otherwise than by confession — but not concerning an outward act, and above all not concerning less likely things, such as these are. In support of all this he adduces several authorities of the jurists.

[Margin: Improbatio Sol. — Disproof of the solution.]

But that this solution presupposes many false things on which it is founded is plain from what was said in the preceding tracts. For, first, it is false that such persons are universally deluded by the devil as regards the heretical articles on account of which, principally, the fathers Inquisitors proceed against them. So although they may be deluded in some of the attendant circumstances [in aliquibus concurrentibus], it does not follow that they cannot confess truly the erroneous things they believe [sapiunt] or have committed. And it will belong to judges who are theologians [iudicū Theologorum], and to those on whom it falls by office — not to those who are mere lawyers [legistae] — to distinguish and recognize whether these are delusions or not. And according to what is alleged and proved to be, or not to be, against the faith, they will proceed to acquit or to condemn on the counsel of experts. And although by law the fathers Inquisitors are not bound to abide by that counsel, they are presumed to be learned in law, above all as regards the matters that concern their own office. So no one ought to oppose them, just as no one ought to oppose other judges in matters that belong to their own court. It is also false, indeed heretical, that these things are impossible absolutely, or according to the order revealed to us

in the sacred letters — even though very many of them are impossible naturally, as far as the active power of man is concerned. For the power of the demon exceeds the power and might of any man whatever, according to the text of Job 41 [Iob. 41.]: "There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him." And it speaks of the devil and Satan. From this it follows well enough that civil law, which deals only with human acts that are not supernatural, rejects these things — not simply as false, since it cannot know or understand that of itself, but as matters exceeding its judgement and its power. And this is the reason why Holy Mother Church would not commit judgement over such things to mere jurists [puris Iuristis]. Beyond the fact that heresy is a spiritual crime, whose judgement is rightly reserved to a spiritual judge alone, it also concerns things which, by their own faculty, it is impossible for them to understand. It follows that such matters cannot be judged well by them, but only by theologians, to whom it properly belongs to know these things. And for that reason Holy Mother Church in the beginning committed this office to the Friars Preachers alone, among whom, above all others, the study of sacred theology flourished from the very beginnings of their foundation. In the course of time the same charge was rightly entrusted in some regions to the Friars Minor [patribus Minoribus] as well, because they too — although this lies outside their rule — apply themselves excellently to the study of sacred theology.

And if it is said that this office of taking cognizance of such people and judging them is also committed to bishops, the answer is that this is certainly true, and it is committed to them in the first place [principaliter]. For it falls to them as well, by their rank, to be accomplished theologians, since they have others to enlighten and to feed spiritually in the perfection of faith and of good morals. They must also, according to Peter's saying, be ready and disposed to give an account of the faith that is in them; and as good spiritual shepherds they must defend those subject to them from heretics and tyrants with all their might, as sheep from wolves. And if some are not such, that is by accident; and they must look to it themselves in the end.

To return, then, to the point: although purely human law rejects these things that are done beyond the natural faculty of men, it is otherwise with divine law. Divine law nonetheless determined that they be judged in the human manner — according, I say, to what is alleged and proved, so far as is permissible in such matters.

Third, it is false that in criminal cases one does not abide by the confession and ratification [ratificationi] of the accused himself [ipsius Rei], if accusations or depositions, witnesses and sufficient indications have come first — as always happens before sentence is pronounced against such people by the Inquisitors. Otherwise the judge would always have had to be present at everything the accused did. Nor are these things any less likely, when one considers both the power and the malice of the demons, and also the multitude of witnesses of

every kind, and of accused persons [Reorum], everywhere throughout Christendom. Hence it is plain that the Adversary's solution to this first argument, made for the truth, in no way holds.

The solution of Ponzinibio to the argument taken from experience is rejected. Cap. II.

[Margin: Ratio 5. — Argument 5 [?].]

By experience, which is the mistress of things (*Metaphysics* I [primo *Metaph.*]), these things have been seen and known, and there is public report [publica fama] of them. Therefore they are to be believed (c. In nomine domini. de testi.) — above all since public report creates belief (c. Cum oporteat. de accus.). Therefore, etc.

[Margin: Solutio Pon zin. — Ponzinibio's solution.]

The Adversary replies that, since these things happen in the spirit alone, they cannot be known or proved by experience, or by eyewitnesses [testes de visu] — because, supply, spiritual things are not seen, and we experience only what happens in the body. He adds that if those who say they have sometimes seen such a multitude — not as members of it, but from a distance, or in some way or other — were examined closely, it would be found either that their depositions were not conclusive, since these things are said to happen by night, in a solitary place, and beyond nature; or that they themselves were likewise deluded.

[Margin: Reprob. Solut. — Rejection of the solution.]

But this solution does not hold, because these things now happen in the body as well, as has been proved. So they can be known by experience from witnesses too, and much more from the accused and from those who take part in the same crime. It belongs to the fathers Inquisitors to judge afterwards how far delusion, or rather the truth of the matter, is found there, and from what cause these things proceed. For the demons would not delude any persons in this way for long unless they had first taken hold of their minds through unbelief, as can be drawn from the said c. Episcopi. Hence the cause or the effect of this wicked traffic [commertij] of men with the devil is always apostasy from the faith. They keep to that apostasy even when awake and in full, free possession of their senses, as they show by their own words; indeed they draw others as well, by their urgings, into the same pit [barathrum] of damnation. So even if they were deluded in the things already mentioned — which is not universally true, as was proved above — the Inquisitors still have, by their office, to proceed against these women [contra eas] as against any heretics or heresiarchs whatever. And all the more so when they display heresy and an apostate mind by their deeds and are accused of it: for instance, that they have heaped insults on the cross and on the sacred body of Christ, and the like.

That these things are said commonly to happen by night is true. But the place is always flooded with some light procured by the demons, so that they can see one another well enough; the nocturnal light of the stars often contributes to the same end. And so it also comes about that these things can be seen from further off by others, as we proved by experiences in our work. And although

these things commonly happen in places removed from human dwellings, the distance is not always so great that they cannot be seen from any dwelling at all. And if the inhabitants of the place say that, while awake and in full possession of their senses, they saw or heard such things from a distance, they are without doubt to be believed. Otherwise anyone who heard reported what he had not seen, or did not believe, would be free simply to deny it and say to the narrator: "You are being deluded by the devil," or "You were deluded."

Although in so frequent an assembly [in tali frequentia] many things happen, as we have often said, beyond nature or above it through the diabolical power that exceeds the human, many things done naturally also concur — for instance, that these accursed persons sometimes come together on foot, even though at other times they travel more swiftly, supported by the help of demons, as has been confirmed repeatedly by sight, by others as well. And since it is presupposed that these persons are examined more closely by the Inquisitors than jurists could do it — for the jurists do not understand the many things that happen in such matters, above all those done beyond nature, as we have said, whereas the theologians do understand them, and they thirst not for blood or money but for the honour of Christ and the advancement of the faith, and abhor its abasement — every good and wise Christian ought therefore to acquiesce in their examinations and judgements, and not set himself against them presumptuously and in ignorance. For the wiser men of the world, indeed the pontiffs and prelates of the Church, are not only content with their judgements but also lend them their favour in such matters.

The solution of Ponzinibio is rejected, to the argument proving that a real carrying of bodies to the course [in cursu] is possible, from the real carrying by which Christ was carried onto a high mountain and onto the pinnacle of the temple. Cap. III.

[Margin: Ratio tertia. — The third argument.]

The third argument for the truth is this. The demon carried our Lord into the holy city and onto a high mountain. Therefore he can all the more carry other men (Reg. Non debet, de re. iu.). This has also been confirmed in many cases. Therefore the carrying of these persons too is to be granted, especially since it is sworn to.

[Margin: Reponsio [recte: Responsio] Ponzinibij. — Ponzinibio's reply.]

The Adversary replies, first, in these words: that the inference [consequentia] made from the said confession is false, and therefore the argument made from it is fallacious and void; for when the consequent in which the ground of the antecedent stands is destroyed, the antecedent is destroyed. Second, he replies that it does not follow: "The devil carried Christ; therefore he carries these women." Third, he says that since cap. Episcopi denies that these things happen in the body, it consequently denies the possibility of this carrying, because what is possible is admissible. For since it commands that such things are not to be believed to happen in the body, it seems by the same reason that it holds that these things cannot be done by the malign spirit except in spirit and by illusion. For it would not have said simply and absolutely that these things happen only

in spirit and not in the body; because just as things forbidden by the nature of things are confirmed by no law (l. Vbi repugnantia. ff. de re. iu.), so things that nature allows are admitted by law as possible.

Fourth, he says that since, according to Seneca, one who distinguishes well is closest to the truth, and one who speaks without distinction is blameworthy, as one who speaks imperfectly — and since the text of c. Episcopi, which is supposed to have been made at the dictation of the Holy Spirit, does not distinguish, but commands that these things are not to be believed to happen in the body — it follows that we ought not to distinguish.

Fifth, he says that it is not likely that those fathers, the framers of c. Episcopi, did not remember the carrying of Christ, and of others, by the demon; and yet, paying no heed to these, they said that these things do not happen in the body, adducing for this the examples of Ezekiel and Paul [Ezech. & Pauli]. Therefore we must say that they did not want that example of Christ, or of anyone else, to be taken into account. For examples are not to be regarded (l. Nemo. C. de sentiis). And things that happen rarely make neither law nor rule (ff. de re. iu. l. ea quæ raro). A law is not to be made about people raised from the dead because Lazarus was raised from death.

Sixth, he says that power has been taken [adepta; recte: adempta] from the devil by Christ, and that he is bound fast in hell until the coming of Antichrist, at which time he will be loosed from his chains to exercise his strength against the wicked. And therefore he cannot now go out to carry people and do the other things that are reported.

Seventh, he says that Christ was carried by the devil with His own permission; so if God's permission is not established, these other carryings ought not to be believed.

Eighth, he adds by way of objection: if the devil can do this, why does he do it only in a few abject persons, since he is the tempter of the whole world, without distinction and universally? Nor can such persons bring forward undoubted testimony about these things (arg. ex d. c. Episcopi). For public report must have its origin in persons worthy of belief and of good standing (c. cum oporteat. de accus.).

"Thus, then," he says, "it is plain that, since this argument from Christ admits of being turned back [patiatu^r retorquitionem], it follows that it is ineffective. But whatever may be the case about this power of the demon, the principal conclusion seems true." So he, or to this effect [Hæc ille, vel ex illo].

[Margin: Impugnatio Sol. — Attack on the solution.]

But in all these points, in so far as they conflict with our principal proposition, he strays from the truth. As to his first statement, we say that the inference touched on in the argument is good, since it infers the possible from the fact itself: for from "to be" to "can be" the inference is valid, as the science of logic teaches. And whoever does what is greater can also do what is less, and what is equal as well — at least in act or virtually, even if not always formally. So one who can beget a man cannot beget an ass, except virtually, or rather eminently,

because he can beget something nobler than an ass. Hence he ought not to have the said inference denied — unless he could answer the proof of it that was touched on in the argument, if he wished to escape its hold. And when he says that the argument is ineffective because the inference is false, that is to prove the same by the same, since that argument is nothing other than that inference. But we bear with him [*Sed compatimur*]. What he adds — that when the consequent is destroyed the antecedent is destroyed — is true if the inference is good. But conversely, when the antecedent is posited, as it must be posited here by faith, the consequent must also be posited, by the same necessity, as logic teaches. And this inference has been proved to be good.

His second statement does not hold either. Nor is the inference drawn in this way by the wise: "Christ was carried by the devil, etc.; therefore these women are carried." Perhaps the Adversary saw some appearance of force in this way of arguing, and so framed the argument like this. But it has no appearance of force at all — not merely among logicians, but not even among people of middling powers of reason. What is well inferred from that antecedent is rather this: "therefore these women can be carried by the same" — considering his natural power, which is always the same, and considering the rule of divine providence shown by this act done to Christ, namely that it permits men to be tempted by the demon not only spiritually but also through bodily changes and afflictions. That they are in fact carried is established by another route, by the judges of this cause.

That the bodily carrying of persons by spirits is impossible is not proved in the said c. Episcopi. Cap. III.

His third statement too is plainly false from what has gone before. For it is not proved by c. Episcopi that such a carrying is impossible. Nor does that canon command that such things are not to be believed as though they were impossible — otherwise it would contradict the Gospel. What it rightly commands is that it is not to be believed that those women were in fact carried to serve Diana as a goddess residing in some fixed, distant place, to which they were carried over long stretches of land, as they thought; and it also says that illusions befell them by the power of the devil, etc. And this was wisely said. For the devil did not have such a carrying as a thing necessary or useful to the end to which he was striving to bring those women — namely, that they should believe things contrary to the faith about a plurality of gods and the changing of men into gods, as the error of the pagans held. For the present carrying, however, the devil now has a malicious and cunning cause or reason, of which we spoke above. So, since the reason for the command is not the same, it is readily deduced that the same thing is not commanded either. It follows that one cannot conclude from this that, just as those women were not carried, so these are not carried either. And still less does that chapter command that such a thing is not to be believed because such a carrying is impossible, whether absolutely or even in the ordinary course. The laws, too, admit not only what is possible by nature but also what is possible through a higher power, of which

kind is the power of the devil. They do not concern themselves with such things so as to understand or judge what they are; rather, they refer them to the higher laws — that is, the theological ones — to be examined. Otherwise the canons would admit no miracle, nor any work of an angel or of the devil, and the civil laws would presuppose none. That is utterly false, since very many such laws were promulgated by most Christian emperors. And Christians are bound of necessity to grant such things.

What he brings forward in his fourth statement is false as well. On the contrary, the text of the said c. *Episcopi* distinguishes the things that are against the faith from those that are not against the faith, as can be seen from the explanation of the chapter given above, in the reply to the Adversary's fifth argument, and likewise in our first work, in the solution of the first argument. Nor, besides, is it necessary for every text to spell out every distinction it can admit. Otherwise no one would need a gloss, and no rule would suffer an exception.

His fifth statement is also false — indeed it is very dangerous to say that that text commands without distinction that these things are not to be believed, and that they do not happen in the body, as though they could not happen in the body, and that nonetheless those fathers remembered that Christ had been carried in the body onto the mountain by the devil, etc. For this way of speaking implies either that the Gospel is not to be believed, or that the council — by which he thinks we must stand in all things [*cui putat standum in omnibus*] — teaches falsehoods and commands things contrary to the Gospel. Neither of these displays the sound faith of those who speak in this way. That those fathers were mindful of the things already mentioned, therefore, we do not deny. But that they paid no attention to them at the time was not because they would not have cared about that example if it had served their purpose; it was because it did not bear on their decree and did not contradict it either, since they did not deny the possibility of such a carrying, which that example implied. But to say absolutely that no account is to be taken of that example is to say that no account is to be taken of the Gospel — and how much faith that shows in the speaker, whoever he is, let him see for himself.

As for examples, again: one is not to judge in such a way that someone is condemned solely by the example of another who was condemned, because that other may not have been justly condemned. But account is to be taken of an example for inferring some possibility absolutely, if the possibility is found by an example to be proved, as happens here. It is therefore plain that that authority is not to the point. And this often happens to the Adversary in these treatises of his: he brings in authorities, I say, of the philosophers as much as of the laws, which are not to the point, and with fallacies of amphiboly, or of equivocation, or of figure of speech [*figurae dictionis*]. And if perhaps Aristotle is brought in [*Arist. inducatur*], saying in the first book of the *Prior Analytics* [*in primo Priorum*], about examples, that they are put forward not because things are always so, but so that learners may as- sent. The answer is that Aristotle said

this because what is brought in as an example is often false or fictitious, since at times the likeness is sought not from the thing's own being but from the meaning it carries. But if the likeness is taken or sought, by way of example, from what is or was in reality, great care must be taken that false things are not said or introduced as true. And so it is in the present case. For the argument rests on the truth of the example of Christ already mentioned, and from that truth is inferred the truth of the possibility of the carrying already mentioned. Hence to deny this is to deny the Gospel.

And what this man adds — that things which happen rarely do not make a rule — is true if he means things that happen by chance or by fortune: such things do not fall under a rule as to their happening now or then, or being done in this way or that. They do, however, fall under this legal rule as well: that they are not to be judged in the same way as things that proceed from the intention of the agent. But things which, although they happen rarely, nevertheless come about either necessarily, or from the intention of nature or of an agent acting on purpose and under the direction of reason — these, I say, fall under a rule if they are moral or civil matters. Thus laws and rules are given concerning the elections of the Pope and of the Emperor, and concerning many other things that occur very rarely. So too there is a science of things that happen rarely but nevertheless necessarily in nature — eclipses, for instance. Yet the things that the *strigae* confess do not by now happen rarely, but very frequently, as is plain from the trials held against them [ex processibus earum].

That the devil is held so bound in hell that he cannot come to tempt us smacks of heresy. Cap. V.

The Adversary's sixth statement does not hold either. Rather, it shows the one who says it to be very ignorant of the sense of Sacred Scripture, and to hold a dangerous view about that binding of the devil — this view, I mean: that the devil has been so bound by the death of Christ in the depths of hell that he cannot come to tempt us. Christ taught the contrary when he gave the Apostles and their successors power to cast out demons. Paul teaches it, saying in Ephes. 6 [ad Ephes. 6.] that our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, and against the spiritual forces of wickedness in the heavenly places. Peter teaches it, saying in 1 Pet. 5 [1. Pet. 5.] that our adversary the devil goes about seeking whom he may devour. Finally, the whole of Mother Church teaches it, singing together: "The world, the flesh, the demons stir up diverse battles" [Mundus, caro dæmonia, diuersa moueret prælia]. All the theologians teach it, demonstrating that spiritual substances are only where they operate. So if all the demons are bound in hell, they will be able to do nothing whatever in this world, nor to tempt or trouble men either spiritually or bodily — contrary to the manifest wisdom of all the Catholic doctors, and the common and most widely known experience. It is a wonder that the Adversary did not notice such things, since he is a Christian and thinks himself not ignorant in such matters.

The devil is said to have been bound by the Passion of Christ because he no longer has the power he formerly had of hindering the free passage of the saints to heavenly things, when they depart without stain or are rendered purged. For the gate of paradise now stands open to such holy souls, the price having been paid by the Passion of Christ — the price to which the whole of human nature was bound because of the sin of the first parent. This hindrance was ascribed to the devil's power because he had overcome the first parent by tempting him, and for this reason the whole human race had been reduced to being his slave: for by whom a man is overcome, of him he is made the slave (1. Petr. 2.). But now, because we have been redeemed from such slavery by the blood of Christ, and so snatched from his power that he has no power to hinder the passage of souls or to detain them, he is said to be bound.

Suppose, too, that the prince of the demons — who before the coming of Christ was worshipped almost by the whole world, and for this reason was called by Christ the prince of this world — were bound in this way, as the Adversary imagines, with chains or ropes in the abyss of hell, and could not tempt anyone by himself and immediately. Does it follow from this that he could not tempt men through the ministry or service of others, and do through them all the things that are related of the *striges*?

The devil's power is also said to be bound — not because he does not have the same power, his malice growing day by day, but because he cannot exercise as much of it over men as he did before, since the holy angels now restrain him, and holy men defend themselves more strongly by the power of the sacraments, which have both their origin and their vigour from the Passion of Christ. In the time of Antichrist, however, he will take back his full power, by the Lord's permission and as the failure of faith requires, which will then be almost universal in the world.

It is said without reason that God does not permit the striges to be deceived by the devil. Cap. VI.

The Adversary's seventh statement does not hold either. For what God permits or does not permit cannot be known except by revelation, in supernatural matters, or from the event, in others. Since, then, He permitted a bodily carrying in the case of Christ, and it is known from this that such a thing is possible in the case of others too, even if it were not known by natural reason, it ought not to be denied that God permits such a thing to be found in others: for we have a reasonable ground from the event, unless it were proved to conflict with Sacred Scripture, or with a sign equivalent to it — for instance, if through a true miracle, that this is not permitted by God in the case of others; or at any rate if it plainly conflicted with a determination of the Church. Neither of these is found in the present matter, as has been said. Since, then, we have the human evidence [*indicia*] of this effect, as much as can be had of it — through witnesses and confessions, through causes and effects, as was set out in our first work — it is the mark of a very stupid and obstinate mind to deny that these things are permitted by God. On the opposite side we have nothing but arguments that

are thoroughly sophistical, or that proceed from a bad understanding of Sacred Scripture and the canons, or from ignorance of the demon's power and of the ways in which these things can or cannot be done, truly [or] by delusion.

His eighth statement does not move us either. The devil tempts lowly persons more in this way precisely because he draws them more easily through pleasures, of which they are deprived of themselves. For deprivation breeds a greater appetite; and a needy person guards a thing once gained more greedily, clinging more firmly to the one from whom he has such a good, lest if he should leave him he lose what he so much desires. The noble and the rich, by contrast, abound in comforts and delights. The wiser excel in judgement and in the fear of God; and so, even if out of curiosity they have sometimes slipped into such things, they recoil from them more quickly and abandon them — although this too is difficult for everyone, because of the great power over them that the demon receives, by the just judgement of God, on account of the enormity of their crimes, even as regards the body.

As for his further claim that the testimony of such persons is not to be accepted, it is plain that he speaks in ignorance, and against the text c. In fauorem. de hæreticis. So he is not to be heard otherwise on this point. Repute [fama] ought ordinarily to arise from trustworthy and honest persons; but this ill repute [infamia] can arise from others as well, provided they have knowledge of the crime — and from accusing it only mortal enemies are excluded. Ill repute can also arise and be caused by a person's own confession, even if the things that are sufficient evidence for interrogation would not be sufficient evidence for condemnation. All the things just mentioned often concur in the proceedings against such persons. It is plain, therefore, how the Adversary's solution to that third argument fails on every side.

Ponzinibio's solution to the argument drawn from the desire by which the devil longs to be worshipped is shown to be weak, together with the argument itself. Cap. VII.

The fourth argument for the truth is this. The devil wants to be worshipped by these persons as God; therefore he wants it more in waking than in sleep. So it was that he wanted to be worshipped by Saul, King of Israel, in waking; and in the same way he required the same thing of Christ, although he did not obtain it (Matth. 4). And these women say that they are carried by the devil for the sake of pleasure, and that they worship him. Therefore it is probably to be believed that the demon himself carries them to the game [ludum] itself truly and in reality, so that he may also be worshipped truly and in reality.

[Margin: Solutio Ponzin. — Ponzinibio's solution.]

[Margin: Reprob. Solut. — Rejection of the solution.]

The Adversary replies that this last step does not follow: it is enough that the devil be worshipped in their houses, as some of them also confess that they do — or at least in the mind. But against this: granted that the argument just stated does not conclude effectively by itself alone, but only when the depositions, testimonies, confessions, events and so on are added to it, the reply given does

not overthrow it in the way in which it proceeds from likelihood and persuades. For the argument does not deny that the devil can have himself worshipped otherwise; it urges that he does so in the manner described as well. He does in some measure satisfy the envy he bears toward man while he leads him into the ruin of mortal sin and the loss of beatitude, from which he himself fell. Yet he is not fully content with this: he tries, as far as he can, to cast man down into graver crimes, so that he offends God not only in heart but in deed, not only in secret but in public, and denies and curses Him, and publicly offers himself to the devil, to more vehement scandal, and does him homage in worship. In this way the devil strives and pants to appear like God, as in his pride he desired from the beginning — even more than that member of his, Antichrist, is to do, of whom it is said in 2 Thess. 2 that he will sit in the temple of God — that is, publicly — exalting himself as if he were God.

That is also why he carries such persons to more remote places: so that he may more easily bend them to his wishes, with the fear removed that they will be seen and accused by Catholics, and with confidence supplied to them, or at least less timidity, by the universal fellowship of those committing the same deeds and by the example of very many. In remote places, too, there is more readily granted licence and every convenience for enjoying pleasures without restraint, as was said in our work.

Ponzinibio's reply to the argument drawn from God's permission with respect to the evils done by the striges fails just as the argument itself does. Capit. VIII.

The fifth argument favouring the truth is this. God permits many evils to be done by the work of demons, so that those who hear of them may be tested as to the devotion and faith they have toward Him (26. q. 5. Nec mirum. circa fin.); therefore He permits these too. For if they were delusions, no one would try to want to experience them; rather, he would despise them.

[Margin: Sol. Ponzi. — Ponzinibio's solution.]

The Adversary replies that it does not follow — "God permits these things, therefore He permits those" — because that is to argue from separate things, which the law does not admit, etc. He adds that those who refuse to believe that such things really happen, abominable as they are, are sufficiently proved to be devout toward God.

[Margin: Reprobatio Sol. — Rejection of the solution.]

But although this argument too is of little weight, his reply to it does not satisfy either. The force of the argument does not lie in this: that if God permits or has permitted this or that evil, it follows of necessity that He permits these. It lies in this: that it follows of necessity that to permit them is not impossible, or incredible, or unfitting, or contrary to the divine wisdom, justice or mercy, as those think who, together with the Adversary, dogmatize the opposite of our conclusion. That it does in fact happen so, we prove by other routes.

Moreover, although this good does follow from the permission of evils — namely, that the devout are tested — it is not for this reason alone that God permits evils. He draws many other goods out of evils as well: for instance,

the shining forth and integrity of the divine justice, which punishes the sins of individual persons, or also of communities or of princes who do not punish such things. For God often permits a sin as the punishment of another sin, according to that saying of Apoc. 22: "He that is filthy, let him be filthy still." These things also come about because of the divine wisdom and providence, by which, although He so bridles the malice of demons and of wicked men that they do not do, or inflict on others, as many evils as they pant after, He nevertheless guides all things gently in such a way as to do no injury to the freedom of those who act.

Those who are devout and truly faithful to God, moreover, are those who reject the very great pleasures and singular curiosities offered to them, so as not to depart from the true God or consent even in the least to the devil, the enemy of our souls, nor renounce the holy faith and baptism. Such persons both appear and are more devout than those who refuse to believe things so reasonably asserted. For these latter show themselves to be so destitute of spiritual strength, so enslaved and given over to carnal things, so unstable in the faith, that if they thought these things were true they could not restrain themselves from attempting them and busying themselves to experience them — so that they would sooner renounce the faith and baptism than become strangers to these pleasures.

Again, if these things were not to be believed for the reason that they are abominable, still less would the worst acts of maleficium [maleficia] be believable, which are said to be done by these same most wicked and criminal persons, sustained by the work of the devil; and the sacred theologians, who teach that both this and that happen by the Lord's permission, would be undevout, and would be seeking to obtain devotion from this man. Would that he did not show himself by this to be the more undevout, imperfect and feeble in virtue and spirit, refusing out of such fear to believe things that are proved by so many assertions to occur! Indeed, to this imperfection and ignorance of his he adds the very bad stain of presumption, and he is soiled by the blot of an unjust persecution, suspect in the faith, against the office of the Inquisition.

Most devout and most faithful soldiers of Christ are those nobles and princes who, hearing that such things are done in contempt of Christ and of the Catholic faith, and recognizing that the sacred theologians — whose principal concern it is to know these things — affirm not without reason that it truly happens, readily believe them, in this matter as in many others that exceed their own competence, and give every favour and help they can, so that such a race of most wicked men may be rooted out and driven far from the borders of Christendom. On the other hand, those who do not believe the things that are to be believed are most imprudent, most undevout, or even unbelievers. And what is more to be lamented, they oppose those who pursue the enemies of Christ, with bodily strength or even with their pens [viribus ... litteralibus], exposing themselves — though against their intention — to the greatest danger of being judged manifest abettors [fautores] of heretics, and consequently of

being deservedly troubled by the Inquisitors. That some are not moved by the devotion they pretend is shown most evidently by this: very many stir up persecution against the Inquisitors for money received or promised, or from carnal love, or from rivalry and vainglory. But if the fathers Inquisitors fear God alone and, moved by zeal for the faith, carry on unconquered the office which, by the command of holy Mother Church and under censures, it falls to them to perform diligently, they will also drive these persecutors — who are the chief cause that this plague grows strong and that a countless multitude of souls perishes — out of the fellowship of Christ's faithful, like wolves from the flock of sheep.

Four weak arguments are reviewed in earnest, together with Ponzinibio's solutions, which fall still further short. Cap. IX.

[Margin: Ratio sexta. — The sixth argument.]

The sixth argument for the truth is this. This opinion is affirmative; therefore it is more probable. For whoever denies posits nothing, and a negative is a non-being; and so it is improbable, because it cannot fall directly under sense — for the senses are of beings, not of non-beings, according to the Philosopher (2. de anima).

[Margin: So. Ponzin. — Ponzinibio's solution.]

The Adversary replies that in criminal cases those who deny are believed no less than those who affirm. [Præ]²⁰ This side has the presumption of law [praesumptionem iuris] — indeed it is proved by law in c. Episcopi. Again, the negative is proved by the very fact that the opposite affirmative is not proved.

[Margin: Reprobatio Sol. — Rejection of the solution.]

Now granted that this argument just set out is futile, and is not brought forward by any wise man but perhaps only by rivals, so that from the weakness of the arguments by which our opinion appears to be supported it may be rendered deservedly suspect as to its truth, and even appear ridiculous — the Adversary nonetheless resolves it badly. First, because it is false that the contrary opinion has the suspicion of law [suspicionem iuris]²¹, or proof in the said c. Episcopi, as has often been shown. It is also ridiculous to say that it is universally true that a negative is proved if the opposite affirmative is not proved. Otherwise, if it were not proved that the King of France was sitting, it would by that very fact be proved that he was not sitting — and so with other cases. This is, however, true and to be accepted in favour of the defendant [Rei] in trials: his denial stands, unless the affirmation is otherwise proved by witnesses. But in the present matter there are most unconquerable proofs and the clearest evidence for the affirmative;

and the opposite negative can be proved by no wise man.

[Margin: Ratio septima. — The seventh argument.]

²⁰the print sets *Præ* before *Hæc* with no mark of contraction; perhaps for *Praeterea*, "further".

²¹the Adversary's claim, stated a few lines above, is *praesumptionem iuris*, "the presumption of law"; the page here prints *suspicionem*

The seventh argument is this. Truth is presumed rather than fiction (l. 3. §. hæc uerba. ff. de neg. gest.).

[Margin: Sol. Ponzi. — Ponzinibio's solution.]

The Adversary replies that there is a stronger reason for judging these things fictions: they proceed from the devil, a deceiver and a liar (arg. in d. c. Episcopi).

[Margin: Reprobatio Sol. — Rejection of the solution.]

But although this argument too is not compelling, the Adversary's inference is nonetheless false — that these things are to be judged fictions because they proceed from a deceiver. For it was said above that anyone who, because the devil is a deceiver and has a thousand ways of doing harm, thought that the devil never tells the truth, or never does or has done anything truly, would be a heretic, since this is contrary to Sacred Scripture. Real acts of *maleficium* [maleficia], inflicted by his malice, also prove this very point. Moreover, not all the things that are narrated are done or accomplished by the devil; some are done by men and through men, as is clear.

[Margin: Ratio octaua. — The eighth argument.]

The eighth argument brought forward in favour of the truth is this. The devil opposes the honour of God and the faith as far as he can. He therefore arranges for insults to the faith to take place truly and in reality — by really trampling on the cross, and so on — rather than fictitiously and in dreams, and so on.

[Margin: Responsio Ponzi. — Ponzinibio's reply.]

The Adversary replies that this argument is resolved by what was said above in answer to the fourth: it is enough for the devil to be worshipped at home, and so on.

[Margin: Reprobatio Sol. — Rejection of the solution.]

Now although this argument does not prove the fact itself, but only a greater probability that the fact is real rather than illusory, his reply — the one he gave to the fourth — has already been emptied of force above. For it is not enough for the devil simply to be worshipped: out of his pride he longs to be like God and to be worshipped as God, publicly and before a multitude, as far as he can. Nor does the Adversary answer the ground drawn from the devil's aiming at a real, and not an imaginary [phantastico], contempt for Christ, for the faith and for the sacraments. For such contempt, occurring in dreams, is not in itself imputed as sin. It is also a greater insult to despise Christ publicly than for similar things to be done privately in houses, and by a few, even when awake. The devil hates Christ more than any other creature hates any enemy whatever, and so he contrives the greatest confusion against him that he can — and above all because such public contempt brings a greater ruin of souls, which he desires with his whole intention and contrives with every malice he can.

[Margin: Ratio nona. — The ninth argument.]

The ninth argument to the same effect is this. Contraries fall under the same discipline. Therefore, just as the devil is publicly renounced in Baptism, so he

wants homage [homagium] to be paid to him publicly, and Christ's faith and Baptism to be renounced publicly. For the same solemnity ought to attend the undoing as attended the making.

[Margin: Sol. Ponzi. — Ponzinibio's solution.]

The Adversary replies that the devil does not care about the form in which it is done, provided he brings the person to the deed — that is, to sin, and consequently to the person's destruction. Nor is that solemnity required for the substance of Baptism, and so on. Likewise, not everything is destroyed in the same way in which it is bound together (l. tam nihil naturale. ff. de reg. iur. in glo.). Nor is anyone cast out of the communion of the faithful in the same way in which he is received — as is clear from comparing Baptism with anathema. The argument is therefore removed, since to remove an argument it is enough to give a counter-instance (l. q. 4. c. sicut urgeri., and 9. Ethicorum).

[Margin: Reprobatio Sol. — Rejection of the solution.]

But like the preceding argument, this one too concludes nothing more than a greater probability, and the Adversary's reply does not remove it. First, it is clear from what has been said why the devil is not satisfied with just any manner of contempt for God and divine things and of ruin for men. Second, it is clear that although that solemnity is not required for the substance of Baptism, the Church nonetheless prescribes it as fitting, because Baptism is a kind of marriage of the soul with Christ, which ought to be made publicly no less than the contracting of carnal marriage. It is also a certain oath of fealty sworn to the supreme Prince, and a solemn vow made to God — all of which, as a rule, require the solemnity of a multitude, each in its own way. Therefore, since the devil out of pride longs for likeness to God, he consequently longs for homage to himself, and apostasy from Christ, to take place publicly. Nor is that counter-instance a good one. For excommunication and anathematization are performed publicly and with solemnity, by priests vested in priestly garments extinguishing candles and casting them to the ground in a public church, and so on. And just as the ordination of clerics is performed with manifold solemnity, so too degradation, or deposition from the clerical state, is likewise performed with solemnity. And if some other counter-instance is given, it will not be among like cases, and so it will not remove the probability of the argument.

The tenth argument, taking its foundations from the said c. Episcopi, is badly resolved by the Adversary. Cap. X.

[Margin: Ratio decima. — The tenth argument.]

THE TENTH argument to the same effect is this. The chapter *Episcopi* is not opposed to this position; therefore nothing prevents it from being believed. The premise is clear. First, because the chapter speaks of another sect, one that held something of divinity to exist apart from the one God, and held that the beasts on which they were carried were made by someone other than God. Neither of these two things is said by these women; on the contrary, they hold that both the beasts carrying them and the apparent prince whom they obey are

demons transformed in this way. Hence, because they believe they are carried, they do not fall into error as though they believed things like those, and so on.

[Margin: Responsio Ponzini. — Ponzinibio's reply.]

The Adversary, however, replies that the interpretation of the said chapter which he put forward above, and by which these things are emptied of force, appears friendly to the letter, more reasonable, and more favourable to souls. For if the contrary side were true, everyone would in a way be invited to evil desires, from which people are drawn away by preaching that these things are false. And perhaps it was for this reason that the provision of that chapter came about. Doubtful matters, moreover, ought to receive the more kindly [benigiorum] [recte: benigniorem] interpretation. These sects are also alike, since these women, like those, attribute something of divinity to the demon when they worship him, as those did Diana, and so on.

[Margin: Reprobatio — Rejection.]

But although the argument brought forward does not properly have the force of an argument, but rather of a reply to the objection that is made from the words of that chapter, nonetheless, to the extent that it contains an inference, it is badly resolved by this man. And it was shown most clearly above that his interpretation of the said chapter is false, and that it does not favour souls but rather harms them, and is the cause of the greatest ruin among Christ's faithful and in the whole Church of God. Nor are any found who could easily be drawn to those things except the most wicked men and faithless women, once they have heard the insults against Christ and holy things committed in such an assembly. The more kindly course, too, is to preach the truth once it is known rather than to attack it — unless someone calls sinning against the Holy Spirit kindness. It is pious to be zealous for the faith of Christ, so that not the least thing in the world may be found opposed to it; and it is impious, with a blind mind, not to care about so many injuries against Christ that have been duly proved, and to refuse to attend to them as though they were illusions. For if it were heard that in such a malign assembly conspiracies were being made against the Prince or against liberty, then even if there were only a single witness, and that a woman or a boy, it would be enough, with these people who are commonly flatterers of Princes, to inquire, torture, condemn, and so on. The juster interpretation is the one that moves Christ's devout and faithful to defend the faith of Christ against all its enemies and their abettors [fautoribus], rather than the one that moves people to make war on the Inquisitors and to trouble those who are doing Christ's business. The safest course is to meet the dangers to souls, and rather to hand over the bodies of these wicked people to destruction than to make light of the scandal among the people and the ruin of both the inner and the outer man [utriusque hominis] that threatens, as though these were dreams.

As for his addition, that this sect is like that one because these women too worship the demon, and so on: we answer that although these women attribute certain signs of divinity to the demon, they do not think he is God, but always

recognize and confess that he is a demon; and their departing from the true God and obeying the demon arises solely from their wish to obtain advantages. Hence these women are not properly held in the error of the pagans, nor are they idolaters, as were those women who thought that those females had been turned into goddesses, and for this reason showed them the honour and worship due to divinity — although these women too are judged heretics on account of the things already mentioned, since they have apostatized from the faith and have done homage to the devil with their body and soul, and have venerated him with the *latria* owed to God alone. And let this suffice against the Adversary's replies to the arguments for our conclusion that he himself brought forward.

Here ends the second Apology, on the lamiae. The third begins.

SINCE, then, we have shown that both the Adversary's arguments brought against us and his replies to our arguments depart from the truth, it must consequently be shown, last of all, that his conclusions too, drawn from the arguments and solutions already mentioned, are all false. The first of them is this.

Three conclusions by which Ponzinibio denies that striges misuse the sacraments and lie in wait for children and kill them, and further that the devil is an incubus or succubus, are refuted. Cap. I.

[Margin: Prima conclusio falsa. Reprobatio. — The first conclusion is false. Rejection.]

THESE WOMEN do not carry the body of Christ to the game [ludum], nor do they do the other obscene things that are contained in the Inquisitors' trial records. But it is said in reply that, just as this conclusion follows from the falsehood that these women, or men, are not carried bodily to the game, so it is also false in itself. And the outcome of events shows this. For it is proved by witnesses, and by the confessions both of those who give and of those who receive the sacred hosts, that they receive them on the eve, carry them home, and — on the morning after the night of the course [cursus] on which they say they carry them and leave them, subjected to insults, at the place of the course — do not find them in the box, or in the house in which they had them in the evening. Therefore they did not dream that they had carried them, since otherwise they would find them in the morning in their hand or in their box; they really did carry them. The Inquisitors' trial records are full of such cases; and to refuse them credence belongs to a foolish man rather than to a perverse or ignorant one, and so on.

[Margin: Secunda conclusio falsa. — The second conclusion is false.]

IT IS NOT TRUE that they enter houses at night to prey upon children [ad strigiandum pueros]. Nor does this seem likely, for the following reason: it is written that a just God does not allow anyone to do harm unjustly (c. Secundum apostolicam.). Again, because to everyone a good angel is given, even from the mother's womb, to restrain the malice of the evil angel (2 [?]. d. 12. q. 2. ar. 5 [?]). Again, because (as has been said) the power of the demon was taken away

by the coming of the Saviour. Again, because otherwise the life and death of man would be in the power of the demon and of wicked persons. That little children are found preyed upon [strigari], however, does not happen in the manner already stated, but in another way — namely through incantations and acts of *maleficium* [maleficia], or even naturally, through burning eyes [per oculos urentes].

[Margin: Reprobatio. — Rejection.]

But it is said in reply that countless experiences have proved this conclusion false. I brought forward some of them in my earlier work on the *striges* to persuade of the truth, showing likewise how one should judge whether this is possible or impossible. And his addition that God does not permit anyone to do harm unjustly is, if nothing else is added, utterly false and dangerous in faith. Otherwise no harm inflicted by a man would be unjust. And so murderers and thieves and wicked men of that kind would not be unjust — something nobody would say, unless perhaps one of their own kind. But it is quite true that God does not permit such things without also punishing them; or rather, He permits no one to suffer unjustly on the part of the sufferer and in relation to God. For no one suffers except for some demerit or fault by which God has been offended — a fault, I say, either his own or another's, which a person can make his own through his own sufferings, whether under compulsion or voluntarily. Thus Christ, above all others, suffered for us, and did so voluntarily, the most innocent lamb, although on the part of the Jews the infliction of that passion was most unjust. Likewise other saints, glowing with charity, often do penance for the sins of others. Moreover, all the punishments that God permits to be inflicted on human beings are just, by the merit of original sin. These punishments, inflicted for original sin alone, God always turns to the good of the sufferer, if he is capable of guile [doli capax] and bears them patiently for God's sake. But if those who suffer are not capable of guile, their punishment redounds to the exaltation of divine justice, and also to the exaltation of divine wisdom: for once original justice had been taken away because of the sins of our first parents, divine wisdom left our body, and whatever in us is passive, in its natural condition, in which, being composed of contraries, it can naturally be altered and corrupted. Furthermore, God punishes little children, and likewise any others whatever, for the sins of their parents. For God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation (Exod. 20). Likewise lords and prelates are quite often punished for the sins of their subjects, and conversely — especially if the one is the cause of the other, or his imitator in crime.

As for his addition that every human being has been given an angel as a guardian, that is true. But it does not follow from this, nor is it necessary on that account, that the angel resists the devil in all things, or always. Otherwise no one would perish in soul or in body through the wickedness of the devil acting directly, beyond the common course of nature — and that is proved utterly false, if what is reported everywhere in the world to happen is to be

believed. The judgements of God are inscrutable. Most justly He permits many evils to be done by demons, notwithstanding the regular guardianship of the good angels, to whom it is sometimes made known that it is not God's will at that time that they resist the evil angel, but rather that they allow his malice to be fulfilled and sated. Men, not seeing the cause of these events, which are sometimes horrible and pitiable, wonder at them beyond measure. Thus it is reported that in our times a woman, in despair because she was despised by her husband, commended herself to the devil and was at once killed by him, after he had made her a false promise that he would come to her aid in her wishes, and she had given her own soul to him at his demand. For it must be judged that she had sunk into such a depth of sins that from then on she deserved to be deprived of all angelic protection and to be left wholly to the power of the devil. The devil, however, would kill all sinners at once if he could; but by the good angel, according to God's mercy, very many are defended — and in most cases defended — up to a time foreknown to the divine wisdom alone. "God waits for us," says the Prophet, "that He may have mercy on us." But when He knows that the iniquities of the wicked are complete, then, as befits His mercy and justice, He withdraws His help from them and hands them over to be punished by the devil's cruelty. As for his repeating that the power of the demon was taken away by the coming of the Saviour, it has been explained above how, in his sense, this is false and heretical, and how in its true sense it does not tell against us; there is no need to repeat it.

He also adds, as though it were a great absurdity, that otherwise our life and death would be in the power of the demon, and of wicked persons through the demon's strength. But it is not true that it follows, taken absolutely in this way, that the life and death of men are always in the demon's power. What does follow is that they are so sometimes, and with respect to some particular person, and this only by God's most just permission, as was shown above. Why God sometimes permits children who are innocent in themselves to be killed by *striges* or preyed upon [*lamari*], we have given several reasons in our work. And if their parents fortified them in the evening with the sign of the cross and commended them to the Lord in prayer, they would without doubt suffer no harm that night, since the good angel appointed to guard them would defend them. As for his addition that children are preyed upon [*strigari*] through other acts of *maleficium* [*maleficia*], here he is already fighting against himself. For acts of *maleficium* take effect only through the special help of the devil operating or co-operating, as is known to those who understand what these things imply. Nor, again, does what has been said stand in the way of little children sometimes being infected by the burning eyes of old women — the cause of which occurrence, too, we gave in our work. But beyond the ways already mentioned, children are also bewitched [*maleficiantur*] and killed by *striges*, in ways set out in that same work. And just as God permits the innocent to perish by acts of *maleficium* only justly, so the Adversary must concede that

they are destroyed by *striges* too only by the just permission of God. But enough has been said about these matters above.

[Margin: Conclusio tertia falsa. — The third conclusion is false.]

The opinion of the Archbishop of Florence²² stands firm, in the second part, the title on lust [de luxuria], chapter 4, at the words "As to the second" [Quo ad secundum], where he says, from the *Compendium theologiae*, that when the devil induces someone to the vice against nature, he flees, abhorring so great a crime because of the nobility of his nature. From this the Adversary infers that what the *striges* affirm is false — namely, that the devil is an incubus or succubus to them against nature. Although it may seem strange, he says, that the devil should flee in this way, since he is most unspeakable, and so on, it can nevertheless be said (he says) that he does not flee except when he sees men so inflamed that they will certainly sin even without his urging them further.

[Margin: Reprobatio. — Rejection.]

But the Archbishop's statement, although it does not take the foundation of its truth from any passage of Sacred Scripture, can nevertheless be upheld without prejudice to the truth of what is said by the *striges*. For those authors are speaking only of the sin against nature committed between human beings, which the devil abhors more, because it is contrary not only to moral order and rectitude, like other sins, but also to natural order. And so, by its genus, this sin is contrary to him, because natural gifts remained splendid in the demons after their sin, according to Dionysius. Where this sin can therefore be committed without his presence, he does indeed induce it, because of the moral disorder of which he himself is the head and author. But he flees in the act itself because of the nobility of his nature, to which everything that is against nature is consequently contrary. Yet through the disorder of his first sin the angel's intellect was darkened and his affection defiled, even with respect to the things toward which he is naturally inclined through such powers, so that he directs everything he understands and desires to an evil end, his malice overcoming his refined [elegantem] nature. So where he cannot induce the vice he abhors without his presence — or not as quickly or easily — he chooses to be not merely present but even a co-operator, in order to satisfy his malice and envy against human beings (God, the Best, permitting this very thing only most justly), rather than attend at that moment to the dignity of his nature or refrain, in a way, from doing it injury. I suppose the Adversary will say that these women are dreaming too when they suffer such things. What a manly consideration! That there are succubus and incubus spirits, however, was proved in our first work by the testimonies of the holy Doctors, so that Augustine judges those who deny such things to be shameless.

That striges are not to be admitted as witnesses against striges, and that the Inquisitors' trials are therefore weak — which Ponzi. comprises in two conclusions — is refuted. Cap. III.

²² Antoninus of Florence, *Summa*

[Margin: Conclusio quarta falsa. — The fourth conclusion is false.]

SUCH WITNESSES, therefore, are not to be admitted — notwithstanding *c. In favorem*, de haeret. in vi. — since they are deluded persons, and their statements proceed from those who, through men they have deceived, are eager to deceive others daily (26. q. 2. c. *Qui sine Salvatore*; q. 5. c. *Nec mirum*); and also because, with the demon deluding them in this way, good and just people could be accused, since the demon transforms himself into the appearances of various persons and displays them (d. c. *Episcopi*).

[Margin: Reprobatio. — Rejection.]

On the contrary: all who depose or testify about such matters, whether against themselves or against others — or indeed who confess — are to be believed, provided they are not found to be mortal enemies, or to be insane in other respects, as was shown in our little work, notwithstanding some illusion that quite often occurs in such cases. For in the principal matters on account of which they are found to be apostates or heretics, they are not deluded: as in the renunciation of the faith and of baptism, in the abuse of the sacraments, in the homage [homagium] paid to the devil, and in many other most unspeakable things. As for the further addition, that just and innocent people could be accused, by *c. Episcopi*: the reply is, first, that the canon does not speak of this sect, as has often been said. Second, although the devil, as far as his natural power goes, could assume the shape even of innocent persons and display them as though present at that game [ludus], it is nevertheless not to be believed that God permits this — unless perhaps such persons, even if not present at that time, had nevertheless been present on other occasions. For God could justly permit it so that they might be punished for a past deed, in that, accused in this way and put to the question [ad quaestiones], they would now be compelled to confess. Even apart from such an excuse of fact, it is not to be thought absolutely impossible, or even out of the ordinary, that God, by some hidden judgement of His, should permit some who are innocent to be accused: just as in other crimes too, by divine permission, the innocent are sometimes accused and condemned by men, through excusable ignorance or even through malice. Yet such people, if they were friends of God, will in the end make their innocence manifest; or else whatever they suffer against justice will turn to their good — for instance, to the remission of sins and to the heaping up of rewards for their patience. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt to be believed that God permits this only very rarely. And the delusion could easily be detected when, afterwards, in the waking state, they did not agree with the others in the words and deeds reported to have taken place at the game.

Yet judgement against such people is not to be omitted on this account, when they are juridically deposed against or accused, unless their innocence were expressly detected from the manner of their answers — a matter to be left to the prudence of the judges. For if, on this ground alone, the prosecution of a trial against such people were dismissed, by the same reasoning all judgements against innocent persons made by judicial process would have to be condemned

universally. That is false, since the laws suppose — indeed decree — that even if the judge alone knew for certain that some innocent person was being accused, when he could not defend that person's innocence against what had been alleged and proved, he ought not to deny justice to those who seek it and acquit the accused. If, then, the conclusion already mentioned held good, or the reason touched on in its support had force, all judgements concerning other crimes too would have to be abolished, because injustices and many falsehoods quite often occur in them. Indeed, the most fitting order of the whole world, established by God, would have to be violated or removed altogether, because some things happen against or outside the nature of things, such as monsters. Since these consequences are absurd — for the regular order is not to be violated or changed on account of things that happen in the fewer cases and by accident — it is clear that, on account of this inference too, even if it sometimes happened, what is deposed against the *striges*, or reported by them, is no less to be believed or judged. On the contrary, these things are to be rooted out completely, with all zeal and severity, when by this very fact they are found to be more dangerous, because they are more hidden, and for that reason a remedy cannot easily be applied.

Where the Adversary, who deserves to be judged and condemned, is eager to condemn others in the most insolent words. Cap. IIII.

[Margin: Conclusio quinta falsa & execrabilis. — The fifth conclusion is false and execrable.]

"The Inquisitors ought to make people abjure [adiurare] the opinion that anyone goes to the game [ludus] itself, or that persons are carried in the body from place to place; and rightly so, since such an opinion has been rejected — which I think should be noted."

[Margin: Reprobatio. — Rejection.]

What astonishing presumption in the man, what detestable madness! Nothing is abjured before the Inquisitors except heresies; no one abjures except heretics. Is that opinion, then, to be a heresy — the opinion which the lord Inquisitors defend, and by which they judge the enemies of the faith worthy of the ultimate condemnation, and which illustrious theologians, and canonists as well, prove to be true and Catholic? What extreme stupidity in the man! By whom has this opinion been rejected? Is it not by a single jurist, raving in such a way that his rejection of it moves every wise theologian to laughter? Are all the theologians, then — indeed the judges themselves, the lord Inquisitors of all Italy, France, Germany and Spain, who hold this opinion and by it unconquerably defend the faith of Christ, removing pestilent apostates from our midst — to abjure before the Inquisitors? And who will be judge in a cause of faith, if the judges themselves come to be judged? It will surely be a fine thing now for our Most Holy Lord [S D.N.] to appoint this illustrious man universal judge against the Inquisitors!

But it is better that the Inquisitors, looking to their own safety, forestall this man, who is suspect of heresy on this very ground: that he rejects an opinion

which draws its firmness from Holy Scripture and from the decrees of the Popes, and who has, moreover, been caught straying from the truth of the faith in many points of this work of his. Let them proceed swiftly against him as one vehemently suspected of heresy, and as an abettor [fautor] and defender of heretics and, to the measure of his small capacity, an obstructor of the most holy Office of the faith. Publicly disgraced (unless he humbles himself), let him be made to abjure every heresy and all abetting of it, when he wishes to return to the bosom of the Church; or else, if he is obstinate, let them hand him over to the secular arm; and let them also condemn this work of his, full of ignorance and stuffed with unbelief, and by public judgement consign it to the fire — lest, if they prove negligent, they should perhaps have to endure more adversaries like him.

I cannot help being astonished, the more closely I consider the folly of this conclusion — or rather, of its author. If what this wretched little man says were true, then the Pope too, since he favours the Inquisitors against such people, and the bishops and their vicars, since they are co-judges, and the doctors as well, and all the counsellors who concur in the condemnation of such apostates, would all have to abjure this heresy; and this man alone, who has brought in these absurdities, will be faithful — indeed he will be the judge of those abjuring, and will himself impose and receive the abjurations. These things ought certainly to be noted by everyone, and this judged the worst of all doctrines.

That jurists are to be called in to frame and complete the trials of the Inquisitors — which Ponzinib. tries to urge in his seventh conclusion — is refuted. Cap. V.

[Margin: Conclusio sexta falsa. — The sixth conclusion is false.]

“Since our science contributes to theological disputations, especially where the execution of justice is concerned, doctors of law are to be called in to assist at the trials of the Inquisitors, and at their examinations and interrogations [quaestiones]. For they are the ones who handle criminal matters, and their summons should not be put off until the trial has been completed. And so the constitutions ought to be observed: c. Vt commissi. & c. fin. de hæretic. in vi. cum concor.”

[Margin: Reprobatio. — Rejection.]

Has holy Mother Church erred, then? She determines that the judges of the faith must communicate their trials to one another only once, at the end of the judgement, as is clear in extraua. Bened. xi. Ex eo., and set out the whole before the bishop or his vicar if the Inquisitor or his vicar is proceeding, or conversely if the bishop or his vicar is proceeding, calling in at that point persons skilled in law and theology, as is ordered in d. c. Vt commissi. & c. Statuta. de hæret. in vi. Should she instead have enjoined the Inquisitors not to presume to attempt anything judicially without the presence and consent of the doctors? What most wicked presumption! When there is need to examine a *strix*, then, will the father Inquisitors be bound to call in the whole college of

jurists — they who by law are not bound to call in even a co-judge for these matters?

That the laws contribute to some theological disputations, though not to all, we grant; and to those they contribute only by serving in the manner of handmaids. But this man wants to be the judge and censor of the theologians. Jurists are the handlers of civil crimes, not of spiritual ones, such as the crime of heresy is. Theologians, by contrast, are not only the first handlers of these crimes, but also their judges and exterminators. The Church did not bind the Inquisitors so tightly that they are obliged to follow the counsel of the experts they have called in. Rather, she honoured their office, so that, after the manner of judging princes, they have counsellors and assessors, yet in such a way that it lies in their own power, together with their colleague, to pass sentence at their own discretion. The Inquisitors also have their own ways of proceeding, and various customs for imposing penance, of which jurists are very often ignorant. For this reason it often happens that the jurists become an impediment to the office of the Inquisition and a nuisance to the Inquisitors, when they try to bind them to the common manner of examining witnesses or the accused — although in this matter the more prudent of them commonly defer to the Inquisitors themselves, so that in this way too colleagues (as is fitting) may defer to one another, and the doctors (as I have experienced myself) may show themselves most obliging to them, without payment, out of zeal for the faith, which we commonly defend unconquerably, as true Christians should. And let this be enough on the erroneous conclusions of the Adversary, who has not shown himself obliging to the father Inquisitors but rather hateful and hostile, and who by these writings of his even provokes others like himself not to fear attempting the same. But now that the emptiness of such writings and opinions of his has been exposed by these little works of ours, I hope that both he and the others will come to their senses, and turn their eyes, their hands and their pens to their own studies.

Here ends the third Apology, on the lamiae. The fourth begins.

One saying of Oltradus about the lamiae, famous among certain jurists, is refuted.

[Margin: *Opinio Oldradi. — The opinion of Oltradus.*]

Having set out the conclusions already mentioned in that third treatise of his, the Adversary appends 26 further conclusions, or rules or sayings, drawn partly from the teaching of Oltradus²³, a most famous doctor, and partly from his own workshop. Having examined them, nothing false in them occurs to me to attack for the present, except one thing which he reports in his 16th conclusion from the *consilium* of Oltradus, 210. It is this, I say: that not every invocation of demons savours of manifest heresy, but only that by which a demon is invoked to do things that are not proper to him but to the Creator — for instance, to foretell the future; but not if he is invoked to do things that do not exceed his own proper faculty — for instance, to tempt women to sexual acts, and the

²³Oldrado da Ponte

like. "Unless perhaps," he says, "this too were done by way of adoration; it is otherwise if it is done by way of command."

[Margin: Reprobatio. — Rejection.]

But Oltradus, and everyone who follows him, is deceived in this passage. He thinks that because such an invocation — one directed even to things proper to the demon — does not savour of this particular manifest heresy (namely, that by the act it implies that something is to be attributed to the demon which is not proper to the demon, such as knowing the future), it therefore savours of none; or, what is the same thing, does not savour of manifest heresy at all. That is to argue negatively from the particular to the universal, against the rules of dialectic, arguing in the present case thus: "It does not savour of this heresy manifestly; therefore it does not savour of heresy manifestly." For just as it does not follow from the fact that someone is not this man — say, Ioannes — that he is not a man, since he could be Petrus; so it does not follow from the fact that the invocation of demons for things proper to the demon does not savour of this heresy — that what is proper to God is attributed to the demon — that it does not savour of some other heresy or some species of unbelief, manifestly. Oltradus did not notice this — and no wonder, since he was purely a jurist, whose own profession gave him no subtle knowledge of how heresies or the species of unbelief are distinguished, and not competent to judge by what deeds or words such things are detected as properly belong to heresies. For this discussion belongs to theology, just as it is the theologians' proper task to treat fully and most subtly of the opposite of unbelief — of the sound and perfect faith of Christ, I mean.

It must therefore be said, following the holy doctors and sacred theologians, that every invocation of demons savours of manifest heresy for this reason: that it always and inseparably carries with it a pact of unbelieving friendship with the demon, tacit or express, in word or in deed, even if sacrifices are absent. For when people do what was instituted by the demon alone, to be done under a pact entered into at least with the first author of the act in order to obtain something, then others who imitate the first in this, and seek to obtain from the demon by that act what they desire, beyond doubt ratify the pact that came before, without which they could obtain nothing from the invoked demon; and so they too are convicted of having a tacit pact with the demon. How much more so, if they invoke the demon with open voice, gesture or nod, imploring his help? To have any pact at all with the demon, tacit or express, belongs to apostasy from the faith, according to Aug., and as is found in 26. q. 7. c. *Nō obseruetis*; and according to Saint Thom. in 2. dist. 7. q. 2. art. 2. For things which exceed even a human being's faculty (for a person invokes the demon precisely because he cannot do the thing himself) are not to be sought through the power of the demon, neither as to the beginning or the middle nor as to the completion of the work. Rather, if the things asked for are evil, they are to be sought from no one; if good, from God alone, or by His power from His friends — according to that passage of Isa. 8: "Does not a people

seek from God a vision for the living and the dead?" Hence, by invoking the demon in such matters, not as a friend of God, a person is convicted of turning to him as to his god, and of having pacts of unbelieving friendship with him, and consequently of having apostatized from the faith.

Such apostasy belongs to heresy; indeed it is the gravest of all unbelief, as is clear from S Tho. sec. 2. q 22 [recte: q. 12] art. 1., since it virtually comprehends all heresies, if a person withdraws altogether from the faith and worship of the true God and our Lord Jesus Christ by adhering to the demon. Hence, absolutely and without distinction, every invocation of the demon savours of heresy manifestly — just as the gloss says, absolutely and without distinction, on the word *Saperent*, c. Cum accusatus. de hæret. lib. vi. Yet not every calling-up of demons is apostasy or belongs to heresy, nor is every familiarity in speaking, especially with the possessed [arrepitii], even if it is evil; nor is every command, especially one given on God's part, which is the business of exorcists. For it is of the very nature [ratio] of invocation that there is a certain subjection, carrying with it the prayers and worship of the one who invokes, directed to the one who is invoked as to a last refuge in the matter for which the invocation is made. Necromancers [Necromantici] and other such diabolical men always observe this worship, even if they seek to obtain from the demon only the things that are possible to him. For no one would deny that pouring out wicked prayers around the altars of idols savours of heresy manifestly, as the gloss confirms on the same word — even if the person acting in this way said that he had done so only to obtain things possible to the demon, for example a woman's love. This, however, is so only on account of the pact, tacit or even express, which he is convicted by this deed of having with the demons, of whom the idols are full, and consequently on account of apostasy. All the more, then, if the demon himself is invoked immediately and in his own person, and not by means of an idol, for whatever reason or cause.

Oltradus is therefore not to be followed in this, since he looked to few things, and above all did not consider that adoration belongs to the very nature [ratio] of invocation of the demon: for the worship is joined with subjection, and is not referred to the true God. In sacred Scripture, indeed, "to invoke" is taken for an act of *latria* [actu latriæ]. Hence the gloss on the text of Gen. 4, "He began to invoke the name of the Lord," says: "To invoke is the same as to worship and to entreat." And the gloss on the text of Ro. 10, "Whoever shall invoke the name of the Lord shall be saved," says: "shall invoke — by subjecting himself and worshipping." That invocation is properly owed to God is clear from that text of Isaiah: "Seek the Lord while he may be found, invoke him while he is near"; and in the Psalm: "Invoke me in the day of tribulation." As a sign of this, too, the Lord says by way of rebuke to a rebellious and unbelieving people (Iud. 10.): "You have forsaken me and worshipped strange gods. Go and invoke the gods whom you have chosen" — as if to say: "God alone ought to be invoked; if, then, those are your gods, invoke them." And (3. Reg. 18.) Elijah [Helias] said to the priests of Baal: "Invoke the names of your gods,

and I will invoke the name of my God.” It is clear from this that invocation is commanded to be made to God as an act of *latría*, and for this same reason it is forbidden to be made to the demon. Consequently every invocation is joined with adoration, and none with pure command, because adoration belongs to the nature of invocation, as has been said.

If, however, Oltradus takes “invocation” in the common sense, as the calling of demons, he speaks improperly. In the matter at hand there is not a mere calling but a true invocation of demons, because before necromancers and *malefici* command the demons, or compel them to do their will, various kinds of worship and wicked observances come first — which savour of apostasy from the faith according to the interpretation of the law, which judges only external things. In no way, therefore, is Oltradus to be heard on this point. We ought rather to acquiesce in and adhere to the holy Doctors, on whom the gloss already mentioned, on the word *Saperent*, relies, than to Oltradus.

From all these things it is clear that the determination of the Adversary, and this treatise of his, prevail in nothing against the fathers Inquisitors; but, being stuffed with many falsehoods and follies, it is to be cast far away from the eyes of all wise men. And the most wicked sect of the *striges* [strigum] must, with every effort, be put to flight and exterminated by the Inquisitors themselves, far from all fear, for the defence of the faith and the praise of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom be honour and glory for ever and ever. Amen.

THE END [FINIS].

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REGISTER [REGESTVM].

† A B C D E F G H I K L M N O P Q R S T V X Y Z.

All the gatherings are whole sheets; Z only a half-sheet [Omnia folia Z, tantum semifolium.].

ROME [ROMAE], In the House of the Roman People [In Aedibus Populi Romani]. 1576 [M D LXXVI].

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